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# Bankers magazine



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# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE

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FIFTIETH YEAR.

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## THE COMING ELECTION.

In a country in which democratic institutions prevail, where the sovereignty of the people is recognized, no other way of carrying on the Government, determining its personnel, and pointing out its policy, than by a division of the voting citizens into parties, has yet been found practical.

The necessity of this method was recognized in the republics of antiquity. According to the laws of Athens the citizen was compelled to join either one party or the other. Neutrality upon questions that concerned the welfare of the public was loathed. Independence except under party lines was not permitted. The man who did not act with one party or the other subjected himself to punishment.

Of course parties, being made up of fallible human beings, are not infallible; they are actuated often by very low motives; professing high ideals they do not live up to them. In every community there are those who from natural or acquired qualities are superior to the average man both in knowledge and in moral character. These citizens are apt to have higher moral and intellectual standards than their fellows, and their judgment and their conscience cause them to shrink from many of the methods employed in party organization to move the masses of the citizens in any given direction. They are averse to yielding to influences that appeal neither to their minds nor their moral nature.

In this superiority, however much to be admired and sought after, has to pay a penalty. It is the old story. In religion the virtuous and aspiring soul is necessarily leagued with and bound to a base and grovelling body. In art the winged Pegasus had to earn his daily bread and with clipped wings draw a heavy utilitarian cart, frequently very badly. So the longings and reachings out of the spirit

are ever thwarted and bound by the heaviness of the flesh. Such are the limitations of existence.

The superior citizen, to be effective, to have his virtues have due effect on the average mass, is compelled to act with them and to use methods they can understand. The independent or mugwump is out of place in a republic, except as he manages to make his ideas intelligible and admirable to the multitude.

The true attitude of the intelligent and conscientious citizen towards party has been well defined by Dr. JOHNSON. After remarking that it was wrong to stick to a certain set of men on all occasions, he said: "I can see that a man may do right to stick to a party, that is to say he is a Whig, or he is a Tory, and he thinks one of those parties on the whole the best, and that to make it prevail it must be generally supported, though in particulars it may be wrong. He takes its fagot of principles, in which there are fewer rotten sticks than in the other, though some rotten sticks to be sure; and they cannot well be separated. But to bind one's self to one man, or one set of men, who may be right to-day and wrong to-morrow, without any general preference of system, this I disapprove."

The comments of a portion of the press at the present time seek to lead the public to believe that all partisanship is wrong, and that independence of parties is the true attitude. They describe the great parties of the United States as devoid of all principle, as combinations of individuals, who instead of being the servants of the community make a league for advancing their private interests. To be sure they hold high the notion of political honor and profess ideas of principle by which honest minds may be caught, but in reality the bond between them is no better than that by which the lowest and wickedest combinations are held together, "the cohesive power of plunder," and that they have reached the last stage of political depravity. But this is an exaggeration, the result arrived at by fixing the gaze too intently upon the rotten sticks in the party principles and actions. It is one extreme to tie one's self to men regardless of principles, but it is another to refuse to admit of laudable purposes of party and to show undue bitterness towards men selected to carry out these purposes. There can be and is as great exaggeration in the one direction as in the other.

But however deplorable are the defects of party management and however conspicuous the failures to promptly reach the ideals proposed or even the failure to reach them at all, it is certain that party management, while there is still room for great improvement, has not retrograded in real devotion to principle during the last fifty years. The checks thrown around the abuse of power have increased, and it is much more difficult to apply corrupt methods, considering the great increase in the means of corruption, than it was a half century ago.

The wealth of the country has augmented one hundred fold; there are thousands more of interests and employments affected by politics than there were thirty years since. As "Falstaff" justly observed, "the more flesh, the more weakness."

If the political methods of the present time had not been greatly improved by the checks thrown around them, and the corruption of to-day bore the same relation to its opportunities and temptations as it bore in former days to the temptations then existing, it would be almost impossible for any one to be honest and thrive.

To point out one most palpable check in the growth of civil service reform by which the incumbents of power are deprived of opportunities of rewarding corrupt services, is sufficient to indicate what is meant.

There are certain criterions of judging as to the party to which the individual citizen should give in his adherence. The first is the party platform itself; the second is the record of the party made when in power, and the third and perhaps of least importance is the man selected as the candidate.

The records of the Republican and Democratic parties during recent years have had more or less reference to the revenues of the country. The Democratic party has endeavored to reduce taxation and lighten the burdens of the people by contending for a tariff that shall be first for revenue and only incidentally if at all for the protection of home industry. This it is claimed will confer benefits on the greater number of citizens. It is not alone what the party has accomplished in the direction marked out that should altogether influence the voter. The tendency of the policy and its real soundness should be considered.

On the other hand the Republican party claims that by adjusting the tariff so that foreign competition with home industries shall be averted, that an increased revenue will be the result, but that this will not be any additional burden on the citizens. In fact the advantages of the removal of foreign competition will outweigh the burden of increased taxation. Moreover the revenues, being in various ways returned to the people, help and advance them. The contention against this is that the people are divided into classes and that some classes are more favored than others. It may however be remarked that these class distinctions insisted upon so much are in truth rather vague. The rich and the poor, the capitalist and the working man, the creditor and the debtor, these divisions probably could not be satisfactorily made with the actual people. If tellers were appointed, and the whole population passed through their hands, there would be great difficulty as to classifying capitalists and working men, or creditors and debtors. As to rich and poor there might be less difficulty at any given date, but there are so many chances of loss and gain

under the workings of our social economy that a new division would have to be made every day.

The recent records of the two parties and their assumed influence on the prosperity of the country are before us. From 1889 to 1893 when the Republican party was in power the condition of the United States Treasury gradually deteriorated. This deterioration was due to the unwise legislation as to silver which increased the demand obligations of the Government, and the fear of a reduction of revenue through a change in the tariff.

For the first both parties were equally to blame in that they weakly yielded to those of their members affected by the silver craze; for the second the Democratic party is responsible. If the correctness of the principle of relaxing the protective tariff be admitted, was it wise to insist upon it at so critical a point in the currency troubles of the country? When increased revenue was needed, a reduction was threatened and finally made, resulting in a necessity for the increase of the interest-bearing debt. For over thirty years a protective tariff had prevailed, and a better time might have been chosen for so radical a reform. The change at the time it was made was just neither to the country nor to the cause of free trade itself.

The Republican Administration, in view of the rapidly decreasing revenues and the depletion of the Treasury reserve, was preparing to sell bonds early in 1893, and had they not been anticipating the end of their power on March 4 they probably would have done so and averted the panic of 1893.

The Democratic Administration may be justly blamed that they did not take up this course as soon as they came into office. Had they done so the run on the gold reserve which precipitated the panic might have been stopped. Their fault was a desire to prove the correctness of their revenue ideas and to test them without a due regard to times and seasons.

The men selected as candidates are of less importance than is usually assumed. The platform is as a rule made up by the united wisdom of the party and in essential particulars is generally observed. But while the platform is supposed to be a guide for the nominee after his election, yet many causes combine to put him in an attitude of inefficiency toward it. The President is only one branch of the Government. He must execute the laws as they stand even if they are diametrically opposed to the party platform, unless his party has been strong enough to have a majority in the legislative branch willing to change the laws. Most men even of strong character find themselves in the presidential office so hedged in by the laws and traditions of the past and bound by their previously given pledges that their course on almost any point can be safely relied on. There have



been very few if any instances in American history of a President failing to carry out the law as it stood or of his warping law to meet personal ends. He is limited in every direction, and is therefore of less importance than is usually assumed.

It may be generally stated that the prosperity of the country can be restored by increasing the revenues and regulating the currency. The party most apt to do this from its avowed principles and its record is the one that should be elected.

The attitude of the average voter of the country is one that in this connection deserves to be carefully studied. The principle adopted for many years by the leaders of the people has been to secure some one prominent idea and to harp upon it until it acquires prominence in the public mind to the exclusion of everything else. The average voter is treated as if he was capable of but one thought at a time. Sometimes this is directed towards a man and sometimes towards a cause. Before the war it was the abolition of slavery; during the war the preservation of the Union. Since the war there has been a lack of striking causes but there have been men—GRANT, BLAINE, GARFIELD, CLEVELAND—who have proved attractive to the public mind. But in the lack of some one great cause, there have been a number of minor ones which have been agitated with an intensity out of all proportion to their national importance. There is prohibition, and socialism and silver. The fierce agitation in favor of each of these causes has tended to divert the attention from larger and more universal subjects. The gazing too long on one object is sure to destroy the just power of comparison with other objects. The flea held close before the eye seems as large as an elephant, a mountain or whatever you please.

This habit of intensity of thought until the power of comparison is almost wholly lost is fostered by the agitation of one question to the exclusion of another. It is the same in morals as in politics. The agitators of the temperance cause have made it so prominent in the minds of the people, that intemperance has come to be regarded as the chief of sins, although not mentioned in the ten commandments. Total abstinence is a virtue that covers and condones all other sins. A man may cheat and backbite, slander his neighbor, and be full of envy, and yet if he is a total abstainer he comes within the ranks of good and virtuous men. On the other hand the possession of all other virtues is nullified by the one fault.

In politics the dwelling on single causes, however much their importance in their proper place may be acknowledged, unfits the citizen from taking a broad view of the necessities of the country. Like DAVID in the cave of ADULLAM, adherence to the one cause outweighs a multitude of deficiencies in other respects.

This concentration of effort on one object has of course its successes, but they are in the end detrimental in their influence in training the voter. Concentration of effort on one object accomplishes wonders, and by this accomplishment people are led to attempt the impossible and absurd. Because the slavery agitation was successful it must be possible to convert every citizen into a practical total abstainer by prohibition. If we only agitate the silver question enough, we can relieve ourselves from the burden of debt, we can make dishonesty honest, and upset the multiplication table and the rule of three. It is thus that the voter by degrees becomes unfitted to take such a survey of all the questions concerned as will enable him to make a just decision between the different parties.

The probability is that in the next election these voters of one idea will count for but little. They are not party men in any true sense. They will give up the whole fagot of principles on account of one rotten stick; there is no compromise in them—and without compromise there can be no party organization. The attempt to introduce the currency question in the Prohibition convention indicates how lamentably these men fail to agree when diverted from their accustomed pet idea.

The spirit of disintegration of party is also encouraged by the so-called independents. Too often a man considers himself independent when he is simply bound fast to one idea, and that idea often a negative one. This particular thing ought not to be, and therefore I will not vote for the candidate of this party or that. There is really no thought as to what ought to be and how to accomplish it through such means as are at hand.

The mass of voters are sure to ascribe the misfortunes of the times to the party which happens to be in power. This is generally unjust in one sense, though not when it is considered that every party assumes power under just this contingency. Knowing in advance that they will be censured for every misfortune that comes to pass during their incumbency, they cannot complain if they get what they had reason to expect, inasmuch as they always obtain or take credit for every thing fortunate that occurs.

But the Democratic party to-day is weighted in the race by the fact that the four years it has been in power have been years of marked financial depression and manufacturing and trading lassitude. All this is laid on their shoulders, and must count against them. CLEVELAND, their strongest candidate, wisely shows no inclination to secure a renomination. He has been so much stronger than his party as to excite envy and disagreement. The bourbon element who learn nothing and forget nothing seem to be on top. There is therefore at present every reason to believe that the Republican party will have

the advantage in the coming election over the Democratic party pure and simple. If however the bolters at St. Louis go over to the Democrats, and the chief plank in the combined platform is the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one, a different face will be put on the matter. While the Democratic party will lose some of its better element, the CLEVELAND wing of the party, it will gain from the Prohibitionists, the Populists and all the dissatisfied. It can discount the depression of the past four years by laying it all on the CLEVELAND Administration.

In one respect such a result is to be desired. It would come to a straight-out fight between good money and bad. It would be the greenback campaign over again. The Republicans have not only been right in adopting the gold plank in their platform, they have been consistent. These bad times they say have not been due to the currency but to unwise and untimely meddling with the tariff. We will show you. Adhering to our present standard which is gold we will repair all by providing adequate revenue. Any other course would have weakened their position and their contention.

Still, the extent of the silver craze must not be undervalued. Those who travel through the country bear witness to the widespread sapping of voters' minds on this question. The contest will no doubt be a bitter and close one. But it is to be hoped that the result will settle the silver craze as it did the greenback insanity.

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THE FAILURE OF FINANCIAL LEGISLATION at the session of Congress just closed might have been expected from the apathy or confusion with which the subject has been viewed by the masses of the people. So much has been dinned into their ears upon both sides that they appear to be in a state of uncertainty. Nor has the fact that the country has managed to worry along under its present system of mixed currency been conducive to future improvement. As long as there is no startling catastrophe so long will the present currency system be endured and even praised.

The only idea of depreciated money popularly held is money that will not pass. So long as the currency of legal tender and Treasury notes, silver certificates and silver dollars will buy goods and pay debts, every dollar is as good as every other dollar; the popular mind cannot understand what all the fuss is about. The question of the standard and how it will affect money is as the calculus to them, an indifferent matter not worth the trouble of understanding.

The bank currency question is one to which the public is equally indifferent. In fact it is very curious that while in some sections there seems to be a desire for the expansion of the currency as long as

that expansion consists of issues of Government notes or silver coin, any expansion of bank issues seems to be regarded with apprehension. It seems to be a vain task to endeavor to convince some people that the banks can issue more in accordance with business wants than the Treasury. There seems to be a rooted fear or prejudice that cannot be overcome. It is useless to blame Congress for inaction on the bank question. If the people who elect Congressmen really want anything, Congress will usually act. The inaction of Congress is due to the indifference of the people.

Of all the bills before the Banking and Currency Committee that introduced by Representative HILL was probably the best in that it would retire the notes of the Government and improve the present system with the least change of law. The bills of Representatives WALKER and FOWLER were each measures containing good features, and either of them would provide a sound bank currency. There were in each measure new and untried features that would have been difficult to secure notes for. This however seems to be a very slight objection, inasmuch as no bank currency measure had any chance of enactment. Still, when such a measure does, if ever, get before the House, it will secure better treatment if there is some resemblance in it to present laws.

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THE DECISION of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the suit of Crane, Parris & Co., of Washington, D. C., against the Fourth Street National Bank, of Philadelphia, given on February 17, 1896, and printed in the 173d Pennsylvania State Supreme Court Reports, page 566, is important in its consequences, as it makes banks which have paid a draft through the clearing-house liable to pay it a second time, if the bank in which the check was deposited fails before it pays its depositor the amount of the draft.

The facts were that Crane, Parris & Co. sent a draft for \$1,990 to the Keystone Bank for deposit and collection. On the morning of March 20, 1891, at half-past eight, the Keystone Bank sent its clerk to the clearing-house with a package of checks and drafts on other banks, amounting to \$70,005.46. The other banks presented checks and drafts on the Keystone Bank for \$117,035.21, thus making the Keystone Bank debtor in exchanges for \$47,029.75. At half-past ten, the same morning, the Keystone Bank was closed by the bank examiner, and the balance due by it was not paid.

The other banks were compelled to pay to the clearing-house Manager the amount of the checks held by the Keystone Bank on them, and of course did not receive payment of the checks for \$117,035.21 which they held on the Keystone Bank; so that they paid out

\$70,005.46, which they owed, and lost \$117,035.21, which was due to them.

Among the checks on the Fourth Street National Bank, presented by the Keystone Bank, was the check deposited in the Keystone Bank by Crane, Parris & Co., and the proceeds of that and other checks passed through the clearing-house by the Keystone Bank were used in paying the indebtedness of the Keystone Bank to the other banks.

Crane, Parris & Co. first sued the clearing-house committee for the amount of their draft, but the court decided that the clearing-house committee merely furnished a place for making exchanges and was not the collector of checks and drafts, and consequently was not responsible. Then Crane, Parris & Co. sued the Fourth Street Bank and obtained a judgment which compelled the bank to pay the draft on it a second time. The justice of this decision is not apparent.

1. The law is that when a person deposits a check or draft, or leaves it for collection, the bank becomes the owner of the check or draft, and is liable to the depositor for the amount of it when collected. The bank owns the check and owes the amount of it when collected, and the bank selects the mode of collecting the check. The transaction is not a bailment where it is expected that the thing deposited is to be returned.

2. The Fourth Street National Bank had actually paid the draft sued upon, in the manner and through the agency selected by the Keystone Bank.

3. Had the balance of exchange on the day the Keystone Bank failed been in its favor, no one would contend that the Fourth Street Bank would have been liable to pay the draft a second time.

4. The Keystone Bank was solvent when the exchanges were made, and the balance struck. Yet because the Keystone Bank did not pay the balance due by it, the Fourth Street Bank, which did pay, is required to pay a second time.

A logical result of the decision is that every depositor in the Keystone Bank whose checks were paid through the clearing-house that morning may sue the banks which have paid them, and compel said banks to make a second payment. A decision which produces such results cannot be right.

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THE CREDIT MANAGERS of banks, mercantile houses and manufacturing houses, and those specially interested in the laws and practices relating to collections and credits, met in national convention at Toledo, Ohio, June 23, 24, and 25. JAMES G. CANNON, Vice-President of the Fourth National Bank, of New York, who is especially qualified to deal with banking and mercantile credit by reason of his

large experience and a careful study of the subject, read a paper before the convention on "Credit, Credit Man and Creditor." Mr. CANNON's paper is printed elsewhere in this number of the MAGAZINE.

The object of the above convention was to perfect an organization for the purpose of bringing about necessary reforms in the laws for the collection of debts, and to secure the punishment of fraudulent debtors, while improving the means of assisting honest debtors.

The necessity and advantage of such an association cannot be gainsaid. The diversity of the laws in the several States in regard to the collection of debts is as great, if not greater, than the diversity of laws upon all other subjects. Perhaps more than any branch of business the giving of credit needs systematization and control. As the country grows the need will be more felt, and the usefulness of such an organization will be more and more apparent.

In the last number of the MAGAZINE comment was made on the growth of associations and organizations, and the cause was found in the imperfection and inconsistency of the laws of the land and their execution. This appears to be one reason for the association of credit men. There is another reason in the control that the association can, if it see fit, exert over competition in giving credit. As trusts have been forced upon business men by unlimited competition in manufactures and products, so competition in credit without check or limit is sure to bring about some of the very situations that reveal the imperfections of the laws. The ambitious house is apt when hard pressed by its rivals to make less and less inquiry into the standing of its customers, and it has been this tendency no doubt that has caused many financial crises extending over the whole land and aggravated their consequences.

It cannot be expected that such an association will spring at once into full development and usefulness. It will have many difficulties to encounter. When the best methods of determining the credit of bank customers was under discussion in the MAGAZINE, it was pointed out that the proposal to interchange information would be regarded as a great innovation by many institutions, as an interference with the confidence between the bank and its customers, and as repugnant to the natural conservatism of the banking business. It can be readily apprehended that the association of credit managers will have the same obstacles to encounter. Perhaps the distribution of mutual information about the standing of customers will not at first be entered into, but it is hardly possible to see how the association can reach its full usefulness without some such feature. It would certainly be a more efficient organization for this purpose, consisting of bank, mercantile houses, and manufacturing establishments, than if it consisted of banks alone.

The banking associations of New York and Pennsylvania, in their several groups, seem to be taking up the subject in earnest. It would no doubt work many important advantages among which would be the reduction of competition. Whether it would in the end supersede private mercantile agencies or not would perhaps be doubtful, but it would be a check on the accuracy of the information received from that source, and might in the end reduce its expense.

At all events the formation of associations to keep the members informed of the standing of the various units of the business world and for the other purposes mentioned cannot be too highly commended. Even if this convention should not result in a perfect and successful organization, such an association is sure to come because it is a necessity of the growing business of the country.

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STATE BANK NOTES of a peculiar form may, it seems, be issued under a recent ruling of the Attorney-General of the United States, without being liable to the ten per cent. tax. The opinion referred to was printed on page 776 of the June number of the *MAGAZINE*. It was in reference to the taxable status of certain notes which are either already issued or intended to be issued by the State banks in Georgia. These notes seem to be a promise to pay "ten dollars in merchandise silver bullion at retail," or any other denomination possibly. The question referred to the Attorney-General through the Treasury Department was whether the issue of such notes would render the banks issuing and receiving and paying them out liable to the ten per cent. tax on State bank circulation. The Attorney-General decides that such notes are not liable to taxation for the reason that they do not indicate a contract upon which an action of debt could be obtained by the holder of it. "It is not negotiable—cannot be used as currency, will not pass from hand by delivery merely, without endorsement—cannot in short be used by the community as money without danger of loss to whoever may take it."

The State of Georgia has been the scene of a good deal of effort on the part of the State banks to secure a circulation for themselves. A short time ago an effort to test the constitutionality of the law taxing State bank notes at the present time, having its origin in that State, was adverted to in the *MAGAZINE*. This later effort in the same general direction has been brought to notice by the Third National Bank of Columbus, Ga., and indicates that the State banks are either issuing such notes or are attempting to issue them and that they have excited the opposition of the National banks.

The State banks of the State mentioned have always had a good record as solvent and conservative institutions. The South as a sec-



tion, perhaps more than any other part of the country, needs a good local bank currency to develop its resources. The National banks do not furnish this in sufficient abundance, no more than they do under the present restrictive laws in any part of the country. The State banks in Georgia are evidently restive under the restrictions imposed on a useful privilege and seem thus to have brought out a real issue.

The decision of the Attorney-General will cut both ways. If as a matter of fact the disabilities which the Attorney-General claims for this form of note do prevent their passing from hand to hand in ordinary circulation, and if it is a fact that they are refused in business transactions, then whether taxable or not they will not be issued. If they have been issued the Attorney-General's decision will tend to discredit them. But the collection or payment of such notes and their consequent credit does not depend on the decision of the Attorney-General. In the first place, the bank issuing them will probably pay them on demand whenever presented or buy them or take them on deposit, and so probably will other State banks. Even if the issuing bank should refuse to pay them, availing itself of the Attorney-General's reasons for escaping the obligation, the holder would sue in the State courts, which might take a very different view from the Attorney-General as to their collectibility. It is impossible to see why they should not have a considerable local circulation as long as the issuing banks did not refuse them. The National banks might refuse them, but the State banks probably would not, and if there is the demand for a local circulation there seems to be, the business men would desert the banks that will not use it for those that would.

The important point in the decision therefore is that such notes are not taxable, and the State banks will justly consider that they have gained a point. It seems as if the actual circulation of a note of any form as money is the real test whether it is taxable or not, and not technical reasons why it ought not to circulate. The lawyer visiting his incarcerated client after hearing him assured him that the law would not permit his imprisonment. "They can't do it," he said. "But — it! I am in jail," said the client. So the National banks may say, notwithstanding the decision, the notes do circulate, and the only way to stop them is to declare them taxable.

This decision if sustained, and it probably will not be, would open the door to a very dangerous form of currency all over the United States. The notes would be taken where local currency was scarce.

The moral of it all appears to be the necessity of the reform of the bank currency of the country. The banks, both National and State, should be permitted to supply the local currency demands of their neighborhoods. This can be done by giving such a currency issuing privilege to the National banks that the State banks would be willing

to abandon their State charters and do business under the Federal system, or by some method by which both State and National banks can issue notes under the supervision of the Comptroller.

A homogeneous bank currency, elastic and sufficiently abundant and secure, would at once deprive the silver forces of two-thirds of their followers, who are in reality men whose moderate financial credit compels them to seek the endorsement of men of more fortunate financial standing. These last under the restrictions imposed on banking cannot readily grant it. They could do so under a better system.

It is important however that note should be taken of this opinion. If permitted to stand it will result in the introduction of a State bank circulation without uniform restrictions. The State courts with their natural bias in favor of State institutions can easily make these notes collectible. They will probably pass readily in local circulation, not being taxable, until after some failure has utterly discredited them. Then it will be too late to prevent the distress of innocent holders.

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THE NOMINATION OF MCKINLEY is the logical outcome of the political events of the past eight years. The author of the tariff bill under which the Government revenues were adequate, and the leading advocate of the protection of home industries, he has been, since the death of BLAINE, the chief figure of the Republican party.

The advent of the Democratic party and the threatened and actual repeal of the revenue measure to which his name was attached were followed by a period of depression in business unequalled in the annals of the United States. This apparent endorsement by events of the proverb that it is best to "let well enough alone" has made MCKINLEY paramount among the other distinguished men of the Republican party. Without doubt the management of his candidacy has been of the shrewdest, and MCKINLEY upon the St. Louis platform, with the mistakes of his opponents for a foil, stands out as a candidate almost sure of election. During some weeks preceding the convention while the canvass was still on, a most determined attempt was made to compel him to announce his position upon the question of standard money. His reply was that he awaited the adoption of the platform. The St. Louis platform contains the first out-and-out declaration in favor of the gold monometallic standard ever adopted in a national convention in the United States.

The complaint against MCKINLEY was that his record shows him to have had a very tender side toward silver, and the charge was made that he had not changed but was willing to go all lengths to satisfy the advocates of so-called bimetallism, or in other words the free coinage of silver. But the records of many distinguished men

on the silver question are no criterion of their present position. But whatever the former position of the nominee, all these complaints and charges, whether by good luck or good management, have in fact been to his advantage. His position on the tariff and his personal popularity made his nomination a foregone conclusion. To remove any shadow of doubt there might be as to the prosperity of the country under his leadership the leaders of the party came out boldly in favor of the gold standard.

If MCKINLEY is elected this declaration of the Republican party will do more to restore the national credit at home and abroad, and insure a revival of business and a new era of prosperity, than any number of bond sales. The issue is so clearly drawn by this act that in the future there can be no uncertainty as to the standard money of the United States.

The Democratic platform must either declare for gold, for bimetallism, otherwise free silver, or it must be some kind of a straddle. If it declares for gold the prosperity of the country will be further assured, for if both parties are in favor of the gold standard, both domestic and foreign capital will be reassured and will again enter the arena of industry. If the Democratic party declares for silver or some ambiguous straddle it will make the issue clear and distinct. The result of the election will at least leave no uncertainty, and even if the country goes to a silver basis, bad as that would be, the knowledge that the bottom was reached and that there were no further depths would enable business men to know just what to expect.

The history of the silver struggle is like that of the greenback contest. With the latter as with the former there were years of fencing and shilly-shallying before the Republican party nerved itself to a desperate contest with the rag baby. But the latter was effectually laid out. Such we have every reason to believe will be the fate of the silver delusion. Men will look back and wonder that it could ever have so swayed their minds.

The election of MCKINLEY will assure such changes in the tariff laws that sufficient revenue will accrue to enable the Government to get along and maintain its credit without a constant augmentation of its interest-bearing debt in time of peace. If annual deficiencies can be prevented the country will soon outgrow its currency difficulties. Even the present restricted tariff, with the growth of business caused by the knowledge that the people of the United States would never sanction covert repudiation, and had forever put down its advocates, might perhaps furnish all the revenue required.

At all events MCKINLEY as a successful candidate stands for the principle of having sufficient revenue to pay as we go, and for the time-honored principle of a continued reduction of the public debt.

## WAITING FOR THE VERDICT.

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The depression of business which has been almost continuous since the financial crisis of 1893, still oppresses the nation, and the most optimistic must admit that permanent improvement can not be expected until there is a definite decision of the controversy in regard to the monetary standard. This is a matter of such vital concern to all that appertains to the investment of capital and the promotion of trade and enterprises of every sort that no marked revival of business is likely to occur while the settlement of the question remains undetermined.

There have been crises followed by quick revivals, but generally in the United States the subsequent periods of depression have extended over years. These crises are not peculiar to the United States, but such events in England and France, where the causes are purely financial, are on an average recovered from with greater rapidity than in this country, whereas the exact converse ought to be true.

The commercial nations of Europe are older communities in which all avenues of enterprise and money making are very completely filled. The natural resources of the United States are yet in course of development. Although great progress has been made in the last thirty years, the room for new enterprise is still ample, and in the development of resources hitherto untouched and also in the expansion of interests already materialized to some extent there are strong reasons why our people should quickly recover from the temporary lack of confidence which is the chief underlying factor in periods of depression. Therefore there must be some special reason why panics have such a serious effect in the United States, and why the process of recovery is so retarded.

The financial crises of 1814, of 1837, of 1873 and of 1893 can be mentioned as crises from the effects of which revival has been slow. Those of 1819, of 1857 and of 1884 were crises where the recovery was not so long delayed. The commercial bodies of the country, the clearing-house associations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce and exchanges have almost unanimously ascribed the slow recovery since 1893 to the uncertainty as to the future of the standard of value in the United States. This they say unsettles all investments certainly in regard to which is the prime factor in all business transactions. They are certainly in as good a position to judge as any class in the community.

This uncertainty as to the future value of the dollar of account is ascribable to the unwise currency laws which now control the finances of the Government and the widespread agitation for the free coinage of silver, now worth as bullion about seventy cents an ounce, at a ratio to gold which assumes it to be worth \$1.29 an ounce. The force of the popular agitation of any subject in the United States cannot be belittled by any considerate observer.

The ease with which even people of more than average intelligence can

be carried away by enthusiasm aroused by inadequate premises is a marked fact in our social economy. The art of fixing the minds of an audience on some one object and then stirring them up until the mass carries almost every individual with it may be witnessed on a small scale in the revival meeting, in the lecture hall, and the political mass meeting. Whether the object be good or bad the methods adopted and the results arrived at are the same in kind. This art of directing the popular mind is as easily applied on a large as on a small scale. It can use the printing-press or oratorical skill. It is certain that the merit of the question involved will cut little figure unless equal or greater effort is made in behalf of the right than the wrong, by the same methods. That is to say, an erroneous opinion, not strenuously antagonized with the same art employed in favor of the right, is almost sure to carry the populace.

It is the ingenious use of this art of persuasion that has caused so many sudden changes in popular opinion in the past. Of course the right will prevail if supported by heavy enough battalions. This state of things seems to be inseparable from a popular form of government, and capitalists, foreign and domestic, when the discussion involves a question in economics, know how easily the people can be led in a wrong direction. The real doubt is not as to the possibility of the right prevailing, but as to whether the defenders of the right will have the energy and power to sustain it.

The defenders of a stable standard of value have not as yet exerted themselves as have its opponents, and the betting by spectators interested and disinterested has so far been in favor of the probability of the wrong prevailing. This uncertainty has not yet passed away and it has lasted since 1893.

The strong stand of the authorities in favor of maintaining the existing gold standard is good as far as it goes, but acute observers dread that unstemmed popular error must in a republic sooner or later sweep this barrier away.

The same uncertainty existed in regard to the currency for years after 1814, 1837 and 1873 as has existed since 1893. In 1814 the time of the resumption of specie payments was for years in doubt while political war went on between the advocates of State banks as opposed to the Bank of the United States. After 1837 there was the same unsettlement as to the time of restoring a metallic standard of intrinsic value. From 1873 to 1879 there was not a year in which there was not popular agitation of the fiercest kind against the resumption of specie payments. Since 1893, although specie payments have been maintained, there has been similar agitation as to whether they would be silver or gold.

On the other hand the panic of 1819 occurred when the currency question was for the time settled. Its effects soon wore off before the certainty that the money in circulation was stable and of fixed value. So with the panic of 1857, although in this case the intervention of the war and the vast increase in the expenditures of the Government render the principle more indistinct. The panic of 1884 made but a passing effect on business, and likewise that of 1890, because the silver agitation had not yet sapped the belief in the maintenance of the gold standard.

Enough has been said to evidence that although financial crises are at times sure to accompany the extended use of credit, their effects are temporary when there is certainty about the stability of the money of account.

This is the secret of the less lasting injury of crises of this description among the commercial nations of Europe. Accidents may occur but the general stability of the machine is not in doubt.

It is true that the people of the United States have shown enormous recuperative power in the past. They will doubtless do so again. It is the more remarkable because it has been manifested in the face of obstacles that would have crushed other nations under like circumstances. The course of the people of this country in recovering from financial setbacks has been usually over the most unpromising and roughest of roads. The revival of business after the resumption of specie payments in 1879 is an instance of quick recuperation when the way is made smooth. Confidence came back as quickly as the sun after a summer shower. So it would be now were it known and believed that the money of account of the United States was once and for all irrevocably settled.

Therefore until this is done, until the popular mind has been conducted into the right path, we may expect continued depression. The capitalist and the investor do not usually seem to have the same ardent interest in defending honest money as their opponents do in attacking it. Once aroused however the forces of thrift and accumulation, which in fact include all the industrious and energetic citizens on whatever side they now appear to be, must certainly prevail. It is only indecision and supineness on their part that enable the agitators for lowering the money of account to obtain such an imposing following.

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AN INTERNATIONAL COIN.—A favorable report on a measure looking to the adoption of an international coin was made at the last session of Congress by the committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures of the House of Representatives. The measure, which was printed on page 773 of the June number of the *MAGAZINE*, was introduced by Hon. Charles W. Stone, of Pennsylvania. Mr. Stone has a paper in the current "North American Review" advocating his bill. He says:

"Why should the nations endure longer the inconvenience and loss, the waste of time and labor incurred in making conversions from the money terms of one nation into those of others, with the further loss of exchange rates, the fees of money changers, and the cost of reminting the coins of one nation into those of others? Why not have at least a common money of account if not of circulation, a common denominator in which can be expressed invoice values, market quotations, and all transactions of international interest? The money of account should be and speedily would be money of circulation, but not necessarily or probably the only money of circulation. In the United States the money of account is simply dollars and cents, while the money of circulation embraces nickels, dimes, quarters and half-dollars, quarter-eagles, half-eagles, eagles and double eagles. We speak of halves, quarters, and dimes; but we compute these only as cents. We handle eagles and double eagles; but we add, subtract, multiply and divide them only as dollars. So an international coin would not necessarily nor probably displace the distinctive coins of the different nations, but these should be made even multiples or sub-multiples of the common coin, so that computations might be simple and easy; and probably in time they would lose their distinctive names and be designated as multiples or fractions of the common denominator or international unit. This would not come at once; it might never be fully attained; it would likely come more rapidly and completely in some nations than in others, according to the measure of their versatility and progressiveness and the extent of their foreign travel and commerce; but the probabilities are that such coinage would be eagerly sought, and for a time more or less hoarded. A coin known to be of unchanging value everywhere, behind which was the allied faith of many nations, itself a sort of emblematic expression of the brotherhood of man and of the growing unity of peoples, would possess a combined practical and sentimental attractiveness which would overcome national exclusiveness and partiality for national things and make it in the end the measure and medium of all exchanges, except the smallest and most distinctively local and provincial."

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE's Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### *CLEARING-HOUSE—WHAT IT IS.*

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, February 17, 1896.

CRANE, *et al.* vs. FOURTH STREET NATIONAL BANK OF PHILADELPHIA.

The clearing-house is not a mutual bank organized and operated by the associated banks.

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WILLIAMS, J. (omitting part of the opinion): We do not regard the clearing-house as a mutual bank, organized and operated by the associated banks. It is, as we have said in *Philler vs. Patterson* (168 Pa. St. 468), an ingenious device to simplify and facilitate the work of the banks in reaching an adjustment and payment of the daily balances due to and from each other, at one time and place, on each day. In practical operation it is a place where the representatives of all the National banks in this city meet, and, under the supervision of a competent committee or officer selected by the associated banks, settle their accounts with each other, and make and receive payment of balances, and so "clear" the transactions of the day for which the settlement is made. These payments may be made in cash or by such form of acknowledgment or certificate as the associated banks may agree to use in their dealings with each other as the equivalent or representative of cash. The use among themselves of a certificate or other representative of money to save the inconvenience and labor of counting and recounting several millions of dollars daily is not the issuing of currency. It is not a violation of the law. It does not convert the clearing-house into a bank of any sort.

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### *RIGHT OF BANK TO REFUSE PAYMENT OF CHECK WHERE CUSTOMER INDEBTED TO BANK.*

Court of Appeals of Kentucky, May 14, 1896.

MOUNT STERLING NATIONAL BANK vs. GREEN.

A bank may refuse to pay the check of a customer when he is indebted to the bank on a past-due note exceeding the amount of his deposit.

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LEWIS, J.: James Green brought this action to recover of the Mt. Sterling National Bank \$5,000 damages, his cause thereof being stated substantially as follows: That October 17, 1892, he drew his check on defendant for \$1,000, payable to the order of Sally A. Bratton, which was, October 27, 1892, duly presented for payment, but that although when said check was drawn and delivered, as also when it was presented by Sally A. Bratton for payment,

plaintiff had ample money on deposit and to his credit in the bank to pay said check, defendant refused to pay, and caused the check to be protested, and thereby injured plaintiff's credit and standing in the community as an honorable business man, to his great damage, etc. As a ground of defense, defendant stated in its answer, substantially, that December 2, 1891, plaintiff executed and delivered to it his promissory note agreeing to pay, six months thereafter, \$5,671.31, which became due June 2, 1892; that October 27, 1892, said note was still due and unpaid, and was for largely more than plaintiff then had on deposit and to his credit in defendant bank; that because it had a lien upon, and right of set-off against, the amount of plaintiff's credit on that day as depositor, defendant refused to pay said check, and retained the amount of his deposit until October 31, 1892, when payment was actually made by him of the note, and then defendant released its lien, and plaintiff drew checks in favor of other parties for the entire amount of his deposit, which were paid as presented. To that answer a general demurrer was filed and sustained, a demurrer to the petition having been previously overruled; and, verdict and judgment being subsequently rendered in favor of plaintiff for \$2,000, the defendant appealed.

It seems to be well settled that the obligation of a bank to pay checks, drafts, and orders of a depositor, so long as it has in its possession funds of his sufficient to do so, and which are not incumbered by the attaching of an earlier lien in favor of the bank, and the reciprocal right of the depositor to have them paid, are so far substantial that if the bank refuses, without sufficient justification, to pay the check of a customer, the customer has his action for damages against the bank. (Morse, Banks, 458.)

As, therefore, the statements in the petition constitute, *prima facie*, a cause of action, the demurrer to it was properly overruled. But, in the language of Masonic Sav. Bank *vs.* Bangs (8 Ky. Law Rep. 16, 10 S. W. 633): "The right of a bank to a general lien on the money and funds of the depositor, in its vaults, for the payment of the balance of the general account of the depositors, is recognized by all the elementary books on banks and banking, and sustained by an unbroken line of American decisions."

In Pursifull *vs.* Pineville Banking Co.'s Assignee (Ky. App. 30 S. W. 203) it is said by this court that there is no difference of opinion as to the right of a bank, under the doctrine of set-off, to have applied to the payment of a note held by it against a depositor unappropriated funds he may have deposited in the bank to his credit. As aptly and correctly said in Herndon *vs.* Banking Co. (decided by the superior court) 10 Ky. Law Rep. 584:

"The relation between the bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, and as long as it exists the bank must honor drafts or checks of the depositor in the order in which they are presented, to the extent of the deposit. But when, on account of any legitimate transaction between the parties, the relation is shifted, and the balance of the account is against the depositor, it seems to us that, upon principle, the bank should not be required to respond to the demand of the holder of a check which was drawn before this altered condition of affairs, but of which the bank had no notice, until afterwards."

In this case, however, the depositor, prior to and at the date of the check, was indebted to the bank, by a promissory note past due, in an amount greater than what he had on deposit, and therefore occupied the relative attitude of debtor. In sustaining the demurrer to the answer, the lower



court expressed the opinion that defendant had a lien on the deposit of plaintiff, and the right, at the time of presentation of the check by the holder for payment, to appropriate the entire amount then on deposit, belonging to plaintiff, to the payment of said note then due from plaintiff to defendant. But the demurrer to the answer was nevertheless sustained, because, in the language of the court, the defendant failed, on presentation of the check, to appropriate said deposit and apply the same as a credit on the said note, and thereby released its lien. It seems to us that the reason for that decision is not sufficient. The question is whether, at the time the check was presented, the bank had the right to refuse payment. If it had, then its simple refusal to honor the check was a proper exercise of that right, and all the appropriation needed for that purpose. In our opinion the facts stated in the answer constitute a sufficient justification of the bank's refusing to pay the check in question, and *prima facie*, sufficient ground of defense to the action. And, as this record stands, defendant was, on the pleadings entitled to judgment.

We need not refer to the instructions, further than to say that, having been given upon an incorrect hypothesis, they are necessarily erroneous. For the primary error in sustaining the demurrer to the answer, the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

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CHECKS—REMITTING TO DRAWEE BANK—DELAY IN PRESENTMENT—  
PAYMENT IN PART.

Supreme Court of Alabama, January 29, 1896.

LOWENSTEIN, *et al.* vs. BRESLER.

The implication is that a check is to operate as payment only in the event that it is honored; and the burden of rebutting this implication is in the person asserting the contrary; and the evidence must be as clear and satisfactory as is essential to establish the payment in satisfaction of an admitted debt or demand.

The sending of a check to the drawee bank for collection does not operate as extinguishment or payment.

While the drawee bank may not be a proper agent to be intrusted with the collection of a check, yet the customer cannot complain of the unsuitableness of the agent, unless he suffers injury thereby.

A bank is under no duty to make a partial payment of a check where the deposit is insufficient to pay the check in full.

It is not within the authority or duty of the agent for collection to receive part payment of a check.

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BRICKELL, C. J.: This was an action on an account for goods sold and delivered, in which the appellants were plaintiffs and the appellee defendant. The trial was had before the court without the intervention of a jury, by consent of the parties, on issue joined on pleas of payment and set-off, and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the appeal is taken.

There is no conflict in the material evidence. The plaintiffs were merchants, residing and doing business in the city of Memphis, and the defendant was a merchant, residing in the town of Tuscumbia, in this State. The account was due and payable on June 3, 1893, amounting to \$143.47, and on that day the defendant remitted to plaintiffs his check on the Tuscumbia Banking Company, a partnership doing business in Tuscumbia, payable to the order of plaintiffs, for the amount of the account, and to be applied to its

payment. The check was received by the plaintiffs on June 5, and on that day deposited by them in the Bank of Commerce, of Memphis, for collection. On the same day the Bank of Commerce remitted the check to the drawee, the Tuscumbia Banking Company, with the indorsement thereon: "For collection and return to Bank of Commerce, Memphis, Tenn., J. A. Ombrey, Cashier."

On June 6, the banking company received the check, and also another check drawn by another person, and the Cashier filled up a check of the company on the United States National Bank, of New York city, payable to the order of the Bank of Commerce, for the sum of \$186.17, the amount of the two drafts the bank had remitted, but laid it aside, and did not forward it until June 9, in accordance with the instructions of the President of the company. This check was promptly forwarded by the Bank of Commerce for collection, and was duly presented, and protested for non-payment.

In consequence of inquiry by letter from the plaintiffs, the letter bearing date June 7, the defendant made inquiry of the banking company as to the payment of the check, and was informed by the Cashier that it had been paid; and the Cashier then, stamping thereon the words, "Paid June 6, 1893, Tuscumbia, Ala.," delivered it to the defendant; but there was no payment of it otherwise than by check on New York, which the Cashier, though he had filled it up, did not forward until June 9. The banking company, at no time after the check of the defendant was received by it, could have paid it in money or otherwise than by exchange on New York, which the Cashier had been instructed by the President not to issue before June 9. The banking company was of good repute for solvency until its suspension on June 8, though the fact was that it was insolvent on or before June 1, and has so continued. On June 1, 1893, the defendant deposited with the banking company \$65.10, but drew thereon two checks—the one for \$46.10, and the other for \$31.40—which were paid June 3, the day the check remitted the plaintiffs bore date. On June 5 he made another deposit of \$139, which was to his credit when the banking company received the check from the Bank of Commerce. The taking of a bill or note or check for a pre-existing debt, without more, is not payment or satisfaction. The intendment or implication of law is that it is to operate as payment only in the event that it is paid; as to a check, that it is cashed. (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1623; 2 Morse, Banks, § 543; 1 Brick. Dig. p. 287, §§ 501-504.) If insisted on as payment, the burden of proof rests on the party making the insistence, and he must repel the legal intendment or implication by evidence as clear and satisfactory as is essential to establish the payment or satisfaction of an admitted debt or demand. *Whitley vs. Lumber Co.* (89 Ala. 493).

The evidence is not consistent with any reasonable hypothesis that the check was accepted by the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the indebtedness of the defendant. It is consistent with no other hypothesis than that it was received as a conditional payment; was not to operate a satisfaction of the pre-existing indebtedness of the defendant unless it was paid on due presentment. The plaintiffs, having received the check, were under the duty to defendant of making due presentment of it for payment and, if not paid, of giving due notice of its dishonor. Laches in the performance of this duty, resulting in loss or damage to the defendant, to the extent of such loss or damage would operate a satisfaction of the original indebtedness. But if

there was not loss or damage, the laches would not be material. (2 Morse, Banks, §§ 543, 544; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1587, 1588.)

It may be the drawee of a check is not a suitable agent to be intrusted with its collection; and it may be that the Bank of Commerce, in selecting the banking company as the agent to collect the check and to remit the collection, rendered itself liable to the plaintiffs for whatever of loss might result to them from the unsuitable selection. The proposition is supported by the authorities to which we have been referred. (Morse, Banks, § 236; *Drovers' Nat. Bank vs. Anglo-American Packing & Provision Co.* 117 Ill. 110, 7 N. E. 601, and 57 Am. Rep. 855; *Bank vs. Goodman*, 109 Pa. St. 422, 2 Atl. 687, and 58 Am. Rep. 728; *Bank vs. Ashworth*, 123 Pa. St. 212, 16 Atl. 596.)

If this were a suit between the plaintiffs and the Bank of Commerce, founded on the averments of a want of care and diligence in intrusting the check to the payee for collection, the measure of recovery would be the actual loss the plaintiffs had suffered. (1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 329; 1 Morse, Banks, § 252.) Conceding that a drawee is not a proper agent to be intrusted with the collection of a check, intrusting it to him for the mere purpose of collection cannot operate its extinguishment or payment. It merely devolves on the drawee the duty and liability of an agent, in addition to the duty of payment if he had funds of the drawer in his hands. Dereliction of duty as the agent would not relieve from the duty of making payment, and unless the drawer has suffered injury from whatever of delinquency there may have been as agent it is not for him to inquire whether the agent was suitable or unsuitable. We think it is shown affirmatively by the evidence that the defendant suffered no injury from the selection of the banking company as the agent for the collection of the check. When the check was drawn he had no funds in the hands of the banking company to meet it. The small deposit he had made a few days previously had been exhausted and his account overdrawn. It was not until two days after (the day the check was received in Memphis by the plaintiffs) that he made an additional deposit, insufficient to meet the check when it might be presented; and this was the condition of his account when the banking company suspended and during all the time the check was in its hands. The banking company was under no duty as the drawee to make a partial payment of the check, and as agent of the payee it was not within the scope of its authority, or duty to receive such payment. (2 Morse, Banks, § 446; Boone, Banking, § 179.)

Mr. Morse observes that whether a bank would be justified in making partial payment of a check may be questioned; that there is no authority on the point, and that banks would not often try to exercise such a right. Independent of this consideration it is shown that at no time after the check reached the banking company would payment of it in money have been made, or anything tendered or offered in payment than exchange on New York, which could not have been issued earlier than June 9, the day after its suspension and its insolvency became known. The check which had been filled up, and which did not leave the possession of the banking company until June 9, was of no obligation on the company until that day. So long as it remained in the possession of the company it was without obligation or validity.

The stamping of the check as paid, and antedating the stamp, would be a fraud upon the plaintiffs if recognized as of any force, as the representation

to the defendant that the check had been paid was a fraudulent misrepresentation; but from it no injury resulted to him. The check had not been paid, nor could payment of it have been made if any other agent had been selected to present it and demand payment. The defendant had not in the hands of the drawee funds sufficient to meet it; and if the drawee would have made a partial payment without special authority, the existence of which is not to be presumed, the agent could not have accepted it. It may be inferred from the prior course of dealing that the defendant expected the drawee to pay the check though he had not funds sufficient to meet it. Such an expectation may or may not have been reasonable. There is no evidence that such payment had been arranged for; the defendant knew of the absence of the President of the bank; and there is no evidence the Cashier had authority to make such payment, or to suffer the defendant to overdraw his account thereby becoming a debtor to the company. (1 Morse, Banks, § 357.) When he accepted the check as paid he must be taken to have known that it was not and could not be paid in full unless the company made him an irregular loan, and to have known that without special authority the banking company as agent could not accept a partial payment.

In addition the fact remains that at no time while the check was in possession of the banking company would payment in money have been made or anything offered or tendered in payment than exchange on New York, which, whether the banking company be regarded as the agent of the Bank of Commerce only or as agent of the plaintiffs as well, it was without authority to accept. The defendant is entitled to stand in the attitude in which he would have stood if an agent of unquestioned suitability had been selected for the collection of the check. This is the extent of his right; and if such agent had been selected no degree of diligence, under the evidence, would have resulted in the payment of the check. If laches could be imputed to the plaintiffs it is without correspondent injury to the defendant.

The judgment must be reversed and a judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for the sum of \$143.47, with the interest thereon to this day, from June 3, 1893, and the defendant must pay the costs in the circuit court and the costs of the appeal.

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*PROMISSORY NOTES—SEAL.*

Court of Appeals of New York, May 26, 1896.

CHASE NATIONAL BANK *vs.* FANROT.

The commercial paper of a corporation does not lose the quality of negotiability by having the corporate seal attached thereto.

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This was an action to recover of the defendant as indorser of a promissory note for \$16,787.02, signed "New York Construction Company, by T. P. Graf, Secretary." Impressed upon the face of the note were the words, "New York Construction Company, Seal." The note did not recite a seal, and no effort was made at the trial to prove the seal, or that it was affixed by authority of the New York Construction Company, save reading the note in evidence. The note was executed and payable in the State of Ohio, and the contract of indorsement was made in the State of New York.

BARTLETT, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The facts upon this appeal are undisputed, and the plaintiff's counsel insists that the seal on the note in

suit was not proved, within the rule laid down by this court in *Weeks vs. Esler* (143 N. Y. 374) that the note is negotiable, and, having been purchased in good faith and before maturity, as found by the jury, the recovery below must be sustained. The defendant's counsel, while admitting that the rule in *Weeks vs. Esler* is opposed to certain of his contentions on this appeal, urges with much earnestness and ability that this court should reconsider the doctrines of that case. He also argues that, even assuming the note to be negotiable in form, it never had a legal inception, and defendant is not liable as indorser.

We held in *Weeks vs. Esler*, that the presumption attaching ordinarily to seals of corporations, when affixed to deeds or other instruments, did not exist as to the promissory notes of a corporation, and that, in the absence of any recital that the seal of the corporation was affixed, and of any evidence to show the fact of sealing, or that the corporate seal was impressed, or that it was the corporate seal, the notes could not be regarded as sealed instruments.

We think this rule a reasonable one, in view of the vast business transactions of corporations, and see no occasion to reconsider it. In the case at bar we shall assume, for the purposes of this appeal, that the note in suit was a sealed instrument, and will place our decision on broader grounds than those laid down in *Weeks vs. Esler*. In view of the law, as settled by this court and the courts of other jurisdictions, as to what instruments are negotiable, we hold that the commercial paper of a corporation, negotiable in form, does not lose the quality of negotiability by having attached thereto the corporate seal.

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*USURY BY NATIONAL BANK—ACTION TO RECOVER PENALTY—WHO MAY BRING—ASSIGNEE FOR CREDITORS.*

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May 18, 1896.

OSBORN vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ATHENS.

An assignee for the benefit of creditors cannot maintain an action to recover of a National bank the penalty for usury paid by his assignor.

In order to recover the penalty prescribed by Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 5198, the illegal interest must have been actually paid; and it is not sufficient that it was carried into renewal notes.

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This was an action of assumpsit by Elmer Osborn as assignee for the benefit of the creditors of E. N. Frost & Son, against the First National Bank of Athens, to recover penalties for taking usurious interest.

MITCHELL, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The objection to the present action is not a mere technicality as to the nominal plaintiff. The right of action did not pass, in any form, by the assignment for the benefit of creditors. The Act of Congress (Rev. St. U. S. § 5198) authorizes the action by the party paying the illegal interest, or his "legal representatives." No decision has been cited showing that the meaning of this term has been fixed by the Supreme Court of the United States; but, on the contrary, it is held that the question of the parties meant to be designated thereby is one of procedure according to the law of the place where suit is brought. (*Pritchard vs. Norton and Glenn vs. Marbury*, *supra*.)

In Pennsylvania the term "legal representatives" means "executors" and "administrators." It is true that if the subject-matter or the context shows that the words are used in a different sense, whether in a statute or a con-

tract, the courts will give them the meaning intended. Thus, they may mean next of kin (*Ralston vs. Waln*, 44 Pa. St. 279), or, if land be the subject, they may be construed to refer to heirs, devisees, or alienees (*Dunrow vs. Walker*, 2 Dall. 205; *Ware vs. Fisher*, 2 Yeates, 578; *Cochran vs. Cochran*, 127 Pa. St. 486, 490). But "*exceptio probat regulam*," and in the absence of such exceptional circumstances the reasoning of all the cases shows that the settled meaning is administrators or executors.

There are no such exceptional circumstances in the present case. The action is not contractual in its origin, but is for a statutory penalty (*Osborn vs. Bank*, 154 Pa. St. 134). The enforcement of it is a personal privilege or right of the party aggrieved. He could not be compelled by his creditors to bring an action to enforce it, nor does any right to do so pass to the assignee for their benefit. It is very similar to the right, under our Act of 1858, to recover usurious interest paid. The action in that case is personal to the debtor paying, and cannot be enforced by creditors, or for their benefit, unless the usury was contracted for and paid with the express intent to hinder or defraud the creditors. (*Lenig's Appeal*, 93 Pa. St. 301; *Stayton vs. Riddle*, 114 Pa. St. 464.)

Yet the right of action in that case is contractual, in that it is a statutory right to rescind a contract in part, even after it is executed, and is not nearly so penal in its nature as the right under the Act of Congress.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the right of action under the Act of Congress is personal to the debtor, and that an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not his "legal representative," within the meaning of the Act.

This decision is not necessarily in conflict with *Bank vs. Overholt* (96 Pa. St. 327) as it was there held that the right of action passed to an assignee in bankruptcy. This officer, like a Receiver, as already said, derives his powers from the statute and the decree appointing him, and stands on a different footing from a voluntary assignee for the benefit of creditors. It was said in that case that the decisions of the Federal courts were conflicting, and it is proper to say now that in view of the subsequent trend of opinion in those courts upon the National Banking Act, even in the absence of an authoritative settlement of the question by the Supreme Court of the United States, it may be necessary to reconsider the point decided in *Bank vs. Overholt*. But that is not now before us.

The second special finding by the referees is not clearly expressed, but appears to be based on the view that the charge of interest in excess of the legal rate, in making renewals of the notes, was equivalent to payment in cash. This was also clear error. The Act of Congress draws a distinct line between reserving or charging excessive interest, and receiving it. In the former case the entire interest is forfeited, and no part of it can be recovered, but that is the extent of the penalty. In the latter case the bank is liable to a penalty of double the amount of the usurious interest, but only to the party who has actually paid it.

If this were not the case, as was said by the Chief Justice in *Kearney vs. Bank* (129 Pa. St. 577), "the penalty might be recovered without the payment of either principal or interest."

This is the uniform rule of our own cases, and of the Supreme Court of the United States. (*Brown vs. Bank*, 72 Pa. St. 209; *Kearney vs. Bank*, 129 Pa. St. 577, 598; *Barnet vs. Bank*, 98 U. S. 555.) Judgment affirmed.

**INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANK—SUIT TO RECOVER DIVIDENDS  
UNLAWFULLY PAID.**

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, December 9, 1895.

HAYDEN vs. THOMPSON, *et al.*

The Receiver of an insolvent National bank may maintain a suit in equity against all the shareholders of the bank to recover dividends unlawfully paid to them out of the capital stock when the bank had earned no net profit and was in fact insolvent.

No special order of the Comptroller of the Currency is necessary to enable the Receiver to bring such suit.

In such a case the remedies provided by the National Bank Act are not exclusive.

In the State of Nebraska a suit to recover from an innocent shareholder of a bank an unearned dividend, which he has received in good faith, without notice of any fact which would lead a reasonably prudent man to learn that the dividend was not earned, is barred in four years from the receipt of such dividend.

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This was a suit in equity by Kent R. Hayden, as Receiver of the Capital National Bank of Lincoln, Neb., against David E. Thompson and others, who were shareholders of that bank, to recover from them the amount of certain dividends which had been received by them out of the capital of the bank when it was insolvent and had earned no net profits. The points presented to the court and passed upon are stated in the syllabus.

**LIABILITY OF NATIONAL BANK FOR DEPOSIT OF POSTMASTER.**

United States Circuit Court, W. D. North Carolina.

UNITED STATES vs. NATIONAL BANK OF ASHEVILLE, *et al.*

A National bank, though not designated as a United States depository, which receives a deposit of United States moneys from a postmaster, thereby assumes a fiduciary relation to the Government, and is liable to the United States as a bailee of such funds.

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This was a bill in equity by the United States against the National Bank of Asheville and others to require an accounting in respect to public moneys deposited in such bank by defendant, George W. Cannon, as postmaster at Asheville.

DICK, *District Judge* (omitting part of the opinion): National banks not designated as depositories cannot lawfully receive public moneys on deposit, except in the case of postmasters making deposits under peculiar and specified circumstances. By positive law and the specific regulations of the Post Office Department (Postal Laws and Regulations, p. 72), all postmasters receiving public moneys in their official capacity are custodians of the funds collected by them or placed in their possession and custody, and are required to keep them safely, without loaning, using, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds than as specially allowed by law, until ordered by the Postmaster-General to be transferred or paid out.

Where there is no designated depository in the county where a post office is situated, the postmaster may at his own risk, and in his official capacity, make deposits in a National bank in his town or city; but he or any other person cannot demand or receive, directly or indirectly, interest on such deposits.

A National bank that knowingly receives such funds from a postmaster

under such permissive authority, and opens an account with him in his official capacity, assumes a fiduciary relation to the Government by reason of the privilege conferred, the confidence reposed, and the risk of possible loss.

This implied authority of law to receive public moneys on deposit is, in effect, equivalent to an express delegation of authority to receive, and constitutes such National bank a bailee of the Government, and it assumes the obligation of safely keeping the public moneys thus deposited and accepted; and any undue negligence or non-observance of law on its part has the legal effect of fraud and breach of the trust and confidence expected and reposed under the sanction of positive law. Such funds are to be held and safely kept for the purposes intended, and can only lawfully be withdrawn by a postmaster under orders of the Post Office Department to meet the legitimate requirements of the public service.

The bank, as a lawfully authorized bailee of such funds, is presumed to know the law regulating the care, custody, and disposition of the same, and cannot, without incurring liability, knowingly allow the postmaster, by private check, to withdraw such funds for his personal use, and cannot under any circumstances retain and apply such funds in satisfaction of the personal indebtedness of the postmaster on private account.

The fact that the public moneys deposited by the postmaster in his official capacity were mingled with the funds of the bank, so as to lose their identity, did not impair the legal and equitable rights of the Government, which still remain as a charge upon the entire mass of the bank funds until the trust moneys are fully restored to the rightful owner. \* \* \* \* \*

The bank was, by law, accorded the permissive privilege of receiving public moneys from a postmaster without furnishing the security required of National banks that are expressly designated depositories. By this indulgence, the Government incurred possible risk of loss if the bank should become insolvent; and the bank was relieved from the rigid penalties imposed upon private and unauthorized banks knowingly receiving deposits of public moneys by holding their receiving officers as guilty of embezzlement.

A person dealing with officers of the Government must take notice of the extent and nature of the authority conferred by law in their official capacity; and the United States are only bound by acts of officers which come within the just exercise of official powers. The defendant bank, by receiving public moneys deposited by postmaster in his official capacity, and by virtue of express authority conferred by law, assumed to some extent the obligations of a designated depository, and became, not a financial agent, but a bailee, bound to exercise the highest degree of care over the funds placed in its custody under the peculiar circumstances. Even if this legal proposition is too broad and stringent, under well-settled principles of equity the acceptance of public moneys by the bank, with full knowledge of their fiduciary character and the confidence reposed by the Government, was sufficient to create a duty to devote such funds to the purposes intended by the deposit of such trust funds. (*McKee vs. Lamont*, 159 U. S. 317.)

If the bank assumed no higher obligations than those imposed upon a gratuitous bailee at common law, it was bound, in good faith and in law, to restore to the Government on demand the public moneys deposited which had not been paid out by authority of law upon the official checks or orders of a rightful public officer. But the bank was more than an ordinary mandatory



bailee, and its primary duty and obligation was to the United States, and not to the official agent who made the deposit. Its duties and obligations were imposed and defined by positive law, founded upon considerations of public policy. It must be presumed to know the law applicable to this peculiar kind of bailment. Such funds could not be used by bailee for the purpose of demanding and receiving interest. They were in the nature of special deposits for Government purposes, and could only be withdrawn in the manner provided by law. If withdrawn on the official checks of the postmaster, and applied by him to his personal purposes, the bank would not be responsible, unless it had actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful intention and purpose of the postmaster when the checks were drawn or presented and paid; for, as the checks were in proper form, the bank would have a right to presume that he was lawfully performing his official duty. The public moneys deposited by the postmaster in the bank did not come within the ordinary rules of law which establish the relation of creditor and debtor between depositors and banks, and require the banks to honor and pay the checks of depositors when they have funds applicable to such purpose, and authorize the banks, by way of lien, to retain personal funds of depositors to satisfy individual indebtedness to the banks.

The deposit of public moneys in this case in no way misled the bank, or was calculated to induce the bank to extend the personal credit of the official depositor. (*National Bank vs. Insurance Co.* 104 U. S. 54.) If the bank, as bailee, mingled these public moneys in the general mass of its own funds, it may be that the bank violated the law by directly or indirectly demanding and receiving interest, as it had no authority to loan such funds, and there was, by law, positive prohibition. The funds certainly did not lose the character they had when deposited, and all the funds of the bank became, in equity, trust funds of the United States, until the just claims of the Government are adjusted and paid.

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#### COLLECTIONS—INDORSEMENT FOR COLLECTION.

Supreme Court of North Carolina, March 31, 1896.

BOYKIN, *et al.* vs. BANK OF FAYETTEVILLE.

Where a bank to which a note is indorsed "for collection" has forwarded the same to a correspondent, and fails, the owner of the note may recover the proceeds from the correspondent, if the correspondent has not actually paid over such proceeds to the transmitting bank.

The rights of the real owner will not be precluded merely by an entry of a credit to the account of the failed bank; but the money must have been actually paid over by the correspondent.

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This was an action by Boykin, Seddon & Co. against the Bank of Fayetteville to recover the proceeds of a draft drawn by plaintiffs, and indorsed for collection to the Bank of New Hanover at Wilmington. Such bank sent the draft to the defendant, which collected it, and placed the proceeds to the credit of the Bank of New Hanover on its books; the two banks being correspondents and having mutual accounts.

CLARK, J.: The indorsement on the paper, "For collection," was notice to the defendant that the plaintiff was the owner of the same, and that the

Wilmington Bank was merely an agent. (1 Morse, Banks, § 217; 2 Morse, Banks, § 593.)

If the defendant had actually paid the money collected to the agent before any notice from the principal, it would have been a discharge of liability; but here there has been no actual payment, simply an entry of the amount on its books to the credit of the Wilmington Bank, which was authority for that bank to draw; but this could be corrected by a counter entry, and a notice to the Wilmington Bank that the money had been paid to the principal. As the latter bank has become insolvent, and has gone into liquidation, it was entirely proper that the principal should intervene, and not permit the fund to go into the hands of his insolvent agent. (*Stevenson vs. Bank*, 113 N. C. 485; 2 Morse, Banks, § 591; *Bank vs. Johnson*, 9 Gill & J. 297.)

Had the defendant bank refused to pay over the money to the Wilmington Bank, it is settled that the latter could not maintain an action to recover from the defendant; but the plaintiff alone could maintain the action, being the real party in interest. (*Abrams vs. Cureton*, 74 N. C. 523), which has been often cited with approval. (See Womack's Dig. No. 8.) It must be noted that here there was shown no interest coupled with a trust, nor any authority devolved upon the Wilmington Bank to apply the funds to any special purpose, which would have entitled that bank to have brought an action for this fund as "trustee of an express trust," which was the case in *Wynne vs. Heck* (92 N. C. 414). No error.

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#### COLLECTION—SUB-AGENTS.

Supreme Court of South Dakota, April 7, 1896.

SHERMAN, *et al.* vs. PORT HURON ENGINE & THRESHER CO.

Where a note is sent without instructions to the bank at which it is payable, such bank cannot delegate its powers; and if the collection is intrusted to another bank, the latter is the agent of the former bank, and has no connection with the owner.

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This was an action to recover commissions upon sales alleged to have been made by plaintiff for the defendant.

HANEY, J. (omitting part of the opinion):

As to the Tyler sale, the facts are undisputed. Notes were taken in settlement for the machine sold. But one had been paid when this action was commenced. It is conceded that no commission was due plaintiffs, unless the proceeds of this note had been received by the defendant in cash. It was, by its terms, payable at Sioux Falls National Bank, of Sioux Falls, to which it was sent by defendant without special instructions, indorsed for collection and remittance. That bank sent it to a bank at Hartford, in this State, indorsed for collection, account of Sioux Falls Bank. There it was paid, but before its proceeds were remitted to Sioux Falls they were attached by plaintiffs in this action. If the Hartford bank was an agent of defendant, defendant had received such proceeds, and plaintiffs' claim for commission thereon was due; otherwise, it was not due when this action was commenced. The jury was, in effect, instructed to find for plaintiffs. This was correct, if the Sioux Falls Bank could delegate its powers to the bank at Hartford. (Comp. Laws, §§ 4004, 4005.) Numerous authorities cited in *Exchange Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh vs. Third Nat. Bank of New York* (112 U. S. 276) hold that where

a claim is sent for collection to one bank, which forwards it to another for the same purpose, the latter is the agent of the owner, and not of the former bank.

These authorities are said to rest on the proposition that, since what is to be done by a bank employed to collect a draft payable at another place cannot be done by any of its ordinary officers and servants, but must be intrusted to a sub-agent, the risk of the neglect of the sub-agent is upon the party employing the bank, on the view that he has impliedly authorized the employment of the sub-agent. (*Exchange Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh vs. Third Nat. Bank of New York, supra.*)

This doctrine is in harmony with the statute in this State. (Comp. Laws, § 4003.) However, a contrary conclusion has been reached by courts of the highest respectability. (*Reeves vs. Bank*, 8 Ohio St. 466; *St. Nicholas Bank of New York vs. State Nat. Bank*, 128 N. Y. 26; *Exchange Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh vs. Third Nat. Bank of New York, supra.*)

Where the note is, as in this case, payable at the bank to which it is sent, without any express authority to employ a sub-agent, we think, under our statute and the authorities, such bank cannot delegate its powers; and, if the collection is intrusted to another bank, the latter is the agent of the former bank, and has no connection with the owner.

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#### COLLECTIONS—NEGLIGENCE—DRAFT SENT TO DRAWEE.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, January 29, 1896.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CORSICANA vs. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF DALLAS.

A draft received for collection should not be forwarded direct to the drawee bank.

Where a draft so sent is not paid by reason of the failure of the drawee bank, the transmitting bank will be liable to the owner of the paper, if the draft would have been paid had it been sent through some other bank or agency.

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This was an action to recover the amount of a draft for \$2,000, which the First National Bank of Corsicana had drawn on Bonner & Bonner at Tyler, Texas, and had sent to the City National Bank of Dallas for collection. The last-named bank forwarded the draft direct to Bonner & Bonner, who failed before remitting the proceeds.

JAMES, C. J. (omitting part of the opinion): Appellee contends that the Dallas bank had all of the 14th in which to forward the draft for collection, and that because, if it had not forwarded it at the time it did, but had held it until next day, and then sent it to a third party for presentation, it would have arrived at Tyler too late to be collected; and therefore, even if it were negligent in sending the draft direct to the drawee, appellee could not be held responsible.

Admitting the correctness of the proposition that appellee would have exercised due diligence in delaying the mailing of the draft until the next day, we do not agree with the proposition that its liability for negligently forwarding the draft is to be governed by reference to what would have been the result had it waited until the last minute of the time allowed for forwarding it. It seems the only proper and rational rule would be that, when the paper is forwarded within the time allowed for doing so, its sending must be attended with ordinary care, and if it be negligently sent, and thereby lost

to the drawer, and it appear that, had it been sent in a proper manner, it would have been paid, the liability of the sending bank is determined.

The question which must decide this case, in our opinion, is whether or not, had the draft been sent through a third person at Tyler, for presentation and collection, it would have been paid by Bonner & Bonner when presented. The mailing of the draft to Bonner & Bonner, the drawees, to be by them remitted, was not the exercise of ordinary care. (*Anderson vs. Rodgers* [Kan. Sup.] 36 Pac. 1067.) In order to exonerate appellee, it should be made to appear that if, instead of thus sending the draft, they had sent it properly, through a third party, its fate would have been the same. If this appear with reasonable certainty, appellant cannot be adjudged to have been damaged by the act of appellee.

[The court then examined the facts, and held that they warranted the inference that the draft, had it been sent through another bank, would not have been presented to the drawees in time for its probable payment. The judgment in favor of the defendant was accordingly affirmed.]

#### TRUST FUNDS—RECOVERY OF AFTER INSOLVENCY OF BANK.

Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern Department, W. D. May 5, 1896.

##### RYAN vs. PHILLIPS.

Where money is paid to, and accepted by, a bank for the purpose of transmitting the same to the holder of a note made by the person so paying, and the same is by such bank mingled with its assets, and used to swell its general estate, and is not transmitted, and the bank thereafter makes an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, the money so received will be held to be a trust fund; and, though the specific money cannot be followed, a trust therefor will attach to the entire estate, which may be enforced against the assignee.

This was an action to recover from the assignee of an insolvent bank, the sum of two hundred dollars, which had been deposited in such bank to be transmitted to the Iowa Mortgage Company, to be paid on a mortgage made by the plaintiff to such company.

GARVER, J. (omitting part of the opinion): We think the decision of the district court is erroneous. The facts are undisputed, the evidence clearly showing the receipt of the money by the bank for the specific purpose of remitting the same to the holder and owner of the Sawyer note. The bank accepted the trust and assumed a duty to the *cestui que* trust (the plaintiff in error), which could be executed only by transmitting the money to her. No title to, or interest in, this fund, ever passed to the bank. Its abuse of the trust conferred no rights upon it, nor upon those in privity with it. As the money was mingled with the assets of the bank, and went to swell its general estate, a trust therefor attached to the entire estate, even though the specific fund cannot be followed. (*Peak vs. Ellicott*, 30 Kan. 156; *Myers vs. Board of Education*, 51 Kan. 87.)

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

MAITLAND, Mo., June 18, 1896.

SIR:—A bank in this town receives for collection a check drawn on us in the following form: "Pay to the order of John Jones one hundred dollars, in current funds or exchange." Are we compelled to furnish them the exchange at par? Can we legally charge them a reasonable rate of exchange, and compel them to accept the draft in payment?

PEOPLE'S BANK.

*Answer.*—The expression "in exchange" is ambiguous, for it does not indicate what exchange is meant. It might mean exchange on New York; or it might mean exchange on Chicago, or St. Louis, or London, or on any other place. The kind of exchange not being mentioned, the bank could not be required to furnish any exchange except that which it might see fit to offer, nor could the payee or his agent be required to receive any exchange except such as he might be willing to accept. The provision is too indefinite to be enforced as a part of the contract, and must be rejected as surplusage, and the check must be paid in money as in other cases, unless the collecting bank should see fit to accept the exchange offered by the drawee bank.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PAYNE, Ohio, June 9, 1896.

SIR:—Kindly answer the following question in your next issue: Is there any danger in dating a note ahead? What if maker should die before date of note? SUBSCRIBER.

*Answer.*—The rule is that a person to whom a past-dated or ante-dated note is given acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery. (See *Pasmore vs. North*, 13 East. 517; *Brewster vs. McCordle*, 8 Wend. 478; *Bayley vs. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286.) In case, therefore, the maker should die before the date of the note, the holder would be entitled to enforce the same against the estate of the maker.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

Boston, Mass., June 21, 1896.

SIR:—I desire your opinion on a question of banking law, and give you herewith the facts in the case. A, who was Cashier of a certain bank, was also Treasurer of a certain association, and had in his hands a certain sum of money belonging to said association. While Cashier of the bank in question, he drew a check against his personal account for the amount due the association, and placed the same to the credit of the association on the books of the bank in question, where it stands to-day. Shortly afterwards he retired from the Cashiership of the bank, and as Treasurer of said association, drew a check on said bank in favor of the President of said association for the amount due same, which check was presented for payment, and same being refused, was protested. The bank admits that A made the entries as above while acting in his capacity as Cashier, but sets up the defense that at the time of drawing the personal check A had nothing to his credit, and therefore the bank owes the association nothing.

A. B. C.

*Answer.*—Unless specially authorized to do so, the Cashier cannot bind the bank by the entry of a credit on its books where no money is actually received by the bank. (See *Flanagan vs. California Nat. Bank*, 56 Fed. Rep. 959.) It is true that where the interests of third persons who are not charged with notice of the facts are concerned, the bank, under certain circumstances, might be liable for such an act of the Cashier, because done

within the apparent scope of his authority. But the case stated in the inquiry cannot be brought within that exception. There the Cashier was also the Treasurer of the association to the account of which the credit was entered, and the association was charged with notice of the fact that the check was not good, and that the act was beyond the scope of the Cashier's authority. Besides, in entering such credit the Cashier was acting in his own behalf, for he was paying his own debt to the association, and under such circumstances he could not be deemed in any sense the agent of the bank. (See *Merchants' Nat. Bank vs. Lovitt* [Mo.] 21 S. W. Rep. 825.) We think, therefore, that the bank was entitled to cancel the credit when it discovered that the check was not good.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CANAL DOVER, O., June 11, 1896.

SIR:—If possible, answer the following through the MAGAZINE: P made an assignment under the laws of Ohio. P's wife made a demand, and had set off to her a homestead. P died after the filing of the inventory and previous to the filing of the petition by the assignee to sell property to pay debts. P's widow now claims homestead and real dower as widow. Assignee claims that she cannot have homestead and only a contingent dower. Which is right?

THEO. W.

*Answer.*—By Rev. Stat. of Ohio, Section 6348, it is provided that the homestead rights shall not pass to the assignee, but shall be set off by appraisers; and by Section 6351, which authorizes the sale of the assignor's real estate, it is provided that nothing therein shall impair the homestead rights; and this section also provides for setting off the wife's contingent dower. A wife's dower, however, is only contingent during the life of her husband, and the statute evidently has in contemplation cases where the assignor is still living. Where the assignor has died, his wife's right of dower has ceased to be contingent, and has become vested. As this right was one which did not pass by the assignment, we think that the wife has the right to claim her full dower rights, as well as the homestead.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

—, New York, June 24, 1896.

SIR:—If we issue to customers, say man and wife, our certificate of deposit in substance as follows: \$1,000—John Jones and Mary Jones have deposited in this bank one thousand dollars payable to the order of either or the survivor on the return of this certificate properly indorsed, J. J. Brown, Cashier, are we safe in paying the amount of the same to the survivor, in the case of the death of one of the parties? Suppose that instead of the parties being man and wife, they be two strangers, would that change your answer?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—This contract is wholly unobjectionable, and is valid in all respects, and the terms thereof would be given full force and effect. The validity of an agreement that property, whether real or personal, owned by two or more, shall pass to the survivor has never been disputed; indeed, it is one of the incidents of joint tenancy, and, except where the rule has been modified by statute, this is one of the legal incidents of a conveyance of transfer to two or more, without qualifying terms. There is no reason why persons may not be joint tenants in a bank deposit as well as in any other property. And as the statutes of New York authorize a married women to own and control property in the same manner as if she were unmarried, there is no reason why a husband and wife may not be joint tenants in the deposit, with a right in the survivor to claim the whole.

## CREDIT, CREDIT-MAN, CREDITOR.

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EXTRACTS FROM AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION  
OF CREDIT MANAGERS AT TOLEDO, OHIO, JUNE 23, 1896, BY JAMES G. CANNON,  
VICE-PRESIDENT FOURTH NATIONAL BANK, NEW YORK.

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What is credit? The term "credit" is derived from the Latin word *credo* (I believe) and its opposite word "debt" from *debeo* (I owe); and there can be no debt without credit and no credit without debt. The word implies the belief of one of the parties to a transaction in a promise made by the other and an obligation acknowledged by one party as due to the other.

Credit is indispensable; and whether it be given in the way of money or merchandise it augments the public wealth, advances the prosperity of the country and insures progress so long as it is given judiciously and wisely. On the other hand, if it be extended to parties who are unworthy and who, because of the lack of character, ability, honesty, or capital, become embarrassed, the result is extremely detrimental.

Some one has truly said that "credit never knocks at the door of the indolent, never lingers under the shadow of indecision, never smiles on good intentions that are barren of results."

Credit oftentimes becomes too cheap and is too readily obtained. As a result a period of inflation follows, until the bubble bursts and a panic ensues, which is disastrous alike to debtor and creditor. As dispensers of credit, therefore, we should be particular to bear in mind that it is highly desirable to curb the spirit of over-trading, the results of which are injurious not only to us but to those who seek favor at our hands.

### ABSENCE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

Never in the history of American commerce has there been such close scrutiny of credits as is now being made; and I believe one of the reasons to be, that a new factor is appearing in business circles in the shape of industrial and commercial corporations as applicants for credit. The personal and friendly element existing between debtor and creditor is eliminated, and corporations, said to have no souls, are rapidly being organized in place of partnerships. Thus the question of family prestige and the protection of a family name are fast ceasing to be factors. Men who would struggle to maintain their family honor and keep their family name from the records of the bankrupt court, as stockholders and managers of corporations have not the same incentives to pay their debts one hundred cents on the dollar. The history of our country is replete with instances of men compelled to succumb to disaster, who, later on, achieved financial success and proudly paid their indebtedness, principal and interest. Men who own, or mainly own, and control corporations that fail, have no need to fight for their family honor. Instead, they pose before the public as unfortunate investors in a disastrous enterprise, claiming sympathy for their losses, with no thought that there rests upon them an honorable obligation to satisfy the corporation's creditors out of any funds that fortune in the future may enable them to accumulate. Personal credit and personal honor thus screen themselves behind joint-stock companies and corporations; and the giver of credit is subjected to greater labor and is compelled to scrutinize more closely in order to protect himself from loss.

## VARIOUS POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED.

As time goes on the margin of profit in all lines of business seems to be constantly narrowing ; and in view of this condition of affairs, we all find that we cannot afford to stand the losses we formerly sustained through failures ; consequently, the lines must be closely drawn and every precaution possible taken to eliminate from the mercantile community those concerns that are unworthy of credit and whose existence constitutes a standing menace to reputable and legitimate business enterprises.

Credit can hardly be classed among the sciences ; and certainly it cannot be said to be an exact science, because it is not governed by any definite, fixed laws. I am sure, however, you will all agree with me that the dispensing of credit has become a profession in itself and the study of the subject is becoming more and more of a necessity to those who are engaged in its pursuit.

The subject of credits has been a special study with me for many years ; and while during that period considerable advancement has been made, nevertheless I feel that there are many things upon which we can get further light by an interchange of opinions in conventions of this character.

From the nature of his duties, the credit-man in any business is an important factor in determining its success or failure. Any subject, therefore, having for its object the betterment of the credit-man is a most timely one in mercantile affairs. It is not a question of how many goods can be sold, but what volume of business can be transacted with only minimum losses from bad debts, and how sales can be increased each year with a decrease in the percentage of losses. This is a subject that interests us all, for when the year closes and we make up our figures, we are naturally anxious to exhibit a satisfactory record.

The credit-man's duties are arduous and exacting. He is not only called upon to perform considerable detail work, but his mind must be ever active and alert in order not only to keep his files closely up to date, but also to be continually posted as to the present situation of his debtors.

Many credit-men endeavor to keep their information stored in the recesses of their minds. This I do not believe to be good policy. The facts as obtained should be carefully noted and put away in such convenient form as to be readily accessible. No man can safely depend upon his memory alone, and the chances are that the credit-man who follows this system will some time or other be confused as to names, and the effort to keep his mind charged with this knowledge will prove a serious strain upon his physical and mental organism.

A credit-man should be of an investigating turn of mind, and should have an agreeable yet indomitable obstinacy ; and when he has once determined not to sell a man, he should strictly adhere to his conclusion.

Unfortunately there is no concert of action among business men to-day, and the rule seems to be, every firm for itself without regard to its competitors.

The credit-men of to-day are placed at a great disadvantage because they do not frequently come in contact with the parties to whom they sell. In other words, they are at arm's length from their customers, and they do not have the opportunity of talking as freely with them and forming as close a judgment of their personal character as was possible in former times, when the merchant himself came to the business center and bought his own goods.

It is necessary that the credit-man should be a good investigator and that he should ask the right questions. In illustration of this point, I heard of a case where a credit-man called upon the head of a firm for information regarding a certain party. He asked if he sold to this party, and the reply was, "Without limit." It occurred to the inquirer before leaving that it might be well to ask the terms upon which the goods were sold, and the response was, "Always for cash." If the



credit-man had not asked this last question, he would have gone away with an erroneous impression and might have been led to check a large bill.

I think that one of the chief characteristics of a credit-man should be industry, as it requires hard work and continuous delving to secure information. He should be the possessor of a judicial mind, that he may impartially weigh the evidence placed before him.

He should be thoroughly acquainted with business systems, customs and usages, and should endeavor to ascertain if the people to whom he sells are themselves carrying out correct principles.

One of the necessary qualifications of a credit-man is conscientiousness. He should endeavor always to get at the unfavorable information regarding his customers, as facts of a favorable nature can take care of themselves.

The credit-man ought to have a well-balanced mind and should not be too hasty. He should be cool and careful, with the courage to back up his opinions. As the countenance is the index of the heart, he should be a good judge of human faces and character and able to decide quickly as to whether or not a man is telling him the truth. A great many people talk to the credit-man for effect, without coming down to facts.

The main qualification of the dispenser of credit is a trained and accurate memory—the judgment to separate and cull out the really important information and apply the remedy, whatever it may be.

The granting of credit by a bank in the way of discounts or purchases of commercial paper is a very different matter from extending credit on sale of merchandise, especially where the seller is a jobber and the lines of credit are scattered among many people for comparatively small amounts.

A good credit-man should not usually be much of a talker. He should always have a pleasant manner with all classes of people, for the reason, if for no other, that he cannot tell when some of the many whom he meets may know something which he should know.

It does not seem essential that a credit-man should have any expert knowledge of accounts; but he should have a general knowledge of the subject in order that he may be able to judge, if he goes to a concern and looks over the books, whether they are properly or improperly kept.

The credit-man should be a good listener, and, as I have stated, a good propounder of questions; and if he can get others to do the talking he can do the thinking.

#### SIGNED STATEMENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED.

The fundamental basis for all credit should be a signed statement. It is conceded by all that an applicant for credit can give better information about himself than can any of his friends or competitors. First-hand information is always preferable. While to some extent it is necessary to do business on faith, yet facts, if obtainable, will stand us in better stead. If the credit-man depends upon indefinite and hearsay information, making that the basis for credit, he has only himself to blame when a loss is the result; but if, on the other hand, he has sought and obtained a full detailed, signed statement and has carefully analyzed, weighed, and verified it so far as lies within his power, by systematic investigation, he will have the satisfaction of knowing that he did everything he could to estimate correctly the risk, and no blame can attach to him.

I think that one of the first things to be considered by this association should be the adoption of uniform statement blanks for use in obtaining information from customers. This plan has been approved by the New York State Bankers' Association, of which I have the honor of being President. This body, embracing all parts of

the State, has divided its members into groups. Each group has adopted statement forms suited to its requirements, and these forms are now being used by the banks with results that are very satisfactory to all. Each blank is stamped "Standard Form, New York State Bankers' Association," giving the number of the group; and when a blank is placed in the hands of a would-be borrower, he knows immediately that the form is approved and recommended by the Bankers' Association of New York State.

The use of these forms has had a very salutary effect, and we find that people are more ready now than ever before to give statements. All reforms in every line of business meet with more or less opposition at the start, and this one has met its share. Old houses, that have been in the habit of conducting their business without revealing the particulars of their affairs, sometimes feel a natural reluctance to making a statement of their condition; but this feeling is gradually passing away, and my conviction is, that the time is not far removed when the firm refusing to give a statement of its financial condition will not be granted accommodation at the banks.

Modern commercial firms cannot exist without borrowing; and if their financial condition and their balances at bank warrant them in asking for funds, they are entitled, as a matter of commercial custom, to the money, and the whole matter of borrowing is thus placed upon a business basis and depends not merely upon favoritism.

When a statement is received it should be carefully analyzed. It is especially desirable to investigate the personal record and character of the would-be debtor, for, after all, everything depends upon his honesty. The psalmist says, "The righteous is ever merciful, and lendeth; the ungodly borroweth and payeth not again," and the truth of this verse of Scripture is fully exemplified in this day and generation. The sacred writer also says, "The borrower is servant to the lender;" but sometimes it seems as if this was reversed, as many borrowers assume a position where they believe themselves masters of those from whom they secure credit.

In investigating the honesty of an applicant for credit it is always well to find out in an indirect way his idea as to what constitutes honesty. Another point which should receive attention is the man's ability; also the circumstances under which he started business life—whether he made his money by his own efforts, or it came to him through the assistance of his friends or relatives, or he inherited it.

A statement should show how much stock a concern carries, and what its indebtedness is, on what terms it sells its goods and whether its credits are settled by note. One should also ascertain what are the firm's running expenses and what amount is withdrawn by its members for living expenses; what accommodation it receives at its bank, and whether it is out of debt once or twice a year.

One of the principal points for investigation is the manner in which a concern buys its goods, and whether the buyer has a proper idea of what he buys, and buys in accordance with his requirements. Injudicious buying and the piling up of undesirable stock will seriously impair the resources of any concern and place it in a position where it will be difficult to turn its merchandise profitably. The old adage runs—"Goods well bought are half sold."

All statements should be analyzed with liquidation in view.

There are, generally speaking, two classes of people who make failures; first, those who will not talk at all; second, those who will tell all that anybody wants to know and a considerable more besides. A credit-man should beware of both under ordinary circumstances.

#### PAY ATTENTION TO LITTLE THINGS.

Many credit-men make bad debts because they do not pay enough attention to little things; in other words they do not appreciate the force of the saying that

"straws indicate the way the wind blows." To illustrate: A friend of mine some time since cited an instance where he had turned a party down because of information received by a member of his family from their dressmaker, to the effect that this party was not paying the dressmaker's bills promptly. He also told me of a livery-stable keeper who had given him valuable information which caused him to refuse credit to a man who had become dilatory in paying his livery bills, and who a little later on failed. Many credit-men hear and know things about those to whom they are granting credit that they do not at the time regard as significant; but when the concern fails they are reminded that they heard so and so a few years before. If they had followed up these leads, they would probably have escaped loss.

It is especially desirable also to investigate each firm closely and frequently. A great many losses are incurred because credit-men consider a man good for the reason that he has been good in the past. Each case ought to be carefully investigated about every time it comes up in order to ascertain if the party is holding his own, making advancement, or running behind.

An excellent idea can be gained regarding the credit of concerns by ascertaining the class of firms from whom they buy their goods. A poor credit risk may do business with one or two first-class houses, but it will be difficult to do business with a dozen or more houses of high standing, as houses that pay close attention to credits are not likely to sell a party of doubtful reputation. In other words, if a dozen good credit-men, whose business it is to investigate a man's standing and character, look him up thoroughly and are ready to sell him, it hardly stands to reason that all of them will be led astray; consequently if you find a man dealing with a number of first-class houses you can sell him more freely than you otherwise would.

The manner in which a firm pays its bills is an important subject for inquiry, for if a concern borrows money in the open market and also allows its bills to run to maturity, it plainly indicates that something is wrong, as it is virtually burning the candle at both ends.

The sales, capital and terms on which a house sells its goods should be carefully considered and compared. There is a proper relation between them, and a mathematical calculation will prove the truth or falsity of the statement. If we have data covering these points, together with a detailed statement, we can form a good judgment of the credit of a concern. These facts will also serve to bring to light any dead or doubtful assets, and they will frequently show whether a concern has the capital it claims. I therefore consider this information of great importance, and it should be the aim of every credit-man to obtain it.

A man's personal habits should be closely inquired into, for if he is loose in these he cannot be expected so to change his life that he will be straight in his business affairs. This leads me to say that I hope this association will give its closest attention to the punishment of those people who make false representations of their condition and thus obtain credit when their financial affairs do not warrant its extension. Another thing of which I am firmly convinced is that where a concern fails and pays a dividend of only twenty-five per cent or less, when it goes into business again it should not be accorded the same terms and privileges as a firm in the same town that has paid one hundred cents on the dollar for its stock; in other words a man who has compromised his credit should not be placed upon a plane of equality with a man who is strictly honest and honorable and has paid dollar for dollar. Too frequently the trade are anxious to commence selling to a man immediately after his failure and compromise, which only serves to encourage dishonest practices.

## NO COMPROMISE WITH DISHONESTY.

Dishonesty and fraudulent failures are attracting too little notice, and the parties are too often allowed to escape unscathed ; whereas, if they were held to a strict accountability for their crimes it would clear the business atmosphere and the result would be of great value to the mercantile community. Its moral influence would be excellent, and it would be plainly indicative to other dishonest debtors that they must expect the same fate. I sometimes feel that banks and mercantile creditors are in a measure responsible for allowing guilty parties to escape merited punishment. When a dishonest failure occurs creditors are often too anxious to secure whatever dividends may be coming to them, and this encourages the swindler in carrying out his nefarious practices.

The head of one of the largest mercantile houses in this country told me some time ago that he had caused the imprisonment of a man for deceiving him as to his financial affairs, with a result that had been surprising ; and since that time, in a number of cases, parties on the verge of making an assignment had come to him and squared up their accounts simply because they were fearful lest he should push them if they failed while owing him.

There is no good reason, to my mind, why parties who are guilty of making fraudulent failures should not be punished to the fullest extent, for there is little difference, if any, between a man who robs you of your purse and one who, by a successfully constructed network of falsehoods, has obtained money or its equivalent in merchandise from an institution or firm. Dishonesty and deceit are at the bottom of these failures, and men with propensities in that line are certainly better behind the bars, where they are restrained from doing further evil.

I am thoroughly convinced there should also be erected a bar of public opinion beyond which these dishonest parties cannot pass. They should be ostracised from the society of all honest and upright business men, and should be made to pay the full penalty of their acts.

## EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION RECOMMENDED.

Before concluding my address I cannot refrain from urging upon credit-men generally the advisability of pursuing a policy of cordial co-operation with each other. Always be ready to answer inquiries, and do not regard them as something to be avoided. To an experienced credit-man these inquiries are of great value, and he will often desire to know from what source they emanate and for what reason they are made. I have talked with a great many credit-men regarding this matter, and they tell me that they generally receive from the inquirer more information than they impart. "Scanty fare for one will oftentimes make a royal feast for two."

If you have a good thing, do not hesitate to let your neighbor have the benefit of it. Some people are so narrow-minded that they frequently stand in the way of their own advancement. I am acquainted with a concern that has been quite prominent in matters relating to credits, and it has been the policy of the gentlemen connected with it to make known to the business community any new methods followed by them, in order to better educate business men in lines where reforms are needed. The result has been very satisfactory, thereby benefitting all mercantile interests.

It is customary and recognized as an unwritten law among reputable and scientific physicians universally to make known to the medical profession at once any valuable or important discoveries they may make in medicine or surgery. This is done for the sake of mankind and differs essentially from the policy pursued by the selfish physician who keeps such discoveries to himself and uses them to advance his own personal ends. Fortunately, physicians governed by such selfish motives are very largely in the minority and are not in good standing among their professional brethren.

Take the wonderful discoveries of Dr. J. Marion Sims. He was one of the foremost surgeons of his day, and made some of the most brilliant discoveries in that field that the world has ever known. No sooner, however, had he put them on a firm basis and satisfied himself of their great value than he gave the operations in full to the medical profession for the benefit of their suffering patients.

Another case in point was the discovery of the use of cocaine, which was made by a young physician in the government laboratory in Vienna. As soon as Dr. Koenig, its discoverer, had become convinced of its value he immediately made it known to the medical world. If he had retained the secret and utilized it alone he could undoubtedly have amassed an enormous fortune in the course of a few years.

These illustrations, it seems to me, should influence us who make a study of credits to give to the business world at large the benefit of any new methods that we may work out along these lines, and not regard our ideas in the light of our own individual property.

If this association can be organized on broad lines, free from any clique, or manipulation, or influence of men who desire to have it support some pet theory, and will work entirely for the best interests of its members, I predict for it a success far ahead of any that its promoters ever thought of or conceived.

**EDITOR, BANKER AND LEGISLATOR.**—In a recent review of the organization and progress of the New York State Bankers' Association, including sketches of the chairmen of the various groups, the "Banking Law Journal" says:

"Bradford Rhodes, Chairman of Group VII., New York State Bankers' Association, is best known to the bankers of the country as the editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, which he recently purchased and consolidated with RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING. He is also an active banker, being President of the Mamaroneck Bank, and also President of the Union Savings Bank of Westchester County, both at Mamaroneck, N. Y.

Mr. Rhodes served three consecutive terms in the Legislature of New York, and as Chairman of the Banking Committee was instrumental in securing the improvement of the banking laws of the State in a number of important particulars.

On several occasions he has contributed papers on banking subjects before conventions of bankers, his plan for currency reform presented at the Baltimore convention of the American Bankers' Association, and subsequently in amended form at the Atlanta convention of the same body, having received wide attention and general approval.

Mr. Rhodes takes a keen interest in the meetings of Group VII., and has worked energetically in behalf of a closer and more practical organization amongst the bankers of the State.

In addition to his connection with the New York State Bankers' Association, Mr. Rhodes is a member of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association."

**VETOES OF FINANCIAL MEASURES.**—In the opinion of the "St. Louis Globe Democrat," the passage of the Bland-Allison Act over the veto of President Hayes was a fateful hour in the business history of the United States. It says:

"Three Presidential vetoes of financial measures since the war stand out prominently on the records. These are Grant's negative on April 22, 1874, of the greenback inflation bill, Hayes', on February 28, 1878, of the Bland-Allison silver coinage bill, and Cleveland's on March 29, 1894, of the silver seigniorage measure. Two of these, Grant's and Cleveland's, stood. Unhappily a two-thirds vote was mustered against Hayes' veto, and set it aside. That was a fateful hour in United States business history. Every financial ill with which the country has been afflicted in the past eighteen years can be traced back to the setting aside of the Hayes veto. February 28, 1878, ought to be painted black in the nation's calendar, like the day when Brennus captured Rome was in the calendar of that city. Compared with the heroic grandeur of these vetoes, all the political blunders which their authors committed are light in the balance."

## WORLD'S PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1895.

Following is an estimate of the world's production of gold and silver for the calendar year 1895; also a *resume* of the world's production and yearly averages of the production of the precious metals for this century, together with the yearly averages for the same for the United States. Compiled by Ivan C. Michels, Washington, D. C.:

	GOLD. <i>Coinage value.</i>	SILVER. <i>Coinage value.</i>
United States.....	\$53,697,388	\$63,148,000
Africa.....	46,476,540	27,580
Argentine Republic.....	116,400	1,652,200
Australasia.....	43,654,200	24,245,000
Austria-Hungary.....	1,498,500	2,485,200
Bolivia.....	71,200	28,369,500
Brazil.....	3,020,100	10,450
British Guiana.....	2,428,100	none.
British India.....	4,127,960	none.
Canada.....	1,110,000	415,400
Central America.....	510,000	2,100,000
Chili.....	508,200	3,875,500
China.....	7,128,600	760,000
Corea.....	428,000	28,700
Dutch Guiana.....	682,100	none.
Ecuador.....	72,200	9,800
France.....	175,100	3,970,200
French Guiana.....	1,470,120	none.
Germany.....	2,020,100	7,965,000
Great Britain.....	58,250	315,400
Greece.....	none.	1,170,100
Italy.....	105,200	1,060,450
Japan.....	478,850	2,158,400
Mexico.....	4,180,550	61,285,000
Norway and Sweden.....	58,955	350,000
Peru.....	75,100	5,162,000
Russia.....	29,185,400	525,200
Spain.....	none.	3,152,825
Turkey.....	7,800	65,140
Uruguay.....	150,200	1,200
United States of Colombia.....	2,285,250	3,150,400
Venezuela.....	850,000	1,800
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$307,588,348</b>	<b>\$217,800,445</b>

The \$217,800,445 in silver production represents the coinage value at \$1.29 per ounce pure silver. The yearly average price of pure silver was a fraction below 66 $\frac{1}{4}$  cents per ounce fine silver; hence the market value of the 168,072,121 ounces of pure silver produced in 1895 was only \$112,812,824.

According to the report of the Director of the Mint the value of the world's production of the precious metals for the calendar year 1894 was: gold, \$181,510,100; silver, \$214,481,100.

The world's yearly production of gold from the beginning of this century, 1801 to 1895, inclusive, averaged as follows:

## WORLD'S PRODUCTION OF GOLD, 1801 TO 1895.

	GOLD. Ounces.	GOLD. Coinage value.
1801 to 1810.....	571,568	\$11,515,000
1811 to 1820.....	867,967	7,606,000
1821 to 1830.....	457,044	9,448,000
1831 to 1840.....	652,291	13,484,000
1841 to 1850.....	1,790,503	36,596,000
1851 to 1860.....	4,448,193	133,398,000
1861 to 1870.....	6,109,894	123,301,500
1871 to 1880.....	5,567,062	115,061,500
1881 to 1890.....	5,123,018	106,005,500
1891.....	6,330,194	130,650,000
1892.....	7,102,180	146,515,100
1893.....	7,808,787	157,287,000
1894.....	8,737,788	180,626,100
1895.....	10,038,121	207,568,348

The world's yearly average production of silver from the beginning of this century, 1801 to 1895 inclusive, was as shown in the following table. The value given for silver is the United States coinage value of 16 to 1, equal to \$1.29 per ounce of pure silver.

## WORLD'S PRODUCTION OF SILVER, 1801 TO 1895.

	SILVER. Ounces.	SILVER. Coinage value.
1801 to 1810.....	23,746,922	\$37,168,000
1811 to 1820.....	17,885,755	22,479,000
1821 to 1830.....	14,807,004	19,144,000
1831 to 1840.....	24,798,000	34,796,000
1841 to 1850.....	25,080,842	32,440,000
1851 to 1860.....	23,791,512	37,221,000
1861 to 1870.....	39,228,778	55,717,500
1871 to 1880.....	71,046,308	91,857,500
1881 to 1890.....	100,457,689	129,884,800
1891.....	137,170,919	177,352,300
1892.....	153,151,762	198,014,400
1893.....	166,062,047	214,745,300
1894.....	167,752,561	216,892,200
1895.....	168,072,121	211,800,440

The yearly average production of both gold and silver in the United States from the beginning of this century, 1801 to 1895 inclusive, was as follows :

## PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE UNITED STATES, 1801 TO 1895.

	GOLD. Coinage value.	SILVER. Coinage value.
1801 to 1850 (fifty years).....	\$2,890,755	\$11,400
1851 to 1860.....	55,100,000	110,000
1861 to 1870.....	47,425,000	1,017,500
1871 to 1880.....	39,530,000	33,030,000
1881 to 1890.....	32,662,000	53,505,800
1891.....	33,175,000	75,417,000
1892.....	33,000,000	82,101,000
1893.....	35,965,000	77,576,000
1894.....	39,500,000	64,000,000
1895.....	53,687,383	63,140,600

Comparisons of the 1894 and 1895 production of gold and silver may be had by reference to the *MAGAZINE* for July, 1895, pages 37 and 38. It will be noticed that since 1892 there has been an important change in the relative output of the two metals.

## BANK TAXATION—INJUSTICES AND INEQUALITIES.

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*EXTRACT FROM AN ADDRESS BY HON. J. C. MABRY, CENTERVILLE, IOWA,  
READ BEFORE THE RECENT CONVENTION OF THE IOWA  
BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.*

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One phase of this discussion is to consider the relation of the banker to our assessment and taxation laws as compared with other business men and to inquire whether in practical results his business interests are on an equality with others. So far as this discussion is concerned we will assume that our law itself makes no unfriendly discrimination against him. And in many localities we may say that in the enforcement of the law there results no unequal burden to the banker, but if any escape with an excessively low assessment he is rarely the lucky man. My observation and experience in a professional way for several years have convinced me that there is no business interest that bears as great a burden of taxation, in the aggregate, as the business of banking, while at the same time it is claimed by many, based upon their ignorance of the business, and upon their suspicions, that this class of business escapes with the lightest taxation of any other kind of property.

In view of the absolute necessity of such concerns in any enterprising city or town, and in view of the high character of that class of citizens who usually preside over these institutions, it is a matter of surprise and perplexity that it should be so.

We often find factories and other concerns not only exempted from taxation for a long period of years in a city or community, but large donations and subsidies are voted to them. Many of our railroads have been built in this way and many private institutions for personal gain have been established and richly endowed; yet these institutions are no more of the bone and sinew of a community than one of our solid and reliable banking concerns. But who ever heard of a bank being presented with a large bonus by a community, or when was one ever exempted from taxation for a period of years? Such a thing is unheard of. But, referring to the ordinary taxation for State and Government purposes, there is an unfriendly discrimination against the banker.

### WHY BANKS ARE TAXED UNEQUALLY.

Let us see if we can discover any of the causes for this. One potent cause I lay to the charge of the demagogue and howling politician. And I think of all the evil and discontent that exists among the people, and the estranged feeling that exists between capital and labor in this country, he is responsible for more of it than all other causes put together. Corporate capital and wealth is his favorite theme, and with this he stirs up the masses. He preaches the doctrine that all corporate and aggregate wealth presupposes dishonesty on the part of some one, and that it is maintained by a system of dishonesty; that unequal distribution of wealth among men means that some one has lost while another has accumulated, and that it has been effected through a process of spoliation, and then assumes that the man who has been successful in the accumulation of wealth achieves the victory because he is a favored child of the Government, and especially so after he has become wealthy. According to his theory, banks are created by the Government in order to acquire a monopoly of the money of the realm.

There is, then, a widespread feeling of envy and prejudice against men of



wealth and moneyed institutions—a feeling that they have prospered and fattened upon the hardships and misfortunes of others. The banker must necessarily be a man of some means and belong to that class of so-called favorites which has grown rich at somebody's expense. There exists in almost every neighborhood, in a greater or less degree, the feeling that his accumulation of wealth is ill-gotten gain and should be distributed back to the sources whence it came, among those whose necessities have compelled them to borrow, and whose failures have been tided over by the banker.

It usually happens that the assessing officer is a man in very modest circumstances, who is anxious to take employment of that kind at a time of the year when there is not much else to do, and it often happens that the members composing equalization boards of cities and towns are of the same class, generally looking upon the banker as a sort of nabob in the community who thrives upon the necessities of others—a favorite of the Government who basks always in the smiles of legislators—a very child of the goddess of fortune. There is much ignorance through the country as to the details and real business of banking, and all these things together place the banker in a poor situation with taxing authorities to enable him to be fairly assessed.

If the assessor has occasion to consult anyone in regard to how he shall assess capital thus employed, it is never the banker but usually the man that knows the least about such a business and who has the strongest prejudice against them. When these sentiments are in the heart they will find expression in the conduct, whether private or official. The banker's property does not usually consist so much in houses and lands, live stock and merchandise, as in money, stocks, bonds and securities peculiar to his business. People will talk about stocks and bonds as if it meant moral contamination to the man that would dare to touch them. Lands and houses can be seen and counted, cattle and horses numbered and merchandise invoiced; but stocks, bonds, and money are concentrated wealth—the dollar, which is the end of all property and every financial obligation, it is said can be concealed and placed beyond the reach of taxation.

If the assessor is a man who looks upon the banker as a monopolist, a Shylock and a favored child of fortune, he will carry with him the feeling that he must exercise great care or here a vast store of wealth will escape the burden of taxation; that what he can see in plain view is only the small portion that the banker has been unable to conceal. He stands before the window of the Cashier, a hero demanding "unconditional surrender." There are stacks of gold and silver and currency, but that which he sees is but the type and representative of that which is concealed. There is a great vault in which it is supposed this wealth is concealed to prevent the robber that wants it from taking it from the one that now has it. He imagines that all the money in his jurisdiction which has escaped taxation has fled to this place as the city of refuge, and as he has captured the fugitive from justice it is "beaten with many stripes."

If the assessor is one who looks upon the banker as a monopolist, a moneyed man, as is often the case, he will encounter a wonderful ingenuity to conceal his wealth and escape taxation, and he resolves to become a terror to such men, but will be careful to "temper the wind to the shorn lamb."

All this is not idle talk, but it is the sober truth that such a feeling exists in many communities, and that it finds its way into the assessor's books in many cases. The fault is not in the law, but lies in a false conception of the business of banking and in the character of the men usually engaged in the business. They often think that all the bank has in its possession should be assessed to it, and for fear there is more than can be seen, and since the whole thing seems to be just pure money, and nothing but money, the assessment is often made a double burden. The officer

charged with this duty forgets sometimes that it is not the money and notes and securities that he must list and assess, but simply the corporate stock of the institution. But he will argue that if the stock represents all this money and wealth then he must assess it just as high as he would the actual money, and he feels that the Government is unkind because it will not permit him to assess the money, but simply the cold, unfeeling shares of stock.

I remember once several years ago being employed by a bank to represent it before the city board of equalization with a petition asking a reduction of the assessment on its shares of stock. The bank had a capital stock of \$50,000, and being the only bank in the county, it was doing a very prosperous business. The assessor had listed its banking building and lot just as other real estate, but had assessed its shares of stock to the various stockholders at \$1.10 on every dollar, under the impression that the stock was worth more than the money it represented. But he had assessed all other classes of property in the town at about 83 per cent. of its cash value. In order to allay the passion and prejudice that I realized had to be met, I urged before that august body that this bank was a real benefactor in the community and had aided and encouraged every worthy enterprise and that its managers were among our very best citizens. I tried to draw a dark picture of what the situation would be if we did not have the bank or if it should be driven out by excessive taxation. I showed that the assessment was an outrageous discrimination and surely would not be upheld by that honorable and conscientious body. That the law in its wisdom had created just such a body and selected just such men as they to prevent such outrages. Then there arose a long-haired, cadaverous looking member and pulled out of his vest pocket the last published statement of the condition of the bank, which showed a deposit of about two hundred thousand dollars, and flourished it in the air, saying that it was most outrageous that the bank having such a deposit as that should ask a reduction when it was only assessed with \$55,000. That it ought to have its property confiscated and its officers and stockholders driven out of town. His argument was conclusive and unanswerable. But others followed with such tirades against the bank, its officers and myself that I began to look for an avenue of escape. In vain did I strive to show that by authority of positive statutes and the decisions of the highest courts of Christendom that their position could not be maintained on any principle of law or justice and that the bank would be driven to its legal remedy and would cost the city a large sum. Then he of the long hair and cadaverous brow said my books might contain good law, but they didn't contain any common sense and only favored the rich and he would not be bound by what they said. The question was put to a vote and to my surprise and chagrin the infamous assessment was sustained. The case was promptly appealed and the appellate court reduced the assessment to 45 per cent. of the par value of the stock.

I have never known real estate or live stock or merchandise to be assessed at its cash value. But I have known bank stock to be assessed that high or even higher. The banker cannot complain of the assessment being lower than the law requires, if his assessment is on an equality with the others, and neither can he complain that his assessment is as the law contemplates, that is, up to the true cash value of his stock, if all other property is likewise assessed at its true cash value. But the law does not mean "cash value" for one man and about forty or fifty per cent. of cash value for another. Whatever it means, it means the same for all classes of men and of property.

The banker's property is usually moneyed capital and will be assessed as such, or as moneys and credits. By far the greatest bulk of property in every county consists of land and live stock and merchandise, and under the usual method by which assessments are made upon these, they will without a single exception be

assessed much lower than bank stock, which is regarded as moneyed capital or moneys and credits. Money invested in land or in merchandise may be just as valuable or even more so than in bank stock and in such case should bear the same burdens of taxation as bank stock. This is an evil that does not inhere in our law, but results from a wrong administration of it.

#### REMEDIES FOR UNJUST TAXATION.

What may be the best and most efficient remedy, I may not be able to show you, but certainly, if there is no other, there is legal redress for every such assessment. No one has power to impose arbitrary and fanciful values upon property or place the assessment value out of all reason simply because they are ignorant of the true value, and place upon the assessor's books a wild guess as the true valuation of the property. Bankers should be well informed as to the proper methods of assessment of their property and then fully explain to the assessing officer how to arrive at the proper valuation, and convince him that a thousand dollars in the banking business should not be assessed any higher than the same amount in the mercantile business, if the two investments are of equal paying value. Property should be valued according to its net paying qualities. There should be no aristocracy about any kind of business that should compel a higher assessment than if the same money in some other kind is of equal value. The law recognizes no such distinction.

What has thus far been said applies with equal force to all classes of bankers, whether National, State or private. In these respects they have to run about the same hazards and suffer under the same burdens. But there are some grievances which the national banker has that others do not. The State banker is purely the creation of State law, and the method of taxing him is a matter of State regulation; but with the national banker it is not so. It is true he is under the State law, but there is a higher law. He is the creation of the general Government and the Federal Government taxes him as it sees proper, and with this the State has nothing to do. A National bank could not be assessed by the State at all except by permission of the Federal statute, which creates the National bank. Section 3219 of the Federal statutes gives to the various States the right to tax the stock of a National bank, provided such taxation is not at a greater rate than is assessed on other moneyed capital within such State. It was foreseen by the national Congress that there might be a disposition among the several States to over-tax these creatures of the Federal Government and discriminate in favor of their own banking institutions created under the State law. Such a tendency has been observed in many States, and both State and Federal courts have had occasion to apply the prohibition of the Federal law containing this restriction.

In some States in the earlier days of national banking the State law did not contain restrictions of this kind and it resulted in many unjust discriminations against the national banker, and such laws were held to be in conflict with the Federal statutes on this subject and therefore void.

In the assessment of National bank stock, the Federal law is not infringed so long as it is not assessed higher than other moneyed capital. It makes no difference how high it may be assessed, so that other moneyed capital is assessed just as high. There is no remedy under the Federal statutes for any wrong except a discrimination against the National bank, and in favor of other moneyed capital within the State.

#### CONSTRUCTION OF THE FEDERAL LAW.

In construing this Federal law in cases of discrimination the question has often been raised, what is meant by moneyed capital as used in this statute? Is every investment of money "moneyed capital?" If you invest in land, or merchandise,

or railroad stock, is it moneyed capital as used in the Federal law? This became a very important question, because it was early observed that there was a tendency in the States to tax money invested in National bank stock at a higher rate than capital invested in any other enterprise in the State and which was not employed in the banking business in any proper sense. It might be in the insurance business or in railroading or the like. Then the national banker rebelled and being denied relief by the States, fled for protection to the Federal statutes, asking that he be protected from a greater rate of assessment than was imposed upon these other forms of invested capital. Then the question arose, Is there a remedy under the Federal statute? and the answer was, yes, if those investments are moneyed capital, but no, if they were not. Then there followed the question, What is "moneyed capital?" And that has been answered. The leading case and the only one that I now recall which construes it with unerring certainty and clearness is the *Mercantile Bank of New York vs. New York* (121 U. S. 188). I can do no better than to quote briefly from the opinion, in which it is said:

"The business of banking, as defined by law and custom, consists in the issue of notes payable on demand, intended to circulate as money where the banks are banks of issue; in receiving deposits payable on demand; in discounting commercial paper, making loans on collateral security, buying and selling bills of exchange, negotiating loans and dealing in negotiable securities issued by the Government, State, national and municipal and other corporations. These are the operations in which the capital invested in a National bank is employed, and it is the nature of that employment which constitutes it in the eye of the statute 'moneyed capital.' Corporations and individuals carrying on these operations do come into competition with the business of National banks, and capital in the hands of individuals thus employed is what is intended to be described by the Act of Congress. The terms of the Act of Congress therefore include shares of stock or other interests owned by individuals in all enterprises in which the capital employed in carrying on the business is money, where the object of the business is the making of profits by its use as money. The moneyed capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in securities by way of loan, discount or otherwise, which are from time to time, according to the rules of the business, reduced again to money and reinvested. It includes money in the hands of individuals employed in a similar way, invested in loans, or in securities for the payment of money, either as an investment of a permanent character or temporarily, with a view to sale or payment and reinvestment. In this way the 'moneyed capital' in the hands of individuals is distinguished from what is known generally as personal property."

Thus the question of the meaning of this phrase at length became well settled, but some other complications arose under our law, and which for a long time burdened the national banker.

#### DUPLICATE TAXATION—DEDUCTIONS.

Section 814 of our Code [Iowa] provides that in listing moneys and credits any person may deduct from the amount thereof the full amount of the debts in good faith owing by him. It will sometimes happen that a banker will have some debts of his own, and it is natural for him if he does to claim the same right under the law to deduct them from the amount of his moneys and credits as other people. This right was denied a national banker until within the last few years. If he had no other moneys or credits but his bank stock, he was not permitted to deduct any debt that he owed from the valuation of his bank stock. But in a case that arose in the southern part of the State a few years ago, in which this question was incidental to the main issues of the case, it was held that in listing bank shares the banker, if he has no other moneys and credits, shall have the right to deduct any debts in good

faith owing by him from the valuation of his bank stock. I have been told by bankers that this has saved the bankers of Iowa a great deal of money in the few years since that decision, and in years to come will amount to thousands and thousands of dollars. This question was first raised in this State, along with the question of double or duplicate taxation, in the case of the First National Bank of Albia *vs.* the City of Albia (86 Iowa, 28). It was one of the best victories for national bankers that was ever achieved in a State court. The assessment had been very exorbitant from year to year, and that old and substantial institution resolved to bear it no longer. After being assessed on its banking house and lot, into which a portion of its original capital had been invested, then it was assessed on the full valuation or amount of its capital stock, that is, the full amount or valuation of its shares was assessed to the individual owners thereof without any allowance for what had been invested in its bank building out of the original capital. Also one or two of the stockholders being indebted in a small amount on some individual account, asked to have such indebtedness deducted from the valuation of their shares of stock. All these rights the equalization board denied, and the case was carried into the courts and finally reached the supreme court, where a decision was rendered that will be a landmark for Iowa and will be a guide for many other States. The amount invested in a banking house was \$10,000, and it was assessed as real estate the same as other real estate. Then, when the shares of stock were assessed, without making any allowance for this deduction, it was held to be double taxation to the amount of \$10,000, and therefore void. The shares of stock represent the real estate, and to tax both is to make a duplicate assessment, which the law does not permit. This was a hard-fought battle and the decision is a sweeping one. It may be read with profit by any one interested in the banking business.

Thus, one by one, troublesome questions have been settled; but there are others to follow. Some of the evils and inequalities seem to be without remedy, and where the discrimination is so great as to violate all the principles of justice and equality, some law has been violated, and there is balm in Gilead for such a wound. Perfect equality is perhaps unattainable, but most of the grievances, the most glaring discriminations, are not the fault of the law, but it rests with the assessor and the equalization boards in the various localities.

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NATIONAL BANK DEPOSITS.—“The Pittsburg Banker” of a recent date presents a table showing the growth in National bank deposits in the principal reserve cities for the past thirty years. In commenting on the table, it says:

“In running down the New York column it will be noted that in the year 1879 there was an extraordinary increase from \$269,000,000 to \$510,000,000. This was due to the operations of the Specie Resumption Act, and the Treasury Department placed on deposit with the banks between \$200,000,000 and \$250,000,000 Government money. Again, back in 1871, the New York banks reported total deposits of \$322,000,000. There was a steady decrease during the year which preceded the panic of 1873, and at the close of the latter year the amount had declined to \$230,000,000. A shrinkage of \$90,000,000 then, when the aggregate of all kinds of money in circulation was only \$754,000,000, or \$18 per capita, was a much more important thing than the loss of a similar amount now, with nearly \$1,600,000,000 in circulation and a per capita of about \$22. Fluctuations of more or less violence may be traced in 1884, 1890 and 1893, marking the periods of financial disturbance which occurred in those years. The latter part of 1894, the high-water mark was recorded when the deposits reached \$571,000,000. The net gain for the thirty years was \$296,125,450, or 111.80 per cent.

Chicago makes the best showing in the table, the net increase for the period reviewed being \$102,424,681, or 976 per cent. It will be gratifying to Pittsburg's pride, however, to have the figures to prove that this city ranks next to the Western metropolis in the percentage of gain. The aggregate increase here is \$31,000,000, or 299.57 per cent. This compares with 133.11 at Boston, 135.02 at Philadelphia, 269.16 at St. Louis, 78.15 at Baltimore and 125.12 at Cincinnati.”

## BULLION VALUE OF A GOLD DOLLAR.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—In publishing some articles in behalf of the gold basis in one of our newspapers, I had occasion to make some statements in regard to bullion value of the gold in a gold dollar, and of the silver in a silver dollar. Not being familiar with these values, I asked a leading jeweler of our city, Mr. William Arnold, what was the value of the gold as bullion in the gold dollar, supposing that the gold dollar is melted down. Mr. Arnold informed me that if the silver dollar was melted, the bullion would be worth about 50 cents, and if the gold dollar was melted, the bullion in it would be worth 88 cents or 89 cents.

The accuracy of this statement in regard to the gold dollar has been questioned by a good many here. One of our citizens wrote to the mint in New York and they stated that they would give a dollar for the bullion in a gold dollar if but little of it had been lost by wear or otherwise. In other words I understand from the statement of the Director of the Mint that if you should melt down a gold dollar, they would give for the bullion in it 100 cents.

Our jeweler, Mr. William Arnold, still insists that the bullion in a gold dollar is only worth in the market at the most 89 cents. I thought perhaps you might give me a decisive opinion upon this question. I wish you would inform me what is the value of the gold as bullion in a gold dollar, supposing that the gold dollar is melted so as not to be valuable as currency. I had always supposed that there was some alloy in a gold dollar, but how much of course I could not tell. Our business men here seem to have different opinions in regard to it, and I would like to get something decisive of the matter if I can.

ANN ARBOR, Mich., June 25, 1896.

NOAH W. CHEEVER.

*Answer.*—The question propounded by our Michigan correspondent was referred to Mr. Maurice L. Muhleman, author of "Monetary Systems of the World," and Deputy Assistant Treasurer of the United States, at New York. Mr. Muhleman is a recognized authority on matters pertaining to coinage and money. His reply to the above question follows.

NEW YORK, July 2, 1896.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—In reply to your inquiry I beg to say that the value of the bullion contained in a gold dollar of the United States, when full weight, is 100 cents.

An ounce of unalloyed gold is worth at the Mint \$20.67 (plus a slight fraction when dealing with very large amounts). At this valuation a grain of gold is worth 4.30 1-16 cents.

The dollar weighs 25.8 grains, of which one-tenth is alloy, leaving 23.22 grains of pure gold. At the above-mentioned valuation per grain this would make the dollar contents equal to 99.991125 cents, and by allowing for the fractional difference the full value of 100 cents results.

Your inquirer has probably been misled by the assumption that the gross weight of the dollar is 23.22 grains; this would account for a difference of about 10 per cent.

To be more nearly exact:

Value of ounce of fine gold, \$20.67183462532+

Value of grain of fine gold, \$00.043066322136+

Very truly yours,

M. L. MUHLEMAN.

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**A Crime Against Labor.**—The greatest crime short of absolute political enslavement that could be committed against the workingman in this country would be to confiscate his labor for the benefit of the employer by destroying the value of the money in which his wages are paid. This irreparable wrong can never be perpetrated under our system of government unless the laboring man himself assists in forging his own chains.—*John G. Carlisle.*

## \* FOREIGN BANKING SYSTEMS.

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### *HOW BANKS ARE ORGANIZED AND MANAGED IN THE LEADING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.*

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[From the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency.]

In his recent annual report the Comptroller of the Currency, Hon. James H. Eckels, has collected and published some valuable descriptions of the banking systems of the world. The enquiries sent out to those who furnished the information covered the following points :

1. Give the different classes or kinds of banks.
2. What requirements must be met in order to enable each class of banks to transact business?
3. Who determines when these conditions have been satisfied?
4. Give regulations, if any, governing each class of banks as to (a) capital stock, (b) management of the bank, (c) liability of shareholders for claims against the bank, (d) reports of condition of the bank, (e) examination by Government official, (f) restrictions on the amount of loans, (g) restrictions of any other character on loans by the bank, (h) security for loans, (i) cash reserve required, (j) accumulation of surplus.
5. Give the regulations, if any, governing the receipt of deposits, and state if it is the custom of the banks to allow interest on deposits.
6. To what extent is the Government interested as a shareholder in the banks?
7. Are any of the banks permitted to conduct branch banks or offices?
8. To what extent and by what medium is information as to the condition of the banks given to the public?
9. What taxes or burdens are imposed upon the banks in return for the privileges granted them?
10. Give as full information as possible as to the closing up of the business of insolvent banks.
11. To what extent and under what conditions are the banks allowed to issue bank notes?
12. What provision is made for the redemption of such notes?
13. Please give any additional information which you think will be of interest concerning the banks.

From the reports received, which are official in most cases, a selection has been made of the descriptions of the most important foreign nations.

### CANADA.

[John B. Riley, Consul-General.]

1. (a) The chartered banks, which alone can issue notes for circulation in denominations of \$5 and upward, the smaller currency being issued by the Dominion Government. These banks are governed by the provisions of the Act 53 Vict., cap. 81, "The Bank Act." (b) Two Savings banks in the province of Quebec, the City and District Savings Bank of Montreal, and La Caisse d'Economie de Notre Dame de Quebec, which are doing business under special Act 58 Vict., cap. 82.

These banks do not issue notes for circulation and are not banks within the meaning of the bank Act (vide sec. 29). They furnish monthly returns to the Government of the state of their affairs and annual returns of their shareholders and of dividends, etc., unclaimed for five years (vide secs. 81, 82 and 83). Their stockholders are only liable for the unpaid amount of their stock (vide sec. 8). These banks have been in existence since before confederation. (c) The Government

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\* Continued from May number, page 619.

**Savings banks :** These are under control of two departments of the Dominion, viz., the Post-Office Savings Banks authorized by sections 65 to 77 of the post-office Act R. S. C., cap. 85 and the Government Savings Bank under control of the finance department, under R. S. C., cap. 121.

These banks are simply Savings banks to encourage the deposit of small savings. The limit of deposit is \$1,000 in any financial year and a maximum deposit of \$3,000 exclusive of interest. The rate of interest is  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. compounded yearly. (d) The loan and savings companies. (e) The private bankers, with reference to whom there is no Dominion legislation except that they can not issue notes nor use the title of "bank," "banking company," etc. (See sections 60 and 100 of the bank Act.)

**NOTE.**—The answers to the following questions refer only to the chartered banks, and the references are to sections of "the bank Act," 53 Vict., cap. 81.

2. They must procure an Act of incorporation from the Dominion Parliament, and then comply with the sections 9 to 17.

3. The treasury board, which is a sub-committee of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, consisting of the minister of finance, *ex officio* chairman, and five other ministers appointed by the governor-general in council.

4. (a) Capital stock : At least \$500,000, all of which must be subscribed and at least \$250,000 paid up before the bank can commence business (sec. 13). The stock may be reduced but not below \$250,000 paid up (sec. 28). (b) Management of the bank : See sections 18 to 25. (c) Liability of shareholders for claims against the bank—"double liability"—that is, to an amount equal to the par value of the shares held in addition to any amount not paid up on the shares (sec. 89). (d) Reports of condition of the bank : (a) Monthly (sec. 85). (b) Special when called for by the minister of finance (sec. 86). (c) Yearly as to shareholders (sec. 87). (d) Yearly statement of dividends, etc., unpaid for five years (sec. 88). The above are to the Government, and in addition an annual statement has to be made to the shareholders on the occasion of the election of directors (see sec. 45). (e) Examination by Government official, none. (f) The amount of discounts and loans to directors, either jointly or severally, or to any one firm or person, or to any shareholder, or to corporations, may be regulated by the shareholders by by-law (sec. 18). The amount of discounted notes and of the loans are exhibited in the annual statement to the shareholders (sec. 45), and in the monthly returns to the Government and in the monthly returns special mention is made of the aggregate amount of loans to directors and firms of which they are partners. (G) The bank can not lend money—(a) on notes of a bank (sec. 52); (b) on a share of its own capital stock, or of the capital stock of another bank (sec. 64); (c) on the security of land, ships, or of any goods, wares, and merchandise (sec. 64). See, however, sections 72 as to advances in aid of the building of a ship. (H) Security for loans : (a) Bills of exchange, promissory, etc. (sec. 64). (b) Has lien on its own shares, and may decline to allow transfer (secs. 65 and 66). (c) Mortgages upon real or personal property by way of additional security for debts contracted (sec. 68). (d) May purchase and acquire title to lands offered for sale under execution, etc., belonging to debtor to the bank, but such lands must be sold within seven years (secs. 69 to 71). (e) Warehouse receipts or bills of lading as security (sec. 73). (f) Goods, etc., to secure advances to wholesale merchants, etc., in certain cases (secs. 74 to 78). (E) Cash reserve required : None, the only provisions being (a) that no division exceeding 8 per cent. per annum is to be made, unless after making it the bank has a rest or reserve fund equal to at least 80 per cent. of its paid up capital after deducting all bad and doubtful debts (sec. 49), and (b) that of whatever reserves are held at least 40 per cent. must be held in Dominion notes (sec. 50). (F) Accumulation of surplus : None. No dividend is allowed to be made to impair the paid-up capital,



and if the paid-up capital is impaired all net profits must be applied to make good the loss.

5. See section 84 as to receipt of deposits. Most of the banks have savings-bank departments attached.

6. The Government holds no bank shares.

7. All are. See section 64.

8. Monthly returns to Government published in "Canada Gazette." List of shareholders and unclaimed balances, returned to Parliament and printed in Blue Book. Annual statement to shareholders—generally printed and published in the financial papers.

9. The banks do not pay any taxes to the Government in any way. They are, however, debarred from charging any discount or commission on official checks of the Government of Canada (sec. 103). They have to make arrangements to insure the circulation of their notes in every part of Canada at par (sec. 55), and they contribute to the circulation redemption fund (sec. 54).

10. See sections 89 to 96 of the bank, and the winding-up Act, R. S. C., cap. 129 and 52 Vic., c. 32, in amendment thereof.

11. To the extent of unimpaired paid-up capital, except in the Banque du Peuple and the Bank of British North America, which can only issue to extent of 75 per cent. of unimpaired paid-up capital. See, in this connection, section 51, subsections 1 and 2. See subsection 3 of section 51 for penalties for non-circulation. They can only issue notes of the denomination of \$5, or multiples of \$5.

12. They are a first charge upon the assets of the bank, and in case of insolvency they bear interest at 6 per cent. from date of insolvency until date named for redemption. There is the further security of the "double liability" of the shareholders and of the "bank circulation redemption fund."

13. The only points to which attention may be called, in addition to the foregoing, are that all sales and transfers of shares must be of *bona fide* shares, actually in the possession of the transferrer, this being with the view of preventing speculative sales of shares (sec. 87); that counterfeit notes must be stamped as such when presented at the bank (section 82); and that heavy penalties are imposed for violation of the provisions of the Act. Special attention is directed to the system of note circulation, which is a very elastic one, the circulation expanding and contracting as the business of the country requires, while at the same time the issue is fully protected. In the last Act (1890) three new provisions were made: (1) The establishment of the bank circulation redemption fund, to give additional security for the redemption of the circulation in case of insolvency; (2) The notes bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent. in case of insolvency, the intention being to prevent the notes going under par, and (3) compelling the bank to establish agencies throughout the Dominion, so as to prevent a discount being charged on their notes. The charters of the banks will expire on July 1, 1901, and further legislation will be required before that time. The Dominion Government, under certain restrictions, may issue Dominion notes to any amount.

## MEXICO.

[M. Romero, Mexican Minister.]

As in the United States, banking in Mexico is a State affair—that is, the Federal Government issues grants to several banks in the Federal district, which includes the city of Mexico, and in the territories, and each State has a right to issue a charter to banks established within her own limits; but the Federal Government, by taxation and other means, can monopolize banking. The Federal Government chartered several banks previous to 1882, but only one was successful and is still in existence, formerly called the Bank of London, Mexico and South America, which

has been reorganized and is now called the Bank of London and Mexico. The other few chartered banks were consolidated in 1884 into one, called the National Bank of Mexico, which has the exclusive right to issue notes, which are received in payment of all taxes, but the Government does not guarantee them and only authorizes the bank to make that issue. The bank can issue notes for three times the amount of its capital and deposits not of a confidential character. To supervise the amount of the notes issued by the bank, so that they shall not exceed the amount allowed, the Government appoints two officers to act as supervisors of the bank for the purpose aforesaid. That bank has a right to establish agencies all over the country and has actually established them in all the principal cities of the Republic. The bank started with a capital of \$20,000,000, of which 40 per cent. was paid up, and the balance to be called upon by the subscribers, the bank having a right to increase its capital to any amount that they thought convenient. The bank agreed to advance the Mexican Government from \$6,000,000 to \$8,000,000 at 6 per cent interest, and to collect some of the Federal revenues, charging a small commission for that service. The Mexican Government appointed the bank its agent to pay the interest of the public debt. The bank enjoys all those privileges for fifty years from the date of the charter, which was May 31, 1884. There is really only one bank in Mexico, and it stands in very much the same position as the Bank of England stands to the British Government.

**BANK OF FRANCE—CORRECTION.**—On page 614 of the May number appeared a description of the Bank of France, taken from the last annual report of the Comptroller of the Currency. A correspondent of the *MAGAZINE* in Paris directs attention to some inaccuracies in the description, in the following letter :

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—I beg to submit to you several detailed rectifications of the descriptions of foreign banks of issue, recently printed in the *MAGAZINE*. The last renewal of the privilege of the Bank of France has been voted by public power for forty years, from 1857 to 1897 (your publication puts it down to 1895, which is no doubt a printer's error.)

On page 615, May number, the term General Treasurer and Cashier has been translated "Treasury Disbursing Agent," whereas the correct translation would be "General Treasurer and Paymaster" for the reason that during half a century these officials have been acting in a double capacity. Each province formerly had one chief financial receiving Cashier and one chief paying out Cashier; the first was collecting all the dues to the Government and the other paid out all that was owing by the Government. About forty years ago it was thought that the same official could very well attend to both duties of receiving and paying out, and each province has since this period only one chief treasury Cashier. The term treasury disbursing agent is misleading and creates the impression that this official is only paying out, whereas as a matter of fact he collects and pays out.

The Bank of France has at the present moment in circulation notes of the following denominations: 5,000, 1,000, 500, 200, 100, 50, 25, 20, 5 francs, but at present it only issues notes of 1,000, 500, 200, 100 and 50 francs. All the other denominations, of which a fairly large quantity is still in circulation, are honored by the bank and on demand paid to bearer. It is legally incorrect to state "the bank may pay in silver if it chooses but in fact it pays in gold." The Bank of France pays its notes in silver or gold at its option, in the same way as private individuals who owe a debt in France get rid of 20, 10 and 5 franc pieces in gold or 5 franc silver pieces, as they have them at hand. Similarly the Bank of France, according to circumstances, makes use of the privilege of bimetalism to pay its notes, one time in silver, another time in gold, and sometimes part in gold and part silver.

The notes of the Bank of France are also guaranteed by the share capital (fr. 182,000,000). The organization of the Bank of France comprises: 1 main office in Paris; 94 branches; 88 auxiliary offices; 23 places resorting from one of these offices; 105 affiliated towns—Total, 261 bank places.

A. DE MALARCE.

PARIS, France.

# REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION.

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## *A STRAIGHT GOLD PLATFORM ADOPTED—BOLT OF THE SILVER MEN.*

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The Republican National Convention met at St. Louis, Mo., June 16, and on June 18 placed in nomination for President, Wm. McKinley, Jr., of Ohio, and for Vice-President, Garret A. Hobart, of New Jersey.

### FINANCIAL PLANK OF THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

The part of the platform relating to the finances is as follows :

The Republican party is unreservedly for sound money. It caused the enactment of the law providing for the resumption of specie payments in 1879; since then every dollar has been as good as gold.

We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are therefore opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States, and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth.

A minority report favoring a free silver substitute was read by Senator Teller, of Colorado, as follows :

We, the undersigned, members of the committee on resolutions, being unable to agree with that part of the majority report which treats of the subjects of coinage and finance, respectfully submit the following paragraph as a substitute therefor :

The Republican party favors the use of both gold and silver as equal standard money, and pledges its power to secure the free, unrestricted and independent coinage of gold and silver at our mints at the ratio of 16 parts of silver to 1 of gold.

In presenting the minority report Senator Teller spoke with great earnestness and from a high sense of duty. That he was moved by a strong conviction and firm devotion to principle was evidenced by the deep emotion that characterized his remarks. His course in leading the silver cause was sincere, open and manly and won the admiration of many who believed him to be mistaken in his financial opinions. Senator Teller's speech, which was the one striking event of an otherwise listless and apathetic convention, was in part as follows :

### SPEECH OF SENATOR TELLER, OF COLORADO.

Loyalty to my own opinion compels me, in the face of unusual difficulties, to present this substitute for your consideration, not with that abiding hope, nor with that courage with which I have presented the same in other bodies with greater measure of success than I have hoped for here. The great and supreme importance of this question is alone my excuse for the few words which I have to say to you. I have dealt with this subject in a public capacity for now twenty years. I represent a State which produces silver, but I want to say to you here now that my advocacy of the proposition is not in the slightest degree influenced or controlled by that fact.

I contend for it because I believe there can be no sound financial system in any country in the world that does not recognize this principle. I contend for it because since 1873, when it was ruthlessly stricken from our statutes, there has been continued depreciation of all the products of human nature and human energy. I contend for it because in this year, 1896, the American people are in greater distress than they ever were in their history. I contend for

it because this, in my judgment, is the great weight, the great incubus which has weighed down enterprise and destroyed progress in this favored land of ours. I contend for it because I believe that the progress of my country is dependent upon it. I contend for it because I believe that the civilization of the world is to be determined by the rightful or wrongful solution of this financial question. I am tolerant of those who differ from me. I act from my judgment, enlightened as well as I have been enabled to enlighten it by many years of study and many years of thought. In my judgment the American people, in the whole line of their history, have never been called upon to settle a question so great to them as this. I think that this is not a question of politics, but a question of principle. It is not a mere idle thing, but one on which hangs the happiness, the prosperity, the morality and the independence of American laborers and American labor and American producers. For the first time in the history of this great country we are confronted with the danger of a financial system which, in my judgment, will be destructive of all the great interests of this land.

The platform contains some platitudes about an international conference. It provides that we will maintain the gold standard in this country until the principal nations of the world shall agree that we may do otherwise.

Gentlemen of the Convention, you will have no bimetallic agreement with all the great commercial nations of the world. It cannot be obtained. And so this is a declaration that the gold standard is to be put upon this country and to be kept here for all time. Do you believe that Great Britain, the principal commercial nation of the world, our powerful competitor in trade and commerce, will ever agree to open her mint to the free coinage of silver or consent that we shall open ours so long as she gets the advantage of the low prices and of depreciating values brought about by the adoption of the gold standard in 1873?

In a partial degree only are we the great debtor nation of the world. Great Britain is the great creditor nation. We pay her every year millions and hundreds of millions as income upon her investments in this country or upon her loans. The gold standard, in my judgment, lowers prices and decreases values; and she buys of us millions and millions more than she sells. She buys upon the gold standard, which is a lowering and depreciating standard. How long do you think it will be before she will agree to a system of finance that raises the prices of our foreign products or of the products of our mines? This proposed financial plank is a declaration that the Republican party intends to maintain low prices and stagnant business for all time to come.

Under existing conditions we undoubtedly have the gold standard. I do not deny that. What you have sought for twenty years is to change it into a bimetallic system. I have believed, and I now believe, that when the Almighty created these twin metals of coin, He intended that the world should use them for the purposes for which they were created. And when He blessed this land of ours with more gold and more silver than any other country in the world, He meant that we should use them for the purpose for which they were intended, to wit, as money for the people. We to-day reverse the traditions of our country and declare that we will use only the one of these two metals. If the American people are in favor of that, I have nothing to say. I must submit to the majority vote and majority voice in this country of ours. I do not believe it. I do not believe that the people are in favor of a single gold standard. I believe that ninety per cent. of the American people are in favor of bimetalism in the old-fashioned meaning of the word up till 1873.

I have formed my convictions of this great question after twenty years of study, after twenty years of careful thought and careful reading. I have been trained in a school which, it seems to me, ought to fit me fairly well for reaching just conclusions from established facts. I have formed my conclusions to such an extent that they have become binding on my conscience. I believe that the adoption of the gold standard in the United States will work great hardships, that it will increase the distress, and that no legislation touching the tariff can relieve the difficulties which all now admit prevail in this land. I believe that the whole welfare of my race is dependent upon a rightful solution of the question; that the morality, the civilization, nay, the religion of my country, is at stake. I know and you know that men in distress are never patriotic nor brave. You and I know that hunger and distress will destroy patriotism and love of country. If you are to have love of country, patriotic fervor, and independence, you must have your citizens comfortably fed and comfortably clothed. That is what made me a Republican in 1853. That is what made me a Republican during all those years. It was because I believed that the Republican party stood for the great mass of men, and that its legislation was intended to lift up and elevate, and hold up and sustain the unfortunate and the distressed, and to give to all American citizens equal opportunities before the law. I do not believe that that will be had with the gold standard. You may doubt my judgment. Many of you will, but why should I doubt it? I must act on my own judgment and not on yours. I must answer to my conscience and not to that of my neighbor. I must do my duty as it is presented to me and not as presented to you. I say to you now that, with the solemn conviction upon me that this plank means disaster to my fel-

low men, I cannot subscribe to it, and I must, as an honest man, sever my connection with a political organization which makes that one of the main articles of its faith.

I would not on my own judgment, carefully as I have attempted to prepare it, take this step alone. But, my friends, I am sustained in my views of the danger that is coming to us and coming to the world by the adoption of the gold standard. I am sustained in it by the intelligence of the entire world. The best thought of Europe, the best thought of the world is with the advocates of bimetallism. All of the great political speakers of Europe, except five or six, are the pronounced advocates of unrestricted and unrestrained bimetallism; and all of the great teachers of political philosophy in European colleges, without a single exception, are in favor of bimetallism. My own judgment, arrived at as I said to you with careful preparation and careful study for twenty years, bears me out and puts me in accordance with them. And I would be recreant to my trust given to me by the people of my State if I came here to protest and I failed, when the Republican party makes the single gold standard one of the tenets of its faith, to sever my connection from that party.

Do you suppose that myself and my associates who hold with me and who take the same view of it that I take—do you suppose that we can take this step without distress? Do you suppose that we can take it for any personal advantage or for any honors that can be conferred upon us? With us it is a question of duty. You may nominate in this convention any man you choose; if you put him on the right kind of a platform I will vote for him. You may take any method to nominate him which you think proper; I will defer to your judgment and support him if your platform is the right one. But when you ask me to surrender my conscience, as an honest man I cannot do it. I realize what it will cost us. I realize the gibes and sneers and contumely that will be heaped upon us. But, oh! my fellow citizens, I have been there before. I have been there before the political party to which you belong had a being. I advocated a cause more unpopular than the silver cause. I stood for the doctrine of free men, free homes, and free speech. I am used to detraction. I am used to abuse, and I heed it not when my judgment is with me. When the Republican party was organized I was there. It has never had a national candidate since it was organized that my voice was not raised in his support. It has never had a great principle announced in its platform that had not my approbation until now. With its distinguished leaders and its distinguished men for forty years I have been in close communication and close friendship. I have shared in its honors and in its few defeats and disasters. Do you think that we can sever our connection with a party like this unless it be a matter of duty—a duty not to one State alone, but a duty to all the people of this great land?

Mr. President, there are few men in the Republican party that have been more honored than I have been. There are few men in this convention or anywhere else who have been longer connected with this organization than I. There are few men in it who have been more active, and none in it—no, not one—that is more attached to the great principles of the party than I have been. And I cannot go out of it without heartburns and feelings that no man can appreciate unless he has endured them. And yet I cannot, before my country and my God, agree to this provision that will put upon this country a gold standard, and I will not. I don't care what will be to me the result. If it takes me out of political life I will go out with the feeling that my conscience is clear and that my countrymen have no right to find fault with me. I beg your pardon for saying so much that is personal, but I think in justice to myself and associates that we should proclaim to you that we take this step not in anger, not in pique, not because we dislike the nominees, prospectively or otherwise, but because our conscience requires us, as honest men, to make the sacrifice. We feel that it is right. Thanking you for your kind attention, retiring from you as I do, perhaps never again to have an opportunity to address a Republican convention, I cannot do it without saying that I have in my heart the hope, nay, the expectation, that better counsels will prevail, and that if you shall be foolish enough to adopt this platform and force us to leave the Republican party, better counsels will prevail and that ultimately upon a true Republican platform I shall have the inestimable privilege of again addressing you.

A vote was then taken on the motion to table the silver substitute. This motion prevailed by the following vote:

#### VOTE ON TABLING THE SILVER SUBSTITUTE.

State.	Yeas.	Nays.	State.	Yeas.	Nays.
Alabama.....	15	7	Idaho.....	—	6
Arkansas.....	15	1	Illinois.....	47	1
California.....	8	15	Indiana.....	30	—
Colorado.....	—	8	Iowa.....	26	—
Connecticut.....	12	—	Kansas.....	16	4
Delaware.....	6	—	Kentucky.....	26	—
Florida.....	6	2	Louisiana.....	16	—
Georgia.....	23	3	Maine.....	12	—

State.	Yeas.	Nays.	State.	Yeas.	Nays.
Maryland.....	16	—	South Dakota.....	6	2
Massachusetts.....	30	—	Tennessee.....	23	1
Michigan.....	27	1	Texas.....	30	—
Minnesota.....	18	—	Utah.....	—	6
Mississippi.....	18	—	Vermont.....	19	5
Missouri.....	33	1	Virginia.....	8	—
Montana.....	—	6	Washington.....	12	—
Nebraska.....	16	—	West Virginia.....	24	—
Nevada.....	—	6	Wisconsin.....	—	6
New Hampshire.....	8	—	Wyoming.....	—	6
New Jersey.....	20	—	Arizona.....	—	8
New York.....	72	—	New Mexico.....	3	8
North Carolina.....	73½	14½	Oklahoma.....	5	1
North Dakota.....	6	—	Indian Territory.....	6	—
Ohio.....	46	—	District of Columbia.....	2	—
Oregon.....	8	—	Alaska.....	4	—
Pennsylvania.....	64	—			
Rhode Island.....	8	—			
South Carolina.....	18	—	Total.....	818½	105½

The financial plank as already given was voted on separately, the vote standing 812½ in favor of the gold declaration to 110½ against it. After this the platform was adopted as a whole.

Senator Cannon, of Utah, presented the protest of the silver men.

#### PROTEST OF THE SILVER MINORITY.

In announcing the purpose asserted in this paper, it is due to our constituents and to ourselves that there shall be a public showing of vindicating facts.

The sole authorized expression of national Republican faith from June 9, 1892, until the present date has been the platform adopted in national convention at Minneapolis. Neither the utterances of State conventions nor the attitude of individuals could change the tenor of that platform or abate the sanctity of its binding force. Every delegate to this convention was elected as its adherent and its advocate. True, one of its most important paragraphs has been subjected to such a divergence of construction as to make its language unsatisfactory during the intervening time, and dangerous if continued in the future; but of the intent contained within that language there has never been a doubt.

It is the rightful province of this convention to revise the party tenets and to announce anew the party purpose. The majority of this convention in the exercise of such authority has this day made official enunciation of Republican law and gospel. With much of the platform we agree, believing that in many essential particulars it compasses the needs of humanity, affirms the maintenance of right and proposes the just remedy for wrong. But it declares one elemental principle, not only in direct contravention of the expression of party faith in 1892, but in radical opposition to our solemn conviction. We recognize that in all matters of mere method it is but just and helpful that the minority shall yield to the will of the majority, lest we have chaos in parties and in government. But as no pronouncement by majorities can change opposing knowledge or belief sincerely entertained, so it cannot oblige minorities to abandon or disavow their principles. As surely as it is requisite for peace and progress that minorities shall yield to majorities in matter of mere method, just as surely is it necessary for that same peace and progress that minorities shall not yield in matters of fundamental truth.

The Republican platform of 1892 affirmed that the American people from tradition and interest favored bimetalism, and demanded the use of both gold and silver as standard money. This was accepted by us as a declaration in behalf of the principle upon which rests the interest of every citizen and the safety of the United States. In such terms the platform was then satisfactory to the believers in bimetalism within our party; only because of equivocal construction and evasion has it since been demonstrated to be insufficient. The platform this day adopted in the National Republican Convention at St. Louis says:

"The Republican party is unreservedly for sound money. It caused the enactment of the law providing for the resumption of specie payments in 1879; since then every dollar has been as good as gold.

We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are, therefore, opposed to the free coinage of silver, except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such an agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved.

All our silver and paper currency now in circulation must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably these obligations of the

United States, and all our money, either coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth."

As the declaration of 1862 has been, by a majority of the party, construed to justify a single gold standard for our monetary basis, and as the recent trend of the official power of the party has been in that direction, we can but assume that the money plank of the new platform, being much more favorable to perpetual gold monometallism, will be determinedly used in behalf of that idea. The Republican party has won its power and renown by pursuing its purposes courageously and relentlessly; it is therefore only in accordance with the party's history to assume that if it shall come to present authority in the United States it will crystallize into law and administration under this tempting platform the perpetual single gold standard in our finances. This, if long continued, will mean the absolute ruin of the producers of the country, and finally of the nation itself.

The American people not only favor bimetalism from tradition and interest, but from that wise instinct which has always been manifest in the affairs of a people destined for the world's leadership. Under the operation of our great demand for advancement, we have become to other nations the greatest debtor nation of the world. We pay the vast charges which every year accumulate against us in the clearing-house of the world with the money of the world, procured by the disposal of our commodities in the markets of the world. We are a nation of producers. Our creditors are nations of consumers. Any system of international or national finance which elevates the price of human product makes our burden lighter, and gives promise of that day when it shall be entirely lifted and our country freed financially, as it is politically, from the domination of monarchy and foreign autocracy. Any system of finance which tends to depreciate the price of human productions, which we must sell abroad, but in so far adds to the burden of our debt and conveys a threat of the perpetual servitude of the producers of our debtor nation to the consumers of creditor nations. To us it is a folly without a parallel that this country or any political party therein should deliberately accept a money system which enriches others at our cost. History, philosophy, morals, all join with the commonest instinct of self-preservation in demanding that the United States shall have a just and substantially unvarying standard composed of all available gold and silver, and with it our country will progress to financial enfranchisement. But with a single gold standard the country will go on to worse destruction, to continued falling prices, until our people would become the hewers of wood and the drawers of water for the consumers in creditor nations of the earth.

To such an unholy end we will not lend ourselves. Dear as has been the Republican name to its adherents, that name is not so dear as the faith itself. And we do not sacrifice one jot or tittle of the mighty principles by which Republicanism has uplifted the world when we say that at this parting of the ways we cling to the faith, let the name go where it will. We hold that this convention has seceded from the truth; that the triumph of such secession would be the eventual destruction of our freedom and our civilization. To that end the people will not knowingly follow any political party; and we choose to take our place in the ranks of the great mass of citizens who realize that the hour has come for justice. Did we deem this issue less important to humanity we would yield, since the associations of all our political lives have been intertwined with the men and the measures of this party of past and mighty achievements. But the people cry aloud for relief: they are bending beneath a burden growing heavier with the passing hours; endeavor no longer brings its just reward; fearfulness takes the place of courage and despair usurps the throne of hope, and unless the laws of the country and the policies of political parties shall be converted into mediums of redress, the effect of human desperation may some time be witnessed here as in other lands and in other ages.

Accepting the fiat of the convention as the present purpose of the party, we withdraw from this convention to return to our constituents the authority with which they invested us, believing that we have better discharged their trust by this action, which restores to them authority unsullied, than by giving cowardly and insincere endorsement to the greatest wrong ever wilfully attempted within the Republican party—once redeemer of the people, but now about to become their oppressor unless providentially restrained by the votes of freemen."

The silver delegates who retired from the hall were Congressman Hartman of Montana, Senator Cannon, Congressman Allen and Delegate Thomas Kearns of Utah, Senator Pettigrew of South Dakota, Delegates Cleveland and Strother of Nevada; from Idaho the entire delegation of six, headed by Senator Dubois; from Colorado the entire delegation of eight, including Senator Teller, who carried with them their standard marking their position in the hall. The total number of those who "bolted" was thirty-four, including four Senators and two Representatives.

## BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS.

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### REPORTS OF MEETINGS IN VARIOUS STATES.

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#### NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION—GROUPS.

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##### GROUP VI.

Group VI. of the New York State Bankers' Association met at Troy, N. Y., Saturday, June 18, William Kemp, presiding.

Chairman Kemp announced the death (since last meeting) of Mr. Murray Hubbard, of Cohoes. A committee having been appointed by the chairman presented and read the following, which was unanimously adopted :

*Whereas*, Since the last meeting of this association, Murray Hubbard, Cashier of the National Bank of Cohoes, has been removed by death. His high character and excellent reputation as a banker, who for over thirty years was Cashier of the above-mentioned bank ; his thorough honesty and integrity and faithful services in said bank was evidenced by its prosperity. His kind and genial manner had endeared him to all who had the pleasure of his acquaintance.

*Resolved*, That we hereby express our feeling of sorrow at his death and record the above upon the minutes of this group, and that the secretary send a copy of same to his family.

On motion of W. H. Rainey a special committee of three on annual convention was appointed as follows : J. H. Neher, E. A. Groesbeck, W. G. Schermerhorn.

Ledyard Cogswell offered the following, which was adopted :

*Resolved*, That the secretary be instructed to send to each member of this group, a circular urging upon them the importance of sending a delegate to attend the State convention to be held at Niagara Falls, July 17 and 18.

The chairman read letters from J. G. Cannon, Bradford Rhodes, A. D. Bissell, Geo. B. Sloan and W. C. Cornwell.

The chairman introduced to the members present Hon. Stephen M. Griswold, of Brooklyn, chairman of Group VIII., who delivered a very able and instructive address.

Mr. De Ridder offered a resolution favoring Saratoga Springs as the place for holding the annual convention of the State association in 1897. Adopted.

Upon motion of Mr. Groesbeck the thanks of the members present were extended to Chairman Kemp for his generous hospitality.

In the address delivered by Mr. Griswold he stated that they had found it of advantage to their group to hold their meetings in the evening, instead of afternoon, thereby having a larger attendance. After some discussion on that subject Mr. W. A. Thompson offered the following resolution which, on motion, was adopted :

*Resolved*, That the time (of day) for holding future meetings and expense attending same be referred to the executive committee.

On motion of W. H. Rainey the matter of preparing by-laws for this group was referred to the executive committee.

F. C. HAVILAND, *Sec'y*.

##### GROUP VII.

An ideal spot was chosen for the summer meeting of Group VII., of the New York State Bankers' Association, which was held at the New Grand Hotel in the Catskill Mountains, June 26 and 27. The hotel is situated on Summit Mountain, in



the western Catskills, and commands an extensive and charming view of the surrounding mountains and valleys.

That the bankers were able to combine so much recreation and pleasure with their business meeting, and to convene at a place unsurpassed in every requisite for relaxation and comfort, was due to the courtesy of Mr. S. D. Coykendall, President of the First National Bank of Rondout, Kingston, N. Y. Mr. Coykendall provided a special train to convey the bankers and their friends from Kingston to the place of meeting, and also generously furnished the most suitable entertainment for the members of the group, the ladies and other guests, until their return to Kingston.

Bradford Rhodes, Chairman of the group, called the meeting to order at eleven o'clock, Saturday, June 27. After the reports from the several committees had been made, there was a brief discussion of the following subjects: "Country Collections," "Protection Against Bank Forgers," and "Guaranteed Endorsements."

An address was made by Hon. Frederick D. Kilburn, Superintendent of the Banking Department, on the relation of banks to the people and to each other. He was especially earnest in recommending social and business meetings like the one he was addressing. He said that if the bankers would indulge in such associations with each other more frequently there would be less unfair and undignified competition between their institutions, and that the banks would not find themselves losers through discounting bad paper as often as now happens. Recurring to the social side of the meeting, Superintendent Kilburn extolled Bank President S. D. Coykendall for having insisted upon it that no banker could attend the association as his guest unless accompanied by his wife, thus making bankers the first organized body of men in the State to accord seats at a banquet to women.

Senator S. M. Griswold, of Brooklyn, Chairman of Group VIII., also made an entertaining address.

Resolutions adopted at the previous meeting, favoring the maintenance of the gold standard, were reaffirmed and the following was also passed:

*Resolved*, That we affirm our conviction that the present monetary agitation involves questions not of mere expediency, but of integrity and righteousness, and therefore, in the interest of national honor, we hereby express our inflexible adhesion to the principle that the gold standard must be maintained.

Mr. Coykendall tendered a banquet to the association on Friday evening, which was thoroughly enjoyed by a large number of the members of the group, including many ladies, and other guests. Toasts were responded to by the following: The Rev. Dr. Charles H. Young, of the Church of the Puritans, New York city; the Rev. Drs. J. G. Van Slyke and W. W. Page, of Kingston; Bank Superintendent F. D. Kilburn; Senator S. M. Griswold, of Brooklyn; E. A. Groesbeck, of Albany, and Judge A. T. Clearwater, of Kingston.

Dr. Van Slyke made a hit by expressing the sentiment that in the approaching political campaign the banks and the churches, for once, at least, would be found fighting side by side in the cause of righteousness, although from somewhat different motives, as the bankers oppose free silver coinage because it is an attempt to rob them, while the church opposes it because it is immoral.

The reception and banquet, combined with the unusually delightful surroundings amid which the convention was held, will long make this meeting a memorable one in the annals of Group VII. Expressions of appreciation of Mr. Coykendall's liberality were universal and enthusiastic

## MINNESOTA BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Minnesota Bankers' Association met in annual convention at Minneapolis, June 9. In the absence of the president, the vice-president, J. F. R. Foss, Vice-President of the Nicollet National Bank, of Minneapolis, presided.

Mr. Foss made the address of welcome and F. E. Searle, President of the Marine National Bank, Duluth, responded on behalf of the bankers.

Reports of the secretary and treasurer were read, and also the report of the legislative committee detailing the work done in securing the enactment of good laws and in preventing the passage of measures calculated to unduly hamper the banking business.

A. R. Davidson, Cashier of the First National Bank, Little Falls, presented a petition to the State Board of Equalization reciting the unjust methods of assessing banks and praying for relief.

At the afternoon session the report of the committee on nominations was read and adopted, viz.:

President—J. F. R. Foss, Vice-President Nicollet National Bank, Minneapolis.

Vice-President—D. A. Monfort, President Second National Bank, St. Paul.

Members Executive Committee—F. H. Wellcome, President Yellow Medicine County Bank, Granite Falls; H. R. Wells, proprietor Bank of Preston; F. M. Prince, Vice-President First National Bank, Minneapolis; F. E. Kenaston, President First National Bank, Breckenridge; W. H. Putnam, Cashier Bank of Pierce, Simmons & Co., Redwing; F. A. Seymour, Cashier Merchants' National Bank, St. Paul; F. E. Searle, President Marine National Bank, Duluth; N. O. Werner, President Swedish-American National Bank, Minneapolis; C. E. Oakley, of C. E. Oakley & Co., Buffalo.

Chas. R. Hannan, Cashier of the Citizens' State Bank, Council Bluffs, Iowa, read a paper on "Banks vs. Express Companies." He dealt in a thorough manner with the points of controversy between the banks and the express corporations. In referring to the growth of the express money order business, he said:

"It is marvelous how quickly these express money orders have sprung into popularity. Why is it? Isn't it because express companies have used printer's ink and explained to people their methods of transmitting money to their customers and friends, while the old-time banker has raised his hand in horror at the use of printer's ink; but banking, like other business, is changing, and the progressive bankers, like the First National Bank of Chicago, and others, are now advertising and endeavoring to educate the people; and I take the position that a banker, if he is progressive, must assist in educating the people, letting them understand what he has to sell and the safety, cheapness and convenience of same, with his other advantages. A man must not only sell his wares at the rate of the market, but he must supply the market with what it demands. You have noticed this in the success of your live merchant, who lets people know what he has to sell and prices, as compared with the old-time merchant who never speaks through the news columns or otherwise. The time has come when we must assist in educating the new generation."

F. E. Kenaston, President of the First National Bank of Breckenridge, read an interesting paper on "Bank Taxation." He cited the following illustrations of the injustice of bank assessments:

"In this city I am credibly informed that bank stocks which sold on the market in May, 1895, at 70 cents on the dollar were assessed at full market value, and, in some instances, higher, and that other bank stocks which sold on the market at 50 cents on the dollar and less in May, 1895, were assessed at 70 cents on the dollar. Two of these banks failed before the personal property tax of 1895, for which such assessment was made, became due, and now the tax-gatherers propose to sue the poor devils of stockholders to recover the amount of the tax, which the assignees refuse to pay. If this is not the rankest injustice, I don't know what is; especially when we take into consideration the great number of industrial and

mercantile corporations in the same community whose taxes are a mere bagatelle when compared with those of the banks.

I will now call your attention to the great disparity between the assessed valuation of acre property, including farm lands and that class of personal property assessed as bank stock in this State, and, as to valuations of the former, will quote from a paper recently prepared and read at a conference of citizens of the Twin Cities and Duluth. So far as I have been able to verify the figures, I have found them correct. The average assessed value of acre property in Minnesota, in 1875, was \$8.19 per acre; in 1895, \$7.71 per acre, a reduction in assessed value of 5.86 per cent. in the twenty years intervening, notwithstanding wonderful growth enjoyed by the cities, towns, villages and agricultural portions of the State in population and improvements, which tended to enhance value during that period.

In one western county, with which I am quite familiar, fifty improved farms, including buildings, fences, etc., actually worth and selling in the open market at \$35 per acre, several of them having recently changed hands at that price, are assessed at about \$7 per acre; and in other and older settled portions of the State, where farm lands sell at \$40 per acre and more, there is a still greater discrepancy, and no one knows these facts better than the five farmers, two real estate agents and the two capitalists who make up the majority of the State Board of Equalization, and yet they remain silent as to this class of property while making their onslaughts upon the banks. It reminds one of the chap who cries 'Stop thief!' while stuffing his pocket with stolen goods."

Gustav Willius, President of the Germania Bank, St. Paul, in participating in the discussion of the subject of bank taxation, said that all that was needed to secure just assessment was a vigorous resistance where banks were not fairly taxed. He referred to an instance where a bank got a reduction of 50 per cent. on its assessment by refusing to pay without litigation.

A motion was adopted providing for securing proper representation of the bankers on the State Board of Equalization.

There was some discussion as to the expediency of adopting a resolution in favor of the gold standard, some of the members deeming such action impolitic, but this sentiment did not prevail and the Chair appointed as a committee to prepare a resolution, Messrs. Kenaston, Parsons, March, Anderson and Farmer, who presented the following:

*"Resolved, That the Minnesota Bankers' Association, in convention assembled, unequivocally indorses the present gold standard, until such time as the great commercial nations of the world change this standard by international agreement."*

On motion of Mr. Willius, of St. Paul, the resolution was adopted by the convention amid cheers and enthusiastic applause.

This most interesting and profitable meeting of the Minnesota bankers concluded on June 10 with a banquet at the West Hotel. There were many other recreative and social features of the meeting which fully attested the thoughtful preparation made by the Minneapolis bankers for the entertainment and pleasure of their guests.

#### TENNESSEE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Tennessee Bankers' Association met at Lookout Inn, near Chattanooga, June 17 and 18.

After the customary address of welcome and the response, the president's address was read by C. F. M. Niles, President of the Continental National Bank, Memphis. John W. Faxon, Assistant Cashier of the First National Bank, Chattanooga, presented the secretary's report.

A. J. Rooks, Cashier of the Fayette County Bank, Somerville, read a paper on "Our Financial Condition—Its Cause and Its Remedy." He attributed the currency troubles largely to the fiat element in the circulation. His suggestions for remedying the existing defects were as follows:

First—We should have a clear and unequivocal declaration by Congress that gold payments will be maintained, and the fact made known to the world that this Government is

undoubtedly on a sound money basis, and will never consent to the free coinage of silver, if at all, at any but the commercial ratio.

Second—The prompt retirement of the fiat money issued by the Government and the substitution in its place of an elastic bank currency that will respond promptly and naturally to the business needs of the country.

The issue of money by the Government to place it upon a level with the great nations of the world should be confined to gold coin, silver coin only to such amount as the activity of the business of the country demands, and Government paper issued on deposit of gold coin simply as a matter of convenience, which certificates should be legal-tender and receivable for all dues, both public and private. This would stop the secreting of gold and its retirement from circulation.

This action would place us upon a level with the great commercial nations of the world.

With England, which has no Government paper, and only as much silver as can be readily assimilated.

With Germany, which has no Government issue except thirty millions of dollars, covered completely by gold in reserve.

With France, which has no Government paper whatever, and the notes of its bank of issue are almost completely covered by its gold reserve.

With Switzerland, which has no Government paper issue whatever.

With Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which have no Government paper issue, and are strictly on a gold basis.

These are the nations with which we trade, and with whose financial system we should be in accord.

No Government paper can have the element of elasticity. The issue by the Government of paper money other than certificates of deposit of the coin itself can only be arbitrary in its character, and under no circumstances can it respond to the demands of trade. It is just as necessary that the currency of the country be contracted in dull seasons as that it be expanded when business is active. If not, when it is not occupied in "moving the crops" and otherwise facilitating business, it will be invested in speculative enterprises, and not be at hand when business demands its use again.

A bank circulation such as that of the Scotch banks and Canadian banks has the true requirements of a bank note issue—it is safe, sound and elastic. Had our bank circulation the element of elasticity and subject to daily redemption, there would be but one other need to place us on an equality with the most favored nations in money matters, and that is the equalization of interest rates as near as possible throughout the country. This can be done most effectively and with least friction by the system of branch banks, which is a feature of Canadian and Scotch banking. Such a system could be readily applied to our present national banking system by allowing all National banks of a sufficiently large capital to establish branches at such other points in the country as they may desire. The issue of notes other than such as are secured by the present system could be allowed to banks of sufficient capital, all banks accepting the provision of such note issue contributing to a common guarantee fund. In order to keep the profits of such circulation within reasonable limits, a graduated tax could be levied on the circulation, varying with the amount of outstanding circulation, so that when there was no active demand for money for legitimate business enterprises, the circulation would be reduced accordingly; and, on the other hand, when the demand for money was great, the circulation could be expanded to meet that demand.

This, we will say, is the ideal condition. How are we to approach it from our present position?

It will be almost impossible to get Congress to adopt an entirely new banking system and fiscal policy in one Act, but the main benefit to be derived can be gained by gradual steps. First, let us take the tax off of bank circulation and allow the banks to issue 100 per cent. on the par value of their bonds; if desirable, a new bond could be issued, bearing a low rate of interest, with which the outstanding Treasury notes, coin notes, etc., could be redeemed, and 100 per cent. circulation allowed on such bonds only. Any measure that would allow the banks a small modicum of profit would be readily accepted, and I believe a small profit on the issue of bank notes is better for the banks, as well as the country at large, than a large profit, as the latter would cause the multiplication of banks beyond the needs of the country, while a small profit would only facilitate the circulation of the bank notes, and thus relieve the Treasury from the constant strain of the circulating medium.

If bonds are not issued to retire the Treasury notes, by increasing the bank circulation and holding fiat paper that comes into the Treasury to a corresponding amount, the same relief may, in some degree, be had.

Whatever is done to restore the equilibrium of our currency will, in all probability, be done by degrees, and not by one gigantic measure of relief.

I have no doubt we are now in the midst of a fiat money craze that seems to strike the

country periodically, and as soon as it blows over, our people of all parties will get together and cause the enactment of such measures as will place our country firmly on the Gibraltar of a sound and secure system of national finance. The day such relief comes will, I am sure, be welcomed by a large majority of all who are in daily contact with the finances of the country.

Other papers read at the first day's session were: "Bank Directors," Michael Savage, director First National Bank, Clarksville; "The Quality Theory of Money," Robert Lund, C.E., Vanderbilt University; "Do Usury Laws Lower the Rate of Interest?" J. L. Maxwell, Jr., Cashier Union Bank, Knoxville; "Some Underlying Causes for Distress in the United States," Herman Justi, stock and bond broker, Nashville; "The Banks and the Express Companies," Charles L. Loop, Traffic Manager Southern Express Co.

In the latter address it was contended that the express business did not compete with the banks to the extent assumed by many bankers, and that generally the express money orders were issued at the smaller towns without banking facilities. He also claimed that the express money order system was a public benefit in that it permitted the transmission of money at about one-third or one-fourth the rates at which the currency could be sent in sealed packages.

"Should Private and National Banks Encroach upon the Rights of Savings Banks by Paying Interest on Deposits," was the topic of a paper read by W. A. Sadd, Secretary Chattanooga Savings Bank. This paper was followed by a discussion of the same topic. Other papers were: "Gratuitous Services Done by Banks," E. G. Oates, Cashier Mechanics' National Bank, Knoxville; "Bank Deposits as Currency," J. L. Hutton, Cashier Phoenix Bank, Columbia.

John W. Faxon, Assistant Cashier of the First National Bank, Chattanooga, presented the following resolution, which was adopted:

"Whereas, The Tennessee Bankers' Association does not share in the fanatical delusion that the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 is a catholicon for all the financial ills the world is heir to; therefore, be it

"Resolved, That we firmly believe that the standard of value in the United States should continue to be the dollar, containing 25.80 grains of gold, 900 fine, and that any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to lower the standard will not only be detrimental to the future welfare of all classes of citizens, except silver mine owners, but will also be disastrous to the entire business interests of the country, besides inflicting a financial curse upon the people from which the present generation will never recover.

"Resolved, That silver coin and paper currency can only be useful as a circulating medium so long as they are issued in such amounts and denominations as is convenient for the requirements of business without imposing unnecessary expense upon the Government, for their redemption, to maintain a parity with gold."

At the closing day's session the following papers were read:

"Why Should the Masses Have an Antipathy to Banks?" J. Arnold, President Bank of Cookeville; "The Trust Company Question," Guy M. Walker, Memphis.

Officers were chosen for the ensuing year as follows:

President—D. N. Kennedy, President Northern Bank of Tennessee, Clarksville.

Vice-Presidents—Chas. A. Iyerly, President of the Chattanooga National Bank, Chattanooga; J. L. Hutton, Cashier Phoenix Bank, Columbia; T. J. Latham, Cashier Memphis National Bank, Memphis.

Executive Committee—for two years, W. A. Sadd, Secretary Chattanooga Savings Bank, Chattanooga; (for three years), Q. Shumate, Cashier Newbern Bank, Newbern; B. F. Myers, Cashier Bank of Goodlettsville; S. B. Luttrell, President Mechanics' National Bank, Knoxville.

Secretary—John W. Faxon, Assistant Cashier First National Bank, Chattanooga.

Delegates to American Bankers' Association—C. F. M. Niles, President Continental National Bank, Memphis; Herman Justi, Nashville.

The next meeting will be held at Nashville at a date not yet fixed.

## WISCONSIN STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The fourth annual convention of this organization met at Racine June 11.

George W. Burton, Cashier of the National Bank of La Crosse, La Crosse, and President of the association, called the convention to order.

Mayor David G. Janes made the address of welcome, which was responded to by John P. Murphy, Vice-President of the Milwaukee National Bank.

President Burton read his annual address, after which Chas. F. P. Pullen, Cashier German-American Bank, Milwaukee, presented the secretary's report. It showed that there were 178 banks in the association. The association is in excellent condition. The treasurer's report was next read, showing a balance on hand June 26, 1895, of \$582.96. There has been received for dues \$890, making the total \$1,472.26. The expenses were \$556.20, leaving a balance in the treasury of \$916.06.

A. J. Frame, President of the Waukesha National Bank, spoke on "Monetary Integrity and Commercial Prosperity." He quoted Gresham's law and the earlier statements of the same principle by Oresme and Copernicus, to show the effect of bad money on good. [The substance of Mr. Frame's address will be printed in the August number.]

Lyman J. Gage, President of the First National Bank, of Chicago, spoke on "Banking in Relation to Business." He referred to the tact and good judgment of some bankers and the recklessness of others. Mr. Gage closed his remarks with an exhaustive review of the financial problem, advocating sound money.

The following resolution was adopted:

*Resolved, That the Wisconsin Bankers' Association is absolutely and unalterably opposed to the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, because it would lead surely to a debased standard of value and operate as a direct swindle to creditors, and particularly to all wage-earners and people of fixed incomes and salaries.*

*This association is opposed to the free, unlimited and independent coinage of silver at any ratio, because we believe the maintenance of any fixed ratio to be impossible. History proves conclusively that the commercial and coinage ratio will not remain identical, and that a very slight variation is sufficient to drive the undervalued metal out of the market.*

*We believe in maintaining the present gold standard, and in the use of so much silver only as can be safely kept on a parity with gold.*

Officers were chosen as follows:

President—A. J. Frame, President Waukesha National Bank.

Vice-Pres.—J. W. P. Lombard, Vice-Pres. National Exchange Bank, Milwaukee.

Treasurer—M. B. Greenwood, Cashier Batavian Bank, La Crosse.

Secretary—Chas. F. P. Pullen, Cashier German-American Bank, Milwaukee.

District Vice-Presidents—First, E. Latimer, President E. Latimer & Co., Delavan; Second, Geo. C. Congdon, Cashier German National Bank, Beaver Dam; Third, Richard Meyer, Sr., Lancaster; Fourth, Washington Becker, President Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Bank, Milwaukee; Sixth, James B. Perry, Cashier First National Bank, Fond du Lac; Seventh, L. Lottridge, La Crosse County Bank, West Salem; Eighth, W. P. Wagner, Cashier Citizens' National Bank, Green Bay; Ninth, C. F. Latimer, Cashier Northern National Bank, Ashland; Tenth, L. M. Newman, Cashier First National Bank, Chippewa Falls.

Delegates to the American Bankers' Association—Geo. W. Burton, Cashier National Bank of La Crosse; A. J. Frame, President Waukesha National Bank; F. G. Bigelow, President First National Bank, Milwaukee; W. S. Reynolds, Cashier Iron Exchange Bank, Hurley.

Executive Council—(for three years), James K. Ilsley, Cashier Marshall & Ilsley Bank, Milwaukee; Geo. L. Field, Cashier First National Bank, Ripon; Ira A. Hill, President Bank of Sparta, Sparta.

In the evening the delegates were given a banquet at the Hotel Racine, at which toasts were responded to by Governor Upham, Associate Justice John B. Winslow, Charles H. Lee, Thomas M. Kearney and others.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—At a meeting of the board of directors of the Bank of New Amsterdam, July 7, Frank Tilford, of the well-known firm of Park & Tilford, was elected President, to succeed the late Geo. H. Wyckoff. R. Reed Moore, the Cashier, was elected Vice-President to succeed Mr. Tilford. R. A. McCurdy was chosen a director.

—The Mercantile National Bank has elected F. B. Schenck President to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of W. P. St. John. Mr. Schenck has been connected with the Mercantile National since 1881, and has been Cashier since 1883. For the present James V. Lott, the Assistant Cashier, will act as Cashier. Chas. M. Vail has been chosen Vice-President.

—George H. Wyckoff, President of the Bank of New Amsterdam, was shot in the President's room of the bank, June 15, by a man who had just demanded of him \$3,000 in cash. His assailant also shot himself fatally at the same time. Mr. Wyckoff died of his wounds, June 20.

—The New York Savings Bank will erect a new bank building at the corner of Eighth avenue and Fourteenth St. It is to be built of white marble, from plans now being prepared.

—In the friendly legal controversy over the proceeds of the old clearing-house property, a decision has been rendered to the effect that the title to the property was vested in the original fifty-nine members, and that the proceeds should have been distributed among them, and not applied on the new building. The amount involved was \$725,000. This decision does not necessarily dispose of the case.

—Under the new rule adopted by the clearing-house in regard to restrictive indorsements it is said that the omission on the part of any bank to guarantee indorsements does not exempt it from its present liability to the Assistant Treasurer of the United States. All checks returned to banks here may be presented up till 3 o'clock on regular days, but to the Assistant Treasurer such checks must be presented by 2 o'clock each day, except Saturdays and holidays, when the last hour is fixed at 1 o'clock.

—Arthur Lincoln has been admitted as a member of the banking firm of Chas Fairchild & Co.

—The banking house of Maitland, Phelps & Co., established in 1798, has changed the style of the firm to Maitland, Coppel & Co.

—The Washington Trust Company has been appointed by the supreme court as a depositary for funds paid to the court.

—Francis A. Palmer, President of the National Broadway Bank, has given \$50,000 to Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, to be used in maintaining a chair of Christian ethics.

—William P. St. John, President of the Mercantile National Bank, and a well-known and able advocate of the free coinage of silver, resigned his position as President of the bank July 3. Mr. St. John's views were not in harmony with those of the other directors, and his activity in behalf of free silver was opposed by them as likely to injure the bank. A silver convention had requested Mr. St. John to go to Chicago and labor to secure the adoption of a free coinage plank in the Democratic platform. The directors asked Mr. St. John not to go to the convention in this capacity, but he refused to comply with their request and offered his resignation, which was accepted with a unanimous expression of regret. Mr. St. John is widely known and esteemed for his character and ability. He remains a director of the Mercantile National Bank.

—Frederick A. Burnham, President of the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, has been elected a director of the Standard National Bank, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of President Marvelle W. Cooper.

—Worden, Bell & Co. succeed Amory, Worden & Co.

—By the will of the late Austin Corbin the controlling interest in the Corbin Banking Co. was bequeathed to Mr. Corbin's son, Austin Corbin, Jr.

—Charles Frazier and Henry G. Marshall, heretofore doing business under the firm name of Lawrence, Frazier & Co., will continue under the name of Charles Frazier & Co.

—Morris S. Decker has been chosen Secretary of the State Trust Co., to succeed the late John Quincy Adams. H. M. Francis has been elected Treasurer, and H. B. Berry, Assistant Secretary.

—Richard Delafield has been elected as an additional Vice-President of the National Park Bank.

—An order was granted on June 24 dissolving the Empire State Bank, which had been in liquidation for some time. After paying all liabilities there was \$31,431 left to divide among the stockholders.

—Many letters have been received by the clearing-house association of this city from different parts of the country, commending the recent action of the association in regard to restrictive indorsements on drafts and checks. Since the new regulations were adopted by the New York associated banks similar action has been taken by the clearing-house associations of Chicago, Cincinnati, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Providence, Norfolk, and many other cities.

—The stockholders of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company have voted to increase the capital stock from \$2,000,000 to \$2,500,000. This new stock is to be taken by the Mutual Life Insurance Company at \$225 per share, which will pay into the Treasury a premium of \$125 on each \$100 share. The agreement is the outcome of negotiation looking toward co-operation between the two companies in the mortgage and title insurance business.

—Plans are being drawn for the erection of a new building by the People's Bank, of Brooklyn. The new building will be a commodious one, and will in all probability comprise several deposit vaults as well as a few offices for renting purposes.

—Robert Bacon, of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., has been elected a director of the National City Bank.

#### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—At a meeting of the Boston Clearing-House Association, June 12, the rule in regard to restrictive endorsemments, promulgated by the associated banks of New York, was adopted to govern paper sent to the Boston banks.

—An Act "To abolish days of grace on commercial paper, except sight drafts," was approved by the Governor of Massachusetts, June 5. The text of the Act is as follows:

"SECTION 1. No days of grace, according to the custom of merchants, shall be allowed on any note, draft, check, acceptance, bill of exchange, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness made, drawn, or accepted by any person or corporation after this Act shall take effect, unless expressly stipulated therein, but the same shall be due and payable as therein expressed, without grace; provided, that this Act shall not apply to any draft or bill of exchange drawn payable at sight.

SEC. 2. Chapter two hundred and twenty-eight of the Acts of the year eighteen hundred and ninety-six, and all Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on the first day of January, in the year eighteen hundred and ninety-seven."

—In the suit of the American Loan and Trust Company against the Northwestern Guarantee Company, of Minneapolis, the supreme court, on June 16, ordered *pro rata* distribution of a trust fund of \$75,000 held by the American Company. The claims out of this fund are held mostly by National or Savings banks in different parts of the country.

**A New Trust Company.**—Malden, Mass., business men have organized the Malden Trust Co., capital \$100,000, to begin business about September 1.

**Savings Bank Dividend.**—The Keene (N. H.) Guaranty Savings Bank, enjoined a year and a half ago, on July 1 began paying a second instalment of ten per cent. on deposits, making thirty-five per cent. thus far paid.

**Hartford, Conn.**—Action was recently taken by the Hartford Clearing-House in regard to restrictive endorsemments on checks in line with the rule adopted by the associated banks of New York. It is suggested that stamps for endorsemments should be arranged to read "Pay to — bank, or order. — & Co." Paper thus endorsed will not be delayed in going through the clearing-houses.

**Testimonial to a President.**—The directors of the National Bank of Rhode Island, Newport, determined some time ago to present their President with a suitable testimonial of his good work in behalf of the bank. On June 4 this determination was put into effect, the testimonial being in the form of a silver loving-cup, 10 inches high and 7¼ across, with an ornamental base of silver, and three handles. It had the following inscription:

"Presented to Frederick Tompkins by the National Bank of Rhode Island, of Newport, as a token of its appreciation of his valuable services as President of that institution. Newport, R. I., Jan. 14, 1898."



## MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—Action has been taken by the associated banks requiring the guarantee of restrictive endorsements by banks transmitting such paper, in line with the rule recently adopted by the New York Clearing-House Association.

—Edward H. Fittler has been elected a director of the National Bank of the Northern Liberties, succeeding his father, the late ex-Mayor Fittler.

—Owing to increased business the Girard Life Insurance, Annuity & Trust Co. has created the new offices of Assistants to the President and Vice-President; Edward S. Page and Albert A. Jackson have been appointed to the respective positions.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—R. R. Hefford is the new President of the Bank of Commerce, succeeding Geo. W. Miller, resigned.

—W. C. Cornwell, President of the City Bank, has contributed an article to a recent number of a New York financial publication on the "Perishable character of bills discounted." Concerning the care exercised by some institutions in handling commercial paper Mr. Cornwell says:

"In looking after the discount department many banks take up for daily scrutiny all loans made the day previous. I know of one institution where a meeting of the active officers is held each morning. Every dollar discounted the day previous is gone over, and the lines and conditions of the customers for whom such discounts have been made are carefully weighed. The paper falling due for the day is also looked over, and decision made as to whether renewals shall be granted, if asked. All new applications for loans are considered, the credit department having previously taken the matter up and turned in all information obtainable on the subject. In addition to this all subjects of importance, coming up in the various departments of the bank, are brought before the meeting and discussed. The facts brought out and the conclusions arrived at at each meeting are taken down by a stenographer. Every subject is numbered and indexed, and the whole forms a valuable file—all unfinished matters being followed up until complete. The credit department in this bank is constantly at work obtaining information as to dealers who discount with the bank, and also as to those to whom they sell. This is done not only through the mercantile agencies, from whom thousands of reports are received, but also by correspondence with banks and others. All data is kept on file for instant reference, and information is being added daily."

**Hank Swindler Caught.**—Thomas Cullin, alias T. H. Howard and Thomas P. Doyle, was arrested recently in Philadelphia on a charge of obtaining a gold watch and three rings, valued at \$32, from George Collins, a jeweler at Salem, Mass., in July, 1895, for which he had made payments by a forged check. His capture was due to the activity of the Delaware County Trust Co., Chester, Pa., where he was apparently trying to do some fine work, but failed owing to the carefulness of the bank. This is the third bank crook the Delaware County Trust Co. officials have run down in the past eighteen months.

**A New Trust Co.**—W. Z. Larned and others are organizing a new trust company at Summit, N. J., with \$100,000 capital.

**New Bank at Rome, N. Y.**—E. S. Packer, President of the Columbia National Bank, of Washington, and O. G. Staples have purchased the Central National Bank building at Rome, N. Y., and will take possession on August 1. A National bank will be started as soon as arrangements are completed. The Central National Bank was wrecked in 1894.

**Portraits of ex-Cashiers.**—An excellent likeness of Dorlin F. Clapp, for many years the Cashier of the Westchester County National Bank (Peckskill, N. Y.), and who was succeeded at his death by the present Cashier, Cornelius A. Pugsley, has been placed in the directors' room in the bank. It is the gift of Mrs. Fannie McGavie, of New York, a sister of Mr. Clapp. Pictures of all except one of the ex-Cashiers now adorn the walls of the room.

**Promoted by Superintendent Kilburn.**—John D. Moriarty, who entered the office of the State Banking Department from Elmira, N. Y., fourteen years ago as a messenger, and has risen step by step as vacancies occurred, through all changes of administration, has been promoted by Superintendent Kilburn to chief clerk.

**Pittsburg.**—The State Bank of Pittsburgh has been chartered with \$50,000 capital.

—Recently the Bank of Pittsburgh took formal possession of its new building, which is described as a model of taste, convenience and stability, its appointments befitting the long and prosperous career of the bank, which was chartered in 1810. Over the directors' room will be the quarters of the clearing-house association, especially designed and constructed for the use of the associated banks. About \$250,000 represents the cost of the new structure.

**New Jersey Bank Reports.**—Hon. G. S. Duryee, Commissioner of Banking and Insurance for New Jersey, has just issued his annual report showing the condition of the banks of

that State. The Savings banks have total resources of \$48,817,114, an increase of \$2,821,862 as compared with the previous year. There was a gain of 10,174 in the number of depositors and an increase of \$5.99 in the average amount credited to each account, which is now \$256.82.

The amount of interest credited depositors for the year was \$1,119,866 more than the amount credited for 1894; the average rate being approximately not quite three per cent.

The total expenses for the year, inclusive of taxes on banking-house properties and rents paid for banking-rooms, were \$232,237, an increase of \$12,770 over 1894. On the basis of total assets, on January 1, the expenses were fifty-three hundredths of one per cent., and on the amount due depositors fifty-eight hundredths of one per cent, the corresponding percentages for 1894 being .0055 and .0061. Taken on the basis of the number of depositors, or open accounts, on January 1, the expenses average \$1.50 per each account; in the year before, \$1.52.

Since 1869 the deposits in the Savings banks of New Jersey have increased from \$11,551,300 to \$30,635,535. In 1878 there were 63,447 depositors; in 1896, 154,334.

The State banks report resources of \$10,651,701, a gain of \$341,571 over the previous year.

Resources of the trust companies are now \$19,502,432, a gain of \$3,553,305 over the preceding year. The gain for the year in deposits was \$2,906,764, equal to 24.6 per cent. In 1894 the gain was nearly 22 per cent. The increase in total resources was over 22 per cent. for the year, as against an increase of 14 per cent. in the preceding year over 1893.

**School Savings Banks.**—J. H. Thiry, of Long Island City, N. Y., sends to the *MAGAZINE* statistical tables showing the operation of this growing system of banks for the past year. From a register of 84,541 pupils in the 323 schools of 83 cities and villages that have adopted the system, 30,921 have saved \$403,620.90, withdrawn \$244,856.74, leaving \$157,164.16 remaining due to the depositors.

While this is a considerable sum of money to the credit of the children where the system prevails, its importance is by no means measured by the amount. It is the habit of saving something, inculcated at an early period of life, that is bound to have a far-reaching and beneficial influence. Mr. Thiry, as the originator of this system in the United States, and as its earnest and untiring advocate, deserves to rank as a public benefactor.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—The Fourth National Bank has been organized with \$400,000 capital and \$40,000 surplus, succeeding to the banking business of the American Banking and Trust Co., which will do a loan and trust business, the two institutions having the same officers.

**Banking Prosperity in the South.**—There is no part of the country that excels the solid advancement made by the banks of the South. Their prosperity is based upon the real and enduring, upon the growth and development of the abundant material wealth of that section. They make progress despite dull times elsewhere, as may be seen from a study of the report of the First National Bank, Gadsden, Ala., under date of July 3. The net earnings for the past six months were \$3,175; of this amount the 3 per cent. dividend absorbed \$1,500, \$600 was passed to surplus and \$1,075 to undivided profits—these latter accounts now aggregating \$7,000. The bank has paid \$39,000 in dividends since its organization in 1887. Its rate of earnings for the past six months was 6¼ per cent. and for the year 12 per cent.

**Not 16 to 1, but 2 to 1.**—The Corn Export and Commission Company, controlling mills at Greensboro, N. C., recently paid its large force of employees in Mexican money, giving them two silver dollars for each United States dollar. This method was adopted as an object lesson to show the effect free silver coinage would have on the country.

[It is to be feared that such object lessons will have the opposite effect from that intended. The average free silver enthusiast will likely be content to get two dollars where he got one before, without stopping to consider that the two depreciated dollars will buy no more than the one good dollar.]

## WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago, Ill.**—In the Lake Street Elevated case, a decision was handed down to the effect that foreign trust companies, accepting trusts in Illinois, must comply with the law requiring a deposit of \$200,000 with the State Auditor. The decision is of importance to companies doing business in Illinois and the West.

—Chicago is to have a gold exhibit next fall, in which the gold fields of every section of the globe will be represented. All the machinery for reducing gold will be exhibited, and with several railroads hauling quartz, visitors will be given an opportunity of seeing just how gold is extracted from the rocks and prepared for the mint. There will be no resemblance between this exhibition and the late silver show in the Western metropolis.

—Henry Failing, a notorious bank forger, was recently captured here by detectives

employed by the American Bankers' Association. Failing is regarded as one of the three most dangerous forgers in the country.

—Joseph R. Wilkins has been re-elected Chairman of the Stock Exchange, a position he has held since 1882.

—In commenting on the disclosures made in connection with the failure of the late Rufus N. Ramsay, the "Inter Ocean" says:

"This exposure is an illustration of the importance of subjecting every bank, whether National, State or private, to rigid inspection. No corporation, firm, or individual, should do a banking business without being thus subjected to inspection. And by 'banking business' we mean the soliciting and accepting of cash deposits. The general Government looks after the National banks, and within a few years the State has undertaken to keep supervision over banks doing business under State charters. The next General Assembly should extend this supervision to private bankers."

It is said that actual losses of the bank during fourteen years were just \$55,190. Ramsay paid out interest during the period on deposits to the amount of \$78,900. He borrowed from outside banks not less than \$1,127,000, paying as high a rate as 10 per cent. for the same. He borrowed, it is added, equally as much from other sources.

—The Merchants Loan and Trust Co. is preparing to organize under the general banking and trust laws of this State, when the present charter expires, which will be in a few months.

—Authority to begin business as a State bank has been given the Standard Banking Co.; capital paid up, \$200,000.

**Marriage of a Cashier.**—Charles Pasche, Cashier of the Iowa National Bank, Davenport, and Miss Mary Ella Dow, daughter of John L. Dow, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Davenport, were married at the home of the bride's parents in Davenport, June 11.

**Louisville, Ky.**—At a meeting held on June 9 the directors of the Bank of Kentucky elected Henry W. Barret President, to succeed his brother, the late Thomas L. Barret. He has been long and successfully identified with various mercantile enterprises. John M. Atherton succeeds Mr. Barret as Vice-President.

**Detroit, Mich.**—The Dime Savings Bank recently commemorated its entrance upon its thirteenth year by ordering new furniture and fixtures throughout. The new furniture is now all in place, and with new decorations and alterations combines to make the Dime Savings Bank one of the handsomest banking institutions in the city. The bank's original capital stock was \$60,000. The second year it was increased to \$100,000. It is now \$300,000. The stockholders have from the first received dividends of 8 per cent. The resources exceed \$2,100,000. In the savings department 56,692 persons have opened accounts.

—Bankers throughout the State are said to favor a reduction in the rate of interest paid on deposits. It is suggested that the rate paid on individual deposits should be reduced to 3 per cent., and to 2½ on bank deposits.

—The trustees of the Wayne County Savings Bank have decided to enlarge the upper part of its building. Plans have been drawn for two additional stories, which will make the building practically six stories high, or five stories and basement. An elevator will be put in, and the total cost of the improvements will be about \$50,000. The building, although erected twenty-five years ago, is almost as good as new, and the improvements contemplated will make it modern in all respects.

**Galesburg, Ill.**—Through the courtesy of the Second National Bank, of Galesburg, the MAGAZINE has received a copy of the speech of Comptroller Eckels on the currency question, delivered at Galesburg, June 11, before an audience of 1,500 people. The speech was an exhaustive and able one, following the lines of the Comptroller's previous utterances in favor of a stable standard and a sound paper currency.

**Milwaukee, Wis.**—Indictments found against a number of the directors of the Plankinton Bank, in 1893, have been dismissed. It is said that after the assets of the failed bank are exhausted there will be a shortage of from \$250,000 to \$300,000. By a recent decision the stockholders will have to pay in \$119,000.

—This city has followed the example of the New York Clearing-House in regard to restrictive endorsements on checks, etc.

**Cincinnati, Ohio.**—Following the action taken by New York, the clearing-house banks of this city have sent out notices to their correspondents requiring that in the case of all checks sent "for collection" or "for account of," the indorsement must be guaranteed. The notice further states that "If, however, none of the previous indorsements are restrictive, simply stamp 'Pay to the — Bank, of Cincinnati, or order,' with the name of your bank and Cashier subscribed, which will be sufficient."

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—The Union Trust Co., organized three years ago, has added \$10,000 to surplus and declared a semi-annual dividend of 2½ per cent.

**Stockholders Heavily Assessed.**—Receiver Armstrong has made an assessment of 94 per cent. on the stock of the Farmers' National Bank, Portsmouth, Ohio. The liabilities of the bank are \$350,000, and the present assets are estimated at about \$115,000. The Receiver estimates that the assessment will produce \$135,000, leaving a deficit of \$100,000.

**Missouri Bank Reports.**—Secretary of State Lesueur sends to the MAGAZINE a statement showing the condition of the State banks of Missouri on April 11, as follows:

RESOURCES.	Incorporated Banks.	Private Banks.	Total.
Loans and discounts.....	\$68,531,188	\$4,919,954	\$73,451,142
Overdrafts.....	1,012,989	107,787	1,120,777
Bonds, real estate and fixtures.....	9,628,492	478,815	10,107,108
Due from other banks.....	11,339,265	1,180,537	12,519,803
Checks and cash items.....	11,025,510	693,981	11,719,472
Total.....	\$101,537,396	\$7,380,857	\$108,918,253
LIABILITIES.			
Capital.....	\$20,271,985	\$1,193,200	\$21,465,185
Surplus.....	8,472,891	432,421	8,905,312
Sight deposits.....	55,733,098	5,151,571	60,884,670
Time deposits.....	15,701,050	474,588	16,175,639
Bills payable.....	1,358,369	129,075	1,487,445
Total.....	\$101,537,396	\$7,380,857	\$108,918,252

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Bold Attempt at Robbery.**—At Los Angeles, Cal., an attempt to rob several of the banks, by means of connecting tunnels, was recently discovered. When found out they had excavated 102 feet of the tunnel and were removing the masonry supporting the vault. One of the would-be-robbers was captured.

**Los Angeles, Cal.**—A late number of the "Los Angeles Record" contains an exhaustive review of the banking institutions of this city, stating that the result of the 1893 panic was to weed out all the weak institutions, and that since that time there has been a gradual and steady improvement in the strong institutions which were able to withstand the panic. The banks mentioned in the review are the First National, Los Angeles National, National Bank of California, Columbia Savings Bank, Citizens' Bank, the Broadway Bank, Savings Bank of Southern California, Los Angeles Savings Bank, Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Security Loan and Trust Co., California Bank, Main Street Savings Bank and Trust Co., Union Bank of Savings, State Loan and Trust Co. and the Security Savings Bank.

### CANADA.

**Canadian Bank Meetings.**—In reading the annual reports of the meeting of the shareholders of several of the Canadian banks, recently held, it is seen that the general dull conditions have been reflected in the banking operations of the Dominion, where even the extremely conservative management of the banks has failed to maintain the normal rate of profits or to avert losses, of which some of the reports complain. But the Canadian banks are possessed of large capital, and their careful management will surely restore the full measure of prosperity when the present season of depression shall have passed.

The usual quarterly review of the Canadian bank statements will be published in the August number of the MAGAZINE.

### FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

**Colon, Colombia.**—Advices from Bogota, state that a decree has been issued by the Government ordering the liquidation of the National Bank and the redemption of paper money by the coinage of 6,000,000 francs in small coin.

**Mexico.**—The Deutsche Bank of Berlin is about to open a branch bank in Mexico, with Herr Kosadowsky, German Consul at Mexico City, as manager.

**Italy's Improved Finances.**—The Italian public revenue for the first half of the fiscal year just expired was 39,000,000 lire more than for the corresponding period of 1895.

**Bank of France.**—The Bank of France has fixed its dividend for the first half of the year at 59 francs net, against 48 francs in the corresponding six months of 1895.

**Havana, Cuba.**—A royal decree has been received here authorizing the Spanish Bank to issue \$12,000,000 in gold bills, to be handed to the local treasury in payment of current obliga-

tions. The Government will transfer to the bank \$3,000,000 in silver, and will allow the bank to retain part of the receipts from the stamp tax as security for the remainder of the issue.

**Venezuela for Gold.**—Recent advices from Venezuela report the adoption of the gold standard by that country, a constitutional amendment having been adopted to wit:

"Neither the legislative nor executive power, nor any other power in the republic, shall in any case or for any motive issue paper money nor declare as legal tender any bank notes or any other value represented in paper, nor shall the coining of silver or nickel be ordered without previous authorization of congress, subject to the same procedure as in the enactment of other laws."

At present the Venezuelan circulation consists of 20,000,000 bolivars (20 cents), of which 12,000,000 are in gold and 8,000,000 in silver. This silver already in circulation will not be retired. The future coinage will be restricted to gold, and the issue of gold certificates representing actual gold on hand.

### New York State Bankers' Association.

THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION, TO BE HELD AT NIAGARA FALLS, JULY 17 AND 18.

The Third Annual Convention of the New York State Bankers' Association will be held at Niagara Falls, Friday and Saturday, July 17 and 18. Convention headquarters will be at the International Hotel. Delegates will be entitled to one and one-third railroad fare, on the certificate plan, and reduced rates will be given at the hotels. Following is the programme in full:

#### FRIDAY, JULY 17.

First Session—10 A. M.—Call to order by the President; Prayer by Rev. A. S. Bacon; Annual Message by the President; Report of the Treasurer; Report of the Secretary; Announcements; Nomination of Officers, informal ballot; Miscellaneous Business.

Adjournment to 1:30 P. M.

Second Session—1:30 to 4 P. M.—*Address*: "Restrictive Endorsements." Mr. S. G. Nelson, Vice-President of the Seaboard National Bank, New York.

*Address*: "The Collection of Country Checks and Other Items." Hon. Seymour Dexter, President of the Second National Bank, Elmira.

*Address*: "Bank Examinations." Mr. John A. Kennedy, Cashier of the Niagara Bank, Buffalo.

4 P. M.—Excursion for Delegates and Ladies over the Gorge Railroad to Lewiston and return. Tickets will be furnished without charge on application to the Secretary. 9 P. M.—Entertainment for the Ladies in the ball-room by Mrs. Waldo Richards and orchestra. 9 P. M.—"Introduction Smoker" for the Delegates in the great dining-room.

#### SATURDAY, JULY 18.

Delegates and Ladies are invited to inspect the wonderful power plants of the Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Manufacturing Company, and the Niagara Falls Power Company. The party will leave the International Hotel at 9:30 A. M.

Third Session—1:30 P. M.—Call to order by the President; Prayer by Rev. Geo. F. Rosenmuller.

*Address*: "The Prosperity of Banks Insures the Prosperity of the People and the Government." Hon. S. M. Griswold, President Union Bank, Brooklyn.

*Address*: "The Uses and Usefulness of Banks." Hon. Geo. B. Sloan, President of the Second National Bank, Oswego.

*Address*: "Will the Business Interests of the Country be Benefited by a Further Expansion of the Currency?" Mr. James H. Tripp, President of the First National Bank of Marathon.

There will be no discussions following the above addresses.

Selection of place for the Convention of 1897; Reports of Committees; Miscellaneous Business; Election of Officers; Introduction of President-elect; Adjournment.

There will be a Reception, with music and dancing, in the ball-room, for the Delegates and Ladies, at 9 o'clock Saturday evening, and Supper will be served in the dining-room from 9 till 12.

The papers to be read at the Friday afternoon session are expected to occupy about 30 minutes each, and the same time will be allowed for discussion, in which members are invited to take part, giving 40 minutes to each subject.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

**Indiana.**—John A. Thompson's Bank, Edinburgh, closed June 11. Estimated liabilities, \$50,000; assets, \$35,000.

**Iowa.**—Receiver R. W. Marquis makes the following report on the condition of the Des Moines Loan & Trust Co.: "Your Receiver is of the opinion that the entire assets are of inconsiderable value—an aggregate not exceeding \$22,000, and the assets that are of any value are of such a character as to be unavailable. Schedule of liabilities aggregates \$507,892."

**Kansas.**—The Clearwater Bank has gone into liquidation, paying off deposits.

—On June 3 the People's Bank, Moran, closed; an examination by the bank commissioner showed it to be solvent. Business will not be resumed.

—Depositors of the People's Savings Bank, Fort Scott, are being paid off, and business will be discontinued.

—The Sumner County Bank, Conway Springs, \$10,000 capital, has gone into voluntary liquidation.

—The First National Bank, Larned, closed June 11, owing to a run which was brought about by a controversy over some local matters.

**Kentucky.**—The Dime Savings Bank, Louisville, has gone out of business because its capital was not up to the requirements of a new banking law. Few Savings banks did a more profitable business, as it had made no losses on its loans. Its business was not large.

**New Hampshire.**—The National Bank of Commerce, Manchester, which suspended in 1893, has paid six dividend, aggregating 85 per cent., and there are assets enough to avoid the necessity of making an assessment.

—Owing to the closing of some of the cotton mills, the Security Savings Bank, Winchester, ceased paying or receiving deposits on June 25.

—A cause similar to the above led to the suspension of the Hinsdale Savings Bank, of Hinsdale.

The closing of the mills led to large withdrawals of deposits, and the suspensions were necessary to protect the depositors.

**Pennsylvania.**—H. J. Hopkins, a private banker at Pleasantville, closed June 15. Deposit liabilities were about \$30,000.

—An appraisalment of the assets of the Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co., Philadelphia, made public July 8, puts the total value at \$777,533, exclusive of a number of mortgages pledged to secure debenture bonds.

**South Carolina.**—The German-American Trust and Savings Bank, Charleston, closed June 18. Reports of the failure are to the effect that the outlook for the payment of creditors is not promising.

**Tennessee.**—A. Bryan & Co., Watertown, assigned June 15. Assets about \$30,000 and liabilities \$20,000. Several local firms were forced to suspend on account of the bank failure.

**Utah.**—The Bank of Salt Lake, Salt Lake City, closed June 23. The liabilities are placed at \$300,000 of which \$200,000 is owing to depositors, and the assets at \$400,000.

**Virginia.**—The Finance Trading Co., Richmond, assigned June 1, the schedules of assignment covering property to the amount of \$127,795. Liabilities are \$75,000. Failure of the President of the company caused the assignment.

—The Roanoke Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Co., Roanoke, assigned to Lucien H. Cooke, June 15. Assets are of the nominal value of \$655,000; deposit liabilities, \$249,000.

**Washington.**—The Bank of Cheney, controlled by D. F. Percival, closed June 15. Deposits were small, and the failure was not unexpected.

—The First National Bank, Cheney, suspended June 15. Liabilities, other than capital, are reported at \$18,000.

—The Marine Savings Bank, of Ballard, assigned June 3. Deposit liabilities, \$3,748; assets, \$24,500; capital, \$30,000.

**Wisconsin.**—An order was recently granted allowing a payment of a 20 per cent. dividend to the creditors of the Commercial Bank, Stevens Point.

**Wyoming.**—Depositors of the Crook County Bank, Sundance, have received a 40 per cent. dividend. It is expected that in all about 95 per cent. will be paid.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of New National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these New National Banks will be found under the different State headings.

- 5043—Pattison National Bank, Elkland, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5044—First National Bank, Grove City, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$50,000.  
5045—Fourth National Bank, Atlanta, Georgia. Capital, \$400,000.  
5046—Riggs National Bank, Washington, District of Columbia. Capital, \$500,000.  
5047—National Bank of La Crosse, La Crosse, Wisconsin. Capital, \$250,000.  
5048—National Bank of Goldsboro, Goldsboro, North Carolina. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

- Adirondack National Bank, Saranac Lake, N. Y.; by A. L. Donaldson, *et al.*  
Citizens' National Bank, Mt. Vernon, Ill.; by Sam Casey, *et al.*  
First National Bank, Robinson, Ill.; by Abner P. Woodworth, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

FRUITHURST—Fruit Growers and Manufacturers' Bank (Branch of Tallapoosa, Ga.)

#### CONNECTICUT.

NEW HAVEN—New Haven Savings Bank; Pres., Samuel E. Merwin; Vice-Pres., Geo. J. Brush; Sec. and Treas., Robert A. Brown.  
STAMFORD—Burlington Safe Deposit Co.; capital, \$30,000.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON—Riggs National Bank; capital, \$500,000; Pres., Chas. C. Glover; Vice-Pres., Thos. Hyde; Second Vice-Pres., James M. Johnston; Cashier, Arthur T. Brice; Asst. Cashier, Wm. J. Flather.

#### GEORGIA.

ATLANTA—Fourth National Bank; capital, \$400,000; Pres. James W. English; Cashier, Jno. K. Ottley.

SWAINSBORO—Citizens' Bank.

#### ILLINOIS.

APPLE RIVER—John Charlton.  
BLUE ISLAND—Commercial Bank; capital, \$30,000; Cashier, Wm. H. Werner.  
CHICAGO—Knight, Donnelly & Co.—Standard Banking Co.; capital stock, \$200,000; Pres. M. J. Wentworth; Cashier, Paul C. Peterson.—American Banking and Brokerage Co.; capital, \$100,000.  
LEBANON—Bank of Lebanon (Jno. A. Ross & Son); Cashier, J. B. Ross.

#### INDIANA.

CHALMERS—Farmers' Bank; Pres. Matt Ream; Vice-Pres. and Cashier, Chas. Vanvoorst.  
GREENTOWN—Commercial Bank; Pres. R. J. Dunn; Cashier, F. R. Hill.

LOGANSPOUT—State National Bank; H. J. Heitbrink, Cashier, deceased.

#### IOWA.

CHARLOTTE—Exchange Bank.  
IDA GROVE—Anderson, Lipton & Co.  
LA MOTTE—La Motte Bank; Pres. N. B. Nemmers; Vice-Pres., N. Tusing; Cashier, Thos. J. Lambe.  
RYAN—Bank of Ryan (J. A. Thomas, Prop'r).  
WALFORD—Novak & Jilep.

#### KANSAS.

LARNED—First State Bank; capital, \$5,000.—Moffet Bros.' Bank.  
WICHITA—Bank of Commerce; capital, \$25,000; Pres. A. C. Jobs; Cashier, C. W. Carey.

#### LOUISIANA.

HOUMA—People's Bank; capital, \$25,000.

#### MARYLAND.

FREDERICK—Wm. A. Mansfield.

#### MICHIGAN.

BELDING—Commercial Bank.  
MUNISING—Munising State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres. Edgar H. Towar; Vice-Pres., Geo. L. Burtis; Cashier, C. W. Case.

#### MINNESOTA.

BENSON—Scandia Savings Association; capital stock, \$50,000.  
ROSEAU—Roseau County Bank; Pres., H. Thorson; Cashier, B. Holdahl.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

CLARKSDALE—Citizens' Savings and Loan Inst'n; capital, \$10,000; Pres. J. W. Cutrer; Vice-Pres., M. J. Bouldin; Sec. and Treas., Albert Nachman; Asst. Cashier, Geo. Richberger.  
GULFPORT—Commercial Bank.

**MISSOURI.**

**ASBURY**—Bank of Asbury; capital, \$5,000; Pres., Robert Robyn; Vice-Pres., E. M. Whetsel; Cashier, J. M. Rutherford; Asst. Cashier, W. F. Porter.

**CHILHOWEE**—Bank of Chilhowee; capital, \$10,000; Pres., R. E. McReynolds; Vice-Pres., S. S. Shumaker; Cashier, A. W. Repp.

**MISSOURI CITY**—Norton Banking Co. (successor to Norton Bros.); capital, \$10,000; Pres., Wm. F. Norton; Asst. Cashier, C. M. Donovan.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**OCEAN CITY**—Central Trust Co.; C. C. Craig, Manager.

**SUMMIT**—Summit Trust and Safe Deposit Co.

**NEW YORK.**

**NEW YORK CITY**—Tower & Sherwood, 10 Wall Street.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**BREVARD**—Bank of Brevard; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Geo. H. P. Coie; Cash., Z. W. Nichols.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**FARGO**—Standard Trust Co.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**GROVE CITY**—First National Bank (successor to Grove City Banking Co.); capital, \$50,000; Pres., A. E. Graham; Cashier, W. C. Alexander.

**PITTSBURG**—State Bank of Pittsburg; capital, \$50,000.

**TURTLE CREEK**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$100,000; Pres. Eli W. Boyd; Vice-Pres., Homer L. Castle.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**CARTHAGE**—W. L. Palmer & Co.

**IPSWICH**—Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.; capital stock, \$3,000,000.

**TENNESSEE.**

**JOHNSON CITY**—Jonesboro Banking and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. D. Cox; Vice-Pres., W. C. Kenyon; Cashier, Tate L. Earnest.

**NASHVILLE**—Herman Justi.

**TEXAS.**

**LLANO**—Llano County Bank (successor to Iron City Nat. Bank); capital, \$50,000; Cashier, M. M. Hargis; Asst. Cashier, Jno. W. Hill.

**WISCONSIN.**

**BARNEVELD**—Barneveld Bank (Jerome J. Jones); capital, \$10,000.

**CUMBERLAND**—Island City Bank (C. A. Ritou).

**HORICON**—Horicon State Bank; capital, \$25,000.

**LA CROSSE**—National Bank of La Crosse (successor to La Crosse National Bank); capital, \$250,000; Pres., John Paul; Vice-Pres., W. W. Cargill; Second Vice-Pres., F. P. Hixon; Cashier, Geo. W. Burton; Asst. Cashier, F. H. Hankerson.

**VIROQUA**—Vernon Co. Bank.

**CANADA.****ONTARIO.**

**WINDSOR**—F. J. Holton & Co.; capital, \$17,500.

**MANITOBA.**

**GLENSBORO**—Fred. W. Young & Co.

**NOVA SCOTIA.**

**PARRSBORO**—Commercial Bank of Windsor; Manager, E. R. Reid; Cashier, Walter Lawson.

**CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.****ALABAMA.**

**BIRMINGHAM**—Birmingham Clearing-House Association; H. B. Gray, Pres. in place of J. M. Davidson; J. H. Wetmore, Manager in place of Geo. B. Ward.

**TALLADEGA**—Isbell National Bank; no Cashier in place of R. L. Ivey, resigned.

**ARIZONA.**

**FLAGSTAFF**—Arizona Central Bank; W. S. Robinson, Cashier, resigned.

**ARKANSAS.**

**PINE BLUFF**—Bank of Pine Bluff; capital reduced from \$150,000 to \$100,000.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**BAKERSFIELD**—Producers' Savings Bank; W. S. Tevis, Pres., F. S. Rice, Vice-Pres.

**SAN DIEGO**—Merchants' National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Levi Chase.

**SAN FRANCISCO**—Security Savings Bank; O. D. Baldwin, Pres., in place of Jerome Lincoln.—German Savings Bank; Geo. H. Eggers, 2nd Vice-Pres. and Director, deceased.

**SANTA ANA**—California Safe Deposit Co.;

E. P. Nickey, Pres.; R. H. Sanborn, Vice-Pres.; Geo. Edgar, Sec. and Treas.

**COLORADO.**

**EATON**—State Bank; E. K. Packard, Pres.

**LITTLETON**—Bank of Littleton; Harry Nutting, Cashier, in place of A. H. Crawford.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**FALLS VILLAGE**—Falls Village Savings Bank; U. H. Miner, Treas., deceased.

**HARTFORD**—Dime Savings Bank; H. Sidney Hayden, Vice-Pres., deceased, also Director Farmers and Mechanics' Nat. Bank;—State Savings Bank; S. Taylor, Pres., in place of G. F. Davis.—Hartford Nat. Bank; Chas. E. Chase, director, in place of Ebenezer Roberts, deceased.

**LITCHFIELD**—Litchfield Savings Society; Chas. H. Coit, Asst. Treas.

**NORWICH**—Uncas National Bank; James H. Welles, Cashier, in place of Walter Fuller; no Asst. Cash. in place of James H. Welles.

**WATERBURY**—Waterbury National Bank; Augustus Sabin Chase, Pres., deceased.



**DELAWARE.**

**SYMENA**—Fruit Growers' National Bank; corporate existence extended until June 17, 1916.

**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.**

**WASHINGTON**—Traders' Nat. Bank; Jno. C. Athey, Asst. Cashier.

**FLORIDA.**

**DAYTONA**—Merchants' Bank (Branch of Volusia Co. Bank, De Land, Fla.); A. D. McBride, Pres.; Frank E. Bond, Cashier; E. T. Conrad, Asst. Cashier.

**MIAMI**—Bank of Biscayne Bay; Wm. M. Brown, Pres.

**GEORGIA.**

**ATLANTA**—Washington Loan and Investment Co.; H. I. T. Heard, Asst. General Manager and director.

**AUGUSTA**—National Exchange Bank; W. B. Young, Pres., in place of Alfred Baker, deceased.—Augusta Savings Bank; W. B. Young, Pres. in place of Alfred Baker, deceased; J. Gardner Weigle, Cashier in place of Wm. B. Young.

**FITZGERALD**—Colony Bank; A. T. Curry, Asst. Cashier.

**MACON**—Exchange Bank and Union Savings Bank and Tr. Co.; Sol. Wexelbaum, director, deceased.

**MCDONOUGH**—Bank of Henry Co.; capital, \$25,000.

**ROME**—Merchants' Bank; E. A. Heard, Cash.

**IDAHO.**

**MOUNTAINHOME**—Elmore County Bank; J. W. Campbell, Cashier, deceased.

**ILLINOIS.**

**BLUE ISLAND**—Calumet State Bank; C. G. Bogart, Pres. in place of Wm. A. Ray; W. B. Brayton, Cashier, in place of J. Jones.

**CHICAGO**—West Side Bank; capital, \$50,000; C. W. Hinkley, Pres.; Edward Tilden, Vice-Pres.—Illinois Trust Safety Deposit Co.; Clarence Buckingham, Pres.; Robert Boyd, Sec.; James C. Hutchins, Treas.

**DECATUR**—J. Millikin & Co.; J. M. Brownback, Vice-Pres.

**GALESBURG**—First National Bank; Loren Stevens, Cashier in place of Jos. Hoover.

**GOLCONDA**—Pope County State Bank (successor to Pope County Bank); capital, \$50,000.

**KIRKLAND**—Rowan & Ault; Boyd Rowan, deceased.

**LA SALLE**—La Salle Nat. Bank; Joseph F. Kilduff, Pres. in place of K. O'Brien; C. Dresterweg, Vice-Pres. in place of Jos. F. Kilduff.

**MOWEAQUA**—Commercial Bank; Mart Ayars, Cashier in place of R. Ayars.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Illinois National Bank; A. Farr, Pres. in place of Frank Relsch, deceased; James A. Connolly, 1st Vice-Pres.

in place of A. Farr; Geo. Relsch, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of J. A. Connolly.

**WATSEKA**—Citizens' Bank; Samuel Williams, Pres., deceased.

**INDIANA.**

**ALBANY**—Albany State Bank (successor to Citizens' Bank); J. S. McQuinn, Cashier; O. C. Atkinson, Asst. Cashier.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Union Trust Co.; surplus increased to \$80,000.

**LA FONTAINE**—La Fontaine Bank; J. G. Harper, Cashier.

**MICHIGAN CITY**—First National Bank, J. F. Kreidler, Cashier in place of W. H. Schoenemann; no Asst. Cashier in place of J. F. Kriedler.

**IOWA.**

**BURLINGTON**—Merchants' National Bank; John Patterson, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**CARLISLE**—Bank of Carlisle; Geo. C. McMurry, Pres.; H. J. McMurry, Cashier.

**GLENWOOD**—Mills County Nat. Bank; A. D. French, Asst. Cashier in place of G. B. Van Horn.

**MANNING**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Jos. Wilson.

**MARION**—First National Bank; J. S. Alexander, Pres. in place of Jay J. Smyth; C. H. Kurtz, Cashier in place of J. S. Alexander; no Asst. Cashier in place of C. H. Kurtz.

**NEWTON**—Farmers and Merchants' State Bank; capital, \$60,000.

**PRIMGHAR**—Primghar Savings Bank; William Briggs, Pres. in place of Wm. Archer.

**SIOUX CENTRE**—Citizens' State Bank; Jerry Kendrick, Cashier.

**SPENCER**—First National Bank; Franklin Floete, Pres. in place of Ackley Hubbard, resigned; Andrew R. Smith, Vice-Pres. in place of Franklin Floete; Ackley Hubbard, Cashier in place of David Painter, resigned.

**THOMPSON**—Farmers' Savings Bank; G. S. Gilbertson, Pres.; E. W. Virden, Cashier.

**WILTON**—Union Bank; A. R. Leith, Pres. in place of C. B. Strong.

**KANSAS.**

**ARLINGTON**—Citizens' State Bank; H. C. Warner, Pres.; J. E. Eaton, Cashier; P. A. Ward, Asst. Cashier.

**BLUFF CITY**—State Bank; W. T. Clark, Pres.; C. O. Johnson, Cashier.

**RICHLAND**—Neese Bros. succeeded by Albert Neese.

**WASHINGTON**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; sold out to Washington Nat'l Bank.

**WICHITA**—Kansas National Bank; Chas. Testard, Asst. Cashier (instead of the Wichita National Bank, as reported in previous number).

**WINFIELD**—Cowley County National Bank; J. E. Jarvis, Pres. in place of J. N. McDonald; J. F. Balliet, Cashier in place of Thomas J. Eaton; C. E. Fuller, Asst. Cashier in place of J. F. Balliet.

**KENTUCKY.**

**GLASGOW**—First National Bank; A. E. Young, Pres. in place of G. C. Young.  
**LOUISVILLE**—Bank of Kentucky; Henry W. Barret, Pres. in place of Thos. L. Barret, deceased.  
**MOUNT OLIVET**—Mount Olivet Deposit Bank; C. Perry, Cashier in place of A. S. Rice.  
**NEWCASTLE**—Henry County Trust Co.; W. W. Turner, Pres. in place of J. S. Smith.  
**PERRYVILLE**—Bank of Perryville; J. M. Gray, Pres.; Geo. W. Edwards, Cashier.  
**PINEVILLE**—J. R. Rice & Co.; capital, \$10,000; J. R. Rice, Pres.; Miss M. A. Rice, Cashier.

**LOUISIANA.**

**DONALDSONVILLE**—Donaldsonville Bank; surplus increased to \$19,500.

**MAINE.**

**AUGUSTA**—Augusta National Bank; M. V. B. Chase, Pres. in place of Jno. F. Hill.  
**BANGOR**—Merchants' National Bank; Chas. P. Stetson, Vice-Pres.  
**WALDOBOROUGH**—Medomak National Bank; A. R. Reed, Pres. in place of Samuel W. Jackson, deceased.  
**WATERVILLE**—Ticonic Nat. Bank; A. H. Plaisted, Cashier in place of A. A. Plaisted, resigned.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—McKim & Co.; Randall McKim, deceased.—Paine and McLaren; succeeded by Clinton P. Paine & Co.  
**CENTREVILLE**—Centreville Nat. Bank; corporate existence extended until June 13, 1916.  
**HAGERSTOWN**—Hagerstown Bank; John L. Bikle, Cashier, in place of Edward W. Mealey, resigned.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**ANDOVER**—Andover National Bank; J. Tyler Kimball, Cashier in place of E. R. Foster.  
**BOSTON**—Hancock National Bank; no Pres. in place of H. J. Jaquith.—Union Loan and Trust Co.; Geo. E. Coates, Asst. Treas.  
**EASTHAMPTON**—Easthampton Savings Bank; J. W. Greene, Treas. in place of S. T. Seelye.  
**FALL RIVER**—National Union Bank; Daniel Wilbur, Pres. deceased.  
**LAWRENCE**—Lawrence National Bank; H. K. Webster, Pres. in place of W. P. Clark, deceased; H. A. Buell, Vice-Pres. in place of H. K. Webster.  
**LOWELL**—Prescott National Bank; Charles H. Coburn, Pres. in place of Hapgood Wright, deceased.  
**MALDEN**—Malden Trust Co.; capital \$100,000; Willard B. Ferguson, Pres.; Chas. L. Dean, Vice-Pres.  
**NEWTON**—Newton National Bank; Francis Murdock, Pres. in place of Joseph N. Bacon, deceased.  
**NEWTON CENTRE**—Newton Centre Savings Bank; S. W. Jones, Pres.; D. H. Andrews, Vice-Pres.; Geo. Warren, Treas.  
**NORTHAMPTON**—Hampshire Savings Bank;

Wm. H. Dickinson, Pres. in place of Josephus Crafts.

**MICHIGAN.**

**BELDING**—Belding Savings Bank; D. E. Hills, Acting Cashier.  
**BRIGHTON**—Baetcke, Fry & Co.; style changed to G. J. Baetcke & Co.  
**DETROIT**—Commercial National Bank; Geo. B. Caldwell, Asst. Cashier in place of Robert L. Courtney.  
**FRANKFORT**—Benzie Co. Bank; successor to Bank of Frankfort.  
**GRAND RAPIDS**—Fourth National Bank; A. J. Bowde, Vice-Pres., deceased.  
**GRASS LAKE**—Farmers' Bank; E. L. Cooper, Cashier in place of Chas. M. Spinning.  
**LEXINGTON**—Lexington State Bank (successor to Lexington Bank); capital, \$30,000; B. R. Noble, Pres.; D. McNair, Cashier.  
**MORENCI**—Bank of Morenci; H. E. Green, Cashier; Jno. P. Rorick, Asst. Cashier.  
**PONTIAC**—Oakland Co. Savings Bank; Byron G. Stout, Pres., resigned.  
**SAUGATUCK**—Fruit Growers' Bank (successor to A. B. Taylor); capital, \$10,000.

**MINNESOTA.**

**APPLETON**—Citizens' Bank; B. K. Salverson, Cashier.  
**CLOQUET**—Merchants' Bank; C. L. Dixon, Cashier in place of A. M. Sheldon, resigned.  
**DOVER**—L. W. Ingham, successor to Bank of Dover (Dyer & Ingham).  
**ELMORE**—Exchange Bank; J. M. Broat, Pres.; A. S. Broat, Cashier.  
**FOREST CITY**—Winnebago County Bank; M. T. Dalquist, Asst. Cashier.  
**GRANADA**—Granada State Bank; capital, \$10,000; David Secor, Pres.; O. J. Clark, Cas.  
**LAKE BENTON**—First National Bank; Chas. E. Laveson, Asst. Cashier.  
**LONG PRAIRIE**—R. H. Harkens, Cashier.  
**MILAN**—Bank of Milan; Torjus Lundervall, Cashier in place of B. K. Salverson.  
**MINNEAPOLIS**—Bank of Minneapolis; William Canaday, Asst. Cashier.  
**REDWOOD FALLS**—Bank of Redwood Falls; G. W. Dickinson, Cashier in place of O. L. Dornberg.  
**STEPHEN**—Bank of Stephen; Yetter & Smith, successors to Smith, Christofferson & Yetter as proprietors.  
**ST. PAUL**—Allemania Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); capital, \$400,000; Albert Scheffer, Pres.; E. De F. Barnett, Cashier; E. J. Devitt, Asst. Cashier.  
**WELLS**—Wells Bank (reorganized as a State bank); capital, \$20,000.  
**WINDOM**—People's Bank; Emory Olson, Cas.

**MISSISSIPPI.**

**GREENVILLE**—Merchants and Planters' Bank; W. Thos. Rose, Cash. in place of S. C. Lane.

**MISSOURI.**

**AURORA**—Bank of Aurora; capital reduced from \$100,000 to \$50,000.

**CHULA**—Exchange Bank; Geo. A. Gardner, Pres.; A. McInturf, Vice-Pres.

**CLERMONT**—Jackson Bank; Henry Weber, Pres. in place of Ira B. Newlon, deceased.

**ELSBERRY**—Bank of Lincoln Co.; C. H. Reed, Asst. Cashier.

**GORIN**—Gorin Savings Bank; B. H. Edelen, Pres.; W. H. Ewing, Vice-Pres.; S. A. Miller, Asst. Cashier.

**GRAHAM**—Citizens' Bank; A. L. Brumbaugh, Cashier in place of C. H. Talbott.

**KANSAS CITY**—International Loan & Trust Co.; F. C. Wornall, Pres. in place of G. F. Putnam.

**LAWSON**—Lawson Bank; J. A. Smith, Pres. in place of Clay Smith.

**LIBERTY**—Commercial Savings Bank; capital, \$75,000.

**LICKING**—Bank of Licking; W. H. Craven, Asst. Cashier.

**MAYSVILLE**—De Kalb Co. Bank; J. W. Bennett, Pres. in place of Sam W. Holmes.

**MEXICO**—Southern Bank of Mexico; T. H. Marshall, Cash.; A. D. Jackson, Asst. Cash.

**MONETT**—Commercial Bank; Carl W. Lenhard, Cashier in place of D. T. Wainwright.

**PARKVILLE**—Park Bank; D. L. Hamilton, Pres. in place A. J. Hamilton, deceased.

**PARNELL**—Wright Bros.; succeeded by U. S. Wright.

**SALISBURY**—Salisbury Savings Bank; capital, \$5,000; Wm. Hengford, Pres.; Thos. Karcher, Vice-Pres.; W. H. Hays, Cashier; B. Hengford, Asst. Cashier.

**SAVANNAH**—Commercial Bank (successor to Farmers' Bank of Andrew Co.); capital, \$22,000; A. S. Keeves, Pres.; D. P. Abbott, Vice-Pres.; B. H. Williams, Cashier; L. Morris, Asst. Cashier.

**SHELDON**—Farmers' Bank; capital, \$5,000; W. A. McCormick, Pres.; C. B. Floyd, Cash.

**ST. LOUIS**—Commercial National Bank (successor to Commercial Bank); Wm. Nicholls, Pres.—Fourth National Bank; Van L. Runyan, Asst. Cashier; Chas. L. Buschman, director, deceased.

**TROY**—People's Bank; P. G. Sheldon, Pres.; Jas. A. Jackson, Cashier.

#### NEBRASKA.

**FAIRBURY**—First National Bank; F. F. Gay, Cashier in place of E. E. McDowell; no Vice-Pres. in place of F. F. Gay; W. P. McDowell, Asst. Cashier.

**OSMOND**—Farmers' State Bank; capital, \$20,000; C. A. Kissinger, Pres.; B. M. Smith, Cashier.

#### NEW JERSEY.

**HADDONFIELD**—Haddonfield National Bank; James Wood Hunt, Cashier in place of Jere H. Nixon.

**LAMBERTVILLE**—Amwell National Bank; corporate existence extended until June 27, 1916.

#### NEW YORK.

**BUFFALO**—Ellicott Square Bank; Andrew

F. Langdon elected director.—Bank of Commerce; R. R. Hefford, Pres. in place of Geo. W. Miller, resigned.

**CATSKILL**—Catskill National Bank; Henry B. Hill, Cashier, deceased.

**CHATEAUGAY**—Bank of Chateaugay; I. M. Warren, Cashier in place of Geo. Hawkins, deceased.

**DUNDEE**—Dundee National Bank; James V. Bigelow, Pres. in place of James Spicer; C. M. Clark, Asst. Cashier.

**HERKIMER**—First National Bank; C. L. Avery, Jr., Asst. Cashier, deceased.

**JAMAICA**—Jamaica Savings' Bank; Daniel Smith, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**JOHNSTOWN**—Johnstown Bank; surplus increased to \$90,000.

**NEWARK**—Peirson & Perkins; reported succeeded by Peirson & Peirson.

**NEW YORK CITY**—Standard Nat. Bank; Frederick A. Burnham elected director in place of Marvelle W. Cooper, deceased.—Title Guarantee and Trust Co.; capital increased to \$2,500,000.—Corbin Banking Co.; Austin Corbin, Pres., deceased.—W. T. Hatch & Sons; Walter T. Hatch, deceased; business continued by Henry P. and Arthur M. Hatch.—S. M. Swenson & Sons; S. M. Swenson, deceased.—National Park Bank; Richard Delafeld, Vice-Pres.—Bank of New Amsterdam; Frank Tilford, Pres. in place of Geo. H. Wyckoff, deceased.—Cantoni & Co.; Salvatore Cantoni, deceased.—State Trust Co.; Morris S. Decker, Sec. in place of J. Q. Adams, deceased; H. M. Francis, Treas.; H. H. Berry, Asst. Sec.—National City Bank; Robert Bacon, elected director.—Mercantile National Bank; F. B. Schenck, Pres. in place of Wm. P. St. John, resigned; Chas. M. Vail, Vice-Pres.; James V. Lott, Acting Cashier.—Amory, Worden & Co.; succeeded by Worden, Bell & Co.—Maitland, Phelps & Co.; title changed to Maitland, Coppel & Co.; Arthur Coppel admitted to firm.—F. P. Freeman & Co.; F. P. Freeman, retired; business continued under same name by Frank M. and Henry W. Freeman.—Chas. Fairchild & Co.; Arthur Lincoln admitted to firm July 1.—Lawrence Frazier & Co.; business continued under name of Chas. Frazier & Co.—T. L. Manson, Jr. & Co.; Henry S. Fullerton, admitted to firm.—Edward Sweet & Co.; S. Quackenbush, retired from firm.

**ONEIDA**—Oneida Valley National Bank; T. F. Hand, Pres. in place of D. G. Dorrance; Geo. Berry, Vice-Pres. in place of T. F. Hand.

**PLATTSBURG**—Iron National Bank; John Henry Myers, Pres., deceased.

**WATERTOWN**—City National Bank; C. R. Remington, Pres. in place of Jno. E. Kemp, deceased.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**CHARLOTTE**—Loan and Savings Bank; Archibald Brady, Cashier, reported a defaulter.  
**LEXINGTON**—Bank of Lexington; W. D. Biggers, Asst. Cashier.  
**WILSON**—Branch & Co.; H. G. Connor, Pres. in place of W. P. Simpson, deceased.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**FARGO**—Red River Valley National Bank; R. S. Lewis, Vice-Pres.; James E. Hyde, Cashier in place of R. S. Lewis; Fred. A. Irish, Asst. Cashier.

**OHIO.**

**CLEVELAND**—Euclid Avenue National Bank; no Cashier in place of E. G. Tillotson.—Marine Bank Co.; W. B. Hale, Vice-Pres.; R. M. Murray, Cashier.

**DAYTON**—City National Bank; William Huffman, director, deceased.

**HAMILTON**—Miami Valley National Bank; F. W. Whitaker, Pres. in place of Peter Murphy, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of F. W. Whitaker.

**WAPAKONETA**—People's National Bank; F. J. McFarland, Pres., deceased.

**WOOSTER**—Albert Shupe & Co.; Albert Shupe, Pres.; W. T. Pickinpaugh, Cashier.

**OKLAHOMA.**

**EL RENO**—First National Bank; J. B. Harris, Pres. in place of J. T. Allison.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**CLARION**—First National Bank; C. Leeper, Pres. in place of G. W. Arnold; Ed. M. Wilson, Vice-Pres. in place of C. Leeper.

**CLINTONVILLE**—Clinton Bank; W. C. McKee, Pres. in place of Thomas McKee, deceased.

**MAHONNY CITY**—First National Bank; J. W. Phillips, Cashier in place of Wm. L. Yoder.

**MILTON**—First National Bank; Chas. H. Dickerman, Pres. in place of H. A. Fonda, deceased.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Girard National Bank; Thomas B. Wanamaker, elected director in place of Wm. C. Houston, deceased.—Geo. S. Fox & Co.; Geo. S. Fox, deceased; business continued under same name by Caleb Fox.—National Bank of the Northern Liberties; Edwin H. Fidler, Jr., director in place of Edwin H. Fidler, deceased.

**PITTSBURG**—Keystone Bank; A. S. Beymer, Asst. Cashier.—Marine National Bank; J. B. Sneathen, director, deceased.

**TOWANDA**—Citizens' National Bank; corporate existence extended until June 1, 1916.

**WAYNESBORO**—Waynesboro Dime Sav. Bank and Trust Co.; consolidated with Bank of Waynesboro; H. E. Hoke, Jr., Cashier.

**WILKINSBURG**—Wilkinsburg Bank; J. A. Strickler, Pres.; E. N. Doty, Cashier.

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**

**LAURENS**—Bank of Laurens; capital, \$50,000; E. M. Caine, Pres.; J. J. Pluss.

**NEWBERRY**—Newberry Savings Bank; J. E. Norwood, Cashier in place of K. H. Wright.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**VERMILLION**—First National Bank; M. J. Lewis, Cashier, deceased.

**TENNESSEE.**

**GALLATIN**—First National Bank; William Hall, Cashier in place of D. F. Barry; R. E. Donnell, Asst. Cash. in place of Wm. Hall.

**MURFREESBORO**—Stones' River National Bank; A. M. Overall, Pres. in place of Wm. Mitchell, deceased; H. E. Palmer, Vice-Pres. in place of A. M. Overall.

**NASHVILLE**—Landis Bkg Co.; A. L. Landis, Pres., deceased.

**SMITHVILLE**—Potter's Bank; W. C. Potter, Vice-Pres.; K. F. Potter, Asst. Cashier.

**WINCHESTER**—Bank of Winchester; capital increased from \$30,200 to \$40,000.

**TEXAS.**

**CHICO**—First Bank; T. J. Morris, Pres.; R. L. Morris, Vice-Pres.

**LONGVIEW**—First National Bank; J. W. Yates, Cashier in place of T. E. Clemmons.

**MERIDIAN**—First National Bank; G. W. Parker, Pres. in place of Chas. C. Blanton.

**ORANGE**—First National Bank; H. B. Curry, Asst. Cashier.

**WINSBORO**—Merchants and Planters' Bank; Geo. D. Hurder, Asst. Cashier in place of B. W. Moore; surplus increased to \$2,500.

**VIRGINIA.**

**CHARLOTTESVILLE**—People's National Bank; J. M. Robertson, Asst. Cashier in place of Jno. P. Harman.

**STAUNTON**—National Valley Bank; Robert W. Burke, Pres. in place of John Echols, deceased; Edward Echols, Vice-Pres. in place of Robert W. Burke.

**WOODSTOCK**—Shenandoah County Bank; Eugene Geay, Asst. Cashier in place of D. P. Magruder.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**MANNINGTON**—Bank of Mannington; C. W. Robinson, Cashier.

**WISCONSIN.**

**RANDOLPH**—Randolph State Bank; E. W. Brandel, Cashier.

**WEST SUPERIOR**—State Trust and Savings Bank; C. T. Landswick, Cashier.

**CANADA.****NOVA SCOTIA.**

**WINDSOR**—Commercial Bank of Windsor; Godfrey P. Payzant, Pres., deceased.

**ONTARIO.**

**COMBER**—Ainslee & Ainslee (successors to Chas. W. Watson); capital, \$15,000.

**GODERICH**—Bank of Montreal; W. L. Elliot, Manager in place of George Lockwood.

**NEW CASTLE**—Traders' Bank of Canada (successor to Standard Bank).

**VANKLEEK HILL**—Banque d'Hochelaga; H. Beaumier, Mgr. in place of W. H. Pambrun.

**QUEBEC.**

**ST. HYACINTH**—La Banque Jacques Cartier; business assumed by Eastern Townships Bk.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****COLORADO.**

DENVER—North Side Bank.  
WRAY—Republican Valley Bank.

**ILLINOIS.**

WARRENSBURG—Ed. White & Co.

**INDIANA.**

EDINBURG—John A. Thompson's Bank.

**INDIAN TERRITORY.**

DURANT—Citizens' Bank.

**IOWA.**

GLADBROOK—Stewart, Moeller & Co.

**KANSAS.**

CHASE—State Bank; in voluntary liquidation.  
CLEARWATER—Clearwater Bank.  
CONWAY SPRINGS—Summer County Bank.  
FORT SCOTT—People's Savings Bank.  
LAFONTAINE—Bank of Lafontaine.  
LARNED—First National Bank.  
LAWRENCE—Douglas County Bank.  
MORAN—People's Bank.  
WELLINGTON—Summer National Bank; in hands of J. Sam Brown, Receiver, June 23.

**KENTUCKY.**

LOUISVILLE—Dime Savings Bank.

**MINNESOTA.**

DEXTER—Farmers' Bank.  
MORRIS—First National Bank.

**NEBRASKA.**

OAK—State Bank.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

HINSDALE—Hinsdale Savings Bank; closed June 23.

WINCHESTER—Security Sav. Bank; closed June 23.

**NEW YORK.**

JAMESTOWN—City National Bank; in voluntary liquidation by resolution of June 18.  
—Chautauqua Co. Nat. Bank; in voluntary liquidation by resolution of June 18.  
NEW YORK CITY—Southern National Bank; in voluntary liquidation June 10.—Empire State Bank; dissolved June 24.

**OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.**

ORLANDO—Bank of Orlando.

**OREGON.**

PORTLAND—Portland National Bank; in voluntary liquidation, June 9.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

NORTH EAST—Short Banking Co.  
PLEASANTVILLE—H. J. Hopkins.  
PORT ALLEGANY—J. S. Rowley; moved to Ulysses, Pa.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

PROVIDENCE—Traders' National Bank; voted to go into liquidation on July 15.

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**

CHARLESTOWN—German-American Trust and Savings Bank.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

LANGFORD—Bank of Langford.  
MILLER—Hand County Bank.

**TENNESSEE.**

WATERTOWN—A. Bryan & Co.

**TEXAS.**

JEFFERSON—National Bank of Jefferson; in hands of Thos. J. Rogers, Rec'vr, June 24.  
LLANO—Iron City National Bank; in voluntary liquidation May 14.  
MEMPHIS—Citizens' Bank.  
SNYDER—Citizens' Bank.

**UTAH.**

MERCUR—First Bank of Mercur.  
SALT LAKE CITY—Bank of Salt Lake.

**VIRGINIA.**

RICHMOND—Finance Trading Company.  
ROANOKE—Roanoke Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Co.; assigned to Lucien H. Cook.  
WESTPOINT—Westpoint Banking Co.

**WASHINGTON.**

BALLARD—Marine Savings Bank.  
CHENEY—First National Bank; in hands of D. F. Percival, Receiver, June 27.—Bank of Cheney.  
FAIRFIELD—Coe Banking Co.  
NORTHPORT—Bank of Northport.  
SEATTLE—Seattle Dime Savings Bank.

**WISCONSIN.**

LA CROSSE—La Crosse National Bank; in voluntary liquidation to take effect July 1 (succeeded by National Bank of La Crosse).

**CANADA.****QUEBEC.**

ST. SAUVEUR—La Banque Nationale.

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**Counterfeit \$20 Note.**—Another issue of the counterfeit \$20 United States note recently described has been discovered, in which the following changes occur: The Treasury number has been changed to A.7256282 and appears in the usual place, and the character used by the Government to prevent alterations of the number only follows this number. The words "Register of the Treasury" and "Treasurer of the United States" have been added in the new issue, and the rounded white space above the shield, held by the female figure, right end of note, has been transferred to the left side of the shield. The note under examination did not have the imitated fibre marks.

## MUNICIPAL BONDS, STOCKS AND OTHER SECURITIES.

### NEW SECURITIES.

—Lunenburg county, Va., will receive bids until July 25 for the purchase of \$6,000 ten year bonds. Address proposals to John L. Yates, clerk board of supervisors.

—The Macon and Birmingham Railroad has decided to issue bonds to the amount of \$500,000.

—Buffalo, N. Y., invites bids for \$60,000 30 year bonds, bearing  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. Erastus Knight, city comptroller.

—West Point, Ga., is negotiating the sale of \$20,000 improvement bonds, to mature in 30 years and bear 6 per cent.

### SECURITIES SOLD.

—J. B. Oldham, of Dallas, has bought \$18,000 5 per cent. Austin County, Tex., bonds at a premium of \$48.

—E. C. Stanwood & Co., Boston, have bought \$200,000 of Camden, N. J. 4 per cents at 102.65 and accrued interest.

—The Greenwich Savings Bank, New York, has bought \$100,000 of Cambridge, Mass., water-works bonds at 107.910.

—Boston, Mass., has sold \$1,600,000 of bonds, the purchasers being Blake & Day, and the East River Savings Bank and Bank for Savings, New York.

### PROPOSED ISSUES.

—Philadelphia will probably emit \$8,000,000 of new securities.

—Cleveland, Ohio, may now issue \$8,000,000 of public-improvement bonds, the validity of the proposed bonds having been affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.

—Benton Harbor, Mich., has voted to issue \$30,000 in bonds for a park and as bonuses to new railroads.

—New Martinsville, W. Va., may decide to sell \$10,500 in bonds for constructing water-works. If issued the securities will bear six per cent. interest.

—Newport News, Va., may issue \$35,000 in bonds to provide additional school accommodations. A. P. Post, Mayor, can give information.

—Sistersville, W. Va., has voted to issue \$25,000 bonds for a public building. The town clerk may be addressed.

—Troy, N. Y., \$25,000.

—Canonsburg, Pa., votes August 8 on a

proposition to issue \$20,000 in bonds to build a new school house.

—Muskegon County, Mich., will vote on an issue of \$30,000 funding bonds.

—Thibodaux, La.; bonds authorized.

—Rockville, Md., \$20,000 bonds authorized, twenty year 4 per cents.

—Covington, Ky., \$60,000.

—Anaheim, Cal., votes August 1 on a proposition to issue \$18,000 bonds.

—Apache County, Arizona, has authorized bonds to amount of \$15,000 for jail and court house.

### NOTES.

—Reduction of the gold reserve to near the \$100,000,000 point raises the question of another Government bond issue.

—Milwaukee, Wis., is in good credit, a recent bond sale netting a premium of 11.87 per cent.

—The silver agitation has greatly interfered with the sale of bonds in many localities.

—Detroit, Mich., has a total bonded debt of \$4,915,000.

## MUNICIPAL BONDS.

### DIETZ, DENISON & PRIOR,

35 Congress Street, BOSTON.

109 Superior Street, CLEVELAND.

Bonds of Cities, Counties, Villages, School Districts bought and sold.

### Banks and Investors

SUPPLIED WITH CHOICE

## COMMERCIAL PAPER

At 5, 6, 7, and 8 Per cent. Discount.

Angus R. Macfarlane,  
DULUTH, MINNESOTA.

## DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.

The Democratic National Convention met at Chicago on July 7, and on July 10 placed in nomination for President, Wm. J. Bryan, of Nebraska; and on July 11 nominated for Vice-President, Arthur Sewall, of Maine.

**FINANCIAL PLANK.**—"Recognizing that the money question is paramount to all others at this time, we invite attention to the fact that the Constitution named silver and gold together as the money metals of the United States, and that the first coinage law passed by Congress under the Constitution made the silver dollar the money unit and admitted gold to free coinage at a ratio based upon the silver-dollar unit.

We declare that the Act of 1878 demonetizing silver without the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold, and a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad; the prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people.

We are unalterably opposed to monometallism, which has locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times. Gold monometallism is a British policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into financial servitude to London. It is not only un-American, but anti-American, and it can be fastened on to the United States only by the stifling of that spirit and love of liberty which proclaimed our political independence in 1776 and won it in the War of the Revolution.

We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender equally with gold for all debts, public and private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract.

We are opposed to the policy and practice of surrendering to the holders of the obligations of the United States the option reserved by law to the Government of redeeming such obligations in either silver coin or gold coin.

We are opposed to the issue of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in time of peace, and condemn the trafficking with banking syndicates which, in exchange for bonds and at an enormous profit to themselves, supply the Federal Treasury with gold to maintain the policy of gold monometallism.

Congress alone has the power to coin and issue money, and President Jackson declared that this power could not be delegated to corporations or individuals. We therefore denounce the issuance of notes intended to circulate as money by National banks as in derogation of the Constitution, and we demand that all paper which is made a legal tender for public and private debts, or which is receivable for duties to the United States, shall be issued by the Government of the United States, and shall be redeemable in coin."

### VOTE ON ADOPTION OF THE PLATFORM.

State.	Yea.	Nay.	State.	Yea.	Nay.	State.	Yea.	Nay.
Alabama.....	22	..	Michigan.....	28	..	Tennessee.....	24	..
Arkansas.....	16	..	*Minnesota.....	6	11	Texas.....	30	..
California.....	18	..	Mississippi.....	18	..	Utah.....	6	..
Colorado.....	8	..	Missouri.....	24	..	Vermont.....	..	8
Connecticut.....	..	12	Montana.....	6	..	Virginia.....	24	..
Delaware.....	1	5	Nebraska.....	16	..	Washington.....	5	3
Florida.....	5	3	Nevada.....	6	..	West Virginia.....	12	..
Georgia.....	26	..	New Hampshire.....	..	8	Wisconsin.....	..	24
Idaho.....	6	..	New Jersey.....	..	20	Wyoming.....	6	..
Illinois.....	48	..	New York.....	..	72	Dist. of Columbia.....	6	..
Indiana.....	30	..	North Carolina.....	22	..	Arizona.....	6	..
Iowa.....	26	..	North Dakota.....	6	..	New Mexico.....	6	..
Kansas.....	20	..	Ohio.....	46	..	Oklahoma.....	6	..
Kentucky.....	26	..	Oregon.....	8	..	Alaska.....	..	6
Louisiana.....	16	..	Pennsylvania.....	..	64	Indian Territory.....	6	..
Maine.....	2	10	Rhode Island.....	..	8			
Maryland.....	4	12	South Carolina.....	18	..			
Massachusetts.....	3	27	South Dakota.....	..	8			
						Total.....	628	301

\*One not voting.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, July 2, 1896.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL YEAR ended on June 30, and an examination of the national finances for the past year at this time may be of interest. For the third consecutive year the revenues of the Government have been less than the expenditures. The total receipts last year were \$326,189,226 while the expenditures were \$352,231,470, leaving a deficit of \$26,042,244, which compares with a deficit of \$42,805,223 in 1895, and of \$69,808,260 in 1894, and a surplus of \$2,341,674 in 1893 and of \$9,914,454 in 1892.

In the past three years the revenues have been deficient in meeting the disbursements by \$138,650,000, which nearly exhausts the surplus of the previous four years. In the past seven years therefore the revenues have been but little more than the expenditures and the reduction of the bonded debt of \$219,000,000 in the first two years of that period at a cost of more than \$30,000,000 for premiums has been more than neutralized by an increase in the past three years of \$262,000,000.

In 1890 the revenues reached the highest point since the war, with the exception of the year 1882, when they were about \$500,000 more than in 1890. In the last-mentioned year the total net ordinary receipts were \$403,080,962 and the expenditures were \$397,736,486, leaving a surplus of \$105,344,496. The receipts, expenditures and balances annually since 1890 have been as follows :

YEAR ENDED JUNE 30.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Balance.
1890.....	\$403,080,962	\$397,736,486	Surplus, \$105,344,496
1891.....	362,612,447	355,372,684	" 87,239,763
1892.....	354,937,784	345,937,784	" 9,914,454
1893.....	335,819,628	333,477,954	" 2,341,674
1894.....	297,722,019	367,525,279	Deficit, 69,808,260
1895.....	313,360,075	356,165,296	" 42,805,223
1896.....	326,189,226	352,231,470	" 26,042,244

The revenues last year were nearly \$18,000,000 more than in the previous year and \$28,000,000 more than in 1894, but they were still less than in 1893 by nearly \$60,000,000 and were nearly \$77,000,000 less than in 1890. The expenditures have steadily decreased since 1893, but are yet \$54,000,000 more than in 1890. The following table shows the changes in revenues, comparing 1896 with 1893 and 1890 :

	1890.	1893.	1896.
Customs.....	\$229,668,594	\$203,355,016	\$180,534,351
Internal revenue.....	142,806,705	161,027,624	146,508,264
Miscellaneous.....	30,805,632	21,436,988	19,146,611
Total.....	\$403,080,962	\$385,819,628	\$336,189,226

Receipts from customs have fallen off \$69,000,000 as compared with 1890 and \$43,000,000 as compared with 1893. Internal revenues have declined \$14,500,000



from 1898, but are about \$4,000,000 more than in 1890. Miscellaneous receipts show a decrease as compared with each of the years mentioned.

The expenditures in each of the years 1890, 1898 and 1896 were as shown below:

	1890.	1898.	1896.
War.....	\$44,582,838	\$49,641,773	\$50,890,961
Navy.....	22,008,206	30,186,084	27,148,231
Indians.....	6,708,046	13,945,347	12,169,106
Pensions.....	108,936,855	159,857,558	139,424,046
Miscellaneous.....	81,403,256	108,732,799	87,268,558
Interest.....	38,099,284	27,264,802	35,286,488
Total.....	\$297,738,486	\$383,477,954	\$352,231,470

There was a reduction in pension payments last year of nearly \$20,000,000 as compared with 1898, but they are still \$32,000,000 more than in 1890. There has been very little change in the other items as compared with 1898, except the decrease of \$16,000,000 in miscellaneous and increase of \$8,000,000 in interest. All the items except interest show an increase since 1890.

The effect of the impaired revenues is reflected in the comparative condition of the national debt, which in twenty-six years prior to 1891 had been reduced \$1,600,000,000. The following statement shows the total bonded debt, annual interest charge, aggregate net debt, total cash and gross and net gold in the United States Treasury on June 30 of the years mentioned:

	June 30, 1890.	June 30, 1898.	June 30, 1896.
Total bonded debt.....	\$728,318,110	\$585,037,100	\$847,968,880
Annual interest charge.....	28,997,008	22,594,194	34,387,265
Aggregate net debt.....	890,784,370	888,969,476	965,297,254
Cash in the Treasury.....	728,228,991	745,004,801	833,906,635
Cash balance in the Treasury.....	155,409,748	122,462,290	267,432,096
Gross gold in the Treasury.....	321,612,422	188,456,438	144,020,384
Net gold in the Treasury.....	190,232,404	95,485,414	101,699,005

The bonded debt increased \$262,000,000 in three years and \$122,000,000 since 1890. The annual interest charge is now nearly \$11,500,000 more than it was three years ago and \$5,000,000 more than in 1890. The net debt less cash in the Treasury has increased \$116,000,000 in three years and \$64,000,000 in six years. There is more cash in the Treasury than on either of the previous mentioned dates and the net balance usually called a surplus is now \$145,000,000 more than in 1890 and \$112,000,000 more than in 1898.

The gold reserves have however been very much reduced. Against \$321,000,000 gold in the Treasury in 1890 and \$188,000,000 in 1898 there is now only \$144,000,000. Of the latter amount the Government owns only about \$102,000,000, or only \$6,000,000 more than it did three years ago, before any bonds were sold to accumulate gold, and \$88,000,000 less than in 1890.

The interest taken in the gold question at the present time suggests inquiry concerning the changes that have recently occurred in the volume of gold in use as money. The largest estimated stock of gold in the United States at any time was \$711,705,050 on October 31, 1888. The total supply on June 30, 1890, was \$696,008,805, of which the Government owned \$190,232,404 and the remainder, \$505,776,400, was in circulation. The following table shows the amounts in the United States Treasury and in circulation and the total supply on June 30 in each of the past six years:

JUNE 30.	Net gold in the United States Treasury.	Gold in Cir- culation.	Total supply of gold in the country.
1890.....	\$190,332,404	\$505,776,400	\$696,008,805
1891.....	117,697,723	528,324,205	646,021,928
1892.....	114,342,397	550,003,079	664,345,446
1893.....	95,435,414	495,808,719	591,244,133
1894.....	64,573,025	564,218,399	628,791,424
1895.....	107,512,363	523,656,526	631,168,889
1896.....	101,699,605	495,449,242	597,148,847

The supply of gold has been reduced \$96,000,000 since 1890 and \$86,000,000 in the past year. More than \$80,000,000 was taken out of circulation last year and \$65,000,000 in the past two years. Compared with 1890 the gold in circulation has decreased \$7,000,000 and in the United States Treasury \$88,000,000.

In the year just ended there has been a contraction in the circulating medium of \$94,000,000, the total amount of money in circulation on June 30 last being \$1,509,725,200, against \$1,604,181,968 on June 30, 1895, and \$1,789,783,511 on January 31, 1894. There was a decrease in gold coin in circulation of \$24,000,000, in gold certificates of \$6,000,000, in subsidiary coin of \$200,000, in Treasury notes of 1890 of \$20,000,000, in old legal-tender notes of \$40,000,000 and in currency certificates of \$24,000,000 and an increase of \$200,000 in silver dollars, of \$11,000,000 in silver certificates and of \$8,000,000 in National bank notes. The per capita of circulation has declined to \$21.15, as against \$22.98 in 1895 and \$24.28 in 1894.

The abstract of the reports of the National banks as made to the Comptroller of the Currency showing their condition on May 7, makes it apparent that the National banking system has not yet recovered from the check which the bad times three years ago put upon its growth. There are now only two more National banks than there were in existence in December, 1891, and 136 less than in May, 1893. We compare some of the principal items reported by the National banks of the country on May 4, 1893, and May 7, 1896, as follows:

	May 4, 1893.	May 7, 1896.	
Number of banks.....	3,880	3,694	Decrease, 186
Capital.....	\$688,701,200	\$652,099,780	Decrease, \$36,601,420
Surplus.....	246,189,138	247,546,087	Increase, 1,406,949
Undivided profits.....	106,966,723	89,378,085	Decrease, 17,588,638
Circulation.....	151,694,110	197,382,364	Increase, 45,688,254
Individual deposits.....	1,749,930,817	1,687,639,515	Decrease, 62,291,302
Loans.....	2,162,401,858	1,970,098,833	Decrease, 192,303,025
United States bonds to secure circulation.	172,412,550	235,017,500	Increase, 62,604,950
"    "    "    U. S. deposits	15,261,000	25,573,000	Increase, 10,312,000
"    "    "    on hand.....	3,519,550	12,491,420	Increase, 8,971,870
Stocks, securities, etc.....	150,747,863	190,968,097	Increase, 40,190,235
Gold coin and certificates.....	168,862,941	157,761,800	Decrease, 11,101,141
Silver.....	38,359,200	44,611,646	Increase, 6,252,446
Legal tenders and certificates.....	115,641,163	147,006,652	Increase, 31,365,489
Total resources.....	3,432,176,697	3,577,638,822	Decrease, 54,537,875

The decreases in capital, deposits, loans and resources are all very large, while the important increases are in circulation, Government bond holdings, stock and bond investments and legal-tender reserves. A banking system whose aggregate resources increased \$1,000,000,000 in the six years from 1890 to 1896 inclusive, can hardly be said to be holding its own, when it makes such an exhibit as the above.

Compared with the statement for February 28 last, there has been some improvement although the capital shows a further decrease of nearly \$2,000,000. The individual deposit, however, increased nearly \$40,000,000. The capital, surplus, deposits and reserves of the National banks during the two years were as follows:

## CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual Deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
July 18, 1894.....	\$671,091,165	\$245,727,673	\$1,677,801,200	\$190,635,167	\$51,035,485	\$188,261,318
Oct. 2, 1894.....	688,861,847	245,197,517	1,728,418,819	190,927,231	40,323,423	165,644,028
Dec. 19, 1894.....	666,271,945	244,957,179	1,665,489,346	175,794,767	42,246,455	156,603,472
Mar. 5, 1895.....	662,100,100	246,180,065	1,667,843,286	178,100,435	42,771,206	144,806,622
May 7, 1895.....	650,146,756	246,740,237	1,660,961,200	177,264,386	41,382,212	145,459,159
July 11, 1895.....	658,224,179	247,782,176	1,730,022,006	171,217,437	43,209,757	168,515,172
Sept. 28, 1895.....	657,135,498	246,448,425	1,701,653,521	162,625,200	53,512,021	145,806,685
Dec. 13, 1895.....	650,956,245	246,177,563	1,730,550,241	168,244,439	38,467,979	130,649,423
Feb. 28, 1896.....	653,904,915	247,178,188	1,648,062,868	156,894,030	30,123,428	141,242,513
May 7, 1896.....	652,089,780	247,546,067	1,687,029,515	157,761,800	44,611,646	147,006,632

The banks gained a small amount of gold, but have not yet got back what they parted with on account of the Government bond subscriptions. The silver and legal-tender holdings are both increasing rapidly, and have been for more than six months past.

The business situation as indicated by the record of the clearing-houses of the country is one of quiet waiting and limited operations. In the past month the total clearings were about  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. less than in the corresponding month last year, and outside of New York they were  $1\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. less. For the first six months of the year the total clearings show a gain of 1.2 per cent., but outside of New York there was a decrease of about  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. The following table shows the clearings each month in the past two years for New York city, all other cities in the United States and in Canada :

## BANK CLEARINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	N. Y. City.	Other U. S. Cities.	Canada.	N. Y. City.	Other U. S. Cities.	Canada.
January.....	\$2,394,672,000	\$2,012,770,000	\$88,131,000	\$2,502,413,708	\$2,046,753,791	\$93,660,693
February.....	1,864,441,000	1,546,705,000	67,588,000	2,372,991,630	1,728,770,777	78,116,990
March.....	2,240,741,000	1,797,494,000	74,340,000	2,316,256,654	1,811,813,600	74,083,323
April.....	2,373,478,000	1,866,341,000	73,985,000	2,363,455,325	1,895,396,642	75,061,959
May.....	2,833,846,000	2,030,511,000	89,257,000	2,340,091,793	1,886,423,931	84,165,036
June.....	2,480,839,000	1,923,480,000	90,660,000	2,414,383,739	1,879,465,515	82,456,364
July.....	2,527,267,000	2,042,829,000	91,563,000			
August.....	2,316,813,044	1,830,241,274	85,478,263			
September.....	2,372,980,069	1,800,379,604	79,295,557			
October.....	2,933,618,760	2,311,092,416	98,644,217			
November.....	2,563,205,250	2,152,394,884	100,404,846			
December.....	2,900,892,035	2,160,407,592	103,195,103			

The past month has not been eventful in financial circles. The adjournment of Congress on June 11 failed to exert the favorable influence that such an event usually does, the political situation now dwarfing all other influences for good or bad. The gold standard declaration of the National Republican Convention, which, early in the month, tended to create confidence in the minds of investors, has been neutralized, to a certain extent, by the indication of a free silver victory in the Democratic Convention, which, at this writing, is about to meet. The stock market suffered a decided slump late in the month as the result of the silver agitation in Chicago, and a number of stocks fell to the lowest point touched during the year. Some of the declines from the highest prices of the year are shown as follows :

	Per cent.		Per cent.
Central New Jersey.....	9½	New York Central.....	47½
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.....	11½	Wheeling and Lake Erie, preferred.....	9½
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.....	6½	American Cotton Oil.....	10
Chicago and Northwest.....	9½	American Cotton Oil, preferred.....	19
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.....	12½	American Sugar.....	19½
Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. and Omaha.....	7½	American Tobacco.....	38½
Cleveland, Cinn., Chicago and St. Louis.....	11½	Chicago Gas.....	14½
Delaware and Hudson.....	8½	Consol. Gas.....	12½
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western.....	8	General Electric.....	14½
Lake Shore.....	8½	Pacific Mail.....	9½
Louisville and Nashville.....	8½	Pullman Palace.....	14
Manhattan.....	16½	Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	15
Missouri, Kansas and Texas, preferred.....	10½	United States Leather, preferred.....	12½
Missouri Pacific.....	10½	United States Rubber.....	14½

The stock market, to some degree, reflects the sentiment which prevails in general business, which dictates a waiting policy until something more definite becomes known as to the future currency policy of the Government, whether that policy shall be framed on the lines of the gold standard, or of free silver coinage.

**COMMERCIAL FAILURES.**—The record of commercial failures as compiled by R. G. Dun & Co. is not as favorable as could be desired. While the liabilities of failed concerns for the second quarter of the year are about \$500,000 less than in the previous year, the number of failures is 140 larger, and both number and liabilities are larger than for the corresponding three months in the past eleven years excepting only 1891 and 1893. The following statement shows the failures in the first and second quarters in each year since 1885:

FAILURES—YEARS.	FIRST QUARTER.		SECOND QUARTER.	
	Number failures.	Amount of liabilities.	Number failures.	Amount of liabilities.
1885.....	3,658	\$46,121,051	2,346	\$28,601,304
1886.....	3,203	20,681,726	1,953	20,752,734
1887.....	3,007	32,161,762	1,905	22,976,630
1888.....	2,948	38,884,789	2,241	29,229,370
1889.....	3,311	42,072,516	2,262	22,856,337
1890.....	3,223	37,852,968	2,162	27,466,416
1891.....	3,545	42,167,631	2,520	50,248,636
1892.....	3,384	39,284,349	2,119	22,989,331
1893.....	3,202	47,338,300	3,199	121,541,239
1894.....	4,304	64,137,333	2,735	37,601,973
1895.....	3,802	47,813,683	2,855	41,029,261
1896.....	4,031	57,425,135	2,905	40,444,547

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—There is little doing in the money market at present and the demand continues small. At the close of the month call money ruled at 2 @ 3 per cent. with the average rate slightly below 2½ per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 3 per cent. as the minimum rate for new engagements. Time

#### MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Feb. 1.	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.	June 1.	July 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	3 — 6	3 — 5	3½ — 4½	2 — 3	1½ — 2	2 — 3
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	6	4 — 5	3½ — 4½	2½ — 3	2 — 2½	3 — 3½
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	.....	4	4	8	2½	3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	5½ — 6	4½	4½	3	3	3½
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	6	5	4½ — 5	3½ — 4	3½ — 4	4 — 4½
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	6	5 — 5½	5½ — 6	4½ — 4¾	4 — 4½	4½
Commercial paper, prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	6 — 7	5½ — 6	6	5 — 5½	4½ — 5	5 — 5½
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	7 — 9	6½ — 7	6½	6 — 6½	5½ — 6	5½ — 6

money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 3 per cent. for 30 to 60 days,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 90 days to 4 months, 4 per cent. for 5 to 6 months and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 7 months. For commercial paper the rates are  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  @  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 4 months commission house names, 5 @  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for prime 4 to 6 months single names, and  $5\frac{1}{2}$  @ 6 per cent. for good 4 to 6 months single names. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the preceding table.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The principal European banks now hold about \$1,000,000,000 of gold, an increase of nearly \$5,000,000 since June 1, and of more than \$50,000,000 as compared with a year ago. The Bank of England increased its gold holdings last month \$6,000,000 and the Bank of France \$8,000,000, while the Bank of Germany lost about \$9,000,000.

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Mar. 18, 1896.	Apr. 15, 1896.	May 13, 1896.	June 17, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£25,018,615	£26,201,060	£28,194,170	£26,539,515
Public deposits.....	19,175,862	13,072,699	14,132,165	13,150,787
Other deposits.....	46,115,323	50,811,453	49,441,954	52,325,365
Government securities.....	15,157,323	15,206,660	15,260,785	15,205,022
Other securities.....	27,800,665	27,851,651	28,501,089	28,734,409
Reserve of notes and coin.....	40,996,529	38,042,790	37,672,598	39,899,978
Coin and bullion.....	49,114,944	47,443,840	47,066,756	49,079,193
Reserve to liabilities.....	$62\frac{1}{2}\%$	$56\frac{1}{2}\%$	$59\frac{1}{2}\%$	$59\frac{1}{2}\%$
Bank rate of discount.....	2%	2%	2%	2%
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	$1\frac{1}{2}\%$	$1\frac{1}{2}\%$	$1\frac{1}{2}\%$	$1\frac{1}{2}\%$
Price of Consols (2% per cents.).....	100%	110%	111%	112%
Price of silver per ounce.....	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	30 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.	30 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.
Average price of wheat.....	25s. 4d.	24s. 6d.	25s. 7d.	25s. 1d.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 3, 1895.		January 2, 1896.		July 1, 1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£33,091,079	.....	£44,960,056	.....	£48,485,266	.....
France.....	82,770,141	£49,423,851	78,010,739	£49,395,202	81,660,098	£50,319,984
Germany.....	38,082,610	12,679,540	31,065,775	13,512,475	29,059,101	14,529,049
Austro-Hungary...	15,161,000	13,991,000	24,402,000	12,775,000	27,242,000	12,859,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	11,020,000	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,406,000	11,360,000
Netherlands.....	4,099,000	6,888,000	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,696,000	7,017,000
Nat. Belgium.....	3,453,333	1,726,667	2,663,333	1,331,667	2,561,333	1,230,667
Totals.....	£184,601,163	£95,729,058	£192,708,908	£93,901,344	£200,088,783	£97,365,650

SILVER.—The price of silver in London has been strong during the entire month. American silver owners have supplied the market very sparingly and much of the strength has been due to the reports concerning the probability of a free coinage plank in the Democratic platform. The market opened at 81 3-16, the lowest price for the month, and advanced to 81 9-16, closing at 81 $\frac{1}{2}$ , a net gain for the month of 5-16.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894. 1895. 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	July.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$		
February	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	August..	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$		
March....	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	27	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	Septemb'r	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$		
April.....	29 $\frac{3}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	29 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	October..	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$		
May.....	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{3}{4}$	Novemb'r	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	31	30 $\frac{3}{4}$		
June.....	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{4}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{4}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	Decemb'r	28 $\frac{3}{4}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	30		

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—The market for sterling has continued dull with rates tending downward. Some bills have come upon the market for purchases of securities for foreign account, but there has been both buying and selling during the month. The demand for exchange has been light while about \$7,000,000 of gold has been shipped to Europe. The following tables show the condition of foreign exchange markets :

## ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	March. 1.	April 1.	May. 1.	June 1.	July 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days .....	4.86½ — ¾	4.87¾ — 88	4.87¾ — 88	4.87½ — ¾	4.87 — ¾
“ “ Sight .....	4.87¾ — 88	4.88¾ — 89	4.88¾ — 89	4.88½ — ¾	4.88 — ¾
“ “ Cables .....	4.88 — ¾	4.89 — ¾	4.89 — ¾	4.88¾ — 9	4.88 — ¾
“ “ Commercial long .....	4.86¾ — ¾	4.87 — ¾	4.87¾ — ¾	4.87 — ¾	4.86¾ — ¾
“ “ Docu'tary for paym't. ....	4.85¾ — 86	4.86¾ — 7¾	4.86¾ — 87	4.86½ — ¾	4.86 — ¾
Paris—Cable transfers .....	5.16½ — ¾	5.15½ — 15	5.14½ — 15½	5.14½ — ¾	5.15½ — 15
“ “ Bankers' 60 days .....	5.18¾ — ¾	5.17½ — 67½	5.16½ — ¾	5.16½ — ¾	5.17½ — 67½
“ “ Bankers' sight .....	5.16½ — ¾	5.15¾ — ¾	5.14½ — ¾	5.15 — 4¾	5.15¾ — ¾
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days ..	5.20¾ — 20	5.19¾ — 8¾	5.18¾ — ¾	5.18¾ — ¾	5.19¾ — 8¾
Swiss—Bankers' sight .....	5.18¾ — ¾	5.17½ — 67½	5.16½ — 15½	5.16½ — 5½	5.16½ — ¾
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days .....	94½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾
“ “ Bankers' sight .....	95½ — ¾	96½ — 1½	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾
Brussels—Bankers' sight .....	5.16½ — ¾	5.15¾ — ¾	5.15 — 14¾	5.15 — ¾	5.15¾ — ¾
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight .....	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾
Kroners—Bankers' sight .....	20½ — 7½	20½ — 7½	20½ — 7½	27 — 7½	27 — 7½
Italian lire—sight .....	5.72½ — 62½	5.65 — 55	5.62½ — 52½	5.47½ — 45	5.50 — 45

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
June 6 .....	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.86½ @ 4.87	4.86¼ @ 4.86½
“ 13 .....	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.88¼ @ 4.88	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.86¼ @ 4.87
“ 20 .....	4.87¼ @ 4.87½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.87 @ 4.87	4.86¼ @ 4.86½
“ 27 .....	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.86¼ @ 4.86½
July 3 .....	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88¼ @ 4.88½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.86¼ @ 4.86½

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The rate for money in the London market has declined slightly, while higher rates prevail in the German money centers. At Paris no change has occurred. The prevailing rates in all these markets are low, and the Bank of England still maintains its minimum rate of discount of 2 per cent., a rate which has ruled for nearly two and a half years.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Jan. 17.	Feb. 14.	Mar. 15.	Apr. 17.	May 15.	June 19.
London—Bank rate of discount .....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts .....	1—1½	1—1½	1½ — 1½	1½	1½	1½
6 months bankers' drafts .....	1½ — 1½	1½ — 1½	1½ — 1½	1½	1½	1½
Loans—Day to day .....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates .....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Berlin, “ .....	3½	2½	2	2½	2½	3
Hamburg, “ .....	3½	2½	2	2½	2½	2½
Frankfort, “ .....	3½	2½	2	2½	2½	3
Amsterdam, “ .....	2½	1½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Vienna, “ .....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
St. Petersburg, “ .....	6½	6½	6½	6½	6½	6½
Madrid, “ .....	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½	5
Copenhagen, “ .....	3½	3½	3½	3	3	3½

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The receipts of the Government in June as reported by the official statement were \$35,221,535, and the expenses \$25,080,000, leaving a surplus for the month of \$191,534. This is the first time a surplus has been reported in six months, and it is only to be accounted for

in the keeping down of expenses until after the close of the fiscal year. The revenues were only about \$600,000 more than in May, but the expenditures were reduced \$3,400,000, about \$2,400,000 of which was in interest. The revenues were about \$400,000 less than in June last year, but the expenditures were \$3,700,000 greater. As there is no prospect of any great increase in receipts this month, a considerable deficit for July may be expected.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	June, 1896.	Since July 1, 1895.	Source.	June, 1896.	Since July 1, 1895.
Customs.....	\$10,862,109	\$160,044,657	Civil and mis.....	\$6,842,000	\$87,212,506
Internal revenue...	12,751,188	145,908,715	War.....	3,512,000	50,755,941
Miscellaneous.....	1,606,258	19,074,938	Navy.....	2,283,000	28,955,990
			Indians.....	723,000	12,159,340
Total.....	\$25,221,535	\$325,026,340	Pensions.....	11,300,000	139,434,430
Excess of expendi- tures.....	* \$191,584	\$26,790,840	Interest.....	870,000	35,298,474
			Total.....	\$25,080,000	\$351,816,681

\* Excess of receipts.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	March 31.	April 30.	May 31.	June 30.
Net gold.....	\$128,713,709	\$125,498,509	\$108,663,269	\$102,418,008
Net silver.....	20,864,635	23,309,627	23,237,885	20,351,974
U. S. notes.....	79,690,290	76,907,711	87,629,865	88,980,861
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).....	15,065,607	22,475,689	22,244,332	22,432,899
Deposits in National banks.....	26,876,970	26,819,581	22,093,400	16,778,451
Available cash balance.....	\$271,111,211	\$274,611,118	\$268,668,751	\$266,942,129

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$27,804,400	\$34,523,447	\$44,705,967	\$29,237,670	\$32,529,340	\$49,845,507
February.....	22,888,057	25,696,065	87,085,511	26,059,228	26,749,956	123,962,979
March.....	25,470,576	25,716,957	90,463,307	26,041,149	27,274,994	128,646,461
April.....	24,247,836	32,990,676	91,247,144	24,282,866	28,987,381	125,393,900
May.....	25,272,078	28,558,214	99,151,409	24,643,718	28,426,592	*108,345,234
June.....	25,615,474	21,683,029	107,512,362	25,221,535	25,080,000	*102,418,008
July.....	29,000,698	38,548,064	107,236,487			
August.....	28,952,696	32,588,185	100,329,837			
September.....	27,549,678	24,320,482	92,911,974			
October.....	27,901,748	34,563,425	92,943,180			
November.....	25,986,503	27,199,283	79,333,966			
December.....	26,288,938	25,814,317	63,262,268			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.—This is the season of the year when the export trade approximates low-water mark, and not until September is there likely to be any improvement. While the exports of merchandise in May, the last month for which complete returns have been made, were \$2,000,000 more than in the same month last year, they are \$4,500,000 less than in April, and \$26,000,000 less than in December last. The imports, on the other hand, should begin to show an increase, but in May they were nearly \$2,000,000 less than in April, and \$9,000,000 less than in May last year. We have, therefore, a net balance of exports of \$9,500,000 against net imports of \$1,700,000 last year. The net exports for the eleven months of the year were \$92,700,000, or \$10,000,000 more than in 1894-5.

We exported nearly \$18,500,000 of gold in May, and with the exports in June the total for the fiscal year will be \$80,000,000 or more. The exports of silver for the month were \$4,594,000, and for the eleven months \$43,585,000, but we imported \$18,657,000 silver ore during the year. The net exports of merchandise, specie and gold and silver ore for the eleven months were \$195,000,000. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and eleven months ended May 31, for the past six years :

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF MAY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$58,062,107	\$71,903,023	Imp., 13,061,516	Exp., \$30,368,112	Imp., \$423,594
1892.....	69,703,479	68,690,171	Exp., 1,007,308	" 3,263,063	Exp., 416,735
1893.....	68,953,348	75,953,294	Imp., 6,900,886	" 15,205,760	" 1,263,258
1894.....	60,997,384	56,160,332	Exp., 4,837,332	" 23,124,058	" 2,904,177
1895.....	64,267,176	66,028,854	Imp., 1,761,675	Imp., 3,271,193	" 3,798,786
1896.....	66,525,169	56,963,910	Exp., 9,561,259	Exp., 18,493,709	" 4,594,798
ELEVEN MONTHS.					
1891.....	826,886,076	771,453,971	Exp., 55,432,105	Exp., 52,500,593	Exp., 4,040,261
1892.....	965,389,811	755,385,894	" 210,003,917	Imp., 16,139,604	" 11,903,808
1893.....	782,218,625	796,706,378	Imp., 14,487,753	Exp., 85,804,919	" 15,113,783
1894.....	894,404,722	596,486,207	Exp., 237,908,515	Imp., 17,847,930	" 34,558,272
1895.....	752,570,535	670,307,021	Exp., 82,262,414	Exp., 32,948,199	" 34,547,565
1896.....	815,971,704	723,260,747	" 92,711,017	" 74,505,546	" 43,585,518

GOLD MOVEMENT FOR FOUR YEARS.

	1892-1893.	1893-1894.	1894-1895.	1895-1896.
July.....	Exp., \$10,240,198	Imp., \$5,776,401	Exp., \$12,823,572	Exp., \$3,296,067
August.....	" 5,716,669	" 40,622,529	" 1,935,308	" 15,183,175
September.....	" 2,224,127	" 5,242,063	Imp., 418,118	" 16,674,909
October.....	Imp., 2,634,060	" 1,072,919	" 519,851	" 76,857
November.....	" 1,438,565	" 4,136,832	" 1,507,388	" 12,468,188
December.....	Exp., 11,336,198	Exp., 1,806,370	Exp., 9,424,439	" 14,170,899
January.....	" 12,213,558	" 573,730	" 24,068,489	" 198,536
February.....	" 12,868,066	" 1,068,935	Imp., 4,067,003	Imp., 9,375,289
March.....	" 1,504,861	" 2,629,241	" 4,120,280	" 238,653
April.....	" 18,944,979	" 9,402,110	" 2,029,761	Exp., 2,639,784
May.....	" 15,205,760	" 23,124,058	" 3,271,193	" 18,493,709
June.....	" 1,701,544	" 22,876,872	" 1,963,750	"
Year.....	Exp., 87,506,463	Exp., \$4,528,942	Exp., \$30,984,449	Exp., \$74,505,546

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion :

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ 60	.....	Twenty marks.....	\$4.76	\$4.81
Mexican dollars.....	53½	\$ 54½	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	48½	49½	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.79	4.83
English silver.....	4.87½	4.90	Mexican doubloons.....	15.55	15.75
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.90	4.92	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.60
Five francs.....	94	97	Ten guilders.....	3.96	3.99
Twenty francs.....	3.86	3.91			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 31½d per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 68½ @ 69¼c. Fine silver (Government assay), 69 @ 69¼c.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—The net changes in the condition of the New York Clearing-House banks for the month of June are small. Loans were reduced soon after the first of the month but were increased later, and show a net gain of \$1,000,000. Deposits, after declining \$3,500,000, increased again, and are \$170,000 more than they were a month ago, but they are \$71,000,000 less than they were at this time



last year. The banks have lost about about \$600,000 of specie and \$1,200,000 of legal tenders, and the surplus reserve is only about \$20,000,000, against over \$32,000,000 at the close of May and \$34,000,000 in 1895. The following statements show the changes in the condition of the New York Clearing-House banks at various dates :

NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
June 6...	\$476,819,100	\$61,808,500	\$80,972,800	\$497,180,000	\$18,486,800	\$14,725,300	\$629,507,300
" 13...	474,278,300	62,394,900	82,489,500	496,829,400	20,677,050	14,510,900	527,069,900
" 20...	474,783,600	61,554,900	82,196,100	496,329,800	19,918,250	14,807,800	526,778,000
" 27...	474,999,300	62,015,300	84,145,700	496,974,700	21,917,325	14,584,900	490,186,800
July 3...	476,199,300	61,886,300	83,223,700	499,046,900	20,328,275	14,566,900	509,536,200

DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January .....	\$508,437,900	\$30,815,150	\$549,291,400	\$35,288,850	\$501,089,300	\$15,969,675
February.....	551,808,400	111,623,000	546,965,200	36,751,500	490,447,200	39,623,400
March.....	581,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,054,500	489,612,200	24,442,150
April.....	547,744,200	83,600,150	504,240,300	13,413,450	481,795,700	17,005,975
May.....	573,853,800	83,417,950	528,968,100	27,233,575	495,004,100	22,944,275
June.....	572,138,400	77,985,100	566,229,400	41,221,250	498,874,100	22,230,675
July.....	573,337,800	74,803,350	570,436,300	34,225,925	499,046,900	20,823,275
August.....	581,556,000	69,053,700	574,304,500	40,917,175		
September.....	585,973,900	65,820,825	574,929,900	39,149,625		
October.....	586,633,500	60,791,825	549,136,500	22,296,175		
November.....	595,104,900	63,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400		
December.....	579,835,600	52,220,800	520,738,000	18,613,300		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$595,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table :

BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
June 6.....	\$162,927,000	\$141,857,000	\$8,459,000	\$3,087,000	\$9,870,000	\$100,344,900
" 13.....	162,674,000	139,884,000	8,698,000	5,851,000	9,852,000	87,759,700
" 20.....	161,753,000	138,979,000	8,850,000	5,960,000	9,894,000	81,552,100
" 27.....	161,883,000	138,555,000	8,932,000	6,509,000	9,863,000	80,025,700
July 3.....	162,342,000	144,984,000	8,610,000	6,440,000	9,894,000	110,807,700

PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
June 6.....	\$108,351,000	\$108,311,000	\$29,586,000	\$6,652,000	\$73,855,000
" 13.....	108,055,000	101,749,000	29,145,000	6,451,000	58,048,400
" 20.....	102,885,000	100,344,000	28,201,000	6,457,000	65,577,900
" 27.....	103,125,000	99,704,000	27,508,000	6,408,000	59,916,100
July 3.....	103,208,000	100,510,000	28,016,000	6,508,000	60,578,100

MONEY IN CIRCULATION.—There was another very large decrease in amount of money in circulation last month, the reduction aggregating \$11,859,083, making a decrease in the past two months of more than \$29,000,000. The per capita of circulation has declined 20 cents since June 1, 40 cents since May 1, and \$1.21 since January 1. The loss in circulation in June was about \$400,000 in gold and gold

certificates, \$5,500,000 in silver dollars and silver certificates, \$1,850,000 in subsidiary silver coin, \$3,860,000 in Treasury notes of 1890, and \$1,700,000 in legal-tender notes and currency certificates. There was an increase in National bank notes of \$46,000. The following statement shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on the dates named, the estimated population and the per capita circulation.

## MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	May 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$494,728,547	\$454,226,656	\$455,976,439	\$456,128,493
Silver dollars.....	59,205,927	53,602,362	52,717,417	52,175,998
Subsidiary silver.....	64,417,685	62,490,507	61,356,627	59,999,805
Gold certificates.....	49,998,489	43,052,559	42,961,909	42,320,759
Silver certificates.....	336,076,648	338,834,413	336,213,080	331,259,509
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	115,726,769	100,921,025	98,080,508	95,217,861
United States notes.....	230,855,873	237,349,381	226,582,755	228,451,858
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	31,605,000	32,930,000	33,430,000	31,840,000
National bank notes.....	206,653,836	216,602,179	215,285,550	215,331,927
Total.....	\$1,579,206,724	\$1,540,007,082	\$1,521,584,283	\$1,509,725,200
Population of United States.....	70,630,000	71,136,000	71,263,000	71,390,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$22.36	\$21.65	\$21.35	\$21.15

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The United States Treasury gained nearly \$5,000,000 more cash last month at the expense of the amount of money in circulation. There was a reduction in the actual cash holdings of more than \$5,000,000, but there were \$10,000,000 of certificates and Treasury notes retired from circulation, making the gain in net cash in the Treasury as mentioned above. The Treasury lost more than \$7,000,000 gold in June, but gained \$1,200,000 in silver. The changes in the other classes of money were insignificant. The Treasury holdings of the various kinds of money are shown as follows:

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	May 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$33,378,362	\$135,594,888	\$118,644,283	\$111,806,340
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	32,851,621	32,662,360	32,217,024
Silver Dollars.....	364,083,702	374,187,554	376,572,490	378,614,043
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	120,989,560	119,989,914	119,063,695
Subsidiary silver.....	12,764,321	15,459,008	15,877,424	15,730,976
United States notes.....	115,825,143	109,331,635	121,118,261	121,229,658
National bank notes.....	7,063,137	7,587,158	10,002,385	10,668,620
Total.....	\$737,547,542	\$795,951,369	\$794,627,626	\$789,317,356
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	533,344,856	515,737,997	510,785,496	500,637,629
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$204,202,686	\$280,213,372	\$283,842,131	\$288,679,727

**THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE COUNTRY.**—The total money in the country, exclusive of certificates and Treasury notes, was reduced \$7,000,000 in June, making

## TOTAL SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	May 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$568,106,939	\$589,820,494	\$574,520,722	\$567,931,823
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	32,851,621	32,662,360	32,217,024
Silver dollars.....	423,289,629	427,789,918	429,239,916	430,730,041
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	120,989,560	119,989,914	119,063,695
Subsidiary silver.....	77,182,006	77,948,510	76,994,051	75,730,781
United States notes.....	346,681,018	346,681,018	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	213,716,973	224,189,337	225,237,935	226,000,547
Total.....	\$1,783,409,410	\$1,820,220,454	\$1,805,426,414	\$1,796,404,927

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

ing a decrease of about \$22,000,000 since May 1. There was a loss of about \$6,000,000 in gold in the month, an increase of \$600,000 in silver dollars and bullion, a decrease of \$1,200,000 in subsidiary silver and an increase in National bank notes of \$700,000. The preceding statement shows the amount of each kind of money in the country on the dates mentioned:

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—The total amount of National bank notes outstanding on June 30, was \$325,912,960, an increase for the month of \$712,612, and for the fiscal year of \$14,312,262. The circulation based on Government bonds was increased \$328,090 for the month and \$19,476,881 for the year. The lawful money deposited to secure circulation increased \$389,523 in June, but is \$5,164,569 less than a year ago. There was but little change in the amount of bonds deposited to secure circulation, but the 4 per cents of 1895 and 1907 are gradually taking the place of the other issues.

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The mints during the past month coined \$1,500,125 of silver dollars, making a total of \$7,500,125 since January 1. The gold coinage for the month was \$2,471,217. In the six months there have been coined \$22,523,072 of gold, \$8,856,714 of silver, and \$475,186 of minor coin, making a total of \$31,854,972.

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—The last of the recent 4 per cent. bond issue has now taken its place in the public debt statement and the total interest-bearing debt stands at \$847,363,890 and will remain at that figure until a new issue is made or the Government resumes the paying off of its debt. By the retirement of \$8,500,000 of certificates and Treasury notes the aggregate debt was reduced about \$6,500,000 to a little less than \$1,770,000,000. The net debt less cash in the Treasury was increased however nearly \$2,000,000 and is now \$955,000,000 as compared with \$947,000,000 on January 1 last. A comparative statement of the debt on the several dates named is given in the following table.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	May 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
" " 1907, 4 " .....	559,681,750	559,686,800	559,686,850	559,686,850
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	50,810	47,290	47,140	47,140
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
" " 1895, 4 " .....	62,815,400	157,283,750	160,440,100	162,815,400
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$747,361,960</b>	<b>\$842,312,140</b>	<b>\$845,483,590</b>	<b>\$847,363,890</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,674,510	1,651,790	1,645,970	1,636,890
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863
National bank note redemption acct..	22,659,734	20,786,048	19,806,698	20,102,023
Fractional currency.....	6,863,394	6,862,489	6,862,489	6,861,184
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$376,258,992</b>	<b>\$374,414,400</b>	<b>\$373,585,050</b>	<b>\$373,728,570</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,125,325,462</b>	<b>1,216,726,540</b>	<b>1,220,669,611</b>	<b>1,222,729,360</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	50,099,899	43,817,469	43,649,189	42,818,189
Silver " .....	245,702,504	350,412,504	346,942,504	342,619,504
Certificates of deposit.....	34,450,000	33,295,000	33,670,000	31,990,000
Treasury notes of 1890 .....	137,771,280	138,069,280	131,286,280	129,663,280
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$568,023,673</b>	<b>\$569,594,253</b>	<b>\$555,546,973</b>	<b>\$547,110,973</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,693,349,135</b>	<b>1,776,320,793</b>	<b>1,776,216,583</b>	<b>1,769,840,333</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	787,578,447	868,799,556	861,766,970	858,905,685
Demand liabilities.....	608,551,247	598,708,896	594,573,760	596,473,539
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$270,090,660</b>	<b>\$267,193,210</b>	<b>\$267,432,066</b>
Gold reserve.....	63,262,268	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	114,764,932	170,090,660	167,193,210	167,432,066
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$270,090,660</b>	<b>\$267,193,210</b>	<b>\$267,432,066</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>947,296,363</b>	<b>948,287,670</b>	<b>958,476,401</b>	<b>955,297,254</b>

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of June, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				JUNE, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	29 $\frac{3}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Feb. 24	12 $\frac{1}{4}$ —Jan. 7	7		15 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	13 $\frac{3}{4}$
" preferred	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	19—June 10	10		23 $\frac{1}{2}$	19	20 $\frac{1}{2}$
Atlantic & Pacific.	2	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 8	$\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Baltimore & Ohio.	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	44—Jan. 27	13—Mar. 6	6		19 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts.	24	19	25—May 16	15—Feb. 11	11		19	19	19
Canadian Pacific.	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	38	62 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 27	52—Jan. 4	4		61	60	60 $\frac{1}{4}$
Canada Southern.	57 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	51 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	45 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		51 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	48 $\frac{1}{2}$
Central of New Jersey.	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	103 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		108	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	108
Central Pacific.	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 15	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	9		15	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cdfs.	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	13—Jan. 7	7		16 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & Alton.	180	147	180—Jan. 18	150—Jan. 27	27		159 $\frac{1}{2}$	158	159 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	69	82 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 24	71 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		80 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & E. Illinois.	57	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	43—Feb. 13	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 13	13		41	41	41
" preferred.	106	90	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 5	98—Jan. 23	23		98	98	98
Chicago Gas.	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 4	61 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 29	29		69 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	53 $\frac{1}{2}$	79 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 17	63 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		79 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	75 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	130	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	130 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 2	125—Jan. 7	7		129	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	127 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & Northwestern.	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	94 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		108 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	101 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	151	137	150—June 30	142—Jan. 8	8		150	149	150
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	74 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	62—Jan. 7	7		72 $\frac{1}{2}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	66 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	46	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	45 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 27	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		44 $\frac{1}{2}$	39 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	129 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	124 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	117—Jan. 7	7		124	122	122
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.	50	23	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	29—June 29	29		34 $\frac{1}{2}$	29	29 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	97	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 20	80—June 18	18		80 $\frac{1}{2}$	80	80
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 16	$\frac{1}{2}$ —June 29	29		1 $\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	22—June 29	29		22	22	23
Columbus & Hock. Val. Coal.	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 7	1—June 15	15		1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 27	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 22	22		17 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	17
" preferred.	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	55	55 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 25	50—June 22	22		55 $\frac{1}{2}$	50	55 $\frac{1}{2}$
Consolidated Gas Co.	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	126	164 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 20	143—Jan. 7	7		161 $\frac{1}{2}$	153	154 $\frac{1}{2}$
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	118	129 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	119 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		127 $\frac{1}{2}$	124 $\frac{1}{2}$	125 $\frac{1}{2}$
Delaware, Lack. & Western.	174	154	166—June 5	155 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		166	156 $\frac{1}{2}$	162
Denver & Rio Grande.	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	14—Feb. 4	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 16	16		14	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	14
" preferred.	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	51—Feb. 24	40—Jan. 7	7		49 $\frac{1}{2}$	46	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	94	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 6	89—Jan. 2	2		96	96	96
Erie.	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	94	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 12	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 10	10		15 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 1st pref.	.....	.....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 17	38—June 29	29		38	38	38
" 2d pref.	.....	.....	25—Mar. 16	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 14	14		.....	.....	.....
Bransville & Terre Haute.	51	28	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	27—Jan. 13	13		30	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$
Express Adams.	153	140	150 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	146—Jan. 15	15		150	147 $\frac{1}{2}$	147 $\frac{1}{2}$
" American.	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	109	116—May 25	110—Jan. 24	24		113	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	113
" United States.	50	36	43—Apr. 24	38—Jan. 9	9		41 $\frac{1}{2}$	39	40
" Wells, Fargo.	115	95	101—Feb. 15	92—June 30	30		100	92	92
Great Northern, preferred.	134	100	121—May 7	108 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 13	13		118	115	115
Illinois Central.	106	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	98—Jan. 31	89 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 8	8		96	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$
Iowa Central.	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 8	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		8 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	32	19	38—Apr. 23	25—Jan. 6	6		35 $\frac{1}{2}$	32	32
Laclede Gas.	33 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	30—Apr. 27	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		24 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lake Erie & Western.	23	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 5	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 30	30		19 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	85	61	75—Feb. 7	64 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		72	66	66
Lake Shore.	158 $\frac{1}{2}$	134 $\frac{1}{2}$	164 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 17	134 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		154 $\frac{1}{2}$	147 $\frac{1}{2}$	147 $\frac{1}{2}$
Long Island.	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	83	84—Jan. 7	74—Jan. 26	26		78 $\frac{1}{2}$	74	75
Long Island Traction.	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	22—Feb. 19	16—Jan. 10	10		.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville.	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	55 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7		53	47	49 $\frac{1}{2}$
Louis., N. A. & Chic., Tr. cdfs.	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 18	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 8	8		9 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 13	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	6		21 $\frac{1}{2}$	19	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
Manhattan consol.	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	99 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	9		105 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$
Michigan Central.	103	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	93—Mar. 23	23		97	96	96
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 21	16—June 11	11		19	16	19
" 1st pref.	83	73	83—Feb. 21	72—Jan. 10	10		79 $\frac{1}{2}$	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	77
" 2d pref.	62	39 $\frac{1}{2}$	53 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 22	40—Jan. 7	7		48	46	46
Mobile & Ohio.	27	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	25—Jan. 11	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 11	11		21 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	20
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 21	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 6	6		12 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	11
" preferred.	41	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 29	29		26 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.		JUNE, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42½	18½	29¾—Apr. 24	20¾—Feb. 4	25	19½	21
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis.....	81½	64	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104½	90	99¾—Feb. 25	93¾—Jan. 7	96	94½	95
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18½	10	15—Jan. 22	11—Jan. 2	13	13	13
1st preferred.....	75	65	80—Jan. 22	71¾—Jan. 17	.....	.....	.....
2d preferred.....	34½	20	35¾—Apr. 13	25—Jan. 15	32½	20½	22
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	15½	7½	17¼—Feb. 20	13¼—Jan. 7	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	30	16	29—Feb. 20	25—Jan. 22	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England.....	65½	29	51¼—Jan. 23	43—Mar. 23	45½	43½	45½
N. Y., New Haven & Hartford.....	218	174	186—Feb. 10	169—May 2	178	173½	173½
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19½	11½	16½—Jan. 31	12½—Jan. 7	15	13	13½
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	14½	6½	11½—Jan. 31	7½—Mar. 26	8½	8	8½
preferred.....	43½	19½	31¼—Feb. 6	21¼—Jan. 7	25½	21½	22
Norfolk & Western.....	6½	1¼	6½—June 16	4½—Apr. 29	5½	4	4½
preferred.....	19½	8	10½—June 15	4½—May 8	10½	9½	9½
North American Co.....	7	2½	6½—Feb. 24	4—Jan. 6	5½	4½	4½
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8½	2½	9½—June 29	14—Jan. 23	9½	8½	8½
pref. tr. receipts.....	27	10½	17¼—May 9	10—Apr. 16	17¼	16½	17¼
Ohio & Mississipp.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern.....	19½	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement.....	14½	3	4¼—Jan. 4	¼—June 12	¾	¾	¾
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	32	17	22—Apr. 14	10—Feb. 18	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line.....	11½	3½	8½—Feb. 8	8½—Apr. 14	.....	.....	.....
Pacific Mail.....	34½	20	31—Feb. 10	20¾—June 29	26¾	20¾	22¾
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	7½	2	3½—Feb. 10	1¼—June 23	2	1¼	1½
Phila. & Reading 2d ins. pd.....	22½	4½	16—June 16	13¼—June 29	16	13¼	14¼
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	22½	12	18¼—Feb. 7	14½—Jan. 7	15	14½	15
preferred.....	60½	43½	50—Feb. 27	52—Jan. 8	53	53	53
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34½	18	20¾—Jan. 31	17—Jan. 15	.....	.....	.....
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178½	146	164—Feb. 11	148—Jan. 7	159	156¼	159
Rio Grande Western.....	19½	15	18½—Feb. 10	16—Feb. 8	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	46½	30	46½—Feb. 10	39—Jan. 27	40	40	40
Rome, Wat. Ogdens g.....	120	112¾	116½—Apr. 27	115—Apr. 16	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	35½	60¼—Jan. 3	54—May 26	60	58½	60
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	9¼	4½	5¼—Feb. 7	4—Jan. 7	5½	4	4½
preferred.....	19½	8	13—Feb. 26	9—Jan. 6	11½	9½	10
St. Paul & Duluth.....	35½	18	27½—Feb. 24	22—June 12	22	22	22
preferred.....	95	86	91—Feb. 10	90—Feb. 4	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116½	104	115—Jan. 11	110—Jan. 22	118	113	113
Southern Pacific Co.....	20½	16½	22¼—Jan. 14	18—June 29	19¾	18	18¾
Southern Railway.....	14½	7	11—Feb. 6	7¾—Jan. 8	9½	8½	8½
preferred.....	44½	22	38¼—Feb. 26	29¾—Jan. 7	29½	26¼	29½
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	46½	18¼	34¾—Feb. 10	20¼—June 10	27	20¼	21¼
Texas & Pacific.....	14½	6½	9½—Feb. 26	7½—June 29	9½	7½	7½
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	4½	½	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17½	4	10—Apr. 21	5½—Jan. 25	8½	6½	7¼
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	6½	2¼	5½—Feb. 13	2—June 10	8½	2	3¼
Wabash R. R.....	10½	5	7¾—Feb. 24	6½—Jan. 7	7½	6½	6½
preferred.....	26½	12½	19¾—Feb. 24	14½—Jan. 7	18½	16½	16½
Western Union.....	95½	82½	87½—Apr. 22	81¼—Jan. 22	86½	82½	86½
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	18½	6½	13¼—Feb. 14	8½—June 29	10½	8½	9½
preferred.....	54½	29	40¾—Feb. 13	31¾—Mar. 19	37½	33¼	36
Wisconsin Central.....	7½	2½	4½—Feb. 24	2¾—Apr. 2	.....	.....	.....
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:							
American Co. Oil Co.....	30½	14	19—Jan. 27	9—June 29	13¼	9	9½
preferred.....	70½	59	68½—Feb. 14	59—June 29	55½	50	51
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121½	86½	126½—Apr. 21	97—Jan. 7	126	102½	111½
preferred.....	107	90¼	104—May 27	85—Jan. 6	106½	100¼	100¼
American Tobacco Co.....	117	63	85—Apr. 2	61¼—June 30	68	61¼	68
preferred.....	118	90	103—Feb. 13	97½—Apr. 23	99½	96½	96½
Dia. & Cattle Feed Co.....	25½	7½	20¾—Apr. 23	13¼—Jan. 23	18	13¼	14¼
General Electric Co.....	41	20	39¼—Mar. 13	22—Jan. 6	34½	27	27½
National Lead Co.....	38	17½	28¾—Feb. 11	22¼—Mar. 7	26½	22¼	22½
preferred.....	94½	73	91½—Apr. 17	82½—Jan. 7	86½	86	86
National Lined Oil Co.....	31½	15	21¼—June 23	15—Mar. 23	21¼	16½	18
National Starch Manfg. Co.....	12	5	6½—Feb. 21	4¾—Jan. 14	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	7½	6½—Feb. 7	4¾—Jan. 14	5½	4¾	4¾
preferred.....	17	1¼	12½—Feb. 7	8¾—Mar. 24	10½	9¼	9¼
U. S. Leather Co.....	24½	7	11½—Feb. 8	7—June 29	9¼	7	7½
preferred.....	97½	58	69½—Feb. 14	56½—June 29	65	56½	57½
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	29—Jan. 13	14¼—June 29	22	14¼	16
preferred.....	96½	75	89—Jan. 15	73—June 29	82	78	74

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 13, '95	....	....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1905	7,000,000	Q J	70	June 29, '96	70½	69¼	43,000
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	94,613,000	A & O	78½	June 30, '96	80¼	76½	2,355,000
	adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	NOV	39½	June 30, '96	42½	38½	1,680,000
	Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Colorado Midland 1st g. 6's.....	1906	J & D	77½	July 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
	eng Tr. Co. certfs of dep. ....	.....	.....	77	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
	cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	F & A	21	June 6, '96	21	21	5,000
eng. Tr. Co. certfs of dep. ....	.....	3,893,000	.....	21¾	June 8, '96	23½	21¾	6,000
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1904	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1907	18,790,000	J & J	90	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d W. d. g. g. s. f. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	52	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
Western div. inc.....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	1	June 27, '96	1	½	20,000
div. small.....	1910	1,811,000	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....
Central div. inc.....	1922	.....	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.), 1919	.....	3,000,000	A & O	107	June 11, '96	108	107	14,000
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
5's, gold.....	1885-1925	10,000,000	{ F & A	92½	June 26, '96	93½	92½	35,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1988	11,988,000	{ F & A	102½	June 22, '96	103	102½	8,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1900	.....	6,000,000	M & N	92½	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1900	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s, 1900	.....	10,607,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1903	10,483,000	J & J	79	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
"B".....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's 1919	.....	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s, 1900	.....	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. June 1st g. s. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's, 1943	.....	7,650,000	{ J & D	116	June 23, '96	116	114¾	62,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ J & D	112½	May 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	113½	June 26, '96	113½	113	2,000
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s's, 1924	.....	3,500,000	A & O	83	June 24, '96	85	80¾	33,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	52	June 9, '96	52	50	10,000
Union Elevated 1st g. g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	80	June 30, '96	84	80	138,000
Seaside & Bkln Bdge 1st g. g. 5's, 1942	.....	1,365,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	78	June 30, '96	80	78	67,000
Brunswick & Western 1s g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	99	June 27, '96	99	97½	11,000
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	124	June 16, '96	124	124	3,000
cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	116¼	June 16, '96	116¼	116¼	1,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121¼	May 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913	.....	1,367,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906	.....	6,500,000	J & D	106¼	June 23, '96	106¼	106	22,000
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	A & O	102½	June 26, '96	102½	101½	38,000
registered.....	.....	.....	A & O	97	Feb. 9, '93	.....	.....	.....
Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927	.....	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 5's. 1920		825,000	A & O	105½	May 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's. 1921		1,905,000	A & O	102	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908		18,920,000	J & J	110½	June 23, '98	110½	109½	67,000
2d mortg. 5's. 1913		5,100,000	M & S	105	June 30, '98	105	104½	22,000
registered.			M & S	108½	Apr. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Cin. Midl'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s. 1909		2,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1907		4,880,000	M & N	96½	June 23, '98	96½	95	20,000
Chatt. Rom. & Colu's g. g. 5's. 1907		2,080,000	M & S	70	July 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
1st consolidated 7's. 1899		3,895,000	Q & J	108½	June 11, '98	108½	108½	16,000
convertible 7's. 1902		1,167,000	M & N	118	June 23, '98	118	116	2,000
deb. 6's. 1906		466,000	M & N	114	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. mtg. 5's. 1907		41,604,000	J & J	120	June 23, '98	120	118½	23,000
registered.			Q & J	114½	June 15, '98	116½	114½	29,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ascd. 7's. 1900		5,500,000	Q & J	108	June 23, '98	108½	102½	40,000
mortgage 5's. 1912		2,887,000	Q & M	90	May 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
Am. Dock & Improv't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	114½	June 8, '98	114½	114½	1,000
N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's. 1909		411,000	J & J	103	Mar. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Pacific g'd bonds. 1906			J & J	103½	June 25, '98	103½	108	21,000
1907		22,883,000	J & J	102	May 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
1908			J & J	103½	June 10, '98	103½	108½	2,000
San Joaquin br. 6's. 1900		6,080,000	A & O	103	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mtge. gold gtd. 5's. 1909		11,000,000	A & O	91	Mar. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Pacific land grant 5's. 1900		2,586,000	A & O	98	May 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
ext g 6s series A. 1906		2,778,000	J & J	107½	Nov. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's. 1918		4,358,000	J & J	103½	June 9, '98	108½	108½	1,000
Western Pacific bonds 6's. 1909		2,735,000	J & J	101	Aug. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		3,884,000	J & J	93½	June 29, '98	94½	93½	99,000
50 year m. gg. 5's. 1908		4,800,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1906		1,500,000	J & J	108½	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd. 1906		2,287,000	J & J	108½	June 17, '98	108½	108½	9,000
6's. g., Series A. 1906		2,000,000	A & O	117	June 18, '98	117	117	1,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	118	June 30, '98	118	117½	7,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1909		23,553,000	M & N	108½	June 30, '98	108	106	114,000
registered.			M & N	106	June 10, '98	106	106	1,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1902		21,798,000	M & S	74½	June 22, '98	75	72	166,000
registered.			M & S	85	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1909		6,000,000	J & J	97½	June 22, '98	97½	96½	40,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1909		1,000,000	J & J	87	June 23, '98	88	82½	12,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	92½	June 17, '98	92½	92½	3,000
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	98	Dec. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	99	June 29, '98	100½	99	14,000
Ches. Ohio & S'hwestern m. 6's. 1911		6,176,600	F & A	105½	Feb. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d mtge. 6's. 1911		2,985,000	F & A	48½	Sept. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1908		1,984,000	J & J	110½	Aug. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Alton's king fund 6's. 1903		1,832,000	J & J	114½	June 22, '98	114½	114½	5,000
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. 1900		1,785,000	F & A	111	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's. 1900		300,000	M & N	109	Apr. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's. 1898		188,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		547,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's. 1926		8,241,000	A & O	103	May 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6's. 1906		935,000	J & D	97	Jan. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		28,924,000	J & J	119½	June 30, '98	120	119½	139,000
5's. sinking fund. 1901		2,315,000	A & O	103½	May 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's. debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	98	June 29, '98	99½	98	30,000
convertible 5's. 1903		15,283,900	M & S	101½	June 27, '98	101½	101	68,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,860,000	A & O	108	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
4's. 1919		7,753,000	A & O	98	June 24, '98	98½	98	29,000
Denver div. 4's. 1922		6,240,000	F & A	95½	June 10, '98	95½	95	9,000
4's. 1921		3,400,000	M & S	88½	Nov. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,730,000	M & N	89½	June 24, '98	91½	89½	94,000
registered.			M & N	90½	July 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	118½	June 15, '98	118½	117½	26,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	115	June 18, '98	115½	115	21,000
small bonds. 1907			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....

# BOND SALES.

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**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & E. Ill. 1st con. 6's, gold. 1884		2,653,000	A & O	127	June 15, '96	127	124½	12,000
"    gen. con. 1st 5's. 1887		7,487,000	M & N	99¼	June 30, '96	101	99½	86,000
"    registered. 1887			M & N	103	Oct. 8, '96			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. 1888		4,636,000	J & J	100	June 26, '96	100	98	9,000
<b>Chicago, Milwaukee &amp; St. Paul.</b>								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st m. 8's P. D. 1888		3,674,000	F & A	108	June 26, '96	108	108	1,000
"    2d 7 3-10 P. D. 1888		1,124,000	F & A	127¼	June 24, '96	127¼	126¾	8,000
"    1st 7's \$ gold. R. div. 1902		3,706,500	J & J	123¼	June 2, '96	123¼	123½	3,000
"    1st 7's 2. 1902			J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94			
"    1st m. Iowa & M. 7's. 1887		2,097,000	J & J	127	June 27, '96	127	127	4,000
"    1st m. Iowa & D. 7's. 1889		444,000	J & J	127¼	June 5, '96	127¼	127½	1,000
"    1st m. C. & M. 7's. 1906		2,363,000	J & J	123	Jan. 21, '96			
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. 1906		11,299,000	J & J	132¼	June 29, '96	132¼	132¼	12,000
"    1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1906		8,505,000	J & J	133¼	June 2, '96	133¼	133¼	1,000
"    1st 6's, Southw'n div. 1906		4,000,000	J & J	118	May 25, '96			
"    1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. 1919		2,500,000	J & J	109¼	June 11, '96	109¼	109¼	1,000
"    1st So. Min. div. 6's. 1910		7,482,000	J & J	118¼	June 11, '96	118¼	118	16,000
"    1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. 1910		5,680,000	J & J	128	June 30, '96	128	127½	11,000
"    5's. 1910		990,000	J & J	106	June 10, '96	106	106	1,000
"    Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	119	June 17, '96	119	119	1,000
"    1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. 1921		25,340,000	J & J	115¼	June 30, '96	115¼	114¼	42,000
"    Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. 1926		3,083,000	J & J	111	June 6, '96	111	109	95,000
"    Mineral Point div. 5's. 1910		2,840,000	J & J	106	Apr. 10, '96			
"    Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. 1921		1,360,000	J & J	110	Apr. 29, '96			
"    Wis. & Min. div. 5's. 1921		4,755,000	J & J	112¼	June 22, '96	112¼	112	3,000
"    terminal 5's. 1914		4,748,000	J & J	114	June 24, '96	114	113	21,000
"    Far. & So. 6's assu. 1924		1,250,000	J & J	118	Sep. 20, '94			
"    mtg. con. st'k. f'd 5's. 1916		1,680,000	J & J	98	Jan. 7, '96			
"    Dakota & Gt. S. 5's. 1916		2,856,000	J & J	109	June 29, '96	109	108½	14,000
"    g. m. g. 4's, series A. 1889		19,010,000	J & J	96¼	June 30, '96	96	96¼	209,000
"    registered. 1889			Q & J	94½	Dec. 11, '95			
"    Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. 1910		2,155,000	J & D	118	June 23, '96	118	115¼	12,000
"    1st convt. 6's. 1913		5,062,000	J & D	118	June 30, '96	118	118	1,000
<b>Chic. &amp; Northwestern cons. 7's. 1915</b>								
"    coupon gold 7's. 1902		12,771,000	Q & F	140	June 23, '96	140	138¼	6,000
"    registered d. gold 7's. 1902		12,336,000	J & D	117	June 30, '96	117¼	116½	20,000
"    sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929			J & D	118¼	May 5, '96			
"    registered. 1879-1929		6,011,000	A & O	115	Apr. 10, '96			
"    5's. 1879-1929			A & O	114	May 27, '96			
"    registered. 1879-1929		7,301,000	A & O	108¼	June 12, '96	109	108¼	12,000
"    debtenture 6's. 1903		9,800,000	M & N	110	June 22, '96	110¼	109	37,000
"    registered. 1903			M & N	108	Jan. 16, '96			
"    25 year debent. 5's. 1909		6,000,000	M & N	106	June 29, '96	106¼	105¼	89,000
"    registered. 1909			M & N	104	May 15, '96			
"    30 year debent. 5's. 1921		9,800,000	A & O	109	June 24, '96	109	109	2,000
"    registered. 1921			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
"    extension 4's. 1886-1926		18,632,000	F & A	102	June 10, '96	102	102	3,000
"    registered. 1886-1926			F & A	115	99¼ May 11, '95			
"    Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. 1901		720,000	J & J	110¼	Nov. 21, '95			
"    Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. 1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
"    Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's. 1900		1,850,000	A & O	116	June 30, '96	116	115¼	11,000
"    Chic. & Milwaukee 1st mtg. 7's. 1898		1,700,000	J & J	106	Apr. 9, '96			
"    Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. 1907		1,692,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '96			
"    Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. 1906		1,600,000	M & S	108	Jan. 7, '96			
"    Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's. 1909		1,600,000	M & S	108	May 21, '96			
"    Northern Illinois 1st 5's. 1910		1,500,000	M & S	106¼	Mar. 31, '96			
"    Mil. Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's. 1921		5,000,000	M & N	131¼	Apr. 29, '96			
"    con. deb. 5's. 1907		436,000	F & A	104	May 13, '96			
"    ext. & impt. s.f'd g. 5's 1929		4,148,000	F & A	114¼	June 13, '96	114¼	114¼	6,000
"    Michigan div. 1st 6's. 1924		1,281,000	J & J	131½	June 17, '96	131½	131	3,000
"    Ashland div. 1st 6's. 1925		1,000,000	M & S	129	June 9, '96	129	129	4,000
"    income. 1900		500,000	M & N	105	June 2, '96	105	105	10,000
<b>Chic., Rock Is. &amp; Pac. 6's coup. 1917</b>								
"    6's registered. 1917		12,100,000	J & J	130	June 16, '96	130	130	9,000
"    exten. and collat. 5's. 1934			J & J	125	Mar. 6, '96			
"    registered. 1934		40,417,000	J & J	105	June 30, '96	106	104¼	238,000
"    debtenture 5's. 1921		4,500,000	J & J	101¼	June 26, '96	101¼	101¼	40,000
"    registered. 1921			M & S	94¼	June 23, '96	96	94	19,000
"    Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. 1906		1,200,000	J & J	88¼	June 12, '96	88¼	88	7,000
"    1st 2½'s. 1906		1,200,000	J & J	66	June 11, '96	66	65	15,000
"    extension 4's. 1906		672,000	J & J	84	Oct. 14, '95			
"    Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. 1923		2,750,000	A & O	103	June 30, '96	103	103	8,000
"    small bond. 1923			A & O	103	Apr. 28, '96			



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,418,000	J & D	125½	June 16, '96	126	125½	35,000
{ Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	129	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	125	May 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	130	June 27, '96	130	129	15,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s.k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		1,316,000	M & N	106½	May 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,652,666	Q M	116	June 30, '96	117	116	18,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ coupons off. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s.k. f'd 7's. 1905		996,000	A & O	119½	June 11, '96	119½	119½	1,000
{ 2d g. 4½'s. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	107½	Dec. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Cin., Day & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	108	June 25, '96	108	108	11,000
City Sub. R'y. Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cfs. 1st 5's for 1917		2,000,000	.....	81	June 17, '96	81	80	22,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1933		5,000,000	J & D	96	May 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		4,763,000	J & J	93	Oct. 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1990		9,750,000	M & N	92½	June 30, '96	98	92½	40,000
{ registered. ....		.....	.....	90	June 30, '96	90	90	15,000
{ Springfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1991		4,000,000	J & J	93½	June 16, '96	93½	93½	1,000
{ Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,790,000	Q F	98	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ registered. ....		.....	.....	95	Nov. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ con. 6's. .... 1920		738,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29, '93	.....	.....	.....
{ Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,571,000	J & J	108	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Ind. Bloom. & W. 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	109	June 9, '96	109	109	2,000
{ Ohio, Ind. & W. 1st pfd. 5's. 1938		500,000	Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	75	June 26, '96	76	75	5,000
{ income 4's. .... 1990		4,000,000	A	22½	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s.k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	108½	June 8, '96	108½	108½	15,000
{ consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914		8,991,000	J & D	184½	May 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ sink fund 7's. .... 1914		.....	J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '99	.....	.....	.....
{ gen. consol 6's. .... 1934		3,205,000	J & J	125½	June 29, '96	125½	125½	5,000
{ registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	June 20, '96	107	106½	26,000
{ Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1938		2,481,000	J & J	117½	Feb. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ registered. ....		.....	Q J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1933		3,000,000	M & S	114½	June 18, '96	114½	113½	12,000
{ registered. ....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 6's. 1931		8,000,000	M & S	87½	June 30, '96	88	84½	210,000
{ gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		1,618,000	J & D	85	June 29, '96	88	84	97,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	132	Aug. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	140	May 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ bonds, 7's. .... 1900		281,000	J & J	115	Mar. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ 7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	115	May 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ 1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	138	June 30, '96	139½	138	12,000
{ registered. ....		.....	J & D	136	June 4, '93	.....	.....	.....
{ N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	133½	June 19, '96	133½	133½	1,000
{ const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	115	June 25, '96	115	115	1,000
{ Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	113½	Nov. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
{ 1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. .... 1917		5,000,000	M & S	143½	May 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ reg. .... 1917		.....	M & S	140	Sept. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. .... 1906		3,000,000	A & O	122½	Apr. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ registered. ....		.....	A & O	123½	Feb. 12, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ 6's. .... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	115	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ registered. ....		.....	A & O	117	Jan. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. .... 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	May 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ 1st r. 7's. .... 1921		.....	M & N	141½	Apr. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 24, '93	.....	.....	.....
{ Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,465,000	J & J	91	June 30, '96	92	90½	154,000
{ 1st mortg. g. 7's. .... 1900		6,382,500	M & N	111½	June 20, '96	111½	110½	17,000
{ impt. m. g. 5's. .... 1928		8,103,500	J & D	90	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. Id gt. 3½ S A. 1911		8,040,000	A & O	18½	June 18, '96	18½	17½	15,000

# BOND SALES.

101

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Detroit & Mack, 1st lien g. 4s.....	1895	900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	....	....	.....
"    g. 4s.....	1895	1,250,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....	1897	6,332,000	A & O	103	June 17, '96	103	102	13,000
"    registered.....			A & O	101½	July 23, '89	....	....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.....	1928	500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's.....	1937	4,000,000	J & J	98¼	June 19, '96	98¼	96	63,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....	1897	2,482,000	M & S	104	June 19, '96	104	103¼	10,000
"    2d extended 5's.....	1919	2,140,000	M & N	114½	Jan. 2, '96	....	....	.....
"    3d extended 4½'s.....	1923	4,618,000	M & S	105½	June 25, '96	105½	105¼	2,000
"    4th extended 5's.....	1920	2,926,000	A & O	114½	Nov. 4, '95	....	....	.....
"    5th extended 4's.....	1928	709,500	J & D	104¼	May 27, '96	....	....	.....
"    1st cons. gold 7's.....	1920	16,890,000	M & S	140	June 2, '96	140	140	4,000
"    1st cons. fund c. 7's.....	1920	3,705,977	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	....	....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.....	1953	7,500,000	A & O	131½	May 11, '96	....	....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....	1916	2,380,000	J & D	133	June 12, '96	133	133	2,000
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.....	1908	1,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
"    small.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.....	1900	2,800,000	A & O	105	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....	1982	12,000,000	M & N	109½	June 23, '96	109½	108	52,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....	1922	1,100,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....	1913	3,396,000	J & J	106	Apr. 28, '95	....	....	.....
Erie R. R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.....	1996	30,000,000	J & J	91	June 29, '96	94	91	114,000
"    registered.....			J & J	65½	June 25, '96	66¾	63½	170,000
"    gen. lien 3-4s.....	1996	30,027,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
"    registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....	1933	500,000	F & A	95	Dec. 19, '94	....	....	.....
Evans, & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....	1921	3,000,000	J & J	109½	May 19, '96	....	....	.....
"    1st General g 5's.....	1942	2,096,000	A & O	95	Apr. 19, '94	....	....	.....
"    Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....	1923	375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	....	....	.....
"    Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....	1930	450,000	A & O	95	Sep. 15, '91	....	....	.....
Evans, & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....	1926	1,591,000	J & J	90	Dec. 11, '95	....	....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....	1920	3,999,000	A & O	114	June 4, '96	114	114	1,000
"    1st con. gold 5's.....	1939	2,100,000	M & N	91	Apr. 19, '96	....	....	.....
"    Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....	1939	3,083,000	A & O	87	May 1, '96	....	....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....	1918	3,000,000	J & J	106	Jan. 17, '96	....	....	.....
"    1st land grant ex. g 5's.....	1930	423,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
"    1st con. g 5's.....	1943	4,370,000	J & J	80¼	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....	1941	1,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctfs. dep. 1st 6's.....	1921	7,699,000	....	57	June 18, '96	58	54½	56,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....	1928	2,888,000	J & J	53½	May 12, '96	....	....	.....
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's.....	1910	4,756,000	F & A	105	Apr. 6, '96	....	....	.....
"    2d mortgage 7's.....	1905	1,000,000	J & D	100	June 22, '96	100	99	12,000
"    Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's.....	1931	13,418,000	M & N	90¾	June 23, '96	91	90¼	114,000
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1927	5,360,000	J & J	80¼	Apr. 30, '96	....	....	.....
Gd. Rapids & Indiana gen. 5's.....	1924	3,746,000	M & S	75	Jan. 27, '95	....	....	.....
"    registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's.....	1937	2,838,000	M & N	123	June 26, '96	123	123	1,000
New Haven & Derby con. 5's.....	1918	575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	....	....	.....
Houston & Texas Central R. R. "    1st Waco & N. 7's.....	1903	1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92	....	....	.....
"    1st g. 5's (int. gtd).....	1937	7,381,000	J & J	109¼	June 22, '96	109¼	109½	1,000
"    Con. g. 6's (int. gtd).....	1912	3,455,000	A & O	104	June 30, '96	104	100	12,000
"    Gen. g. 4's (int. gtd).....	1921	4,297,000	A & O	69¼	June 30, '96	70	69	89,000
"    Deben. 6's p. & int. gtd, 1897		705,000	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '95	....	....	.....
"    Deben. 4's p. & int. gtd, 1897		411,000	A & O	88	Mar. 28, '96	....	....	.....
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's.....	1951	1,500,000	J & J	114	June 18, '96	114	114	2,000
"    registered.....			J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	....	....	.....
"    gold 3½'s.....	1951	2,499,000	J & J	104	June 4, '96	104	104	10,000
"    registered.....			J & J	97	Dec. 17, '95	....	....	.....

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Illinois Central gold 4's.....1952		15,000,000	A & O	102½	Apr. 23, '98	....	....	.....
" gold 4's regist'd.....1953			A & O	101	July 27, '98	....	....	.....
" gold 4's registered.....1953		24,679,000	M & N	100	June 19, '98	100	100	3,000
" 2-10 g. 4's.....1904		4,806,000	J & J	99	June 10, '98	99	99	7,000
" 2-10 g. 4's registered.....1904		4,806,000	J & J	102½	June 30, '98	104½	102½	12,000
" West'n Line 1st g. 4's, 1901 registered.....		8,550,000	F & A	101½	Sept. 10, '98	....	....	.....
" Cairo Bridge 4's g.....1950 registered.....		3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98	....	....	.....
" Springfield div. coupon 6's.....1898		1,600,000	J & J	104	Apr. 24, '98	....	....	.....
" Middle div. registered 5's.....1921		600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98	....	....	.....
" Chic., St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....1897		530,000	M & N	109½	Nov. 21, '94	....	....	.....
" 1st consol. 7's.....1897		826,000	M & N	106	Dec. 13, '98	....	....	.....
" gold 5's.....1951		16,526,000	J D 15	119	June 26, '98	121½	118½	8,000
" gold 5's registered.....			J D 15	115	Oct. 25, '94	....	....	.....
" Memphis div. 1st g. 4's, 1901 registered.....		8,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '98	99½	98	5,000
" Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		1,384,000	J & J	120	Apr. 26, '98	....	....	.....
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex bonds.....		1,800,000	A & O	28	Apr. 13, '98	....	....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....1905		1,824,000	J & J	99½	June 27, '98	101½	99½	15,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....1909		800,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 20, '98	....	....	.....
" 1st ext. g. 5's.....1943		600,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '98	....	....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold 1919		7,954,000	M & N	115½	June 3, '98	116½	115½	5,000
" 2d mortgage 4½-5's.....1909		6,593,000	M & S	70	June 26, '98	73½	70	14,000
" 3d mortgage 4-4's.....1921		2,701,000	M & S	25	May 1, '98	....	....	.....
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1928		6,322,000	J & D	96	June 30, '98	96	94½	80,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1929		3,000,000	A & O	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....1925		3,177,000	J & J	60	June 27, '98	60	60	3,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....1929		1,979,000	M & S	60	Mar. 30, '98	....	....	.....
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....1937		7,250,000	J & J	117½	June 25, '98	117½	117	5,000
" 2d mtge. g. 5's.....1941		2,100,000	J & J	102½	June 18, '98	103½	100	10,000
" Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	102	June 8, '98	102	102	10,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.								
" Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....1898		2,755,000	A & O	105½	May 6, '98	....	....	.....
" Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....1906		924,000	F & A	123	June 2, '98	123	123	1,000
" Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '98	....	....	.....
" con. co. 1st 7's.....1900		14,890,000	J & J	114	May 29, '98	....	....	.....
" con. 1st registered.....1900			Q J	111	June 24, '98	112	110½	12,000
" con. co. 2d 7's.....1903		24,692,000	J & D	116½	June 9, '98	120½	116½	2,000
" con. 2d registered.....1903			J & D	119½	Apr. 27, '98	....	....	.....
" Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....1901		1,000,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 24, '98	....	....	.....
" Kal., A. & G. H. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1938		840,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
" Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1934		1,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '98	....	....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....1940		15,000,000	J & J	102	June 29, '98	108	101	17,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1941		10,000,000	A & O	109	June 30, '98	110	108	17,000
" registered.....			A & O	110	Feb. 6, '94	....	....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1933		10,280,000	J & J	103	July 27, '98	....	....	.....
" registered.....			J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '98	....	....	.....
" registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" Elm., Cort. & N. 1st gtd 6's.....1914		750,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
" g. 1st gtd 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
Lex. A. v. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....1903		5,000,000	M & S	114½	June 30, '98	116	113½	206,000
" registered.....			M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....1916		400,000	J & J	96	Feb. 25, '98	....	....	.....
Lit. Rock & M. tr. co. cts. for 1st g. 5's.....1897		3,145,000	....	25	Apr. 22, '98	....	....	.....
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....1898		1,121,000	M & N	105½	June 17, '98	105½	105½	11,000
" Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	119½	June 29, '98	120	119½	5,000
" Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1898		3,000,000	J & D	94	June 25, '98	94	93½	11,000
" Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	91	June 16, '98	91	91	1,000
" g. 4's.....1932		325,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
" deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
" N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....1927		984,000	M & S	100	May 1, '98	....	....	.....
" 2d m. inc.....1927		1,000,000	S	40	Mar. 23, '98	....	....	.....
" N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....1897		500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	....	....	.....
" N. Y. B'n & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,228,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '98	....	....	.....
" Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	.....
" 1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	105½	Apr. 30, '98	....	....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1882		1,075,000	Q JAN	108½	June 17, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. d 5's, 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. Tr. Co. et. gold 5's, 1888		3,406,000	J & J	82	June 2, '96	82	82	1,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1883		2,432,000	M & S	14	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's, 1898		7,070,000	A & O	105½	June 22, '96	105½	105½	5,000
Cecilian branch 7's, 1897		600,000	M & S	105	Apr. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1890		5,000,000	J & J	119	June 25, '96	119	119	24,000
2d 6's, 1890		1,000,000	J & J	100½	June 1, '96	100½	100½	1,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		2,110,000	J & D	117	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
general mort. 6's, 1890		10,486,000	J & D	116	June 29, '96	116	115	7,000
Pensacola div. 6's, 1890		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1891		3,500,000	M & S	120	Mar. 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 8's, 1890		3,000,000	M & S	87	May 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	118½	June 11, '96	118½	118½	40,000
So. N. Ala. st'g fd. 6's, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	94½	June 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
55 50 year g. bonds, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	98	May 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
Unified gold 4's, 1940		14,994,000	J & J	79	June 30, '96	72½	77	82,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. g. 1921		2,870,000	F & A	100	June 23, '96	100	99½	19,000
collateral trust g. 5's, 1981		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '96	101	101	10,000
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4's, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	105½	Dec. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's, 1987		2,086,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's, 1986		8,678,000	F & A	96	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1987		6,742,000	J & J	88	June 18, '96	88	88	1,000
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	114	June 23, '96	114	114	4,000
cons. g. 6's, 1916		4,700,000	A & O	100	June 28, '96	100½	99½	45,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's, 1940		2,800,000	M & N	69	June 29, '96	72½	69	87,000
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1980		22,973,000	A & O	97½	June 18, '96	98½	97	27,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1984		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Memphis & Charlestown 6's, g., 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1908		10,818,000	J & J	120½	June 25, '96	120½	119½	64,000
2d 6's, 1899		4,000,000	M & N	107½	June 30, '96	107½	106½	12,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's, 1911		58,908,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's, 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mexican International 1st g. 4's, 1942		14,000,000	M & S	75	June 29, '96	75½	74½	181,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A", 1917		12,285,000	M & S	37½	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
coup. stamped, 1917						.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "B", 1917		12,285,000	A	6	June 9, '96	6	6	10,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910		1,411,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered, 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's, 1902		8,000,000	M & N	116	May 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 5's, 1902		2,000,000	M & N	105	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
6's, 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's, 1981			M & S	115½	May 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's, 1981		3,576,000	Q M	115	Apr. 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's, 1940			J & J	108	June 19, '96	108	107½	9,000
mtge. 4's reg., 1940		2,600,000	J & J	102	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's, 1889		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 3, '96	140½	140½	5,000
1st con. g. 5's, 1984		5,000,000	M & N	99½	June 30, '96	101	99½	66,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1909		1,015,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		638,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	122	June 1, '96	122	122	4,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1986		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 28, '87	.....	.....	.....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.						.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'st Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,060,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,774,000	J & D	81½	June 30, '96	84	81½	412,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	56	June 30, '96	60	56	355,500
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,686,000	M & S	77	June 29, '96	78½	75	33,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	71	June 30, '96	71	70	3,000
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	77½	June 8, '96	77½	77½	3,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		599,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	93	June 24, '96	93	91½	70,000
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small. ....		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	87½	June 25, '96	89	87½	16,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	108	May 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	65	Feb. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	65	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	104½	June 24, '96	104½	103	18,000
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	105	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1928		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	101½	June 30, '96	102	101½	7,000
St. L. & I'r'n. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1897		4,000,000	F & A	109½	June 11, '96	100½	100½	11,000
St. Louis & I'r'n. Mount. 2d 7's. 1897		6,000,000	M & N	101	May 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Ark'nasas b'nchext 5's. 1896		2,500,000	J & D	101½	May 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Carlo, Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1897		1,450,000	J & D	101½	May 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
" g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		18,345,000	A & O	80	June 25, '96	79½	74	63,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	118	June 22, '96	118½	116½	13,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	112	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1898		9,489,500	Q J	86	June 22, '96	86	85½	72,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	88	Dec. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	118	June 22, '96	118	117½	14,000
" 1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,800,000	J & J	132	June 30, '96	132	130½	12,000
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		5,094,000	A & O	100	June 29, '96	101	100	45,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	106½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		30,000,000	J & J	120½	June 26, '96	120½	120½	4,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	119	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		10,000,000	M & S	107½	June 24, '96	107½	107½	18,000
" debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	107	June 18, '96	107½	106½	9,000
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904		1,000,000	M & S	105	Apr. 1, '94	.....	.....	.....
" debenture 4's. .... 1905		15,000,000	J & D	103½	May 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			J & D	103½	Sept. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		6,450,000	M & N	101½	June 9, '96	101½	101½	2,000
" registered. ....			M & N	100½	May 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	112½	June 20, '96	112½	112½	3,000
" 7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	111½	June 1, '96	111½	111½	5,000
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,650,000	F & A	102	Oct. 3, '94	.....	.....	.....
" reg. certificates. ....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	106½	June 30, '96	107½	106	279,000
" registered. ....			J & J	104½	June 28, '96	106	104	98,000
Beech Creek 1st. g. gtd. 4's. .... 1936		5,000,000	J & J	107	May 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			J & J	105½	June 12, '96	105½	105½	3,000
" 2d gtd. 5's. .... 1936		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, /		770,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'l. Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's...1922		9,061,000	A & O	117	June 27, '98	118	116 3/4	81,000
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		130,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	108	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1891		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adirond 1st gtd g. 4's. 1891		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1893		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1897		19,425,000	A & O	108 1/4	June 30, '98	104 1/4	103 1/4	86,000
registered.....			A & O	102 1/4	May 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	122 1/4	June 4, '98	122 1/4	122 1/4	15,000
1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	116	June 20, '98	116	116	4,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1908		2,000,000	J & D	108	Dec. 4, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	132 1/4	June 10, '98	132 1/4	132	17,000
small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	.....	130 1/4	May 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	119	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1899		5,600,000	J & D	107 1/4	June 30, '98	107 1/4	107	9,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1922		8,125,000	M & S	88	June 29, '98	88	87 1/4	75,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.			M & S	82 1/4	Aug. 25, '92	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refunded 5's. 1897		3,750,000	J & J	99 1/4	June 30, '98	100	98	42,000
2d mortg. 4 1/2's.....1897		638,000	F & A	99	June 30, '98	99	97 1/4	8,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's.....1940		2,300,000	F & A	89 1/4	June 27, '98	70	69 1/2	10,000
term. 1st mtg. g. 5's.....1843		2,000,000	M & N	105	June 29, '98	105	105	1,000
registered.....\$5,000			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		3,000,000	J & D	85	June 11, '98	85	85	2,000
Midland R. of N. Jersey 1st 6's. 1910		3,500,000	A & O	116	June 22, '98	116	116	2,000
N. Y., Texas & Mexico g. 1st 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R. R. & L. G. S. F. g. c. 6's. 1921		30,087,000	J & J	116	June 30, '98	117 1/4	115 1/4	381,000
registered.....			J & J	112 1/4	June 29, '98	117 1/4	112 1/4	447,000
J. P. M. & Co. eng. ctf. dep.....		17,500,000	.....	114 1/4	June 17, '98	114 1/4	113 1/4	33,000
g. 2d lgt. s. f. g. 6's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		19,000,000	.....	111	June 30, '98	115 1/4	111	156,000
g. 3d lgt. s. f. g. 6's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		11,408,000	.....	72	June 19, '98	73	71	16,000
1st gtd. con. g. 5's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		44,900,000	.....	46 1/4	June 30, '98	50	46 1/4	745,000
col. s. 6's g. nts J. P. M. & Co. c.		9,450,000	.....	90	June 29, '98	92	90	180,000
recs. ctf. g. 6's July 1, 1897		4,900,000	J	79	Jan. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
James Riv. Val. 1st g. 6's T. C. cfs. 1936		932,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Spok. & Pal. eng. cfs. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1936		1,768,000	M & N	89 1/4	June 19, '98	86	83 1/4	269,000
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. 6's.....1923		7,985,000	F & A	124	June 4, '98	124	124	1,000
registered certificates.....			Q F	123 1/4	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Helena & Red M'tain 1st g. 6's. 1937		400,000	M & S	100	Dec. 30, '91	.....	.....	.....
Dul. & Man. 1st g. 6's. stpd. cfn. s.		440,000	J & J	77 1/4	Jan. 16, '95	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. of dep. stmpd.		1,142,000	.....	87 1/4	May 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Dak. dl. 1st a. r'd g. 6's.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
stamped coupons.....		98,000	J & D	82 1/4	Feb. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. dep. stamped.		1,358,000	.....	90	June 23, '98	90	80	6,000
N. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1933		3,993,000	J & J	109 1/4	June 29, '98	109 1/4	107 1/4	25,000
N. P. & Mon. J. P. M. & Co. c. f. g. 6's. 1938		5,255,000	M & S	87	June 30, '98	87	86 1/4	75,000
Cœur d'Alene 1st gold 6's.....1916		890,000	A & O	104	May 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. 1st g. 6's.....1938		878,000	M & S	102	Jan. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Central Wash. Tr. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1938		1,497,000	.....	54	Apr. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's.....1940		25,523,000	A & O	42	May 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Trust Co. eng. ctf. s.			.....	45	June 30, '98	45 1/4	41	515,000
Seat. L. S. & E. Tr. rec. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1931		4,991,000	F & A	40	May 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
assessment paid.....			F & A	43 1/4	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's....1941		750,000	M & N	108	June 4, '98	108	103	1,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,233,000	M & N	123 1/4	June 25, '98	123 1/4	123 1/4	5,000
New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	114	June 23, '98	114	114	1,000
imp'tment and ext. 6's.....1934		5,000,000	F & A	97	Feb. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. adjtmt mtg				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
7's.....1924		1,488,000	Q M	107 1/4	May 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. eqpmnt g. 5's.....		4,086,000	.....	82	Apr. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. gold 5's.....1990		8,875,000	J & J	66	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. No. above 10,000		3,200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. Clinch V. div. g. 5's		2,475,000	.....	55	Feb. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. Md. & W. div.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's.....1941		6,809,500	J & J	60 1/4	May 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sci'o Val. & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & N	82 1/4	June 27, '98	82 1/4	80	39,000
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. g. 5's. 1922		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdb'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's....1920		3,500,000	A & O	94	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Ogdensburg & Lake Champl. Inc. 1920		800,000	O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdensburg & L. Champl. Inc. small		200,000	O	82	Feb. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. con. s.kg. fund 7's.....1898		3,436,000	J & J	104½	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
" consolidated 7's.....1898		3,086,000	J & J	105	June 25, '98	106	104½	4,000
" 2d consolidated 7's.....1911		2,952,000	A & O	111	Apr. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st Springf'd d. 7's.....1905		1,984,000	M & N	101	June 17, '98	101	101	4,000
" 1st general 5's.....1932		405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's.....1898		2,000,000	J & D	88	June 23, '98	88	88	2,000
" gen. mortg. g 6's.....1987		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's.....1921		3,924,000	J & D	88	June 30, '98	89½	87	22,000
" gen. mortg. g 4's.....1921		1,548,000	M & N	34	Feb. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certs.....		1,255,000	.....	45	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's 1987		2,717,000	.....	45	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oregon & California 1st g 5's.....1927		18,842,000	J & J	78	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's 1910		4,146,000	J & D	83	June 30, '98	90	81	100,000
" con. mortg. g 5's.....1939		1,268,000	A & O	124	June 30, '98	15	11½	10,000
" Trust Co. certificates.....		5,291,000	.....	12½	June 30, '98	17½	11½	560,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. 1st 6's 1909		5,078,000	J & J	111½	June 23, '98	112½	110½	14,000
" consol. m 5's.....1925		611,000	J & D	92	June 29, '98	96½	92	2,000
" Trust Co. certs.....		12,372,000	.....	97	June 30, '98	97	92½	37,000
" Tr. Co. cfs for col. tr g 5's 1919		5,092,000	.....	62½	June 29, '98	62½	60	158,000
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's.....1920		1,815,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1890.....		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Panama s. f. subsidy g 6's.....1910		1,953,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st.....1921		19,467,000	J & J	112½	June 30, '98	113½	110½	49,000
" reg.....1921			J & J	111	June 17, '98	111	111	12,000
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s								
Series A.....1940		10,000,000	A & O	110	June 16, '98	111½	110	41,000
Series B.....1942		10,000,000	A & O	110½	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Series C.....1942		2,000,000	M & N	110½	June 5, '98	110½	110½	2,000
Series D gtd. 4's.....1945		3,000,000	M & N	102½	June 17, '98	102½	102½	4,000
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's.....1940		6,863,000	F & A	114	Nov. 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st reg. 7's.....1900			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's.....1912		2,917,000	J & J	140½	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's.....1912		2,546,000	J & J	138½	June 2, '95	138½	138½	1,000
3d 7's.....1912		2,000,000	A & O	131	July 16, '95	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's.....1932		1,506,000	A & O	116	June 24, '98	116	116	1,000
registered.....			A & O	110	May 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's.....1900		1,505,000	M & N	114	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
Series A.....1942		3,000,000	J & J	113½	Apr. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
4½ Series B.....1942		1,561,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's.....1897		1,899,000	J & J	104½	June 26, '98	104½	104	6,000
2d 7's.....1908		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd. 7's.....1898		1,600,000	M & N	106½	Jan. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ g 1941		3,910,000	J & J	107	May 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's.....1942		5,389,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's.....1923		1,675,000	.....	108	June 25, '95	108	108	1,000
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds.....								
Sterling Gold 6 per cent.....1920		22,782,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Currency 6 per cent.....1905		4,718,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			Q mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 5 per cent.....1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			Q mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 4 per cent.....1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g 4½'s.....1935		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's.....1944		5,648,000	M & S	110	Dec. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's.....1920		1,287,000	J & J	101½	June 13, '98	101½	101½	1,000
" Evansville div. 1st 6's.....1920		1,470,000	M & S	101	Mar. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cfs. 2d mort 5's.....1926		1,778,000	M & N	128	May 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's.....1921		1,500,000	Q F	109½	June 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 2d m 4½'s.....1921		1,499,000	M & N	71½	Apr. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Phila. & Reading gen. g. 4's Trust Co ctf's, stamped assented.		32,284,000	.....	79½	June 30, '98	80½	78	989,000
eng. Tr. Co. ctf's unst'mp'd assented.		11,379,000	.....	91¼	June 29, '98	98	90	297,000
1st pref. inc. Tr. Co. certf'a.		23,434,000	.....	82½	June 30, '98	84½	81	183,000
2d instal. pd.		15,442,000	.....	20½	June 30, '98	22½	19	218,000
2d pref. inc. Tr. Co. certf'a.			.....	18½	Feb. 7, '98			
2d instal. pd.			.....	5¼	Jan. 10, '98			
3d pref. inc. 1958		21,634,462	F	18½	June 30, '98	20½	18	551,000
3d pr. in. con. 1958								
Tr. Co. ctf's 2d instal. pd.								
Pine Creek Railway 6's. 1932		3,500,000	J & D	123½	Oct. 26, '98			
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	108½	Apr. 5, '98			
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1922		1,440,000	J & J	124	Mar. 13, '98			
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1928		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '98			
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1932		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '98			
2d g. 6's. 1934		900,000	J & J					
McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. 1918		600,000	J & J					
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	95½	Apr. 2, '98			
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	80½	June 23, '98	90	89½	45,000
1st cons. 5's. 1943		786,000	J & J	88½	June 5, '98	89½	88	14,000
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		9,700,000	J & J	78	June 25, '98	78	75½	13,000
Mort. g. 5's. 1891-1941		3,500,000	M & N	79½	Sept. 9, '98			
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N					
Prescot & Arizona Cent. 1st g. 6's. 1916		775,000	J & J	71½	July 27, '98			
coupon off.		775,000	J & J					
2d inc. 6's. 1916		775,000	J & J					
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. 1939		15,200,000	J & J	78	June 30, '98	77	75½	206,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1939		1,850,000	J & D	98	Jan. 13, '98			
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4. 1940		4,510,000	J & J	67¼	Feb. 10, '98			
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J					
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st 6's. 1925		553,000	M & N	44	May 11, '98			
Cent. Tat Co. ctf's of deposit		6,447,000		47	June 23, '98	47	44	85,000
St. Joseph & Grand 1st 2d inc. 1925		1,680,000	J & J	10	Aug. 2, '98			
Coupons off.				8	June 25, '98	8	8	20,000
Kansas C'y & Omaha 1st g. 5's. 1927		2,940,000	J & J	87½	Oct. 16, '98			
St. Louis, A. & T. H. 1st 2T. g. 5's. 1914		2,200,000	J & D	105½	June 30, '98	105½	104½	30,000
registered.			J & D					
Belleville & Southern I. 1st 8's. 1896		1,041,000	A & O	103	Nov. 1, '98			
Belleville & Carodt 1st 6's. 1923		485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '98	115	115	5,000
Chic., St. L. & Pad 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1917		1,000,000	M & S	102	Oct. 2, '98			
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		550,000	M & S	70½	May 28, '98			
2d inc. 5's. 1931		126,000	M & S	72½	Nov. 25, '91			
1st con. 5's. 1939		899,000	M & S					
Carbond'e & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S					
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A. 1906		500,000	M & N	115½	June 15, '98	115½	115	4,000
2d g. 6's, Class B. 1906		2,786,500	M & N	116	June 25, '98	116	115½	28,000
2d g. 6's, Class C. 1906		2,400,000	M & N	116	June 24, '98	116	115	5,000
1st g. 6's P. C. & O. 1919		1,042,000	F & A	118	May 23, '98			
gen. g. 6's. 1931		7,807,000	J & J	113½	June 25, '98	114	112	79,000
gen. g. 5's. 1931		12,293,000	J & J	99	June 25, '98	99½	99	30,000
1st Trust g. 5's. 1987		1,099,000	A & O	90	May 2, '98			
Trust Co. cefs for Cons. 4's. 1990		13,523,500	A & O	24	June 19, '98	24	20	4,000
Kansas City & So. W. 1st 6's, g. 1916		744,000	J & J	85	Feb. 6, '91			
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		349,000	A & O	100½	May 16, '98			
St. Louis, Kan. & So. W. 1st 6's. 1916		732,000	M & S	100	Jan. 19, '95			
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. 1937		1,608,000	J & D					
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. 1939		20,000,000	M & N	68½	June 23, '98	70	67½	48,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. 1939		8,000,000	J & J	23½	June 23, '98	26½	23½	56,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1937		2,480,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '98			
gtd. gold 5's. 1937		1,138,000	J & J	114	Aug. 24, '94			
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. 1913		1,000,000	F & A	103	Apr. 20, '98			
2d 5's. 1917		2,000,000	A & O					



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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's, 1909		357,000	J & J	106	Apr. 24, '96	....	....	.....
" small .....			J & J	106	July 29, '84	....	....	.....
" 2d 6's .....	1909	8,000,000	A & O	119½	June 30, '96	119½	118	13,000
" Dakota ext'n 6's .....	1910	5,676,000	M & N	119½	June 20, '96	119½	119¼	4,000
" 1st con. 6's .....	1933		J & J	124¼	June 12, '96	124½	123½	26,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered .....		13,344,000	J & J	120	Aug. 19, '95	....	....	.....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s .....		20,316,000	J & J	105¾	June 16, '96	106	105	33,000
" 1st cons. 6's register'd .....			J & J	105	Nov. 4, '95	....	....	.....
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's, 1937		7,805,000	J & D	89	June 27, '96	89	84¼	24,000
" registered .....			J & D	89	Aug. 19, '95	....	....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's .....	1922	2,150,000	J & J	125	Oct. 3, '95	....	....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	116	May 11, '96	....	....	.....
" 1st 6's, registered .....			J & J			....	....	.....
" 1st g. g. 5's .....	1937	2,700,000	J & J	102¼	June 18, '96	102½	102	10,000
" registered .....			J & J			....	....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's, 1908		4,700,900	A & O	106¼	June 18, '96	106½	106¼	13,000
" registered .....			A & O			....	....	.....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's, 1938		3,625,000	J & D			....	....	.....
" registered .....			J & J			....	....	.....
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's, 1943		18,886,000	J & J	56	June 29, '96	58	55½	76,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st g. g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100	Mar. 17, '96	....	....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's .....	1934	4,056,000	A & O	114	July 24, '95	....	....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's .....	1926	2,500,000	J & J	98	Apr. 18, '96	....	....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '88	....	....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,250,000	M & N	94½	June 20, '96	94½	94½	4,000
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	96	June 30, '96	96½	96	51,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's .....	1905-12	30,677,500	A & O	110½	June 30, '96	111	110½	2,000
" g 5's .....	1888-1938	706,000	A & O	85½	May 19, '94	....	....	.....
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's .....	1937	16,834,000	M & N	91½	June 27, '96	92¼	91½	60,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's .....	1941	1,920,000	J & J	86¼	June 30, '96	86½	86	92,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g 4's .....	1937	5,500,000	J & J			....	....	.....
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's .....	1911	4,180,000	J & J	105	June 30, '96	106	105	83,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's, 1894		25,839,000	J & J	92¼	June 30, '96	94½	92	792,000
" registered .....			J & J			....	....	.....
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's .....	1938	4,500,000	M & S	91	June 27, '96	92	91	37,000
" registered .....			M & S			....	....	.....
Alabama Central, 1st 6's .....	1918	1,000,000	J & J	107¾	June 19, '96	107¾	107¾	2,000
Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's, 1897		500,000	A & O	121¾	May 25, '92	....	....	.....
" income .....	1900	750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95	....	....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's .....	1916	2,000,000	J & J	113	May 5, '96	....	....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's .....	1900	3,123,000	J & J	111½	June 24, '96	111¾	111	37,000
" divisional g 5's .....	1930	3,106,000	J & J	112½	June 29, '96	112¾	112½	12,000
" con. 1st g 5's .....	1956	12,770,000	M & N	107½	June 29, '96	107¾	106½	64,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's .....	1922	5,660,000	J & J	114	May 25, '96	....	....	.....
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's .....	1925	2,000,000	J & J	115½	June 29, '96	115¾	115½	38,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's .....	1915	5,597,000	J & J	121¼	June 27, '96	121½	120½	13,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's, 1909		1,328,000	M & S	98½	Apr. 30, '96	....	....	.....
" deb. 5's stamped .....	1927	3,368,000	A & O	100	Apr. 24, '96	....	....	.....
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's, 1906		600,000	M & S			....	....	.....
" small .....			M & S			....	....	.....
" ser. B 6's .....	1911	1,900,000	M & S			....	....	.....
" small .....			M & S			....	....	.....
" ser. C 6's .....	1916	1,100,000	M & S			....	....	.....
" small .....			M & S			....	....	.....
" ser. D 4-5's .....	1921	950,000	M & S			....	....	.....
" small .....			M & S			....	....	.....
" ser. E 5's .....	1926	1,775,000	M & S			....	....	.....
" small .....			M & S			....	....	.....
" ser. F 5's .....	1931	1,310,000	M & S			....	....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's .....	1936	2,392,000	M & N	100½	May 28, '96	....	....	.....
" gen. 5's gtd. stamped, 1926		2,466,000	M & N	99¾	June 30, '96	101	99½	45,000
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's .....	1924	1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '95	....	....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's .....	1914	2,531,000	J & J	112	June 10, '96	112¾	112	32,000
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s, 1943		500,000	J & D			....	....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s, 1939		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94	....	....	.....
" 1st con. g 5's .....	1894-1944	4,500,000	F & A	105½	June 29, '96	105½	104½	29,000
St. L. Mers. bldg. Ter. gtd g 5's, 1930		3,500,000	A & O	102½	Oct. 9, '95	....	....	.....
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's, 1914		391,000	Q JAN	105¾	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	.....
Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's .....	1905	1,620,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '96	....	....	.....
" Sabine d. 1st 6's .....	1912	2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '96	....	....	.....
" con. m. g 5's .....	1943	1,620,000	F & A	90½	June 30, '96	90½	90½	117,000

## BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. { 1906		3,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,049,000	J & D	83½	June 30, '98	88	83½	265,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		23,227,000	MAR.	19½	June 30, '98	22½	18½	498,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's.....1987		5,000,000	J & J	122½	June 30, '98	122½	120½	60,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's....1985		3,000,000	J & J	109½	June 23, '98	109½	109¼	4,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....1935		2,500,000	A & O	108	June 30, '98	108½	108	20,000
gen. g. 5's.....1985		1,500,000	J & D					
Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's.1980		2,340,000	A & O	81½	June 23, '98	81½	80	35,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's....1917		4,400,000	J & D	78	June 19, '98	79	78	15,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's.1916		8,234,000	M & N	70	June 23, '98	72½	70	33,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's....1928		1,852,000	J & D	100½	June 30, '98	100½	100	8,000
Union Pacific 1st 6's.....1886			J & J	106½	June 30, '98	104½	108½	42,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps				99	June 15, '98	99	98	8,000
1887			J & J	104½	June 29, '98	104½	104½	63,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps				94½	June 5, '98	94½	94½	2,000
1888		27,229,000	J & J	105½	June 29, '98	105½	104½	45,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps				99½	June 23, '98	99½	99½	39,000
1889			J & J	108½	June 8, '98	108½	108½	6,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps				99½	June 10, '98	99½	99½	7,000
collat. trust 6's.....1908		3,983,000	J & J	98	June 25, '98	98	97	11,000
5's.....1907		5,029,030	J & D	95	June 22, '98	95	95	1,000
g 4½'s.....1918		2,058,000	M & N	50	May 22, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....				50½	Apr. 4, '98	....	....	.....
gold notes, 6's stamp'd.1884		8,578,000	F & A	97	June 29, '98	97	97	1,000
Ext. sink'g fd g 8's.1889		2,070,000	M & S	90	June 30, '98	91	90	22,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....		1,391,000		98	Apr. 24, '98	....	....	.....
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's.....1886		1,461,000	F & A	110	May 28, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps		779,000						
1st 6's.....1886		2,189,000	J & D	112½	June 10, '98	112½	112½	8,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps		1,994,000		95½	June 2, '98	95½	95½	1,000
Denver div. ased. 6's.1889		2,973,000	M & N	111	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps		2,914,000		96½	June 10, '98	96½	96½	15,000
1st con. 6's.....1919		1,237,000	M & N	70½	June 12, '98	70½	70½	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....		10,488,000		71	June 24, '98	72½	70	121,000
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. fd cps 7's.1886		690,000	M & N	96	June 22, '98	....	....	.....
Atch., Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's.....1906		4,070,000	Q F	32½	June 19, '98	32½	32½	22,000
At. Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's.1906		542,000	Q F	37½	Apr. 28, '98	....	....	.....
U. P., Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g 5's.1918		4,480,000	A & O	85	May 7, '98	....	....	.....
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g 5's.1909		15,801,000	J & D	33½	June 30, '98	37	32½	122,000
Or. S. L. & U. N. Tr. Co. cts. 1st c. g 5's.1919		10,482,000	A & O	65½	June 30, '98	67½	64½	472,000
assented.								
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's.....1922		4,171,000	F & A	112½	June 30, '98	114	112½	23,000
Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....		10,780,000		111½	June 30, '98	112½	111½	155,000
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's.1908		689,000	J & J	115	May 2, '98	....	....	.....
gold 5's.....1926		1,877,000	J & J	100	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
Utah So'n Tr. Co. cts. gen. mtg 7's.1919		858,000	J & J	64½	June 30, '98	66	64	5,000
Tr. Co. cfs. ext. 1st 7's.1909		1,366,000	J & J					
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g. 6's.1921		1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '98	....	....	.....
Coupon off.....								
Wabash R.R. Co. 1st gold 5's....1909		31,684,000	M & N	106½	June 30, '98	107	105	314,000
2d mortgage gold 5's.1909		14,000,000	F & A	73	June 29, '98	75½	73	163,000
deben. mtg series A.1909		3,500,000	J & J					
series B.....1909		25,740,000	J & J	22	June 29, '98	25½	22	101,000
1st g 5's Det. & Chi. ex.1940		3,500,000	J & J	98	June 30, '98	100	98	16,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.								
1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	105½	June 17, '98	105½	105½	1,000
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g 5's.1937		10,000,000	J & J	108	May 29, '98	....	....	.....
gen g. 2-3-4's.....1943		10,000,000	A & O	43	June 27, '98	44	43	10,000
inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	18½	June 25, '98	18½	18	9,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g 6's.1911		3,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '98	....	....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's....1926		3,000,000	A & O	100	June 25, '98	100	98½	4,000
Wheeling div. 1st g 5's.1928		1,500,000	J & J	91	Jan. 27, '98	....	....	.....
exten. and imp. g 5's.....1930		1,608,000	F & A	91	May 8, '98	....	....	.....
consol mortgage 4's....1932		1,600,000	J & J	60	June 17, '98	68	60	5,000
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g 5's.1937		2,364,000	J & J	42½	Apr. 7, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Trust Co. certificates.		9,636,000		35½	June 30, '98	37½	31	239,000
income mortgage 5's....1937		7,775,000	A & O	6	Jan. 9, '98	....	....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

**MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 5's. 1900		2,810,000	Q F	109	June 18, '98	109½	109	14,000
Am. Water Works Co. 1st 6's. 1907		1,600,000	J & J	105	July 6, '91	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100½	May 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Best. Un. Gas 1st cts s'k f'd g. 5's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	81½	Sept. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		12,836,000	M & M	106½	June 30, '98	107	106	226,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		16,000,000	F & A	98½	June 30, '98	100	98½	54,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1937		10,000,000	J & J	98	June 17, '98	98	92½	28,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	108	Jan. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	99	June 15, '98	99½	99	8,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	99	Feb. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 10, '92	.....	.....	.....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Hock. Val. C'l & I'n g. 6's. 1917		960,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1897		1,250,000	J & J	157½	Feb. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Con'rs Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1906		4,346,000	J & D	82½	June 20, '98	82½	80	8,000
Detroit Gas Co. con. 1st g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	F & A	81½	June 20, '98	82½	81	38,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	109	June 27, '96	109	107	52,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1905		2,130,000	J & J	104	June 29, '98	105½	108	86,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's. 1882		2,500,000	M & S	111½	May 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1906		2,000,000	J & J	96	June 3, '98	97	96	2,000
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		10,000,000	J & D	88	June 29, '96	90½	88	48,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 28, '95	.....	.....	.....
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 8, '92	.....	.....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,779,000	M & S	110	May 31, '94	.....	.....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	86	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	92	Oct. 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 16, '95	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	92½	June 29, '98	98	92	44,000
small bonds.				97½	Nov. 1, '95	.....	.....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Manh. Bch H. & L. lhm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
registered.			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mutual Union Tel. Skg. F. 6's. 1911		1,967,000	M & N	114	Apr. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,897,000	J & J	95	June 25, '98	95	95	1,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1990		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,271,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95	100	100	3,000
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		448,000	F & A	82½	May 5, '93	.....	.....	.....
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 18, '99	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	102	Feb. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	105	June 17, '98	106	103½	6,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	99½	June 28, '98	99½	99	41,000
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1899-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		590,000	M & N	106½	Oct. 14, '95	.....	.....	.....
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102½	June 8, '98	102½	102½	2,000
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,299,000	A & O	91	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,490,000	J & J	90	June 28, '98	90½	89½	4,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,434,000	F & A	92	Dec. 3, '95	.....	.....	.....

# BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		JUNE SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
U.S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. recta		6,245,100	.....	25	June 30, '98	297½	25	58,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb...1915		6,000,000	M & N	110½	June 25, '98	112	110½	22,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's...1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's....1875-1900		3,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
7's, registered.....1900			M & N	108½	June 23, '94	108½	108½	8,000
debenture, 7's....1884-1900			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....1900			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
col. trust cur. 5's.....1938		8,401,000	J & J	108½	June 25, '98	108½	107½	25,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		877,000	J & J	70¼	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's..1908		570,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1896.		JUNE SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,500	Q M	.....	.....	95	95	20,000
" 4's registered.....1907		559,634,000	J A J&O	110¼	108	108¾	108	122,000
" 4's coupons.....1907			J A J&O	111¼	108¾	110¼	109¼	44,000
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	118½	113	118¼	116¼	45,000
" 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	119	113	118¼	116¼	1,051,000
" 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113¾	112	113	112¾	20,000
" 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	114¼	112	113¼	112¾	128,000
" 6's currency.....1897		9,712,000	J & J	103¼	103¼	.....	.....	.....
" ".....1898		29,004,952	J & J	105	105	.....	.....	.....
" ".....1899		14,004,500	J & J	107½	107½	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee)1896		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ".....1897		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ".....1898		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ".....1899		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Illinois State Banks.—Statement of condition, June 3, March 17, 1896 and March 20, 1895.

RESOURCES.	June 3, 1896.	March 17, 1896.	Mar. 20, 1895.
Loans and discounts.....	\$87,659,717	\$85,077,209	\$80,250,094
Overdrafts, secured and unsecured.....	315,676	261,306	224,096
United States bonds.....	356,436	479,408	192,243
Other bonds and stocks.....	10,162,413	10,193,805	10,232,296
Cash on hand.....	12,911,832	12,414,598	13,834,007
Due from other banks.....	16,269,574	14,448,656	447,637
Banking house.....	433,817	469,744	447,637
Other real estate.....	736,625	702,069	427,441
Furniture and fixtures.....	283,284	287,349	279,328
Current expenses.....	280,490	227,811	219,564
Checks and other cash items.....	3,736,558	2,742,247	1,688,801
Collections.....	170,614	128,293	148,716
Total.....	\$133,367,071	\$127,432,923	\$121,912,068
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock.....	\$18,749,500	\$18,739,500	\$18,216,500
Surplus fund.....	7,476,965	7,463,378	6,075,096
Undivided profits.....	3,465,752	2,909,127	3,566,858
Dividends unpaid.....	5,109	17,321	4,089
Savings deposits subject to notice.....	31,316,405	30,249,796	25,973,158
Individual deposits subject to check.....	51,218,941	48,214,359	49,336,744
Demand certificates of deposit.....	4,893,942	3,843,563	3,205,584
Time certificates of deposit.....	7,294,271	9,207,016	7,315,190
Certified checks.....	889,407	788,459	435,161
Cashiers' checks outstanding.....	438,902	854,359	730,780
Due to other banks.....	7,341,179	6,853,701	6,958,040
Bills payable.....	184,700	199,531	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	289,094	92,300	64,927
Total.....	\$133,367,071	\$127,432,923	\$121,912,068

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Baker.**—Alfred H. Baker, President of the National Exchange Bank and the Augusta Savings Bank, Augusta, Ga., died June 18. He was a man of considerable wealth, and was engaged in many other business enterprises in addition to his banking interests.

**Bowne.**—A. J. Bowne, Vice-President of the Fourth National Bank, Grand Rapids, Mich., died June 7.

**Bristow.**—Benjamin H. Bristow, Secretary of the Treasury from 1874 to 1876, and at one time a prominent presidential candidate, died in New York city (where he had been engaged in the practice of law for a number of years past) on June 22. Mr. Bristow was noted for his eminent legal ability, and was a man of remarkably fine personal character. He gained distinction during Grant's administration for his prosecution of the notorious Whiskey Ring.

**Campbell.**—J. W. Campbell, Cashier of the Elmore County Bank, Mountainhome, Idaho, died June 14.

**Cantoni.**—S. Cantoni, of the banking firm of Cantoni & Co., New York city, died June 21. Mr. Cantoni was born in Italy nearly fifty-six years ago, and had lived in this country about thirty years. He became a member of the New York Stock Exchange in January, 1879, and substantial prosperity rewarded his efforts in the banking business. He was prominent and popular among the Italians in the city, and he extended a helping hand to many of his less fortunate countrymen. In recognition of his services to his countrymen he was knighted by the King of Italy.

**Chase.**—Augustus S. Chase, President of the Waterbury (Conn.) National Bank, died June 7. Mr. Chase was born at Pomfret, Conn., August 15, 1828. In 1852 he became Cashier of the Waterbury National Bank, and was chosen President in 1864. He was president of many other corporations and was extensively interested in manufacturing enterprises.

**Corbin.**—Austin Corbin, President of the Corbin Banking Co., New York city, and identified with numerous railway and other financial enterprises, was accidentally killed while out driving on his estate in New Hampshire, on June 4.

**Fox.**—George S. Fox, a prominent and wealthy Philadelphia banker, and a member of the firm of George S. Fox & Sons, died June 7.

**Hatch.**—Walter T. Hatch, senior member of the firm of W. T. Hatch & Sons, New York city, died June 8. Mr. Hatch was born at Haverhill, Mass., in 1818, and was educated at Yale University. He founded the banking firm in 1863. Besides being engaged in the banking business on his own account, he was a director in several other financial institutions in New York and Brooklyn.

**Hawkins.**—George Hawkins, Cashier of the Bank of Chateaugay, N. Y., died June 7.

**Hayden.**—Hon. H. Sidney Hayden, Vice-President of the Dime Savings Bank, Hartford, Conn., and a director of the Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank, died June 7. He was eighty years of age and was very prominent in business and benevolent enterprises.

**Heitbrink.**—Henry F. Heitbrink, Cashier of the State National Bank, Logansport, Ind., died June 28, aged thirty-two years.

**Hill.**—Henry B. Hill, for the past thirty years Cashier of the Catskill (N. Y.) National Bank, died June 5.

**Hooker.**—Henry Hooker, who had been honorably connected with banking in Massachusetts for sixty years, and who until a short time since was Cashier of the First National Bank, Westfield, Mass., died June 13, aged seventy-six years.

**Landis.**—A. L. Landis, President of the Landis Banking Co., Nashville, Tenn., died June 5. Major Landis was in his seventy-third year. In 1886 he engaged in banking at Nashville, and built up a most successful business.

**Lewis.**—Martin J. Lewis, Cashier of the First National Bank, Vermillion, South Dakota, died in New York city, June 20. He had been a resident of South Dakota since 1870, and was one of the representative bankers of the State.

**McKim.**—Randall McKim, of Messrs. McKim & Co., bankers, Baltimore, Md., died June 15.

**Swenson.**—S. M. Swenson, head of the banking firm of S. M. Swenson & Sons, New York city, died June 12, in the eightieth year of his age.

**Wilbur.**—Daniel Wilbur, President of the National Union Bank, Fall River, Mass., died June 19. He was a member of the State Legislature for several terms, serving in both branches. His connection with the bank as a director dated from its organization in 1865.

**Williams.**—Judge Samuel Williams, President of the Citizens' Bank, Watseka, Ill., and for twenty years President of the First National Bank, of the same place, died June 16. He was born July 11, 1829, in Adams County, Ohio.

**Wyckoff.**—Geo. H. Wyckoff, President of the Bank of New Amsterdam, New York city, was shot on June 15 by a crank who demanded money. A fatal termination of his wounds occurred on June 20.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTIETH YEAR.

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THE NOMINATION OF BRYAN for the presidency by the regular convention of the Democratic party, upon a platform advocating the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1, has sharply defined the lines upon which the contest will be carried on in the coming campaign.

It seems to be generally acknowledged that the financial question will absorb all others, as indeed it has always included them. In fact the tariff and the reforms demanded by the socialists are but subordinate parts of the monetary struggle. The interest with which all these are regarded springs from the desire of every man to live under favorable economic conditions. Without a just and unchangeable standard of value no secondary economic questions can ever be rightly settled.

It is therefore most satisfactory that the issue between the gold and silver standards has been so sharply defined in the platforms of the two chief parties. And yet this is only a preliminary, though an important one.

The Government and the policy of the United States are controlled by majorities, and while there is a widespread feeling that the right will prevail, simply because it is right, history shows that popular prejudice and ignorance have often for a time sustained and upheld the wrong, and that the right has only finally triumphed after ruin and destruction have branded bitter lessons of experience on the hearts of men.

What is right in monetary and financial matters is already as definitely settled as the multiplication table, but in the United States it still remains to convince a majority of voters that this is so. Whether this can be done or not is still a doubtful point.

The idea that the condition of the debtor classes and of wage earners and producers can be improved by making money cheap, either by free silver coinage or by fiat paper money, has a firm hold on many

minds. It is the outgrowth of the policy which has inaugurated and maintained the legal-tender issues of the Government. The inflation of the currency following the outbreak of the Civil War, on the surface at least, seemed to give to many magnificent opportunities for improving their condition. The development of the resources and wealth of the country since the close of that war has, by a very natural fallacy, been ascribed to the use of the legal-tender note. Many therefore think that another inflation would reproduce the opportunities and inaugurate a new period of prosperity and development.

The argument that the rehabilitation of silver, by its free coinage at the existing ratio, will double the stock of money, and repeat the conditions prevailing after the Civil War, has taken a deep hold on many minds.

Of course the environment is now altogether different. The immense consumption of men and material during the war has no counterpart at the present time; but the advocates of free coinage and their disciples do not think of this, or if they do, think that they can artificially reproduce the same riot of production and consumption that then existed.

These erroneous ideas can only be combated by the strenuous advancement of correct views, and the time before election is none too great to combat the dangerous fallacies which have insinuated themselves into a large part of the public mind.

There is no argument which will be more effective or powerful than to show how slow and difficult will be the process of establishing free coinage of silver even if BRYAN should receive a majority of electoral votes, and at the same time pointing out that during all this period of delay the existing doubt and uncertainty as to the future must continue to prevail, crushing any hope of the revival of business or the return of prosperity.

In 1861 and 1862 the passage of the legal-tender Acts and the issue of paper money, compelled by what was believed to be an overwhelming necessity, was a sudden and almost immediate act. Legal-tender notes began to inflate the channels of trade, through the vast expenditures of the Government, with the impetuosity of a flood. There was no period of doubt during which capital shrank within itself. The President and Congress were already in power, and the Administration had a majority able and willing to carry out all its policy.

It is very different now. The enthusiasts who shout for the free coinage of silver do not reflect on the obstacles and delays that must be encountered before their object can be attained even under the most favorable circumstances, nor do they appear to understand that this slow approach will be accompanied by the greatest depression and

uncertainty, and will prevent the growth of business and dull the edge of enterprise. How long will the great mass of their followers endure the dull and wearing action of a corroding delay?

Some of these obstacles are as follows: In the first place it is necessary, in order to secure the free coinage of silver, to elect not only the President but also a majority of the next Congress. If BRYAN is elected in November, and the majority in Congress is favorable to the passage of a silver free coinage Act, there is still three months during which the silverites though triumphant must sit with their hands tied. Should BRYAN be inaugurated on the fourth of March, he would then have to call an extra session of Congress. If a free coinage bill is immediately passed by both the House and the Senate, it would be a most remarkable feat. There are so many things to do. The offices must be distributed, the House and Senate organized, and in all of these operations there are a hundred chances of the disruption of any majority. The distribution of the offices alone is a work fraught with danger to any President. The conditions surrounding the Treasury and money market cannot be foretold, and may be such as to paralyze the most desperate and radical majority. They may lose faith in the panacea they are called together to apply, when they behold the ruin the threat of its application has wrought. Like the princes who went after the living fountain and the singing tree, they may be turned to stone by the storm of obloquy they encounter, even when the prize is in sight.

But supposing that with faces set and ears stuffed with cotton, they press onward and pass the measure that the President approves, even then the cause is not won as long as special gold contracts are upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. This difficulty cannot be removed by an Act of Congress, for the court as now constituted would declare such an Act to be unconstitutional. It remains therefore to alter the personnel of the Supreme Court, to increase its numbers or to change the method of selection from appointment for life to election for a term. How long will it take to effect this change?

Enough has been pointed out to prove, even if the Chicago platform is sustained by the people in November, that for a space of time not much short of two years the country will be in a state of uncertainty and doubt as to its financial policy.

On the other hand, if the cause of the existing standard shall triumph in November, this weight of apprehension and doubt will be removed at once. If a majority of the people of the United States declare themselves in favor of maintaining the standard of value as it is, confidence will be as quickly restored as it was by the resumption of specie payments in 1879.



The people of the country have been misled as to the causes of the depression of business and the delay of the return of prosperity. The quacks into whose hands they have fallen have produced the disease by the very means they now propose to use as a remedy. Dr. SANGRADO used to prescribe bleeding and hot water for his patients, and as a cure for their consequent weakness, he prescribed more blood-letting and deeper draughts of hot water. If they died it was because they had not been bled enough, and had not drunk a sufficiency of hot water. So the free silver demagogues prescribed first the Act of 1878. When its effect was unsatisfactory they administered the Act of 1890, and when these two doses of silver have brought the country to its present desperate state, they coolly inform the people that all that is required is more silver.

Sick men are notoriously credulous, or this absurd doctrine would have been rebuked by the popular vote long ago. It is through their power to keep up the condition of depression that the silver illusionists have maintained their hold.

The eyes of the people should be opened to the fact that although while these unwise leaders possess the power to keep the country in a turmoil, they must encounter obstacles which will prevent them from effectually applying their remedy. That its application in the past has resulted disastrously, and can only have the same result again. That the quickest way out of this quagmire is to sustain the existing standard of value in November. This will simply be a declaration on the part of those in whom power finally rests, that debts shall be paid in the money in which they were contracted.

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THE CHIEF STRENGTH OF THE SILVER CRAZE lies in its appeal to the debtor classes of the country. In presenting to them a method of paying their debts more easily, as to which, though essentially dishonest, the dishonesty is so veiled and excused that men in whom self-interest is awakened do not readily recognize it.

In analyzing the debtor classes they must be divided into two parts: First, there are the banks and corporations, building associations, insurance companies, railroads, and all institutions for investment. The debts of this class of debtors perhaps exceed those of the other class. They very likely make up the great bulk of the indebtedness of the country. Second, there is the class of individual debtors whose debts are in each case comparatively small in amount, but nevertheless of great importance to each individual debtor. Among these are the agricultural classes who live on their own land and get their living from it. These owe either mortgages on their land or bills for supplies and implements or both. Almost every farmer is

more or less in debt during each season. While his crops are growing he requires many things to carry him through until his crops can be harvested and sold.

The system of credits to the farming community differs in different parts of the country. The extent to which it is depended upon by the farmer also varies. But it may be justly premised that most of those who live upon and own or work the farms of the country depend from year to year upon some form of borrowed capital. These credits seldom extend over the season. If the bills contracted during each season are not paid from the produce of the crops then the land has to be mortgaged to make up the deficiency.

This is the history of the evolution of the greater part of the farm mortgages. Failure of crops and too sanguine expectations as to prices bring about a condition that prevents the repayment of the bills contracted annually. Then the mortgage becomes a necessity.

It is estimated that nearly, if not quite, a majority of the holders of land in the United States live upon and cultivate their own land. There is besides a large number who not owning the land live upon it and cultivate it on shares or by paying rent. These, as to their debts, are in the same category.

Although the debts of corporations, etc., belonging to the first class of debtors mentioned, have been assumed to form the largest part of the indebtedness of the country, there are good reasons to believe that the indebtedness of individuals does not fall very much short of the corporate indebtedness. The latter is made the subject of statistics more or less accurate, while the former cannot be definitely known. Corporate indebtedness rests upon what is apparently a more certain and definite means of payment than individual indebtedness. Every corporation has its balance sheet, which shows resources as well as liabilities. In ordinary circumstances the resources are at least a grade more definite in value than the resources of the individual debtor. The latter's resources depend more upon the contingencies of times and seasons. Of course in the final view the prosperity of the two classes of debtors is interdependent, but when adversity overtakes the country the first and finally the greatest pressure comes upon the individual debtor.

When it is considered that votes count in a political campaign, it will at once be seen that the amount of indebtedness has little to do with the effect that debt pressure will have upon the questions at issue. Thus the corporations of the country with their great indebtedness may be very little affected by an argument in favor of scaling their debts in a sly way. Their resources are made up of debts from other people, and they know these will shrink in the same proportion

as their liabilities. But these corporate debtors control very few votes in proportion to the extent of their balance sheets.

On the other hand the class of individual debtors who live on the land form a very large proportion of the voters of the country. They derive their resources from the sale or use of their crops. The price of these crops is an item of great importance to them. It is useless to say that the proposition in favor of the free coinage of silver does not strike this class of men favorably. It is admitted that if silver were reinstated prices of all farm products would rise. In any one year if the price of wheat were doubled, the farmer can pay his bills for help and for supplies twice as easily as he could before. He may have something left to lighten his mortgage, if there is one on his farm. For a man so situated, to simply get out of debt gives him a new lease of life. His immediate living he can extract from his farm. For a time at least he becomes entirely independent. What does it matter to him if others go to the wall. He reflects that very few if any seemed to care when he was going to the bad.

Therefore it is not surprising that we see agricultural papers advocating the free coinage of silver, and that the silver craze has made a deep impression on the mind of the farmer. It is true that he may be made to realize that in the future the prices of all that he has to buy, his supplies, his agricultural implements, etc., will also rise. He trusts to make himself even there by economy, by using what he has got, by coming down perhaps to more primitive methods than were employed by him before. Out of debt he can survive a good while by avoiding his mistakes of the past. He gets a new start. It is the immediate relief that the free coinage of silver promises that has its attractions for him. It does not do to ignore this view of the case. Wage earners may be mistaken when they think that free coinage of silver will better their condition, but the farmer in debt knows that his debts are a fixed quantity and that with free silver the prices of his produce will nominally rise.

Of course the answer to all this is that the general depression that must sooner or later overtake the country in consequence of free silver will react upon the farming industry, but the majority are apt to accept an immediate good, and pay less regard to a future evil.

The dishonesty of the transaction is also hard to impress on minds that are somewhat sore with a belief that their class has been over-slaughed, and blinded by self-interest. They reason that capitalists have not in many instances been squeamish in their use of capital. They point to trusts and combines. They have encountered many men who have great business reputations and who have proved to be evasive and non-committal in their dealings. When the promoters of a railway for instance come through a farming country, begging

the gift of right of way they can well pay for, but which if obtained for nothing puts money into the pockets of the promoters, they give the agricultural citizens an object lesson in sharp A No. 1 business methods that proves confusing to old-fashioned ideas of honesty. The newspapers reek with proceedings not at all straight, both in business and in politics, that are at least admitted to be clever. Free coinage of silver has no more to be said against its honesty than a hundred business transactions. "Business is business," covers a multitude of irregularities.

Therefore, notwithstanding that it rests on fallacies that it will in the end bring about a state worse than the first, the free coinage of silver doctrine is very attractive to the farming community. The strong argument with such is that they will be ruined before they can get it. In other words the delay and procrastination that will be kept up by politicians, before free silver can be obtained, will neutralize any benefits that might ensue from it.

It is better for the farmer to vote to preserve the present standard of value, and secure an immediate return of confidence, which will help him to pay his debts and at least extend his credit, than it is to wait for the doubtful help of free silver, and run the risk of ruin before it can be obtained.

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THE NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION at its annual convention at Niagara Falls passed a strong resolution supporting honest money and the gold standard. The resolution is a strong and succinct enunciation worthy of the association. Bankers throughout the country generally, at their formal and informal meetings, cannot do better than to adopt and reiterate this resolution. There never was a time when the financial men of the nation, those whose education and experience have given them a clear understanding of the relations of the currency to the prosperity of the country, can do more good by speaking out than they can now.

In the past there has been a sentiment among bankers that it was unwise to give their resolutions a political complexion. But now the very essence of the coming political campaign is the currency, which is in one sense the foundation of the banking business. In other words the bankers of the country do not go into politics by speaking out in favor of sound finance at their conventions. Politics has invaded the proper sphere of the banker.

The influence of the organized banks of the country, if efficiently used, as it may readily be, will be of great weight in the coming campaign. There is no one in any community to whom the most intelligent and enterprising citizens will more confidently go for advice in

this crisis than to the banker. The associations of the various States and the American Bankers' Association can readily distribute to their members the salient arguments in favor of the present gold standard, and the answers to the heretical and fallacious campaign documents now so freely sent out by the advocates of the free coinage of silver. If every banker in the country be provided by the association with the antidote to this poison, he will be able to allay the doubts of those who will most certainly consult him. Every bank may thus become a centre of information. In this way the banks of the country can patriotically use their commanding position to protect their depositors and to aid in restoring prosperity to the whole nation.

It may be said by some timid ones that to undertake such a propaganda will give the Populists and the more reckless silver enthusiasts an opportunity for shrieking about a conspiracy of the gold bugs, etc. They will do this whether the banks work together or not, and so long as the work done is in the right direction, and done honestly and for a good and honest purpose, what can unjust and untruthful criticism amount to ?

The very knowledge that the bankers are aroused by the prospect of the success of repudiation doctrines, to combat them in the interests of the thrifty and economical citizens who have placed their earnings in the custody of financial institutions, will tend to remove the unpopularity which demagogues have always striven to foster. To protect the money intrusted to them from the shrinkage sure to ensue if the dollar is reduced in value is the first duty of trustees.

The resolution of the New York State Bankers' Association is a strong statement of principles which should appeal to every citizen of intelligence and common sense who is accustomed to reach settled conclusions in accordance with the results of experience and the dictates of reason. There is no doubt that the bankers of the country as a rule hold right views on monetary questions. There are some however who may not have been accustomed to formulate or express their opinions. These need encouragement and assistance. Resolutions are all very well, as a declaration of principles, but it needs exertion and energetic exertion, too, to impress these principles on the minds of voters. Every association of bankers in the United States should declare in favor of the gold standard and should then in combination with all other associations exert all their influence to maintain it.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF GOLD from the Treasury for export and for hoarding within the country has reduced the reserve to about \$89,000,000. Deposits of gold in the Treasury in exchange for legal-

tender notes by the banks of New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago have however once more restored the reserve to above the one hundred million mark.

These periodic withdrawals may be expected to continue until the country makes an authoritative declaration that it will permanently adhere to the gold standard. In face of the declarations of the Democratic platform at Chicago such an authoritative declaration can only be made by the votes of a majority of the people of the United States. This cannot be done until November. In the meantime speculation and opinion as to the probable result of the campaign will influence the markets and also the gold withdrawals from the Treasury. Any sufficient signs that the people are accepting the arguments in favor of the gold standard will strengthen the credit of the Treasury and contrary signs will weaken it.

Of course it is well understood and believed that the present Administration will maintain the gold reserve at any cost, that new issues of bonds will be made when necessary. Nevertheless at this time the increased doubt and uncertainty as to the future will make the success of a bond issue more difficult.

It is doubtless this view of the case that has led the banks of New York and other cities to exchange gold for legal-tender notes at this juncture, and also the cause of the attempt to control withdrawals of gold for export by a combination among the foreign banking firms that make a business of exporting gold. It is also the cause of the cultivation of the patriotic sentiment that all good citizens and banks should refrain from calling upon the Treasury for gold.

There are two good reasons quite obvious why it would be well to postpone a new issue of bonds as long as possible. If, as seems to be generally believed in financial circles, the election in November shall declare for the gold standard both by the election of MCKINLEY and a strong gold standard Congress, this result will be equal to a renewal of the resumption of specie gold payments and will tend to permanently settle the credit of the country on a firm basis. If a bond issue were attempted in the present period of uncertainty and it should fail in any way of success, it would have a decidedly depressing effect.

The belief in the issue of bonds in the near future would no doubt augment the withdrawals of gold by those who wish to be prepared to bid for the new issue. If therefore the banks can carry the Government over the next three months by supplying gold in exchange for legal-tender notes they will prevent the risk of two dangers in a new issue of bonds at this time, the danger of the failure of the loan and the danger of increasing gold withdrawals for hoarding. The banks run no great risk in this matter. If the silver craze should triumph in November, their embarrassment would be so great

that they can afford to take the risk to prevent it. In the meantime the withdrawal of legal-tender notes from immediate circulation in exchange for the gold will diminish the free stock upon which gold might be obtained.

Of course this effort of the banks to carry the Treasury can only be a temporary one, inasmuch as all their gold would not maintain the reserve for over six months. The experiment also is no doubt somewhat tentative and if the twenty millions which the banks have promised, combined with the sentimental frowning down of those who think it to their interest to withdraw gold, does not have the effect to prevent withdrawals for hoarding, they will probably find it necessary to leave the Treasury to the operation of the unwise laws which control it before they have weakened themselves too much. How long this artificial condition of things can continue with safety is a serious question.

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IN "BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON," the eminent Doctor is quoted as saying of some individual just then prominent, "His logic is inverted, sir! he reasons backward."

To the man who reasons normally, that is, accepts some facts, however few they may be as proved, and then deduces conclusions in which most of his fellow men must agree with him, the attitude of mind of many who uphold the cause of free coinage of silver is a puzzle and a perplexity. So far as that portion of these advocates of silver is concerned who are evidently governed by self-interest, the view is clearer. They may either be categorized as blinded by their own interest, self-deceived, or if not so blinded, as knaves who deliberately seek to blind others.

But there is another class still who appear to have no interests of their own to serve, who are disinterested, and who even sacrifice their own interests and make martyrs of themselves for the cause of silver in the abstract. As "Robert Elsmere" found himself compelled to sacrifice his traditional religious beliefs in order that he might give freedom to his intellectual nature, so this class of silver advocates seem to take up and fight for the cause simply because the bent of their logic compels them. To the mass of reasoning men their logic seems inverted, as JOHNSON said. They do not admit facts that are regarded as such by the majority who investigate them, they disdain authorities. History is not accepted by them. They simply, in opposition to the usual methods of reasoning, first fix their conclusions and then argue backwards until they reach their premises. The conclusion being regarded as infallibly true, *ergo*, their premises must necessarily be so. If the premises do not agree with the premises

founded in fact from which other men start, then so much the worse for these facts.

This kind of reasoner starts with the conclusion that if the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one be established the bullion value of the silver dollar will at once be equal to the bullion value of the gold dollar. He reasons backwards from this conclusion that the Act of 1890, by which the purchase of silver at the rate of 4,500,000 ounces per month was authorized, only failed to advance the price of silver bullion because it did not afford a market for enough silver, and the Act of 1878 was of course even more inadequate. Under both of these Acts the price of silver bullion instead of advancing fell lower as more silver was purchased; then he says the reason was that silver was not primary money or money of final redemption, or that it was the crime of 1873, or that there is a conspiracy among the gold bugs to make gold the only primary money. That this conspiracy started in England. He finds also that the United States sustained silver and gold coins in circulation at a parity, the ratio being 16 to 1, from 1791 to 1873, and that France did the same thing from 1803 to 1873.

Having reached these premises by reasoning backwards from his first infallible conclusion, he next discovers that all the historical facts sustained by public documents, which contradict his premises, are false and unreliable. They must be or how can his infallible conclusion be infallible. Calmly ignoring all history, all authority past and present, he then goes out to instruct the multitude and to gain disciples. "I have discovered the true historical method," he assures them. "These alleged facts on which the advocates of the gold standard base their arguments are not worthy of notice, they are garbled and false, they have been specially prepared by the conspiring gold bugs who have paid for the falsification of public documents and of the facts of history. It is part of the crime of 1873. Now I assure you that if free coinage of silver be adopted our silver and gold dollars will return to a parity, and the basis of primary money will be doubled. This cannot be denied by the gold bugs or any one else."

Then our advocate states that his premises must be true because he has traced them by their tracks back from his conclusion.

This is the inverted process by which some sincere men addle their own brains and attempt to addle those of other men. That they are sincere cannot be doubted. There is nothing more dangerous than a fixed idea. It is the idea that in some way or other the old relation of value between gold and silver can be restored, and ought to be restored, that becomes the absorbing factor in such minds as these. It is however the fanatics who give respectability to an illogical cause. The designing men who support it for selfish purposes could never stand a moment alone. Their insincerity is too evident. The East



Indian fakir who has devoted two-thirds of his existence to the exclusive contemplation of his own navel becomes, it is said, able to ignore all the material things of life, and exists chiefly in his astral body.

These fanatics dwell in a region of astral facts, but like the fakir they excite a certain degree of veneration in the multitude which the self-interested advocates of free coinage can never do.

The history of the martyrs of earth enumerates repeated instances of men and women ready to sacrifice friends, wealth, life itself for an idea, and that idea as likely to be wrong as right. The most notable instance in recent times is the sacrifice which has been made by Mr. W. P. ST. JOHN for the cause of silver. President of one of the foremost banks in New York city, personally popular with his associates, by temperament and disposition a winner of the sincere friendship of men of standing and character, he has been willing to give up his position as an eminently successful banker and to risk the social and business friendships of a lifetime for what most men in the rank he occupied consider a delusion. The tendency to this final act has not been unmarked for a number of years. He was a constant attendant at the conventions of the American Bankers' Association, and several times he endeavored to influence that body to declare in favor of a silver policy. Among his new associates he cannot fail to be appreciated. In one respect at least he should be able to afford them valuable information. From his position among the bankers of New York he must be able to tell his new associates of all the secret plots of the gold bugs and bankers in Wall Street and throughout the country against the producers of the United States. If they existed he could not have been ignorant of them. Outside of his pet fallacy he is a man of too much acumen to have been blinded by his gold bug associates to such an extent as to fail to perceive that something was being done, if such a conspiracy against prices ever had any existence.

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THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE during the pending campaign will stand where it has always stood—for the strict maintenance of the national faith and credit. Repudiation of obligations has never brought prosperity to nations or individuals, and it never will. Free coinage of silver wherever tried has either been abandoned or has resulted in silver monometallism. If the people of the West and South want more money, the way not to get it is to vote for free silver. It is in the gold standard countries that money of all kinds is most abundant. History and experience furnish lessons whose value exceeds the sophisms of all the theorists in the world, and these lessons warn us that the attempt of the United States to establish bimetallism by free coinage would be an act of supreme folly.

## FINANCIAL POLICIES OF THE PRESIDENTS.

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***EVERY EXECUTIVE HAS SUSTAINED THE NATIONAL FAITH AND CREDIT—PRESIDENTS A BULWARK AGAINST UNSOUND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION.***

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The attitude of the executive branch of the Government in a country where democratic institutions prevail is of vital importance to the credit and consequently to the prosperity of the whole people. A scientific question like that of financial administration can have but one correct solution. Therefore it must be handled by those who have made it a special study. The theory of a democratic government is that the majority of the voters will as a rule be right in their decisions, but this is only true under considerable limitation. The ordinary voter, occupied chiefly with his own personal interests, has no time or inclination to acquaint himself with questions purely technical. No ordinary man and but few extraordinary ones can secure the special knowledge necessary to decide rightly upon all questions.

The real duty of the voter in a democracy is to acquaint himself with the capability of those who are to be selected to carry on the administration of political and social government, and to place them in power. In the same manner as an architect is chosen to build a house or a shoemaker to make shoes, a lawyer to plead in court, a doctor to heal the illness of humanity, so experts should be selected to make and execute the laws upon which the happiness of every community depends.

The vice of modern democracy seems to be in not properly defining the scope which the voter should permit himself to range over. The sense of the necessity of preserving the freedom of the individual, and the jealous watch that is kept upon the actions of those who seek to be placed in power, as well as the competition among those who seek public office, tend to confirm the average voter in the view that he is the source of all wisdom, and that *in posse* at least he is as capable to decide all governmental questions, including the financial issue, as those whose study and experience have placed them in power. This attitude of mind is fostered by those who desire to gain popularity. The gravity and importance of governmental questions is belittled and the masses are given to believe that they cannot fail to be settled right in some vague way because of the intelligence and wisdom of the average citizen.

This idea that principles of government must be right because a majority vote for them, has been gaining ground ever since the foundation of the Government. The earlier administrations had an easier task than their successors, because the people generally seemed to have more confidence in their leaders. The finances of the Government, the coinage and currency for instance, were left to be settled by the wisdom of the men elected to carry on the legislative, judicial and executive departments of the Government. The attitude of mind was that the men selected were either experienced in these matters or that they were placed in a position where, if they did not know

the right course to pursue, they could soon find out. People were willing to believe that the scientific questions involved in carrying on the Government were pretty well settled, just the same as they believed in the multiplication table or the rule of three.

The voters of Washington's time recognized the absurdity of making the methods of finance and currency the basis of a division of parties, as they recognized the absurdity of a division into parties on such a question as whether the multiplication table were correct or not. A political campaign over a dispute as to whether six times nine were fifty-four or fifty-two, would excite the risibility of the most ignorant. And in a more latent way there exists the same absurdity in having a political division over the proper standard of value.

The voters in earlier days seem to have had a clearer notion of this than those of more modern times. They seemed to be more sure that there was a standard of honesty as distinguished from dishonesty, and that this standard was not to be altered because a majority wanted it to be changed any more than the course of the earth around the sun can be altered by the votes of all the people upon the globe.

But while essential facts cannot be changed, the position of those who administer a democratic government is rendered more and more difficult as voters by degrees acquire an overweening and unjust estimate of the power of their votes and lose an accurate idea of the limit of that power.

The legislative branch of the Government, being nearer to the people, is more apt to partake of and even to foster their growing errors than the executive branch. The former come in contact with the people less practically than the latter. The executive, in collecting the revenues and paying the expenses of the Government, touches the people on their most practical and experienced side. What legislators can or will do is always more or less a matter of theory and hypothesis. A plan for reform or improvement may look well on paper, but no one can tell just how it will work in practice ; but the executive deals with actualities.

Thus it may seem to be a matter of great advantage to the majority of the voters to have the Legislature enact some financial scheme that will cheapen money and enable them to obtain it more readily. When the executive comes to put it in practice the individual citizen who deals directly with the Treasury will soon discover if there be any injustice or loss in its practical application. No one can be more watchful of practical difficulties than the President. If he has had experience he is doubly watchful ; if he has not he must of necessity soon acquire it from contact with subordinates who are the permanent wheels and machinery of the executive. The President therefore throws all his weight in favor of verities. No matter what his promises may have been before he is put in office, he soon learns what can and what cannot be done, and resists impracticabilities with all the power of his personality and his office. Thus it has been that from the beginning of the Government the influence of the presidential office has generally been exerted for the right solution of financial difficulties, and this attitude of the successive Presidents has done much to preserve the credit of the Government, correcting the vagaries of popular excitement and popular legislation.

WASHINGTON.—The training of the first President had been most intensely practical. He had seen the struggles of the Continental Congress to maintain

payments of any kind during the dark period of the Revolutionary War and had witnessed the rise, progress and downfall of Continental paper money. After the adoption of the Constitution, which was supposed to contain provisions that would forever prevent the use by the Government or people of irredeemable paper money, he chose for his Secretary of the Treasury and financial adviser Alexander Hamilton, who drafted the laws for establishing a revenue, for providing a gold and silver coinage and for the organization of a National bank. All of Hamilton's recommendations received the steady support of Washington, although for political reasons they were opposed, especially the plan for a National bank, by Jefferson, who held the office of Secretary of State.

Hamilton was the leader of the Federal party, the party of sound conservative methods in all the ramifications of the Government and especially in that of finance.

Although Washington sought to strengthen his administration by inviting to his cabinet the distinguished men of both parties existing at that time, yet the natural conservatism of his mind led him to favor the Federalists. He cordially supported the work of Hamilton in funding the debt and in providing revenue and also in the use of a National bank as a fiscal agent.

At that date the use of both gold and silver as standard legal-tender money was the practice of enlightened nations, although the disadvantages of the bimetallic system were beginning to prove oppressive and propositions had been put forward both in England and France to select either the one or the other metal as the sole standard. Hamilton sought to conform to the best usage of his time in providing for the coinage of both gold and silver and in this course he had the approval of Washington. It is perfectly reasonable to assume on the basis of all the acts and papers of Washington that if the conditions of gold and silver production and the action of commercial nations in regard to the two metals had been as they were to-day, that Washington would have been a strong supporter of a stable gold standard.

JOHN ADAMS.—As President, Adams in his financial policy followed the traditions of the administration of Washington. During the Revolutionary War he had been the financial agent of the Continental Congress. He well knew that the springs of national credit were adequate revenue and adherence to engagements. During his administration the plans of Hamilton for the payment of debts contracted in Europe were religiously carried out. Mr. Adams would have rejected with contempt any proposition to take advantage of foreign creditors, or domestic either for that matter, by any change in the value of the currency either metal or paper. According to the lights of that day he was for the highest standard of value, and if he had held the same responsible position in this day that he did in his own, he would no doubt have been designated a gold bug on account of his sound and conservative ideas.

JEFFERSON.—The election of Jefferson to the presidency was the triumph of democracy in its purest form over federalism with its tendency to class aristocracy. The former administrations had distinguished the presidency by a certain degree of pomp and ceremony in which they copied to some extent the etiquette of monarchical courts. Jefferson affected and practiced simplicity. He treated alike the highest and lowest. He regarded himself on a par with the Governors of the States. To secularize and republicanize the Gov-

ernment was his chief purpose. In political effect the overturn of the Federalists and the triumph of Jeffersonian democracy was as great a change as would be the defeat of the Republican party by the Populists.

But Jefferson never dreamed of overturning the foundations of honesty or even of tampering with them. Twice two makes four under a simple democratic government as well as under the pomp and circumstance of a monarchical one. The obligations of contracts, the payment of obligations, were just as sacred to Jefferson, the severe republican, as to Washington and Adams with their aristocratic tendencies.

Jefferson well understood the nature and importance of a standard of value. He also knew the purport and real force of the Government mint stamp on the coins. He recommended that an ounce of silver should be the standard, thus indicating a leaning toward intelligent monometallism. He probably was better versed in technical knowledge as to the real function and necessity of a tangible standard of value than either Washington or Adams. He made the cautious and conservative Gallatin his Secretary of the Treasury. Although he had opposed the authorization of the first Bank of the United States on constitutional grounds, he did not attempt to interfere with its operations, and all through his administration this institution held the funds of the Government and assisted its financial operations. At the present time Jefferson would no doubt be a sound money Democrat of the Cleveland type.

Although he was, no doubt, a thorough politician, he would have shrunk from seeking eminence upon a platform founded on false financial principles as he would from going into an estimate upon false mathematical premises and deductions.

MADISON.—During Madison's administration the country had to encounter a most difficult and stormy financial situation. The success of democracy had begun to impress upon the minds of the masses freer ideas on all subjects. The expiration of the charter of the first Bank of the United States, in 1811, always regarded as an aristocratic institution, the growth of State banks and their rivalry with each other and the Bank of the United States, had depreciated the currency. When a new charter was refused to the last-named institution, the Government was thrown for fiscal support on the State banks.

The outbreak of the War of 1812, with Great Britain, found the currency of the country in such shape that specie payments had to be suspended. Resort was had to the issue of interest-bearing Treasury notes, and the regular loans of the Government were made at a discount. Nevertheless as soon as peace was restored we find Madison supporting the law for a new Bank of the United States, although he like Jefferson had opposed the charter of the first bank of that name on constitutional grounds. He recognized the necessity of a homogeneous currency. In the absence of gold and silver, which he hoped would soon return to the channels of circulation, there were, he said in one of his reports, three courses open: Either to rely on the State banks, which would not combine to furnish such a currency, to organize a National bank, or to issue notes from the Treasury direct.

Madison left the decision to Congress but his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dallas, proposed a plan for a second Bank of the United States, which was adopted by the legislative branch of the Government. No attempt was made or thought of to change or in any way tamper with the existing metallic

standard of value. When specie payments were resumed the bulk of the coin in circulation of American coinage consisted of silver half-dollars. The ratio between the gold and silver coinage was such that gold coins were exported as soon as minted. The American silver was supplemented by some foreign gold and silver coins that were light enough in weight to remain in circulation.

Madison, while leaving financial matters almost wholly to the direction of Congress, shows no sympathy with any but the soundest financial ideas in any of his writings or public documents.

MONROE.—The administration of Monroe was distinguished by the rapid payment of the Government debt. The Bank of the United States had got well under way during his administration and aided the Government in this direction. In 1819 there occurred a commercial crisis which brought business to a standstill. It was the result of the over-trading and sanguine extent of credit which accompanied the revival of business commencing in 1816, after the recovery from the effects of the War of 1812. No abnormal methods of finance were adopted and the storm soon passed over.

Mr. Crawford was Secretary of the Treasury during Monroe's administration. His course in endeavoring to conciliate State bank interests was open to some criticism. There was however very little difficulty in carrying the Treasury through the time of trouble. The financial administration of Monroe was comparatively colorless, and consisted in carrying out the policy of his predecessors—to pay off the public debt as it fell due or opportunity of purchase offered. Monroe was, as far as his writings and the history of his administration show, in favor of sound money.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.—The four years of the second Adams were still more uneventful than those of his predecessor. It was an era of prosperity. The Bank of the United States furnished a homogeneous currency and kept down the issues of the State banks, thereby storing up future wrath for itself. The subsequent career of Mr. Adams in Congress shows him to have been on the side of the soundest standard of value.

JACKSON.—The hero of New Orleans was nothing if not a sound money man and in favor of the gold standard. Of course his prejudice against the Bank of the United States, regarding it as he did as a political opponent, exhibits him in the contest that ensued often in most unreasonable attitudes of mind. It is questionable whether he or his advisers had any accurate financial knowledge, but they at least knew that gold and silver coins were real money and that paper money, whether issued by the Government or the banks, was not.

In this administration the war on paper money carried on with conspicuous ardor by Benton, Jackson's great henchman in the Senate, opened the eyes of the public men to the reasons why it was so difficult to keep gold in the country. Benton made it the burden of his song that American freemen should not be obliged to put up with rags but should have the good gold mint drops shining in silken purses as well as the effete populations of Europe.

Secretary Ingham, who had the Treasury during Jackson's first administration, made a most lucid and exhaustive report on the question of the metallic standard and the reasons the gold coins of the United States did not remain in circulation.

Jackson was for gold and silver money, but in his defense of them he was unnecessarily pronounced and did some damage by his ill-judged defense of

them against the paper of the United States Bank. He would have regarded with scorn any attempt at covert repudiation by any change of the existing standard of value.

**VAN BUREN.**—In 1834, during Jackson's administration, an Act had been passed reducing the amount of gold in the gold coins so that they would remain in circulation. In 1837, a still further change was made fixing the weight and fineness of the gold coinage at the point where it remains to-day. Van Buren inherited the traditions of Jackson and was like him, though in a less pronounced manner, an enemy of bank paper and a friend to gold and silver as the common and ordinary circulation of the country. The great panic of 1837 occurred during the first year of his administration.

**HARRISON, TYLER AND POLK.**—These administrations were comparatively colorless in a financial sense. The panic of 1837 left the Treasury in bad condition, and Harrison, if he had lived, was pledged to the re-establishment of a National bank. Tyler however repudiated this pledge of his party and instead advocated the independent Treasury system which was established under Polk, August 6, 1846. The support received for this measure was due to the popular desire to see the Treasury made independent of the State banks which always failed at critical times. In their support of the measure both Tyler and Polk were undoubtedly anxious to remove the Government credit from the influence of recurring commercial panics, in which as long as the State banks held the Government moneys it was at such times sure to be somewhat compromised.

We may at this day regard them as mistaken as to the method adopted, but their sincerity and devotion to sound principles of conduct cannot be wholly denied.

**TAYLOR, FILLMORE, PIERCE AND BUCHANAN.**—The independent Treasury was now in operation, and undoubtedly, with the small revenues and expenditures of the Government then collected and paid out, it worked well. These administrations are noted for the prominence of other questions than the financial one. The slavery question culminated in Buchanan's last months of power. There is no doubt however that these men, weak and indifferent as some of them showed themselves upon the subjects agitated in their day, would have been bold enough on a subject they regarded as so well settled as that of the standard of value.

It required many years of constant sapping by socialistic ideas to produce men with any color of eligibility for the presidential office, who would look with complacency on the slightest tampering or interference with monetary standards.

**LINCOLN.**—With the era of the Civil War a radical change occurred in the management of the finances of the Government. For the first time since the adoption of the Constitution the specie basis of payments was partially departed from. Not indeed in regard to the public funded debt, but in respect to the basis of ordinary payments between citizens and the Government.

The vast expenditures of the Civil War seemed to Lincoln to render the suspension of the specie standard of value and the passage of the legal-tender Acts necessary. But Lincoln indicated his attachment to sound principles of finance by the manner in which he laid stress on the deplorable exigency that rendered a departure from specie payments necessary. In this departure Mr. Lincoln was supported by the majority of the wisest statesmen of his day.

But a return to specie payments was kept steadily in view and the credit of the public debt was sustained by paying gold interest and promising the redemption of the debt in coin.

What Lincoln would have done had he been permitted to direct the welfare of the country during his second term cannot now be known. The innate honesty of his character, recognized by friend and foe, leaves it to be inferred that he would have striven for an early return to a metallic basis.

JOHNSON.—Johnson, Lincoln's successor, with Hugh McCulloch as Secretary of the Treasury, attempted to reduce the outstanding notes of the Government with a view to an early return to specie payments. From this most laudable effort he was compelled to desist by congressional action. Whatever may have been Johnson's failings he deserves credit for his stand in financial matters.

GRANT.—General Grant was firm against all attempts to impair the credit of the country by vetoing bills for paying the debt in greenbacks. It was during his second term that the celebrated mint Act was passed by which gold was made the sole standard of value. This Act received his approval. Gold had in fact been the metallic standard of the United States from 1834 and this Act merely confirmed existing facts.

Grant set his face firmly against all the efforts of the greenback party in Congress, and no doubt by his firmness brought the country with as much credit through that craze as he brought it safely through the shock of battle in the Civil War.

HAYES.—The greenback craze during Hayes' administration took upon itself the more plausible and dangerous form of advocacy of what was called the rehabilitation of silver.

Hayes was consistently and intelligently in favor of sound money—the money of the commercial world. The Act for the revival of the silver dollar was passed over his veto, but if he had not firmly stood in the way, there is no doubt that the silver men would have been able to have enacted a law for the free coinage of silver.

GARFIELD AND ARTHUR.—Both of these Presidents were sound money and gold standard men. During their administrations the finances of the Government were prosperous; there was constantly a large surplus in the Treasury. The refunding and payment of the public debt went on while they held office, conducted with the greatest ability and scientific care.

CLEVELAND.—Mr. Cleveland yields to none of his predecessors in the firmness and alacrity he has shown in sustaining sound money principles under the most trying and difficult circumstances. The first term of office brought upon him the arduous duty of disposing of a surplus, which labor also devolved upon his successor.

HARRISON.—Gen. Harrison, like his immediate predecessors, was obliged to manage the finances of the country and keep them on a sound basis in the face of a most perplexing mass of financial legislation which tended to depress and discredit them. The legal-tender Acts of 1861 and 1862, supplemented by that of May, 1878, and given the widest possible scope by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the silver legislation of 1878, followed by that of 1890, were constantly enlarging the demand obligations of the Government. The maintenance of the parity of gold and silver dollars was made mandatory by the Act of 1890. As long as the surplus revenues of the Government were



large there was no difficulty in maintaining the whole mass of paper, silver and gold money at a parity. The payment of the maturing debt also afforded an employment for currency that concealed its tendency to redundancy. The piling up of the surplus had of course its peculiar difficulties but it did not fail to strengthen the public credit. The two processes, of increasing the volume of the circulating demand notes of the Government, and of reducing the revenues, went on continuously during Harrison's administration. The demand for an increased reserve and the reduction of the sources of that reserve soon made it apparent that there was difficulty ahead. Starting with a surplus, the administration of Harrison soon began to find it dwindle and at the close of his term the Treasury was in a critical position. The expiration of his incumbency prevented Harrison from exercising the power in his hands to avert danger. There is evidence that he was preparing to do so when he was succeeded by Cleveland.

**CLEVELAND'S SECOND TERM.**—It is possible that, if Harrison's term had lasted another year the panic of 1893 might have been averted. Matters were no doubt approaching a dangerous crisis, but the Administration was firmly in the saddle with the reins of direction well in hand. The bond sales subsequently made by Cleveland after the panic, if they had been made, as they undoubtedly would have been by Harrison, if his term had continued for another year, during the early months of 1893, would have so strengthened the reserve that the panic might have been averted. Cleveland entered the office at an unfortunate time, there was the unavoidable delay of settling the personnel of his advisers, a policy in accord with the situation had to be planned. There was no doubt some hesitation at first, and matters were permitted to drift too long until the panic occurred, while the natural disadvantage of a change of President at a critical time had much to do with the catastrophe. Lincoln's aphorism that it was not wise to swap horses when crossing a stream has here an application. There was undoubtedly some lack of decision at the beginning of Cleveland's second administration. On the other hand it may be justly said that costly catastrophes are in the United States necessary to teach the public the necessity of good laws and for the repeal of bad ones. It seems as if the panic of 1893 was necessary to secure the repeal of the silver-purchase law, which by increasing the demand paper of the Government, coincidently with reduction of revenues, was the chief cause of the critical situation.

When Cleveland was fully aroused to the situation, although his preventive action had been inadequate, he showed himself strong in applying the lesson of the panic and in taking measures to remedy its worst effects on the finances of the Government. The traditions of his party prevented him from remedying one cause of the difficulty by an increase of revenue, but he did his best in securing the repeal of the silver-purchase law and thus stopped the increase of the burden on the reserves.

**THE NEXT PRESIDENT.**—In view of the fixed policy of the country since the adoption of the Federal Constitution it is inconceivable that a President will be elected who favors a reversal of the sound money traditions to which previous Executives have adhered. It has never been the policy of the United States to force its creditors to accept depreciated coin, and its paper currency has been brought to the gold par and kept there. Despite any appearances to the contrary, there is no likelihood of any change in the monetary standard upon which debts have been contracted and paid since 1834.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### NATIONAL BANK—"PRELIMINARY" BUSINESS—LEASE.

Supreme Court of Illinois, June 11, 1896.

MCCORMICK *vs.* MARKET NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO.

A National bank is not authorized to lease a banking house before it is authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to commence the business of banking.

The provision of law requiring that the place where the business is to be carried on shall be stated in the organization certificate refer to the town or city, and not to the particular building or street number.

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This was an action to recover rent. On February 3, 1893, the articles of association and organization certificate of the Market National Bank of Chicago were filed in the office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Afterwards the bank leased from the plaintiff certain premises to be used by it as a banking house. The bank never completed its organization, and afterwards the organizers of the bank executed a paper revoking the articles of association and organization certificate. The rent was paid for a part of the term, and the action was brought to recover for the balance of the term.

PER CURIAM (omitting part of the opinion):

"In passing upon this case we are first called upon to determine the effect of the United States statute reading: 'But no association shall transact any business except such as is incidental and necessarily preliminary to its organization until it has been authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to commence the business of banking.' (Rev. St. U. S. § 5136.) We do not regard this as meaning incidental and necessarily preliminary to the commencement of a banking business. The words under consideration are in the section with, and immediately following, a statement of powers incidental to the business of banking, which the corporation is authorized to exercise. If the intention of Congress had been to merely forbid the doing of any business except such as is 'incidental and necessarily preliminary' to the commencement of a banking business, it would have said so. Instead of this, it prohibits the doing of any business save such 'as is incidental and necessarily preliminary to' the organization. The word 'organization' is three times used in section 5136 before its use in the restrictive clause. By the terms of said section the association, 'upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certificate' becomes, not only a body corporate, but has all the powers it is ever to possess, were it not for the inhibition already quoted. That a lease of offices to be used 'by said Market National Bank as a banking office, and for no other purpose, from May 1, 1893, to April 30,

1898, for \$13,000 per annum, payable \$1,083.33 on the last day of each and every month during said term,' was not incidental and necessarily preliminary to the organization of said corporation, is evident. Never having been authorized by the Comptroller to commence the business of banking, this corporation had at no time authority to do any business except such as was 'incidental and necessarily preliminary to its organization.' The leasing of the rooms as a banking office, and which it was stipulated were to be used for no other purpose, was not 'necessarily preliminary to its organization.' For the mere purpose of doing a banking business, it had no power to rent rooms at all, for the doing of a banking business was not 'necessarily preliminary to its organization.' Its acts in this regard were not a defective use of power, or the work of a merely *de facto* corporation, but a transaction which this *de jure* and *de facto* corporation was specially forbidden to engage in. To make this lease it had no power. It is quite likely that, for the purpose of perfecting its organization, it might have rented a room in which its members could meet and pay in their respective subscriptions, and that it could also have purchased books in which to record its proceedings, and hired a clerk to keep the record. These things might have been 'necessarily preliminary to its organization.' The renting of rooms 'as a banking office and for no other purpose' could not have been 'necessarily preliminary to its organization.'

The association is required, in its organization, to state the place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, but by this is meant the town or city, not the room, street or number in such town or city. This is clear from section 5190, which provides that 'the usual business of each banking association shall be transacted at an office or banking house located in the place specified in its organization certificate.' It will not be contended that a National bank is compelled to designate an office, street or number, and during the entire term of the existence do business at such locality. As before stated, the attempt to make this lease was more than an abuse of power, or an improper exercise of judgment. It was an attempt to do that for which no power existed. The proceeding was neither within the express nor implied scope of its powers. On the contrary, power to do this thing was directly denied.

The case at bar is not like that of *Tarbell vs. Page* (24 Ill. 46), or *Bushnell vs. Machine Co.* (138 Ill. 67), in which *de facto* corporations made contracts within the powers of the *de jure* body each held itself out to be.

Neither is this case similar to that of *Chubb vs. Upton* (95 U. S. 665), in which one who had subscribed for stock attempted to defend upon the ground that the stock for which he subscribed was part of an increase of capital which the company had, without authority, attempted to make.

We are herein called upon to deal, not with irregularities, but with a plain attempt to do what was absolutely forbidden, and we are asked to enforce an executory contract made in defiance of the law, the same as if it had been fully authorized. Nor is the company, because it represented itself as fully authorized to make this lease, now estopped from insisting upon its want of power. On the contrary, it is its duty to cease to act in defiance of the law, and it has no right by silence to suffer itself to be driven into a continuance of what was always wrong. To enforce the part of this agreement which yet remains executory, would be for the Court to declare that a corporation can, by a contemptuous disregard of the law, acquire powers forbidden to it, or,

as is said in *Assurance Co. vs. Rosenthal* (55 Ill. 85-87), 'to give the person or corporation or individual the same rights in enforcing prohibited contracts as the good citizen who respects and conforms to the law.'

It is well settled that, while corporations cannot be rendered directly liable upon *ultra vires* transactions, they must account for the benefits received therefrom. (Green's Brice, *Ultra Vires*, 42, 728.)

Where benefits have been received under an *ultra vires* agreement, relief granted is not upon the basis that a valid or merely voidable contract has been entered into, but, the act not being *malum in se*, the parties will, as near as they well can be, restored to their original condition. (*Pennsylvania R. Co. vs. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co.* 118 T. S. 290; *Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. vs. Oregonian Ry. Co.* 130 U. S. 1; *Thomas vs. Railroad Co.* 101 U. S. 71; *Society vs. Crowell*, 65 Ill. 453-458.)

We have discussed the question submitted upon the lines presented by appellant, who, the contract having been partially executed, recovered a judgment for \$2,548.35. It is not here contended, nor does it appear, that this was not equal to the entire benefit received by appellee. The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. Affirmed."

Our consideration of this case has led to the same conclusion reached by the appellate court, announced in the foregoing opinion by Justice Waterman. That opinion will accordingly be adopted as the opinion of this court, and the judgment affirmed. Affirmed.

CARTER, J.: I do not concur in the decision rendered in this case.

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#### LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS—STOCK HELD IN TRUST.

United States Circuit Court, District of Nebraska, May 7, 1896.

LEWIS vs. LEVITZ.

Where certificates of stock of a National bank are made out to the holder as the absolute owner thereof, and he so appears upon the books of the bank, he will not be permitted to show in an action against him to recover an assessment on the stock that he held the same as trustee.

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SHIRAS, *District Judge*: The plaintiff herein, as Receiver of the Buffalo National Bank, seeks to recover judgment against the defendant for the amount of an assessment, levied by the Comptroller of the Currency upon the shares of stock held in said bank; it being averred in the petition that the defendant is the owner of 50 shares of the capital stock of the bank, of the par value of \$100 per share. The defendant, answering said petition, avers, in substance, that he is not in fact the owner of any shares in said bank; that one Hamer was formerly the owner of the shares; that he had become indebted to the bank; that the President of the bank came to defendant, and stated that the only chance the bank had to protect itself from loss by reason of the debt due the bank from Hamer was to purchase the shares of stock and give him credit on the purchase price for the indebtedness due the bank; that he, on behalf of the bank, desired the defendant to take the shares of stock in trust for the bank, and for its benefit; that defendant agreed to act as trustee in the manner stated, and in pursuance of this arrangement Hamer surrendered the shares held by him, and new certificates therefor were issued in the name of the defendant; that by a written agree-

ment to that effect he (the defendant) holds the shares in fact as a trustee for the bank, and not in his own right, nor for his own benefit. To this answer plaintiff demurs, on the ground that the facts set forth in the answer do not constitute a defense to the action.

The demurrer to the answer admits the fact to be that the defendant is not the actual owner of the shares of stock standing in his name, but that he holds the same as a trustee for the bank. Section 5152 of the Revised Statutes, expressly enacts that "persons holding stock as executors, administrators, guardians or trustees, shall not be personally subject to any liabilities as stockholders." If, therefore, when the new certificates of stock were issued to the defendant, it had been made to appear upon the books of the bank that the defendant took the same, not in his own right, but as a trustee, he could not be held personally liable thereon. The averments of the answer show, however, that the character in which the defendant took the stock was not made to appear upon the bank records; but, on the contrary, the certificates were issued to him in his own name, and upon the books of the bank he was carried as the owner, in fact, of the stock. The general rule is well settled that, if a person knowingly permits his name to be entered upon the stock books of a National bank as the owner of stock therein, he cannot be permitted, as against creditors, to show that, in fact, he was not the owner. (Thomp. Corp. §§ 3192-3194; *Welles vs. Larrabee*, 36 Fed. 866; *Finn vs. Brown*, 142 U. S. 56.) The averments in the answer filed in this case show that the defendant consented to the transfer of the shares of stock to himself. He knew that the new certificates were issued in his own name, and he did not cause the books to show that he held the stock, not in his own right, but as a trustee only. Under these circumstances he is liable to creditors, represented by the Receiver, for the assessment levied on the stock. Demurrer sustained.

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#### DRAFT—INDORSEMENT TO FICTITIOUS PAYEE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, May 23, 1896.

CHISM, *et al.* vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK.

The indorsing of a draft to a fictitious person, when the fictitious character of the indorsee is not known to the indorser, does not make the draft payable to bearer.

Where a draft is indorsed to a fictitious person, the indorser supposing such indorsee to be a real person, and the name of the fictitious payee is improperly indorsed by the person in possession of the draft, such indorsement will be treated as a forgery, and payment of the draft by the drawee bank to the person in possession thereof will not discharge the draft.

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This was an action by Chism, Churchill & Co. against the First National Bank of New York and the Mercantile Bank of Memphis as garnishee.

BEARD, J.: The complainants are cotton factors in the city of Memphis. On July 13, 1894, they purchased from the First National Bank of Memphis a draft for \$3,000 payable to their order, and drawn on the defendant, the First National Bank of New York. After getting this draft, they indorsed it, "Pay to H. C. Hamilton or order," and then placed it in the hands of one Weems, to be delivered to the indorsee, Hamilton. The drawing, indorsement, and delivery of this draft were the result of a fraudulent scheme, which Weems practiced upon complainants. They were induced by him (at that

time a man of fine reputation in the community) to think Hamilton was a real person who had consigned to him as warehouseman for storage and sale a large lot of cotton, and this draft represented the advance which the complainants agreed to make to the supposed consignor upon this cotton, upon an understanding that they were to sell same and earn the commissions accruing therefrom.

It turned out however that Hamilton was non-existent and that Weems had no such cotton under his charge. But the record discloses that complainants neither knew nor had occasion to suspect such to be the facts but, believing that Hamilton was a real personage and with the view of carrying out this agreement with Weems, they purchased this draft and turned it over to him, indorsed as is stated above for delivery to their indorsee. Immediately after its receipt Weems indorsed it to himself or order, using for this purpose the name of Hamilton, and then carried it to the Mercantile Bank of Memphis, and that bank, without any suspicion of the bad faith of the transaction, or of the right of Weems to transfer title, upon his indorsement, paid him full value for it, and then forwarded it to its correspondent in New York, by whom in due time it was presented to the drawee, who, equally ignorant of the want of title in Weems, and in perfect good faith, paid it. Discovering within a few days the fraud practiced upon them, and at the same time that the draft had already been paid, this bill was filed by complainants, the payee, against the drawee, the First National Bank of New York, and the Mercantile Bank of Memphis; against the first upon an assumpsit implied from the wrongful appropriation of the draft and a refusal to account for its proceeds, and against the latter as a garnishee holding funds of the former subject to attachment.

Two defenses are made: First, that complainants were guilty of such carelessness in their dealings with Weems as to estop them from setting up the present claim; second, that the indorsement by Chism, Churchill & Co. of this draft to a fictitious indorsee was in law an indorsement to bearer, and the result was that its payment through the usual channels of trade, without notice of the alleged defect, discharged the drawee.

As to the first of these grounds, it is sufficient to say that the record fails to show any recklessness or carelessness upon the part of complainants in this transaction to prevent a recovery, if for any sound reason this suit is maintainable. It is the second ground, however, upon which the defendants rest largely their defense to this claim. What is the effect of indorsing a bill to a fictitious person, the indorser not knowing that the indorsee was fictitious, but, on the other hand, believing him to be a real person, is a question of first impression in this State. There is no doubt it is true, as a general proposition, that the holder of commercial paper, payable to order, must trace his title through a genuine indorsement, including that of the payee. (2 Rand. Com. Paper, § 988; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 731; 1 Edw. Bills & N. § 519; *Mead vs. Young*, 4 Term R. 28-30.) And it is equally true that where a banker pays a draft or check drawn upon him, he, at his peril, pays it to any one but the payee, or to one who is able to trace his title back to the payee through genuine indorsements. The mere possession of the check or bill under apparent title does not necessarily imply the right to demand or receive payment, and when it is paid to such holder the drawer has put upon him the risk of seeing that the apparent is the real title to the paper; for the banker holds

the funds of his depositor under an obligation to pay them to him or to his order, and if he pays them otherwise he cannot treat such a payment as a discharge of his liability. (*Shipman vs. Bank*, 126 N. Y. 318; *Robarts vs. Tucker*, 16 Q. B. 575; *Dodge vs. Bank*, 30 Ohio St. 1.)

It is otherwise as to his payment of a check or bill payable to bearer. In such a case, in the absence of knowledge that the party presenting the paper is wrongfully in possession of it, he can safely pay, because in so doing he is complying with the positive demand of his depositors. (Tied. Com. Paper, § 312.) And it is insisted for the defense that this was the legal effect of the indorsement by Chism, Churchill & Co. to Hamilton, the fictitious indorser. It seems from a note by Byles, Bills, p. 79, that the controversy over the effect of indorsement of bills to fictitious persons grew out of the bankruptcy of Linsay & Co. and Gibson & Co., who negotiated bills with fictitious names upon them to the amount of nearly a million sterling a year.

A great many cases grew out of these indorsements in the various courts of England, one of which (*Minet vs. Gibson*, 3 Term R. 481) was carried to the House of Lords. (1 H. Bl. 569.) Mr. Chitty, in his work on Bills (page 178), says: "The result of the discussion seems to be that a bill payable to a fictitious person or his order is, in effect, a bill payable to bearer, and may be declared on as such in favor of a *bona fide* holder ignorant of the fact against all the parties knowing that the payee was a fictitious person." In other words, whether such a bill was collectible by the holder, as if payable to bearer, depended upon the fact that the party against whom it was sought to be enforced, at the time he assumed liability upon it, knew that the payee was fictitious. Where he possessed such knowledge he was estopped from saying to a *bona fide* holder that he was not bound; otherwise he would be a party to the circulation of commercial paper, apparently good, yet with an inherent vice which rendered it worthless, at least as to him though it fell into the hands of an innocent purchaser. Subsequently the bill of exchange Act of 1882 was passed, the effect of which was in fact that a bill might be treated as payable to bearer when the party named as payee was a real person, but has not and was not intended by the drawer to have any right arising out of it. (*Bank vs. Vagliano* [1891] App. Cas. 107.)

In this country, among the text writers, Mr. Daniel states the rule as general, and says that: "In the case of a note payable to a fictitious person it appears to be well settled that any *bona fide* holder may recover on it against the maker as upon a note payable to bearer. It will be no defense against such *bona fide* holder for the maker to set up that he did not know the payee to be fictitious." Mr. Daniel rests the rule upon the ground of estoppel, but Mr. Randolph, in his work on Commercial Paper (Volume 1, § 164, note 4), suggests that the cases cited by him to support his text "apply this rule only when the maker has by his words or conduct raised any estoppel against himself," and this latter author fails in his text, as we understand it, to give the sanction of his approval to the rule as announced by Mr. Daniel.

The questions presented in this case have arisen and have been discussed in but few of the American courts, and the conclusions reached by them have been variant.

[The court here examined the following cases: *Blodgett vs. Jackson* 40 N. H. 21; *Kahn vs. Watkins*, 26 Kans. 691; *Lane vs. Kiekel*, 22 Iowa, 399; *Phillips vs. Inthirm*, 114 E. C. L. 694; *Forbes vs. Espy*, 21 Ohio St. 474.]

Upon the other hand, we have at least two well-considered cases, which in effect, adopt the English rule, to wit, that only such paper as is issued to a fictitious payee or indorsee by the party sought to be bound, with full knowledge of the fact, shall be treated as payable to bearer. In one of these cases, that of *Armstrong vs. Bank* (46 Ohio St. 412) after a careful review of authorities, it is said:

"If the drawer of a check, acting in good faith, makes it payable to a certain person or order, supposing there is such person, when in fact there is none, no good reason can be perceived why the banker should be excused if he pay the check to a fraudulent holder upon any less precautions than if it had been made payable to a real person; in other words, why he should not be required to use the same precautions in the one case as in the other—that is, determine whether the indorsement is a genuine one or not. The fact that the payee is a non-existing person does not increase the liability of the bank to be deceived by the indorsement."

The case of *Shipman vs. Bank* (126 N. Y. 318) involved over \$200,000, was argued by counsel of research and ability, and was determined by a court of deserved reputation. In that case it appeared that the plaintiffs were depositors in the defendant bank. They drew checks for large sums to fictitious payees, supposing them to be real persons. These checks were given to a trusted employee, to be turned over to the respective payees. Instead, however, this employee indorsed the names of the payees upon them, and had them presented to the drawee, when they were paid without inquiry or suspicion of the genuineness of the indorsements. Suit having been instituted by the drawer to recover the sums so paid out, it was resisted upon the ground that these checks were in law payable to bearer. The court, however, speaking through O'Brien, J., said:

"The maker's intention is the controlling consideration which determines the character of such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to bearer unless the maker knows the payee to be fictitious, and actually intends to make the paper payable to a fictitious person."

We think the rule thus limited is reasonable, while to eliminate the element of knowledge or intent would leave it harsh and unreasonable. In addition, with this limitation the law of negotiable paper, so far as it involves the question of forgery, is consistent; for it is universally conceded that the payment of a check or a bill drawn to the order of a real person upon a forged indorsement of the payee's name will not protect. In such a case the banker is still liable to the owner for the fund in hand as though no payment had been made. (3 Rand. Com. Paper § 1739.) And this would be so even if the forger should personate an intended payee of the same name. (*Com. vs. Foster*, 114 Mass. 311.)

Then, in a case where the drawer has been guilty of no wrong, but innocently issues or indorses his check or bill to a fictitious person, believing him to be real, and a third party without authority writes the name of this fictitious payee or indorsee upon it, and by this fraud succeeds in collecting it, why should the drawee, by payment of such indorsement, discharge himself from liability to the drawer? The writing of the name of the non-existing payee under such conditions is forgery at common law (4 Bl. Comm. p. 247; 2 Whart. Cr. Law, § 653 and under Mill. & Code, § 5492.) In the present case, without fault on the part of the complainants, the drawee has paid



upon a forged indorsement, to a party not entitled to collect it, a bill of which Chism, Churchill & Co., were owners, and which no one had a right to collect save upon their order, and now has it, and declines to account for its value. Under these circumstances, we think the Chancellor was right in holding the drawee liable, and we therefore affirm his decree.

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**NATIONAL BANK—SALE OF COLLATERAL—AGENCY.**

Supreme Court of North Dakota, April 30, 1896.

**ANDERSON vs. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GRAND FORKS.**

Where a National bank holds notes of its debtor as a collateral to his indebtedness to the bank, it may lawfully act as agent for him in the sale of such notes to a third person, such agency being merely incidental to the exercise of its conceded power to collect the claim out of such collateral notes. But, ordinarily, a National bank may not engage in the business of agency. The fact that its act in assuming to represent another as agent is *ultra vires* will not exempt it from those rules of law which regulate the duties of an agent to his principal. It cannot plead its own violation of law to justify a breach of trust. Accordingly, *held*, that a National bank which had assumed to sell for another certain notes owned by him, but had, instead of so selling them to a third person without his knowledge, sold them to itself, had violated its duty to the owner, the same as if it had full power under the law to act as such agent; and was, therefore, guilty of a conversion of such notes. (Syllabus by the Court.)

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CORLISS, J. (omitting part of the opinion): It is contended that a National bank cannot legally engage in the business of acting as agent for another in the sale of securities such as those which were owned by the plaintiff. But that is not the precise question before the court. It ignores the conceded fact that at the time this correspondence was had the defendant held plaintiff's note for \$2,000, which it had discounted in the regular course of business. The seven notes in question belonging to plaintiff were also held by the bank as collateral to plaintiff's indebtedness on that note. The bank, as pledgee, could not sell these notes. It could only collect them. Certainly, in furtherance of its undoubted power to collect a debt from one whose paper it had discounted, it could, with the assent of the debtor, act as his agent in the disposition by sale of collateral held by it to secure such debt. In doing so in this case the bank was not engaged in the general business of agency. The bank merely acted as agent in the particular case under special circumstances, when the exercise of power to act as agent was merely incidental, and entirely subordinate to the exercise of the conceded power of every National bank to take all the steps which may be necessary, appropriate, or useful in the collection of its claims against others.

To deny to a National bank large incidental powers in the enforcement of such claims would be seriously to hamper and cripple them, and this, too, without necessity, and in the face of general principles.

There is a wide difference between a bank engaging in the business of agency when the agency is not in furtherance of the powers conferred upon the bank, and, on the other hand, its acting for a debtor of the bank under his authority in the disposition of collaterals held by the bank to secure the debt, when without such authority the bank would have had no power to make such disposition.

We are of opinion that under the facts of this case the defendant, in as-

suming to act for plaintiff in the sale of these notes with his consent, kept entirely within the limits of its power. The whole drift of authority seems to us to support this view. (*Shinkle vs. Bank*, 22 Ohio St. 516-524; *Holmes vs. Boyd*, 90 Ind. 332; *John A. Roebling Son's Co. vs. First National Bank of Richmond, Va.*, 30 Fed. 744; *Reynolds vs. Simpson*, 74 Ga. 454; *Wylie vs. Bank*, 119 U. S. 361; *McCraith vs. Bank* [N. Y. App.] 10 N. E. 862; *First National Bank vs. National Exchange Bank*, 92 U. S. 122; 1 Morse, Banks, §§ 77, 78.)

The Wylie case appears to be nearly in point. The principle which underlies all the decisions cited is the principle which we apply in this cause. We hold that, as an incident of the conceded power of the bank to realize on security it held, it had power to act as agent for the plaintiff in effecting a sale thereof; thus enabling it to turn that security into cash to be applied on its claim. But we would reach no different conclusion even though we should assume that the act of the bank was *ultra vires*. It is one thing to assert that a bank cannot legally engage in the business of acting as agent. It is an entirely different thing to assert that when it has in fact assumed to act as agent it shall not be held to the ordinary duties and obligations which govern such a relation.

A bank may repudiate its promise to act as agent when such promise is not binding, and in so doing it will incur no liability. So long as the matter remains executory, it can fall back upon the defense of *ultra vires*. But a widely different question is presented when it has executed or pretended to execute the agency. So long as the business remains unfinished, the person dealing with the bank must take the risk of the refusal by the latter to proceed. He is bound to know that the act is *ultra vires*. But it is not a physical impossibility for a bank to act as agent. If it assumes to and does so act, and receives the proceeds of the sale, it must account for them as agent. It has undoubtedly violated the law by exercising powers not conferred upon it. But this violation can be taken advantage of only by the sovereign authority which created the bank. (*Bank vs. Butler*, 157 Mass. 548; *Bank vs. Smith*, [S. D.] 65 N. W. 437; *Bank vs. Hanson*, [Minn.] 21 N. W. 850; *Hennessy vs. City of St. Paul* [Minn.] 55 N. W. 1123.) Indeed, in many cases this is the rule, although the act performed by the bank is in defiance of a positive statutory prohibition. (*Bank vs. Matthews*, 98 U. S. 621; *Bank vs. Whitney*, 103 U. S. 99; *Thompson vs. Bank*, 146 U. S. 240; *Bank vs. Townsend*, 139 U. S. 67; *Bank vs. Birch*, 130 N. Y. 221.)

#### TRUST COMPANY—PRESENTMENT OF NOTE AT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Feb. 29, 1896.

NASH vs. BROWN.

In the absence of a well-established custom authorizing such a presentment, a note "payable at any bank" in a specified place cannot be presented for payment at a trust company.

This was an action by Willard G. Nash against Charles H. Brown, indorser on a promissory note held by plaintiff, "payable at any bank in Boston." The note was presented to the Massachusetts Loan and Trust Company, and duly protested. This corporation was created for the purpose of receiving, on deposit, storage or otherwise, moneys, Government securities, stocks, bonds,

coin, jewelry, plate, valuable papers and documents, evidences of debt and other property of every kind, and of collecting and disbursing the principal of such property as produces interest or income when it becomes due, upon terms prescribed by the corporation, and for the purpose of advancing money or credits on real and personal security, on terms that might be agreed upon. The Court, at defendant's request, ruled that the trust company was not a bank, within the contemplation of the contract set forth in the note, and that defendant could not be held, to which rulings plaintiff excepted.

FIELD, C. J.: This is an action against an indorser on a promissory note made "payable at any bank in Boston." The note was duly presented for payment at the office of the Massachusetts Loan and Trust Company, in Boston, and was duly protested by a notary public for non-payment. The question is whether the Massachusetts Loan & Trust Company is a "bank," as that word is used in the promissory note. The meaning of the word "bank" has been considered in *Way vs. Butterworth*, 106 Mass. 75, 108 Mass. 509. The Massachusetts Loan and Trust Company is a corporation, but it is not a National bank, and not a State bank, within the meaning of Pub. St. c. 118. It was incorporated by St. 1870, c. 323, under the name of the Northampton Loan and Trust Company, and by St. 1875, c. 16, was allowed to change its name to that of the Massachusetts Loan and Trust Company, and to have its location in Boston. (See St. 1881, c. 95; St. 1888, c. 413.)

We assume that it has the power to discount commercial paper, and perform many other acts which banks of issue and deposit usually perform. But our statutes make a distinction between trust companies organized under our laws, and banks, and we are not aware that such trust companies are commonly called "banks," or that there is any well-established custom to present promissory notes and bills of exchange payable at a bank to such trust companies for payment. The present case discloses no evidence of any such custom. We are of opinion that the ruling was right. Exceptions overruled.

#### DIVIDENDS—DISCRETION OF DIRECTORS.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, June 2, 1896.

REYNOLDS *vs.* BANK OF MOUNT VERNON.

The question of the declaration of dividends rests in the fair and honest discretion of the directors, and unless it is shown that the failure of the directors to declare dividends proceeds from an improper motive, the courts will not interfere.

This was an action by James L. Reynolds against the Bank of Mount Vernon, New York, and Gouverneur Rogers, its President, for various forms of equitable relief, and among others, for a mandatory injunction to declare a dividend or dividends.

CULLEN, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The second objection of complaint was that, though the bank had continuously earned money, only one dividend had been paid from the organization of the bank to the commencement of the action, the profits being allowed to accumulate as a surplus. After the commencement of the action, the bank commenced declaring dividends at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum, which has been continued up to now. Still, if the plaintiff had any cause of complaint in this respect at the

time he brought the action, the subsequent conduct of the bank would not defeat his right to maintain the action. The broad claim is made on behalf of the plaintiff that the accumulation of profits for the purpose of creating a surplus is a violation of the articles of association, and illegal, because it is practically increasing the capital stock. That it does, in one sense, increase the capital of the bank, is unquestionable; but we have never known of such action being challenged. The propriety of accumulating some surplus is too palpable to require extended discussion.

When the capital stock of a bank is impaired, the deficiency must be made good by an assessment on the stockholders; and, in case the deficiency is not made good within sixty days, proceedings may be instituted against it, as in the case of insolvent corporations. Hence, if such a corporation should divide all its profits and accumulate no surplus, any business loss would subject it to the hazard of a receivership and the loss of its corporate life. This danger is so apparent that of late years it has been common, on the formation of banks or trust companies, to pay in 50 or 100 per cent. in addition to the nominal capital stock; so that the corporation may begin business with a surplus. Some banks have accumulated so much of their profits that the surplus is from ten to thirty times the amount of the capital stock. These banks stand the highest in the commercial world. Nor is this conduct illegal.

In *Williams vs. Telegraph Co.* (93 N. Y. 162) the Court said:

"When a corporation has a surplus, whether a dividend shall be made, and if made how much it shall be, and when and where it shall be payable, rests in the fair and honest discretion of the directors, uncontrolled by the courts."

In *McNab vs. Manufacturing Co.* (62 Hun, 18) it was held:

"That the rate of dividend to be paid and the amount of surplus to be retained by a corporation must rest in the fair and honest discretion of its trustees."

In the case of *Hiscock vs. Lacy* (9 Misc. Rep. 578) a National bank was decreed to declare a dividend. In the opinion there delivered by Judge Vann, there is an elaborate review of the authorities on the right of courts to control the action of the directors of a corporation. The rule already cited, that the question of the declaration of dividends rests in a fair and honest discretion of the directors, uncontrolled by the courts, is conceded. The decision proceeded in that case solely on the ground that the action of the bank in refusing to declare dividends did not proceed from "the fair and honest discretion of directors," but in pursuance of a scheme adopted by the majority owners of the stock to injure the minority owners, on account of personal enmity between the parties.

In the case before us there is nothing to show that the action of the directors in accumulating the surplus proceeded from any other motive than the good of the bank. Whether it was wise to accumulate all the earnings, instead of distributing part to the stockholders in dividends, was a question which rested in the discretion of the directors, and as to which we are called upon to express no opinion. The plaintiff, for some time, seems to have sanctioned that course. However, even if the course was continued against his opposition, there is nothing in the case before us which would give the court the right to interfere with the action of the directors.

## SALE OF NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES—IMPLIED WARRANTY.

Supreme Court of the United States, May 25, 1896.

MEYER, *et al.* vs. RICHARDS.

In the sale of negotiable securities, as in the sale of any other personal property, there is an implied warranty that the thing sold is what it purports to be.

Where both the vendor and vendee of negotiable bonds contemplate valid securities, of which there are many outstanding, and those delivered are void, not because of a want of power to enact the law under which they were issued, or because they are *ultra vires* for some other legal cause, but because they have been stricken with nullity by a constitutional provision adopted after the act authorizing the issue of the securities, there being nothing on their face to indicate their invalidity, there is a breach of the implied warranty of identity, and the vendor may recover.

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This was an action to recover the sum paid for certain bonds of the State of Louisiana sold by the defendant to the plaintiff. The bonds were part of what are known as "Consolidated Bonds" of the State of Louisiana. They had been held by the State Treasurer or trustee for two funds, viz.: The Mechanical and Agricultural College, and the Louisiana State University or Seminary fund; but by a constitutional provision it had been declared that the bonds of the State sold for the use of such funds should be null and void, and should be cancelled. Such bonds were not, however, cancelled by the Treasurer, but were fraudently issued by him. There was nothing on the face of the bonds to indicate their invalidity, and both parties dealt with them as though they were valid securities.

WHITE, J. (omitting part of the opinion): Both in England and in the United States the doctrine is universally recognized that, where commercial paper is sold without indorsement, or without express assumption of liability on the paper itself, the contract of sale, and the obligations which arise from it, as between vendor and vendee, are governed by the common law relating to the sale of goods and chattels. So, also, the undoubted rule is that, in such a sale, the obligation of the vendor is not restricted to the mere question of forgery *vel non*, but depends on whether he has delivered that which he contracted to sell, this rule being designated, in England, as a condition of the principal contract, as to the essence and substance of the thing agreed to be sold, and in this country being generally termed an implied warranty of identity of the thing sold.

[Here follows a review of numerous authorities both English and American.]

Nor is there any foundation for the assertion that *Otis vs. Cullum* (92 U. S. 447), and the cases of *Orleans vs. Platt* (99 U. S. 676) and *Insurance Co. vs. Middleport* (124 U. S. 534) both of which cite *Otis vs. Cullum*, support the doctrine that a sale of commercial paper without recourse is not, as between the vendor and vendee, governed by the ordinary rule of the common law.

On the contrary, that case expressly rested its conclusion on the decision in *Lamert vs. Heath*, *supra*, which latter case, as we have seen, while enforcing the principles of the common law, considered that, under the particular facts they presented, it was a question for the jury to determine whether the scrip delivered was the kind of scrip which the defendant had ordered purchased. That case not only, as has already been stated, concerned non-nego-

liable paper, but its decision involved no question of the scope of the warranty, but solely what was the thing bought.

Nor does the case of *Otis vs. Cullum* justify the assumption that this court laid down the rule that a mere sale of commercial paper, as between vendor and vendee, when the sale was made without recourse, created some peculiar and exceptional warranty to be considered in this particular as the law merchant.

It is true that, in expressing the general doctrine, Mr. Justice Swayne said: "The seller is liable *ex delicto* for bad faith, and *ex contractu* there is an implied warranty on his part that they belong to him, and are not forgeries. Where there is no express stipulation, there is no liability beyond this." But, in using this language, as to the extent of the warranty, the mind was directed to that form of non-existence which more commonly obtains, and the expression is a mere illustration of the rule, "*De eo quod plerumque fit.*" If this were a case where a vendee claimed to recover back the price paid by him on a purchase of negotiable securities, which pass by delivery from hand to hand, on the averment that, after the sale, it had developed that they were not valid, although not forgeries, because the law under which they had been issued was constitutionally void, or *ultra vires*, the claim of implied warranty of existence would be without merit, for the reason that such a state of fact would present a case of a sale of securities, whether valid or invalid, hence engendering no implication of warranty of existence. Under the state of facts thus supposed, the purpose of the parties to make a contract of that nature would legally result from the fact that they were both necessarily equally chargeable with notice of want of power, and therefore would be both presumed to have acted with reference to such knowledge.

This is *Otis vs. Cullum*. But it is not the case at bar, since it is here admitted that both parties, in entering into the contract of sale, contemplated valid securities, of which there were many outstanding, and those delivered were void, not because of a want of power to enact the law under which they were issued, or because they were *ultra vires* for some other legal cause, but because they were stricken with nullity by a constitutional provision adopted after the Act authorizing the issue of the securities, and where nothing on the face of the bonds indicated that they were illegal.

The distinction pointed out by the foregoing statement not only illustrates the correctness of the decision in *Otis vs. Cullum*, but also demonstrates the error of attempting to extend it to the state of facts presented in the case under consideration. Indeed, in examining and applying *Otis vs. Cullum*, the fact that it does not control a case like this has been recognized. (Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 734a; *Rogers vs. Walsh*, *supra*; *Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. vs. Citizens' Nat. Bank*, 24 Wkly. Law Bul. 198, 211.)

The foregoing analysis of the principles and review of the authorities governing the law of sale of negotiable paper, transferred without recourse as between vendor and vendee, clearly demonstrates the unsoundness of the positions upon which the defendant in error relies, since it affirmatively establishes that there is no peculiar warranty in a sale of commercial paper, and that the reasoning by which it is attempted to prove its existence is a mere misconception of the principles of the common law relating to the sale of goods and chattels.

In passing, however, it is worthy of note that, while the civil law enforces,

in the contract of sale, generally, the broadest obligation of warranty, it has so narrowed it, when dealing with credits and incorporeal rights, as to confine it to the title of the seller and to the existence of the credit sold; and *e converso*, the common law, which restricts warranty within a narrow compass, virtually imposes the same duty by broadening the warranty as regards personal property so as to impose the obligation on the vendor to deliver the thing sold as a condition of the principal contract, or by implication of warranty as to the identity of the thing sold. By these processes of reason the two great systems, while apparently divergent in principle, practically work substantially to the same salutary conclusions.

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**BANKING CORPORATION—ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS—BUSINESS OF MINING.**

Supreme Court of Colorado, March 16, 1896.

WESTON *vs.* ESTEY.

A banking corporation has no authority to enter into a contract for the working of mines.

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In this case one Jacob T. Long and others had negotiated a loan of \$50,000. from the Bank of Leadville, which was secured by a deed of trust upon certain mining property, which was the subject of this suit. Not being able to pay this loan when due, Long and his associates deeded the property to George Fisher, who was the Cashier of the bank, as trustee. This deed provided among other things that the trustee should operate the mines.

HOYT, C. J. (omitting part of the opinion): The defendant Weston claims title to this property, as we have seen, as the result of his attachment proceedings against the Bank of Leadville, but as the Bank of Leadville never held title to this property, but at best had a mere security thereon, we are unable to see how the defendant Weston obtained any title by reason of his suit against the bank. He cannot rely upon the claim that Fisher, in taking his title was acting for an undisclosed principal, to wit, the bank, for two reasons: First, because of the rule of law which requires the principal to adopt a contract in its entirety, if at all, which in this case would require the bank to adopt the agreement made by Fisher with the Longs and Derry, whereby he (Fisher) agreed to go into the mining business and work this property. It requires no argument to show that it is beyond the power of the bank to enter into a contract of this nature.

If banking institutions in this country were permitted to enter into the hazardous business of mining, there would be very little security for depositors. (Mills' Ann St. § 510; *Thomas vs. Railroad Co.* 101 U. S. 71; *Mor. Priv. Corp.* § 316; *Township of Taymouth vs. Koehler*, 35 Mich. 22; *Bray vs. Farwell*, 81 N. Y. 600; *Head vs. Insurance Co.* 2 Cranch, 127.)

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

WALTON, N. Y., July 27, 1896.

SIR:—A man makes an assignment and has to his credit, say, fifty dollars. We also have certain notes given by other parties which he left with us for collection. We have his habil-

ity upon certain notes as endorser and also his own notes as maker. Can we hold and apply the balance which he has in the bank and the notes which he has deposited for collection upon any indebtedness which he may owe to the bank? GEO. O. MEAD.

*Answer.*—It is well settled that the bank has a lien upon the bills and notes of its customer deposited for collection for any balance that may be due it. (*Cockrill vs. Joyce*, 52 BANKERS' MAGAZINE, p. 725.) And it is also well settled that the bank has a lien upon, or more properly speaking, a right of set-off against, his balance on his deposit account. (Pratt's Manual of Banking Law, 172-177 and cases cited.) If, therefore, the notes on which the depositor is liable had matured at the time of the assignment, the right of the bank to hold the proceeds of the collections and the balance of the account for the debt due to itself is clear. But the rule in this State appears to preclude such right where the assignment occurs before the maturity of the note. In *Fera vs. Wickham* (135 N. Y. 223, 229-30) the Court of Appeals laid down the rule as follows: "The right of set-off must attach at the time of the making of the assignment. It cannot arise afterwards, for the reason that the claim in favor of the estate has passed to the assignee, and to allow a set-off would be to the prejudice of other creditors. I think the principle to which we should adhere is this: When a party asks to have set off against a demand upon him by an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a claim against the insolvent estate, it will be allowed, provided his was a claim upon the estate due when the assignment was made; upon the ground that, by reason of the existence of cross-demands at the time of the assignment, which were due (or might have become due at the creditor's election), an equitable adjustment by set-off is made without interfering with the equities of others. But after the estate has passed to an assignee upon a trust to hold for and to distribute among creditors, the former and natural equity disappears in superior equities vesting in the general body of creditors. They are then interested in having equality of distribution, and if a creditor who, when the assignment was made, had no right to any offset, may be allowed it afterwards, he gains a preference. By the intervention of the rights of third persons, under the assignment, the equities change with the change in the situation of the original parties; to the misfortune of the creditor holding the demand against the insolvent estate, but, nevertheless, in accordance with equitable principles, as I deduce them from the decisions."

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

CORRIGANA, TEXAS, July 23, 1896.

SIR:—A check on the First National Bank of Ennis, drawn to the order of John Brown, is endorsed as follows: "John Brown by R. A. T.;" "Pay to the order of Ninth National Bank Ennis, Texas, for collection and account of Second National Bank, Dallas, Texas." This check is paid by the First National Bank of Ennis, and afterwards it is discovered that the first endorsement is fraudulent. Can the Second National Bank of Dallas be required to pay the amount of this check to the First National Bank of Ennis? If so, would the latter bank have to first bring suit against the Ninth National Bank? P. C. T.

*Answer.*—The general rule is that where the drawee bank has made payment upon a forged endorsement, it may recover the amount so paid as money paid under a mistake of fact. (*Canal Bank vs. Bank of Albany*, 1 Hill, 287, 290; *Bank of Commerce vs. Union Bank*, 3 N. Y. 230; *Redington vs. Woods*, 45 Cal. 406; *Onondaga County Savings Bank vs. United States*, 64 Fed. Rep. 703.) Usually the proper course is for the drawee bank to sue the bank to which it made payment. (*Canal Bank vs. Bank of Commerce*,



*supra.*) But in this case, as the endorsement of the Ninth National Bank gave notice that that bank was merely an agent for collection, it could not be held liable if the proceeds were paid over to its principal, the Second National Bank of Dallas, before it had notice of the fraudulent character of the endorsement. (*National Park Bank vs. Seaboard National Bank*, 114 N. Y. 28; *United States vs. Exchange National Bank*, 52 BANKERS' MAGAZINE, p. 33.) In such case, therefore, the action should be against the Second National Bank of Dallas. (*United States vs. Exchange National Bank, supra.*)

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PERRYVILLE, Mo., July 27, 1896.

SIR:—A borrows from us \$100 for ninety days and gives a joint note signed by B and C as sureties. The note is made on a blank form which is follows:

\$..... PERRYVILLE, Mo.....100  
 .....after date.....promise to  
 pay to the order of THE BANK OF PERRYVILLE.....  
 .....DOLLARS,

for value received. Payable at the BANK OF PERRYVILLE, in Perryville, Missouri, with interest from.....at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, and if the interest be not paid annually to become as principal and bear the same rate of interest. The drawers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and notice of protest on non-payment of this note. It is expressly agreed that in case this note is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, the makers of this note shall pay the further sum of ten per cent. of the principal and interest thereof remaining unpaid as attorney's fees and that the same may be included in any judgment rendered thereon.

When the note became due, A requested an extension of ninety days on the same note, saying he had the consent of the sureties to the extension. Upon these representations A is permitted to pay the usual discount for ninety days, and it is endorsed on the note as follows: "3-21-96. Discount paid to 6-21-96." By A paying said discount and securing a renewal of ninety days, does it relieve the sureties from liability on the note? After the note became due the second time, A had disappeared from his residence. B and C claim that they did not give their consent to a renewal.

THOMAS L. PHILLIPS, *Cashier.*

*Answer.*—The payment and receipt of the discount for the ninety days operated as a binding agreement to extend the time of payment, and if, in fact, made without their consent, discharged the sureties. (Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 1317, and cases there cited.) The representation of the maker that the sureties had given their consent could not bind them, as he could not be deemed their agent for that purpose.


*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SUN PRAIRIE, Wis., July 30, 1896.

SIR:—In what States is it lawful to take out of a payment made on a promissory note before the interest is due, the accrued interest on the whole of the principal up to the time such payment is made, in the absence of any such agreement?

J. M. S.

*Answer.*—We do not know of any rule or statute which would justify such a proceeding. In all of the States a bank may take the interest in advance when it makes a loan. But if the loan is made without the interest being so taken, and by the terms of the note the interest is to be paid at intervals, there is no authority to apply any payment made on the note to the discharge of interest not accrued.



## NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

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*THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION, HELD AT NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y., JULY 17 AND 18, 1896.*

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**N**IAGARA FALLS, famous the world over for its unsurpassed scenic attractions, is a most delightful place for holding conventions. Its hotel facilities are good and the many natural beauties, combined with the refreshing northern atmosphere, make it an especially suitable place in which to hold a mid-summer convention. To expatiate upon the great cataract itself would be to traverse a theme that

has engaged the attention of the world's great poets, writers and artists, all of whom have failed to describe or portray its sublimity and beauty.

Familiar as are New Yorkers with this great spectacle, it remains a source of perpetual interest, an object to be always contemplated with awe and wonder.

It is a pleasure to record that under the wise regulations put in force by the State, visitors are no longer subjected to the extortionate demands that in years past kept so many tourists away from the Falls. The State reservation includes the islands in the Niagara River, and many other points of interest which may now be visited without charge, while the fees for carriage hire have also been put under reasonable regulations. These are welcome changes that make Niagara Falls a most attractive place for recreation and pleasure.

But the success of the Third Annual Convention of the New York State Bankers' Association—for it was a success, both in point of attendance, in the general interest manifested and particularly in its social features—was not due alone to the pleasant surroundings, but was largely the result of the indefatigable labors of the committee of arrangements. Mr. Charles Adsit, of Hornellsville, chairman of the committee, was not only untiring in his endeavors to facilitate the business of the convention, but his resourceful and tactful management of the innumerable details added very materially to the comfort and pleasure of all the delegates and guests of the association.

The full committee of arrangements was as follows :

#### COMMITTEE OF ARRANGEMENTS.

Charles Adsit, Chairman, Hornellsville,  
A. D. Bissell, Buffalo.  
Wm. J. Ashley, Rochester.  
John B. Weber, Buffalo.

Geo. J. Howard, Niagara Falls.  
F. E. Johnson, Niagara Falls.  
Arthur Schoellkopf, Niagara Falls.  
Geo. J. Shepard, Niagara Falls.

David Isaacs, Niagara Falls.

The labors of the committee were lightened by the co-operation of the bankers of Niagara Falls, who did all in their power to aid in making their visitors welcome and to promote the success of the convention, an effort in which they thoroughly succeeded. Nor must the Buffalo bankers be forgotten. They kept open house, and contributed in many ways to make the meeting remarkable for the spirit of genial fellowship which is taking such an increased hold of the banking fraternity of the Empire State. Buffalo is one of the most important commercial centres of the country, and her bankers are progressive and they have been one of the leading factors in developing the city's commerce. This development is still going on rapidly, but on the most enduring basis, under the guidance of these wise and able financiers.

With the increase in the attendance of ladies the social part of the conventions is becoming more of a distinguishing feature, and in this respect the Niagara Falls meeting was particularly noteworthy. A special entertainment had been provided for them, consisting of a recital by Mrs. Waldo Richards and orchestral music.

An opportunity for general conversation and introductions was given by the "Introduction Smoker," held in the dining-room on Friday evening. Ample refreshments were served, but there was no formal banquet, and the occasion was the more enjoyable for the absence of the usual conventionalities.

During the convention an opportunity was given the visitors to inspect the many points of interest about the Falls, the appliances by which the vast force of the cataract is used in producing electrical power coming in for an especial share of attention.

The papers and addresses read were all home products. Most of them dealt with every-day banking topics, and the several themes were treated in a business-



OFFICERS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION, 1896-'97.

like way and from the standpoint of experience. No material abridgement of any of the papers has been made, and they may be read in the following pages of the MAGAZINE with pleasure and profit by all who are interested in banking subjects.

No commendation is too high for the ground taken by the association in regard to the pending struggle to maintain the existing money standard. It has been suggested that the free coinage of silver would enable the New York Savings banks to pay off their deposits in money about half as valuable as that which they received from their depositors. This led a conspicuous organ of free silver, published in Denver, to ask why, if they could pay their depositors in cheap dollars and thus make a big profit, they did not take advantage of this opportunity to make money! It is almost needless to say that the paper referred to has no conception whatever of the nature of the Savings banks of New York, which hold the deposits of the poor as a sacred trust, bound by every principle of honor to return as good money as they receive. Besides the affairs of these banks are administered by trustees; there are no stockholders, and the total assets, including the surplus, are the property of the depositors. Without making any invidious distinctions, it may be said that the Savings banks of New York are as honestly managed as any banks in the world, and their trustees and officers would scorn a suggestion to defraud the poor by receiving from them dollars of the intrinsic worth of one hundred cents and paying them in money only half as valuable.

All of this applies with equal force to the discount and deposit banks of the State. Although debtors to the public to a large extent, they believe in sticking to their contracts. The resolutions constitute a platform on which every honest citizen should take his stand in the campaign now pending.

It is to be noted that under the constitution of the New York State Bankers' Association no president or vice-president shall succeed himself in office. It is also an unwritten law of the association that all of the executive officers shall be ineligible for re-election, and that they shall not be chosen to any other office until at least one year has elapsed from the expiration of their respective terms of office, thus providing for a new executive board chosen each year from the ranks of the association. The organization is democratic and entirely free from the control of any clique or faction. By the terms of a resolution adopted at the Niagara Falls convention each group will hereafter have the privilege of proposing one of their number to be voted on for the several offices to be filled.

The wisdom of the group plan of organization has been shown by its practical workings. It has especially prevented the smaller banks from being overshadowed in the organization by those of larger capital. By means of the group plan the banker, as an individual, has been able to make his influence known and felt.

No doubt the New York State Bankers' Association is to exercise a constantly increasing power for good throughout the State, and the group system will be one of the chief elements in extending a feeling of local comity between the banks and the people in the various localities.

On the preceding page will be found portraits of the newly-chosen officers of the New York State Bankers' Association, made expressly for the BANKERS' MAGAZINE. Brief sketches of the lives of the several officers accompany the illustrations.

A summary of the work done by the various groups throughout the past year is also presented, showing the topics that have engaged the attention of the bankers and the trend of opinion in relation to the proposed reforms in banking customs, such as collections, credits, etc. Accompanying this review of the group meetings will be found portraits of the chairmen and an outline of their business careers. Altogether the account of the proceedings and the special features preceding this report form the most complete record of the work of the association ever published.

SEYMOUR DEXTER, *President.*

SEYMOUR DEXTER was born at Independence, N. Y., March 20, 1841; served in the Union army, 1861-68; graduated at Alfred University in 1864; studied law at Elmira, and was admitted to the bar in 1866; married Eleanor E. Weaver of Leonardsville, N. Y., June 17, 1868; was city attorney of Elmira in 1872, member of the Assembly in 1878, and Judge of the County Court of Chemung County, 1878-80; has been President of the Second National Bank of Elmira since 1889.

This is a brief outline of the personal history of the new President of the New York State Bankers' Association.

Judge Dexter has achieved an honorable reputation as a lawyer, a jurist and a financier. His career has been that of the American boy not unduly favored with opportunities, but endowed with a firm will and noble aspirations. Judge Dexter traces his ancestry to the Rev. Gregory Dexter, who came over to the Providence Plantation with Roger Williams.

After attending district schools, young Dexter entered Alfred Academy, and was there fitted to enter Alfred University. He was a student in the latter institution at the time of the firing on Fort Sumter. That event stirred his youthful patriotism, and he laid aside his books, to enlist as a private in Company K, 23d New York volunteers. He gave two full years to the service of his country, and after he was mustered out resumed his college work and graduated in 1864.

In the fall of that year he took up his residence in Elmira, where he entered the law office of James L. Wood, pursuing his legal studies there till admitted to the bar. After spending a year as managing clerk in a law office, he formed a partnership with Robert T. Turner, to which E. C. Van Duzer was subsequently admitted. The firm of Turner, Dexter and Van Duzer soon commanded a lucrative practice, and won a high reputation in legal circles. In the spring of 1872 Mr. Dexter was appointed city attorney. In the fall of the same year he was elected a member of the Assembly by the Republican party, with which he has always been affiliated. He was the only Republican elected from Chemung county during a period of sixteen years. Judge Dexter had now gained both the esteem of the bar and the confidence of the people, as was further evinced by his election as county judge for two terms of six years each. His career in this office added to his reputation for diligence, learning and uprightness.

In 1889, before the expiration of his second term, Judge Dexter resigned from the bench to become President and active manager of the Second National Bank, Elmira, a position that he still occupies. His retirement from the bench was made the occasion of a banquet in his honor by his professional brethren, at which resolutions were passed testifying to his standing as a lawyer and a judge.

In the field of banking and finance Judge Dexter has also distinguished himself. His management of the affairs of the Second National Bank has been marked by prudence and firmness. Since he became active in the bank's management its resources have increased from \$623,839 to \$1,272,679, and the individual deposits from \$226,000 to \$696,000. This was not his first experience in the management of financial institutions, for he had been President of the Chemung Valley Mutual Loan Association since its organization in 1875. In the administration of that institution he developed a deep interest in the theory and practice of this form of co-operation, and the results of his studies were given to the public in a volume on co-operative savings and loan associations, published by the Appletons in 1889. This book has had great influence in the spread of these associations on a sound basis throughout the United States. On the formation of the New York State League of Co-operative Savings and Building Loan Associations, Judge Dexter was

chosen a vice-president; and he was elected president in 1890 and 1891. He was the leading spirit in the organization of the United States League of Local Building and Loan Associations, and was president for two years. He had the further distinction of proposing the motto of the League: "The American Home, the Safeguard of American Liberties."

Judge Dexter is a thorough student of political and social science, and has read papers before the American Economic Association and the American Social Science Association. His address before the latter society on "Compulsory Arbitration" received the approval of men competent to judge the value of its arguments.

Judge Dexter is active in religious work in Elmira, and is a charter member of Baldwin Post, G. A. R., and has been Judge-Advocate of the State Department, and is still prominent in the organization.

#### STEPHEN M. GRISWOLD, *Vice-President.*

STEPHEN M. GRISWOLD, was born at Windsor, Connecticut, in 1835, and when sixteen years of age came to New York, where he has been engaged in the jewelry and diamond business for over forty years. His home is in Brooklyn, where he was twice elected a member of the Board of Aldermen, and has served two terms in the State Senate.

Senator Griswold has been a member of the Republican party ever since the party has existed. He is a member of the Society of Old Brooklynites and of the Montauk Club of Brooklyn.

Senator Griswold was elected President of the Union Bank of Brooklyn at the time of its organization in 1898. He has taken an active part in the work of Group VIII., of which he is chairman.

Prominent in politics, banking and business, the new vice-president will add force and dignity to the executive staff of the New York State Bankers' Association. A portrait of Senator Griswold is presented on page 151.

#### CHARLES F. VAN INWEGEN, *Treasurer.*

CHARLES F. VAN INWEGEN was born September 18, 1849. He was graduated from Rutgers College in 1871, and was the valedictorian of his class.

On June 6, 1876, he was married to Miss Emma L. Van Etten, member of a well-known family. Mr. and Mrs. Van Inwegen have four children—one daughter and three sons.

Mr. Van Inwegen is Cashier of the First National Bank, Port Jervis, N. Y., which makes a strong report for a country bank, showing resources of \$762,400 and individual deposits of \$451,800.

Though deeply engrossed in the affairs of his bank, Mr. Van Inwegen responds to all reasonable demands of other business and social duties, and is a member of the Deerpark Club, of Port Jervis, the Holland Society, of New York, and the D. K. E. and Phi Beta Kappa college societies. That he is held in high regard locally may be judged from the fact that he is a trustee of the Masonic Lodge of Port Jervis, and has served as supervisor of the town, treasurer of the village and school district, a member of the board of education, board of health and president of the Democratic club.

As secretary of Group VII. of the New York State Bankers' Association, he has done faithful service in advancing the work of the organization. His connection with the First National Bank of Port Jervis dates from 1871, and since 1874 he has been its Cashier.

Mr. Van Inwegen is popular in banking and general business circles, and will make an efficient treasurer.

JOHN A. KENNEDY, *Secretary.*

JOHN A. KENNEDY, the new Secretary of the New York State Bankers' Association, is a substantial figure in Buffalo financial circles. He is Cashier of the Niagara Bank, a thriving institution, which has progressed from a small beginning as a suburban bank, situated at Black Rock, to a business of large proportions now conducted in splendid quarters in the new Ellicott Square. For the prosperity which has attended this bank much credit belongs to Mr. Kennedy, whose judgment and acuteness have worked out this success during a period of unsettled financial conditions.

Mr. Kennedy was born on a farm near the village of Springfield, Ontario, forty years ago, and his early life ran the familiar course—country schools, town groceries and the simple career which has made the beginning of many leading business men of to-day.

To fill out the limited school opportunities which had been his he took a course at the Rochester Business University under Prof. L. L. Williams and his brother, Hon. O. F. Williams, late consul to Havre, France. He made such progress under these teachers that a few months later, in September, 1874, he was appointed teacher in the commercial department of the Lyons Union School and Academy. While there he received an appointment as clerk in the Hamilton Provident and Loan Society, of Hamilton, Canada. Here he made the acquaintance of Hon. Frank Leland, United States Consul at Hamilton, and when Mr. Leland's term expired in 1883, he returned to Wisconsin and organized the First National Bank of Lake Geneva, and offered the cashiership to Mr. Kennedy. The offer was accepted and Mr. Kennedy remained in Wisconsin until the spring of 1889 when he went west as far as Seattle, intending to embark in business, but seeing everywhere the earmarks of boom, he decided to return east. During this time he declined three cashierships. In July, 1889, he returned to Buffalo and accepted a place as collection clerk in the People's Bank under Cashier Clarence W. Hammond. He was rapidly promoted, serving in almost every capacity in the bank, and at the end of two years he was appointed clerk to the officers.

In April, 1893, there was a vacancy in the cashiership of the Niagara Bank, and in casting around for a man, President P. H. Griffin selected Mr. Kennedy as the most available stock. The directors of the bank endorsed him for the place. During Mr. Kennedy's connection with the bank it has moved from its small quarters to the banking floor of Ellicott Square, where it occupies half the Main street front.

Mr. Kennedy has made a special study of the subject of bank examinations, and has developed some highly practicable and valuable ideas in this line.

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GROUP I.

*Comprising the Counties of Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Niagara, Orleans and Wyoming.*

This territory embraces the extreme western portion of the State and includes Buffalo, the largest city outside of New York and Brooklyn.

Energetic work has been done by the officers and members toward bringing all the banks into the organization, and these efforts have borne fruit, as there are only eighteen banks that remain outside the association.

In the discussion of the matter of establishing a system of clearing country



checks, some of the country banks in Group I. have felt that an arrangement of this kind might interfere with one of their legitimate sources of profit. The payment of interests on deposits has been discussed and there has been a gen-



John B. Weber, Chairman.

eral desire to avoid paying any but circumstances have not made it feasible to do this. An important factor was the interest paid by Savings banks, and there have been conferences in regard to a change in the interest rates paid by this class of banks.

Among the other topics discussed were those in regard to cashing express money orders and how to avoid the loss incident to this custom, and the propriety of having a special bank examiner for each group. Resolutions were also passed favoring a currency commission and advocating the cancellation of the greenbacks.

A. D. Bissell, former chairman of the group, and Vice-President of the People's Bank, of Buffalo, has been one of the powerful forces in building up Group I to a position commensurate to its bank: igh importance.

Socially the meetings have been most pleasant, and the discussions and papers have brought out many valued ideas.

W. C. Cornwell, who was the first President of the New York State Bankers' Association, and who has contributed many sound and practical facts and opinions to the literature of currency and banking, is one of the active members of the group.

There are eighty-one banks in the group territory, of which sixty-three are members. The banking capital of the group is \$7,688,300 and the surplus \$5,203,000.

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JOHN B. WEBER, Chairman of Group I., was born September 21, 1842, at Buffalo, N. Y.; enlisted in the Union Army as a private soldier August, 1861; served in all the minor positions, non-commissioned and commissioned, and became Colonel of the 89th Reg. U. S. Col'd Infantry, September 19, 1863. After the war he was Assistant Postmaster at Buffalo in 1870 to 1873, inclusive, and was Sheriff of Erie County from 1874 to 1876. He also served two terms as Representative in Congress. from 1885 to 1889. Mr. Weber was appointed Commissioner of Immigration at the port of New York by President Harrison, and while in this position was sent to Europe at the head of a commission to make an investigation into the sources and causes of immigration. He has been Cashier of the American Exchange Bank of Buffalo since April, 1894.

In the many important political positions in which he has been placed Mr. Weber has shown marked ability, and his long executive training and sound qualities place him in the ranks of the most progressive bank officers.

The American Exchange Bank was organized in 1853, and now has a paid-in capital of \$200,000 and \$100,000 surplus.

## GROUP II.

*Comprising the counties of Livingston, Monroe, Ontario, Seneca, Wayne and Yates.*

Directly north of Group III. and west of Group I. lies Group II., its most important centre being Rochester. Other towns and cities of considerable size are also included in the territory. All but seven of the banks in the group are members, indicating a thorough appreciation of the actual benefits to be derived from the organization.

Not only is the proportion of members to the number of banks very large but there is also a lively interest shown in the meetings, and on the whole the condition of the group is highly satisfactory.

Two meetings have been held since the previous annual State convention.

It is admitted by some of the thoughtful bankers of this group that here, too, circumstances compel the banks to pay too high a rate of interest. This is partly due to the competition of the Savings banks, which have a fixed rate that is higher than the discount banks should pay; but care is taken not to offer excessive rates, and the banks of the group keep the rate down as low as is consistent with securing a fair share of business while maintaining sound banking principles.

This group has adopted the system of uniform statements and has also done some good work in behalf of a stable money standard.

At the June meeting, held at Rochester on the 10th of that month, there was an excursion to Ontario Beach, a dinner at the Genesee Valley Club, and addresses by Bank Superintendent Kilburn and Dr. D. J. Hill, President of the University of Rochester.

There are forty banks in the group and thirty-three members. Banking capital of the group, \$3,990,000; surplus, \$2,512,000.



Norman H. Becker, Chairman.

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NORMAN H. BECKER, Chairman of Group II., was born in the town of Fayette, Seneca Co., N. Y., October 31, 1842, and received his early education in the public schools of his native place. At the age of fifteen he entered as a freshman at Hamilton College, and graduated with his class as one of the "honor men" in 1862. During the three following years he was engaged as teacher in the Whitestown Seminary.

His residence at Seneca Falls dates back over thirty years, to 1865.

In May of that year he came to Seneca Falls and assisted in the organization of the National Exchange Bank of that village, and was its first teller. About a year later he became its Cashier, and from that time had practically the entire management thereof, until the expiration of its charter in 1885, at which time the present institution, known as the Exchange National Bank, was organized, of which he is

now a director, the largest stockholder, and the executive officer. The bank is an important institution with capital, surplus and profits of \$195,000.

As a banker Mr. Becker is judicious and careful. He has taken a deep personal interest in the affairs of his group and has done much to enlarge its membership, as well as to forward the practical work of the association.

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### GROUP III.

*Comprising the counties of Allegany, Broome, Chemung, Schuyler, Steuben, Tioga and Tompkins.*

Chairman Dexter, of this group, has just been promoted to the presidency. The effective work done by him and the secretary of the group, Charles Adsit, is shown by the fact that practically all the banks in the territory have been brought into the association.

There has been some discussion as to the plan for a clearing-house for country checks, but the matter is in abeyance. The questions of interest on deposits, and in regard to express money orders have not occupied much attention in the proceedings. There is a general approbation of the group plan of organization, and it is believed that a much greater sphere of public usefulness is opening for the banks by reason of it.

Group III. does not have a set place for its meetings, but meets alternately at various places, including Elmira, Binghamton, Hornellsville, Wellsville and Ithaca.

Among the topics discussed at the various meetings have been the "Bankers' Relation to the Community," by J. W. Manier, President of the Susquehanna Valley Bank, of Binghamton, and "The Relation of Banks to the Government," by G. R. Williams, President First National Bank, Ithaca.

Charles Adsit, the secretary of Group III., and Cashier of the First National Bank of Hornellsville, has done much important work in increasing the membership and promoting general interest in the association, both in his own group and throughout the State.

There are forty-two banks in the group, all but seven being members. Banking capital of the group, \$2,975,000; surplus, \$1,972,000.

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SEYMOUR DEXTER, Chairman of Group III., has been honored by promotion to the presidency of the State association.

An appropriate outline of Judge Dexter's banking career, accompanied by his portrait, will be found in the sketches of the officers of the association, in the preceding pages.

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### GROUP IV.

*Comprising the counties of Cayuga, Cortland, Madison, Onondaga, Oswego and Jefferson.*

Syracuse, Oswego and several other cities and towns of commercial importance are embraced in the group.

In the matter of uniform statements and a clearing-house for country checks, there does not seem to be complete agreement, the former being regarded by many as too much of an innovation. This objection was made by the country bankers especially. It is conceded by most of the members that the problem of

properly handling country checks is one of great moment, but the difficulties in the way of any present solution seem to be insurmountable.

James G. Cannon, Vice-President of the Fourth National Bank of New York, Hon. Ellis H. Roberts, President of the Franklin National Bank of New York, and Bradford Rhodes, editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, have addressed the group meetings and have been most cordially received.

Senator Sloan, President of the Second National Bank of Oswego, who declined the nomination for president of the State association, is one of the active workers of the group and prominent both in banking and politics.

"Charges for Check-Books," "Charges for New York Drafts and for Country Checks," have been discussed, also amount of balance to regulate line of discount.

General interest in the meetings of the group is manifested.

Thirty-nine of the fifty-one banks in the group are members. The banking capital of Group IV. is \$4,435,940 and the surplus, \$2,584,000.



Anthony Lamb, Chairman.

**ANTHONY LAMB**, Chairman of Group IV., was born at Norwich, Chenango county, New York, January 19, 1847. He was educated at the academy of his native town, and was prepared to enter the sophomore class at Yale College, but his mind having been diverted by the attractions of a business career, he went to Syracuse January 1, 1866, and entered the Syracuse City Bank as messenger. He was soon advanced from one position to another, and when the bank surrendered its charter and went into voluntary liquidation four years afterwards (its President having been elected President of the People's Savings Bank, just organized under a special charter), he was its Acting Cashier. He then entered the People's Savings Bank as receiving teller, and was soon after advanced to paying teller, which position he held for about four years, when he became connected with the firm of Smith & Powell, the well-known nurserymen and livestockmen of Syracuse, as their financial manager. He was connected with this firm for eighteen years in various capacities, the last six years as partner under the firm name of Smith, Powell & Lamb.

When the Commercial Bank was organized in May, 1891, Mr. Lamb was induced to become its Cashier, and three years afterwards was elected one of its directors.

Although only five years have elapsed since this bank was organized, it is already recognized as one of the soundest, most popular and successful institutions in Syracuse. Notwithstanding most of this time has been fraught with great disaster to business interests in general, and they are still struggling against unfavorable conditions on all sides, this bank has paid six per cent. dividends since the second year of its existence, and laid aside a surplus of \$50,000.

Mr. Lamb is also treasurer of the Empire Savings and Loan Association, and the Homeopathic Hospital, and a director in the Syracuse and Lakeside Traction Company.

## GROUP V.

*Comprising the counties of Chenango, Delaware, Fulton, Herkimer, Lewis, Montgomery, Oneida, Otsego and St. Lawrence.*

Some difficulty has been experienced in arousing the banks of this group to the importance of the work being done by the association, but the interest is growing and the membership now comprises more than half the banks in the group.



D. A. Avery, Chairman.

There are some large counties in this territory and the means of communication in them not so good as generally prevail in most of the groups, which doubtless explains the fact that so many banks yet remain non-members.

In the discussion of the proposed clearing-house for country checks considerable interest has been shown, and several valuable ideas brought out.

The manner of handling the accounts of country banks, accepting checks at par, and making any profit out of the accounts, is a perplexing problem. It is evident that the true basis upon which to estimate the value of the depositor's account is the average actual available balance remaining with the bank, over the reserve required, which can be loaned out for the benefit of the reserve agent.

A logical solution of this problem is considered, by some of the writers on the subject, to be a reasonable charge for the collection of all foreign items. The one thing essential is to secure general co-operation, without which any plan must fail.

Of seventy-eight banks in the group forty-two are members. Banking capital of the group, \$8,098,000; surplus, \$4,935,000.

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D. A. AVERY, Chairman of Group V., is a descendant of the Averys, of Groton, Connecticut, although Mr. Avery himself was born at Burlington, Otsego county, New York.

His fellow-citizens have twice honored him with important public offices, he having been county clerk of Otsego county for three years and county treasurer for the same length of time.

Mr. Avery has attained his majority as a banker, his services in this branch of business extending over twenty-one years, twelve of which were spent in the Second National Bank, of Cooperstown, where he was successively bookkeeper, teller and Cashier. For the past nine years Mr. Avery has been Cashier of the Second National Bank, of Utica. This is a strong bank, being a Government depository, and has a combined capital and surplus of \$400,000.

Mr. Avery is devoted especially to the banking business, to which so large a part of his life work has been given. He has been a strong supporter of the New York State Bankers' Association, and has freely given the results of his experience

and research in aid of the practical work sought to be done by the group of which he is chairman. The bank with which he is identified, and whose progress has been advanced by his long experience and capability, ranks high among the banks located in the interior of the State.

## GROUP VI.

*Comprising the counties of Albany, Clinton, Columbia, Essex, Franklin, Genesee, Renasselaer, Saratoga, Schenectady, Schoharie, Warren and Washington.*

The district included in this group comprises the eastern counties, and extends to the northern boundary of the State. Within the territory are the Adirondack Mountains, the Catskills, Saratoga Springs and the State capital.

At one of the meetings a resolution was passed stating that in the opinion of the members of the group, it was inexpedient for them to co-operate in a movement for establishing a clearing-house for clearing country checks.

In speaking on this subject at one of the meetings, the chairman related the following experience of his bank:

"We have an account with the largest concern in the United States and they bring in deposits every day, checks from thirteen to twenty States or Territories in the Union. This one, I was going to speak of, was a check for a Cellar Company on a little bank in the State of Kentucky. We sent it out to this little bank for collection and they charged us twenty-five cents for collection and gave us a check on their bank. We sent it to Louisville for collection and they charged us twenty-five cents and sent us their draft on Detroit. We sent to Detroit and they charged us twenty-five cents and gave us a draft on Chicago, and finally we got our pay in New York, after three weeks in getting it and paying twenty-five cents to each bank."

Express orders, special examiners, restrictive endorsements and credits have been among the subjects discussed.

Addresses have been made by Hon. A. B. Hepburn, Ex-Comptroller of the Currency and President of the Third National Bank, New York, and by Hon. Stephen M. Griswold, President of the Union Bank, Brooklyn, and now Vice-President of the New York State Bankers' Association.

There are seventy-three banks in the group and fifty members. Banking capital of the group \$6,863,400; surplus, \$4,977,000.



William Kemp, Chairman.

WILLIAM KEMP, Chairman of Group VI., was born in Troy, N. Y., January 14, 1829. He has always resided there, and is to-day one of the foremost business men of the city. He served in the late rebellion, holding the position of paymaster of the Second Regiment, which was mustered into service at Troy. In 1865 he was appointed a member of the board of education and from 1860 to 1871 served as president.

Mr. Kemp represented the fourth ward in the common council two years and from 1873-75 was honored with the office of mayor.

Mr. Kemp's banking career dates back to May 3, 1865, when he was elected a director of the Mutual National Bank, of Troy. He was chosen Vice-President, January 12, 1876 and since July 17, 1878, has held the position of President.

Mr. Kemp is a trustee of the Troy Orphan Asylum, the Emma Willard School, and since 1868 has been on the board of trustees of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He is also vice-president of the Troy Gas Co., a director of the Citizens' Steamboat Co. and a director of the Troy City Railway Co.

The bank of which Mr. Kemp is President—the Mutual National—has \$250,000 capital, \$175,000 surplus and \$37,000 undivided profits, and is a strong and well managed corporation.

#### GROUP VII.

*Comprising the counties of Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster and Westchester.*

This group is contiguous to New York city and frequently holds its meetings there; one meeting has been held at Poughkeepsie.

During the year addresses have been made before the group by James G. Cannon on the "Ratios Between the Lines of Discounts and Deposits;" by Hon. Joseph C. Hendrix, President of the National Union Bank, New York, on the work of the American Bankers' Association in the prevention of bank forgeries; and by Hon. Charles N. Fowler, member of Congress from New Jersey, on the principles to be kept in view in reforming the currency.



Bradford Rhodes, Chairman.

The mid-summer meeting of the group was held at the Grand Hotel, in the Catskill Mountains, on June 26 and 27. It was through the courtesy of Mr. S. D. Coykendall, President of the First National Bank of Rondout, at Kingston, that the group was permitted to meet at such an attractive place. Members of the association, together with their friends, to the number of one hundred and twenty-five, were the guests of Mr. Coykendall, who entertained them most liberally. Many ladies were present at this meeting, and from a social standpoint especially, and the pleasure which the bankers and their friends derived from their stay at the charming mountain resort, it was the most agreeable meeting the group has had. Its success was very largely due to the thoughtful provision made for the comfort of his guests by Mr. Coykendall.

Ex-Chairman C. A. Pugsley, Cashier of the Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill, has devoted considerable time to work in behalf of the group.

Group VII. has been firm for the gold standard and urged a courageous course on this question by the political parties. The meetings of the group are always well attended and the banks within its territory have in many ways been benefited through the instrumentality of the association.

Hon. Ellis H. Roberts, President of the Franklin National Bank, New York, has been one of the speakers at a group meeting.

Opinion in regard to a clearing-house for country checks appears to be adverse. Seven counties comprise the territory of Group VII., and in one county—Westchester—every bank is a member of the group. The total membership is forty-two. Banking capital of the group, \$4,265,650; surplus, \$2,278,000.

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BRADFORD RHODES, Chairman of Group VII., was born in Beaver county, Pennsylvania, February 25, 1849. He graduated from the Beaver Academy, and was for a time principal of the Darlington Academy, in Western Pennsylvania.

In 1864, when under sixteen years of age, he enlisted in the 184th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and passed the physical examination, but the mustering officer would not swear him in on account of his youthful look.

In 1872 Mr. Rhodes came to New York, where he secured employment in newspaper work. For a time he was connected with the "Daily Bulletin," and later began the publication of "The Safeguard," devoted to the interests of Savings bank depositors. This publication was successful, and in 1877 its form was improved and enlarged and the name changed to RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING. In July of last year Mr. Rhodes purchased the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, the oldest banking publication in the country, and consolidated the two periodicals. The firm of Bradford Rhodes & Co. also publish other works devoted to the interests of bankers.

Politically his affiliations have been with the Republican party, which has honored him with three consecutive elections to the Assembly of New York, in 1888, 1889 and 1890. His Assembly district—the Second, of Westchester county—is normally Democratic on the State and national tickets.

As Chairman of the Committee on Banking, he was influential in securing the enactment of some important amendments to the banking law, and also introduced and secured the passage of the anti-bucket-shop law.

In 1892 he received the unanimous nomination for Congress in the Sixteenth Congressional District but declined the honor owing to his inability, on account of increasing business, to give the office proper attention.

Mr. Rhodes resides on a farm near Mamaroneck, Westchester county, where he is President of the Mamaroneck Bank and the Union Savings Bank. He takes an active interest in the management of both institutions. The former bank was organized about four years ago—in September, 1892—and the measure of its success is indicated by the fact that the stock is now worth 155. The Union Savings Bank was incorporated in 1887, and it is largely used as a depository for savings by the working people of the neighborhood. Its depositors now number over eleven hundred.

He is a member of the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association, and has several times presented papers at the conventions of that organization. Though very actively engaged in business, he is deeply interested in the work of Group VII., and takes pride in the fact that all the banks in his county are members.

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#### GROUP VIII.

*Comprising the counties of Kings, Queens and Suffolk.*

The territory of this group is bounded by water, but the enthusiasm of the members is unbounded. In point of practical work done and enjoyable social gathering the group stands well to the front. It has also furnished a vice-president to the State association—Senator Griswold, of Brooklyn.

A method of clearing country checks is already in operation in Brooklyn, a des-



cription of which will be found in the report of the proceedings published in the pages following. This plan is independent of the group, however, as no definite action has been taken by that body, although the matter has been fully discussed.

A very live subject that has been considered here is the equalization of the taxes of banks and trust companies. Some of the banks find it difficult to compete with the trust companies in certain lines, and it is contended that taxation is not always equal for the same kinds of business. The matter of a central agency for the collection and exchange of information has also been considered by the group.

Commercially the territory in this group is second only to that of the New York group, and its real banking importance is hardly indicated by the banking capital, the trust company business being especially large.

President Cannon, ex-President Cornwell and Bradford Rhodes have addressed the group meetings.

There are forty-seven banks in the group, and the energy of the work done is shown by the fact that all but seven of them have been brought into the association.

Banking capital of the group, \$4,982,000; surplus, \$5,210,000.

STEPHEN M. GRISWOLD, Chairman of Group VIII., has been justly promoted to the position of Vice-President of the New York State Bankers' Association. An outline of his business and banking career, together with a portrait, appears with the portraits and sketches of the officers of the association, on the preceding pages.

## GROUP IX.

*Comprising the counties of New York and Richmond.*

This group has the greatest banking capital of any in the State, and includes the city of New York, the commercial capital of the Western Hemisphere, and the central clearing point for the banks of the United States.



A. B. Hepburn, Chairman.

There has developed, since the organization of the group, a greater appreciation of more intimate relations between the banks, as it has been found that by an exchange of information much loss can be avoided. A case in point occurred where one of the active members, by investigation, found that a customer had accounts with six different banks, each one of which supposed it was the sole custodian of his funds and the only dispenser of credit to him. Similar exchanges of information along this and other lines result in preventing many unsafe loans.

At the meeting of Group IX, held at the Clearing-House in New York on April 18, the subject of clearing-house methods was most ably discussed, managers or representatives of the clearing-houses of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago and Baltimore being present. They described at length the system of clearings in use in the respective cities. Their addresses were printed in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE for May, page 578.

The meetings have been valuable from a business standpoint and have also furnished a suitable opportunity for the bankers of the city to become better acquainted.

There are ninety-eight banks in the group and eighty-nine members. Banking capital of the group, \$57,275,000; surplus, \$64,829,000.

**ALONZO BARTON HEPBURN**, ex-Comptroller of the Currency and President of the Third National Bank, of New York, was born in Colton, N. Y., July 24, 1846.

Mr. Hepburn entered Middlebury College in the class of 1871. His first public office was that of School Commissioner in St. Lawrence county, which position he held for three and one-half years, resigning to take his seat in the New York Assembly, January 1, 1875. He was re-elected for five successive years, during which period he served on the Committees on Railroads, Insurance, Judiciary, Ways and Means, and other important committees, devoting his attention to commercial and financial interests rather than politics. He introduced, among other important measures, and secured the passage of the law making life insurance policies non-forfeitable after the payment of three annual premiums, and requiring the companies upon application to issue paid-up insurance to an amount which the surrender value of the policy would purchase at regular rates.

He was Chairman of the Railroad Investigation Commission, created at the instance of the Chamber of Commerce, of the City of New York, took over six thousand pages of testimony, and reported to the Legislature several important measures which became laws—among them the Act creating the present Railroad Commission, an Act regulating the use of proxies, and an Act defining and regulating annual reports, compelling a continuous balance-sheet. Prior to this Act the railroad reports had been a source of confusion rather than of information to an investigator.

In April, 1880, he was appointed Superintendent of the Banking Department of the State of New York, and held the position something over three years. The Savings banks, trust companies and State banks enjoyed a marked degree of prosperity during Mr. Hepburn's administration, evidenced by increase of resources, reserve and surplus profits, and number of institutions reporting. There was no failure of any institution in New York city or Brooklyn, no trust company or Savings bank, and only two discount banks of minor importance.

In June, 1889, he was appointed National Bank Examiner for the cities of New York and Brooklyn by Comptroller Lacey and the late Secretary Windom, from which position he was promoted by President Harrison to be Comptroller of the Currency. As bank examiner he was discreet as well as thorough. Mr. Hepburn resigned as Comptroller upon the advent of the Cleveland administration, and became President of the Third National Bank, of New York city. Largely increased deposits, additional volume of business and general progress attest the efficiency of his administration as President.

#### DETAILED REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The third annual meeting of the New York State Bankers' Association was called to order at 10 o'clock A. M. on Friday, July 17, at the International Hotel, Niagara Falls, President James G. Cannon in the chair.

A list of those registered at the convention follows:

**JAMES G. CANNON**, Vice-President Fourth National Bank, New York.

**LEDYARD COGSWELL**, Vice-President New York State National Bank, Albany.

**CHARLES ADSEIT**, Cashier First National Bank, Hornellsville.

**A. J. BARNES**, Cashier City Bank, Buffalo.

**JOHN A. KENNEDY**, Cashier Niagara Bank, Buffalo.

**JOHN PULLMAN**, director Union Bank, Brooklyn.

EDWARD WELLS, Cashier People's Bank, Johnstown.  
 CHARLES N. HARRIS, Cashier Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank, Gloversville.  
 H. G. MOE, Cashier First National Bank, Groton.  
 S. G. NELSON, Vice-President Seaboard National Bank, New York.  
 WILLIAM KEMP, President Mutual National Bank, Troy.  
 ARTHUR SCHOELLKOPF, President Power City Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 C. H. GIFFORD, President Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, Jamestown.  
 J. H. DERIDDER, Cashier Citizens' National Bank, Saratoga Springs.  
 WILLIAM H. DOTY, President First National Bank, Yonkers.  
 HARVEY SUDDS, Cashier Bank of Gouverneur, Gouverneur.  
 C. E. SANFORD, President People's Bank, Potsdam.  
 ANTHONY LAMB, Cashier Commercial Bank, Syracuse.  
 WALTER G. ROBBINS, Vice-President Ellicott Square Bank, Buffalo.  
 D. C. RALPH, Cashier Ellicott Square Bank, Buffalo.  
 F. P. ALLEN, Cashier German-American Bank, Rochester.  
 W. J. HAYES, Assistant Cashier Niagara Bank, Buffalo.  
 J. C. DANN, Manager Buffalo Clearing-House, Buffalo.  
 C. O. RANO, Director Niagara Bank, Buffalo.  
 J. McWILLIAMS, Director Niagara Bank, Buffalo.  
 H. A. MENKER, President Union Bank, Buffalo.  
 P. P. PRATT, President Manufacturers and Traders' Bank, Buffalo.  
 F. L. DANFORTH, President Buffalo Commercial Bank, Buffalo.  
 S. M. CLEMENT, President Marine Bank, Buffalo.  
 IRVING E. WATERS, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Buffalo.  
 F. D. KILBURN, Superintendent New York State Banking Department, Malone.  
 THOMAS J. COWIE, Second Vice-President Merchants' Bank, Rochester.  
 HAYWOOD HAWKS, Secretary Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Company, Rochester.  
 E. FRANK BREWSTER, Vice-President Flour City National Bank, Rochester.  
 HENRY WELLS, President Metropolitan Bank, Buffalo.  
 C. W. HAMMOND, Cashier People's Bank, Buffalo.  
 W. H. GRATWICK, Director Merchants' Bank, Buffalo.  
 ROBERT L. FRYER, Second Vice-President Merchants' Bank, Buffalo.  
 WILLIAM C. CORNWELL, President City Bank, Buffalo.  
 A. B. HEPBURN, President Third National Bank, New York.  
 JAMES H. TRIPP, President First National Bank, Marathon.  
 LOUIS J. CLARK, Cashier Pulaaki National Bank, Pulaaki.  
 ANTHONY STUMPF, Editor "American Banker," New York.  
 JOHN B. WEBER, Cashier American Exchange Bank, Buffalo.  
 A. H. BENNETT, Cashier Homer National Bank, Homer.  
 E. A. GROESBECK, Cashier National Commercial Bank, Albany.  
 J. B. DUCHER, President National Bank of Pawling, Pawling.  
 FRANK E. JOHNSON, Cashier Bank Suspension Bridge, Niagara Falls.  
 F. W. FISKE, Cashier Merchants' Bank, Buffalo.  
 ROBERT R. HAFFORD, President Bank of Commerce, Buffalo.  
 R. G. BREWER, Cashier Mamaroneck Bank, Mamaroneck.  
 GEORGE WHITMAN, Cashier First National Bank, Morris.  
 FRED I. PIERCE, Cashier Power City Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 DAVID ISAACS, Vice-President First National Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 HENRY DURK, Cashier First National Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 A. D. BISSELL, Vice-President People's Bank, Buffalo.  
 BRADFORD RHODES, President Mamaroneck Bank, Mamaroneck.  
 NORMAN H. BECKER, Cashier Exchange National Bank, Seneca Falls.  
 WILLIAM H. FRANKENBACH, Cashier Yorkville Bank, New York.  
 WILLIAM M. WEST, President National Hamilton Bank, Hamilton.  
 GEORGE G. SHEPARD, Cashier Electric City Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 C. A. PUGSLEY, Cashier Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill.  
 M. L. BALDWIN, President Baldwin's Bank, Penn Yan.  
 J. M. BRUNDAGE, Cashier Andover State Bank, Andover.  
 REUBEN L. LYNN, Bath.  
 THOMAS J. O'DONNELL, Assistant Cashier Bank of Suspension Bridge, Niagara Falls.  
 D. A. AVERY, Cashier Second National Bank, Utica.  
 J. T. SAWYER, President Citizens' Bank, Waverly.  
 S. M. GRISWOLD, President Union Bank, Brooklyn.  
 SEYMOUR DEXTER, President Second National Bank, Elmira.  
 WILLIAM C. BROWN, Cashier Utica City National Bank, Utica.  
 ELLIS H. ROBERTS, President Franklin National Bank, New York.

EDWARD BUSHINGER, Cashier A. D. Mather & Co.'s Bank, Utica.  
 G. POMEROY KESSE, President Second National Bank, Cooperstown.  
 DAVID CROMWELL, President White Plains Bank, White Plains.  
 RICHARD J. SCOLES, Cashier Bank of Millbrook, Millbrook.  
 M. L. SHELDON, President First National Bank, Salem.  
 MRS. WALCOTT J. HUMPHREY, Director Wyoming County National Bank, Warsaw.  
 EDWARD ELSWORTH, President Falkkill National Bank, Poughkeepsie.  
 AMOS YOUNG, Cashier First National Bank, Fulton.  
 E. S. TEFFT, Assistant Cashier First National Bank, Syracuse.  
 D. W. HARKNESS, Cashier National Bank of Cold Spring, Cold Spring.  
 H. BERNARD COOMBE, Cashier People's Bank, Brooklyn.  
 J. K. ALEXANDER, Cashier Twenty-sixth Ward Bank, Brooklyn.  
 W. D. WEST, Cashier Fulton County National Bank, Gloversville.  
 GEORGE C. BURN, Director Manufacturers and Merchants' Bank, Gloversville.  
 W. H. RAINEY, Cashier National Union Bank, Kinderhook.  
 J. R. COMPTON, Cashier Niagara County National Bank, Lockport.  
 ALVAH TROWBRIDGE, Cashier National Bank of North America, New York.  
 HENRY S. MOTT, President Bank of Northport, Northport.  
 E. W. CARD, President Medina National Bank, Medina.  
 WATSON F. BARRY, Vice-President National Bank of Medina, Medina.  
 W. H. BARD, Cashier Bank of Gowanda, Gowanda.  
 D. KLOCK, JR., President National Bank of Troy, Troy.  
 GEORGE T. DUNHAM, Cashier Chenango National Bank, Norwich.  
 MRS. SUSAN G. ADSIT, Director First National Bank, Hornellsville.  
 M. S. SANDFORD, Cashier Geneva National Bank, Geneva.  
 W. E. FREW, President Queens County Bank, Long Island City.  
 J. H. SMEDLEY, Oyster Bay Bank, Oyster Bay.  
 H. O. WAIT, President First National Bank, Salamanca.  
 WILLIAM WALKER, Vice-President Dobbs Ferry Bank, Dobbs Ferry.  
 GEO. C. TODD, Cashier Dobbs Ferry Bank, Dobbs Ferry.  
 FRANK WELLS, Cashier First National Bank, Brewster.  
 RALPH W. KIRBY, Cashier First National Bank, Bainbridge.  
 E. G. REISTERER, Cashier German-American Bank, Tonawanda.  
 J. S. CLUTE, Teller Manufacturers' Bank, Cohoes.  
 W. A. FIELD, Cashier First National Bank, Brooklyn.  
 H. W. BURT, Cashier German-American Bank, Buffalo.  
 F. O. SMITH, Cashier Farmers' Bank, Springville.  
 JOSEPH BLOCK, President Citizens' Bank, Buffalo.  
 CHARLES F. VAN INWEGEN, Cashier First National Bank, Port Jervis.  
 FRANK E. HOWE, Assistant Cashier Manufacturers' National Bank, Troy.  
 J. M. EDWARDS, Cashier Merchants and Farmers' Bank, Dansville.  
 E. M. DAVIS, Cashier Bank of Port Jefferson, Port Jefferson.  
 W. I. TABER, Cashier Herkimer Bank, Herkimer.  
 G. ROGERS, President Bank of Mount Vernon, Mount Vernon.  
 A. L. FAIRIS, stock broker, New York.  
 G. J. HOWARD, Cashier Bank of Niagara, Niagara Falls.  
 E. A. WALKER, President Seventeenth Ward Bank, Brooklyn.  
 JOHN A. NIXSEN, Cashier Fulton Bank, Brooklyn.  
 JOHN R. VAN WAGENEN, President First National Bank, Oxford.  
 JAMES KERR, Cashier Union Bank, Buffalo.  
 P. J. MULBOLLAND, Cashier Merchants' National Bank, Dunkirk.  
 GUY H. CLARK, Cashier First National Bank, Earlville.  
 J. H. LOOMIS, J. H. Loomis & Son, Attica.  
 P. M. THORN, Cashier People's Bank, Hamburg.  
 OTTO CHURCHILL, Assistant Cashier Bank of Hamburg.  
 F. W. BARKER, Cashier Robert Gere Bank, Syracuse.  
 W. D. PIERCE, Cashier Frontier Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 D. D. MCKOON, Vice-President Frontier Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 J. T. MILLS, JR., Cashier Chase National Bank, New York.  
 G. S. VAN GORDER, President State Bank of Pike, Pike.  
 L. S. FREEMAN, Cashier L. S. Freeman Bank, Middleport.  
 GEORGE A. NEWELL, President Union Bank, Medina.  
 E. T. COANN, President Citizens' National Bank, Albion.  
 W. J. ASHLEY, Vice-President Merchants' Bank, Rochester.  
 JAMES H. RAND, Banker, North Tonawanda.  
 FRED J. BLACKMON, President Bank of Gowanda, Gowanda.

BENJAMIN L. RAND, Cashier State Bank of Tonawanda, North Tonawanda.  
 LEWIS D. SULLIVAN, Cashier State Bank Brockton, Brockton.  
 C. C. WOODWORTH, President Flour City National Bank, Rochester.  
 F. HOWARD HOOKE, "The Financier," New York.  
 T. P. OTIS, President Wellsville Bank, Wellsville.  
 JOHN CERRAR, Banker, Hamilton, Ont.  
 GEORGE E. MERRILL, Cashier Bank of Holland, Holland.  
 N. ROCHESTER, Cashier Third National Bank, Buffalo.  
 J. T. RANSOM, Rand Ledger Co., North Tonawanda.  
 H. AUSTIN BREWSTER, Vice-President Commercial Bank, Rochester.  
 CHAS. E. HART, President Orleans County National Bank, Albion.  
 F. C. EDDY, Cashier Bank of Syracuse, Syracuse.  
 OTIS M. BIGELOW, President Baldwinsville State Bank, Baldwinsville.  
 ALLEN J. DEAN, President State Bank, Sherman.  
 F. N. MANN, Jr., Vice-President Mutual National Bank, Troy.  
 C. J. HOWDEN, Cashier State Bank, Fillmore.  
 F. F. LAHEY, Teller L. S. Freeman Banker, Middleport.  
 B. TOMPKINS, Cashier First National Bank, Morrisville.  
 W. J. RICHARDSON, Cashier State Bank, Belmont.  
 F. E. JOHNSON, Cashier Bank of Cattaraugus, Cattaraugus.  
 W. B. MANLEY, Cashier Bank of Belfast, Belfast.  
 M. F. WARREN, Belfast.  
 E. O. ELDRIDGE, Cashier Owego National Bank, Owego.  
 C. B. BENEDICT, Director Bank of Attica, Attica.  
 H. C. MORGAN, Cashier First National Bank, Cuba.  
 O. S. LAYCOCK, Second Vice-President Niagara Bank, Buffalo.  
 N. C. BARNUM, Director Niagara Bank, Buffalo.  
 E. R. BACKER, President State Bank of Elmira, Elmira.  
 E. A. GEORGER, Cashier German Bank, Buffalo.  
 G. B. LONGTREET, Cashier National Bank of Auburn, Auburn.  
 W. W. WILCOX, Teller Electric City Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 M. H. OLIN, President Citizens' Bank, Perry.  
 MAX OUTBERG, Director First National Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 HENRY C. BREWSTER, Vice-President Traders' National Bank, Rochester.  
 GEORGE W. THAYER, President Alliance Bank, Rochester.  
 F. R. ROBBINS, Ellicott Square Bank, Buffalo.  
 W. F. MORRIS, Vice-President First National Bank, Baldwinsville.  
 G. W. HANNAHS, Cashier Farmers' National Bank, Adams.  
 F. R. GREEN, Cashier Fredonia National Bank, Fredonia.  
 WILLIAM B. JACKSON, President Bank of Holland, Holland.  
 JAMES G. BERRY, Second Assistant Cashier City Bank, Buffalo.  
 HENRY P. SMITH, Cashier First National Bank, Tonawanda.  
 H. H. APPELEGATE, Hanover National Bank, New York.  
 EDWIN S. SCHENCK, Cashier Hamilton Bank, New York.  
 A. B. ADAMS, Cashier Bank of Lancaster, Lancaster.  
 T. J. G. PUGH, "Evening Post," New York.  
 M. M. SKIFF, Secretary Chautauqua County Trust Company, Jamestown.  
 J. O. GARRETSEE, Vice-President Bank of Lancaster, Lancaster.  
 E. O. LELAND, Cashier First National Bank, Springville.  
 JAMES M. DONALD, Vice-President Hanover National Bank, New York.  
 O. E. DUNLAP, President Citizens' National Bank, Waxahachie, Tex.  
 T. J. SWANTON, Cashier Commercial Bank, Rochester.  
 WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, Banking House J. H. Rand, North Tonawanda.  
 B. S. W. CLARK, New York State Bank Examiner, Plattsburg.  
 B. Q. DENHAM, State Bank, North Tonawanda.  
 CHAS. M. PRESTON, Director National Bank of Rondout, Rondout.  
 C. B. TAYLOR, Banker, Middleport.  
 J. HENRY WOOD, Security Investment Company, Buffalo.  
 H. L. CHAMPLIN, New York State Bank Examiner, Buffalo.  
 GEORGE F. DIENER, Teller First National Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 CHAS. E. CLARK, Secretary Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Co., Buffalo.  
 H. J. AUER, Assistant Cashier Marine Bank, Buffalo.  
 WILLIAM MILLER, Director Hightstown National Bank, Hightstown, N. J.  
 J. DILCHER, Cashier Metropolitan Bank, Buffalo.  
 E. J. MACKENNA, Vice-President Bank of Niagara, Niagara Falls.  
 M. L. KEYES, Cashier First National Bank, Oneonta.

## FIRST DAY'S SESSION.

President James G. Cannon called the convention to order and invited the Rev. A. S. Bacon to invoke the divine blessing. At the conclusion of the prayer President Cannon delivered his annual address, as follows :

## PRESIDENT JAMES G. CANNON'S ANNUAL ADDRESS.

We are gathered here to-day to celebrate the second anniversary of the New York State Bankers' Association, and to participate in the exercises incident to its third annual convention. As the presiding officer of this body it is my pleasant privilege to bid you a hearty welcome and to express the hope that our meeting may be productive of much profit and enjoyment to us all.

I shall not at this time burden you with any statistical information touching the affairs of our association, but will leave that task to our secretary and treasurer, both of whom will be heard from at a later stage in our proceedings.

It affords me pleasure to state that our association is in a high degree of prosperity. Its growth during the past year has been of a most satisfactory character, demonstrating thereby its usefulness and importance in the estimation of the bankers of the State.

During the past year twenty-one group meetings have been held, and the council of administration has been called together upon four different occasions. The group meetings have been well attended, and much interest has been shown in the discussion of the various topics under consideration.

I desire to testify to the excellence of the group system and the successful working of the entire plan of organization. The whole idea commends itself to the judgment of the closest students of finance, as evidenced by the fact that many of the State associations throughout the country are arranging to reorganize on the same general plan as our own.

The New York State Bankers' Association stands to-day for improved methods in banking, and is a live and effective organization. Its membership is composed of men of influence and intelligence, whose deliberations cannot fail to exert a powerful influence for good upon mercantile and banking interests generally.

The greatest harmony has prevailed among our members, and there has been evinced that spirit of cordial co-operation that goes so far toward the accomplishment of the objects for which we are banded together, and I cannot refrain from giving expression to my grateful appreciation of the uniform courtesy that has been shown me by the officers and members of the association during my occupancy of the presidential chair.

Group meetings have been the means of bringing together gentlemen who were well acquainted by signature but not by sight, and as a result a closer personal relationship and good fellowship have been established among the bankers of the Empire State. Heretofore we were too distrustful of our neighbors and competitors, and instead of combining against losses, we unconsciously connived to make them.

## VALUE OF UNIFORM STATEMENTS.

The scheme of uniform statements put in operation by this association has been adopted by the Pennsylvania association, which during the past year has organized on the same general lines as our own. The bankers' associations of Missouri, Texas, Kentucky and Florida have also carefully canvassed this question with a probability of its adoption. A deep interest is being manifested in this subject, and I hope before another year shall have passed uniform statements will be in use in all the States of the Union.

The National Association of Credit Managers, which held its first convention at Toledo during the past month, and which I had the honor of addressing on the subject of credits, has taken up the question of uniform statements and will undoubtedly adopt blanks for the use of its members. I mention this convention in order to show the interest that has lately been manifested all over the country in this important matter. It clearly shows the drift of public thought, and can only result in great benefit to the banking fraternity.

The Credit Men's Convention comprised the representatives of many of the most important mercantile concerns in the United States, as indicated by the fact that the annual sales of the houses represented reached the grand total of \$213,400,000.

It is gratifying for me to state that uniform statement blanks have now been adopted by all the groups composing our association, and I have reason to believe that every banker present to-day has found these forms to be very useful and efficacious in the prevention of

losses through bad debts. Their proper use not only tends to save banks from being involved in failures, but it also exerts a protective influence over mercantile interests and guards them against the unfair competition of men who, with insufficiency of capital and indifferent abilities, have heretofore successfully competed with honest and worthy merchants. And why? Simply because of the borrowing facilities extended to them by banks who, ignorant of their condition, have made advances beyond their rightful limit.

Uniform statements also have the effect of educating the mercantile community to a higher standard of business methods. Many applicants for credit fail to realize their dangerous condition until their case is properly diagnosed by a careful and conscientious bank officer, with the assistance of a detailed statement. It is by means of statements and their careful analysis that unbusinesslike practices may be discovered and the merchant diverted from a dangerous course to safe and conservative methods.

When a firm makes a showing of its affairs and unreservedly discloses its financial condition to the bank officer, who should take a personal interest in its welfare, the house should be afforded credit facilities commensurate with its standing and responsibility. Thus the whole matter of borrowing would be placed upon a business basis and not be dependent upon favoritism.

Let the banker make it plain to the customer that the banks are public institutions and not merely private enterprises; that their doors are wide open and that all their legitimate facilities are at the disposal of their worthy depositors; that the obtaining of accommodation is not a matter of partiality, but of right to every customer who can show that his financial condition and his balances warrant his borrowing, and you will find that in every community where there is a bank, farmers and merchants will look upon it as a friend and a benefactor. They will, therefore, take a personal interest in the welfare of the institution, and do what they can to advance its prosperity.

To enable us to better perform our duties we should familiarize ourselves with the current laws of trade and commerce, study crop reports and acquaint ourselves with the conditions of trade in each line of business. Then availing ourselves of the opportunities offered by our conventions and group meetings, we should endeavor by a free comparison of notes and the discussion of timely topics to broaden our views, taking care to guard against narrow-minded and circumscribed ideas.

The profits of banking have largely decreased in the past ten years, and we find it necessary to adapt ourselves to the new order of things to enable us to receive a fair return from our investments. To the accomplishment of this end we should bend all our energies, endeavoring to make a proper adjustment of the intricate machinery of our business.

The dispensing of credit is a subject that is securing more and more attention on the part of the general public, and bankers, in justice to their depositors, their stockholders and themselves, must recognize the imperative necessity of giving it careful study. The belief that is held in some quarters, that the commercial interests of this country demand an increase in circulation, is not, to my mind, well founded. What we need is not more currency, but a better and more comprehensive knowledge of whom to trust. For when a man's standing and credit are clearly demonstrated and his banker is thoroughly satisfied of his solvency and ability to pay his obligations, he should experience no difficulty in obtaining all the funds necessary to meet his legitimate needs at a moderate rate of interest.

#### MERCANTILE FAILURES AND BANK LOSSES.

During the first six months of this year, according to "Bradstreet's," there were 1,059 failures in the State of New York—a much larger number than in any other State of the Union. These insolvents had liabilities of \$22,815,117, and assets of only \$10,779,687; and one has only to consider these figures to realize the immense losses sustained mostly by the banks of this State. Of course, the banks did not have to bear the whole burden; the mercantile community naturally had its share. To reduce their losses to a minimum and afford every possible protection to their depositors and stockholders, should be one of the chief aims of the members of this association.

I desire to call your attention to thirty-five failures in which the bankers of New York city have been particularly interested and which occurred during the first six months of 1896. All of these failures were not in New York city, but were scattered in various sections of the United States. The concerns involved, however, either had bank accounts in New York or sold their paper in that market. As closely as can be learned, the direct liabilities of thirty-four of these concerns amounted to \$13,984,000, and the contingent liabilities of seven of them footed up \$1,221,000, making a grand total of direct and contingent liabilities of \$15,205,000. I have taken great pains to ascertain the causes which led to these failures and to gather some statistics regarding them. Ten of the concerns refused to make statements, three made general representations without going into details, and twenty-two gave detailed exhibits.

A careful analysis of the statements of the twenty-two concerns that gave details, supplemented by searching investigations, disclosed the fact that seventeen of them, or more than 77 per cent., were not in a position to deserve credit. Of the thirty-five concerns in question, twenty-seven either refused to make statements or in giving them revealed their financial weakness. Could there be a more powerful and conclusive argument in favor of the uniform statement system?

Ten of the houses were too much extended; seven of the failures were fraudulent—steals, pure and simple—and in four instances the paper was handled by more than one broker, which fact in itself should put bankers on their guard.

I earnestly hope that this association will in the near future take active steps to secure such legislation as will protect its members against fraudulent assignments. There is no reason to my mind why a man who obtains money by false representations should not be punished to the fullest extremity of the law. I would place him in the same category with the burglar who breaks into your vault and steals your cash. Your money is lost in both cases.

Dishonesty and deceit are at the bottom of these failures, and the sooner those who are dishonestly inclined realize that they cannot ply their trade to the detriment of the interests of the bankers of the State of New York, the better it will be for us all.

#### RELATION OF BANKS TO THE PEOPLE.

I feel that I cannot close these remarks without reference to the subject that is uppermost in the mind of every banker in the State at the present time, namely, the maintenance of the gold standard of value, and the question occurs to me—Are we in any wise blame-worthy for the growth of the free-silver sentiment? Is it not true that a large number of bankers have perhaps unconsciously contributed to bring about the present dissatisfaction of the borrowing class? Too frequently when a tradesman or a farmer goes to his banker to secure a loan he is met with a refusal on the ground that there is a scarcity of money, or he is informed that because of the scarcity of money he must pay a high rate of interest. This is a poor policy to pursue, especially if money is not scarce. The banker should rather carefully study the conditions that surround his customers and when refusing advances should frankly and honestly give his reasons for so doing. If a farmer, for instance, is raising only one crop and that crop is likely to fail, thus obliging his banker to wait for his money an entire year, he should be advised by the bank officer to put in more diversified crops or to produce something that will sell for cash, so that he can pay his loans at the bank at maturity. Or if a merchant is selling to a class of trade in a community that is undesirable, he should be cautioned and advised regarding this whole subject. In other words, the banker should be looked upon by his clients the same as a good family physician is looked upon by his patients, and there should exist between them the utmost confidence. It is time for bankers to be more explicit in their statements to customers and borrowers, as careless and unadvised remarks made by bankers, seized upon and distorted by reckless agitators, have inclined many a farmer and producer, who would otherwise have retained sound views on the money question, to follow the illusive free silver will-o'-the-wisp.

The bankers of this country are its largest debtors; and it is to their honor that they have stood like a solid wall repelling the free silver attacks that have made serious inroads in the ranks of other debtors. We believe in "laws, freedom, truth and faith in God" and it behooves us to stand firm in our demands for honesty in commercial affairs, for honest conduct and honest statements, for honest banking, and for an honest dollar.

A. D. Bissell, of Buffalo, as treasurer, reported the following receipts and disbursements from July 26, 1895, to July 11, 1896:

#### TREASURER'S ANNUAL REPORT.

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
Received from J. G. Cannon, ex-Treasurer.....	\$1,242.68	Expenses of executive board.....	\$300.02
Received from 428 members for dues.....	4,905.00	Postage.....	38.79
Received on account of general fund.....	12.25	Stenographic expenses.....	603.40
		Group expenses.....	364.63
		General expenses.....	4,418.91
		Cash on hand.....	344.13
Total.....	\$6,159.88	Total.....	\$6,159.88



STATISTICS SHOWING NUMBER OF BANKS IN EACH GROUP, NUMBER OF MEMBERS, AND CAPITAL AND SURPLUS OF THE BANKS—COMPILED FROM THE SECRETARY'S ANNUAL REPORT.

	No. of banks in group.	No. of banks members.	Capital of banks in group.	Surplus of banks in group.
Group I.....	81	68	\$7,683,300	\$5,208,000
Group II.....	40	23	3,990,000	2,612,000
Group III.....	42	33	2,975,000	1,972,000
Group IV.....	51	39	4,435,940	2,534,000
Group V.....	78	42	3,098,000	4,935,000
Group VI.....	73	50	6,863,400	4,977,000
Group VII.....	52	42	4,295,650	2,278,000
Group VIII.....	47	40	4,962,000	5,210,000
Group IX.....	98	89	57,275,000	64,829,000
Total .....	562	421	\$95,543,290	\$94,550,000


The following banks have joined the New York State Bankers' Association during the past year:

Farmers' National Bank, Franklinville.  
 First National Bank, Franklinville.  
 Bank of East Aurora.  
 First National Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 Electric City Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 Citizens' National Bank, Albion.  
 Exchange Bank of Holley.  
 Bank of Wayne, Lyons.  
 Citizens' National Bank, Friendship.  
 Strong State Bank, Binghamton.  
 National Bank of Auburn.  
 Homer National Bank, Homer.  
 State Bank of Canastota.  
 Individual Banking Co., De Ruyter.  
 First National Bank, Baldwinsville.  
 State Bank, Baldwinsville.  
 Citizens' National Bank, Adams.  
 First National Bank, West Winfield.  
 First National Bank, Oxford.  
 Delaware National Bank, Delhi.  
 Manufacturers & Merch. Bank, Gloversville.  
 Northville Bank, Northville.  
 Canajoharie National Bank, Canajoharie.  
 Farmers National Bank, Rome.  
 Oneida National Bank, Utica.  
 National Bank of Waterville.  
 National Central Bank, Cherry Valley.

Albany County Bank, Albany.  
 South End Bank, Albany.  
 National Hudson River Bank, Hudson.  
 National State Bank, Troy.  
 First National Bank, Mechanicville.  
 Mohawk National Bank, Schenectady.  
 Fishkill National Bank, Fishkill Landing.  
 German-American Bank, Brooklyn.  
 Kings County Bank, Brooklyn.  
 Mechanics' Bank, Brooklyn.  
 North Side Bank, Brooklyn.  
 Schermerhorn Bank, Brooklyn.  
 Bank of Northport, Northport.  
 Bowery Bank, New York.  
 Home Bank, New York.  
 Mutual Bank, New York.  
 National Broadway Bank, New York.  
 National Citizens' Bank, New York.  
 Oriental Bank, New York.  
 Sixth National Bank, New York.  
 Standard National Bank, New York.  
 Tradesmen's National Bank, New York.  
 Kountze Bros., New York.  
 University Bank, Alfred.  
 Union National Bank, Troy.  
 Frontier Bank, Niagara Falls.  
 National Bank of Troy.

Ledyard Cogswell, Secretary of the association, read his annual report giving a concise sketch of the proceedings of the previous convention and the work of the several groups for the past year. [The principal facts contained in this part of the secretary's report are included in the sketches of the groups, published in the introduction to the report of the proceedings.]

In conclusion Secretary Cogswell said:



THE ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS OF MUSIC, 1908. (The photograph is oriented horizontally on the page.)





DELEGATES AND OTHERS ATTENDING THE THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION N. Y. STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION,  
NIAGARA FALLS, JULY 17 AND 18, 1896.



Your secretary would call the attention of the convention to the fact that the territory covered by some of the groups is of such an extent that it is hard to obtain a full attendance of members at some of the group meetings; and he would suggest that the annual convention now in session appoint a committee, or delegate the power to the council of administration, to remodel the territory of the several groups, so that each group would contain a city easily reached by the railroads, so that the members could leave their homes and return to them the same day. This can be accomplished in almost every case.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I might say, in reference to the last clause of the secretary's report, that a committee appointed by the council of administration will report to the association later on in regard to changing the by-laws in reference to the groups.

A resolution offered by William Kemp, of Troy, providing that the convention ballot informally for the nomination of officers, was adopted. By the terms of the resolution the two highest names on the list were to be considered the nominees for the respective offices. Charles Adsit, of Hornellsville, and F. P. Allen, of Rochester, were named as tellers.

Upon the vote being taken the tellers announced that George B. Sloan, of Oswego, and Seymour Dexter, of Elmira, had received the highest number of votes for president, and were therefore the candidates for that office for the ensuing year.

Ballots were then distributed for the informal ballot for vice-president. A. B. Hepburn, of New York, and Stephen M. Griswold, of Brooklyn, received the largest number of votes and were therefore nominated for the office.

F. W. Barker and Charles F. Van Inwegen were placed in nomination for treasurer, and John A. Kennedy and G. W. Thayer, for secretary.

**MR. HEPBURN:** I desire to offer the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That a committee on resolutions, consisting of one member from each of the nine groups in the association, shall be appointed by the chair, and that all resolutions which may come before the convention shall be referred without debate to said committee.

**MR. KEMP:** I second that resolution. If I understand it correctly, the idea is to get all the resolutions together before this committee, and, after the committee report on the resolutions, then the convention can debate them. The idea is simply to save time, as I understand it.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Yes, sir; to refer them to the committee without debate, and then afterwards they can be debated.

The resolution was adopted.

**THE PRESIDENT:** We have a report from the committee on the revision of our by-laws, of which Mr. Cornwell is chairman.

**W. C. CORNWELL, of Buffalo:** The committee appointed at the last meeting of the council of administration have to report a few suggestions in line with what has been noted in the secretary's report as to the sub-division of the groups. The authority under which these changes can be made is Section 9 of the by-laws, which reads:

These by-laws may be amended or altered at any regular meeting of this association by a vote of two-thirds of the members present.

This section which divides the association into groups is Section 6, which fully sets forth what each group shall consist of, that there shall be nine groups, and so on.

The committee suggests that the council of administration be authorized to rearrange the groups in such manner as it may deem to be in the best interests of the association, and to revise Section 6 of the by-laws in accordance therewith.

The next suggestion covers the various meeting of the groups. It is now provided in Section 7:

The meetings of each group shall take place on the third Saturday in the months of September, December, March and June, except that by vote of each group its meetings may be

held in September and March only. Until otherwise ordered, the meetings shall be held as follows: Group I. at Buffalo; Group II. at Rochester; Group III. at Elmira; Group IV. at Syracuse; Group V. at Utica; Group VI. at Albany; Group VII. at Poughkeepsie or New York; Group VIII. at Brooklyn and Group IX. at New York. Each group shall elect at its annual meeting in September a chairman, an executive committee consisting of five members and a secretary.

It has been found by experience impossible to adhere definitely to Section 7, and in order to make that section more elastic and make it come more within the practice which has prevailed, the committee suggests that it be made to read as follows:

Each group shall hold at least two meetings each year, and may hold four, at such times and places as each group may determine; provided, however, that one of such meetings, to be called the annual meeting, shall be held not later than December 1. Unless otherwise arranged, the meetings shall be held as follows: Group I. at Buffalo; Group II. at Rochester; Group III. at Elmira; Group IV. at Syracuse; Group V. at Utica; Group VI. at Albany or Troy; Group VII. at Poughkeepsie or New York; Group VIII. at Brooklyn; Group IX. at New York.

Each group shall elect at its annual meeting a chairman, an executive committee consisting of five members, and a secretary.

Then, in order to arrange the meetings of the council of administration under Section 8, so as to accord with the new arrangement of Section 7, the committee suggests that Section 8 be made to read as follows:

The council of administration shall meet at least twice a year, or oftener subject to the call of the chair. One of such meetings to be held after the annual meetings of the groups, not later than January 1.

Mr. Hepburn moved that the recommendations of the committee be adopted.  
Carried.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is no other business to come before us at this morning's session, I would announce the following as the committee on resolutions:

Group IX.—A. B. Hepburn (chairman), President Third National Bank, New York.  
Group I.—William C. Cornwell, President City Bank, Buffalo.  
Group II.—Frederick P. Allen, Cashier German-American Bank, Rochester.  
Group III.—Seymour Dexter, President Second National Bank, Elmira.  
Group IV.—Geo. B. Sloan, President Second National Bank, Oswego.  
Group V.—C. E. Sanford, President People's Bank, Potsdam, N. Y.  
Group VI.—Edward A. Groesbeck, Cashier National Commercial Bank, Albany.  
Group VII.—J. B. Dutcher, President National Bank of Pawling, Pawling.  
Group VIII.—Walter E. Frew, President Queens County Bank, Long Island City.

A recess was then taken.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION.

THE PRESIDENT: This afternoon we are to partake of the solid meat on our programme. If there is any one subject in which the bankers of New York city particularly are interested, and indeed all the bankers of the country, it is the question of restrictive endorsements, and I am sure we are greatly favored to have with us to-day a gentleman who has made a thorough study of this subject—more, I think, than any other banker in this country. I refer to Mr. S. G. Nelson, Vice-President of the Seaboard National Bank of New York.

#### RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS—ADDRESS OF S. G. NELSON.

The task which has been assigned me, of addressing you on the subject of "Restrictive Endorsements," will take me from the romance of dollar marks, amid which bankers love to dwell, and place me for the time being among the dry bones of the law. The subject will therefore, I fear, not prove as interesting as would be one more in line with our general and favorite pursuit.

It has often been said that there is no profit in the law, and I have a vague suspicion that a sense of profit sometimes proves interesting, even to bankers.

The topic of which this paper treats, although not dealing with the narrow and immediate subject of financial profit, is, like many other questions outside of such subject, of grave importance to financial men, when viewed in a wide sense, from the standpoint of the compensating element of their business.

The most baneful enemy of modern business enterprise, whether it be commercial, industrial or financial, is uncertainty. With the distress and stagnation wrought by the uncertainties of both the tariff and currency fresh before us, and still upon us, I need not dilate further upon this point. If the element of certainty is an important one in general business enterprise, it is apparent how vital it must be in banking in which the stupendous volume of figures dealt in is infinitely larger and the proportion of profit infinitely smaller than in the field of any other human endeavor. A slight factor of uncertainty may prove a great menace to the banking industry, and our interests, above all others, lies in reducing the business, as far as possible, to a standard of absolute certainty, for uncertainty means risk, and risk in the long run means loss.

You will agree with me, I think, that the recent action of the New York Clearing-House Association concerning restrictive endorsements is a step in the direction of certainty, and removed from uncertainty, and as such should be encouraged and applauded by bankers in every section of the country.

Let me briefly present to you the history of the amendment. As far back as we can remember banks have been in the habit of frequently adding to their endorsements, when forwarding paper to New York or other points, words of restriction, such as "For collection," "For account of," or "For remittance to." Such paper was dealt with by banks through whose hands it passed in the same manner as paper bearing nothing but absolute or ordinary endorsements, and it was presumed that the same right of recourse existed against previous endorsers in both classes of paper.

However, the result of a friendly suit brought by the National Park Bank of New York against the Seaboard National Bank of the same city proved a revelation to many of us, and pointed out the great danger which lurked in checks and other paper having restrictive endorsements.

In that suit the National Park Bank sought to recover the amount which it had overpaid on a draft which was drawn by its correspondent for eight dollars, and before having been presented was raised to eighteen hundred dollars.

The facts in the case are interesting and show characteristic methods resorted to by a clever sharper to victimize banks. On July 15, 1885, a man introducing himself as Frank Saxton appeared at the Eldred Bank, in Eldred, Pa., having in his possession a draft apparently for eighteen hundred dollars, drawn by The First National Bank of Wallingford, Conn., on The National Park Bank of New York, and stated that he would like to have the Eldred Bank collect the item for him.

It was received by the bank and entered in its collection register, and a receipt for collection was given by the bank to Saxton. The Eldred Bank presented the paper to The Seaboard National Bank after endorsing it to the order of the defendant's Cashier, "For collection for the account of the Eldred Bank, Eldred, Pa." The Seaboard National Bank received it on the morning of July 16, and at once notified the Eldred Bank by mail that it had been received and placed to its credit. On the following morning the Seaboard National Bank presented it through the exchanges of the New York Clearing-House to the National Park Bank for payment, and as there was nothing on the paper to indicate in the slightest degree that the draft had been tampered with, the National Park Bank paid the full amount. It was of course the custom of the Seaboard National Bank to notify its correspondent of the failure of collection of any of the drafts or checks or of anything wrong regarding them. The Eldred Bank waited until July 25, and having been advised ten days prior of the due receipt and credit of the draft, became satisfied that it was a valid instrument, and therefore, upon request from Saxton, paid over the proceeds less a small charge for collection.

During the trial before the Supreme Court the fact was brought out that the man Saxton was a stranger to the officers of the Eldred Bank, but that he disarmed them completely by his expressed willingness to allow the draft to remain with them for collection, and to have the proceeds when collected credited to him, subject to final disposition upon his order.

Nothing further was heard from Saxton until about two weeks later, when request was received through the mail by the Eldred Bank to send the net proceeds to him in bills, per express, to Buffalo, N. Y., where he would call at the express office and receive the package. The bills were accordingly sent. Since then the bills, as well as the plausible Saxton, have been lost to the banking world.

It was not until August 15, a month after Saxton appeared at the Eldred Bank window, that the National Park Bank received notice that the draft had been raised from eight to eighteen hundred dollars. Efforts were immediately made to run down the forger, but he and his booty had lost their identity like the sands of the seashore.

I would call your attention to the cleverly laid plan of Saxton, by which he presented the



draft in the middle of the month, and then, in order that the Eldred Bank should not have its suspicions aroused, permitted the returns to remain in its possession until a few days before he knew that it would be impossible to longer conceal the fact that the draft had been tampered with. He secured his money a few days before the close of the month, when the monthly return of vouchers and adjustment of accounts would lead to a discovery of his crime. As a specimen of expert alteration and forgery the draft was a marvel, and the finesse and skill which it displayed should be a lesson of caution to all of us in the handling of commercial paper.

The officers of the Wallingford Bank, who drew the eight dollar draft, took the precaution to run a line in red ink to fill up the intervening space between the words "eight" and "dollars." That line was obliterated so thoroughly that only by the use of a powerful glass could a dim shadow of it be detected on the paper; in fact, were it not for the affidavits and unquestioned corroborative proofs which were furnished, the draft, even when suspicion had been directed against it, might have successfully withstood assault upon its genuineness.

On being notified by the Wallingford Bank that the draft had been raised, the National Park Bank made a demand on the Seaboard National Bank for the repayment to it of the difference between eight dollars and eighteen hundred dollars. By that time the Eldred Bank had parted with the money in good faith, and the books of the Seaboard National Bank showed that the money had actually been drawn by the Eldred Bank.

A suit was brought in the Supreme Court to test the question, and was ably contested by those leading lights of the legal profession—General Barlow, representing the National Park Bank, and Messrs. Taylor & Parker, the defendant.

The court rendered a decision in favor of the defendant, holding that by the use of the words "for collection" the Eldred Bank gave notice that the Seaboard National Bank did not become vested with the title to or ownership of the draft, but was acting merely as agent, and that it had performed its full duty by collecting the draft and paying over the proceeds of same to its principal, the Eldred Bank.

The plaintiff sought to have the defendant held liable on the theory that the defendant was the owner of the property, and, accordingly, had received the eighteen hundred dollars for itself, and as its property, and that it should be obliged to repay the money on the ground of having received property to which it was not entitled. The defendant, however, claimed that it had not received anything for itself in the transaction, and as it had paid over to its principal, the Eldred Bank, the eighteen hundred dollars in good faith, its obligation in the transaction came to an end.

You will observe the real question round which the decision in the case revolved was whether or not the Seaboard National Bank was, in law, the owner of the draft, and this is the all-important point to bear in mind when considering the subject of "Restrictive Endorsements."

The case was appealed from the trial court to the General Term, where the decision was sustained. It was then taken to the Court of Appeals, and there the decision of the lower court was affirmed in an exhaustive opinion by Judge Vann, in which all the Justices concurred, the court plainly stating that if there was any cause of action it was against the Eldred Bank, or Saxton, not against the defendant. Allow me to briefly quote from the opinion:

"When the draft in question was paid by the plaintiff under mistake of fact, the defendant either owned it or simply held it for collection, as agent of the Eldred Bank. \* \* \* If, however, the defendant did not then own the draft, but merely presented it for payment as agent of another bank, it could not be required to repay, provided it had paid over to its principal before notice of the mistake. The plaintiff claimed that the entry made by the defendant on its books to the credit of the Eldred Bank upon receipt of the draft proved that it belonged to the defendant, while the defendant claimed that the restricted endorsement of the draft by the Eldred Bank prevented any change of title, and simply created an agency for collection. A question of fact as to the intention of the parties to the transaction, to be determined by considering their words and acts. \* \* \* Moreover, it seems to be settled that the title to commercial paper received for collection by a bank and forwarded to its correspondent in the usual course of business, without any express agreement in reference thereto, does not vest in such correspondent, even if it has remitted upon general account in anticipation of collection. Title passes only by contract to that effect, to be either expressly proved or inferred, from an unequivocal course of dealing."

As the result of this opinion the National Park Bank commenced suit against the Eldred Bank directly, which has progressed as far as the General Term. Messrs. Taylor & Parker, who represented the Seaboard National Bank in the previous suit, set up the same defense in behalf of the Eldred Bank. It was argued in behalf of the Eldred Bank that its endorsement "for collection for account of the Eldred Bank" was notice of the agency of the Eldred Bank in the transaction, just as it showed that the Seaboard National Bank was merely an agent. The General Term, however, did not accept this view of the case and rendered a decision in

favor of the plaintiff. The case now stands appealed, and will be heard later in the Court of Appeals.

This is a brief history of the case which has revolutionized the methods of long standing in the use of the collection stamp. About one year ago another bank in New York city had a raised draft returned by its correspondent and immediately demanded the return of the overpayment from its neighbor. Payment however was refused, for the bank on which the claim was made, with its usual up-to-date methods, had informed itself fully as to the Seaboard National Bank case, and called attention to the restrictive endorsement, and the decision concerning such cases. This attracted considerable attention, and opened the eyes of banks heretofore unacquainted with the decision to the real status of liability in cases of restrictive endorsements. The consequence of this public attention was the starting of a movement to compel all banks in New York city to become responsible each to the other upon all endorsements of whatever nature. The movement was strongly opposed by many, who showed that it would not meet the real mischief sought to be corrected. What was aimed at was, first, to prevent the perpetration of crime, and secondly, to prevent criminals from visiting loss upon innocent banks so situated that no care or scrutiny on their part could stay the hand of the criminal. You will readily see that a bank to which a draft is presented for payment through respectable banking channels, when the draft under the eyes of an expert teller appears genuine, can do but one thing and that is to pay it. A bank which forwards such paper for collection has the power, however, by its vigilance and scrutiny, of putting an end to the schemes of sharpers and preventing them from preying upon the banking community.

If the forwarding bank however is under no responsibility in the transaction it will be apt to be easy going and careless, and permit itself to be innocently used as an instrument of criminals, as was the fact in the Saxton case.

Nothing is better calculated to arouse vigilance than responsibility. If forwarding banks realize that they are responsible for the genuineness of the paper transmitted by them the trade of the bank sharper will fall to a low ebb and the cause of honest banking will be furthered.

It was to effect this result and to put responsibility where it properly belongs that the clearing-house association passed the resolution forbidding the sending through the exchanges after July 1, 1896, of any item bearing restrictive endorsements unless they are guaranteed.

In consequence of that resolution, restrictive endorsements have largely disappeared, and forwarding banks, now realizing that they are not merely irresponsible agents in forwarding transactions, will be more alert about the character and antecedents of those for whom they act, and less available as innocent tools in the hands of criminal "strangers."

#### WHAT ARE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS?

The question now remains to be considered, what are the restrictive endorsements which fall within the meaning of the clearing-house resolution?

The resolution, by its terms, is directed against any checks, sight drafts, notes, bills of exchange, or other items having thereon any qualified or restrictive endorsement, such as "for collection" or "for account of."

It is quite natural that some difficulty should be encountered in determining what forms of endorsements are covered by the resolution.

In a sense, every endorsement which departs from the form of an ordinary general endorsement is restrictive.

It is apparent, however, from a consideration of the reasons that led to the adoption of the clearing-house resolution, that its object was to prevent a bank which had received money upon a forged or otherwise irregular check from pointing to the endorsement on the paper and saying: "We acted in this matter merely as an agent, and you cannot have recourse upon us." With that in mind, it will be apparent that the endorsements which are intended to be forbidden are those which indicate that an agency exists, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the title to the paper has not passed.

That such is the intention is also apparent from the language of the resolution itself, which, when describing the endorsements which are prohibited, mentions such as "for collection" and "for account of."

The words "for collection," and "for account of" clearly show the existence of an agency, so also do the words "for remittance to," and leave the paper subject to all the mischief which was sought to be corrected.

There is a form of endorsement in vogue with depositors, and serving a very useful purpose, which has been the subject of inquiry since the passage of the resolution. I refer to the endorsement "for deposit," or "for deposit only."

This endorsement is, as we are all aware, resorted to as a matter of precaution to prevent paper from going astray or becoming diverted, and many depositors would deem it a misfortune and hardship if they were prevented from availing themselves of such safeguard.

The question has been raised that it is a restrictive endorsement. It is restrictive, however, only in the sense of indicating that it is endorsed merely for the purpose of being deposited in a bank. Now it is a familiar rule to all of us that, when paper is deposited in a bank in the ordinary way, the bank becomes the owner of or vested with the title to the paper.

When a person, therefore, indicates by his endorsement that he makes it "for deposit" in his bank, it seems clear that he does not betray an intention not to pass the title to the paper, but quite the contrary. In view of the fact, however, that the use of the words above referred to has not been specially passed on by the courts, and also for the reason that many banks are discriminating against items on which they appear, I recommend that it will be better for depositors to endorse their items in blank, or to make use of the words "Pay to \_\_\_\_\_ Bank or order."

Another approved form of endorsement, as I understand it, is one reading: "Pay Smithburg Bank, or order, for credit Bank of Jonesville, John Smith, Cashier." Here the endorsement would seem to indicate merely that the paper is to be paid to the Smithburg Bank and that the Jonesville Bank is to have the credit of it.

In ordinary banking transactions such a course would make the Smithburg Bank the owner of the paper and give the Jonesville Bank a claim against it for the amount received. The transaction, obviously, would involve the passing of title to the paper, and hence such endorsement I maintain should not be regarded as falling within the spirit of the resolution.

Some banks, in order to save time and labor and multiplicity of stamps, are desirous of adopting an endorsement stamp which will be acceptable on all of their items, and which may be stamped on them indiscriminately. This would, of course, require the making of a general endorsement without mentioning the name of any endorsee.

There is an objection to such course, for the reason that an item may, through miscarriage in the mails, theft, or other reason, not reach its destination. In such case, the bank forwarding the item might be subjected to considerable embarrassment, the expense of tracing the missing paper or indeed absolute loss.

I have suggested that if banks insist upon such a method an endorsement reading, "Pay to any bank or banker, or order, Smithburg National Bank, John Smith, Cashier," might be used with advantage. If there were then any diversion or loss, the fact that the paper could be paid only to a member of the banking community would afford some protection to the endorser.

Its disadvantages, however, when compared with an endorsement in which the endorsee is named, are apparent.

I have dealt with the topic of this paper purely from the standpoint of a practical banking man, and in the light of my own experience with the subject, avoiding debatable questions.

Many bankers are seeking information, finding it necessary, doubtless, on account of the return of items forwarded by them.

Some difficulties must be expected to arise at the inception of any new system. Notwithstanding, however, such temporary annoyance and trouble, I am confident you will agree with me that we will not have suffered in vain, if, by the new method, business shall be conducted with greater safety. It is but right that banks requiring unrestricted endorsements shall, in turn, furnish such to their correspondents, and while I am not informed of any concerted action in that direction, still, I am sure, the practice will easily and naturally become general.

In closing, allow me to congratulate you upon the success achieved by the association thus far. I am sure we have all felt its influence and benefits, and in the annual reunions provided for us have learnt to appreciate that better understanding among men which social intercourse fosters and which is so valuable to men in every line of industry. Certainly the work accomplished during its short existence speaks louder than any words I can utter in commendation of the wisdom and forethought displayed by its founders. To the officers and council of administration we owe much gratitude, for their duties have been at times arduous, requiring much painstaking thought, in order to guide the association in such a way as to accomplish work that will be of lasting benefit.

Let us push the work vigorously during the coming years, so that the New York State Bankers' Association may not only continue but also increase its influence throughout the country as a useful factor in the betterment of affairs financial.

THE PRESIDENT: This very important subject is open for discussion. Twenty minutes will be allotted for that purpose.

## DISCUSSION OF S. G. NELSON'S PAPER ON RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENTS.

**JOHN B. WEBER:** This is an important topic, and I am sure that the members of this association feel deeply indebted to the gentleman who has just taken his seat for the able paper prepared by him on a subject which has lately grown into prominence by reason of the action of the New York Clearing-House Association.

While it was lucid and explained some points which have been puzzling the minds of rural bankers, I wish I might add that it had swept away entirely the mists surrounding that decision of the court upon which the clearing-house resolutions were based.

One thing has seemed clear to me, sir, and that is that our New York friends have aimed to, and probably succeeded, in protecting themselves by pushing the risk behind them and letting it fall upon their country correspondents, who have seemingly no adequate protection save by refusing to do business with anyone whose credit is not of a very high order. In the decision of the court in the case in point the loss fell upon the paying bank, and the court evidently reached its conclusion upon the theory that the intermediary banks were but simple agents, not vested with title, and that the paper bore upon its face plain evidence of such agency. Now, our New York friends say that if we can divest paper—of what?—of the evidence of a fact, the evidence that they are purely and simply agents, then we will be able to push this loss back upon the bank below, and ultimately upon the bank which originally took the paper for collection.

Now, I am aware that the decision of courts does not work out equal and exact justice in every case, for in laying down general and broad principles individuals must occasionally be harmed, but the intention is always right.

Now, it may be asked, did not the Eldred Bank and the Seaboard Bank have equal opportunities of determining the fraudulent character of this paper as did the National Park Bank? And if so, why should there be a release because of the absence of restrictive endorsement? I assume that the courts intend always to place the loss upon the one who is negligent and whose negligence makes the loss possible. In the case in point there may be some difference of opinion as to whether the negligence was primarily due to the Eldred Bank or to the Seaboard Bank or to the Park Bank, but I want to ask what would be the outcome of a case like this, for instance. Suppose a draft apparently genuine, but forged throughout, in signature and in the body, were forwarded for collection through several banks, and, deceiving the bank upon which it was drawn, is paid. Would that bank be able to recoup itself from the bank below because there was no restrictive endorsement on that paper? If not then this decision of the court does not protect the paying bank in all cases of forgery. And are we to understand that it protects only in those cases where negligence may be imputed to the paying bank?

These same questions may be applied with respect to checks passing through our own clearing-house, and altogether, it seems to me, that this decision has opened wide the door for some very interesting situations and complications hereafter. I do not believe that the time allotted to a discussion of a matter like this, so far-reaching in its importance and consequence, is sufficient to give it full consideration, and I question whether it would not be wise to have this subject remitted or submitted to the highest legal authority in order that our rights and duties may be fully established, and so that arrangements can be made which shall be just and equitable and fair to all parties in interest; because if it is not settled right it will not stay settled, Mr. President. At present it looks to me as if it was a case of permitting the risk to fall upon the hindmost, with the country banker marching submissively, though somewhat reluctantly, at the rear of the procession.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Are there any further remarks on this subject. We still have ten minutes left.

**S. G. NELSON:** I want to say this in reply to Mr. Weber. I take it that the Eldred Bank in that particular case was exactly in the same position that the Seaboard Bank would be if a visitor should come in and ask to have a check cashed. The Eldred Bank in that case should have known who Saxton was, and there is no reason why a bank, whether it is located in New York city, or anywhere else, should cash a check on another bank for a stranger and then be allowed to put a stamp on it which would make the paying bank and the innocent bank suffer. That is the point of that decision, and it seems to me it is fair.

From Mr. Weber's statement of the case which he instances, it seems to me that the paying bank is responsible for the signature of the maker, and the forged check would fall upon the paying bank if the signature was forged. The paying bank is only responsible for the signature on it.

**MR. WEBER:** If you will allow me to take the floor again, sir, I will say that high legal authority—whose name would at once command your attention if I were to mention it—has

assured me that in his judgment the courts would not make a difference as to the particular kind of forgery, and that this decision governs the other kind, which open the door to danger. Again, he says that the Eldred Bank ought to have known Saxton. Suppose they did; suppose they knew that he had an account there and was good for a moderate credit, and he brings in to them, in good faith apparently, a draft for \$1,000 or \$5,000—very much more than his credit would entitle him to borrow—are they to tell him "This draft will be forwarded through the different banks, and when it is credited we will hold it still, until a sufficient time has elapsed to determine whether the draft has been raised or whether it is a forgery?" You can very readily see that Mr. Saxton would take his account to some other bank. He would do that in the country. I don't know what he would do in the city of New York.

I say that it simply paralyzes business, or we must insist upon doing no business with any one who is not absolutely good for the business that he does with the bank outside of borrowing.

**MR. NELSON:** It simply comes down to this, Saxton was the customer of the Eldred Bank. From our standpoint, as a customer the bank should be responsible for him; the same as the banks here are responsible for the acts of their customers. And I cannot see the justice of making an innocent bank, that collects outside, responsible for the sins of this customer. Saxton was the customer of that bank, the same as your customer would be of yours, and in taking in checks as we do in New York we generally size up the man's business in taking the collection as to the risk we are taking. It seems to me that for that reason the court was right, and the bank whose customer committed the crime in this particular case should be responsible for it.

**SHYMOUR DEXTER:** We had a discussion of this very thing in Group III., and a very interesting experience was related by the President of the Susquehanna Valley Bank, of Binghamton. Of course, the only way that the country bank would have to do if Saxton came in would be to produce some customer of the bank whom the bank knew was good and require his endorsement upon the paper.

In Binghamton many years ago a customer of the bank walked in with a stranger—a stranger both to the customer and to the officers of the bank—but he had brought to the customer a letter of introduction from a very strong firm in New York with which this customer in Binghamton dealt. He said, "Here is a \$1,200 draft that these friends of mine in New York have asked me to see that this man gets the money on, and I want to accommodate them." Well, the bank wanted to accommodate their customer, and so they said, "All right, endorse the paper." He endorsed it. The paper went through, and it was not until half the month or more had passed before it was discovered that the draft had been raised, and then the Binghamton Bank looked to their customer who had endorsed the paper. They sued him and they got a verdict in the lower court, which was sustained at General Term. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment, holding that the bank could not hold their customer for the draft because the paper had never been protested. So there is another instance where the country banker caught it again.

**A. B. HEPBURN:** I think this discussion is drifting a little one side of what is properly before the convention. It has taken the shape of reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals. Now, whatever we may think of that decision, it is law and it is binding upon us, and it has met with the approval of courts in other States, and I have no doubt it will stand. I do not think it has the effect in practice of forcing any undue responsibility upon the country bank. It is the responsibility of each bank to anyone with whom it deals, and if parties are dealing in lawful instruments, or if they are not, they should be held responsible. The wrong in this case originated with a bank in Connecticut that sold a draft for \$8 on New York to a party whom it probably knew nothing about. The draft was raised, and this other man took it to the bank which of itself should have put that bank upon its guard.

It is not conceivable that any general rule will fail to work unjustly. The only way we can protect ourselves is to put the responsibility upon the shoulders of those who have an opportunity to investigate and ascertain what the facts are and act thereon.

A bank in Buffalo which is paying a check for its correspondents can know nothing about the instrument except the signature of the drawer and the last endorsement which placed the instrument in its possession. Those are the only two things open to them. If the signature of the drawer is forged and they pay the paper, they lose. They are responsible for the last endorser, and beyond that they can have no responsibility and no knowledge. That is the law that has been laid down, and it seems to me it is perfectly just and proper. At all events it is the law, and confronting this practical question we should meet it as it exists to-day.

Last week I sent a \$60 draft to our correspondents in Hartford, which bore on the back of it, "For deposit in the Third National Bank," and the Third National Bank endorsed it to the order of our Hartford correspondents and sent it forward for collection. They returned it. It was for deposit in the Third National Bank; was deposited there; bore our plain endorsement; no other endorsement or marks on the back of the paper, and yet they refused

to receive it for collection. In the same letter was another draft in very similar terms for \$30. Both of them came back. We had to go to our customer in the city and have him put on a plain endorsement, and then we re-forwarded the draft for collection.

In Toledo we had a number of items returned from our correspondents there bearing restrictive endorsements, in a sense, and yet not any of them falling within this decision. I think the endorsements were, "Pay to the order of the Third National Bank for credit of," etc.

When the banks of New York had this subject under consideration in the clearing-house they were very much afraid that the country banks would not follow them, and therefore they did not adopt a radical measure, but attempted a middle course, requiring restrictive endorsements to be guaranteed. We find now that the country has gone to the opposite extreme, and requires an absolutely plain endorsement, refusing to accept a guarantee. So that this is what we have got to come to.

Let me state here that a guarantee of prior endorsements on the back of a check would not afford any protection as against a raised check. If a check comes to a bank with plain endorsement, "Pay to blank or order," and that check is raised on the face of it, the bank paying it would have recourse on the prior endorsers for the amount for which it had been raised.

This guarantee of indorsers does not afford protection. The only way we can get back to the original position in which we did business a few years ago is by requiring and making absolutely plain endorsements. We should do that. Everything that the banks in New York send out through the country is for collection. There is not a bank in Buffalo or Chicago or any place west upon which we can draw checks. The items that we send there are strictly for collection. Most all the items in number and amount are strictly collection items. Yet we have abandoned this restrictive endorsement and gone back to the plain endorsement. Of course, if a bank fails anywhere in the country we can recover the last remittance that has gone into its hands and which has not yet been indistinguishably mixed with the assets of the bank because of this restrictive endorsement; but the very slight protection and saving that we might make because of that is many times overbalanced by the risk in paying raised drafts, and under this decision of the Court of Appeals and with these restrictive endorsements the doors were never open broader to collusion and the work of sharpers than they are at the present time. I think it would be the part of wisdom for this association, supplementing the very excellent paper which we have heard read, to pass a resolution to the effect that all banks and bankers should endorse the instruments forwarded with a plain endorsement.

THE PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, the time is up, and I think we could continue to discuss this paper the balance of the afternoon; but we have one or two other interesting subjects which we must now take up. We are next to listen to a paper by Seymour Dexter, of Elmira, on "The Collection of Country Checks and other Items."

#### THE COLLECTION OF COUNTRY CHECKS AND OTHER BANK ITEMS—ADDRESS BY SEYMOUR DEXTER, PRESIDENT SECOND NATIONAL BANK, ELMIRA.

The brevity of the time necessarily allotted to me compels conciseness in statement in the discussion of this subject. I feel assured, however, that in an assemblage of bankers conciseness will not be regarded as a fault. To aid in making clear my suggestion, I have placed the greater part of my address in the form of propositions.

*First.* That the present method is defective and a better method desired, I believe, is conceded by all bankers.

*Second.* It is desirable, beyond question, that any endeavor at reformation should proceed along lines that are permanent, because based upon unchanging facts and principles of finance and commercial activity having direct relation to the matter under consideration.

*Third.* It will be of advantage to assist in making clear the suggestions which I shall make for a new method of collecting country checks, and the collection of country bank items generally, to make a brief statement of some of the unchanging facts and principles which have a direct relation to this subject.

*Fact One.* The most important and enduring motive in financial and commercial activity is the desire of gain. therefore, any proposed new method of collecting country items must commend itself upon the ground that there is gain in the proposed method for the bankers of the country. either in increasing the actual exchange received by them, or decreasing the actual expense and risk incurred, or the time consumed in making them under present methods.

*Fact Two.* All financial activities are grouped in and about country centres, and these centres correspond with the centres of commercial and industrial activity. Outlying, or small centres of activities, are grouped about a larger centre of activity and the larger centres hold direct relations with the great centres like New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago

and New Orleans. These centres may be properly classified into three classes; namely, the great centres, the intermediate centres and the small centres.

*Fact Three.* Checks, drafts and bank credits have supplanted actual money in financial activities until cash is used in a very small percentage of the total volume of such transactions. Checks, drafts and bank credits in fact constitute the great volume of the monetary circulation of the country.

*Fact Four.* Banks are located in these centres and constitute the clearing-house for all their customers, and their customers conduct all financial activity, except a percentage of same so small that it does not affect the problem under consideration.

*Fact Five.* The banks, whether one or more, perform the functions of the clearing-house in every small centre of financial activity.

*Fact Six.* There is direct and rapid communication between every small centre of activity and the larger or immediate centre with which it naturally forms and holds close financial and commercial relations. There is also direct and rapid communication between all intermediate and great centres of financial activity and also, as a rule, between all the intermediate centres.

In any proposed plan for improving the present methods of collecting country bank items, the following principles should be followed:

#### PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COLLECTIONS.

*First Principle.* Economy in handling and the shortest time possible in which to collect the item.

*Second Principle.* A uniform rate of exchange in each intermediate centre of activity and the small centres grouped about it. I do not mean that the rate shall be the same for all intermediate centres. New York city is the great centre of all centres and the final clearing-house for all the intermediate centres and other great centres, and final balances must be paid in actual money, and the cost of shipping cash bears a just relation to the rate of exchange.

*Third Principle.* The intermediate centres should become the clearing-house for all centres grouped with it.

For economy in handling an item and the shortest time in making collections, a check deposited in and payable at a New York State bank should reach the centre where it will be cleared or paid in one mailing; if deposited in New York city or any intermediate centre in the State, and if deposited at a small centre, only one mailing should be necessary if drawn upon any bank in that group, and only one additional mailing should be necessary if drawn upon any other bank in the State.

Now, can the banks at the intermediate centres be made the clearing-house as above suggested?

The perfect way would be to have one bank in each intermediate centre where all other banks in the group kept an account for the purpose of clearing their checks, but in the competitions and adverse interests arising out of such competition, that would be impracticable, but I feel it is practical in time to get every bank in the small centres belonging to the intermediate centre to keep an account with one bank at such intermediate centre. Very many of the banks in the smaller centres throughout the State already keep accounts at the intermediate centres.

#### CLEARING-HOUSE PLAN OUTLINED.

The plan which I propose admits of any bank in the group having an account with any bank it may select at the intermediate centre, and the banks at the great centres having, as their correspondent, any bank in the intermediate centres.

In the daily exchanges made between the banks at the intermediate centres, whether through a clearing-house or otherwise, all checks would be cleared. Checks upon the banks in the small groups would be cleared by the bank in the intermediate group with which the bank in the small group had its account for that purpose.

The core of the problem to be solved in improving present methods of collecting country bank items is the question of exchange. The country banker is tenacious in his desire to collect exchange upon all checks drawn upon his bank by his depositors and presented for payment through the medium of other banks.

A great number of New York city bankers as well as other bankers at the great centers in the competition for business say to those desiring bank facilities, "Keep your account with this bank and we will credit your account at par with all checks received from your customers." They also say to the country banker, "Keep your New York account with us and we will give you credit at once at par for all checks sent for deposit." The banker in the great center then devotes his energies to hunting up the cheapest way to collect these items and in many instances finds a most roundabout way.

A uniform rate of exchange would simplify that question for him. He would always

know just what his loss was to be on the item. The customer would soon come to know just what it cost his banker to collect the item and it would be much easier to induce the depositor to pay the exchange for immediate credit of the item. Under the present methods the depositors do not as a rule know what it does cost their banker to collect the items deposited and suppose it costs a much less sum than it does.

My own convictions are strong in favor of the group plan as compared with the one central clearing-house for the whole State. The group plan tends to bring into closer relations the banks and bankers in each intermediate centre and small centres naturally belonging to it, and the closer those relations are established the stronger will be the banking system in the group, to protect its own interests and conserve the best interests of the commercial and industrial interests located within the group.

Weak or reckless bank management in any particular bank in a group would sooner make itself manifest and tend to its correction before the complete collapse that sometimes takes place, entailing losses and hardships upon confiding depositors that are hard to be borne. Each bank in the group is placed in a stronger position to meet successfully any unexpected and sudden demand made upon it, and the combined influence of the bankers in the group can secure just and fair treatment in the matter of exchange where the location of the banker is such that he feels he has a monopoly and will fix such a rate as pleases himself without regard to what is a fair and just rate. I do not feel that the plan proposed in any way detracts from the business or interests of the great centres.

Under the plan proposed each bank in the small centre would have its New York account as now, and to it would send all New York exchange and checks deposited during the day, payable at a bank in the New York group, or vicinity. Checks drawn upon any bank in the group of which it was a part, would go to its clearing bank in the intermediate group. All other cash items deposited during the day would be sent as suited the banker's convenience, arrangements made in reference to them or his needs, either to his New York account, his clearing bank at the centre of his group, or direct to some bank at the clearing centre of the bank upon which drawn or made payable, or in special cases to the bank upon which drawn.

The clearing bank at the intermediate centre, at the close of business, forwards to each bank in the group for which it clears all checks drawn upon it, with statement showing exchange credited to its accounts. On receipt of letter in the morning, the bank at the small centre verifies and determines which checks are good, and in case of any important matter found not to be O. K., use the phone or telegraph, but in all ordinary matters, unless otherwise requested, returns duly protested by first mail all items requiring protest.

The plan now going into operation throughout our banking system, of eliminating all restrictive endorsements from bank items, removes some of the difficulties or dangers for the clearing bank under the old methods of restrictive endorsements. The plan which is here proposed would eliminate to a large degree the shipping of currency to the great centres, only to be shipped back. I believe as a rule the small centers run short on currency while intermediate centres, unless extensively engaged in manufacturing, have a surplus. The clearing bank at the intermediate centre should, as a rule, provide currency for the banks in the small centres for which it clears.

I have no thought that any plan can be proposed to reform present methods that will meet with approval by all or a great majority. It will take time and the stimulating effect of losses under present methods before united action can be had for better methods. A great advance has been made in doing away with restrictive endorsements, and that would not have occurred, except for losses sustained by those who morally ought not to have borne them.

Let the agitation and discussion of this subject be kept up. The primal question involved is exchange or no exchange. If exchange should be charged for collection of country items, and I believe it should, the rate should be uniform throughout the group. The plan here proposed permits of extension throughout the whole country, and it seems to me to tend to strengthen the whole banking system.

Time does not permit me to enter into details. Sound principles are, however, of greater importance than mere details, in the present stage of the discussion.

THE PRESIDENT: We now have twenty minutes in which to discuss this paper.

#### DISCUSSION OF SEYMOUR DEXTER'S ADDRESS ON COLLECTIONS.

ANTHONY LAMB, of Syracuse: Having been associated on this committee with Judge Dexter, it has given me great pleasure to hear his views and to know that he has been able to present them to this convention to-day. The present haphazard method of collecting country checks, comprising as they do so large a portion of the circulating medium of the country, is not creditable to the banking fraternity, who ought to be leaders in the improvement of business methods affecting the interests of so many people.



Judge Dexter has evolved a plan that while perhaps it does not promise all we desire, yet it seems to me it is a step in the right direction and is an improvement over the present method in that it will certainly render it impossible for these items to travel about the country for ten days or two weeks, often coming back to their starting point before arriving at their destination. And it would also fix a uniform rate of exchange in the different groups. This doubtless is all we can expect so long as the present custom prevails of charging exchange for collecting country checks. Country banks—banks in small country towns—receive very few of these items, and the question of their collection is of small moment to them. On the other hand, they do receive a considerable revenue from the collection of their own checks, and any plan that is presented must be something whereby they will derive an advantage over the present method. These are people to whom you will have to prove that a change will be for their advantage, and I am not at all sanguine from my experience with the members of our own group that they can even be made to see that this plan of Judge Dexter would be for their interest.

We have had some discussion in Group IV. and it has failed to elicit any particular interest or any expressions of opinion that such a reform is demanded. These people must be converted before you can put any such plan as this into execution. Without their co-operation it certainly could not succeed, and I would like to hear an expression from the representatives of these country banks as to whether they think the present method of collecting checks is all that is desired; and, if not, whether they will suggest some remedy—if not in the line of Judge Dexter's suggestion, then in some other way. So far as the banks in the commercial centers are concerned, I believe they could be more easily induced to adopt some plan of this kind. They receive a much larger amount comparatively of these country checks, and they appreciate more fully the annoyance, the expense, and the loss of time which their collection entails.

Any plan which would make so radical a change in the collection of country items must be equitable and its details so arranged as not to disturb the relations of one bank with another. Judge Dexter has I think very happily overcome that difficulty in that he provides that the banks in the commercial centres shall be the clearing banks for their correspondents in the outlying districts. There is no necessity that there should be any change in the relations that the banks sustain to each other either in their own vicinity or in the State at large. Each bank retains its own correspondents and its collection business is not interfered with in the least. I do not know how our New York friends may feel upon this subject. They certainly handle a large proportion of the country checks and it seems to me that any plan that will simplify their collection and save time and expense would be welcomed by them.

WALTER E. FREW, of Long Island City: In these days when all branches of trade have found it advantageous to form combinations in order to make the largest profits with the least expense, the banking business in the collection of country checks has done nothing; we are still pursuing the same antiquated method of collecting these checks as was done years ago. We say we all want this subject solved but few are willing to make the concessions necessary to accomplish such a result. The keynote of the whole situation is exchange or collection charge. If all the banks in this State would agree not to charge, or all the banks both city and country agree to charge the same rate on their checks, this problem could easily be solved. A bank that pays out ten dollars a day exchange to collect checks deposited with it and receives ten dollars a day exchange on their checks would soon realize they have not made much and would undoubtedly be willing to entertain a proposition on a par basis.

I believe the cause of a great deal of this trouble can be traced directly to those city institutions which, in order to get an account, pursue the policy of offering all sorts of inducements to country banks, such as accepting all their country checks by crediting their accounts on receipt without charging for collection and allowing them interest on the amount of their balances, which in a number of cases is purely fictitious.

In New York city alone the banks of that city had at the time of last quarterly statement, \$85,152,300 due from country banks. This amount loaned at 4 per cent. would net \$3,406,092, which is more than 5¼ per cent. on their capital.

If the city banks would agree between themselves not to take these checks on which they are obliged to pay exchange without charging what they are obliged to pay and not credit until New York funds are received, I do not believe it would be long before the country institutions would become convinced that a clearing-house, which would enable their checks to be handled the same as checks drawn on banks situated in clearing-house cities, was something necessary for them.

These are facts and no solution of this problem can be accomplished until both the city and country banks give this subject more thought and agree to sacrifice a little of their supposed profits to give an impetus to this movement which has been the subject of discussion for many years.

A short time ago letters were sent out to 400 institutions in the various parts of this State asking questions as regards clearing-houses, and the number of replies received was 234; 102

of these replies stated that they would patronize a clearing-house, 49 were uncertain whether they would or not, 73 stated they would not, 49 stated that they would favor a clearing-house in New York city, 40 stated they were in favor of a single clearing-house in each group, 33 were in favor of the appointment of a central city in each group and that every bank in that city should be the redemption agency of the banks of their group that kept accounts with them.

As regards exchange charges, 45 were willing to waive exchange, 21 were uncertain about it, 111 were not willing.

From the replies received, when there had been no definite plan for a clearing-house presented, it was found there were 102 banks in the State which were willing to make a start. But how to make a start, that is the question.

The first thing to be decided upon is do we want it. If so, the next point is, where has it been tried and proved successful? We find that clearing checks is and has been for a number of years a part of the system of the London Clearing-House. We have in this State the most perfect system of clearances there is in the world in the system of the New York Clearing-House Association, and what is to prevent that association, if the members desire, from establishing country clearances on the same line as is being done in London to-day. If this is impossible through this association a separate clearing-house in New York city (which the largest number of replies received were in favor of) would be the next best plan. If it cannot be done on a par basis, a uniform rate of exchange can be charged and paid and the system of the London Clearing-House could be followed in this plan.

The plan which was so eloquently presented by the gentleman from Elmira on the main is a good one, but any successful clearing-house system adopted in this State would be followed by the other States, and if we subdivide this State into nine clearing-houses and the other States follow our example it would make too many centers to mail our letters to. Our State could easily be handled by one clearing-house located at its most important center and if this is established and proves a successful system other States would adopt it and a system of forty-five clearing-houses, one located in each State, could handle the country check clearances of the entire country.

In a quiet way one of the banks of our group is practically doing a clearing-house business for banks on Long Island outside of Brooklyn to-day, and has done it for the last five years. The plan by which this institution does the business is as follows: The clerks in this department are at the bank at 7 A. M. to attend to it. They receive the checks to be cleared from New York city and other banks in the early morning mail. By 9 A. M. all the checks on the Long Island banks are mailed to their destination, drafts are received in payment of these checks by the clearing-house bank either the night of the same day sent, or early the following morning. To cover the cost of exchange which the bank is obliged to pay some of the Long Island banks, and expenses, such as stationery, clerk hire and supervision, the clearing bank charges the banks that send checks through them a small rate of exchange.

This little system of theirs proves that it can be done, and if it is the desire of the bankers of this State to handle this subject on a broad liberal basis a committee of nine, one from each group, appointed by this association could soon present a plan by which, if the city and country institutions are willing to make concessions, this subject could be disposed of and the banking business in this department show progression instead of stagnation.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The last topic on our programme is one which I think as practical bankers we are all very much interested in. We have with us this afternoon F. D. Kilburn, State Superintendent of Banks, and no doubt we shall have the pleasure of listening to some remarks by him.

I now introduce Mr. John A. Kennedy, Cashier of the Niagara Bank of Buffalo, who has made a careful study of the subject of Bank Examinations, and I know he will give us a very interesting and able address.

#### BANK EXAMINATIONS—ADDRESS OF JOHN A. KENNEDY, CASHIER NIAGARA BANK OF BUFFALO.

This subject is one in which I have been much interested in the past, and my interest in this question has continually increased with my years of experience in banking. In my judgment it is a subject in which this association should be deeply interested; that it should command the best thought and most careful attention of all our members.

No special form has ever been adopted by the banks of this country, either State or National, for conducting private examinations of banks. Many directors and officers serving faithfully, possessed of excellent judgment in advising as to credits and the general policy of their banks, are entirely at sea when they attempt to compile the affairs of their bank under

a system. The best examinations made are under the official examiner, around which, however, there seems to lurk a mystery to the bank officials.

Unquestionably we have the best banking department of any State in the Union, but this is an age of progress and bankers, of all men, should be progressive. I believe that our system can be improved by bringing the banks and the department into closer relations. The Superintendent of Banks should have the power to appoint as examiners men well qualified, not alone as accountants but men of experience as bankers and judges of human nature and affairs. This association should aid in securing to the Superintendent authority to make his appointments upon these lines. This question is of vital interest, for without good examiners the best system must fall short of the best results. The Superintendent, who is with us to-day, will undoubtedly give us his views upon this subject. I will, therefore, confine myself more particularly to the subject of private examinations.

Examinations are not made for the sole purpose of detecting fraud. A thorough inspection is quite likely to expose dishonesty, it is true, if any exists, but its true object is much broader and greater. An examination should be made to satisfy the officers and directors that the cash is correct and on hand, that the bills receivable and other assets are of a proper quality and accounted for, that the liabilities are as stated, that the books are in balance and well kept, that the details are not straggling and that the employees are honest.

When an examination is made under a proper system it will be so plain that any officer or director may leisurely peruse the report and arrive at an intelligent and definite conclusion as to the bank's condition. Each report or inspection should be as accessible and as carefully preserved as any record of the bank. The very best forms obtainable should be adopted and this would at once result in a uniformity of methods. The real object of examinations by the department and of private examinations is the same. It follows that the forms used should be identical.

We must insist that private examinations be conducted with no less care than those made by the department. There may be directors or officers who decline to be troubled with the details of examinations and who are indifferent. To those I would say, you are inviting loose management, at least, and possibly worse. There may be officers and directors who say, We know what is in our bank and examinations are unnecessary. To these I would say, possibly you are correct, but you do not know who will follow you in your official capacity, and it is your duty to strengthen our system of banking generally, and this you can do by enforcing rigid periodical inspections.

No true and trained banker ever did or ever will deny the great benefits derived from frequent and thorough examinations. The propositions I have stated are maxims in every banker's code. The only question then is one of method. If the New York State Bankers' Association shall succeed in having adopted a uniform and thorough system of examinations of banks, private and official, a great advance will have been made. This subject strikes to the very vitals of banking and cannot be too carefully considered.

THE PRESIDENT: We shall be very glad now to hear from Superintendent Kilburn.

#### ADDRESS BY HON. F. D. KILBURN, SUPERINTENDENT STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT.

I shall not hope to add anything to the very interesting paper which Mr. Kennedy has read in your hearing, but I speak somewhat from a different standpoint—not as an active banker in the State to-day, but as one who happens to be at the head of the State Banking Department.

The subject of bank examinations has developed in the last few years into more importance than has ever before been attached to it. Bankers generally are giving it more thought and are coming to discuss it as a distinct feature of banking, with a view to making examinations more effective and evolving a system which will result in going beneath the surface and in determining, if possible, the question of values as applied to assets.

There are many bankers in the State to-day who have little respect for or confidence in the present system of bank examinations, as sometimes applied. There is sometimes a feeling of antagonism on the part of bankers towards bank examiners and the department they represent, which it may be impossible to entirely eliminate. The feeling, however, is found more commonly among those banks whose condition is such as not to invite the closest scrutiny and whose management has not been conducive to the best results or the largest measures of success, the very institutions, of course, which need the closest supervision and the most thorough examination. The officers of such an institution, cognizant of the bank's condition and fearing the consequences of a close and exhaustive examination, generally look upon a bank examiner as an annoying monster whose only mission seems to be to meddle in other people's business and make trouble.

These officials generally receive an examiner with a cold formality or an ill-concealed impatience that would chill the heart and utterly discourage and dismay men of less assurance than the ordinary bank examiner possesses. Such a course at once develops a feeling of antagonism between the officials and the examiner that generally results in more adverse criticism than otherwise would have occurred, or than a proper and unprejudiced understanding of the facts would warrant, and sometimes in public comment of a nature to create suspicion and distrust.

Carried to its logical conclusion, it results in antagonistic relations between the bank and the department having control. This, in turn, also tends to arouse suspicion and surmise unwarranted by the actual state of affairs.

It sometimes happens, however, that the bank examiner himself is to blame for any feeling of antagonism which may be engendered. Not all bank examiners are men of the utmost sense of propriety, nor do they all have a proper conception of their duties and sometimes they overestimate their own importance.

In my experience as a bank official I have run across but one of this kind who had the complaint very bad. The breed is rare but not entirely extinct. The one I refer to was probably a fair sample of his kind. Pompous, self-conceited, and altogether important, which latter fact he never lost sight of and was determined that others should not, he was entirely satisfied with himself but not with anybody or anything else. He had that air of superiority and condescension which was meant to awe and impress you. He acted as if he owned the bank and assumed at once that it was insolvent and the officials dishonest and that things generally were wrong. He was no more fitted for a bank examiner than to be an Ambassador to the Court of St. James. I was confident that the bank was in fairly good condition at least and therefore the demeanor of this examiner was simply amusing.

Such an examiner is absolutely useless, is a discredit to himself and generally discredits the department which he is supposed to represent. But, as before remarked, the breed is rare and seldom met with and is always recognized when seen. I am pleased to believe that I have no personal knowledge of one in the service to-day.

There ought not to be any antagonism or ill feeling of any kind between the department or its examiners and the banks. No possible good can come of it and a great deal of harm may result. It simply gives rise to prejudice and distrust and frequently prevents concerted action in adjusting and mending matters, which but for the want of harmonious effort could be easily arranged.

On the contrary, the most cordial relations ought to exist. Not such relations as will result in less thorough examinations, or that will prevent proper supervisions, criticism and regulation, but there should be a mutual endeavor to get at the true state of affairs concerning the banks, and a concerted effort to right any matters needing correction.

The duties of a bank examiner are extremely difficult, if thoroughly performed. It is hard even for the officials of a bank to determine its condition exactly with reference to the value of its loans and discounts, and for the good of the institution there is no danger that too much will be ascertained even by the combined efforts of the bank officials and the department.

I believe it the duty, as well as the best policy, of bank officers to give to the department and its examiners all information in their possession concerning the affairs of the bank; lay before him a list of the paper which, in their honest judgment, is bad or reasonably doubtful; disclose any wrong doing on the part of anybody connected with the bank; report anything and all things which may be causing them anxiety; and, in short, make a clean breast of everything which in any way reflects upon the management or absolute solvency of the institution.

It is pretty certain to come to the surface sooner or later even if not ferreted out by an examiner, and it may then be too late and too large to remedy. I believe that such a course on the part of bank officials would prevent a great deal of trouble and embarrassment and ruin of reputations.

The Superintendent of Banks is of course intensely desirous that the institutions under his supervision shall be managed so as to furnish the greatest protection to depositors, the widest help and accommodation, consistent with safety, to the business of the country, and hence the largest success to the institution. The national department can have no other desire.

This also must be the ambition of every honest bank officer in the country. All are interested therefore that everything be done that can be done to accomplish this result.

#### CONCEALMENT BEGETS LOSSES.

Much more can be done than is done in this direction if bankers will cast aside the desire which too often exists to conceal the true condition of their banks from the respective departments and their examiners. This may be looked upon as an unsophisticated view of the matter and as smacking too much of the foolish and indiscreet. To conceal however by

not voluntarily disclosing may, as matters grow worse, develop into a positive attempt not only to conceal but to deceive.

I have in mind a small bank which, through careless management, resulting more from slackness and good nature and a desire to accommodate than any wilful mismanagement, had accumulated quite an amount of poor paper, none of it, with the exception of one piece, very large, but amounting to considerable in the aggregate. The President and Cashier of the bank knew that some of it was worthless and all of it doubtful, but it was renewed from time to time. Interest was sometimes paid but more frequently added, and this seemed to quiet their fears. Finally the nature of the paper was ascertained by an examiner of the department and a halt called. The past-due portion of the paper was at once charged to profit and loss and the balance treated the same way as fast as it became due. Some little of it may have been paid when due and some has been collected since; but the probabilities are that had not the department ascertained the character of this paper it would have been carried indefinitely among the assets of the bank, probably increased, and eventually caused a great deal of trouble. As it was, the matter was dealt with before it had grown to proportions sufficient to greatly embarrass. I believe this bank furnishes in a nutshell a fair illustration of the condition of altogether too many banks in the State and the passive carelessness of too many bank officials.

I know how hard it is to disturb a nice surplus by charging off bad paper. Bank officers hate to admit, let alone reveal, anything which will necessitate such a course.

It is not, however, good banking or good business to carry among the assets of a bank items that the officers know are substantially worthless. Considered in the abstract, it is hardly honest and certainly not fair to depositors or stockholders; and especially is this so if the worthless paper amounts to any considerable sum compared to the capital and surplus of the bank.

The departments ought, and the State department under its present management will, so far as it has the power, insist that such items as it believes to be worthless be charged to profit and loss and entirely eliminated from the assets, as shown by the statement. This seems to me to be in line with conservative and careful banking and entirely proper.

Examiners are instructed to make special endeavor to ascertain with reference to the value of paper and report the same, together with the circumstances and any and all facts which may add to information concerning it and which will help to sift and adjust it.

The exercise of good judgment and of that degree of caution which is usual in one's private business, stripping your action of all undue influences, will generally prevent the accumulation of any considerable amount of bad and doubtful assets; but once accumulated and found to exist there is but one correct business-like way of treating them, and that I have already indicated. This, I know, is heroic treatment, but it must appeal to every reasonable man as the only correct course to pursue.

My own views as to what a bank examination should consist of, how it should be conducted and the kind of a man an examiner should be, are so well known by those who have honored me upon occasion with their attention that it would seem like threshing old straw to give them here. My opinion may not coincide with that of other men who have had larger experience and given the subject greater study.

#### WHAT A BANK EXAMINATION SHOULD SHOW.

Without for a moment ignoring the importance of ascertaining the clerical correctness of a bank's affairs and its substantial compliance with the law, the honesty of its management, the verification of its balances and the correctness of its cash, I maintain, that unless the value of assets, including unmatured paper, can be ascertained to a degree sufficient to determine, approximately, at least, the condition of the institution with reference to solvency and impairment of capital, the examination in nine cases out of ten is in the main perfunctory merely and does not accomplish that measure of good which I believe the law contemplates.

Especially, in my opinion, is this kind of an examination necessary among country banks, and generally where one man power is substantially in control, and where clearing-house committees do not exist, or, if they do, do not examine, and where directors do not meet frequently for the purpose of examining the paper.

To make such an examination needs a man of experience in affairs and among men, a man of judgment and tact, thoroughly honest and capable and very observing, and who will disclose nothing of what he ascertains except to his chief. A good judge of human nature and of business men and methods. You may not all be familiar with the fact that State bank examiners are under the civil service law and that the Superintendent has very little to do in their selection. At any rate he is confined in his choice to the so-called eligible list.

This list is made up as the result of examinations made by the Civil Service Commission. This commission I believe is doing all it can and all that any commission could do in the line

of bettering the standard of our civil service. And with reference to certain classes of positions are accomplishing good results. They are men of high character and are in sympathy with civil service reform.

With reference to bank examiners, however, they cannot from their present system of examinations, or from any system which they can make practicable, ascertain very much if anything with reference to the qualifications of a bank examiner except his technical knowledge of banking and the laws governing the same. His honesty and general moral character, his general fitness and make-up with reference to the qualifications I have suggested, are not and cannot in the circumstances be ascertained by the Civil Service Commission.

I believe the head of the department could do this and therefore I contend that the Superintendent of Banks should have the power to select his own examiners with the proviso, however, that before they are commissioned they shall be examined by the civil service commission as they now are, except that the competition, instead of being against other applicants, shall be against a standard to be fixed by the commission. As an abstract proposition I believe this would insure the selection of better men than can be guaranteed under the present system. So long as humanity is fallible just so long will it be impossible to conduct banks without making losses. But there is a way to conduct banks which does not involve a great deal of difficulty, by which losses can be greatly reduced.

#### DIRECTORS SHOULD BE THE BEST EXAMINERS.

Every banker knows the way and it is not necessary to suggest much if anything with reference to it. A good board of directors, who are such in fact as well as name, who meet frequently and go over and scrutinize with the same degree of care and fidelity the business of the bank that they would their own affairs, will do more towards reducing losses to a minimum than any other system of examinations can possibly do. There are altogether too many banks whose directors are merely such in name, and who give little or no attention to the bank's affairs, and, therefore, can know but little of its business. Men who cannot or will not give a reasonable amount of their time to a bank ought not to be elected directors, and, if elected, ought not to accept the position. This is not a new suggestion: it has been made a thousand times and as often ignored. I wonder if it would not be a good idea for this association to take up the subject of directors, for the purpose of creating a sentiment everywhere in the State in favor of electing those men only who will give time and attention sufficient to make them fully acquainted with the affairs of their respective banks. This is by no means necessary with reference to all banks, for many of them recognize the necessity of this and elect their directors upon this principle and with this understanding.

If I might be pardoned for doing so, I would respectfully suggest a course which is now practiced by a good many banks. Elect a committee of directors, to be called an examining committee, whose duty it shall be to examine all of the assets of the bank, and especially its loans and discounts, at least once in three months (once a month would be better), inquiring into and investigating any that they do not know to be good and making a list of such as they consider in any degree doubtful, with suggestions as to what shall be done with it. This committee should consist of not less than three (five would probably be better) and after every examination the head of the committee should go out and a new man be added, the one going out to be again added to the committee in his turn. Thus, every member of the board would examine consecutively during each term of his services the same number of times as there were members of the committee.

I am not sure that a law making this, or some such plan obligatory (the fact of its observance to be ascertained by the affidavits of the President and Cashier, or of the respective directors) would not be a good thing. Such a course wherever adopted has worked well when faithfully observed and would I believe reduce losses to a minimum and make examination by the departments less necessary and difficult.

#### GOOD MANAGEMENT THE RULE IN THIS STATE.

I do not wish to be understood as taking a pessimistic view of the present condition and management of our banking institutions. On the contrary, I regard New York as the model banking State of the Union and that banking here is reduced nearer to a science than anywhere else in our country. The banks of no State are safer or more conservative than those of New York and nowhere else can be found institutions which are better serving the people or more completely fulfilling the public purposes for which they are organized.

Few are so perfect however that they cannot, with careful management, become more so, and there is still room in a great many localities and among a great many banks for improvement and the adoption of methods of management which will tend to greater strength and safety. One of the purposes of supervision and examination by the different departments is to accomplish this result. It is, and will continue to be, hard work without the aid of those in immediate control. Together we can accomplish wonders.

THE PRESIDENT: We still have a few minutes left.

#### DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF BANK EXAMINATIONS.

N. ROCHESTER, of Buffalo: Frequent examinations by the directors of a bank are a positive force in the well-being and earning capacity of the institution, tending as they do to keep the directors fully informed as to the affairs of the bank, and permitting them to advise intelligently with the officers in regard to the policy to be carried out.

The officers and directors of any well-managed bank should have its affairs well in hand at all times, and the books should be so arranged and kept that at any time a statement of the bank's general condition can be taken off with very little labor, indeed each morning the executive officers should at the opening of business have a brief summary of its condition before them. There are a number of systems of this character in use by banks in various parts of the country, adapted to the special kind of business done, and all have their good points. Bank examinations vary from a "take it for granted that is right," to those of the most rigid and exacting kind—but unless the latter method is pursued examinations do not amount to much. When carried out on a definite plan and understandingly by the examiners they are of the utmost importance, and of such I desire to speak.

The examiners should be selected, from the board of directors and should be men who are conversant with office work. When such gentlemen are not to be found (as is often the case) on a board of directors, they should employ a competent accountant from outside of the bank force, to prove the books and schedules and his statement, with explanations, to be made to the board, who can then take up the matter intelligently.

The examiners should fix their own time for the examination and without warning to either officers or clerks, step in at the close of business and take possession of the bank, notify the head bookkeeper to take off a statement at the close of the day's work, and while that is being done, prove the cash. The schedules accompanying the statement should be handed to the different departments to be filled out at the same time, and before the examiners leave for the night, the totals of these schedules should agree with those as shown on the general statement. The proving of the schedules in detail should be taken up the following day and by dividing this work amongst the examiners, the true condition can be very quickly arrived at. I have here a form which Mr. Kennedy has prepared for examination which quite fully covers the ground. It has borne the test of practical work very satisfactorily both in the Niagara Bank and in the Third National Bank of Buffalo, and with the addition of a few schedules such as different banks might find necessary in their own business, would I think prove a most satisfactory form for general use. If this form is honestly and carefully carried out, all items in the statement can be proved to a cent. The only weak spot being in the proving of the individual deposits, and this is a point to which during the past few years the attention of bank officers has been most forcibly called, and a number of methods suggested for checking it.

Perhaps as good a way as can be offered is—

- (1) Try to know your clerks, their habits and home influences.
- (2) Change their work frequently and without warning.
- (3) Have pass-books written up every thirty days by clerks who have nothing to do with keeping the books.
- (4) When possible introduce the "check desk system" in your office.

If I am not taking up too much of your time I would like to run over briefly Mr. Kennedy's forms for making bank examinations. (Exhibiting several large sheets of printed forms.) This is divided into sections, you see. Due from directors. Total loans and discounts. Then here he deducts partial payment. There are schedules for each of the items. Here it gives the name of the payer, and, under the head of Remarks, states how the paper was secured, the date and the amount. Then there is a schedule covering the past-due loans, giving the name of the payer, the name of the endorser, and the name of the payee; when it is due, and the amount. That is followed by three columns, headed respectively Good, Doubtful, and Bad. If the past-due loans are carefully examined by the directors, with the assistance of the officers of the bank, they can quickly tell in which column to place the paper, whether it is good, doubtful, or bad. That is where trouble is very apt to occur in a bank. The next schedule is of the bills discounted. The bank examiner, the directors, or whoever they appoint, should handle every bill in the bank, and check them off from the ticklers. For all papers which are not in the bank they should have a receipt corresponding in the bank showing to whom they have been sent for collection. They can have a form of letter prepared which the examiners can send to the different banks, and have the replies sent back to the examiners and not to the bank. The next schedule is a statement of the deposits, and a partial statement of the notes. The next is overdrafts at the close of business. That is a statement which should be very carefully scrutinized by the examiners. Sometimes items are carried for a long time as overdrafts which should be charged off. Then there is a schedule

for bonds, at the close of business, and for mortgages. I think the schedule as used in the National bank form for reports of the Comptroller of the Currency is perhaps a better schedule. That gives a description of the property, if it is real estate, and its assessed valuation; the amount at which it is carried on the books of the bank; the amount of prior liens on the property, and the estimated actual value; the date when acquired, how acquired, and remarks. All these items should be filled out carefully, and the same would apply to mortgages; showing when the interest had last been paid; the condition of the property, and its present value. The amount due from banks and to banks is scheduled out in full. If statements come in within three or four days from these corresponding banks, those statements being reconciled will prove satisfactorily enough. The schedule of cash will give the items held as cash. Certificates of deposit outstanding are shown in detail, giving the name of the party holding them, the number, and the date when interest was last paid. Another schedule used should be one of the certificates of stock. The stock-book should be checked up, and there should either be a cancelled certificate there or the stub, and it should balance with the cash capital of the bank. That is a check on over-issue of stock.

This form of examination has been tested by the Niagara Bank for several years, and we have found it very satisfactory, and I know that the National bank examiner has upon several occasions given it his approval. If an examining committee composed of the directors of a bank will follow out these schedule forms they will find that their examinations can be made very quickly and thoroughly.

In line with Mr. Kennedy's suggestion of a uniform system of bank examinations throughout the State I would suggest that the form that he has got up be examined and looked into and examined by the banks, and if it meets with their approval I think it would be a very good form to adopt.

Adjourned to Saturday, July 18, 1896, at 1.30 P. M.

#### SECOND DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

The convention was called to order, and the Rev. George F. Rossmuller offered prayer.

Mr. Hepburn, from the committee on resolutions, reported as follows :

#### STRONG RESOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF THE GOLD STANDARD.

We declare that the bankers of this State have no selfish or class interest in the establishment of any particular standard of value or any use for any particular kind of money as currency, nor are we benefited as a class by the maintenance of one metal as the standard to the exclusion of others.

We are the custodians of hundreds of millions of dollars, not our own money, but the money of merchants, manufacturers, workingmen, widows, orphans—all, in fact, who have money employed in business or saved against the impairment of earning capacity or old age—every dollar of which to-day is equal to a gold dollar. We have the same interest in the preservation of a safe, stable monetary system that every citizen of whatever trade, business or profession has—no more, no less.

The chartered banking institutions of the State of New York are indebted to the public at large in the form of deposits subject to check in the sum of \$1,853,000,000, while the public are indebted to us in the form of loans and discounts in the sum of \$1,261,000,000. Being debtors in this large amount, with our payables largely exceeding our receivables, we believe it to be the part of wisdom and the part of honor for the United States to maintain the present gold standard of value.

We believe in the full observance of all contracts, and in the payment of all obligations in money of the same standard of value as that which existed at the time of the creation of such obligations.

The best definition of coin money has been furnished by the ablest bimetallist of the age, Henri Cernuschi. He says:

"It is by the ordeal of fire that money may be tried. The coins which being melted down retain the entire value for which they were a legal tender before they were melted down, are good money. Those which do not retain it are not good money."

Gold coins are the only ones that sustain that test.

Currency, which is the basis of all business transactions, should be based upon that standard that is least variable and has the widest recognition among the nations of the world in order that transactions, both national and international, may be settled with the least embarrassment from fluctuations in exchange.

The \$16,000,000,000 of international trade balances are annually settled in gold. The do-



mestic commerce of the United States, amounting annually to \$35,000,000,000, is contracted for and settled upon the gold basis. The business of all the great commercial nations of the world is conducted upon the gold basis. Eighty-three per cent. of the commerce of the world is upon the gold basis.

In view of this fact we believe it would be criminal folly to break away from the most advanced and civilized nations to join China and Mexico upon the silver basis.

Gold has been the standard of value in the United States as a matter of fact since 1834, and as a matter of law since 1873.

In all countries where the gold standard prevails both gold and silver circulate as money. In all the countries where the silver standard prevails there is no gold in circulation as money.

There was in circulation and in the United States Treasury on July 1, 1896, \$636,304,102 of coined silver and Treasury notes issued against silver bullion purchased; \$610,750,012 of gold and \$804,671,563 of paper money.

The free coinage of gold and silver at the ratio of sixteen to one means that sixteen ounces of silver shall possess the same coinage value at the mint that one ounce of gold has, notwithstanding the fact that the commercial or market value of one ounce of gold is equal to 81½ ounces of silver. It means that any person can purchase in the open market one thousand dollars worth of silver bullion, take it to the mint, and, coinage free (the alloy would have to be paid for), receive therefor 2,000 full legal-tender dollars with which to discharge two thousand dollars worth of indebtedness. It means a dollar commercially worth 52 cents, but, by fiat of Government, which stamps it as a legal tender, made to pass for 100 cents. It would thus mean the repudiation of 50 per cent. of indebtedness. This would be true only of existing debts. The sagacious instinct of trade would correct this wrong as to future contracts by doubling the price of commodities.

Hence the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 means a great inflation of prices without any increase of values. Just in proportion to this inflation would the purchasing power of a dollar be decreased, and in the same measure and to the same degree would pensions, annuities, salaries, life insurance, savings funds, and all fixed income be impaired in their power to provide maintenance and support. It means that the seigniorage, or apparent profit in coinage, that is, the difference between the cost of the silver bullion in open market and the face value of the money into which it is coined, shall hereafter inure to the benefit of the individual and not to the Government. It means a silver basis and silver monometallism. It means that the \$600,000,000 of gold now in circulation would go to a premium, would cease to circulate as money and become a commodity simply, whether coined or uncoined. It would produce a violent contraction of the currency to the extent to which gold now in circulation ceased to circulate as money. It would not only unsettle but would thoroughly demoralize business. All classes would suffer. Those would suffer most who are least able to take care of themselves, to wit, the laboring classes. The crushing effect upon business would be equalled only by the demoralizing effect upon public morals and the public sense of honor, lowered and humiliated as they would be by such an act of repudiation.

We believe it to be the duty of all good and patriotic citizens to unite their efforts in preventing such a calamity. We believe it to be the duty of the Government to maintain the gold standard and preserve the parity of all forms of currency which it allows to circulate as money.

We believe this to be indispensable in order to protect and foster the interests of our citizens and preserve to the United States the paramount position which she occupies in the sisterhood of nations.

The resolutions were unanimously adopted.

MR. KEMP: This is a campaign of education, and I believe that the document just read would be a magnificent campaign document to send all over this country to educate the people.

MR. COOMBE: I move that a copy of that resolution be sent to every member of the association and to the chairmen of the various groups. Carried.

THE PRESIDENT: We will now take up the regular order, and I have great pleasure in introducing to you Hon. S. M. Griswold, President of the Union Bank of Brooklyn, who will address us upon "The Prosperity of Banks."

#### THE PROSPERITY OF BANKS—ADDRESS BY HON. S. M. GRISWOLD, PRESIDENT OF THE UNION BANK, OF BROOKLYN.

As this is the last business meeting of your convention, and as others are to follow me and important business is to be transacted, I shall occupy your time but a few moments. I have not prepared any paper to read to you upon any theory or plan of banking. I knew

that others would do that better than I could. In fact, they have already done it. But I will direct the few remarks which I shall make toward the relation of the banking business to the community and to the Government.

The most important organization in the community is our system of banking. It stands next to the Government. All classes depend largely upon it. The farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant and the artisan, all require the assistance of the banks to successfully conduct their business. The Government, in its financial department, depends upon the banks; especially in times of emergency, which fact has been repeatedly demonstrated in our history. This does not apply alone to the United States; the banking systems of England, France and Germany are the foundation of their business prosperity; they could not produce and transport their products from one country to another; they could not create and maintain their standing armies and navies without loans, which the banks are called upon to place.

The prosperity which has generally attended the conducting of the banking business shows that it is a needed institution, and if wisely managed will ensure the prosperity of the people. As a proof of this let one or two or three banks fail in succession, and at once distrust and disaster follow. On the other hand, how many times have the banks stood like a wall against financial panic and ruin, and to-day the position which the banks of this country have taken upon the question of a gold standard and against the silver craze will do more than all other influences combined to bring to a successful issue the sound money question. \* \* \*

The development of the banking business of the world has reached its highest standard in this country. As an evidence of it I call to your minds the opening which took place recently of that magnificent financial palace, the New York Clearing-House, also of the spectacle presented a few months ago of a Government asking for a loan of \$100,000,000 in gold and over \$600,000,000 was offered. In view of these facts, who can prophesy the future?

I will have one thing more which I will allude to—the currency problem—which will have to be settled before a great while. There is at the present time in circulation \$346,000,000 of legal tender war currency; \$150,000,000 of various other issues of Treasury notes and \$200,000,000 National bank notes, making a total of \$696,000,000. To meet the increased business requirements of the country this circulation should be increased to at least \$1,000,000,000. Our circulation in the United States is only \$22 per capita, while in France it is \$42. Let the Government issue \$500,000,000 thirty-year three per cent. interest-bearing bonds; retire the legal-tender and Treasury notes; have Congress pass a law allowing the banks to issue the \$1,000,000,000 bank notes secured by Government bonds at par, and you solve the problem.

I cannot sit down without expressing my gratitude to the New York State Bankers' Association for the benefit it has been to me in the valuable information which I have gained among you in regard to financial matters and for the many pleasant associations and friendships which I have formed here, not forgetting the elegant manner in which we were entertained day before yesterday by the Buffalo bankers in that splendid city, and I look upon this social feature of our gatherings as being the charm and the power of our organization, and in my judgment if you go on as you have, and develop the social features of our association the time will not be far distant when, uniting not only in this State in one common brotherhood the officers of the bank, but throughout the whole nation, we will control the destinies of the people.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I suppose the members of the association have noticed one peculiar feature in regard to our programme this year. At the meeting of our council of administration we concluded not to invite any outsiders, so to speak, to address us at this convention, and I am sure we have all listened with pleasure to the gentlemen who have come before—those of yesterday and Senator Griswold to-day—and I now have the great pleasure of introducing to you Hon. George B. Sloan, who will address us upon "The Uses and Usefulness of Banks."

#### THE USES AND USEFULNESS OF BANKS—ADDRESS BY HON. GEO. B. SLOAN, PRESIDENT SECOND NATIONAL BANK, OSWEGO.

The subject I am expected to discuss to-day is a broad one; so broad, indeed, that a wider share of knowledge is required than I dare to believe I possess. I have hesitated to undertake it, lest I might not be able to touch acceptably even its salient features.

Banks have filled and continue to fill so important a place in the transactions of the world, I deem it within bounds to say, the scope of their influence is as wide as civilization itself. Not only in the exchange of domestic commodities, but in foreign exchanges—in all

commercial transactions in fact—the business of banking so nearly penetrates every avenue, it has grown to be one of the elements of a common whole. To compute the part it plays from day to day, or to fathom the extent of its share in the total of the world's pursuits, presents a field of conjecture inscrutable to many, and only imperfectly comprehended by students and thinkers.

Banking is a factor of positive force. Its force is felt in all the activities of life, in wider measure, perhaps, than any other vocation. It is associated with the affairs of governments, corporations, firms, and individuals—women as well as men. Its offices are required by the rich and the poor, by the miser and the spendthrift. It is the inseparable ally of enterprise. It touches the lives of governments, monarchies as well as republics. Crowned heads have sought the favor of banks, and presidents have been known to acknowledge their usefulness. Banks have it in their power to help or hinder the growth of States. They tide them over emergencies. They afford relief at critical junctures. Banks aid the enterprise of cities, towns, and villages. The touch of banks to husbandry is as close as the plow or the reaper. Without banks, there could be no adequate outlet for farm products. The first man sought to "move the crop" is the banker. So, too, his hand is part of the machinery of the mill, the mine, and the forge. The banker is asked to fill a place in the manufacturer's work, beginning with the purchase of the raw material and ending when the bills payable, representing finished product, are paid and cancelled. Either for themselves or as intermediaries for others, banks furnish the capital for railroads, canals, and telegraphs. In the same way they float the "ocean greyhounds," and play no small part in providing cargoes, both passengers and freight. Their resources respond to the demands of towering "sky-scrapers," and the tenants of these tall buildings, feel never so far above the banker as to pass him by.

The banker, in short, is very much in evidence whichever way we turn. He is the omnipresent helper of development, willing always to lend a hand, but, not forgetting that the "laborer is worthy of his hire," demands all the hire the borrower will pay. In other words, the banker is not in business for diversion. And yet I venture the assertion that in no other employment is there more exacting labor performed, greater extent or variety of risks incurred, for smaller compensation, than in the business of banking. But still it sometimes seems to me, though I hesitate to speak it out loud, remembering that erroneous impressions are possible, that no compensation is more reluctantly paid than the fees of banks. The advantage of "the account" is rated to be of great value by the bank customer, and is thought to entitle him to a waiver of charges for service rendered, even when that service entails upon the bank more of outlay than of income. Profits of banks, especially banks of discount and deposit, in the matter of percentages of rates for doing business, are so infinitesimal, that large aggregations of transactions afford the only promise of gain, and the measure of gain on the largest volume of transactions can hardly be said to be enough to provide an insurance fund to cover the losses of financial panics, against which adequate safeguards are yet imperfect. It should be said, however, in passing, that to turn aside such perils modern methods have done something—not all that is needed, to be sure, but steps of practical value have been taken and tried, and with good effect. It is within the knowledge of the members of this association that a recent and memorable crisis in financial affairs would have been vastly more destructive but for clearing-house systems, and notably the clearing-house of the city of New York. The skill and courage of the committee of the New York Clearing-House was a shield of protection against the dangers of that trying ordeal. I believe it to be no overstatement of the case to say, that if the work of the clearing-house committee did not save the country from universal bankruptcy, it did save it from universal liquidation. When we turn aside to study the character of that service, quite naturally we try to estimate the consequences, had there been no clearing-houses. In that way better knowledge is acquired of what a clearing-house is, and what a clearing-house can do. New insight is gained of its power to meet emergencies and to stay their havoc. No illustration of that power could be more convincing than what it did in 1893. The part it played in that crisis alone should have won the admiration of every business man, whether banker or not, because all were sharers in the benefits. Certainly the value of that service is beyond computation, and cannot be too gratefully remembered.

#### VALUE OF PATIENCE AND COURTESY.

The banker of to-day who earns dividends for his stockholders can be neither slack in methods nor slow in action. He must be diligent and sagacious. More than that, he must be a mind-reader; he must possess the power of divining situations and measuring men. He cannot afford to make mistakes. May I not suggest, too, the extreme value in a banker's equipment of that little attribute called patience? Is it not indeed a prime necessity? If I do not err more than I think I do, it is a greater necessity now than formerly. Competition of to-day sharpens the need for every helpful quality of character to keep in the race at all, but sharper still is that need to hold a place at the front. Time was when the spur of compe-

tion prodded bankers less severely than it does to-day; when the President's chair was perched on a higher eminence than now; when the average patron crossed the threshold of the bank parlor with a sense of dread, lest the distant welcome should remind him that it was a cold day. Not always, I may say, but sometimes, the greeting was more than cold—it was arrogant, if not ill-natured—and all of these were borne because bank facilities were in few hands and capital scarce. Happily that day has passed, and I hope forever.

It is obvious to all in these days of intimate contact, the little with the big and the big with the little, that the borrower of money needs no hint to know that he possesses rights which the lender is not only bound to respect, but is willing to respect. It is also known by lenders as well as borrowers that neither arrogance nor self-sufficiency has any place in modern banking. Little observation is needed, either, to see that courtesy is already a superseding element, and that the banker who does not know it is badly handicapped. Bankers who note the conditions they live in, are learning that the account of the customer will go somewhere else when courtesy is lacking, if, indeed, a near-by banker is not already making overtures to entice it away. Other things being equal, therefore, and sometimes whether equal or unequal, courtesy plays a helpful part, if not a controlling part. The truth is, bores in banking are out of place. They are back numbers—and they ought to be.

Recalling some of my own experiences in early life when asking banks for loans, I remember most gratefully the considerate banker, and I remember, too, the other variety. I am glad to be able to say of them, speaking collectively, that the former were in the majority, but not so large a majority, I believe, as they are to-day. Living over again those experiences, I am reminded of the utility, and also the banker's need to remember, that "A soft answer turneth away wrath." The banker should not harden his heart to the extent of needlessly wounding his customer's pride. I venture to throw this in as a precept, since I know myself what it is to be one of the wounded. Even at this late day I think I could unlock my memory and trace a scar or two. I may add that, like the boy in school who hoped that some day he would be big enough to flog the schoolmaster, I have been wicked enough myself, when smarting under the banker's capriciousness, to indulge a similar hope. I think I ought to admit, however, that time has softened those asperities. I can see now that the peculiarities of the banker warped my judgment. I did not give wide enough place in my thoughts for the banker's cogitations. The desirability of the paper was the puzzle he was solving. I realize now that the point of view makes a difference. I wish to tell you, therefore, that I harbor no resentments for what my banking friends did, but I still dislike as much as ever the way they did it.

Glancing thus hurriedly over the field of uses of banks, I think I may summarize by asserting that the business of banking is a needed and a staying one. I may dare to maintain that a community without a bank is essentially a feeble community. I take it that such a community is as wanting in the elements of development as machinery is deficient without a lubricant.

#### BANKS NECESSARY TO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY.

The activities of a community can no more expand without a bank than vegetation can grow without sunshine. One is as indispensable as the other. To a greater extent, I think, than other vocations, banking enlists the patronage of all. It brings to its counter the lawyer, the doctor, the minister, the editor, the capitalist, the merchant, the manufacturer, the farmer, the workingman, the mechanic, the teacher, the clerk, the nurse, and the seamstress—all, in short, who have a part to play in the drama of life. They go there either as depositors, to receive payments of checks drawn against the deposits of others, or to avail themselves in other ways of the facilities of the bank. All are therefore interested in the stability of the bank. When the bank suspends and becomes insolvent, the consequences distress more people than insolvency in any other branch of business. Recall the evidences you have seen yourselves. Look back at the groups of anxious faces gathered on the street, seeking information and comfort from each other, because the bank has failed. Note the workingman, inquiring if you think he has lost his all, so lately thought to be secure; the merchant, too, disturbed and harassed, contriving ways to meet maturing obligations, and the widow, impoverished and agonized, seeking your advice—all appealing to sympathy, and sending deep down into your convictions a livelier sense of the responsibility of assuming the guardianship of money.

So potent is the instrumentality of the bank, that in many countries it is allied to the state—so closely allied that it fulfills the obligations of near relationship. Its power is so great in finance, and finance so great in moving the wheels of government, statecraft long ago recognized the need of incorporating into its systems these provisions of alliance for mutual advantage. The belief, I think, is general, that banks under government supervision are nearer to extreme conservatism than in any other way they can be. Therefore we witness in our own country concurrence in the wisdom of laws providing for examination of

banks, not only to protect the people who patronise them, but to guard the good name of the Government, whose sponsorship they involve.

I have sometimes wondered whether the success of the national banking system, especially its supervision of the management of banks, has not in some minds magnified the inherent power of Government; whether it has not sown seeds of belief that the Government is omnipotent—that it can actually conduct business in defiance of natural laws. Either this or its successful issue of Treasury notes, more commonly known as greenbacks, or both, have had the effect, I fancy, of creating a hatchery of measures so eccentric, both in form and matter, that their contemplation tires the brain with astonishment. Some of these proposed laws as curiosities are worthy of attention. In the last degree they are startling, so startling I think I may be pardoned for asking you to note them. In the brief time I am allowed, however, I must confine myself to a limited selection from the collection, but at the same time assuring you that there are many more in the museum quite as Quixotic as those I shall mention. Here is an epitome of the title of one introduced into the fifty-third Congress, viz.: "An Act to authorize the establishment of a bureau of loans, and directing it to issue Treasury notes to be loaned on real estate and imperishable products of agriculture and manufactured articles that will not deteriorate by storage a few months." Another, introduced at about the same time, proposes to provide for the establishment of a Government banking system and to create the office of "bankers-general, twelve bankers-general to hold office for twelve years at ten thousand dollars per annum, and to be retired at five thousand per annum, and to build buildings in all cities, counties and states, and to issue money to double the cost of the buildings and fixtures, to be loaned upon real and personal property." These bills, if enacted into laws, we are told, would fill a long-felt want—an aching void, so to speak. Their authors entertain the opinion that they are needed in order to supply with money the "wants of trade," the theory being, I infer, that the Government through its omnipotency can do anything it pleases—that it can install safety at will, and therefore plant confidence in any enterprise it undertakes, without being at all subordinated to practices or methods. For instance, it is believed, as already you have observed, that Government can connect the business of banking with its other functions, and conduct it safely on lines that if practiced by individuals would be rejected as unsafe and dangerous. In other words, it is assumed that the Government could properly supply the people with money on the security of insufficient collaterals, and because it was done by the Government, all would be well. Strangely enough, the promoters of these fallacies cannot see that insecure loans by the Government are as impermissible as loans of like character by individuals, or individual corporations. A system of loaning money by the Government, if for any reason of exigency or otherwise it were desirable at all, should be no less conservative than the systems of private enterprise. It takes no prophet to foretell that if not equally conservative, the system would come to grief. Without the possibility of doubt, that result would follow, unless the Treasury of the United States stood ready to make good the deficiencies of losses, and, of course, that can never be a part of Government obligation. To bolster up banks or bureaus created to "make money easy" is too foreign to our republican notions for a moment to be entertained.

But conservative reasoning, or even rational reasoning, falls short and always will fall short of changing the opinions of that school of economists. They will never look upon life as worth living until their experiments are tried. They are inoculated, and I may say saturated, with them—optimism dominates the whole range of their vision. They never scent danger until overwhelmed by it. Their convictions are so deep-seated that through their way of seeing things the affairs of the world will never cease to be awry until their panaceas are adopted. If bureaus or banks could only be organized to let people have money without such pesky particularity about getting it back again, they tell us we would see business "hum." It is not necessary to tell this assemblage of practical business men that the common-sense idea is opposed to schemes of that character. It looks upon them as madness let loose, and well it may, for nothing could be crazier than to launch the Government in the business of loaning money for business uses, in any form, with or without security. It might, perhaps, become a fad with the man who rests his hopes on the power of the "political pull," urging it to "help the party," but I fancy a bigger "pull" would be required to "pull" the party and the people out of the hole we should find ourselves pulled into, when such laws are written on the statute-books.

#### LIMITS OF BANKING LEGISLATION.

The sensible and immutable law is, that legislation affecting banks goes far enough when the safety of depositors and bill-holders is secured, and the rights of stockholders guarded, when undue exactions by banks are forbidden, and when contracts entered into in pursuance of these enactments can be enforced in the courts.

It is outside the province of the state, using that word in its general sense, either to

engage in the business of loaning money or of creating money. The first is lunacy, and the second is a dream. The state can enact laws vesting in banks the power to issue its notes, payable in money, but such notes are not in themselves money. They are simply promises to pay money, and will circulate from hand to hand, just as long, and no longer, than confidence prevails that money is ready at the counter of the bank to pay them when presented.

Money cannot be created by any agency on earth in defiance of the laws which nature has decreed, and any effort to do it will bring ruin to those who undertake it, and suffering to all who come under the dominion of such attempts.

I need not repeat what this intelligent body of bankers knows so well—that the experience of generations teaches that gold and silver are the best adapted to supplying these qualities—the qualities of accuracy and stability—gold as the measuring metal, with silver performing a subsidiary function; the former as redemption money, and the latter as minor coin or change money. It is not denied, however, that silver can be used outside the province of change money to the extent of its convertibility into gold at the Government Treasury, at the pleasure of the holder, practically as now, but not beyond that, until through international agreement concurrent action on other lines is reached.

I may remark at this point that the extraordinary propositions of organizing banks and bureaus for loaning money by the Government are only types of other inventions of theorists of a new school of finance. Their plans of legislation are numerous, but not more numerous than unique. Therefore, let me say apologetically for calling attention to them, that I have done it more to show the financial vagaries of the human mind than to treat them as calling for any expenditure of effort to avert a danger. No Congress ever yet elected in the United States would give such measures serious consideration.

I think I ought to say right here, parenthetically, that the men who advocate government bureaus for loaning money, and other radicalisms like government ownership of railroads and telegraphs, are also the advocates of free coinage of silver; but do not understand me as saying that all the advocates of free coinage are supporters of these delirious schemes now and again coming to the surface. Still, I believe I am quite right in assuming that the advocates of these fantasies to a man, not excluding, either, a single anarchist in the land, will be found in the councils of free coinage. They have nothing in common with gold bugs. Always falling into line, therefore, on the question of free coinage, making that a common rallying ground, they tell us that they are looking out for our welfare as well as their own, and they regret our lack of understanding to appreciate it. They tell us their legislation will be for the good of all. They tell us they are sharper than we are—too sharp to be caught by Lombard street or Wall street. Their eye teeth were cut too early for that. They assure us they have looked down deeply into the whole question, and they know precisely what the preventive of hard times is, and they will use it. Looking the matter squarely in the face, stripping it of all sophistry, it resolves itself into a call for us to decide, as it seems to me, whether we shall plunge headlong into the dangers of the gravest character: whether, for instance, we shall follow the example of the man who seated himself on the limb of a tree, and vigorously proceeded to saw off the limb. For myself, I shall seek neither knowledge nor experience in that way—the cost would be too high. I must try something cheaper.

#### STABILITY OF THE MONEY STANDARD NECESSARY.

Coming back again to the question of stability in our monetary transactions, from which I have digressed for a moment, we need to know correlatively what money is. When we know that, we have the case plainly before us. I should say in reply, if called upon to answer that inquiry, that money is the servant of barter. Technically, according to some authorities, that definition is not quite precise, because the exchange of one commodity for another commodity, whether one is money or something else, is barter; but for my purpose to-day I shall ask a little license, and so term money as I have proposed, or as another has expressed it "the yard-stick of trade." The needs of the human family are vast and varied. To supply these needs the industry and the ingenuity of many hands are required. One has aptness in producing one article, while a neighbor finds profit in producing another. One man chooses for a vocation the cultivation of land, another is a builder, another a shoemaker, another a tailor, and so on through all the long lists of trades and professions. Each of these requires the products of the other as essential to existence and happiness. One product is wanted to sustain life, and is, therefore, a necessity; another is a luxury, but both are wants that must be supplied, either through the agency of money or of barter.

Pardon me for calling attention to primeval conditions, not because I have a thought that I am either enlightening or entertaining you, but, nevertheless, please indulge me for a moment, by thinking what kind of a condition we would be in if the possession of all of these needed things could only be acquired by the process of barter, by searching for those who owned them and would be likely to enter into negotiations to dispose of them. Think of the time consumed in effecting the exchange of something we needed for something we chanced to own, and were willing to part with. How many fruitless attempts to make a bargain

would occur before the terms of the bargain were agreed upon? I am inclined to think that about one day of such conditions would teach the utility of money as it never was taught before, and another day would indelibly impress the lesson of its labor-saving and nerve-saving power. We can see at a glance that without money, however much property value one might possess in goods and chattels, he might still find himself scouring the neighborhood in vain to buy a breakfast, and no imagination is needed to realize how easy it would be for the dinner hour to arrive before breakfast was ready.

To destroy money or to banish it from circulation would be a backward step—a step to barbarism. It would be accepting aboriginal conditions, and that of course is neither desirable nor possible. This servant of barter, therefore, as I have taken the liberty of terming money, should, above all else, be a reliable servant, and to be a reliable servant it should be an absolutely correct measure. In other words, it should do its work accurately. It cannot be efficient one day, and inefficient the next. It must enjoy such good repute as to maintain confidence, and to maintain confidence, if must be the same every day in the year. Without the confidence that comes from good repute, it can have no first-class employment; there is no use for it except in the second class. That class may be good enough for China or Mexico, but not good enough for the United States. To put it in another form, value must express equality at home and abroad. The money of the United States cannot possess one value here, and another value in Europe, and yet be counted good money. Only as an absolutely correct measure everywhere, can money in the highest sense fulfill its mission. For the United States alone to undertake the task of using silver as such money, would be futile and disastrous. It would be contrary to sound principles and the results of all experience. To my mind, it passes comprehension that all cannot see it in that light, but they cannot or do not, and we must take things as we find them.

Time forbids and necessity requires no analysis in this presence, of the reasons for opposing free coinage of silver. The overwhelming sentiment of this association is opposed to it. Not altogether, I desire to say, is it opposed because bankers' interests are directly involved; not because the change to free coinage would bring losses to every bank holding bills receivable, or other assets good under normal conditions; not because a period of doubt and danger would run all through the business of banks of the State and nation; but because every man engaged in business of any kind, merchants, manufacturers, workingmen—all of our citizens in short—would feel the ill effects, and for that larger and broader reason, therefore, we enter our protest against this monstrous error.

I cannot better epitomize my own prophecy of evil than by quoting a recent declaration of our former President, Mr. Cornwell. That gentleman was at Chicago, and needless to say, doing yeoman's service in the cause of sound money during the session of the convention that nominated a candidate for President last week. He was reported as saying that he was there "as a member of the Sound Money Committee of the Reform Club of New York city." The committee is non-partisan, composed of both Republicans and Democrats.

"We have come on to protest," he said, "in the name of the business men of the United States, against the reckless insanity of free silver. We have come to say that the business men, North, South, East and West, have not been carried away by this craze, but are solid for sound money. Three-quarters of the men who are for 16 to 1 honestly believe that they are working for success and prosperity, but they are deluded. The success of free coinage means, to begin with, the worst panic we have ever had, followed by black ruin and ten years of hard times." To which I will simply add the remark, that I do not think the consequences to come from free coinage are at all overwrought by Mr. Cornwell.

I am not prepared to say that in all cases the men who take the other view are ill-intentioned, notwithstanding the violent epithets they hurl at us, but I think I may predict that the objective point of rescuing the country from hard times, which they tell us they are striving to do, will not be reached by traveling over that road. People will come to understand that the road these men are traveling, if traveled long enough, will ditch them in the end. The fact remains, however, that their creed has hypnotized a great many good men. Too long the promise of more money has been captivating the ear, proving itself more enticing to the unthinking than the promise of good money. Quality has been a better word to conjure with than quality. We are aware that it has taken years of discussion to impress the fact that beneath the promise of more money—the catch phrase for free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1—there are dangers too disquieting for silence or inaction. And after all has been said, there is still lacking that appreciation of the danger we would like to see. Because the advocates of free coinage look upon it merely as an incident of the Herculean endeavors, they tell us they are putting forth to better the condition of their fellow citizens, I suppose they omit to call attention to their expectation that free coinage will bring double profits to mine owners. They fail to remind us of their belief that opening the mints of the United States for silver bullion worth fifty-three cents, to be coined into dollars worth one hundred cents, will be a very good thing for the silver regions. We do not object to enhanced profits to the mine-owner any more than we do larger profits to the agri-

culturist or the manufacturer, but we want those profits to come legitimately, and not at the cost of demoralization of our whole financial system. While at the moment we are witnessing a revival of the demand for free coinage, and seemingly with more earnestness than ever, there comes with it an antidote of powerful agencies of opposition. In states where all or nearly all were for free coinage, we hear the warnings of master-minds appealing to their brethren to stop and consider. Like the voice of John the Baptist, "crying in the wilderness," these voices will be heard. They will be heard, because the lessons they teach are the lessons of logic and experience, and cannot be controverted. Six months ago the silver agitation was strong, and is strong now in many sections of the country, especially in the South and West: but now we see evidences that new seed is sowing, with here and there some fruitage, where all supposed no crop was looked for. This is not a welcome discovery to note, but it is here and has to be met. It should be remembered, nevertheless, as an offset to that side of the picture, that, for the first time since the commencement of the agitation of the question, the issue is squarely made, and will be voted on in November by the electors in every State of the Union. In this there is encouragement, greater encouragement than I can express, greater than you and I together can estimate, and great enough, I confidently expect, to win the battle. I do not hesitate to predict that under the searchlight of full and free discussion, as will surely come and continue up to the day the decision is pronounced, the verdict is not, and never can be in doubt. The American people will not debase their currency. They will not vote to make their money second to any money in the world. I may say, therefore, that I have no apprehensions, no fears. None whatever. I look with confidence to the tribunal of the highest court, and feel secure in what I believe to be a fact, that right makes might. It is said that there is nothing in the world that has life without it also has an enemy. In the animal kingdom, in the vegetable kingdom, on the earth, in the air, and in the water, the enmity exists, and the interminable fight for life and death goes on. I believe I may say without getting very far away from truth, that in none of these fields of sanguinary conflict has the fight been more virulent than in the arena of finance in the United States, for a score or more of years. First we had the greenback agitation, followed by its legitimate offspring, the free-coinage contention. The greenback agitation was fought to a finish, and is dead beyond resurrection. Those who upheld it do not care nowadays to introduce it as a topic of conversation. No wonder. It is not an agreeable subject for a greenbacker to discuss. Public opinion sat down upon it so hard it lingers only as a memory, and yet we can all remember that it was very much alive in its day. So, too, I venture again to give as my opinion, will be the fate of free coinage of silver. Notwithstanding the desperate efforts to breathe new life into it, I firmly believe dissolution is near. I believe free coinage is on its last legs. The people are rising in their might and that means the end. The fact that after such an aggressive and intensely bitter fight for life, it is soon to die, affords new evidence of the power of intelligent people, acting in their sovereignty, to solve intricate problems. It proves that when questions of moment are under consideration in this enlightened country of ours, however hesitating in judgment the people at times may be, when the verdict is reached the decision is sure to be right. At the "heel of the hunt," the judgment of the American people is infallible.

If I were asked for an opinion on the present outlook therefore, I would say, with the immortal bard, the "winter of our discontent" is passed. The "glorious summer" so long and so anxiously looked for is here. The warmth of its sunshine is upon us. The blackness of the financial sky is clearing. Golden hues are visible, not in all their brightness yet, but growing brighter every day. I believe we are on the threshold of better times and that before the meeting of this association a twelvemonth hence, manufacturers, merchants, mechanics, workingmen, producers all, will be looking at the dawning of a better day. I believe that smiling plenty will bless our land. I believe it will come to every worthy household. Its coming will cause gladness around the hearths of homes where joy has been a stranger. I believe a change is near, and when it comes the people will lift their voices in praise and thanksgiving. The long night of gloom will have passed away, and the glory of prosperous days will illuminate the land, inspiring us all to greater effort at the call of wider opportunity.

THE PRESIDENT: We shall now have the pleasure of listening to an address by James H. Tripp, President of the First National Bank, of Marathon, on the question, "Will a Further Expansion of the Currency be of any Material Benefit to the Business Interests of the Country?" [See June number of the MAGAZINE, page 738.]

MR. GROESBECK: I have a matter which I wish to present to the association by way of suggestion. We have heard a great deal lately about the political campaign that is upon us, and that it is going to be a campaign of education. I think we should realize that there has got to be a great deal of educational work done in this



campaign. I do not think we should be content and say that we are going to win anyhow. Now, the suggestion I wish to make is that a committee of this association be appointed, which might be termed "A Sound Money Literature Committee," and that it shall have the power to select and purchase certain books and pamphlets and distribute the same among the members of the association. My attention has been called lately to a little slip entitled "16 to 1," which I understand the Seaboard National Bank has had printed for general distribution. There are a number of similar things that might be published with advantage.

MR. ASHLEY: Mr. President, I would offer the following resolution, which bears directly upon the subject spoken of by Mr. Groesbeck:

*Resolved*, That the present committee on resolutions be continued as a sound money literature committee to disseminate among the people such literature, etc., as they shall deem proper for the purpose of creating a sentiment for the continuance of honest money in the United States.

Mr. Ashley's resolution was adopted.

MR. GROESBECK: I think it is proper at this time to offer a vote of thanks to the Buffalo banks for the courtesies and entertainment extended to the members of this association. I move that a vote of thanks be tendered them.

THE PRESIDENT: It affords the Chair much pleasure to put the question on this motion. All in favor of the motion will say aye; opposed, no. Carried.

MR. COOMBE: I think there is no more fitting time—although perhaps it should come just previous to adjournment—than this to offer a vote of thanks to the Niagara Falls committee on entertainment, and particularly to Mr. Charles Adsit, the chairman of the committee. To anybody who has served on such committees the work and responsibility incurred is well known and in a measure it is a thankless position. From what I have seen I know that when Mr. Adsit goes home from this convention he will probably take a well-earned rest. I move that the thanks of this association be tendered to the Niagara Falls bankers and in particular to Mr. Adsit for their arduous efforts to make this convention a pleasant and successful one.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we should take the vote upon this question by rising. All in favor of the motion will please rise. Carried.

Mr. Trowbridge moved that at the next annual convention opportunity be given to each group to present names for the respective offices to be filled and that the groups be called in their order for the presentation of names to be voted for. Carried.

Mr. Kennedy moved a vote of thanks to the proprietors of the hotel for the conveniences afforded the members of the association during this convention. Carried.

BRADFORD RHODES: I believe a large part of the success of this convention has been due to the presence of ladies among us. At the meeting of Group VII. a few weeks ago in the Catskill Mountains we had 102 delegates present and a large number of ladies. The invitations sent out by your committee some weeks ago made special mention of the fact that the ladies should come along with their husbands and friends. Therefore, I move you, sir, that it is the sense of this convention that hereafter during the continuance of this organization the ladies be especially requested to be present. It has been my pleasure, and I believe the pleasure of many of us, to see lady delegates at this convention. We hope that hereafter in future conventions we may have many of them.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Kennedy and was carried.

Senator Sloan declined the nomination for president and urged the election of Judge Seymour Dexter, who was thereupon chosen as president for the ensuing year.

Mr. Hepburn declined the nomination for vice president in favor of Hon. S. M. Griswold, who was chosen unanimously.

Mr. Barker withdrew in favor of C. F. Van Inwegen, who was elected as Treasurer. Mr. Thayer declined the nomination for secretary, and John A. Kennedy was elected to that office.

Delegates to the next convention of the American Bankers' Association were chosen as follows:

- Group I.—S. M. Clement, President Marine Bank, Buffalo.
- Group II.—N. H. Becker, Cashier Exchange National Bank, Seneca Falls.
- Group III.—Charles Adsit, Cashier First National Bank, Hornellsville.
- Group IV.—James H. Tripp, President First National Bank, Marathon.
- Group V.—John R. Van Wagenen, President First National Bank, Oxford.
- Group VI.—Francis N. Mann, Jr., Vice-President Mutual National Bank, Troy.
- Group VII.—C. A. Pugsley, Cashier Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill.
- Group VIII.—Walter E. Frew, President Queens County Bank, Long Island City.
- Group IX.—Stuart G. Nelson, Vice-President Seaboard National Bank, New York.

MR. SLOAN: I think it proper for us to recognize the great efficiency manifested by the retiring president, and I move that the thanks of this association be extended to James G. Cannon, of New York, for his attention to the duties of the office of president of this association and the ability with which he has performed them.

Carried, with three cheers. Mr. Roberts moved a vote of thanks to the retiring vice-president, the secretary and the treasurer. Carried.

THE PRESIDENT: I now present the newly elected president, Seymour Dexter.

#### ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT SEYMOUR DEXTER.

I appreciate more than I can express the partiality and honor which you have conferred upon me in this election as your president for the ensuing year. It is with great diffidence that I accept this high honor. I said to my friend, Mr. Sloan, that I felt that he was getting me into a place where I really did not belong; that there were a score of other bankers in this association that deserved this honor more than I.

I became a banker when I did not want to be, but the call of others came to me, and as I accepted that call I accept your call now to the presidency of this association for the ensuing year. I accept it at a time when I feel there is greater responsibility, greater opportunity for the bankers of the State of New York than at any time in recent years except in the immediate panic and excitement of the crash of '33. It is a time when, as we go back from this convention to our respective offices and duties, we should go back with courage and confidence that we have come together here and met face to face and formed acquaintances until as bankers of this State we are growing closer and closer together.

I suggest that we should raise the question in our own minds, if a part of the community look upon us as a favored class, and are beginning to engender a spirit here and there as though they would tear down anything that the bankers were for, perhaps we should look over our own conduct towards them and see if we may not improve it. In our banking houses we ought to come in as close contact with our customers as possible, as a physician does with his patient or a lawyer with his client. In the situation that exists to-day I feel that there is a duty upon every banker to make his power and influence felt in the community where he lives. He should make that influence felt in conversations from day to day with those in his vicinity whom he feels are liable to be influenced by this popular craze that is now spreading over the country. He should make that influence felt with the editor; he should make it felt with all classes in his community, and in his banking establishment he should have documents on sound currency and should seek to instruct the wage-worker that his highest interests lie in maintaining the high standard of the dollar that we now have and which these resolutions declare has existed since 1834. He should have there the argument that is true, that he may place it in the hands of the leaders of workingmen of his locality, whereby he may show them the truth that the wage-worker to-day with the dollar which he receives for his work can go into the markets and stores and buy of necessities for his household, of luxuries and of comfort, equal or greater amounts than were ever bought by the wage-earner in this country since the war, for a dollar.

These facts and all those that bear upon sound currency it is a duty resting upon bankers throughout the land to bring to all those with whom they have influence.

In this association of ours, in the groups especially, where the acquaintance becomes stronger and in closer contact, you all agree that great benefit has accrued to the bankers by coming together and shaking each other's hand, and not being afraid that some other banker knows how we do our business or what rate of exchange we are charging. The old order of things was that every one stood competing with each other, and each was afraid to give up the secrets of his business. Let us conduct our business in such a way that we are willing the whole world should know the secret of it and notify them to investigate it. Our interests are mutual and not antagonistic. Our interests are also identical with those of the people of the community in which we live, and let us by our own acts, by our precepts and by

coming in contact with them, make them understand that fact, as we are understanding that our interests are advanced by mutual contact and acquaintance between ourselves.

I know full well that a very strong pace has been set for the president of this association by the two presidents who have preceded me, President Cornwell and President Cannon. I know that without the earnest support and co-operation of the bankers of this State I cannot satisfactorily fill this position, and I ask at your hands that you will give me that support, and that in your groups you will make them strong and make them centers of interest throughout the territory that they cover. Thanking you again, I can only pledge you the best effort which my strength and ability will enable me to give to the association.

At the conclusion of President Dexter's address the convention adjourned to meet at Saratoga Springs next year.

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#### CONVENTION NOTES.

—Mrs. Walcott J. Humphrey, director of the Wyoming County National Bank, Warsaw, and Mrs. Susan G. Adsit, director of the First National Bank, Hornellsville, the two lady delegates present at the convention, took a deep interest in the proceedings.

—The group portrait presented on another page was, unfortunately, taken at a time when a number of the delegates were absent.

—The Mt. Kisco National Bank, of which T. Ellwood Carpenter is President, joined the association some months ago, but was unintentionally omitted from the secretary's list of new members received during the past year.

—Group VII. occupied the writing-room of the International Hotel as headquarters during the convention.

—Buffalo bankers maintained headquarters at the hotel, and were most liberal in dispensing hospitality to the delegates.

—There were a number of bright features at the closing entertainment, a leading one being the song composed by W. E. Keyes and sung by C. B. Bidwell, chief clerk of the People's Bank of Buffalo.



## AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

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*TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION, TO BE HELD AT ST. LOUIS, MO.,  
SEPTEMBER 22, 23 AND 24.*

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The coming convention of the American Bankers' Association, which is to be held in the Olympic Theatre, St. Louis, September 22, 23 and 24, promises to be one of the most interesting gatherings of the bankers of this country which has ever occurred. The convention is, for the first time in its history, to rely upon members of the association for the discussion of the questions which are brought before it. Heretofore special addresses which have been of varied interest have been relied upon to occupy the thought and attention of visiting members.

It is proposed to present a number of practical banking questions which will be thrown open to the body of the convention for discussion and a general exchange of views and experiences in the banking business in the various States. This will undoubtedly prove a very interesting programme.

The clearing-house members of St. Louis have a special committee appointed for the reception of visiting bankers.

On the first afternoon there will be a drive through all the famous parks of the city.

On the evening of the next day there will be a reception at the residence of J. C. Van Blarcom, Cashier of the National Bank of Commerce, St. Louis, and the proceedings will wind up the next day with a banquet given by the bankers of St. Louis at the Planters' Hotel.

The officers of the association have put in a year of very hard work and the convention ought to show some of its results. Reduced rates have been obtained from the various railroads leading into St. Louis, and any member of the association will be able to make a pleasant and profitable journey at the railroad rate of one and one-third fare.

It is believed that the change from the practice of having the programme made up of set papers, and substituting open discussion therefor, will give greater spontaneity to the proceedings, besides giving an open field for those who desire to present their ideas to the convention. Such a plan is sure to popularize the association with those who have hitherto maintained that its annual meetings did not afford a broad enough opportunity for the discussion of banking and financial subjects. Whether the increase in the facilities for open debate will bring out as valuable and thoughtful contributions to the various topics is yet to be seen. At all events the experiment is worth trying. There is no doubt that this plan will give zest and freshness to the proceedings, and stimulate interest, though possibly the discussions may not be of as much permanent worth as the carefully-prepared papers that have been read at previous conventions.

Though the past year has been a trying one to bankers, as well as to those engaged in all other kinds of business, it is expected that the reports of the officers will show an increase in membership and receipts. There has been much valuable work done in the past year, especially in the line of preventing and discovering frauds and crimes against banks.

St. Louis is a most interesting city, and the bankers there will give the association a very cordial welcome.

## WISCONSIN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

At the fourth annual convention of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association, held at Racine on June 11, A. J. Frame, President of the Waukesha National Bank, read a paper on "Monetary Integrity and Commercial Prosperity," extracts from which were put in type for the July number, but were unavoidably crowded out. He said in part:

Let us illustrate the Gresham law in this way. We will call gold "cream," silver, "skim milk" and paper money "water." Each nation has a large reservoir filled with these liquids and all the reservoirs are connected by canals, so that all will naturally seek a common level. Now suppose the United States pours a sufficient quantity of water into its reservoir to overflow it. What runs off to the reservoirs of other countries? "Cream" of course. What runs off if we pour into the reservoir "skim milk" in free coinage does? "Cream" of course. Do the statesmen of the best land on earth desire to leave us on a diet of "skim milk" and "water" and give the other nations the "cream"?

The Gresham law has operated in the United States since 1880 because the natural reservoir of the quantity of money required by us was full. The magnanimous American people in their good will toward the silver producing States (after adding about \$475,000,000 of their product to our circulating medium since 1873) consented in 1880 to still add to a constantly depreciating currency a larger monthly volume of silver until it reached the enormous sum of \$625,000,000. Silver fell in the meantime from \$1.29 per ounce to 63 7-10 cents in 1894.

This resulted in our "cream" floating abroad as naturally as water flows down stream, thus creating distrust, and this distrust bred our panic of 1893.

This vast sum to-day exceeds the stock of any nation on earth, except only the great sink holes for silver, China and India, and yet with silver constantly depreciating, our Western silver producing friends think us ungenerous, and are still clamoring for the free opening of our mints to the world's silver, worth only 65 cents per ounce in the market, with the cool assertion that Uncle Sam's stamp on it will at once again raise this huge mass to \$1.29. They also with colossal coolness deny that our "cream" will flow from us with this prodigious in-pour of silver into our reservoir. Such assertions innocently made can only excite our pity.

Right here allow me to propound a conundrum or two. If the silver mine owners of the United States alone turned out a crop of 50,000,000 ounces of silver in 1895 and sold it for 65 cents per ounce, how much would they turn out annually if Uncle Sam took all they could mine at \$1.29 per ounce? And if the world's silver were turned into Uncle Sam's ample dimensions would he not exclaim with Johnnie when his mother brought him a fresh plate of pancakes after he had stowed away a Bland-Allison-Sherman law quantity, and she found him with an 1893 panicky face on) and asked: "What is the matter, Johnnie? Don't you want any more pancakes? Johnnie held his sides and exclaimed: "No, mamma, nor I don't want what I got."

If the United States has an excess of demand gold obligations outstanding and there is profit to the people who hold these obligations in demanding the gold, is it not human nature to keep the endless chain running as long as the Government stupidly pays out the demand obligations again? Would anyone say a business man had ordinary common sense who would continue the process if his credit was undoubted and he could borrow on time and pay those demand obligations?

There is a great hue and cry among high-class journals that the interest on our foreign debt and the expenditures of our citizens abroad annually absorbs \$200,000,000 to \$300,000,000. Is this a serious state of affairs? In the rapid development of this country does not the farmer or merchant go to the city or to the East if he can borrow money cheaper than from his neighbor? If corporations or individuals can borrow money cheaper in Europe than at home will they not do it? Does it bankrupt anyone to borrow money cheaper abroad than at home? Was Britain not a debtor nation a century ago?

We glory in the fact that the American people can afford to enrich their minds by European travel and in study of the world's history, since seeing is infinitely more satisfactory than book knowledge alone. According to the United States census report for 1890 the average annual increase of our wealth for the past decade was \$2,200,000,000, so our little savings for two short years would wipe out completely the most generous estimates of our great foreign debt, that gives so many people the shivers.

Let the people of the United States settle absolutely the quality question of our money, reduce its depreciated, redundant quantity, increase our revenues to cover the requirements of even a billion-dollar Congress. Let them imbibe a generous quantity of the philosophy of the farmer's wife in her answer to her husband when he ejaculated: "On the coinage ques-

tion, I stand square on the platform." "It ain't standin' square is what is the matter with you, Silas; standin' round is what is aillin' you an half these other fellers that orter be out plowin' instead of savin' the country with their mouths." And the marts of trade will be filled with creamy gold, the bugbear of the balance of trade will melt imperceptibly away, distrust will cease and European banks with \$300,000,000 more gold on hand than in 1879 will open their floodgates again. No people on earth are more eager for an income on their idle money than the British, and yet the Bank of England rate of discount has not changed from 2 per cent. for two years, and to-day her coffers hold \$30,000,000 more gold than a year ago, all private deposits awaiting investment where integrity and the standard of payments are unquestioned. \* \* \*

America is in her childhood compared with many of the old world countries. She outstrips them all in wealth. Her per capita debt is a very marked contrast to that of the great nations of Europe. She produces, according to Mulhall, 80 per cent. of the grain, and 38 per cent. of the meat of the civilized world, and her people are the best fed, housed and clothed. Under the head of "chief occupations of mankind" the great superiority of her various industries is shown in every item, except her foreign commerce. Her banking power exceeds even that of the United Kingdom, while every other country pales into insignificance compared with her.

Mulhall declares that 9,000,000 farm laborers in the United States produce as much grain as 33,000,000 in Europe. If this marvelous energy of the American people be supported by wise legislation, by continuing that standard of value which is recognized by the highest civilized nations of the earth, the future development of this country will be beyond our comprehension.

As against the superficial cry for free silver will any one dare deny that Germany has had a remarkable prosperity since she resolved in 1871 to adopt the gold standard? At the time of the adoption of the gold standard by Britain in 1816 her total wealth was but £2,400,000,000, with the enormous debt of 37½ per cent. of that sum. To-day she has assets of £10,000,000,000 with 6½ per cent. debt.

The United States—a country immeasurably more productive—will start the next century far ahead of where Britain ends the present one. She may soon become the creditor nation of the world. The tide is already setting in that direction. Our great insurance companies report millions invested in foreign securities.

A vast responsibility rests upon our statesmen if we would forge ahead in our rapid onward career, and no one thing will help to guide us so much as the absolute integrity of our money. Confidence is the bulwark of all progress and distrust breeds commercial distress. May the aim of our legislators be, prosperity before politics. If we fail in attaining the commercial supremacy of the world in every particular, thus transferring the commercial center from London to New York city or even Chicago (the old world metropolitan cities being internal) the grave responsibility will rest largely with our statesmen.

#### PLACES AND DATES OF FUTURE MEETINGS.

**CANADIAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The next annual meeting of the Canadian Bankers' Association will be held at Ottawa, September 9, 10 and 11.

**ILLINOIS STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The next annual convention of the Illinois State Bankers' Association will be held at Springfield, Oct. 14 and 15.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**—The second annual convention of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association will be held at Pittsburgh, November 18 and 19.

**MICHIGAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The annual convention of the Michigan Bankers' Association will be held in Grand Rapids on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, September 1st, 2d and 3d, 1896.

The Grand Rapids banks and bankers are arranging for the entertainment of delegates who may attend the convention, and the ladies who may accompany them.

F. W. Hayes, President of the Preston National Bank, Detroit, is secretary of the association.

**OHIO BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The next convention of the Ohio Bankers' Association will be held at Dayton, October 7 and 8. C. E. Niles, President of the First National Bank of Findlay, is president of the association, and S. B. Rankin, Cashier Bank of South Charleston, secretary.

## BANKING AND COMMERCE IN CANADA.

### *QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN BANK RETURNS.*

When reviewing Canadian banking at the close of the first quarter of this year a dull business season was predicted for the then current quarter, and taking the evidence as gleaned from the several annual bank meetings and the reports of commercial agencies, together with the published monthly bank returns, the result has been on a par with these anticipations.

The general elections have come and gone, many have been disappointed, many others have realized a hope which seemed nearly a forlorn one for the past eighteen years but which has become a reality at last. Up to the date of the decision as to which party should hold the reins of power there seemed an uncertainty which affected permanent investments. Now that the change has actually taken place the fear seems to continue lest a change should be made in the tariff affecting each one's special industry.

The new Government has gone to work with no seeming intention of disturbing the business of the country with any immediate changes in the tariff policy. Parliament, which was to have met on July 16, has been adjourned until August 19 in order that the newly appointed ministry may return to their constituents and receive a fresh endorsement of the people's confidence now as ministers of the Crown.

Many of the leading Canadian banks held their annual meeting in June and as may be expected a certain amount of preparation is undergone to place in good shape the figures to be submitted to the shareholders and which of course will recommend most highly to the business public the several competing institutions. The currency question in the United States has an effect to a certain degree upon Canadian business. The quarter just ended in every year is proverbial for trade contraction.

The returns for the month of April declined somewhat from those of March, although an improvement on those of the month of April, 1895. At this season on ordinary occasions money is in demand for the cattle export trade, and the butter and cheese trade, for all of which this year prices ranged low and the season has been unusually late in opening. This also affects current loans to a certain extent as well as bank notes in circulation. Call loans declined also. This may be directly attributed to the general disturbance in speculative stocks of all kinds and the extreme caution on the part of bankers to assume an apparent doubtful risk.

The deposits of the public increased during April to a fair extent, which may be gauged by the belief that the money is safer in bank pending the results of the changes before referred to.

The May returns do not hold a very prominent place in financial statements, coming in the midst of a superabundance of banking and statistical literature, which refers to the business of the year and the annual statement. Among the banks which submit their annual statement in June the following hold first place in Canadian banking, viz.: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Toronto, Canadian Bank of Commerce, Merchants' Bank, Imperial Bank, Bank of Hamilton, Ontario Bank, Traders' Bank, Quebec Bank, Banque Jacques Cartier, Banque Ville Marie, Banque

## STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

Assets.	June 30, 1896.				Increase and decrease for month.				Increase and decrease for year.			
	June 30, 1896.	May 31, 1896.	June 30, 1895.	June 30, 1896.	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$21,865,797	\$21,506,475	\$20,945,389	\$21,506,475	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	7,733,952	7,169,130	6,780,685	7,169,130	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Due from banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	18,464,973	18,564,594	21,361,104	18,564,594	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Due from banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	3,699,685	4,682,125	3,436,078	4,682,125	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Canadian municipal securities and British provincial or colonial, other than Dominion.....	8,727,596	8,769,791	9,150,855	8,769,791	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Railway securities.....	11,585,001	11,495,418	9,163,951	11,495,418	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Loans on stocks and bonds on call.....	13,024,606	13,437,452	16,763,622	13,437,452	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,
Current loans to the public.....	208,014,178	206,970,096	205,497,046	206,970,096	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Overdue debts.....	3,468,517	3,373,283	2,366,964	3,373,283	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Total assets.....	\$316,122,706	\$315,212,349	\$312,686,516	\$315,212,349	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
CAPITAL.												
Capital stock paid up.....	\$62,198,413	\$62,198,413	\$61,701,007	\$62,198,413	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Reserve fund.....	26,348,799	26,318,799	27,063,799	26,318,799	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
LIABILITIES.												
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$30,338,844	\$29,365,414	\$30,106,578	\$29,365,414	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Balance due to Dominion Government.....	3,271,974	2,974,817	6,170,008	2,974,817	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Balance due to Provincial governments.....	2,567,357	2,564,887	2,376,435	2,564,887	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Deposits of the public payable on demand.....	62,634,631	61,881,340	66,582,630	61,881,340	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Deposits of the public payable after notice.....	130,835,461	121,634,721	114,061,499	121,634,721	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Deposits payable on demand or after notice between banks.....	2,494,116	2,280,425	2,215,596	2,280,425	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Due to banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	178,877	168,273	198,388	168,273	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,	Inc.,	Dec.,
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	5,068,566	4,945,056	4,805,104	4,945,056	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
Total liabilities.....	\$228,383,219	\$227,295,944	\$223,943,664	\$227,295,944	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,
MISCELLANEOUS.												
Directors' liabilities.....	\$7,622,302	\$7,680,312	\$8,363,491	\$7,680,312	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,	Dec.,
Greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during month.....	30,964,383	30,750,314	30,622,195	30,750,314	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,	Inc.,

Deposit with Dominion Government for security of note circulation, being five per cent. on average maximum circulation for year ending June 30, 1895, \$1,841,270. An increase during the month of \$24,457 being, we presume, interest for year added to the amount deposited by some of the banks.



de Hochelaga. The Merchants' and Bank of Montreal have their head offices in Quebec but their business is distributed pretty evenly throughout the Dominion.

Upon the occasion of submitting the annual statement to the shareholders it has become the practice of the President and General Manager to go minutely into the state of trade throughout the country for the year, dealing with such subjects as appear of interest and immediately affecting the showing of the year's business in relation to the past year. The General Manager of the Bank of Montreal, in his address on the business outlook of Canada, referring to the Venezuelan incident, said :

"It was one of the worst panics, if not the worst, of the century, not only in the United States but in Canada also. Ruin apparently stared everyone in the face and he would have been a rash man who would have undertaken to value the assets of the banks of the United States and Canada during the first few days of that crisis. With the hopeful feeling which had been steadily growing in Canada up to the end of the year our merchants had been tempted to increase their importations and our manufacturers were enlarging their output, and as a consequence they now find themselves with heavy stocks and a dull market.

There is another factor in the general situation that must not be overlooked. Not for many years have the laborers, the artisans, the mechanics and the rest of the people experienced such cheap living ; all the necessities of life are obtainable at a lower basis of cost than ever before known in the history of the Dominion. A similar tone of argument of the lack of earning facilities for money is discernible throughout the reports submitted, but withal the banks hold their own, pay the usual dividend and sustain the reserve fund. The general feeling now seems to be that the dullness in trade may continue for a time yet but will be followed in the fall by greater activity. The bank returns indicate on the whole a better trade for 1895-6 than there was for 1894-5."

The statement for June shows an exceedingly quiet state of trade for that month, which is the one generally during which fresh energy is expected to show itself after the quiet of the spring months. As may be seen in the abstract the bank notes in circulation show a fair increase for the month and year. However, the usual record of June over May has been much greater for the three preceding years. Balances due from banks and agencies in foreign countries are being recalled. Very little has been invested in permanent securities, and call loans on bonds and stocks have been reduced \$412,846 during the month and over 375 millions during the year. Current loans show an increase of more than 250 millions over the same date a year ago, and over a million increase over the May report. An increase of nearly 125 millions in overdue debts during the year is attributable to La Banque du Peuple, in liquidation. The summing up for the quarter ending June 30 must be that trade has been exceedingly dull, money plentiful, but hard to obtain, produce cheap and few new enterprises being entered into.

The tables on the preceding page give the official returns for the month ending June 30, with comparisons showing increase or decrease for the month of May. In order that the present standing of the Canadian banks may be judged in relation to their condition a year ago, the figures for June 30, 1895, are also given, together with the changes in the different items.

It is the intention of the MAGAZINE to publish these reports quarterly in the future.

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**Pictures on the Greenbacks.**—"Dearest," she said, coolingly, "I wish you were a great statesman, with your picture on our greenbacks."

"I wonder if she knows that a man has to be dead to get his picture on the currency ?" he thought to himself, but he didn't press the question. There are some things it is better not to know.—*Indianapolis (Ind.) Journal*.

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—Superintendent Kilburn of the State Banking Department has tabulated the reports of the financial operations of the Savings banks in New York and Brooklyn, for the year ending June 30 last. Compared with the reports for the year ended June 30, 1895, this year's reports show that in New York city the total resources of the Savings banks have increased \$24,500,000; the amount due depositors has increased \$26,200,000; the surplus has decreased \$1,700,000, and the number of depositors has increased 38,997.

In Brooklyn the total resources of Savings banks has increased \$6,700,000, the amount due depositors has increased \$6,800,000; the surplus has decreased \$105,270; and the number of depositors has increased 9,629.

—On August 1 the representatives of the city government met and refused to adopt the recommendation of Comptroller Fitch to make the National City Bank the chief city depository instead of the Importers and Traders' National Bank, which has acted in that capacity twenty years. The only point involved in the matter was in regard to the rates of interest to be paid on city deposits, and the amount of the city's loans the banks should subscribe for.

—Following closely upon the adoption of the free-silver declaration by the national convention of the Democratic party, the Treasury gold reserve declined toward the latter part of the month to a point considerably below the \$100,000,000 mark, withdrawals being made for export and hoarding by individuals. President Tappen, of the Gallatin National Bank, conceived the idea of restoring the reserve by voluntary contributions by city banks. The movement was eminently successful, about \$20,000,000 being turned in in exchange for legal tenders. A syndicate of foreign and American bankers has also formed a plan to furnish exchange and prevent gold exports.

—In a late decision by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court the following rules were laid down as governing the payment of a Savings bank deposit:

Presentment of the pass-book by some one other than the real owner will not discharge the bank from liability for payments "if at the time of payment a fact or circumstance was brought to the attention of the bank calculated to excite the suspicion of an ordinary careful person. The possession of a pass-book when there is no fact or circumstance to excite suspicion or inquiry, justifies payment to the holder."

—Oswald C. Gifford, for seventeen years Cashier of the local branch of the Merchants' Bank of Canada, committed suicide on July 24.

—A. J. Cassatt, a director of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co., was recently chosen a director of the Manhattan Trust Co.

—At a meeting of the board of directors, July 28, Richard Hamilton was elected President of the Bowery Bank to succeed Henry P. De Graaf, deceased. Mr. Hamilton was formerly Secretary of the Clearing-House Association, and was for a time acting chairman.

—George J. Baumann, who was formerly connected with the Gallatin National Bank, has been appointed Cashier of the Bank of New Amsterdam in place of R. Reed Moore, promoted to the Vice-Presidency.

—The New York Credit Men's Association is a useful organization, auxiliary to the National Association of Credit Men. Bankers will derive much benefit from the work of this association, which is organized for protective and educational purposes; to promote and combine the intelligence and influence of members for protection against imposition, injustice and fraud; to agitate and effect changes in the collection and bankruptcy laws of the various States and the United States to the end of uniformity of statutes and protection of creditors against abuses now prevalent; to bring about mutual improvements, greater similarity and certainty in business customs and usages of trade, and to establish closer ties of business association to the end that the welfare of all may be the more highly conserved.

M. E. Bannin is president of the local association, and H. J. Sayers, of 531 Broadway, secretary.

—The Savings Banks of the city have been made the object of a most unwise and unjust attack by a local real estate corporation that issues shares on which it pays six per cent. interest. New York Savings banks are the safest and most carefully managed financial institutions in the world, and make only the most careful investments, eliminating all speculative risks, which cannot be true of any concern that deals in real estate or anything else.

—In that part of Greater New York known as Long Island City, presided over by Mayor Patrick Jerome Gleason, the assessed valuation of property has been increased from \$16,717,677 last year to \$32,000,000. This should be a "tip" to the southern and western economists who claim that the East is growing rich at the expense of their sections, citing the rapid increase in the assessed valuation of property as an irrefragable proof of their assertions. They should study Mr. Gleason's methods. Increasing the "value" of property here is a very easy process—double your figures and there you are.

—The New York Stock Exchange committee on securities has adopted the following: "For the purpose of quotation and settlement of contracts in securities payable solely in sterling money, the committee rules that a pound sterling be considered equivalent to \$5."

—Acting Chairman G. G. Williams of the clearing-house committee, in a circular to banks that are members of the New York Clearing-House Association, advises them to request their depositors and correspondents to use the form "Pay — bank, or order" in endorsing checks and drafts. This advice is given because some of the clearing-houses of other cities have held that the endorsements "For deposit" and "For deposit to the credit of" are restrictive endorsements, as the endorsement "For collection" has been held to be.

—This city was visited recently by a distinguished party of Japanese financiers, *en route* to London, to collect the Chinese war indemnity. While in New York they were shown about the city by Gōjuro Nagasaki, agent of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Those constituting the party were: S. Hayahawa, private secretary to the Japanese Minister of Finance, Councillor of the Ministry of Finance, and Government Inspector of the Bank of Japan at Tokio; and Sonada Kokichi, President of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, and T. Yamawoto, Chief Cashier of the Bank of Japan. On the evening of July 30, Sonada Kokichi, President of the Yokohama Specie Bank, gave a dinner at the Hotel Majestic, many eminent Japanese and American bankers being present. On August 6, Edward E. Poor, President of the National Park Bank, gave a dinner to the visiting bankers at the Union League Club.

—At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Standard National Bank, on August 6, Horace H. Brockway was elected a member of the board. Mr. Brockway is also Treasurer of the Garfield Safe Deposit Company. William C. McGibbon was elected President of the bank, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the late Marvella W. Cooper. Mr. McGibbon is head of the firm of McGibbon & Co., an old business house and was one of the first to open a business house on Fifth avenue nearly thirty years ago.

—The Long Island Bank, of Brooklyn, which is one of the oldest banks in that city, has decided to go out of business, owing to too much competition. The bank is solvent and abundantly able to pay off its deposits.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Providence, R. I.**—The Manufacturers' National Bank, on account of the growth of its business, has found it advisable to move into more commodious banking rooms, at 71 Westminster street. By the July 14th statement of the bank, its total resources now exceed \$2,503,000, and its deposits, exclusive of bank deposits, are \$1,657,301. The capital is \$500,000 and surplus and profits, \$350,000. There is plenty of cash also, the amount on hand and with reserve agents being \$346,324. Careful attention to details and prompt and liberal treatment—not inconsistent with sound banking—are cardinal principles of this strong and prosperous New England bank.

**Bank May Resume Business.**—At the annual meeting of the stockholders of the suspended Bank of New England, held at Manchester, N. H., July 28, it was voted to increase the capital stock \$50,000. The directors state that the bank will resume business after election if the outlook is favorable.

**Savings Banks Curtailing Loans.**—Savings banks in New Britain, Conn., are curtailing their loans owing to the uncertain condition of monetary and political affairs. It is alleged that other Savings banks in the State are considering the taking of similar action.

### MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore.**—The United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. has completed its organization, and will carry on a bonding and banking business. Its authorized capital is \$1,000,000, of which \$290,000 has been subscribed and \$123,000 paid in.

**Pennsylvania Bankers' Association—Groups.**—The Semi-annual meeting of Group VIII. of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association was held at Pittsburg, July 15.

—Group II. met at Reading, July 24, about twenty-five banks being represented. John W. Thompson, President of the National Bank of Chester Valley, of Coatesville, was made president, and U. S. G. Finkbinder, Cashier of the National Bank of Rogersford, secretary.

—Group III. met at Paxinosa Inn, Easton, July 15. Wm. Hackett, Cashier of the Easton National Bank, presided. There was a good attendance.

**Philadelphia.**—The National Building and Loan Convention, in session here July 23, passed the following by a unanimous vote:

"First—That it is the sense of this meeting that the interests of all shareholders of building and loan associations in the United States demand that the present standard of values, upon which our monetary system has been based since the resumption of specie payments in 1879, shall remain unchallenged and inviolate.

Second—That we believe that the interests of every class in the community, and especially those of the great wage-earning class, imperatively demand that every dollar in circulation, whether coin or paper, shall be equal in purchasing power, and therefore equal in value, to every other.

Third—That patriotism demands that the dollar bearing the mint mark of the United States shall be the equal of the dollar of the most advanced nations, and entitled to full faith and credit all over the world, and to that end it must be maintained free from all suspicion, debasement, or repudiation.

—The capital stock of the Guarantors' Liability Indemnity Co. has been increased from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000.

**Appointed bank Examiner.**—Channing Bingham has been appointed a National bank examiner for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. He was formerly a State bank examiner.

**New York State Bank Decision.**—Attorney-General Hancock (New York) in response to a request for an opinion as to whether a person elected director of a banking corporation of this State forfeits his office by hypothecating his stock, or whether by such hypothecation he ceases to be the owner of the same in his own right, says:

"The intent of the statute, in my judgment, is that every director of such a bank shall be the absolute owner, free from encumbrance, of at least \$1,000 of stock if the bank is capitalized for \$50,000, and of at least \$500 if the capital of the bank is less than \$50,000; and that he shall continue to be, to that extent at least, financially interested in a banking corporation while acting as a director thereof. He cannot be the absolute owner in his own right of stock which he has hypothecated, such hypothecation being a pledge or encumbrance on the subject of ownership which may destroy all beneficial interest which the pledger has in the stock. The rights of the pledgee in the stock hypothecated would be superior to those of the nominal owner of such stock. When this condition of affairs is presented the office should be deemed vacant."

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—The Buffalo Savings Bank recently completed the fiftieth year of its existence, it having been chartered May 9, 1846. A history of the bank from the time of its organization has been prepared by the trustees for distribution amongst the bank's patrons. Present officers are: President, Edward Bennett; First Vice-President, Jewett M. Richmond; Second Vice-President, Christopher Rodenbach; Secretary, John U. Wayland; Assistant Secretary, Edward G. Becker.

—A reorganization of the Stock Exchange has been effected, and it is the intention to open for business in larger quarters on September 1.

## WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The Standard Banking Co. was recently organized, with \$300,000 capital, for the purpose of arranging for extending the charter of the Merchants' Loan and Trust Co., whose business will be carried on by the new corporation with no change in the title or officers of the Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. The capital will be increased to \$2,100,000.

**St. Joseph, Mo.**—An erroneous press despatch sent out from the State capital on July 15 made it appear that the well-known private banking firm of Tootle, Lemon & Co., of this city had been incorporated as a private bank. This is not the case, as the firm remains as heretofore a partnership with unlimited liability. There are few, if any, banking firms in the West that are of a higher rank.

**Bank of Galesville, Wis.** This bank has increased its capital from \$25,000 to \$50,000, and C. M. Kellogg, who has been connected with the bank for ten years, and Cashier for the past eight years, has been succeeded by J. F. Cance. Mr. Kellogg retired voluntarily, much to the regret of the stockholders and directors.

**Bank Consolidation.**—The First National Bank and the Security Bank, of Mitchell, South Dakota, have consolidated under the former title. There will be no change in the present location of the First National Bank, the officers of which now are: President, John O. Walrath; Vice-President, H. R. Kibbee; Assistant Cashier, O. P. Graham.

**Denver, Colo.**—A branch of the United States Mortgage and Trust Co., New York, has been incorporated here. Henry Van Kleeck will be agent for Colorado.

—Joseph T. Talbert has been appointed temporary Receiver of the American National Bank. Efforts are still being made to effect a reorganization. About \$100,000 has been collected since the bank suspended.

**Condition of Iowa Banks.**—The State Auditor of Iowa has recently made public a compilation of the condition of the State and Savings banks on June 30. As compared with the statement of a year ago there have been changes as follows:

ASSETS.		LIABILITIES.	
Cash—increase.....	\$16,827	Capital stock—Increase.....	\$250,100
Credits subject to sight draft—increase .....	219,328	Deposits—Increase.....	130,657
Overdrafts—Increase.....	7,055	Surplus—Increase.....	116,751
Real and personal property—Increase	341,621	Undivided profits—Increase.....	158,822
Total increase.....	\$584,432	Total increase.....	\$565,330
Loss bills receivable—decrease.....	1,409	Less indebtedness to banks and others—decrease.....	81,907
Net increase of assets.....	\$583,423	Net increase of liabilities.....	\$583,423

**Louisville, Ky.**—Henry W. Barret, who a few weeks ago succeeded his brother, the late Thomas L. Barret, as President of the Bank of Kentucky, resigned on July 4, as his manufacturing business required so much of his attention that he was unable to give the necessary time to the duties of the position. John M. Atherton has been chosen as his successor, and Oscar Fenly, Cashier of the Citizens' National, has been elected Vice-President.

—The First National Bank was made a State depository July 16. The American National Bank is also a State depository, having executed a bond as such some time ago.

—**Nebraska Bank Calls in Its Paper.**—The farmers of Box Butte County, Neb., are considerably excited over a communication received from the First National Bank of Alliance. After referring to the constant agitation of the financial policy of the United States, and the socialistic feeling engendered by the Chicago convention, the letter states that, rather than take chances of loss, all the paper of the bank must be called in, and those holding notes must pay them promptly.

**Wisconsin Banker Sentenced.**—A. C. Probert has been sentenced to two and one-half years imprisonment for the embezzlement of a note of \$1,500 from the Bank of Lodi, Wis.

## PACIFIC SLOPE.

**San Francisco.**—Becker and Cregan, the bank forgers whose operations have been fully described in previous numbers of the MAGAZINE, have been convicted of swindling the Nevada Bank by means of a raised draft.

—At a meeting of the Executive Council of the California Bankers' Association, held in this city on July 20, the following was adopted:

"Resolved, That the standard of value in the United States should continue to be the dollar containing 25.80 grains of gold, 900 fine, and that any attempt by legislation or otherwise to lower that standard would be disastrous to the future welfare of every class of our citizens; and that silver and governmental paper as forms of currency can only be used with safety in such quantity as will be absorbed by the people and remain in circulation constantly without throwing upon the Government at any time the burden of redemption to maintain a parity."

—The American Mercantile and Banking Co., capital \$800,000, has been organized to promote American commerce with Japan and China.

**Montana Bank Item.**—On August 1 the Commercial National Bank, Bozeman, moved into the large and well-equipped banking rooms formerly occupied by the Gallatin Valley National Bank, now out of business. Its new location has been used as a banking stand since 1872—a long time in the history of Montana banking. The management of the bank is good, and its banking connections especially strong and ample for the transaction of home and foreign business.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

**Costa Rica to Adopt a Gold Standard.**—The Government of Costa Rica has issued a decree withdrawing its present system of currency and adopting a gold standard. The previous adoption of the silver standard has driven gold out of the country and generally deranged the finances and business.

**Mexico.**—The London Bank, City of Mexico, has decided to increase its capital to \$10,000,000.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

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**Indiana.**—The Lake County Bank, of East Chicago, closed July 8. It is not expected that the losses will be large.

**Iowa.**—On July 27, the Farmers' Bank, of Rock Valley, suspended. C. M. Swan was appointed assignee.

**Louisiana.**—NEW ORLEANS.—On August 6, the American National Bank closed, being unable to meet its engagements with the clearing-house. It had on July 1 deposits of \$335,000. No other bank has been affected by the embarrassment of the American National Bank, which is about five years old.

**Michigan.**—The Ingham County Bank, Lansing, closed August 7, owing to unprofitable business and withdrawals of deposits. It had been in existence since 1886, and had \$100,000 capital. Deposit liabilities are about \$144,000.

—The People's Savings Bank, of Lansing, capital, \$150,000, closed on July 13. Seymour Foster has been named as Receiver. It is stated that the entire capital will be wiped out and that an assessment will be necessary.

**Minnesota.**—MINNEAPOLIS.—David C. Bell, Receiver of the City Bank, has paid the creditors of that institution a third dividend of 15 per cent. This makes three dividends aggregating considerably over \$150,000—practically one-half of the indebtedness of the City Bank—collected and paid to the creditors by the Receiver within six months from his appointment.

**Missouri.**—Conkling, Bros. banking house, at Nevada, was closed August 6 by the State banking department on the report of an examiner that business was not being properly conducted.

The Bank of Bronaugh, the Bank of Sheldon and the Bank of Richards, all owned by Conkling, Bros., were also closed at the same time. Receivers have been placed in charge of the firm's business.

**Nebraska.**—The German Savings Bank, of Omaha, closed on July 10. The officers assure the public that the assets cover the liabilities twice over. The deposits amount to \$311,262, and the actual assets in the hands of the bank are \$469,959. In addition to these assets the capital stock of the bank is \$500,000, with \$100,000 paid up.

**North Dakota.**—On July 17, the First National Bank, of Minot, suspended on account of its low cash reserve. There is a large surplus of assets over liabilities.

**Ohio.**—The Dennison Deposit Bank closed July 29 with only small liabilities.

—On July 16 the First National Bank, of Hillsborough, closed owing to dissensions in the management. An assessment of 50 per cent. had recently been made by the Comptroller, which was resisted by two of the shareholders. Cashier John Hulitt has been appointed Receiver.

**Texas.**—The First National Bank of Uvalde has gone into voluntary liquidation. Deposits amounting to \$38,000 will all be paid promptly. Stockholders will receive from 120 to 110 for their stock. The bank has annually paid 10 per cent. dividends.

**Washington.**—On July 11 the Kittitas Valley National Bank, of Ellensburg, suspended. Julius C. Hubbell was appointed Receiver July 18.

—The Commercial State Bank, Chehalis, organized in 1891, was reported as having assigned July 13.

—The Bellingham Bay National Bank, of New Whatcom, now in the hands of a Receiver, will pay the second dividend of 15 per cent. this fall and is in better condition than any of the banks which closed here during the year of bank suspensions. The assessment of 100 per cent. made on the stockholders by the Comptroller is being paid in slowly, and the expectation is that depositors will ultimately be paid in full.

The Columbia National and the First National, which have now been closed over two years, show no signs of ever being able to pay their indebtedness to depositors.

The Puget Sound Loan, Trust and Banking Company, which closed a second time about a year ago, is closing out slowly and a vigorous effort is being made to collect the necessary cash to pay depositors in full, with a prospect of accomplishment.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of New National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these New National Banks will be found under the different State headings.

5049 - First National Bank, Robinson, Illinois. Capital, \$50,000.

5050 Sandford National Bank, Sandford, Maine. Capital, \$50,000.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

Citizens' National Bank, Jeannette, Pa.; by J. H. Ringer, *et al.*

First National Bank, Saranac Lake, N. Y.; by Frank F. Potter, *et al.*

Arlington National Bank, Arlington, N. J.; by E. P. Dutcher, *et al.*

People's National Bank, Jeannette, Pa.; by J. F. McNaul, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ARKANSAS.

MELBOURNE—Bank of Melbourne; capital, \$10,000; Pres., B. E. Massey; Cashier, Stephen Brown.

#### COLORADO.

DENVER—United States Mortgage and Trust Co.—branch New York city; Henry Van Kleeck, agent.

#### ILLINOIS.

EAST ST. LOUIS—Main St. Safe Deposit Co.; capital stock, \$20,000.

ROBINSON—First National Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., Abner Woodworth; Vice-Pres., Wm. C. Jones; Cashier, C. H. Steel; Asst. Cashier, C. S. Jones.

#### INDIANA.

ASHLEY—Commercial Bank (successor to Ashley Banking Co.); capital, \$20,000; Cashier Reuben Sawvel.

SWAYZEE—Farmers' Banking Co.; Pres., N. J. Lelsure; Vice-Pres., A. E. Crullen; Cashier, J. H. Dehority.

#### IOWA.

CENTERVILLE—Iowa State Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. A. Bradley; Vice-Pres., W. A. McCready; Cashier, D. C. Bradley.

HANCOCK—Valley Bank; Pres., J. B. Johannsen; Cashier, P. E. Johannsen.

MAURICE Maurice Bank (Henry Hoepers); Cashier, P. N. Vos.

RUDD—Bank of Rudd (Dunlap & Lohr); capital, \$10,000; Pres. E. F. Dunlap; Cashier, E. B. Lohr.

ST. CHARLES—Citizens' Bank (successor to Browne, Wood & Co.); Pres., D. Minard; Cashier, C. F. Wood.

WELLMAN—Security Savings Bank; capital, \$25,000; Pres., W. T. Hamilton; Cashier, M. C. Struble; Asst. Cashier, Gus. W. Klockenteger.

#### KANSAS.

ARKANSAS CITY—Brown Investment Co.; capital, \$10,000.

#### KENTUCKY.

BURKSVILLE—J. P. Frank; capital, \$10,000.

#### LOUISIANA.

DONALDSONVILLE—Bank of Ascension; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. Libermuth; Vice-Pres., J. J. Claverie; Cashier, J. S. Thibaut; Asst. Cashier, Frank K. Sims.

#### MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE—United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co.; authorized capital, \$1,000,000; paid in, \$123,000.

#### MICHIGAN.

MENDON—First State Bank; capital, \$15,000; Pres., J. G. Schurtz; Cashier, F. Wolf.

NORTH LANSING—Lansing State Savings Bank (Branch); L. L. Sattler, Mgr.

#### MINNESOTA.

CHOKIO—Bank of Chokio (Westfall Bros.)

DULUTH—Hartman & Patterson.

KILKENNY—Bank of Kilkenny (John Murphy).

MADISON LAKE—Bank of Madison Lake (Everett & Lewis).

PRINCETON—Princeton Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. L. Brady.

STEWART—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Pres., Isaac Hulett; Cashier, F. G. Wright.

#### MISSOURI.

KANSAS CITY—Russell Brokerage Co.; capital, \$10,000.

TRENTON—Citizens' State Bank (successor to Union Bank and Farmers and Merchants' Bank); capital, \$50,000; Pres., C. P. Brandon; Cashier W. P. Fulkerson.

#### NEW JERSEY.

BRIDGETON—Cumberland Trust Co.; capital (paid in), \$50,000; Pres., Benjamin Hancock; Treas., John S. Ware.

## NEW YORK.

LE ROY—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres. Wm. F. Smallwood; Vice-Pres., T. B. Tuttle.

NEW YORK CITY—Bergen & Mills.

## OKLAHOMA TERRITORY.

BLACKWELL—Bank of Blackwell.

ENID—Citizens' Bank; Pres., H. T. Smith; Cashier, H. H. Walker.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

NORTH EAST—W. H. Adkins & Co. (successors to Short Banking Co.); capital, \$10,000; Pres., W. H. Adkins.

## TENNESSEE.

WARTRACE—Bedford County Bank (Wilkinson & Young).

WATERTOWN—Bank of Watertown; capital,

\$10,000; Pres., H. Neal; Vice-Pres., D. Young; Cashier, T. A. Young.

## TEXAS.

KILLEEN—Jewelers' Bank; capital, \$18,200; Cashier, Will Rancier.

SCHULENBURG—Newhaus Bros.

## WEST VIRGINIA.

WHEELING—Guarantee Loan and Trust Co.

## WISCONSIN.

DORCHESTER—Shafer & Spengler; Cashier, John H. Spengler.

MILWAUKEE—Tregaskis Savings Co.; capital, \$5,000.

PORT WASHINGTON—Bank of Port Washington (John H. Jacques).

SHEBOYGAN—Citizens' State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres., John Mogenson; Vice-Pres., Emil Ladwig; Cashier, C. A. Crawford; Asst. Cashier, P. M. Reuter.

## CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

## ALABAMA.

BIRMINGHAM—First National Bank; Tom O. Smith, Cashier in place of W. J. Cameron.

—Alabama National Bank; Edw. W. Rucker, Pres. in place of R. M. Nelson.

BREWTON—Bank of Brewton; C. L. Sowell, Pres. in place of S. J. Foshee.

MONTGOMERY—Capital City Insurance Co.; D. C. Hanson, Cashier in place of P. C. Smith.

## ARIZONA.

PHOENIX—National Bank of Arizona; Emil Ganz, Pres. in place of M. W. Kales.

TEMPE—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Neils Petersen, Pres. in place of E. G. Frankenberg.

TUCSON—Arizona National Bank; L. M. Jacobs, Cashier, in place of R. W. Wood.

## ARKANSAS.

BRINKLEY—Monroe County Bank; John Gazzolo, Pres. in place of P. C. Ewan.

## CALIFORNIA.

RIVERSIDE—First National Bank; Stanley J. Castleman, Asst. Cashier.

SAN FRANCISCO—California Safe Deposit & Trust Co.; capital stock reduced to \$1,000,000.

SAN JOSE—First National Bank; Geo. M. Bowman, Pres. in place of J. A. Clayton, deceased; Jos. R. Ryland, Asst. Cashier.

STOCKTON—Stockton Savings Bank; J. D. Peters, Pres. in place of H. S. Sargent.

## CONNECTICUT.

WATERBURY—Waterbury National Bank; Jas. S. Elton, Pres. in place of A. S. Chase, deceased.—Holmes & Parsons; business carried on by G. S. Parsons & Co.

## DELAWARE.

MILFORD—First National Bank; corporate existence extended until July 23, 1916.

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON—National Metropolitan Bank; William Thompson, director, deceased.

## FLORIDA.

OCALA—Merchants' National Bank; W. A. Redding, Asst. Cashier.

TITUSVILLE—Indian River State Bank; Chas. S. Schuyler, Cashier.

## GEORGIA.

AUGUSTA—Commercial Bank; Chas. H. Ballard, Cashier in place of P. G. Burum.

BRUNSWICK—National Bank of Brunswick; no Asst. Cashier in place of Robert Troup.

CALHOUN—Bank of Calhoun; H. J. Doughty, Cashier, deceased.

COLUMBUS—National Bank of Columbus; corporate existence extended until July 6, 1916.

NEWMAN—Newman National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of John S. Bigby.—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of John S. Bigby.

VALDOSTA—Merchants' Bank; J. T. Blalock, Asst. Cashier.

## IDAHO.

HAILEY—First National Bank; H. H. Parsons, Cashier.

## ILLINOIS.

BEARDSTOWN—First State Bank; capital stock increased to \$50,000.

BELLEFLOWER—Exchange Bank; H. F. Helmick, Pres. in place of M. O. Flanigan; G. M. Carson, Cashier in place of H. F. Helmick.

CHARLESTON—First National Bank; Will J. Kenny, Cashier in place of Curtis L. Davis.

CHICAGO—Royal Trust Co. Bank; Isaac N. Camp, director, deceased.—Standard Banking Co. consolidated with Merchants' Loan and Trust Co.; capital increased to \$2,100,000.

COLLINSVILLE—State Bank; C. A. Hartmann, Cashier in place of John Cook.

HIGHLAND—Highland Bank; Joseph C. Ammann, Cashier in place of S. Padst, resigned; Geo. Roth, Vice-Pres.

JACKSONVILLE—Jacksonville National Bank;



Thomas B. Orear, Pres. in place of O. D. Fitzsimmons.  
**LOVINGTON**—Drake, Hostetler & Son; name changed to Drake & Hostetler.  
**MASON CITY**—First National Bank; D. W. Vickery, Vice-Pres. in place of A. A. Blunt.  
**MOWEQUA**—V. Snyder & Co.; Geo. A. Kantz, retired from firm.  
**OAKLAND**—Oakland National Bank; John Rutherford, Pres. in place of L. S. Cash; John C. Martin, Vice-Pres.; John F. Menough, Cash. in place of John Rutherford.  
**ROCKFORD**—Second National Bank; Wm. B. Barbour, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. E. King.  
**SALEM**—Salem National Bank; no Asst. Cashier in place of J. E. Martin.

## INDIANA.

**COVINGTON**—Citizens' State Bank; title changed to Citizens' Bank and capital reduced to \$30,000.  
**GOSPORT**—Henry, Gray & Co.; James Grimsley, Cashier in place of W. A. Montgomery.  
**GREENSBURG**—Third National Bank; John E. Robbins, Pres., deceased.  
**INDIANAPOLIS**—Indiana National Bank; Geo. B. Yandes, Vice-Pres., resigned.  
**LEAVENWORTH**—Citizens' Bank; surplus increased to \$30,000; N. M. Barnett, Asst. Cashier in place of H. Summers.  
**MARION**—First National Bank; Wm. C. Webster, Vice-Pres., in place of W. W. McCleery; W. W. McCleery, Cashier in place of A. B. Morrison, deceased.  
**MUNCIE**—Delaware Co. National Bank; J. C. Johnson, Pres., in place of Emmet M. Smith; W. E. Hitchcock, Vice-Pres., in place of Joseph A. Goddard.  
**REDKEY**—Bank of Redkey; Geo. N. Edger, Pres., in place of Nathan Cadwallader; Daniel Wilts, Cashier in place of Geo. N. Edger.  
**SEYMOUR**—First National Bank; Louis Schenck, Vice-Pres., in place of J. H. Andrews; J. H. Andrews, Cashier in place of G. W. Murphy, deceased.  
**VALPARAISO**—State Bank; L. R. Skinner, Cashier.

## IOWA.

**ALTA**—Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.; A. R. Browne, Cashier.  
**BROOKLYN**—Poweshiek Co. Bank; W. J. Smith, Asst. Cashier, in place of E. C. Odell.  
**CASEY**—Citizens' Bank; capital, \$50,000.  
**CENTREVILLE**—First National Bank; A. T. Bradley, Pres., in place of Wm. Bradley, deceased; C. W. Lewis, Vice-Pres.  
**CHARLOTTE**—Charlotte Exchange Bank; A. J. Albright, Pres.; F. L. Butzloff, Cashier.  
**CONRAD GROVE**—Bank of Conrad; John Morrow, Jr., Asst. Cashier.  
**DEXTER**—State Bank; C. E. Bales, Asst. Cashier in place of O. R. Savage.  
**DUBUQUE**—German Trust and Savings Bank; John Bell, director, deceased.

**ELDON**—Eldon Savings Bank; W. O. Bagley, Asst. Cashier.  
**EMMETSBURG**—Bank of Emmetsburg; John Moncrief, Cash. in place of J. H. Thatcher.  
**FARMINGTON**—Farmers' Savings Bank; E. Miller, Pres. in place of John Sax.  
**GOODELL**—State Savings Bank; C. S. Farman, Pres. in place of M. A. Fell; A. Medowell, Cashier; H. A. Sweigart, Asst. Cashier.  
**HARTLEY**—C. H. Colby & Co.; O. A. Colby, Asst. Cashier.  
**IDA GROVE**—Anderson, Lipton & Co.; capital, \$100,000; Robert Lipton, Pres.; Ed. G. Bowman, Cashier.  
**MISSOURI VALLEY**—Valley Bank; capital, \$50,000; J. B. Barrett, Cashier in place of W. J. Burke.  
**SIOUX CENTER**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; R. W. Green, Asst. Cashier in place of H. S. Braithwaite.—Citizens' State Bank; W. H. Sieman, Pres. in place of G. H. Schoep.  
**SIOUX RAPIDS**—Farmers and Merch. Bank; J. E. Henriques, Cashier in place of M. C. Struble.  
**VICTOR**—Farmers' Savings Bank; Florence Mussetter, Asst. Cashier.  
**WEBSTER CITY**—First National Bank; L. L. Estes, Pres. in place of Kendall Young, deceased.  
**WILLIAMSBURG**—Williamsburg Sav. Bank; B. H. Kelly, Asst. Cashier in place of H. L. Murchison.

## KANSAS.

**BAXTER SPRINGS**—Baxter Bank; capital, \$30,000; A. A. Warner, Cashier in place of Ira C. Perkins.  
**EL DORADO**—Exchange National Bank; S. G. Fleming, Cashier, reported an embezzler.  
**FREDONIA**—State Bank; Elva Mariner, Asst. Cashier.  
**KANSAS CITY**—Wyandotte National Bank; Porter Sherman, Pres. in place of Thomas J. Barker; C. L. Brokaw, Cashier in place of C. W. Trickett; no Asst. Cashier in place of C. L. Brokaw.  
**KINGMAN**—First National Bank; J. L. Mecomey, Vice-Pres. in place of H. Billings; D. Billings, Asst. Cashier in place of R. L. Hanscome.  
**MCCRACKEN**—Bank of McCracken; James S. Warden, Pres. in place of B. F. Coughenour.  
**NESS CITY**—First National Bank; no Pres. in place of H. F. Black; O. H. Laraway, Vice-Pres.  
**OSAGE CITY**—First National Bank; F. E. Wilson, Cashier *pro tem.* in place of R. L. Brown.  
**PAOLA**—National Bank of Paola; W. D. Greason, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. Kingsley.  
**SYLVIA**—Bank of Sylvia; O. J. Richards, Cashier.

**KENTUCKY.**

**BLOOMFIELD**—Citizens' Bank; S. F. Williamson, Vice-Pres.

**CATLETTSBURG**—Big Sandy National Bank; Monte J. Goble, Cashier in place of J. B. Hatten; no Asst. Cashier in place of Monte J. Goble.

**HICKMAN**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; B. R. Kuykendall, Asst. Cashier in place of W. M. Randle.

**HOPKINSVILLE**—Bank of Hopkinsville; Edgar McPherson, Pres. in place of E. P. Campbell, deceased; R. H. De Treville, Cashier in place of Edgar McPherson.

**LOUISVILLE**—Bank of Kentucky; Jno. M. Atherton, Pres. in place of H. W. Barret, resigned; Oscar Fenley, Vice-Pres.—German Insurance Bank; Nicholas Finzer, director, deceased.—Citizens' Nat. Bank; W. M. Edmunds, Cashier in place of Oscar Fenley, resigned.

**NEW CASTLE**—Bank of New Castle; Jno. W. Mathews, Cashier, deceased; also Secretary Henry Co. Trust Co.

**PADUCAH**—City National Bank; Eldridge Palmer, Pres., deceased.

**LOUISIANA.**

**NEW ORLEANS**—Provident Savings and Safe Deposit Bank; Geo. W. Young, Pres. in place of J. C. Morris; S. D. Autey, Cashier.

**MAINE.**

**BANGOR**—Kenduskeag National Bank; Geo. F. Bryant, Cashier in place of W. H. S. Lawrence.

**MADISON**—First National Bank; Charles H. Clark, Pres. in place of Omar Clark; Chas. A. Wilber, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. H. Clark.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—National Farmers and Planters' Bank; D. L. Bartlett, Vice-Pres.—Robert Garrett & Sons; Robert Garrett, deceased.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**BOSTON**—South End National Bank; W. A. Tripp, Asst. Cashier, *pro tem.*, to act in absence of Cashier to July 30.—National Bank of Commerce; W. R. Whittemore, Asst. Cashier in place of E. L. Lincoln.

**FALL RIVER**—National Union Bank; Thomas D. Covel, Pres. in place of Daniel Wilbur, deceased.

**HUDSON**—Hudson National Bank; Edmund M. Stone, Pres. in place of Luman T. Jefta, deceased; Joseph S. Bradley, Vice-Pres. in place of Edmund M. Stone.—Hudson Savings Bank; Luman T. Jefta, Vice-Pres. deceased.

**LYNN**—Central National Bank; Henry B. Sprague, Pres. in place of Philip A. Chase.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Northampton Institu'n for Savings; H. R. Hinckley, Pres. in place of M. M. French, deceased.

**READING**—First National Bank; H. Wells, Asst. Cashier in place of M. E. Parker.

**WOBURN**—Woburn Five Cents Savings Bank;

Benjamin Hinckley, Pres. in place of John Cummings.

**MICHIGAN.**

**HASTINGS**—Hastings National Bank; Daniel Striker, Pres. in place of Andrew J. Bowne, J. T. Lombard, Vice-Pres. in place of Daniel Striker.

**WYANDOTTE**—First Commercial and Savings Bank; William Campbell, Pres. in place of James T. Hurst, resigned.

**MINNESOTA.**

**AUSTIN**—Citizens' National Bank; Lyman D. Baird, Pres. in place of C. L. West.

**FARIBAULT**—Security Bank; B. B. Sheffield, Pres.; Stephen Jewell, Vice-Pres.

**WINONA**—German-American Bank; E. D. Dyar, Pres.; Theodore Wold, Cashier.

**MISSISSIPPI.**

**OKOLONA**—John Trice Banking Company; capital increased to \$50,000.

**MISSOURI.**

**BOONVILLE**—Central National Bank; A. H. Stephens, Asst. Cashier.

**BURLINGTON JUNCTION**—Northwestern Bank of Missouri; C. I. Hann, Asst. Cashier.

**EDINA**—Knox Co. Savings Bank; F. B. Parsons, Vice-Pres.

**MACON**—Bank of Macon; H. G. Riggs, Cashier in place of W. R. Compton.

**NEW CAMBRIA**—New Cambria State Bank; A. H. Carey, Cashier in place of H. G. Riggs.

**PURDIN**—Bank of Purdin; capital, \$10,000.  
**ST. JOSEPH**—National Bank of St. Joseph; Louis C. Burnes, Pres. in place of Calvin Fletcher Burnes, deceased.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**JERSEY CITY**—Provident Institution for Savings; Edmund W. Kingsland, Pres. in place of Freeman A. Smith; James S. Newkirk, Secretary and Treasurer.

**PLAINFIELD**—First Nat. Bank; Elias R. Pope, Pres., deceased; also Treasurer Dime Savings Institution.

**NEW MEXICO.**

**LAS VEGAS**—First National Bank; Joshua S. Reynolds, Pres. in place of Jefferson Reynolds.

**NEW YORK.**

**BUFFALO**—Citizens' Bank; E. B. Tallman, Asst. Cashier.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Cambridge Valley National Bank; Thos. C. Gifford, Vice-Pres. in place of B. P. Crocker, deceased.

**CAMDEN**—First National Bank; J. G. Dorrance, Pres. in place of D. G. Dorrance, deceased; no Vice-Pres. in place of E. A. Harvey, deceased; D. J. Dorrance, Cashier in place of J. G. Dorrance; no Asst. Cashier in place of D. J. Dorrance.

**CATSKILL**—Catskill National Bank; P. Gardner Coffin, Cashier in place of Henry B. Hill, deceased.

**CLAYTON**—Exchange Bank; Jacob Putnam, Pres. in place of John Johnston.

**DUNKIRK**—Lake Shore National Bank; no Pres. in place of M. L. Hinman.

**JAMAICA**—Jamaica Sav. Bank; John H. Sutphin, First Vice-Pres. in place of Daniel Smith; Geo. L. Peck, Second Vice-Pres.

**NEW YORK CITY**—Manhattan Trust Co.; A. J. Cassatt elected director.—Italian Savings Bank; J. N. Francolini, Pres.; D. Saladino, Treas.; D. W. C. Ward, Secretary.—Bowery Bank; Richard Hamilton, Pres. in place of H. P. De Graaf, deceased.—Benedict Bros.; Howard R. Benedict, deceased.—Metropolitan Trust Co.; Joseph Ogden, director, deceased.—H. K. Burras; readmitted to Stock Exchange.—Bank of New Amsterdam; Geo. J. Baumann, Cashier.—Standard National Bank; William C. McGibbon, Pres. in place of Marvelle W. Cooper, deceased; Horace H. Brockway elected director.

**PLATTSBURGH**—Iron National Bank; S. Moffitt, Pres. in place of John H. Meyers, deceased.

**POUGHKEEPSIE**—Merchants' National Bank; I. Reynolds Adriance, Pres. in place of W. C. Arnold, deceased; no Second Vice-Pres. in place of I. Reynolds Adriance.—City National Bank; Theo. V. Johnston, Vice-Pres. in place of O. H. Booth, deceased.

**SYRACUSE**—New York State Banking Co.; Rasselas A. Bonta, Pres. in place of Nathan F. Graves, deceased; Geo. L. Bonta, Cashier.

**UTICA**—First National Bank; Henry R. Williams, Asst. Cashier.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

**CHARLOTTE**—Loan and Savings Bank; Lee H. Battle, Cashier in place of Archibald Brady.

**GREENVILLE**—Bank of Greenville (successor to Tyson & Rawls); Pres., R. L. Davis; Vice-Pres., R. A. Tyson; Cashier, Jas. L. Little.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

**PEMBINA**—First National Bank; Judson La Moure, Pres. in place of Lewis E. Booker; W. J. Kneeshaw, Vice-Pres. in place of Judson La Moure.

#### OHIO.

**CAMBRIDGE**—Central National Bank; no Asst. Cashier in place of Roger Kirkpatrick.

**CLEVELAND**—Western Reserve Nat. Bank; James Pickands, director, deceased.—Wick Banking & Trust Co; Dudley Baldwin, director, deceased.

**COLUMBUS**—Commercial National Bank; Walter Crafts, Pres., deceased.

**LODI**—Exchange Bank; John Taylor, Pres., deceased.

**STUEBENVILLE**—Commercial National Bank; Geo. A. Maxwell, Vice-Pres.

**TIFFIN**—Tiffin Savings Bank; Benjamin F. Myers, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**WAPAKONETA**—People's National Bank; S.

W. McFarland, Pres. in place of F. J. McFarland, deceased.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

**ATHENS**—First National Bank; F. K. Harris, Cashier in place of C. T. Hull, resigned.

**BELLEFONTE**—First National Bank; James P. Coburn, Pres., in place of Geo. F. Harris; Geo. F. Harris, Vice-Pres. in place of James P. Coburn.

**CHARLEROI**—First National Bank; P. J. Foley, Asst. Cashier.

**KANE**—First National Bank; F. A. Lytle, Cashier, deceased.

**PENNSBURG**—Farmers' Nat. Bank; Albert F. Fluck, Cashier in place of B. F. Leidy, deceased.

**PHILADELPHIA**—Commercial National Bank; Edward C. Napheys, elected director in place of Thos. Moore, resigned.—Bank of North America; Wm. G. Audenreid, director, deceased.

**PITTSBURG**—Keystone Bank; Chas W. Batchelor, Vice-Pres., deceased.—Freehold Bank; Lincoln H. McQuitty, Asst. Cashier.

**WELLSBOROUGH**—First National Bank; J. M. Robinson, Pres., deceased.

**WILLIAMSPORT**—Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co; Benjamin C. Bowman, Pres., deceased.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**PROVIDENCE**—Miller & Vaughan; title changed to Miller, Vaughan & Co.; Jules S. Bache admitted to firm.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**IROQUOIS** Bank of Iroquois; J. Smalley, Cashier in place of M. M. Wheeler.

**MITCHELL**—First National Bank and Security Bank; consolidated under former title; Jno. O. Walrath, Pres.; Geo. E. Logan, Vice-Pres.; H. R. Kibbee, Cashier; O. P. Graham, Asst. Cashier.

#### TENNESSEE.

**MARTIN**—Bank of Martin; M. P. Martin, Pres., deceased.

#### TEXAS.

**BROWNWOOD**—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of A. L. Trent.

**DENISON**—National Bank of Denison; J. J. McAlester, Vice-Pres. in place of D. O. Fisher.

**HEARNE**—First National Bank; L. W. Carr, Pres. in place of H. R. Hearne, deceased; Edwin Wilson, Vice-Pres. in place of L. W. Carr.

**WACO**—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of J. K. Rose; R. F. Gribble, Acting Cashier.—Provident National Bank; J. K. Rose, Vice-Pres. in place of S. C. Olive.

#### VERMONT.

**CHESTER**—National Bank of Chester; F. W. Pierce, Asst. Cashier.

#### VIRGINIA.

**RICHMOND**—National Bank of Virginia; L. Z. Morris, Vice-Pres. in place of James T. Gray.

**WASHINGTON.**

**SPOKANE**—Theis & Barroll; succeeded by H. C. Barroll & Co.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**CHARLESTON**—Citizens' National Bank; J. H. Huling, Vice-Pres.

**WISCONSIN.**

**CUMBERLAND**—Island City Bank (O. A. Ritau) capital, \$15,000; J. Swanson, Cashier.

**GALESVILLE**—Bank of Galesville; capital increased from \$25,000 to \$50,000; J. F. Cance, Cashier in place of C. M. Kellogg, resigned.

**CANADA.****NOVA SCOTIA.**

**WINDSOR**—Commercial Bank; A. P. Shand, Pres. in place of G. P. Payzant, deceased; John Keith, Vice-Pres. in place of William Dimock, deceased.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****ARKANSAS.**

**HARDY**—Spring River Bank.

**COLORADO.**

**DENVER**—American National Bank; in hands of Joseph T. Talbert, Receiver, July 25.

**INDIANA.**

**CATUGA**—Cayuga Exchange Bank.

**EAST CHICAGO**—Lake County Bank.

**IOWA.**

**ROCK VALLEY**—Farmers' Bank; assigned to C. M. Swan.

**KANSAS.**

**SAVONBURG**—Bank of Savonburg.

**TOPEKA**—Topeka Inv. & Loan Co.; out of business.

**KENTUCKY.**

**SCOTTSVILLE**—Scottsville Banking Co.

**LOUISIANA.**

**NEW ORLEANS**—American National Bank.

**MICHIGAN.**

**EAST SAGINAW**—Home National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**LANSING**—People's Savings Bank; in hands of Seymour Foster, Receiver.—Ingham County Savings Bank; in hands of Receiver, Aug. 6.

**MINNESOTA.**

**DULUTH**—Security Bank.

**MISSOURI.**

**Bronaugh**—Bank of Bronaugh; closed Aug. 6.

**NEVADA**—Conkling Bros.; closed Aug. 6.

**RICHARDS**—Bank of Richards.

**SHELDON**—Bank of Sheldon; closed Aug. 6.

**TRENTON**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**NEBRASKA.**

**OMAHA**—German Savings Bank; in hands of Thos. H. McCague, Receiver.

**RIVERTON**—Riverton State Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

**ALBANY**—South End Bank.

**BROOKLYN**—Long Island Bank; paid depositors and gone into voluntary liquidation.

**NEW YORK CITY**—Murray Hill Bank.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**MINOT**—First National Bank.

**OHIO.**

**DENNISON**—Dennison Deposit Bank.

**HILLSBOROUGH**—First National Bank; in hands of John Hulitt, Receiver, July 22.

**OREGON.**

**HEPPNER**—National Bank of Heppner; in liquidation.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**WATERTOWN**—Watertown National Bank; in voluntary liquidation by resolution of July 10.

**TEXAS.**

**UVALDE**—First National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**UTAH.**

**SALT LAKE CITY**—Bank of Salt Lake; Frank Knox and C. H. Jacobs appointed Receivers.

**WASHINGTON.**

**CHENAHALIS**—Commercial State Bank.

**ELLENSBURGH**—Kittitas Valley Nat. Bank; in hands of J. C. Hubbell, Receiver, July 18.

**SEATTLE**—Seattle Dime Savings Bank; G. R. Fisher, Receiver.

**SEDRO**—Bingham & Holbrook; M. L. Holbrook, assigned.

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MINNESOTA.

## U. S. NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the last call on July 14, 1896. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of February 28, 1896, and May 7, 1896. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$325,367,559	\$394,053,826	\$335,103,154
Overdrafts.....	164,369	171,240	230,437
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	16,893,850	17,290,850	17,899,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	20,674,000	10,965,000	1,220,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	3,198,300	3,075,200	4,083,350
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	3,220,000	2,731,433	2,021,710
Stocks, securities, etc.....	35,532,945	30,873,781	36,900,038
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	13,750,709	12,833,309	12,873,801
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,571,170	1,574,895	1,584,016
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	27,546,875	28,839,496	28,164,861
Due from State banks and bankers.....	4,701,185	4,398,572	4,490,130
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,908,028	1,702,232	2,067,097
Checks and other cash items.....	51,227,778	51,078,010	42,279,016
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,020,895	1,390,857	1,121,587
Bills of other National banks.....	62,149	57,042	61,758
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	15,671,682	11,382,978	13,576,699
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:	10,167,110	10,449,320	9,567,800
Gold coin.....	22,200,000	24,775,000	25,725,000
Gold Treasury certificates.....	111,834	123,841	93,441
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	4,524,836	6,110,188	5,021,599
Silver dollars.....	478,579	427,544	462,225
Silver Treasury certificates.....	48,826,434	45,096,658	48,046,219
Silver fractional coin.....	20,735,000	19,285,000	18,040,000
Legal-tender notes.....	742,165	760,364	798,209
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	578,723	744,328	643,523
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	\$630,784,641	\$626,140,942	\$611,664,677
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	Total.....	Total.....	Total.....
	\$630,784,641	\$626,140,942	\$611,664,677
	29.42 p. c.	28.68 p. c.	29.70 p. c.
	*The total lawful money reserve was \$122,713,456 on February 28, 1896; \$117,630,520 on May 7, 1896; \$121,132,983 on July 14, 1896.		

### ALBANY, N. Y.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,388,798	\$7,705,116	\$7,596,518
Overdrafts.....	1,479	5,913	2,262
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	400,000	400,000	400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....

## ALBANY, N. Y.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	\$29,000	\$27,500	\$27,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	742,461	1,044,483	812,065
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	295,000	295,000	295,000
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	15,503	15,408	22,408
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	935,539	1,062,875	1,089,099
Due from State banks and bankers.....	169,238	612,238	337,941
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,385,096	2,558,127	4,467,298
Checks and other cash items.....	83,670	252,288	133,082
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	107,108	87,727	138,324
Bills of other National banks.....	62,042	70,024	62,394
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,087	1,167	1,974
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	443,632	405,044	422,500
Gold Treasury certificates.....	287,190	284,300	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	19,487	18,852	20,855
Silver Treasury certificates.....	43,735	47,700	53,368
Silver fractional coin.....	13,871	9,956	19,259
Legal-tender notes.....	316,178	369,707	454,200
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	18,000	18,000	18,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		1,210	
Total.....	\$13,806,112	\$15,342,636	\$17,288,947
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000
Surplus fund.....	1,397,000	1,397,000	1,397,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	129,543	157,933	166,672
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	947,890	846,580	849,370
Due to other National banks.....	2,622,092	2,888,594	2,691,906
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,239,025	1,354,299	1,439,305
Dividends unpaid.....	13,797	2,841	2,598
Individual deposits.....	6,434,750	7,773,688	9,620,361
U. S. deposits.....	39,824	47,126	36,213
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	4,850	2,873	13,786
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	26,738	21,738	21,738
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
Total.....	\$13,806,112	\$15,342,636	\$17,288,947
Average reserve held.....	38.84 p. c.	36.98 p. c.	49.50 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,124,094 on February 28, 1896; \$1,135,500 on May 7, 1896; \$1,254,482 on July 14, 1896.

## BALTIMORE, MD.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$31,964,689	\$31,921,988	\$31,311,440
Overdrafts.....	13,792	9,156	14,270
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	2,765,000	2,910,000	3,160,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	102,000	202,000	202,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	50,000	100,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	323,919	369,284	306,514
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,559,808	1,430,374	1,490,861
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	2,075,255	2,075,795	2,075,795
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	165,025	169,937	166,347
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,767,808	1,911,553	2,002,181
Due from State banks and bankers.....	305,207	356,594	391,509
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,369,384	3,005,134	4,027,391
Checks and other cash items.....	130,622	104,492	101,814
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,721,359	1,376,838	1,451,199
Bills of other National banks.....	130,387	257,050	279,060
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	13,860	13,894	15,544
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,698,363	1,610,351	1,652,429
Gold Treasury certificates.....	415,000	362,310	352,850
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	10,000		15,000
Silver dollars.....	57,606	55,457	51,837
Silver Treasury certificates.....	891,730	1,780,698	1,399,479
Silver fractional coin.....	85,603	73,369	55,439
Legal-tender notes.....	528,324	758,446	777,387
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	610,000	1,050,000	1,580,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	119,985	130,950	142,200
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	3,000	4,950	2,000
Total.....	\$49,875,714	\$52,040,624	\$53,485,452
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$13,243,280	\$13,243,280	\$13,243,280
Surplus fund.....	4,684,200	4,684,200	4,689,750
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,103,848	1,846,994	904,085
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	2,369,620	2,568,490	2,773,850
State bank notes outstanding.....	4,606	4,606	4,606
Due to other National banks.....	4,630,729	4,288,514	4,490,194
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,161,173	1,072,879	928,097

## BALTIMORE, MD.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Dividends unpaid.....	\$80,478	\$47,300	\$171,173	
Individual deposits.....	21,887,308	24,238,242	25,825,888	
U. S. deposits.....	91,988	226,185	220,795	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....				
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....	610,000	315,000	220,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	11,250	15,000	4,276	
Total.....	\$49,875,714	\$52,040,624	\$53,485,458	
Average reserve held.....	28.38 p. c.	33.99 p. c.	36.50 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$4,294,627 on February 28, 1896; \$6,690,632 on May 7, 1896; \$5,884,412 on July 14, 1896.

## BOSTON, MASS.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$138,615,108	\$140,278,309	\$142,984,307	
Overdrafts.....	104,840	110,657	87,539	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	10,967,000	11,272,000	11,372,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	265,000	265,000	265,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	446,000	289,500	130,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,335,677	1,272,899	1,296,253	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	6,677,275	6,744,328	6,816,319	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	2,375,329	2,374,236	2,380,236	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	689,629	424,066	455,974	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	14,706,765	14,555,449	13,933,297	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	202,584	367,674	530,628	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	16,623,072	21,935,133	23,224,953	
Checks and other cash items.....	349,546	266,173	383,230	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	8,255,827	8,553,281	7,744,699	
Bills of other National banks.....	867,712	1,197,451	1,024,613	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	22,175	20,473	20,443	
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	5,255,278	5,217,275	5,699,948	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	1,523,100	1,561,240	1,461,080	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	85,857	86,182	81,479	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	2,001,943	1,750,239	1,958,357	
Silver fractional coin.....	164,536	166,119	149,727	
Legal-tender notes.....	4,870,261	6,357,453	6,889,516	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	330,000	670,000	840,000	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	484,965	507,240	496,620	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	194,540	150,900	142,883	
Total.....	\$217,504,021	\$226,448,194	\$230,289,294	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$50,750,000	\$50,750,000	\$50,750,000	
Surplus fund.....	14,751,509	14,915,530	14,915,530	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	5,273,809	4,280,997	5,130,893	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	9,522,232	10,068,112	10,068,480	
Due to other National banks.....	24,412,141	28,105,457	28,311,206	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	13,433,189	14,255,767	17,241,303	
Dividends unpaid.....	30,429	49,336	34,740	
Individual deposits.....	96,689,556	101,621,740	101,225,755	
U. S. deposits.....	105,452	146,416	130,688	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	85,837	83,224	94,906	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....	3,449,760	2,062,760	2,227,440	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	102	138,850	133,149	
Total.....	\$217,504,021	\$226,448,194	\$230,289,294	
Average reserve held.....	28.57 p. c.	32.01 p. c.	32.93 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$14,230,975 on February 28, 1896; \$16,831,508 on May 7, 1896; \$17,080,108 on July 14, 1896.

## BROOKLYN, N. Y.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,610,227	\$10,601,002	\$10,540,839	
Overdrafts.....	2,247	1,716	5,467	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	200,000	200,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	5,000	5,000	5,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	46,125	54,250	52,875	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,317,232	2,237,358	2,228,087	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	442,850	442,850	442,850	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	177,678	213,045	215,580	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	129,316	83,784	94,375	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	70,255	84,915	89,779	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,770,545	2,806,111	2,531,359	
Checks and other cash items.....	41,658	61,048	79,648	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	819,110	708,961	656,556	
Bills of other National Banks.....	177,020	178,887	194,748	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,901	9,319	7,475	

## BROOKLYN, N. Y.—Continued.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896. May 7, 1896. July 14, 1896.		
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	\$285,231	\$369,936	\$440,084	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	185,000	145,000	184,000	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	16,981	14,704	24,650	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	170,409	492,278	318,700	
Silver fractional coin.....	53,994	34,142	42,173	
Legal-tender notes.....	1,244,527	1,467,057	1,398,123	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....				
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	28,890	28,890	28,890	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,123	.....	.....	
Total.....	\$19,344,323	\$20,881,258	\$20,427,096	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	
Surplus fund.....	2,218,000	2,218,000	2,240,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	406,476	493,497	415,708	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	599,850	599,455	572,450	
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846	
Due to other National banks.....	203,590	216,635	262,166	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	197,887	242,111	240,776	
Dividends unpaid.....	561	401	10,755	
Individual deposits.....	14,302,633	15,584,912	15,096,515	
U. S. deposits.....	41,995	152,439	165,279	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	49,511	48,020	49,266	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....				
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		4,968	20,331	
Total.....	\$19,344,323	\$20,881,258	\$20,427,096	
Average reserve held.....	27.61 p. c.	35.27 p. c.	32.94 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,956,142 on February 28, 1896; \$2,523,117 on May 7, 1896; \$2,311,081 on July 14, 1896.

## CHICAGO, ILL.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$96,920,643	\$92,955,874	\$91,408,164	
Overdrafts.....	274,525	205,650	422,794	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,650,000	1,650,000	1,650,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	550,000	550,000	550,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	246,850	254,600	208,100	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	117,767	107,767	97,500	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	5,333,847	4,978,797	4,544,637	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	821,545	821,425	825,848	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	992,404	1,016,587	986,932	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	13,750,230	13,525,290	14,383,313	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	4,493,528	3,533,698	3,604,551	
Due from approved reserve agents.....				
Checks and other cash items.....	44,266	47,251	32,332	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	6,035,503	5,033,873	4,245,852	
Bills of other National banks.....	835,969	1,631,099	833,539	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	20,692	25,102	24,808	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	13,325,343	14,186,320	14,353,992	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	2,253,540	2,503,250	2,482,030	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	290,318	251,290	180,725	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,808,257	2,535,471	2,068,338	
Silver fractional coin.....	265,200	216,104	223,032	
Legal-tender notes.....	6,600,036	11,111,788	7,065,611	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	500,000	1,180,000	1,240,000	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	72,000	72,000	72,000	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	80,000	101,960	103,032	
Total.....	\$147,272,469	\$158,475,188	\$151,602,136	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$21,400,000	\$21,400,000	\$21,400,000	
Surplus fund.....	9,587,000	9,522,200	9,543,400	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,202,067	2,284,243	2,154,562	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,178,895	1,091,165	1,032,615	
Due to other National banks.....	29,163,346	31,906,292	29,671,705	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	21,470,539	20,404,487	20,188,749	
Dividends unpaid.....	3,198	4,636	24,183	
Individual deposits.....	61,793,498	71,319,175	67,012,322	
U. S. deposits.....	431,692	494,262	532,632	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	56,588	48,696	31,835	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....				
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	5,683		10,100	
Total.....	\$147,272,469	\$158,475,188	\$151,602,136	
Average reserve held.....	28.43 p. c.	31.80 p. c.	29.32 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$25,032,694 on February 28, 1896; \$31,964,212 on May 7, 1896; \$27,608,728 on July 14, 1896.



## CINCINNATI, OHIO.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$24,899,690	\$23,829,375	\$23,802,289
Overdrafts.....	10,811	39,812	24,942
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	4,068,000	5,068,000	5,071,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	850,000	850,000	850,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	762,150	921,230	985,600
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	633,578	832,411	697,125
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,918,970	2,514,424	2,594,709
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	478,461	469,980	472,700
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	59,856	59,856	58,848
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,025,029	2,085,520	2,698,109
Due from State banks and bankers.....	608,689	663,278	547,128
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,851,597	2,366,044	3,695,796
Checks and other cash items.....	109,884	198,054	195,513
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	207,117	252,928	184,358
Bills of other National banks.....	220,554	241,073	224,941
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,735	3,085	2,748
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	758,795	914,247	817,654
Gold Treasury certificates.....	270,060	288,070	278,650
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	58,455	75,359	72,178
Silver Treasury certificates.....	463,257	414,652	413,273
Silver fractional coin.....	24,134	22,035	18,419
Legal-tender notes.....	2,306,410	2,399,220	2,216,064
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	390,000	850,000	990,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	175,770	217,520	228,195
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	800	27,800	6,500
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$44,635,688</b>	<b>\$44,974,509</b>	<b>\$46,156,736</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$8,400,000	\$8,000,000	\$8,000,000
Surplus fund.....	2,790,000	2,790,000	2,790,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,040,434	928,786	999,070
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	3,505,910	4,406,287	4,503,197
Due to other National banks.....	6,263,130	5,677,776	5,778,681
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,872,197	2,671,945	2,792,089
Dividends unpaid.....	1,103	84,442	18,780
Individual deposits.....	17,818,020	18,151,877	19,315,111
U. S. deposits.....	763,541	831,036	849,804
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	120,000		
Bills payable.....	375,000	526,000	360,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	684,350	829,549	735,050
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$44,635,688</b>	<b>\$44,974,509</b>	<b>\$46,156,736</b>
Average reserve held.....	29.53 p. c.	28.62 p. c.	32.20 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$4,203,102 on February 28, 1896; \$4,403,593 on May 7, 1896; \$4,176,238 on July 14, 1896.

## CLEVELAND, OHIO.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$27,623,110	\$27,077,816	\$26,827,143
Overdrafts.....	64,423	50,009	42,862
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,300,000	1,400,000	1,400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	60,000	60,000	60,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	59,896	46,790	46,790
Stocks, securities, etc.....	671,084	683,431	675,431
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	514,971	509,971	509,971
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	213,451	212,451	212,451
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,754,329	1,899,328	1,561,425
Due from State banks and bankers.....	539,808	651,373	574,080
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,279,602	2,274,891	2,618,480
Checks and other cash items.....	127,410	127,777	56,901
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	193,982	257,606	223,801
Bills of other National banks.....	105,203	124,316	125,291
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,480	6,060	4,850
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,283,990	1,352,300	1,342,275
Gold Treasury certificates.....	353,500	243,500	244,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	70,772	85,352	94,400
Silver Treasury certificates.....	63,000	142,940	119,000
Silver fractional coin.....	32,223	40,268	36,059
Legal-tender notes.....	894,456	1,063,900	997,600
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	55,506	61,270	60,760
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	15,000	12,360	14,500
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$38,362,012</b>	<b>\$38,368,408</b>	<b>\$37,818,084</b>

## CLEVELAND, OHIO.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$9,550,000	\$9,550,000	\$9,550,000	
Surplus fund.....	2,022,000	2,064,000	2,064,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	711,267	562,909	679,261	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,177,159	1,243,910	1,248,680	
Due to other National banks.....	2,542,857	2,314,066	2,540,361	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,870,603	1,651,323	1,733,519	
Dividends unpaid.....	2,101	34,062	2,285	
Individual deposits.....	17,131,743	17,665,601	17,320,222	
U. S. deposits.....	81,253	39,548	47,444	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	24,766	21,991	13,034	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	348,299	305,972	90,415	
Bills payable.....	2,205,000	2,205,000	1,175,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	745,000	755,000	760,859	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$38,362,012</b>	<b>\$38,393,408</b>	<b>\$37,813,084</b>	
Average reserve held.....	28.42 p. c.	28.10 p. c.	27.70 p. c.	

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,687,941 on February 28, 1896; \$2,948,260 on May 7, 1896; \$2,803,234 on July 14, 1896.

## DES MOINES, IOWA.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,251,632	\$2,675,097	\$2,524,161	
Overdrafts.....	17,226	19,511	18,448	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	288,200	292,200	292,200	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	13,610	13,560	13,000	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	284,348	290,400	271,515	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	144,135	144,135	143,635	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	81,330	89,739	89,191	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	149,537	130,041	91,543	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	38,409	41,089	38,763	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	387,341	509,043	368,733	
Checks and other cash items.....	6,263	7,963	4,371	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	25,156	71,795	58,327	
Bills of other National banks.....	12,840	38,244	16,841	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	696	505	882	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	83,535	115,592	89,012	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	21,180	760	1,170	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....	
Silver dollars.....	22,877	22,560	19,798	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	12,053	21,918	4,904	
Silver fractional coin.....	15,960	14,893	16,699	
Legal-tender notes.....	131,982	319,690	180,353	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	12,917	13,117	13,117	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	4,440	.....	.....	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,005,645</b>	<b>\$4,831,858</b>	<b>\$4,246,670</b>	

LIABILITIES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	
Surplus fund.....	236,000	236,000	236,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	48,380	53,098	59,075	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	255,030	256,840	261,880	
Due to other National bank.....	539,747	766,481	653,239	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	837,379	1,246,118	940,571	
Dividends unpaid.....	3,005	2,451	1,519	
Individual deposits.....	1,266,123	1,445,673	1,234,384	
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	30,000	
Bills payable.....	20,000	20,000	50,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,005,645</b>	<b>\$4,831,858</b>	<b>\$4,246,670</b>	
Average reserve held.....	28.42 p. c.	32.00 p. c.	26.54 p. c.	

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$287,567 on February 28, 1896; \$495,403 on May 7, 1896; \$311,937 on July 14, 1896.

## DETROIT, MICH.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$14,870,995	\$14,746,733	\$14,837,504	
Overdrafts.....	10,013	12,300	13,834	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,350,000	1,350,000	1,350,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	300,000	300,000	300,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	165,500	163,000	157,500	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	8,382	8,687	6,149	

## DETROIT, MICH.—Continued.

RESOURCES		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	\$36,853	\$36,858	\$39,788	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	67,122	76,479	78,975	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	548,671	669,922	761,097	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	268,573	223,234	279,078	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,600,296	1,659,342	2,301,574	
Checks and other cash items.....	12,874	19,957	16,717	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	176,472	216,714	258,275	
Bills of other National banks.....	107,280	152,068	171,173	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	12,345	12,143	13,004	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	1,180,997	1,081,945	1,164,442	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,000	30,040	24,110	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	71,005	57,785	49,443	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	63,539	131,610	155,424	
Silver fractional coin.....	70,967	59,117	45,650	
Legal-tender notes.....	412,949	519,793	653,054	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....				
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	60,750	60,750	60,750	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	8,092	4,152	5,591	
Total.....	\$21,413,663	\$21,597,705	\$22,743,538	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,600,000	\$3,600,000	\$3,600,000	
Surplus fund.....	618,000	618,000	618,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	490,737	496,890	429,758	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,200,840	1,203,600	1,192,580	
Due to other National banks.....	2,246,334	2,018,393	2,024,107	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,746,565	3,582,987	3,845,294	
Dividends unpaid.....	291	688	6,091	
Individual deposits.....	9,060,240	9,465,334	10,572,942	
U. S. deposits.....	211,496	248,733	252,940	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	78,656	65,724	46,968	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	60,000	182,912	54,331	
Bills payable.....	100,000	124,500	100,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....				
Total.....	\$21,413,663	\$21,597,705	\$22,743,538	
Average reserve held.....	24.37 p. c.	21.52 p. c.	20.15 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,809,478 on February 28, 1896; \$1,804,490 on May 7, 1896; \$2,092,124 on July 14, 1896.

## KANSAS CITY, MO.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$14,840,880	\$15,155,242	\$14,100,614	
Overdrafts.....	139,121	159,749	113,398	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	400,000	400,000	400,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....				
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	39,500	39,000	34,000	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	935,099	912,739	926,115	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	92,108	92,108	91,608	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	344,786	347,906	373,500	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	643,805	645,936	629,908	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	759,039	1,051,178	693,434	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,737,497	2,874,262	2,769,438	
Checks and other cash items.....	88,949	83,290	111,633	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	619,968	457,178	484,559	
Bills of other National banks.....	196,812	118,400	215,755	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,913	5,265	4,734	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	904,982	1,044,570	1,038,747	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	21,020	40,620	17,400	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	101,770	76,585	121,435	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	252,382	339,379	243,572	
Silver fractional coin.....	40,348	30,301	29,078	
Legal-tender notes.....	803,573	814,971	713,110	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....				
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	13,000	13,000	13,000	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	59,474	40,674	22,015	
Total.....	\$24,143,943	\$24,241,829	\$23,262,053	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,550,000	\$3,550,000	\$3,550,000	
Surplus fund.....	584,500	584,500	552,500	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	207,715	247,610	172,373	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	380,000	380,000	380,000	
Due to other National banks.....	4,686,419	4,188,724	3,908,562	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	4,454,453	4,123,317	4,067,386	
Dividends unpaid.....	1,994	1,311	24,398	
Individual deposits.....	9,760,011	10,423,686	10,190,417	

## KANSAS CITY, MO.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.			
	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
U. S. deposits.....	\$71,354	\$70,700	\$81,818
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	24,595	18,408	21,105
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		19,570	
Bills payable.....	465,000	650,000	825,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$24,143,043</b>	<b>\$24,241,829</b>	<b>\$23,282,053</b>
Average reserve held.....	29.12 p. c.	28.42 p. c.	30.48 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,124,075 on February 28, 1896; \$2,343,426 on May 7, 1896; \$2,173,342 on July 14, 1896.

## LINCOLN, NEB.

RESOURCES.			
	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,829,722	\$1,737,871	\$1,685,654
Overdrafts.....	5,132	4,538	9,457
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	150,000	150,000	150,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....			
U. S. bonds on hand.....		7,340	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	6,000	6,000	6,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....	65,904	58,397	79,699
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	74,994	74,994	74,994
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	66,528	72,744	79,319
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	42,738	40,788	80,498
Due from State banks and bankers.....	28,817	22,552	89,873
Due from approved reserve agents.....	129,714	230,214	132,584
Checks and other cash items.....	40,808	41,221	17,521
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	11,596	16,809	16,897
Bills of other National banks.....	3,240	1,920	3,410
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,226	602	619
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	94,883	79,015	111,785
Gold Treasury certificates.....			900
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	21,672	9,112	8,650
Silver Treasury certificates.....	4,996	3,481	3,002
Silver fractional coin.....	5,527	3,803	5,647
Legal-tender notes.....	63,669	60,922	46,872
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	6,750	6,750	6,750
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,655,111</b>	<b>\$2,629,049</b>	<b>\$2,559,607</b>

LIABILITIES.			
	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$850,000	\$850,000	\$850,000
Surplus fund.....	131,000	135,000	135,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	26,542	25,141	20,922
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	134,300	135,000	135,000
Due to other National banks.....	135,230	188,721	176,414
Due to State banks and bankers.....	190,882	164,549	147,397
Dividends unpaid.....			
Individual deposits.....	1,125,656	1,054,736	997,080
U. S. deposits.....			
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	47,500	65,900	93,793
Bills payable.....	10,000	10,000	14,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,655,111</b>	<b>\$2,629,049</b>	<b>\$2,559,607</b>
Average reserve held.....	24.09 p. c.	29.69 p. c.	26.99 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$192,447 on February 28, 1896; \$156,333 on May 7, 1896; \$176,556 on July 14, 1896.

## LOUISVILLE, KY.

RESOURCES.			
	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,423,031	\$8,455,022	\$7,997,554
Overdrafts.....	37,119	36,105	36,634
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,075,000	1,275,000	1,275,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	500,000	500,000	500,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	6,000		
Stocks, securities, etc.....	93,984	108,484	96,421
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	397,045	375,835	820,500
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	195,567	195,567	195,862
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	25,808	26,376	26,376
Due from State banks and bankers.....	662,665	588,249	589,426
Due from approved reserve agents.....	290,165	251,313	330,293
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,280,073	997,821	1,460,644
Checks and other cash items.....	37,518	12,159	17,591
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	79,766	145,816	135,394
Bills of other National banks.....	92,566	85,466	96,858
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	5,051	4,207	3,338

## LOUISVILLE, KY.—Continued.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896. May 7, 1896. July 14, 1896.		
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	\$624,875	\$681,376	\$608,208	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	5,000	5,000	22,800	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	38,610	33,298	34,180	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	20,000		34,568	
Silver fractional coin.....	25,895	22,344	19,455	
Legal-tender notes.....	528,292	480,696	369,711	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....				
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	43,555	57,055	57,055	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		1,000	5,000	
Total.....	\$14,465,290	\$14,818,184	\$14,254,832	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,001,500	\$3,001,500	\$3,001,500	
Surplus fund.....	731,400	738,400	714,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	194,685	211,458	189,741	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	868,900	1,141,340	1,142,100	
Due to other National banks.....	1,986,877	1,825,649	1,954,247	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,061,716	1,467,418	1,568,717	
Dividends unpaid.....	5,428	7,585	9,614	
Individual deposits.....	4,939,519	4,814,519	4,571,131	
U. S. deposits.....	381,514	397,580	387,961	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	81,506	99,637	111,329	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	2,100	22,100	2,100	
Bills payable.....				
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	10,192	3,000	2,300	
Total.....	\$14,465,290	\$14,818,184	\$14,254,832	
Average reserve held.....	32.08 p. c.	29.94 p. c.	35.31 p. c.	
*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,240,372 on February 28, 1896; \$1,202,704 on May 7, 1896; \$1,108,953 on July 14, 1896.				

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,240,372 on February 28, 1896; \$1,202,704 on May 7, 1896; \$1,108,933 on July 14, 1896.

## MILWAUKEE, WIS.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$16,499,151	\$15,971,619	\$14,790,482
Overdrafts.....	62,778	58,565	74,803
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	720,000	820,000	920,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	360,000	360,000	360,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	8,250	10,250	8,250
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	138,819	157,219	141,959
Stocks, securities, etc.....	468,900	531,300	650,175
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	135,763	132,300	127,263
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	25,000	25,000	25,000
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	493,851	570,512	651,555
Due from State banks and bankers.....	259,982	330,721	389,885
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,975,294	3,043,481	2,558,982
Checks and other cash items.....	3,245	3,904	3,138
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	349,884	325,884	283,724
Bills of other National banks.....	57,696	56,489	56,608
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	5,674	3,221	2,432
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	2,106,000	2,068,720	2,070,680
Gold Treasury certificates.....			
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	40,100	37,456	46,131
Silver Treasury certificates.....	52,186	86,411	108,004
Silver fractional coin.....	26,124	26,702	23,817
Legal-tender notes.....	640,537	748,608	638,500
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	32,400	36,067	41,400
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	700	8,000	143,577
Total.....	\$25,478,809	\$25,455,996	\$24,146,380
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000
Surplus fund.....	496,000	496,000	521,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	195,900	291,011	185,951
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	643,870	720,700	827,000
Due to other National banks.....	1,794,935	1,697,687	1,544,663
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,080,808	931,252	815,685
Dividends unpaid.....	137	137	1,237
Individual deposits.....	17,727,905	17,743,547	16,539,111
U. S. deposits.....	170,723	224,102	201,400
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	178,928	171,555	323,300
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
Total.....	\$25,478,809	\$25,455,996	\$24,146,380
Average reserve held.....	29.67 p. c.	31.11 p. c.	30.43 p. c.
*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,865,027 on February 28, 1896; \$2,982,897 on May 7, 1896; \$2,887,132 on July 14, 1896.			

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,865,027 on February 28, 1896; \$2,982,897 on May 7, 1896; \$2,887,132 on July 14, 1896.

## MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,281,008	\$11,107,682	\$11,393,509
Overdrafts.....	29,794	26,910	21,520
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	400,000	400,000	400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	500	500	500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	33,907	32,345	31,845
Stocks, securities, etc.....	350,404	341,299	345,315
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	159,115	159,215	159,188
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	302,917	304,786	303,751
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	485,131	486,567	574,380
Due from State banks and bankers.....	312,266	378,440	346,273
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,252,287	1,429,072	1,118,628
Checks and other cash items.....	21,314	16,224	45,582
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	464,926	605,819	524,399
Bills of other National banks.....	72,309	94,257	51,788
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	14,146	7,667	2,777
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	741,589	1,017,875	863,647
Gold Treasury certificates.....	23,500	23,500	23,500
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	48,638	43,724	28,069
Silver Treasury certificates.....	10,300	13,793	28,000
Silver fractional coin.....	17,136	17,121	18,669
Legal-tender notes.....	450,100	732,421	307,193
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	18,000	18,000	18,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	3,000	.....	5,524
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,542,295</b>	<b>\$17,307,193</b>	<b>\$16,672,033</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,200,000	\$3,200,000	\$3,200,000
Surplus fund.....	427,500	427,500	461,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	405,287	457,159	424,763
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	309,470	306,650	301,150
Due to other National banks.....	1,179,905	1,508,022	1,395,732
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,119,760	1,046,342	1,052,598
Dividends unpaid.....	552	1,296	6,202
Individual deposits.....	7,416,819	8,166,566	7,775,852
U. S. deposits.....	29,127	38,696	36,109
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	20,050	4,970	13,824
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	141,822	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	270,000	150,000	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	22,000	.....	5,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$16,542,295</b>	<b>\$17,307,193</b>	<b>\$16,672,033</b>
Average reserve held.....	30.38 p. c.	35.82 p. c.	27.42 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,291,264 on February 28, 1896; \$1,848,434 on May 7, 1896; \$1,269,098 on July 14, 1896.

## NEW ORLEANS, LA.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$12,977,205	\$12,222,595	\$12,172,335
Overdrafts.....	718,546	851,792	744,134
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	900,000	900,000	1,000,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....	72,500	95,000	3,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	67,483	71,674	68,370
Stocks, securities, etc.....	3,131,090	2,685,173	2,501,522
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....	674,439	675,239	674,258
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	95,297	128,090	128,021
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	368,943	319,996	339,861
Due from State banks and bankers.....	323,147	209,898	220,592
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,644,872	1,509,599	1,440,073
Checks and other cash items.....	130,720	5,795	12,835
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,522,550	972,560	652,288
Bills of other National banks.....	75,544	125,975	99,182
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,286	11,252	7,681
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	394,897	366,709	425,289
Gold Treasury certificates.....	115,720	118,000	169,610
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	114,417	63,154	43,295
Silver Treasury certificates.....	876,146	982,123	584,160
Silver fractional coin.....	97,218	50,627	52,228
Legal-tender notes.....	1,617,868	1,895,430	1,232,894
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	39,060	40,500	44,620
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	24,250	11,650	1,880
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$25,978,232</b>	<b>\$24,313,737</b>	<b>\$22,699,144</b>

## NEW ORLEANS, LA.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$2,900,000	\$2,900,000	\$2,900,000
Surplus fund.....		2,489,500	2,489,500	2,440,000
Undivided profits less expenses and taxes paid.....		871,470	480,840	273,194
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		806,945	806,245	897,186
Due to other National banks.....		1,497,884	1,189,708	1,061,710
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,565,784	1,478,839	1,215,142
Dividends unpaid.....		24,628	18,218	67,456
Individual deposits.....		15,435,262	14,294,353	13,544,014
U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		194,082	248,656	248,178
Bills payable.....		485,000	52,250	52,250
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		197,874	345,135	.....
Total.....		\$23,978,232	\$24,313,737	\$22,089,144
Average reserve held.....		30.19 p. c.	32.74 p. c.	27.79 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$3,216,267 on February 28, 1896; \$3,476,043 on May 7, 1896; \$2,557,487 on July 14, 1896.

## OMAHA, NEB.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$8,888,941	\$8,698,787	\$8,263,702
Overdrafts.....		102,738	101,469	104,373
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		780,000	730,000	730,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		401,000	450,000	450,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		10,000	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		108,725	101,250	101,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....		688,500	677,462	661,473
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		832,088	832,088	832,088
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		428,978	413,773	424,088
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		475,550	454,527	578,903
Due from State banks and bankers.....		406,497	406,795	503,041
Due from approved reserve agents.....		1,665,080	1,397,512	1,628,983
Checks and other cash items.....		78,475	91,049	121,470
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		474,649	436,599	497,399
Bills of other National banks.....		81,232	155,897	147,484
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		8,937	7,750	9,109
* Lawful money reserve, viz.:				
Gold coin.....		1,180,933	1,463,880	1,328,777
Gold Treasury certificates.....		.....	.....	1,010
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....		90,028	91,863	75,990
Silver Treasury certificates.....		95,483	111,374	91,566
Silver fractional coin.....		47,197	64,790	52,496
Legal-tender notes.....		301,571	405,372	461,847
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....		.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasury.....		35,100	32,500	32,230
Due from U. S. Treasury.....		3,650	710	990
Total.....		\$17,212,658	\$17,123,364	\$17,098,025

LIABILITIES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$3,950,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000
Surplus fund.....		371,500	321,500	323,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		124,388	74,896	68,169
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		701,995	656,425	653,595
Due to other National banks.....		1,876,144	1,963,545	2,128,043
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,982,124	2,045,943	1,861,618
Dividends unpaid.....		384	359	3,735
Individual deposits.....		7,510,268	7,774,963	7,847,223
U. S. deposits.....		155,042	233,964	278,144
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		196,984	102,026	96,966
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		876	.....	.....
Bills payable.....		363,000	140,000	85,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		.....	.....	.....
Total.....		\$17,212,658	\$17,123,364	\$17,098,025
Average reserve held.....		33.58 p. c.	33.26 p. c.	35.01 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,716,112 on February 28, 1896; \$2,137,279 on May 7, 1896; \$2,011,677 on July 14, 1896.

## PHILADELPHIA, PA.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$89,416,977	\$88,130,157	\$88,230,372
Overdrafts.....		16,914	21,243	22,974
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		7,477,500	7,907,500	7,627,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		300,000	250,000	375,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		880,834	866,897	824,899
Stocks, securities, etc.....		10,045,484	9,715,696	10,203,932

## PHILADELPHIA, PA.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	\$4,324,146	\$4,331,112	\$4,331,302
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	690,131	806,790	695,788
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	6,126,487	6,064,540	6,809,521
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,125,273	1,187,884	1,224,424
Due from approved reserve agents.....	10,593,020	11,425,622	10,444,550
Checks and other cash items.....	1,241,252	1,143,375	1,199,813
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	10,977,850	7,671,296	8,660,732
Bills of other National banks.....	336,589	345,064	425,442
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	66,902	61,270	58,450
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....			
Gold coin.....	1,711,599	1,642,246	1,660,991
Gold Treasury certificates.....	258,570	202,390	204,220
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	5,415,000	5,570,000	5,575,000
Silver dollars.....	265,325	268,432	282,648
Silver Treasury certificates.....	3,261,057	4,722,817	3,637,676
Silver fractional coin.....	271,614	801,734	269,897
Legal-tender notes.....	2,372,128	3,182,841	2,510,873
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	4,330,000	3,910,000	3,495,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	316,011	355,654	343,237
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	54,064	129,751	117,411
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$162,494,415</b>	<b>\$161,544,118</b>	<b>\$159,601,697</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$21,965,000	\$21,965,000	\$21,965,000
Surplus fund.....	10,988,000	14,638,000	14,673,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,767,614	2,409,970	2,583,597
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	6,549,252	7,005,897	6,687,736
Due to other National banks.....	10,128,839	17,426,202	18,625,338
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,368,416	5,330,424	5,622,285
Dividends unpaid.....	40,111	334,923	87,743
Individual deposits.....	87,150,105	91,062,151	88,706,765
U. S. deposits.....	176,258	153,398	203,783
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		1,243	1,035
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	325,000		50,352
Bills payable.....		297,414	395,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	4,435,618	889,492	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$162,494,415</b>	<b>\$161,544,118</b>	<b>\$159,601,697</b>
Average reserve held.....	31.40 p. c.	32.24 p. c.	29.79 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$18,385,293 on February 28, 1896; \$19,800,361 on May 7, 1896; \$17,836,410 on July 14, 1896.

## PITTSBURG, PA.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$43,899,656	\$44,609,241	\$45,304,021
Overdrafts.....	65,842	55,744	68,956
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	3,406,250	4,215,250	4,810,250
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	23,500	3,300	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	359,523	447,413	464,100
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,721,389	2,752,216	2,740,615
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	3,205,567	3,177,625	3,193,250
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	515,331	528,715	537,164
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,181,729	1,481,928	1,702,288
Due from State banks and bankers.....	250,773	334,966	300,855
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,628,765	3,501,435	3,889,238
Checks and other cash items.....	221,910	252,138	322,657
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,801,548	1,535,144	1,681,613
Bills of other National banks.....	245,032	330,588	283,428
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	17,365	15,722	14,203
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:.....			
Gold coin.....	3,015,334	2,900,963	2,885,171
Gold Treasury certificates.....	388,270	369,930	368,220
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	256,751	267,274	243,310
Silver Treasury certificates.....	524,614	768,066	641,974
Silver fractional coin.....	144,614	137,513	152,185
Legal-tender notes.....	2,001,251	2,605,205	2,044,351
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with treasurer.....	159,972	184,711	215,596
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	20,500	40,500	130,960
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$68,264,493</b>	<b>\$70,765,583</b>	<b>\$72,233,112</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$12,100,000	\$12,100,000	\$12,100,000
Surplus fund.....	9,229,318	9,371,618	9,420,543
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,370,833	1,371,549	1,345,268
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	3,051,267	3,772,372	4,267,572
Due to other National banks.....	5,824,726	5,100,678	5,303,774
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,329,891	2,269,018	2,147,567
Dividends unpaid.....	56,316	137,814	124,194
Individual deposits.....	33,587,971	35,582,612	36,758,963



## PITTSBURG, PA.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
U. S. deposits.....	\$131,916	\$95,905	\$149,682
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	52,909	107,262	51,232
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	1,027,242	694,250	460,653
Bills payable.....	.....	160,000	80,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	2,500	2,500	3,600
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$68,264,493</b>	<b>\$70,765,583</b>	<b>\$72,233,112</b>
Average reserve held.....	26.63 p. c.	27.23 p. c.	25.81 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$6,330,835 on February 28, 1896; \$7,098,941 on May 7, 1896; \$6,365,211 on July 14, 1896.

## ST. JOSEPH, MO.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,312,520	\$3,152,219	\$2,718,479
Overdrafts.....	17,611	10,631	21,509
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	4,000	4,000	3,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	91,806	86,500	73,953
Stocks, securities, etc.....	106,082	106,017	103,350
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	21,350	32,122	35,096
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	172,296	116,244	232,739
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	68,732	78,916	71,233
Due from State banks and bankers.....	669,878	374,025	663,064
Due from approved reserve agents.....	27,297	23,639	24,185
Checks and other cash items.....	54,714	52,800	42,552
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	8,629	11,003	7,145
Bills of other National banks.....	707	917	657
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	.....	.....	.....
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	201,790	192,722	187,192
Gold Treasury certificates.....	7,440	5,620	6,360
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	21,176	33,039	21,502
Silver Treasury certificates.....	54,544	48,773	51,047
Silver fractional coin.....	5,835	8,914	4,716
Legal-tender notes.....	129,363	133,947	145,502
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	8,968	8,965	8,955
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,900	2,900	1,700
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,235,737</b>	<b>\$4,735,413</b>	<b>\$4,675,191</b>
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,100,000	\$1,100,000	\$850,000
Surplus fund.....	140,000	140,000	140,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	33,122	44,551	42,127
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	179,100	179,100	179,100
Due to other National banks.....	387,705	387,694	346,519
Due to State banks and bankers.....	710,910	583,109	591,778
Dividends unpaid.....	567	230	3,913
Individual deposits.....	2,613,317	2,260,158	2,472,547
U. S. deposits.....	43,493	48,762	49,205
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	573	557	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	46,998	21,249	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$5,235,737</b>	<b>\$4,735,413</b>	<b>\$4,675,191</b>
Average reserve held.....	32.05 p. c.	26.62 p. c.	35.02 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$421,138 on February 28, 1896; \$422,416 on May 7, 1896; \$416,369 on July 14, 1896.

## ST. LOUIS, MO.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$27,841,225	\$27,825,052	\$27,708,748
Overdrafts.....	40,448	38,836	35,195
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	402,000	1,402,000	1,402,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	525,000	525,000	525,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	107,750	191,500	173,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,305,440	1,278,649	1,398,567
Stocks, securities, etc.....	945,951	951,253	960,445
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	160,959	164,537	173,141
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	3,575,257	2,693,735	3,447,616
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	989,672	819,148	690,963
Due from State banks and bankers.....	.....	.....	.....
Due from approved reserve agents.....	.....	.....	.....
Checks and other cash items.....	54,724	225,567	114,131
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	974,215	1,206,363	1,258,172
Bills of other National banks.....	336,280	282,710	137,867
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	2,862	1,665	2,041

## ST. LOUIS, MO.—Continued.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	\$1,340,886	\$1,554,577	\$1,765,175	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	253,950	299,770	193,730	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	42,300	27,191	19,381	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,000,956	1,374,137	996,758	
Silver fractional coin.....	18,609	28,062	25,475	
Legal-tender notes.....	2,285,446	2,289,182	2,257,587	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	1,000,000	1,290,000	1,290,000	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	18,042	63,042	63,042	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	4,000	2,500	16,250	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$44,234,858</b>	<b>\$44,434,508</b>	<b>\$44,648,758</b>	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$9,400,000	\$9,400,000	\$9,400,000	
Surplus fund.....	1,896,000	1,896,000	1,891,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	634,898	683,688	583,371	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	857,460	1,253,540	1,250,340	
Due to other National banks.....	7,700,962	7,649,719	6,949,783	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	6,578,644	5,853,479	5,895,474	
Dividends unpaid.....	2,210	41,787	2,383	
Individual deposits.....	16,984,477	17,148,790	17,562,925	
U. S. deposits.....	490,266	512,500	512,500	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			101,000	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			475,000	
Bills payable.....	200,000	25,000	25,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....				
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$44,234,858</b>	<b>\$44,434,503</b>	<b>\$44,648,758</b>	
Average reserve held.....	27.70 p. c.	26.35 p. c.	26.01 p. c.	

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$7,151,047 on February 28, 1896; \$6,832,950 on May 7, 1896; \$6,548,086 on July 14, 1896.

## ST. PAUL, MINN.

RESOURCES.		Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....				
Overdrafts.....	\$10,710,516	\$10,907,366	\$10,731,212	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	4,834	12,852	10,083	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	252,000	252,000	252,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	475,000	475,000	475,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....				
Stocks, securities, etc.....	853,800	714,901	818,292	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	753,508	753,508	752,718	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	148,824	148,150	175,479	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	894,604	374,015	383,280	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	184,794	174,521	129,062	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,495,983	1,872,694	1,730,496	
Checks and other cash items.....	38,578	38,633	34,060	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	200,189	346,479	329,510	
Bills of other National banks.....	43,113	58,065	88,500	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,794	3,666	4,252	
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	2,282,874	2,144,355	2,152,885	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,400	12,200	10,800	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	72,320	54,400	61,663	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	23,606	79,884	61,125	
Silver fractional coin.....	27,049	82,841	18,156	
Legal-tender notes.....	122,099	170,777	145,508	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....				
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	11,293	11,293	11,293	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	14,150	18,846	21,846	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$18,082,443</b>	<b>\$18,657,334</b>	<b>\$18,455,756</b>	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	
Surplus fund.....	1,055,000	1,055,000	1,055,000	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	959,499	943,854	896,113	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	203,440	201,950	201,270	
Due to other National banks.....	1,646,176	1,938,898	1,776,242	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,354,819	1,410,596	1,401,861	
Dividends unpaid.....	3,074	3,346	6,255	
Individual deposits.....	8,638,021	8,845,357	8,840,090	
U. S. deposits.....	110,486	212,324	293,175	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	312,425	245,997	171,753	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....				
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			14,025	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$18,082,443</b>	<b>\$18,657,334</b>	<b>\$18,455,756</b>	
Average reserve held.....	35.96 p. c.	37.41 p. c.	36.34 p. c.	

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,538,348 on February 28, 1896; \$2,494,438 on May 7, 1896; \$2,450,137 on July 14, 1896.

## SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1897.
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,084,995	\$7,088,141	\$7,025,026
Overdrafts.....	111,231	123,944	109,624
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	102,000	103,000	108,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	26,780	25,113	27,675
Stocks, securities, etc.....	146,582	149,417	149,882
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	344,567	344,567	344,567
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	13,170	20,140	34,038
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	105,913	107,980	147,326
Due from State banks and bankers.....	332,555	232,372	296,061
Due from approved reserve agents.....	204,425	515,675	321,633
Checks and other cash items.....	.....	.....	.....
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	270,889	159,912	206,324
Bills of other National banks.....	5,100	19,060	17,800
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	260	653	288
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,261,222	1,175,450	1,476,502
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	22,400	18,440	17,180
Silver Treasury certificates.....	11,949	10,624	4,464
Silver fractional coin.....	36,123	27,112	33,670
Legal-tender notes.....	140,000	4,500	12,530
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	4,500	4,500	4,500
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	300	400
Total.....	\$10,374,597	\$10,381,904	\$10,531,971

## LIABILITIES.

Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,500,000	\$2,500,000	\$2,500,000
Surplus fund.....	1,425,000	1,425,000	1,450,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	78,885	167,850	70,088
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	45,000	45,000	45,000
Due to other National banks.....	605,778	607,219	521,972
Due to State banks and bankers.....	889,328	911,156	819,162
Dividends unpaid.....	2,190	800	13,775
Individual deposits.....	4,747,013	4,573,196	5,011,291
U. S. deposits.....	101,400	101,661	100,680
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....
Total.....	\$10,374,597	\$10,381,904	\$10,531,971
Average reserve held.....	29.95 p. c.	30.95 p. c.	32.25 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,471,694 on February 28, 1896; \$1,236,126 on May 7, 1896; \$1,544,317 on July 14, 1896.

## SAVANNAH, GA.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,542,423	\$1,319,131	\$1,164,179
Overdrafts.....	637	697	1,196
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	102,000	102,000	102,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	70,000	90,000	90,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	10,250	11,650	11,400
Stocks, securities, etc.....	78,920	76,512	66,715
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	67,292	67,292	67,292
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	19,812	19,848	18,380
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	44,152	56,007	81,772
Due from State banks and bankers.....	27,230	49,731	40,139
Due from approved reserve agents.....	88,185	125,803	54,239
Checks and other cash items.....	.....	.....	.....
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	.....	2,142	34,351
Bills of other National banks.....	24,715	19,300	24,597
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,599	1,854	1,193
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	11,000	1,500	3,300
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	32,000	11,000	26,000
Silver Treasury certificates.....	27,000	84,004	150,000
Silver fractional coin.....	5,300	7,095	7,700
Legal-tender notes.....	71,300	70,000	80,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	4,543	4,543	4,543
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	5,200	2	2
Total.....	\$2,233,563	\$2,120,113	\$2,018,960

SAVANNAH, GA.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$750,000
Surplus fund.....	225,000	225,000	225,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	33,521	45,425	36,322
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	88,635	87,405	88,475
Due to other National banks.....	56,968	72,849	61,884
Due to State banks and bankers.....	119,108	107,639	106,122
Dividends unpaid.....	951	911	1,712
Individual deposits.....	673,973	589,801	656,437
U. S. deposits.....	.....	7,236	231
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	74,864	71,904	86,025
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	200,000	150,000	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	10,544	12,441	6,739
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,233,563</b>	<b>\$2,120,113</b>	<b>\$2,018,950</b>
Average reserve held.....	28.84 p. c.	42.06 p. c.	43.96 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$146,600 on February 28, 1896; \$173,599 on May 7, 1896; \$267,000 on July 14, 1896.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESOURCES.	Feb. 28, 1896.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,938,616	\$8,984,414	\$8,028,322
Overdrafts.....	10,867	10,510	20,777
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	815,400	834,150	874,150
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	285,000	285,300	896,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	57,783	56,124	68,174
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,110,941	1,118,008	1,363,562
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	1,099,994	1,099,994	1,099,994
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	55,184	55,968	56,133
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	729,077	715,571	583,990
Due from State banks and bankers.....	130,148	86,220	884,901
Due from approved reserve agents.....	778,438	906,998	1,562,605
Checks and other cash items.....	78,367	102,481	125,834
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	124,826	177,657	181,983
Bills of other National banks.....	7,964	9,968	19,856
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	7,577	7,888	6,483
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	342,556	396,907	616,506
Gold Treasury certificates.....	655,980	655,710	681,550
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	10,471	10,549	13,755
Silver Treasury certificates.....	598,606	817,989	1,356,175
Silver fractional coin.....	34,951	25,971	28,082
Legal-tender notes.....	487,894	588,884	890,561
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	10,000	10,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	83,643	35,270	83,770
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	10,000	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$14,474,069</b>	<b>\$15,032,133</b>	<b>\$18,513,178</b>
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,575,000	\$2,575,000	\$3,075,000
Surplus fund.....	1,390,000	1,390,500	1,401,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	244,877	280,977	263,072
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	681,635	690,535	681,615
Due to other National banks.....	335,414	282,942	316,989
Due to State banks and bankers.....	172,625	140,082	158,130
Dividends unpaid.....	3,269	2,834	7,876
Individual deposits.....	8,963,919	9,540,544	12,513,397
U. S. deposits.....	43,308	84,738	56,417
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	44,000	44,000	15,070
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	25,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$14,474,069</b>	<b>\$15,032,133</b>	<b>\$18,513,178</b>
Average reserve held.....	33.07 p. c.	36.21 p. c.	42.12 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$2,130,238 on February 28, 1896; \$2,475,711 on May 7, 1896; \$3,586,609 on July 14, 1896.

Can't Help Liking Us.—THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE AND RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING is always full of interesting articles on financial topics. It is by no means sound on those topics, save as "sound money" is sound; but it discusses the money question with intelligence and an absence of bigotry that is rare among the goldite press. The articles in the current number are many, and all well written, while the summary of legal decisions, official reports, etc., are all most valuable.—Salt Lake (Utah) Tribune, 16 to 1 Free Silver.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## *A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.*

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NEW YORK, August 3, 1896.

FREE AND UNLIMITED COINAGE OF SILVER, ratio 16 to 1, and all obligations private and public to be payable in silver dollars, are the declarations in the Democratic national platform, adopted at Chicago last month. The issue of a gold or silver standard is now raised and in just three months from this time will be decided by the voters of this country, now numbering about 17,000,000, of whom at least 13,000,000 may be expected to register their will. The issue is so important and involves such vital principles of national honor and of individual prospects, that until it is settled, there is not likely to be much discounting of the future by business men in the way of taking unnecessary chances in business ventures.

Following the action of the Chicago Democratic convention and, in fact, anticipating it, a demand for gold sprung up which at once put the Treasury reserves in jeopardy again. The banks have had requests for gold from customers and out of town correspondents, which they have been compelled to refuse. For the past two months there have been indications that private hoarding of gold was on the increase, and those who remember how quickly gold went to a premium during the war when the Government began to issue legal tender notes, have good reason to believe that gold will be a good thing to own if silver inflation is to come.

The Treasury, what with deficient revenues and the uncertainty as to the future of our money standard, has again been placed in a position to need relief. It is understood that the policy of the Government is to issue no more bonds for the purchase of gold until the money question has been voted on by the people. But for the action of the bankers in New York and other cities, in voluntarily surrendering to the Government, gold in exchange for notes, the gold reserve would now be considerably less than the \$100,000,000 limit. That reserve was down to \$44,563,493 on February 10 last, but by the bond sale, was restored to \$105,092,843 on February 21, and further increased to \$128,713,709 on March 31. From that point it declined to \$102,418,002 on June 30.

On July 9, when the Democratic platform was adopted, the reserve was \$100,654,257. Four days later, on July 13, it crossed the \$100,000,000 line and fell to \$99,202,329, declining rapidly to \$89,669,975 on July 23.

Before the reserve had fallen to this point, some of the leading bankers of this city met and an agreement was made to assist the Treasury by depositing gold, which has resulted in nearly \$20,000,000 being paid over to the Government, and \$5,000,000 more likely to go into the Treasury in the course of a few days.

Further, to assist the Government in maintaining the reserve and to prevent the export of gold, which is usual at this season, arrangements have been made with the leading foreign exchange houses to supply the market with 60 day bills sufficient to meet the demand, until shipments of cotton and grain furnish the necessary supply. This action reasonably assures a cessation of gold exports for some time to come.

Aside from the demand for gold for export, there is the possibility of the

Treasury being confronted with a demand for gold by individuals who want to hoard it. The holder of a greenback may demand gold for it, and the Treasury notes of 1890 are redeemable in gold or silver at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, but with the duty imposed upon him by law to maintain the parity of gold and silver, refusal to redeem the latter notes in gold would precipitate the danger to be avoided—a premium on gold.

There are \$346,000,000 of the legal tenders of the old issue of greenbacks, of which the Treasury holds about \$68,000,000. There are \$94,000,000 of the Treasury notes outside of the Treasury, making \$372,000,000 of notes redeemable in gold, outstanding. The National banks, last May, held \$147,000,000 of legal tenders and all other banks, a year ago, held \$71,000,000 of paper money including bank notes and certificates, beside \$125,000,000 of cash unclassified. A fair estimate of the legal tenders held by all the banks and trust companies in the country would probably be \$200,000,000, leaving about \$170,000,000 in the hands of the people. Only a small proportion of these are likely to be presented to the Treasury, and with \$110,000,000 of gold now on hand, the Government appears to be abundantly able to redeem all notes presented, if the banks can keep the legal tenders in their possession.

**BANK DEPOSITS.**—As shown by the reports of the National banks of the principal cities this month, the deposits have been decreasing. Compared with a year ago, the National banks of New York have lost nearly \$16,000,000; Boston, \$16,500,000; Philadelphia, \$11,000,000; Chicago, \$5,000,000; Cleveland and Milwaukee, each about \$2,000,000, and New Orleans, \$2,500,000—a decrease in these cities alone of \$55,000,000. In the last two weeks of July the deposits of the clearing-house banks of this city have been reduced \$20,000,000, while in Boston and Philadelphia there has also been a considerable reduction.

**DECLINE IN STOCKS.**—In the review in our last issue we called attention to the large decline that had taken place in the market value of stocks. The decline in July carried prices very much lower and about the middle of the month values fell at a most extraordinary rate. We show here the decline in a number of stocks comparing the lowest prices last month with the highest prices previously recorded during the year.

	<i>Per cent.</i>		<i>Per cent.</i>
Canada Southern.....	10¾	New York, New Haven and Hartford..	26
Central New Jersey.....	21¼	Pittsburg, Cinn., Chic. & St. Louis, pref.	11
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.....	20¼	Southern Railway, preferred.....	14
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.....	13¼	Western Union.....	10¾
Chicago and Northwest.....	14¾	Wheeling and Lake Erie, preferred.....	17
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.....	23¾	American Cotton Oil.....	11
Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. and Omaha.....	13¾	American Cotton Oil, preferred.....	30¾
Cleveland, Cinn., Chicago and St. Louis.....	18¼	American Sugar.....	26¾
Delaware and Hudson.....	14¾	American Tobacco.....	40
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western.....	20	Chicago Gas.....	21¼
Lake Erie and Western, preferred.....	15	Consol. Gas.....	24¾
Lake Shore.....	17¾	General Electric.....	19¼
Long Island.....	16	Pacific Mail.....	14
Louisville and Nashville.....	12¾	Pullman Palace.....	23
Manhattan.....	26¼	Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	21¾
Missouri, Kansas and Texas, preferred.....	15¼	United States Leather, preferred.....	25¾
Missouri Pacific.....	14¾	United States Rubber.....	13¾
New York Central.....	9¾	United States Rubber, preferred.....	19

Out of 135 stocks, whose prices are recorded in our tables of quotations, 86 sold at their lowest prices of the year last month. Railroad bonds of the very best class also suffered a heavy decline. Government bonds were also lower, the 4 per cents, of 1907, registered, declining to 106 from 110¾ earlier in the year, and the coupons from 111¼ to 107¼. The 4s, registered, of 1925 have fallen from 118¼ to 112¾, coupons from 119 to 112¾ and the 5s, registered, of 1904 from 113¼ to 110¾ and coupons from 114¼ to 110¾.

What promised to be a panic in Wall street, the situation from July 16 to 21

being extremely critical, was allayed by the action of the bankers in coming to the aid of the Government, when a drain of gold was impending. The New York banks have cut down their specie reserves considerably while assisting the Treasury, holding now only about \$46,000,000 against \$62,000,000 a month ago. They have increased their legal-tender reserve during the month from \$33,000,000 to nearly \$38,000,000. The specie holdings are now just about one-third of the total reserve; a year ago it was 35 per cent. and two years ago 42 per cent.

**GOLD PRODUCTION.**—While the United States is struggling with the question of adopting the gold or the silver standard, it is interesting to note that the production of gold is increasing very rapidly. From data gathered by the Director of the Mint, the world's production of gold this year will be \$220,000,000 and may exceed even that figure. There is no record in the world's history of any such aggregate production in a single year. The production of gold in the United States, it is expected by the mint authorities, will exceed \$50,000,000, and may reach \$54,000,000. An appreciation of these figures is only possible through comparison with previous periods.

	<i>World's annual production.</i>	<i>United States' annual production.</i>
1811-1820.....	\$7,600,000	
1851-1855.....	132,513,000	\$59,000,000
1856-1860.....	134,083,000	51,200,000
1861-1865.....	99,116,000	32,000,000
1866.....	118,848,700	32,845,000
1867.....	130,650,000	32,175,000
1868.....	146,815,100	33,000,000
1869.....	157,287,600	35,955,000
1870.....	180,620,100	39,500,000
1871.....	203,000,000	47,000,000
1872.....	220,000,000	50,000,000

The largest production of the world was during the period from 1856 to 1860, when the average annual yield was \$134,083,000, but in 1861-5 it had fallen to \$99,116,000. It is now nearly double the production of 1860. In 1863 the gold mines of the United States produced the largest in their history, \$65,000,000. The yield fell to \$30,000,000 in 1868, and since 1862 it has been increasing very rapidly. The increased production disposes of the fear of a gold famine, particularly as the discovery of new deposits in various parts of the world promises a still larger output.

**CONDITION OF THE CROPS.**—The report of the Department of Agriculture on the condition of the crops last month, encourages the expectation of a bountiful harvest for most of the cereals. Corn has been having the right kind of weather and a large yield is probable, although the condition on July 1 was slightly below that of a year ago when the average was higher than had been recorded in years. Spring wheat and barley are the only other crops which do not show a better condition on July 1 than a year ago. A conservative estimate of the wheat crop makes the yield of spring wheat, this year, 180,000,000 bushels and of winter wheat, 265,000,000 bushels, a total of 445,000,000 bushels comparing with 467,103,000 bushels, the Government final estimate for 1895. The Government estimates for previous years were: 1894, 460,267,000 bushels; 1893, 396,132,000 bushels; 1892, 515,949,000 bushels; 1891, 611,780,000 bushels, the last mentioned being the largest crop ever harvested. It is believed that the wheat crops of the four years, 1891 to 1894 inclusive, were all underestimated, making a difference in the four years' yield of more than 230,000,000 bushels. The corn crop last year was 2,151,000,000 bushels, the largest on record.

**THE IRON INDUSTRY.**—Some very interesting statistics pertaining to the iron industry have been published recently, which are full of encouragement. The statistics of production of pig iron in the United States for the first six months of 1895, as prepared by the American Iron & Steel Association, show that the output was 4,976,236 tons, an amount exceeded only once in any six months' period. The production of pig iron, in each half year since 1885, has been as follows:

	<i>First half year, Gross tons.</i>	<i>Second half year, Gross tons.</i>	<i>Year.</i>
1885.....	1,320,371	2,124,154	4,044,525
1886.....	2,637,154	3,045,642	5,682,796
1887.....	3,040,294	3,397,854	6,408,148
1888.....	3,020,002	3,409,646	6,489,738
1889.....	3,661,906	3,942,039	7,603,945
1890.....	4,560,513	4,642,190	9,202,703
1891.....	3,368,107	4,911,763	8,279,870
1892.....	4,769,683	4,387,317	9,157,000
1893.....	4,502,918	2,561,584	7,124,502
1894.....	2,717,983	3,989,405	6,657,388
1895.....	4,087,558	5,358,750	9,446,308
1896.....	4,976,236	.....	.....

With the exception of the second half year of 1895, there has been no period in the history of the country in which more iron was produced than during the first six months of the present year. More important still is the fact that consumption has kept pretty even pace with production, for the increase in stock unsold since January 1 has been less than 200,000 tons. The estimated consumption for the half year is 4,776,521 tons, which compares with 4,228,296 tons in the first half of 1895, 2,849,435 tons in 1894, 4,519,703 tons in 1893, 4,621,061 tons in 1892 and 3,547,559 tons in 1891.

There has been a falling off in production of iron in the past few months, but the weekly capacity of the furnaces in operation on July 1 was 180,532 tons as compared with 171,194 tons the year before. Last year, however, there was a very rapid increase in the output, in the last half year the weekly production running up to 217,306 tons by November 1. At the present rate of production, the output for the current half year will exceed 4,500,000 tons, bringing the total for the year above that of 1895, the year of the largest production ever known. That results such as these can be shown, when railroad construction is at the lowest point reached in many years, indicates the great change that has taken place in the industrial conditions and methods of the country. Iron enters more largely into building operations than ever before and the railroads have ceased to be the principal buyers of iron.

**THE RAILROADS.**—The statistical report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, just issued, makes an interesting study, although the results presented are a year old, the report being for the year ended June 30, 1895. At that time the total railway mileage in the United States was 180,657 miles, an increase for the year of only 1,949 miles the smallest increase for any year since the Commission has been collecting statistics, in fact the smallest since 1875. The total capital invested in railways is \$10,985,203,125, an increase for the year of \$188,729,312. This capital consists of \$4,201,697,851 common stock, \$759,561,305 preferred stock, and \$5,407,114,813 funded debt. How unprofitable railway investments have been is indicated first in the fact that railways representing 37,855 miles of road and nearly \$2,500,000,000 of capital are in the hands of receivers, second, that \$3,475,640,208 of the total capital stock or more than 70 per cent. paid no dividends at all, while \$904,436,200 of funded debt paid no interest. The value of an income bond as an investment is suggested in the statement of the Commission, that \$225,235,619 or 91.52 per cent. of all, paid no interest. The total dividends paid aggregated \$85,287,543, an average of less than 1¼ per cent. on the total stock capital and of about 5¼ per cent. on the total stock that paid any dividends. The Commission says that in no other year since the organization of the division of statistics, has so large a percentage of stock passed its dividends, or except in 1894, has so large a percentage of funded debt defaulted its interest.

The total gross earnings of the railways of the country in 1894-5 were \$1,075,371,462, an increase over the previous year of \$2,009,665. The net earnings after paying operating expenses were \$349,651,047, an increase of \$7,703,572 over 1894, but a decrease as compared with any previous year since 1890. The total net



income from all sources was \$482,088,180, out of which was expended \$425,966,921 for fixed charges, leaving applicable to dividends the sum of \$56,116,259. After paying dividends there was a deficit of \$29,845,241 following a deficit of \$45,851,294 in the previous year. In two years, therefore, the railroads have gone behind over \$85,000,000.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—Rates for money have been tending upward and the market is working closer. Banks are refusing to renew maturing time loans except on call. Commercial paper is difficult to negotiate and practically unsalable. The coming crop movement will create a demand from out of town correspondents and the banks are nursing their balances in anticipation of it. At the close of the month call money ruled at 2 @  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. with the average rate about 2 per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 2 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for 30 to 60 days, 5 per cent. for 90 days to 4 months,  $5\frac{1}{2}$  @ 6 per cent. for 5 to 6 months. For commercial paper the rates are  $5\frac{1}{2}$  @ 6 per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable, 6 @ 7 per cent. for 4 months commission house names, 6 @ 7 per cent. for prime 4 to 6 months single names, and 7 @ 8 per cent. for good 4 to 6 months single names. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the following table.

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Mar. 1.	Apr. 1.	May 1.	June 1.	July 1.	Aug. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	3 — 5	$3\frac{3}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	2 — 3	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	2 — 3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	4 — 5	$3\frac{3}{4}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	2 — 3
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	4	4	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	3	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	5	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6
Commercial paper, prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	6	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 7
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$6\frac{1}{2}$ —7	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6 — $6\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	7 — 8

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The movement of gold continues to be in favor of the principal European banks although the Bank of England holds about \$3,000,000 less gold than it did a month ago. The Bank of France gained \$5,000,000 gold and parted with about \$1,000,000 silver. The Bank of Germany gained \$5,000,000 gold and \$2,500,000 silver.

BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Apr. 15, 1896.	May 13, 1896.	June 17, 1896.	July 15, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£28,201,050	£28,194,170	£28,589,515	£27,387,770
Public deposits.....	13,072,889	14,152,185	13,150,787	6,951,901
Other deposits.....	50,311,453	49,441,954	52,325,365	56,448,143
Government securities.....	15,206,060	15,280,785	15,205,022	14,980,281
Other securities.....	27,951,631	28,501,088	28,734,469	28,900,421
Reserve of notes and coin.....	38,042,790	37,672,588	39,389,678	37,599,808
Coin and bullion.....	47,443,840	47,068,756	49,079,193	48,187,668
Reserve to liabilities.....	$50\frac{3}{4}\%$	$50\frac{1}{2}\%$	$50\frac{1}{2}\%$	$50\%$
Bank rate of discount.....	2%	2%	2%	2%
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	$\frac{3}{4}\%$	$\frac{3}{4}$ @ $\frac{3}{4}\%$	1 $\frac{1}{2}\%$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ $\frac{3}{4}\%$
Price of Consols (2 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cents.).....	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	111 $\frac{1}{2}$	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$
Price of silver per ounce.....	30 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.	30 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.
Average price of wheat.....	24s. 6d.	25s. 7d.	25s. 1d.	24s. 7d.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 2, 1896.		July 1, 1896.		August 1, 1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£44,980,056		£48,486,266		£47,880,142	
France.....	78,010,739	£49,385,202	81,650,098	£50,319,984	82,711,128	£50,168,662
Germany.....	31,085,775	13,812,475	29,058,101	14,529,049	30,198,100	15,098,700
Austro-Hungary...	24,402,000	12,775,000	27,242,000	12,859,000	27,352,000	12,907,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,406,000	11,360,000	8,406,000	11,480,000
Netherlands.....	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,638,000	7,017,000	2,634,000	6,921,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,663,333	1,331,667	2,561,333	1,280,667	2,602,000	1,301,000
Totals.....	£192,708,903	£93,901,344	£200,038,783	£97,365,650	£201,783,370	£97,871,362

**SILVER.**—The fluctuations in the price of silver in London were very narrow last month and the firmness in price is due almost entirely to the withholding of American silver from the market. The situation is indicative of the hope that silver producers in this country entertain that the free coinage of silver will be the future policy of the United States. The price opened at 81½d and did not go below 81½d during the month. It touched 81½d and at the close of the month was 81¾ a decline of ½d since June 30.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894, 1895, 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	81¾	80¾	27½	27¼	30¾	30¾	July.....	28½	28¾	30¾	30¼	31¾	31¾
February..	30½	27½	27½	27¼	31½	30¾	August.....	30¾	28½	30¾	30¾		
March.....	27½	27	30¾	27½	31½	31½	Septemb'r	30¾	29½	30¾	30¾		
April.....	29¾	29¾	30¾	29¾	31½	30¾	October.....	29½	28½	31½	30¾		
May.....	29¾	28¾	30¾	29¾	31½	30¾	Novemb'r	29½	28¾	31	30¾		
June.....	28½	28½	30½	30¾	31½	31½	Decemb'r	28½	27½	30½	30		

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—Early in the month the sterling exchange market declined under the influence of some foreign buying of American securities. Later rates advanced, the silver agitation having an unfavorable effect, and gold exports were resumed, \$8,500,000 going to Europe and \$900,000 to Canada. After the New York and foreign banking houses agreed to help the Government maintain its gold reserve the exchange market became dull but rates continue firm. The following tables show the condition of foreign exchange markets:

## ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	April 1.	May 1.	June 1.	July 1.	August 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.87¾—88	4.87¾—88	4.87¾—¾	4.87 — ¾	4.88 —
" " Sight.....	4.88¾—89	4.88¾—89	4.88¾—¾	4.88 — ¾	4.89 —
" " Cables.....	4.89 — ¾	4.89 — ¾	4.89¾—9	4.89¾—¾	4.89¾—¾
" Commercial long.....	4.87 — ¾	4.87¾—¾	4.87 — ¾	4.86¾—¾	4.87¾—¾
" Documentary for paym't.	4.86¾—¾	4.86¾—87	4.86¾—¾	4.86 — ¾	4.87 — ¾
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.15¾—15	5.14¾—13¾	5.14¾—¾	5.15¾—15	5.14¾—3¾
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.17¾—6¾	5.16¾—¾	5.16¾—¾	5.17¾—6¾	5.16¾—¾
" Bankers' sight.....	5.15¾—¾	5.14¾—¾	5.15 — 4¾	5.15¾—¾	5.15 — 4¾
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days.	5.18¾—8¾	5.18¾—¾	5.18¾—¾	5.18¾—8¾	5.18¾—¾
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.17¾—6¾	5.16¾—15¾	5.16¾—5¾	5.16¾—¾	5.16¾—5¾
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	95 — ¾	95¾—¾	95¾—¾	95 — ¾	95 — ¾
" Bankers' sight.....	95¾—¾	95¾—¾	95¾—¾	95 — ¾	95¾—¾
Brussels—Bankers' sight.....	5.15¾—¾	5.15 — 14¾	5.15 —	5.15¾—¾	5.15¾—15
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40 — ¾	40 — ¾	40 — ¾	40 — ¾	40 — ¾
Kronors—Bankers' sight.....	20½ — 7½	20½ — 7½	27 — 7½	27 — 7½	27 — 7½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.05 — 55	5.62¾—52¾	5.47¾—45	5.50 — 45	5.50 — 40

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
July 3.....	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.86½ @ 4.86½
" 11.....	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.86½ @ 4.86½	4.86 @ 4.86½
" 18.....	4.88 @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.89 @ 4.89½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.87 @ 4.87½
" 25.....	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.88½ @ 4.88½	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.86½ @ 4.86½
Aug. 1.....	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.89 @ 4.89½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.86½ @ 4.87

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—There has been no important change in the money situation abroad. Money is plenty and cheap and in most of the continental cities the open market rate is close to 2 per cent. while in London the rate of discount is below 1 per cent., the Bank of England still maintaining its nominal rate of 2 per cent.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Feb. 14.	Mar. 15.	Apr. 17.	May 15.	June 19.	July 17.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	1—1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1—½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	1½—1¾	¾—	¾	¾	¾	1½—¾
Loans—Day to day.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Berlin, ".....	2½	2	2½	2½	3	2½
Hamburg, ".....	2½	2	2½	2½	2½	2½
Frankfort, ".....	2½	2	2½	2½	3	2½
Amsterdam, ".....	1½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Vienna, ".....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
St. Petersburg, ".....	6½	6½	6½	6½	6½	6
Madrid, ".....	4½	4½	4½	4½	5	5
Copenhagen, ".....	3½	3½	3	3	3½	3½

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The showing made by the Treasury for the month of July is even more unfavorable than was expected. The total revenues were nearly \$4,000,000 larger than in June and only about \$40,000 less than in July last year. The expenditures, however, were \$17,000,000 greater than in June and \$3,500,000 greater than in July, 1895. There is a resulting deficit for the month of more than \$13,000,000, the largest deficit reported in any month since the Government began running behind excepting only the month of October, 1894, when it was about \$500,000 larger. The July deficit is nearly as large as that for the previous six months since January 1, the expenditures having exceeded the receipts by more than \$26,000,000.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	July, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.	Source.	July, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.
Customs.....	\$12,157,331	\$12,157,331	Civil and mis.....	\$12,310,000	\$12,310,000
Internal revenue...	14,302,532	14,302,532	War.....	5,221,000	5,221,000
Miscellaneous.....	2,569,346	2,569,346	Navy.....	3,734,000	3,734,000
Total.....	\$29,029,209	\$29,029,209	Indians.....	954,000	954,000
Excess of expendi- tures.....	\$13,125,790	\$13,125,760	Pensions.....	13,100,000	13,100,000
			Interest.....	6,836,000	6,836,000
			Total.....	\$42,155,000	\$42,155,000

## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	April 30.	May 31.	June 30.	July 31.
Net gold.....	\$125,498,509	\$108,663,269	\$102,418,008	\$110,567,322
Net silver.....	23,209,627	28,237,885	36,331,904	38,850,616
U. S. notes.....	76,607,711	87,629,865	88,980,861	67,704,664
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).	22,475,689	22,244,332	22,432,899	28,760,225
Deposits in National banks.....	26,819,581	22,093,400	16,778,461	16,284,421
Available cash balance.....	\$274,611,118	\$268,868,751	\$266,942,129	\$262,147,249

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—There was only a small increase in amount of National bank notes outstanding last month the total being on July 31, \$225,942,455, and on June 30, \$225,912,960. There has been an increase, however, in the past twelve months of \$14,660,547. Of the present circulation \$206,108,504 is based on Government bonds and \$19,888,951 on lawful money deposited to retire bank notes—a reduction of nearly \$5,000,000 in such deposits for the past year.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Apr. 30, 1896.	May 31, 1896.	June 30, 1896.	July 31, 1896.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$224,101,345	\$225,300,348	\$225,912,960	\$225,942,455
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	208,403,239	205,215,839	205,538,829	206,108,504
Circulation secured by lawful money....	20,698,106	19,984,509	20,374,081	19,838,951
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Four per cents. of 1893.....	29,763,050	31,363,550	31,783,550	32,630,060
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	10,322,000	10,407,000	10,048,000	9,831,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,354,450	22,384,950	22,078,100	22,241,100
" " 1907, 4 per cent.....	151,124,700	151,539,450	151,969,450	151,774,450
Five per cents. of 1894.....	12,914,350	12,916,850	13,057,850	13,067,850
Total .....	\$223,478,550	\$228,651,800	\$228,915,960	\$229,544,450

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1895, \$1,285,000; Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$880,000; 2 per cents of 1891, \$1,033,000; 4 per cents of 1907, \$12,195,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$1,585,000, a total of \$16,928,000.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$87,587.

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—The transfer of gold by the local banks to the sub-Treasury in the last two weeks is reflected in the decrease of \$16,000,000 in the specie reserves while the legal tender reserve increased less than \$7,000,000. There has been a heavy withdrawal of deposits since the middle of July, nearly \$21,000,000 having been withdrawn in that time. Loans have been reduced less than one-half of that sum, only \$10,000,000. Naturally a decrease in the surplus reserve has followed and that item is now less than \$18,000,000, a decrease of \$4,500,000 since July 11. A year ago the surplus was nearly \$41,000,000. The deposits are \$89,000,000 less than on August 1 last year and loans \$40,000,000 less.

## NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
July 3...	\$476,199,300	\$61,886,300	\$83,223,700	\$499,048,900	\$20,328,275	\$14,556,900	\$599,536,200
" 11...	477,152,900	61,950,800	86,158,500	503,488,100	22,237,275	14,595,800	615,209,600
" 18...	497,540,900	62,333,400	85,937,400	505,981,100	21,773,025	14,599,400	558,424,400
" 25...	474,239,900	56,231,300	85,607,800	493,358,200	18,449,550	14,676,700	515,989,100
Aug. 1...	469,535,900	46,254,700	92,727,400	485,014,000	17,728,800	14,800,000	444,781,100

## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January .....	\$506,437,800	\$80,815,150	\$549,291,400	\$35,268,850	\$501,089,300	\$15,989,675
February.....	551,808,400	111,623,000	546,965,200	38,751,500	490,447,200	30,623,400
March.....	531,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,054,500	496,612,200	24,442,150
April.....	547,744,200	83,800,150	504,240,200	12,413,450	481,785,700	17,006,375
May.....	573,853,800	83,417,950	526,996,100	27,328,575	495,004,100	22,944,275
June.....	572,128,400	77,965,100	568,229,400	41,221,250	498,674,100	22,230,675
July.....	579,237,800	74,803,350	570,436,300	34,225,925	496,046,900	20,328,275
August.....	581,556,000	69,063,700	574,304,500	40,917,175	495,014,000	17,728,800
September.....	585,973,900	85,830,825	574,929,900	39,149,925		
October.....	586,633,500	80,791,825	549,136,500	22,208,175		
November.....	585,104,900	83,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400		
December.....	579,835,600	52,220,800	523,788,000	18,613,300		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$595,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

**BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.**—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table :

## BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
July 3.....	\$162,342,000	\$144,934,000	\$8,610,000	\$6,440,000	\$9,894,000	\$110,807,700
11.....	162,027,000	143,473,000	8,787,000	7,712,000	9,960,000	92,983,800
18.....	162,642,000	145,155,000	8,911,000	7,700,000	9,937,000	93,206,000
25.....	162,542,000	141,173,000	8,964,000	7,449,000	9,957,000	81,353,400
Aug. 1.....	162,209,000	138,211,000	7,571,000	7,399,000	9,986,000	96,420,800

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
July 3.....	\$103,203,000	\$100,510,000	\$28,016,000	\$6,508,000	\$60,578,100
11.....	103,342,000	99,491,000	27,706,000	6,480,000	64,108,200
18.....	103,307,000	109,745,000	27,531,000	6,481,000	65,846,900
25.....	102,806,000	98,484,000	27,442,000	6,526,000	57,140,200
Aug. 1.....	102,628,000	98,422,000	27,479,000	6,492,000	49,394,562

**FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.**—The exports of merchandise in June were larger than in May which is a rare occurrence. The exports were also exceptionally large and exceed those of June in any previous year for many years. They were nearly \$12,000,000 larger than last year, and \$9,000,000 larger than in 1894. The imports were smaller than in May and \$5,500,000 less than in June last year. There was a net balance of exports for the month of \$10,500,000, and we exported net \$6,000,000 of gold and \$3,000,000 of silver a total balance of nearly \$20,000,000 for the month. The exports of merchandise in the fiscal year ended June 30 were \$882,519,229, the imports \$779,717,306 and the net balance of exports \$102,801,923. This should be reduced to about \$86,000,000 as gold and silver imported and exported in ores heretofore included in merchandise are now excluded. The net exports of gold coin and bullion were \$80,521,287 and of silver \$46,726,845, making a total balance of more than \$212,000,000. For eight consecutive years we have lost gold, the net exports in that time aggregating \$326,000,000. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and twelve months ended June 30, for the past six years :

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF JUNE.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$57,594,734	\$73,462,225	Imp., 15,867,491	Exp., \$15,539,494	Exp., \$523,847
1892.....	64,888,337	72,016,598	" 7,128,231	" 16,635,477	" 1,365,166
1893.....	65,446,569	69,094,544	" 4,247,975	" 1,701,544	" 2,431,284
1894.....	57,594,487	51,783,712	Exp., 5,720,775	" 22,376,872	" 2,000,401
1895.....	54,957,830	61,682,044	Imp., 6,064,214	Imp., 1,963,750	" 3,123,223
1896.....	66,618,162	56,159,045	Exp., 10,459,117	Exp., 6,015,741	" 3,140,827
<b>TWELVE MONTHS.</b>					
1891.....	884,480,810	844,916,196	Exp., 39,564,614	Exp., 68,180,087	Exp., 4,564,108
1892.....	1,030,278,148	827,402,462	" 202,875,686	" 495,873	" 12,835,473
1893.....	847,695,194	866,400,922	Imp., 18,735,728	" 87,506,463	" 17,544,067
1894.....	862,140,572	654,994,622	Exp., 237,145,950	" 4,528,942	" 37,164,713
1895.....	807,538,165	731,969,965	" 75,568,200	" 30,984,449	" 37,674,797
1896.....	882,519,229	779,717,306	" 102,801,923	" 80,521,287	" 46,726,845

## GOLD MOVEMENT FOR FOUR YEARS.

	1892-1893.	1893-1894.	1894-1895.	1895-1896.
July.....	Exp., \$10,240,198	Imp., \$5,776,401	Exp., \$12,823,572	Exp., \$3,296,067
August.....	" 5,716,699	" 40,622,529	" 1,985,308	" 15,189,175
September.....	" 2,824,127	" 5,242,068	Imp., 418,118	" 16,674,809
October.....	Imp., 2,684,080	" 1,072,919	" 519,851	" 76,867
November.....	" 1,498,565	" 4,139,882	" 1,507,898	" 18,468,188
December.....	Exp., 11,899,199	Exp., 1,908,300	Exp., 9,424,439	" 14,170,899
January.....	" 12,212,553	" 573,790	" 24,698,499	" 198,586
February.....	" 12,968,068	" 1,068,335	Imp., 4,067,008	Imp., 9,375,389
March.....	" 1,504,961	" 2,229,241	" 4,120,230	" 293,658
April.....	" 18,844,979	" 9,402,110	" 2,029,761	Exp., 2,689,764
May.....	" 15,205,780	" 23,124,058	" 3,271,193	" 18,493,709
June.....	" 1,701,544	" 22,876,872	" 1,963,750	" 6,016,741
Year.....	Exp., 87,506,463	Exp., \$4,523,942	Exp., \$30,964,449	Exp., \$80,521,287

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION.**—There was an increase in the aggregate amount of money in circulation in July of \$5,177,942. The increase is entirely in legal tender notes of which there were \$21,659,180 issued. The circulation of gold coin and certificates was reduced \$18,861,819. Silver dollars were increased \$176,201, but silver certificates were reduced \$397,162. Subsidiary silver was reduced \$336,244, Treasury notes \$1,268,829, and National bank notes \$1,285,807. The per capita of circulation was increased from \$21.15 to \$21.18, which is \$1.18 less than on January 1 last. The following statement shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on the dates named, the estimated population and the per capita circulation:

## MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$484,728,547	\$455,876,439	\$450,128,483	\$445,298,944
Silver dollars.....	59,206,827	52,717,417	52,175,998	51,996,797
Subsidiary silver.....	64,417,685	61,358,627	59,999,805	59,668,561
Gold certificates.....	49,998,439	48,961,909	42,320,759	39,293,479
Silver certificates.....	336,076,648	336,318,080	331,259,509	331,656,671
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	115,728,769	96,063,506	95,217,381	93,948,533
United States notes.....	230,855,873	225,562,755	225,451,858	227,410,538
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	31,605,000	33,490,000	31,840,000	41,540,000
National bank notes.....	206,663,836	215,285,550	215,631,927	214,096,620
Total.....	\$1,579,206,724	\$1,521,584,233	\$1,509,725,200	\$1,514,908,142
Population of United States.....	70,680,000	71,263,000	71,890,000	71,518,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$22.86	\$21.35	\$21.15	\$21.18

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The net cash in the United States Treasury was reduced more than \$9,000,000 last month. There is \$6,000,000 more gold in the Treasury than a month ago, \$1,000,000 more silver, \$1,000,000 more National bank notes, and \$12,000,000 less United States notes. The certificates and Treasury notes outstanding were increased about \$6,000,000. The Government has only \$75,000,000 more cash than on January 1 last, as the result of its \$100,000,000 bond sale earlier in the year.

The Treasury holdings of the various kinds of money are shown as follows:

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$83,378,362	\$118,644,233	\$111,808,340	\$119,371,284
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	32,662,890	32,217,024	30,640,941
Silver Dollars.....	364,083,702	376,572,499	378,614,043	379,852,244
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	119,989,914	119,053,665	118,753,758
Subsidiary silver.....	12,764,321	15,647,424	15,730,976	16,004,145
United States notes.....	115,825,143	121,118,261	121,239,658	109,270,478
National bank notes.....	7,063,137	10,002,335	10,668,630	11,968,422
Total.....	\$737,547,542	\$794,627,626	\$799,317,356	\$785,826,272
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	533,344,866	510,735,495	500,637,629	506,438,662
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$204,202,686	\$283,842,131	\$298,679,727	\$279,387,590

**THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE COUNTRY.**—There is \$4,000,000 less money in the country now than on July 1. The supply of gold decreased \$5,000,000 while there was an increase in the supply of silver of about \$1,000,000, while legal-tender notes and National bank notes show no material change. Since January 1 the money supply has increased nearly \$11,000,000, but there has been a decrease since May 1 of \$26,000,000. The following statement shows the amount of each kind of money in the country on the dates mentioned:

**TOTAL SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Jan. 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$568,106,969	\$574,520,722	\$567,961,823	\$564,665,228
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	32,662,860	32,217,024	30,640,941
Silver dollars.....	423,289,639	429,289,916	430,790,041	431,862,041
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	119,969,914	119,053,695	118,753,758
Subsidiary silver.....	77,182,006	76,994,051	75,780,781	75,667,708
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	218,716,978	225,297,935	226,000,547	226,000,042
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,783,409,410</b>	<b>\$1,805,426,414</b>	<b>\$1,796,404,927</b>	<b>\$1,794,200,732</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—There has been no material change in the principal of the public debt during the month although the net debt less cash in the Treasury has increased nearly \$11,000,000. The aggregate debt increased about \$8,000,000 but this is due to the issue of certificates which is offset by a corresponding increase of cash deposited to secure the certificates. The total cash assets decreased \$2,000,000 and the demand liabilities increased \$9,000,000 causing a reduction of \$11,000,000 in the net cash balance, making that item \$256,000,000. The net debt is now \$966,000,000 an increase of nearly \$19,000,000 since January 1. A comparative statement of the debt on the several dates named is given in the following table:

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**

	Jan. 1, 1896.	June 1, 1896.	July 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
"    "    1897, 4    "    .....	559,631,750	559,636,850	559,636,850	559,637,750
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	50,310	47,140	47,140	46,600
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
"    1825, 4    "    .....	62,315,400	180,440,100	162,315,400	162,315,400
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$747,361,960</b>	<b>\$845,488,590</b>	<b>\$847,363,890</b>	<b>\$847,364,250</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,674,510	1,645,970	1,636,800	1,633,640
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863
National bank note redemption acct.....	22,659,734	19,906,698	20,102,023	19,688,546
Fractional currency.....	6,868,394	6,892,489	6,891,184	6,891,184
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$378,288,992</b>	<b>\$373,535,050</b>	<b>\$373,729,570</b>	<b>\$373,315,094</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,125,325,462</b>	<b>1,220,669,611</b>	<b>1,222,729,350</b>	<b>1,222,312,964</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	50,099,889	43,649,189	42,818,189	40,697,189
Silver    "    .....	345,702,504	346,942,504	342,619,504	344,032,504
Certificates of deposit.....	34,450,000	33,670,000	31,990,000	42,150,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	137,771,280	131,385,280	129,683,280	128,343,280
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$568,023,673</b>	<b>\$555,646,973</b>	<b>\$547,110,973</b>	<b>\$555,212,973</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,693,349,135</b>	<b>1,776,316,583</b>	<b>1,769,840,323</b>	<b>1,777,525,937</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	787,578,447	861,706,970	858,905,635	851,868,747
Demand liabilities.....	609,551,247	594,573,760	596,473,539	595,705,275
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$267,133,210</b>	<b>\$267,432,096</b>	<b>\$256,158,472</b>
Gold reserve.....	63,262,268	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	114,764,932	167,133,210	167,432,096	156,158,472
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$267,133,210</b>	<b>\$267,432,096</b>	<b>\$256,158,472</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>947,296,282</b>	<b>953,476,401</b>	<b>955,297,254</b>	<b>966,154,512</b>

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of July, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				JULY, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	10 $\frac{1}{4}$ —July 29	29	14 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
" preferred	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	15—July 16	16	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Atlantic & Pacific.	2	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$ —Feb. 6	6	$\frac{1}{8}$ —Jan. 7	7	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$
Baltimore & Ohio.	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	32 $\frac{1}{4}$	44—Jan. 27	27	13—Mar. 6	6	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	16
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitta.	24	19	25—May 16	16	15—Feb. 11	11	.....	.....	.....
Canadian Pacific.	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	33	62 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 27	27	52—Jan. 4	4	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$	56 $\frac{1}{2}$
Canada Southern.	57 $\frac{1}{2}$	42	51 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	41	41—July 20	20	46	41	45
Central of New Jersey.	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	109 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	23	87 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 22	22	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$
Central Pacific.	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 15	14	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 9	9	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cfs.	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	23	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & Alton.	160	147	160—Jan. 18	18	143 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 29	29	155 $\frac{1}{2}$	148 $\frac{1}{2}$	150
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	69	82 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 24	24	62 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	62 $\frac{1}{2}$	65 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chicago & E. Illinois.	57	43 $\frac{1}{4}$	43—Feb. 13	13	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 13	13	41	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	40 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	106	90	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 5	5	98—Jan. 23	23	.....	.....	.....
Chicago Gas.	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 4	4	49 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	52 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	53 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 17	17	63 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7	78	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	68 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	130	114 $\frac{1}{2}$	130 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 2	2	121 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 16	16	127 $\frac{1}{2}$	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	123
Chicago & Northwestern.	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	108 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	23	82 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	151	137	150—June 30	30	142—Jan. 8	8	149	144	144
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	74 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	52 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	66	52 $\frac{1}{2}$	56
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	46	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	45 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 27	27	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	32	34
" preferred.	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	123 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 8	8	117—Jan. 7	7	125 $\frac{1}{2}$	122	124
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.	50	28	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	10	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 29	29	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	97	83 $\frac{1}{2}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 20	20	78 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 22	22	80	78 $\frac{1}{2}$	78 $\frac{1}{2}$
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 16	16	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 18	18	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	16—July 18	18	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	18 $\frac{1}{2}$
Columbus & Hock. Val. Coal.	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 7	7	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 9	9	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 27	27	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 22	22	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	55	60—July 22	22	50—June 22	22	60	57	60
Consolidated Gas Co.	161 $\frac{1}{2}$	123	164 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 20	20	140—July 20	20	155 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	142
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	134 $\frac{1}{2}$	118	129 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	11	115 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 16	16	125	115 $\frac{1}{2}$	119 $\frac{1}{2}$
Delaware, Lack. & Western.	174	154	166—June 5	5	146—July 29	29	159	146	150
Denver & Rio Grande.	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	14—Feb. 4	4	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 22	22	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	51—Feb. 24	24	40—Jan. 7	7	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	41	41
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	94	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 6	6	89—Jan. 2	2	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$
Erie.	.....	.....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 12	12	13—July 29	29	15	13	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 1st pref.	.....	.....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 17	17	27—July 29	29	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	27	27
" 2d pref.	.....	.....	25—Mar. 16	16	17—July 20	20	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	17
Evansville & Terre Haute.	51	28	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	27—Jan. 13	13	29	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$
Express Adams.	153	140	150 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	23	145 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 1	1	150	145 $\frac{1}{2}$	147
" American.	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	109	116—May 25	25	108—July 30	30	112	108	109
" United States.	50	36	48—Apr. 24	24	38—Jan. 9	9	40	40	40
" Wells, Fargo.	115	95	101—Feb. 15	15	90—July 29	29	98	90	90
Great Northern, preferred.	134	100	121—May 7	7	108 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 13	13	113	109	109
Illinois Central.	106	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	96—Jan. 31	31	80 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 8	8	93	90	91
Iowa Central.	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 8	8	6—July 16	16	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	38	19	38—Apr. 23	23	21—July 20	20	31	21	24
Laclede Gas.	32 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	30—Apr. 27	27	17—July 20	20	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lake Erie & Western.	28	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	23 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 5	5	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	15
" preferred.	85	61	75—Feb. 7	7	60—July 20	20	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	60	61 $\frac{1}{2}$
Lake Shore.	158 $\frac{1}{2}$	134 $\frac{1}{2}$	154 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 17	17	134 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	137	142
Long Island.	89 $\frac{1}{2}$	63	84—Jan. 7	7	68—July 29	29	75 $\frac{1}{2}$	68	68
Long Island Traction.	22	5	22—Feb. 19	19	16—Jan. 10	10	.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville.	66 $\frac{1}{2}$	39	55 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	24	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	7	49 $\frac{1}{2}$	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$
Louis, N. A. & Chic., Tr. cfs.	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 18	18	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 21	21	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 13	13	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	19	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
Manhattan consol.	119 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	113 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	11	87 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 30	30	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	89
Michigan Central.	108	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 11	11	90—July 15	15	94	90	94
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 21	21	16—June 11	11	18	16	16
" 1st pref.	88	78	83—Feb. 21	21	66—July 17	17	68	66	67
" 2d pref.	62	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	53 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 22	22	34—July 23	23	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	34	38
Mobile & Ohio.	27	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	25—Jan. 11	11	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 20	20	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 21	21	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 28	28	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
" preferred.	41	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	25	16—July 20	20	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	20 $\frac{1}{2}$



## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.		JULY, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42½	18½	29¾—Apr. 24	15¾—July 20	21¾	15¾	17¾
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis.....	81½	64					
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104½	90	90¾—Feb. 25	90 —July 16	96	90	92
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18¾	10	15 —Jan. 22	10¾—July 20	12	10¾	10½
1st preferred.....	75	65	80 —Jan. 22	67½—July 28	68	67½	67½
2d preferred.....	34½	20	35¾—Apr. 13	21½—July 20	30¾	21½	23½
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	15½	7½	17¾—Feb. 20	13¾—Jan. 7	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	30	16	20 —Feb. 20	25 —Jan. 22	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England.....	65½	29	51¾—Jan. 28	35 —July 21	37	35	35
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.....	218	174	186 —Feb. 10	160 —July 23	171	160	165
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19¾	11¾	15¾—Jan. 31	12½—July 29	14	12½	13
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	14¾	6½	11½—Jan. 31	7 —July 31	8½	7	7
preferred.....	43½	19½	31¾—Feb. 6	17 —July 20	22½	17	19
Norfolk & Western.....	6½	1½	6 —July 14	1½—Apr. 29	6	2½	6
preferred.....	19½	8	11¾—July 8	4½—May 8	11¾	8½	10
North American Co.....	7	2¾	6½—Feb. 24	3¾—July 20	4¾	3¾	4½
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8½	2½	9½—June 29	14 —May 23	8½	5½	5½
pref tr. receipts.....	27	10½	17½—May 9	10 —Apr. 16	17	12½	12½
Ohio & Mississippi.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern.....	19½	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement.....	14¾	3	4¾—Jan. 4	1½—June 12	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	32	17	22 —Apr. 14	10 —Feb. 18	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line.....	11¾	3½	10 —July 16	3½—Apr. 14	10	9¾	9¾
Pacific Mail.....	34½	20	31 —Feb. 10	17 —July 20	23½	17	19
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	7½	2	3½—Feb. 10	1½—June 23	1½	1½	1½
Phila. & Reading 2d ins. pd.....	22½	4½	10 —June 16	10 —July 20	14½	10	10½
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	22½	12	18¾—Feb. 7	12 —July 16	13½	12	12½
preferred.....	60¾	43½	50 —Feb. 27	48 —July 22	53	48	48
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34½	18	20¾—Jan. 31	17 —Jan. 15	.....	.....	.....
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178¾	146	164 —Feb. 11	141 —July 20	150¾	141	145
Rio Grande Western.....	19½	15	18½—Feb. 10	16 —Feb. 8	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	46¾	30	46¾—Feb. 10	39 —Jan. 27	.....	.....	.....
Rome, Wat. Ogden's g.....	120	112¾	116¾—Apr. 27	114 —July 16	114	114	114
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	35½	60½—Jan. 3	54 —May 26	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	9½	4½	5¾—Feb. 7	3 —July 29	4	3	3
preferred.....	19½	8	13 —Feb. 28	7 —July 29	9½	7	7
St. Paul & Duluth.....	35½	18	27½—Feb. 24	22 —June 12	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	95	86	91 —Feb. 10	90 —Feb. 4	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116¾	104	115 —Jan. 11	107¾—July 24	107¾	107¾	107¾
Southern Pacific Co.....	26¾	16¾	22¾—Jan. 14	17¾—July 15	19	17¾	18½
Southern Railway.....	14½	7	11 —Feb. 6	6½—July 29	9½	6½	7½
preferred.....	44½	22	33¾—Feb. 25	19¾—July 29	26½	19¾	20¾
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	46½	13½	34¾—Feb. 10	13 —July 20	21¾	13	16¾
Texas & Pacific.....	14¾	6½	9½—Feb. 25	6 —July 20	7¾	6	6½
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	4¾	1½	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17½	4	10 —Apr. 21	3¾—Jan. 25	7½	5½	6½
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	8½	2½	5½—Feb. 13	1½—July 29	2½	1½	1½
Wabash R. R.....	10½	5	7¾—Feb. 24	5¾—July 28	6½	5½	5½
preferred.....	26½	12½	19¾—Feb. 24	13 —July 20	16½	13	14
Western Union.....	95¾	82½	87¾—Apr. 22	77 —July 20	83¾	77	79½
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	18½	6½	13½—Feb. 14	6½—July 30	9½	6½	7½
preferred.....	54½	29	40¾—Feb. 13	23¾—July 30	33¾	23¾	24½
Wisconsin Central.....	7¾	2½	4¾—Feb. 24	1½—July 2	1½	1½	1½
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:							
American Co. Oil Co.....	30¼	14	19 —Jan. 27	8 —July 20	10½	8	9
preferred.....	79½	59	68¾—Feb. 14	38¾—July 29	51½	38¾	38¾
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121¾	80½	120¾—Apr. 21	97 —Jan. 7	111½	100	105½
preferred.....	107	90¼	104 —May 27	95 —Jan. 6	101½	95	98½
American Tobacco Co.....	117	63	95 —Apr. 2	55 —July 20	62¾	55	59¾
preferred.....	116	90	103 —Feb. 13	97 —July 14	97	97	97
Dis. & Cattle Feed Co.....	25½	7¾	20¾—Apr. 23	10 —July 20	14½	10	10½
General Electric Co.....	41	20	39½—Mar. 13	20 —July 16	27½	20	24½
National Lead Co.....	38	17½	28¾—Feb. 11	18¾—July 21	23	18¾	19
preferred.....	94¾	73	91½—Apr. 17	79 —July 16	86	79	80¾
National Linseed Oil Co.....	31¾	15	21¾—June 23	15 —Mar. 23	18	15	15
National Trench Manfg. Co.....	12	5	6½—Feb. 21	4¾—Jan. 14	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	2½	6½—Feb. 7	3½—July 29	4¾	3½	3½
preferred.....	17	1¼	12¾—Feb. 7	6¼—July 29	9	6¼	6¼
U. S. Leather Co.....	24¾	7	11¾—Feb. 8	5½—July 16	7¾	5½	6½
preferred.....	97¾	58	69½—Feb. 14	44 —July 20	58¾	44	48½
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	29 —Jan. 13	14¾—June 29	17½	15½	15½
preferred.....	98½	75	89 —Jan. 15	70 —July 23	79¾	70	70

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 13, '95	....	....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	66	July 25, '96	70½	66	70,000
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1995	95,488,000	A & O	73	July 31, '96	79½	71½	2,078,000
" adjustment, g. 4's.....	1995	51,728,000	NOV	32¾	July 31, '96	36¾	30½	2,002,000
" Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colorado Midland 1st g. 6's.....	1936	429,000	J & D	77½	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
" eng Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	5,821,000	.....	65	July 27, '96	71	65	15,000
" cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	973,000	F & A	21	June 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
" eng. Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	3,893,000	.....	19½	July 18, '96	20	19½	7,000
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's, 1934	.....	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1937	18,790,000	J & J	50	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 2d W. d. g. s. f. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	92	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
" Western div. inc.....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	¾	July 25, '96	76	¾	87,000
" div. small.....	1910	.....	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....
" Central div. inc.....	1922	1,811,000	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.), 1919	.....	3,000,000	A & O	105	July 6, '96	105	105	4,000
" coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" 5's, gold.....	1885-1925	10,000,000	{ F & A	92	July 10, '96	92	91	6,000
" registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1888	11,988,000	{ F & A	103	July 2, '96	103	103	2,000
" registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1900	.....	6,000,000	M & N	83½	July 10, '96	83½	83½	1,000
" coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1990	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
B & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s, 1990	.....	10,667,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1993	10,483,000	J & J	79	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
" "B".....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. g., 5's 1919	.....	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s, 1930	.....	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
" Coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. June. 1st g. s. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
" coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's, 1943	.....	7,650,000	{ J & D	115	July 30, '96	117	115	57,000
" registered.....	.....	.....	{ J & D	112½	May 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	110½	July 27, '96	110½	110½	5,000
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s's, 1924	.....	3,500,000	A & O	77½	July 29, '96	80½	76	50,000
" 2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	52	June 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Union Elevated 1st g. g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	76	July 27, '96	80	75	41,000
" Seaside & Bkin Bdge 1st g. g. 5's, 1942	.....	1,365,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	77	July 25, '96	79½	77	34,000
Brunswick & Western 1s g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	97	July 16, '96	97	97	7,000
" Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	120	July 16, '96	120	120	3,000
" cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	114	July 28, '96	117	114	6,000
" Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121½	May 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913	.....	1,387,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906	.....	6,500,000	J & D	104	July 30, '96	106½	104	10,000
" con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	{ A & O	102½	July 23, '96	102½	102½	2,000
" registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	97	Feb. 9, '93	.....	.....	.....
Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's, g, 1927	.....	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's. 1890		825,000	A & O	105½	May 21, '98			
1st 5's. 1891		1,905,000	A & O	102	July 28, '98	102½	102	5,000
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908		18,820,000	J & J	106	July 30, '98	108¼	105	64,000
2d mortg. 5's. 1913		5,100,000	M & S	100	July 30, '98	106	100	19,000
registered.			M & S	108¼	Apr. 7, '98			
Col. & Cin. Midla'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s. 1909		2,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 31, '92			
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1907		4,880,000	M & N	95	July 3, '98	95	95	5,000
Chat., Rom. & Colu's g'tg. g. 5's. 1907		2,060,000	M & S	70	July 25, '98			
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
1st consolidated 7's. 1899		3,885,000	Q J	108¼	June 11, '98			
convertible 7's. 1902		1,167,000	M & N	116	June 23, '98			
deb. 6's. 1906		466,000	M & N	114	Apr. 2, '98			
gen. mtg. 5's. 1907		41,604,000	J & J	114½	July 31, '98	117½	114½	95,500
registered.			Q J	118¼	July 23, '98	114½	118¼	28,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ased. 7's. 1900		5,500,000	Q M	102	July 31, '98	103	102	15,000
mortgage 5's. 1912		2,887,000	M & N	90	May 15, '98			
Am. Dock & Improv'm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	112	July 13, '98	112	111¼	3,000
N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6's. 1899		411,000	J & J	108½	July 23, '98	108½	108½	3,000
Central Pacific g'd bonds. 1896		19,493,000	J & J	102	May 20, '98			
San Joaquin br. 6's. 1900		6,080,000	J & J	100	July 14, '98	101	100	13,000
Mtge. gold gtd 5's. 1909		11,000,000	A & O	103	May 25, '98			
Central Pacific land grant 5's. 1900		2,528,000	A & O	91	Mar. 14, '98			
ext g 5's series A B C D. 1898		5,508,000	J & J	98	May 8, '98			
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's. 1918		4,358,000	J & J	100	July 14, '98	100	100	2,000
Western Pacific bonds 6's. 1899		2,735,000	J & J	107½	Nov. 27, '98			
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		3,964,000	J & J	101	July 14, '98	101¼	101	6,000
50 year m. gg. 5's. 1908		4,800,000	A & O	101	Aug. 5, '98			
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1896		1,500,000	A & O	92	July 30, '98	98¼	92	102,000
Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd. 1898		2,287,000	J & J	106¼	June 17, '98			
6's. g. Series A. 1906		2,000,000	A & O	119	July 30, '98	119	118	2,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	115	July 31, '98	115	115	3,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1909		23,553,000	M & N	108	July 31, '98	107½	100	52,000
registered.			M & N	106	June 10, '98			
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1902		21,798,000	M & S	69	July 31, '98	73	67½	183,000
registered.			M & S	85	Dec. 30, '98			
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1899		6,000,000	J & J	94¼	July 21, '98	94¼	94	54,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1909		1,000,000	J & J	83	July 14, '98	83	83	1,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	92½	June 17, '98			
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	96	Dec. 21, '93			
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	98¼	July 20, '98	99¼	98¼	25,000
Ches. Ohio & S'thwestern m. 6's. 1911		6,178,800	F & A	105½	Feb. 15, '98			
2d mtge. 6's. 1911		2,895,000	F & A	48½	Sept. 10, '98			
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1938		1,984,000	J & J	110¼	Aug. 22, '98			
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's. 1903		1,832,000	J & J	111½	July 8, '98	111½	111½	3,000
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. 1900		1,785,000	F & A	111	Apr. 15, '98			
2d 7's. 1900		300,000	M & N	111	July 10, '93	111	111	1,000
St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's. 1898		188,000	J & J	104¼	Dec. 7, '92			
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		547,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '98			
Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's. 1898		8,241,000	A & O	102½	July 30, '98	103	102½	19,000
deb. 6's. 1896		935,000	J & D	97	Jan. 24, '98			
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1908		28,924,000	J & J	118¼	July 29, '98	116	113	89,000
5's. sinking fund. 1901		2,315,000	A & O	108¼	July 8, '98	108¼	108	8,000
5's. debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	85	July 29, '98	97½	85	11,000
convertible 5's. 1903		15,283,900	M & S	97½	July 27, '98	101	97	32,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,860,000	A & O	104½	July 23, '98	105	104½	2,000
4's. 1919		7,753,000	A & O	93½	July 31, '98	97	93	36,000
Denver div. 4's. 1922		6,240,000	F & A	91	July 25, '98	96½	91	12,000
4's. 1921		3,400,000	M & S	88¼	Nov. 6, '98			
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '98			
Nebraska extensi'n 4's. 1927		26,730,000	M & N	82	July 29, '98	89¼	82	71,000
registered.			M & N	90¼	July 10, '98			
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	116	July 21, '98	118¼	116	31,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,999,000	J & D	115	June 18, '98			
small bonds. 1907			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & E. Ill. 1st con. 6's, gold ..1884		2,653,000	A & O	112	July 22 '96	115	112	17,000
"    gen. con. 1st 5's.....1887		7,487,000	M & N	98	July 29 '96	99½	98	18,000
"    registered.....			M & N	108	Oct. 8 '95			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's.....1886		4,636,000	J & J	98	July 9 '96	98	98	1,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st m. 5's P. D.....1888		3,674,000	F & A	108½	July 11 '96	109½	108½	2,000
"    2d 7½-10 P. D.....1888		1,124,000	F & A	127	July 11 '96	127	127	4,000
"    1st 7's & gold, R. div.....1902		3,796,500	J & J	127½	July 13 '96	128	126½	28,000
"    1st 7's &.....1902		2,007,000	J & J	117½	July 29 '96	128½	117½	16,000
"    1st m. Iowa & M. 7's.....1887		444,000	J & J	127½	June 5 '96			
"    1st m. Iowa & D. 7's.....1889		2,366,000	J & J	124	July 16 '96	124	124	5,000
"    1st m. C. & M. 7's.....1903		11,299,000	J & J	124	July 31 '96	130	124	20,000
"    1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex.....1908		3,505,000	J & J	126	July 23 '96	128	126	10,000
"    1st 6's, Southw'n div.....1909		4,000,000	J & J	111	July 21 '96	111	111	10,000
"    1st 5's, La. C. & Dav.....1919		2,500,000	J & J	105	July 22 '96	105½	103	28,000
"    1st So. Min. div. 6's.....1910		7,432,000	J & J	112	July 28 '96	115	112	26,000
"    1st H'st & Dk. div. 7's.....1910		5,680,000	J & J	120	July 31 '96	120	120	2,000
"    5's.....1910		980,000	J & J	106	June 10 '96			
"    Chic. & Pac. div. 6's.....1910		3,000,000	J & J	119	June 17 '96			
"    1st Chic. & P. W. 5's.....1921		25,340,000	J & J	109	July 31 '96	112½	108½	118,000
"    Chic. & M. R. div. 5's.....1923		3,063,000	J & J	108	July 29 '96	109½	108	27,000
"    Mineral Point div. 5's.....1910		2,840,000	J & J	106	Apr. 10 '96			
"    Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's.....1921		1,380,000	J & J	109½	July 16 '96	109½	109½	1,000
"    Wis. & Min. div. 5's.....1921		4,755,000	J & J	110	July 15 '96	110	110	2,000
"    terminal 5's.....1914		4,748,000	J & J	114	June 24 '96			
"    Far. & So. 6's assu.....1924		1,250,000	J & J	118	Sep. 20 '94			
"    mtg. con. st'k. f'd 5's.....1916		1,680,000	J & J	98	Jan. 7 '96			
"    Dakota & Gt. S. 5's.....1916		2,853,000	J & J	106	July 29 '96	106	106	1,000
"    g. m. g. 4's, series A.....1909		19,010,000	J & J	99½	July 31 '96	98	99½	30,000
"    registered.....			Q	94½	Dec. 11 '95			
"    Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's.....1910		2,155,000	J & D	116	July 11 '96	116	116	1,000
"    1st convt. 6's.....1913		5,082,000	J & D	116	July 8 '96	116	116	8,000
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's.								
coupon gold 7's.....1902		12,771,000	Q F	138	July 18 '96	140	138	5,000
"    registered d. gold 7's.....1902		12,336,000	J & D	116½	July 23 '96	117½	116½	15,000
"    sinking fund 6's. 1879-1923			J & D	116	July 11 '96	116	116	1,000
"    registered.....1879-1923		6,011,000	A & O	115	Apr. 10 '96			
"    5's.....1879-1923			A & O	114	May 27 '96			
"    registered.....1879-1923		7,301,000	A & O	107½	July 23 '96	108½	107½	20,000
"    debenture 5's.....1903		9,800,000	A & O	109½	May 25 '96			
"    registered.....			M & N	107	July 24 '96	110	107	12,000
"    25 year debent. 5's.....1909		6,000,000	M & N	106	Jan. 16 '96			
"    registered.....			M & N	106	July 31 '96	106½	106½	15,000
"    30 year debent. 5's.....1921		9,800,000	M & N	104	May 15 '96			
"    registered.....			A & O	109½	July 24 '96	109½	109½	9,000
"    extension 4's.....1889-1923		18,632,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20 '95			
"    registered.....			F A 15	99½	July 30 '96	102	99½	16,000
"    Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's.....1901		720,000	F A 15	99½	May 11 '95			
"    Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	J & J	110½	Nov. 21 '95			
"    Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's.....1900		1,850,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8 '84			
"    Chic. & Milwaukee 1st mtg. 7's.....1888		1,700,000	A & O	116	July 9 '96	116	116	1,000
"    Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,582,000	J & J	104½	July 1 '96	104½	104½	2,000
"    Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1906		1,600,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17 '96			
"    Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1909		1,600,000	M & N	106	Jan. 7 '96			
"    Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & N	105	July 21 '96	106	105	1,000
"    Mil. Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's.....1921		5,000,000	M & N	106½	Mar. 31 '96			
"    con. deb. 5's.....1907		438,000	M & N	131½	Apr. 29 '96			
"    ext. & Impt. a. f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	104	May 13 '96			
"    Michigan div. 1st 6's.....1924		1,281,000	F & A	110	July 30 '96	114	109½	27,000
"    Ashland div. 1st 6's.....1925		1,000,000	J & J	130	July 9 '96	130	130	1,000
"    income.....		500,000	M & N	129	June 9 '96			
"    ".....			M & N	105	July 28 '96	106	105	2,000
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.								
6's registered.....1917		12,100,000	J & J	124	July 17 '96	127	124	22,000
"    exten. and collat. 5's.....1917			J & J	122	July 18 '96	123	122	20,000
"    registered.....1917		40,417,000	J & J	96	July 31 '96	102½	96½	355,000
"    debenture 5's.....1921		4,500,000	J & J	99½	July 17 '96	100½	99½	10,000
"    registered.....			M & S	90½	July 23 '96	101½	90½	7,000
"    Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	M & S					
"    1st 2½'s.....1906		1,200,000	J & J	88½	June 12 '96			
"    extension 4's.....		672,000	J & J	55	July 24 '96	55	55	6,000
"    Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	J & J	84	Oct. 14 '95			
"    small bond.....1923			A & O	108	July 1 '96	108	103	1,000
"    ".....			A & O	103	Apr. 28 '96			

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		12,413,000	J & D	117	July 30, '98	126	117	4,000
{ Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	129	May 29, '98			
{ North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	125	May 4, '98			
{ St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	124	July 31, '98	129½	123	10,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. r'd g. 6's. 1919		1,313,000	M & N	106½	May 15, '98			
{ gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,652,666	Q M	115	July 28, '98	115	115	2,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	96½	Mar. 13, '98			
{ coupons off. ....								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's. 1906		993,000	A & O	120	July 15, '98	120	120	1,000
{ 2d g. 4½'s. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	107½	Dec. 7, '98			
{ Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	105	July 29, '98	107½	105	4,000
City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,450,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 17, '98			
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		780,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. 6's for 1917		2,000,000		81	June 17, '98			
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1933		5,000,000	J & D	96	May 25, '98			
{ do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		4,763,000	J & J	98	Oct. 2, '98			
{ St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1930		9,750,000	M & N	90	July 16, '98	98½	91	19,000
{ registered. ....				90	June 10, '98			
{ Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '98			
{ White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		850,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16, '98			
{ Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1931		4,000,000	J & J	90	July 20, '98	92	90	5,000
{ Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,780,000	Q F	98½	July 8, '98	98½	98½	2,000
{ registered. ....				96	Nov. 15, '94			
{ con. 6's. .... 1930		733,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29, '98			
{ Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1923		2,571,000	J & J	106	Jan. 31, '98			
{ Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's. 1930		1,000,000	J & J	109	June 9, '98			
{ Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's. 1933		500,000	Q J					
{ Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	70	July 22, '98	73	69	47,000
{ income 4's. .... 1930		4,000,000	A	22½	May 5, '98			
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	106½	June 3, '98			
{ consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914		3,991,000	J & D	134½	May 13, '98			
{ sink. fund 7's. .... 1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '98			
{ gen. consol 6's. .... 1934		3,205,000	J & J	126½	June 29, '98			
{ registered. ....			J & J					
{ Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	112	Dec. 20, '98			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1933		4,300,000	A & O	107	July 2, '98	107	107	1,000
{ Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,481,000	J & J	120½	July 21, '98	120½	120½	2,000
{ registered. ....			Q J					
{ Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1933		3,000,000	M & S	119½	July 28, '98	115½	113½	57,000
{ registered. ....			M & S					
{ Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. 1931		8,000,000	M & S	83	July 30, '98	87	83	44,000
{ gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		2,000,000	J & D	85	July 31, '98	85½	83	37,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv' 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '98			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,037,000	M & S	132	Aug. 12, '98			
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,936,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4, '98			
{ Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	140	May 7, '98			
{ bonds, 7's. .... 1900		231,000	J & J	106½	July 25, '98	105½	105½	4,000
{ 7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	115	May 7, '98			
{ 1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	136	July 22, '98	139	136	5,000
{ registered. ....			J & D	136	June 4, '98			
{ N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	133½	June 19, '98			
{ const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	115	June 25, '98			
{ Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	113½	Nov. 6, '98			
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
{ 1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. .... 1917		5,000,000	M & S	143½	May 26, '98			
{ reg. .... 1917			M & S	140	Sept. 18, '98			
{ Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. .... 1906		8,000,000	A & O	123½	Apr. 27, '98			
{ registered. ....			A & O	123½	Feb. 12, '94			
{ 6's. .... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	115	May 8, '98			
{ registered. ....			A & O	115	July 29, '98	115	115	1,000
{ Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. .... 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	May 21, '98			
{ 1st r 7's. .... 1921			M & N	141½	Apr. 20, '98			
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 24, '98			
{ Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O					
{ Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J					
{ Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
{ Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,435,000	J & J	85½	July 31, '98	90½	85½	135,000
{ 1st mortg. g. 7's. .... 1900		6,382,500	M & N	111½	July 15, '98	111½	111½	1,000
{ impt. m. g. 5's. .... 1923		8,103,500	J & D	86	July 14, '98	86½	86	6,000
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. ld gt. 3½ S A. 1911		3,040,000	A & O	15	July 30, '98	17½	15	23,000

# BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Detroit & Mack 1st lien g. 4s.....1905		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
g. 4s.....1905		1,250,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1907		6,332,000	A & O	100	July 30, '96	102½	100	15,000
registered.....		.....	A & O	101½	July 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.1908		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's. 1907		4,000,000	J & J	96	July 23, '96	96	92½	12,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....1907		2,482,000	M & S	104½	July 23, '96	104½	104½	12,000
2d extended 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & N	114	July 29, '96	114½	114	2,000
3d extended 4½'s.....1923		4,618,000	M & S	106½	July 15, '96	106½	105½	6,000
4th extended 5's.....1920		2,928,000	A & O	114½	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
5th extended 4's.....1923		709,500	J & D	104½	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		16,890,000	M & S	140	June 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....1920		3,705,977	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.....1903		7,500,000	A & O	131½	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....1916		2,380,000	J & D	132½	July 1, '96	132½	132½	1,000
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's. 1908		1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.....1909		2,800,000	A & O	103½	July 21, '96	103½	102½	12,000
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....1902		12,000,000	M & N	104	July 31, '96	103½	102	62,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,398,000	J & J	106	July 25, '96	106	106	41,000
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds. 1906		30,000,000	J & J	89½	July 25, '96	91	88	125,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien 2-4s.....1906		30,927,000	J & J	58	July 23, '96	64½	58	270,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....1903		500,000	F & A	95	Dec. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.1921		2,000,000	J & J	109½	May 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st Gen'l g 5's.....1942		2,068,000	A & O	95	Apr. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		875,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1900		450,000	A & O	95	Sep. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....1926		1,591,000	J & J	90	Dec. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....1920		2,999,000	A & O	114	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. gold 5's.....1909		2,100,000	M & N	91	Apr. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....1909		2,068,000	A & O	80	July 10, '96	80	80	10,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		2,000,000	J & J	106	Jan. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1900		423,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.1941		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. cts. dep. 1st 6's.1921		7,699,000	.....	49	July 31, '96	51	48½	53,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.1923		2,888,000	J & J	50	July 7, '96	50	50	10,000
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's.1910		4,756,000	F & A	105	Apr. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d mortgage 7's.....1905		1,000,000	J & D	96	July 21, '96	99½	96	6,000
Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's.1931		12,418,000	M & N	90½	July 31, '96	90½	90	130,000
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....1927		5,360,000	J & J	80½	Apr. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Gd. Rapids & Indiana gen. 5's.....1924		3,748,000	M & S	75	Jan. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's.....1907		2,838,000	M & N	120	July 29, '96	120	120	3,000
New Haven & Derby con. 5's.....1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
Houston & Texas Central R. R. 1st Waco & N. 7's.....1908		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92	.....	.....	.....
1st g 5's (int. gtd).....1907		7,381,000	J & J	102	July 24, '96	102½	102	30,000
Con. g. 6's (int. gtd).....1912		3,455,000	A & O	101	July 20, '96	101	101	1,000
Gen. g. 4's (int. gtd).....1921		4,297,000	A & O	69½	July 13, '96	69½	69½	40,000
Deben. 6's p. & int. gtd. 1897		705,000	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
Deben. 4's p. & int. gtd. 1897		411,000	A & O	88	Mar. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's.....1961		1,500,000	J & J	114	June 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
gold 2½'s.....1961		2,499,000	J & J	104	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	97	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Illinois Central gold 4's.....	1952	15,000,000	A & O	102½	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's regist'd.....	1952	15,000,000	A & O	101	July 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's.....	1953	24,679,000	M & N	99½	July 29, '98	101½	99½	8,000
gold 4's registered.....	1904	4,806,000	M & N	99	June 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
2-10 g. 4's.....	1904	4,806,000	J & J	99	June 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
2-10 g. 4's registered.....	1904	4,806,000	J & J	99	June 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st g 3s sterl. £500,000.....	1951	2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '98	92½	92½	15,000
registered.....	1951	2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '98	92½	92½	15,000
West'n Line 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,550,000	F & A	100	July 31, '98	100½	100	5,000
registered.....	1951	3,550,000	F & A	100	July 31, '98	100½	100	5,000
Calro Bridge 4's g.....	1950	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1950	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Springfield div. coupon 6's.....	1898	1,600,000	J & J	104	Apr. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1921	900,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....	1897	539,000	M & N	109½	Nov. 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
1st consol. 7's.....	1897	539,000	M & N	105	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's.....	1951	16,528,000	J D 15	117	July 14, '98	118	117	6,000
gold 5's, registered.....	1951	16,528,000	J D 15	117	Oct. 25, '94	.....	.....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1951	3,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....	1907	1,334,000	J & J	120	Apr. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex bonds.....	1906	1,800,000	A & O	28	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
stamped.....	1906	1,800,000	A & O	28	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1935	1,824,000	J & J	97½	July 30, '98	97½	97½	6,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....	1899	800,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st ext. g. 5's.....	1943	500,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold.....	1919	7,954,000	M & N	114½	July 31, '98	114½	114	6,000
2d mortgage 4½ 5's.....	1909	6,593,000	M & S	67	July 29, '98	67	67	1,000
3d mortgage 4½ 5's.....	1921	2,701,000	M & S	16½	July 22, '98	16½	16½	3,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1938	6,322,000	J & D	89	July 30, '98	95	89	85,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,000,000	A & O	57½	July 9, '98	58	57½	3,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....	1925	3,177,000	J & J	60	Mar. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....	1929	1,979,000	M & S	114	July 24, '98	115½	114	17,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	102½	June 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1941	2,100,000	A & O	102	June 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	102	June 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.	1898	2,755,000	A & O	105	July 10, '98	106	106	5,000
Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....	1898	2,755,000	F & A	123	July 1, '98	123	123	2,000
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....	1906	1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....	1899	1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. co. 1st 7's.....	1900	14,990,000	J & J	110½	July 11, '98	110½	110½	3,000
con. 1st registered.....	1900	14,990,000	J & J	111	June 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. co. 2d 7's.....	1903	24,692,000	J & D	118	July 20, '98	118	118	24,000
con. 2d registered.....	1906	24,692,000	J & D	119½	Apr. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....	1901	1,000,000	A & O	111½	Jan. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1938	840,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....	1940	15,000,000	J & J	99½	July 27, '98	100	98	24,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1941	10,000,000	A & O	109	June 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1941	10,000,000	A & O	110	Feb. 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1933	10,280,000	J & J	108	July 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1933	10,280,000	J & J	108	July 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y., 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's.....	1914	750,000	A & O	114½	July 29, '98	115½	114	151,000
g. gtd 5's.....	1914	1,250,000	A & O	114½	July 29, '98	115½	114	151,000
Lex. Av. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1933	5,000,000	M & S	95	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1933	5,000,000	M & S	95	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....	1916	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. ctf. for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000	.....	25	Apr. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....	1898	1,121,000	M & N	104	July 21, '98	104	104	6,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1931	3,610,000	Q J	119½	June 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1898	3,000,000	J & D	91	July 23, '98	92½	91	3,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,600,000	M & S	90	July 27, '98	90½	90	28,000
g. 4's.....	1932	325,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....	1927	984,000	M & S	100	May 1, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d m. inc.....	1927	1,000,000	M & S	40	Mar. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....	1897	500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'klin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....	1935	1,226,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....	1911	250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's.....	1911	750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '98	107½	107	4,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1932		1,075,000	Q J A N	103½	June 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's, 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. TrCo. ct. gold 5's, 1939		3,406,000	J & J	32	June 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1943		2,432,000	M & S	14	May 8, '95	.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's, 1898		7,070,000	A & O	105½	July 14, '96	105½	105½	5,000
Cecilian branch 7's, 1907		600,000	M & S	103	July 24, '96	103	103	2,000
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1890		5,000,000	J & J	116½	July 9, '96	116½	116½	18,000
2d 6's, 1930		1,000,000	J & J	100	July 18, '96	100	100	6,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		2,110,000	J & J	113	July 22, '96	113	113	1,000
general mort. 6's, 1930		10,486,000	J & D	112½	July 30, '96	114½	112½	17,000
Pensacola div. 6's, 1920		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1921		3,500,000	M & S	120	Mar. 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's, 1980		3,000,000	M & S	97	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	109½	July 13, '96	109½	109½	10,000
So. N. Ala. st'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	94½	June 28, '92	.....	.....	.....
5½ 50 year g. bonds, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	98	May 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
Unified gold 4's, 1940		14,994,000	J & J	70	July 31, '96	77½	70	49,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. 6s, 1921		2,870,000	F & A	100	June 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st g. 4's, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	105½	Dec. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's, 1937		2,096,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's, 1936		3,673,000	F & A	96	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1987		6,742,000	J & J	84	July 20, '96	87	84	13,000
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S					
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	112	July 21, '96	112	110½	3,000
cons. g. 6's, 1916		4,700,000	A & O	91½	July 29, '96	99½	89	23,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's, 1940		2,800,000	M & N	65	July 23, '96	65	60	5,000
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1990		22,973,000	A & O	97½	June 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Memphis & Charlestown 6's, g. 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1908		10,818,000	J & J	114	July 31, '96	117½	114	87,000
2d 6's, 1890		4,000,000	M & N	103	July 31, '96	106½	103	44,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtg. 4's, 1911		58,903,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's, 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mexican International 1st g. 4's, 1942		14,000,000	M & S	75½	July 31, '96	76	75	129,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A", 1917		12,265,000	M & S	30	July 16, '96	30	30	5,000
coup. stamped, 1917			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "B", 1917		12,265,000	A	5½	July 7, '96	5½	5½	20,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910		1,411,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered, 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's, 1902		8,000,000	M & N	116	May 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 5's, 1902		2,000,000	M & N	103	July 28, '96	103	103	9,000
6's, 1900		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's, 1931		3,576,000	M & S	111½	July 24, '96	111½	111½	2,000
reg. 5's, 1931			Q M	115	Apr. 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's, 1940		2,600,000	J & J	105	July 30, '96	105	104	2,000
mtg. 4's reg., 1940			J & J	102	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. 6's, 1889		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1926		5,500,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's, 1934		5,000,000	M & N	97½	July 30, '96	100	97	46,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1900		1,015,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		686,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	119½	July 11, '96	119½	119½	4,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd., 1936				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '95	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	....	....	....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		30,774,000	J & D	78½	July 31, '96	83½	77	360,500
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	52½	July 31, '96	57	51	587,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	78½	July 23, '96	77	73½	14,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	71	June 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	77	July 15, '96	77	77	7,000
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		590,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	88	July 31, '96	91	87½	50,000
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" small. ....		226,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	78	July 31, '96	84	78	56,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,328,000	M & N	107	July 10, '96	107	107	1,000
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,978,000	M & S	60	July 22, '96	60	60	5,000
" registered. ....			M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	45	July 28, '96	45	40	2,000
" registered. ....			F & A	.....	.....	....	....	....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1908		7,000,000	M & S	102	July 29, '96	108½	102	21,000
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	105	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1936		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1923		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
St. L. & I'n. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1897		4,000,000	F & A	101½	July 8, '96	101½	101	6,000
St. Louis & I'n. Mount. 2d 7's. 1897		6,000,000	M & N	100	July 21, '96	100½	100	27,000
" Ark'nas b'nch ext 5's. 1896		2,500,000	J & D	101	May 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Carlo, Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1897		1,450,000	J & D	99½	July 11, '96	99½	99½	2,000
" g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. 1981		18,345,000	A & O	60	July 28, '96	77½	68½	140,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. 1981		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5, '96	.....	.....	....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	117½	July 18, '96	117½	117½	1,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	112	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1908		9,489,500	Q J	58	July 31, '96	66	58	50,500
" St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1981		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	111	July 21, '96	111	111	2,000
" 1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23, '96	.....	.....	....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	127½	July 22, '96	128½	127½	6,000
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1923		5,094,000	A & O	98	July 31, '96	99½	98	4,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	106	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. 5's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	106½	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1908		30,000,000	J & J	115	July 30, '96	117	114½	30,000
" 1st registered. .... 1908			J & J	114	July 27, '96	114½	114	15,000
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		10,000,000	M & S	104	July 29, '96	105	104	7,000
" debenture 5's reg. ....			M & S	107	July 9, '96	107	107	10,000
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904		1,000,000	M & S	105	Apr. 1, '94	.....	.....	.....
" debenture g. 4's. .... 1905		15,000,000	J & D	103½	May 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			J & D	103½	Sept. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		6,450,000	M & N	99	July 27, '96	99	99	500
" registered. ....			M & N	100½	May 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	120½	July 31, '96	111½	110½	12,000
" 7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	111½	June 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
" N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1968		1,860,000	F & A	103	Oct. 3, '94	.....	.....	.....
" reg. certificates. ....			F & A	.....	.....	....	....	....
" West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	101½	July 31, '96	105	101	425,000
" registered. ....			J & J	100	July 30, '96	104½	100	173,500
" Beech Creek 1st. g. gtd. 4's. .... 1906		5,000,000	J & J	107	May 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered. ....			J & J	105½	June 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 5's. .... 1906		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st a. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's...1922		9,081,000	A & O	115	July 24, '98	117	115	11,000
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's.1916		120,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's.1918		875,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's.1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's.1922		1,800,000	J & J	108	Dec. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's.1991		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adiron 1st gtd g. 4's.1981		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1908		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's.1907		19,425,900	A & O	102	July 29, '98	108%	102	108,000
registered.....			A & O	100%	July 11, '98	102%	100%	88,000
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	122%	June 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	118%	July 8, '98	118%	118	7,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's.1908		2,000,000	J & D	108	Dec. 4, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	120	July 22, '98	122%	120	11,000
small certifs.....\$100		1,420,000	.....	120%	May 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	119	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's.1909		5,800,000	J & D	105	July 30, '98	107	102	82,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1902		8,125,000	M & S	82	July 30, '98	88	82	43,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.			M & S	82%	Aug. 28, '92	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refunded 5's.1907		3,750,000	J & J	98	July 27, '98	94%	90	15,000
2d mortg. 4 1/2's.....1907		698,000	F & A	64	July 16, '98	64	64	3,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's.....1940		2,800,000	F & A	61	July 30, '98	69%	60	8,000
term. 1st mtg. g. 5's.....1843		2,000,000	M & N	103%	July 29, '98	106	103%	8,000
registered.....\$5,000			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's.1942		3,000,000	J & D	85	June 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Midland R. of N. Jersey 1st 6's.1910		3,500,000	A & O	118	June 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Texas & Mexico g. 1st 4's.1912		1,442,500	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m.R.R. & L.G.S.F.g.c.6's. 1921		30,067,000	J & J	110%	July 31, '98	114	110%	120,000
registered.....			J & J	112	July 31, '98	118%	112	64,000
J.P.M. & Co. eng ctf dep.....		17,500,000	.....	114%	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
g.2d lgt s f g 6's Tr.Co.c.as.		19,000,000	.....	107	July 22, '98	110%	107	81,000
g.3d lgt s f g 6's Tr.Co.c.as.		11,408,000	.....	59	July 30, '98	67%	59	107,000
1nd gtd con g 5's Tr.Co.c.as.		44,900,000	.....	41	July 31, '98	46%	38%	1,428,000
col ts 6's g nts J.P.M. & Co.c.		9,450,000	.....	82%	July 30, '98	90%	82%	108,000
reco. ctf. g. 6's July 1, 1897		4,900,000	J	79	Jan. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
James Riv. Val. 1st g. 6's T.C.cfs.1906		922,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Spok & Pal. eng. cfs. 1st s.f.g.6's.1906		1,768,000	M & N	85%	June 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		7,968,000	F & A	124	June 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered certificates.....			Q F	122%	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Helena & Red M'tain 1st g. 6's.1907		400,000	M & S	100	Dec. 30, '91	.....	.....	.....
Dul. & Man. 1st g. 6's, stpd opns.....		421,000	J & J	121	July 23, '98	121	121	2,000
Tr. Co. ctf. of dep. stmpd.		1,229,000	.....	87	July 17, '98	90	87	48,000
10 p c purchase price paid		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Dak. di. 1st a f d g. 6's,		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. stamped.		1,428,000	.....	90	June 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's.1903		4,000,000	J & J	100	July 30, '98	108	100	19,000
N. P. & Mon. J.P.M. & Co. cf. 1 g. 6's.1903		5,256,000	M & S	81	July 31, '98	86	81	81,000
Coeur d'Alene 1st gold 6's.....1916		860,000	A & O	104	May 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. 1st g. 6's.....1938		878,000	M & S	102	Jan. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Central Wash. Tr. Co. 1st g. 6's.1908		1,497,000	.....	54	Apr. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's.....1940		25,523,000	A & O	42	May 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Trust Co. eng. ctf.		.....	.....	38	July 29, '98	45	37	533,000
Seat. L.S. & E. Tr. rec. 1st gtd g. 6's.1931		4,981,000	F & A	40	May 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
assessment paid.....		.....	F & A	43%	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's.....1941		750,000	M & N	105	July 1, '98	105	105	2,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. g. 5's.1931		7,283,000	M & N	123%	June 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
New River 1st 6's.....1932		2,000,000	A & O	114	June 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
imp'ment and ext. 6's.....1984		5,000,000	F & A	97	Feb. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. adjtmnt mtg		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
7's.....1924		1,488,000	Q M	107%	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. eqpmnt g. 5's.....		4,068,000	.....	82	Apr. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. gold 5's.....1980		8,875,000	J & J	86	Apr. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Nos. above 10,000		3,200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Clinchv. div. g. 5's		2,475,000	.....	55	Feb. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Md. & W. div.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's.....1941		6,809,500	J & J	69%	May 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Sci'o Val & N. E. 1st g. 4's.1909		5,000,000	J & N	80	July 15, '98	80	80	8,000
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's.1922		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdb'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's.....1920		3,500,000	A & O	94	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ogdensburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1820		800,000	O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdensburg & L. Chapl. inc. small		200,000	O	82	Feb. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. con. akg. fund 7's. 1898		3,435,000	J & J	104½	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
consolidated 7's. 1898		3,064,000	J & J	105	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d consolidated 7's. 1911		2,952,000	A & O	111	Apr. 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st Springf'd d. 7's. 1905		1,984,000	M & N	101	June 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st general 5's. 1892		405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's. 1896		2,000,000	J & D	88	June 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. mortg. g 6's. 1897		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's. 1921		3,924,000	J & D	75	July 31, '96	83	70½	19,000
gen. mortg. g 4's. 1921		1,543,000	M & N	25	July 15, '96	25	25	2,000
gen. eng. Trust Co. certs. 1925		1,255,000	.....	45	May 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's. 1907		2,717,000	.....	39	July 23, '96	40	39	17,000
Oregon & California 1st g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	76½	July 7, '96	76½	76½	1,000
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's. 1910		4,146,000	J & D	75	July 28, '96	88½	75	22,000
con. mortg. g 5's. 1939		1,258,000	A & O	12½	June 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Trust Co. certificates. 1939		5,291,000	.....	9	July 31, '96	12½	7	180,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. 1st 6's. 1900		5,078,000	J & J	106	July 28, '96	108	106	67,000
consol. m 5's. 1925		496,000	J & D	92	June 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
Trust Co. certs. 1925		12,488,000	.....	60	July 18, '96	65	60	28,000
Tr. Co. cts. for col. tr. g 5's. 1919		5,092,000	.....	92	July 31, '96	97	92	56,000
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's. 1920		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Issue of 1890		1,815,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Issue of 1892		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Panama s. f. subseidy g 6's. 1910		1,963,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s. 1st. 1921		19,467,000	J & J	110	July 27, '96	111½	110	37,000
reg. 1921		.....	J & J	111	June 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Series A. 1940		10,000,000	A & O	111	July 11, '96	111	111	11,000
Series B. 1942		10,000,000	A & O	111	July 13, '96	111	111	8,000
Series C. 1942		2,000,000	M & N	110½	July 7, '96	110½	110½	5,000
Series D gtd. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & N	102	July 14, '96	102	102	6,000
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1900		6,863,000	F & A	111	July 14, '96	111	111	1,000
1st reg. 7's. 1900		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,917,000	J & J	140½	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	134½	July 28, '96	134½	134½	7,000
3d 7's. 1912		2,000,000	A & O	131	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932		1,506,000	A & O	115½	July 9, '96	115½	115½	1,000
registered. 1932		.....	A & O	110	May 8, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900		1,505,000	M & N	114	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
Series A. 1942		3,000,000	J & J	113½	Apr. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
4½ Series B. 1942		1,561,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's. 1897		1,899,000	J & J	100½	July 31, '96	100½	100½	13,000
2d 7's. 1898		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd. 7's. 1898		1,800,000	M & N	105½	Jan. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½'s. 1941		3,910,000	J & J	107	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's. 1942		5,389,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st RI Est. g 4's. 1923		1,675,000	.....	106	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds. 1920		22,762,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sterling Gold 6 per cent. 1920		.....	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Currency 6 per cent. 1905		4,718,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. 1919		.....	Qmch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 5 per cent. 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. 1943		.....	Qmch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 4 per cent. 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s. 1935		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's. 1944		5,646,000	M & S	110	Dec. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's. 1920		1,287,000	J & J	98½	July 14, '96	98½	98½	3,000
Evansville div. 1st 6's. 1920		1,470,000	M & S	101	Mar. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cts. 2d mort 5's. 1926		1,778,000	M & N	28	May 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's. 1921		1,500,000	Q F	109½	June 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
2d m 4½'s. 1921		1,489,000	M & N	69	July 29, '96	69	69	2,000

## BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's Paid	LAST SALE		JULY SALES.		
				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Phil. & Read, gen. g. 4's Tr. Co. ctf's. assented.....		44,668,000	.....	72¾	July 31, '96	77	71	786,000
1st pref. inc. Tr. Co. certf'a. 2d instal. pd.....		23,434,000	.....	27	July 28, '96	31½	25½	1,012,000
2d pref. inc. Tr. Co. certf'a. 2d instal. pd.....		15,442,000	.....	15½	July 31, '96	19½	14	184,000
3d pref. inc. ....1958				18¼	Feb. 7, '96	....	....	.....
3d pr. in. con. ....1958		21,634,462	F	6¼	Jan. 10, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf's 2d instal. pd....				18¼	July 31, '96	18	11½	113,000
Pine Creek Railway 6's.....1962		3,500,000	J & D	123¼	Oct. 26, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's.1922		2,400,000	A & O	106¼	Apr. 5, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's.....1922		1,440,000	J & J	124	Mar. 12, '96	....	....	.....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1923		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '93	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's.1962		2,350,000	J & J	117	May 31, '89	....	....	.....
2d g. 6's.....1964		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
McKept & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's.....1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's.1916		1,000,000	J & J	65¼	Apr. 2, '95	....	....	.....
Pitta. Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's.1940		3,000,000	A & O	90	July 21, '96	90	90	15,000
1st cons. 5's.....1943		786,000	J & J	83¼	June 5, '96	....	....	.....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's.1917		9,700,000	J & J	69¼	July 31, '96	71½	69	19,000
Mort. g. 5's.....1891-1941		3,500,000	M & N	79½	Sept. 9, '95	....	....	.....
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's.1927		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's.....1969		15,200,000	J & J	67	July 31, '96	74¾	66¾	153,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's.1969		1,850,000	J & D	96	Jan. 13, '96	....	....	.....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4.1940		4,510,000	J & J	67¾	Feb. 10, '96	....	....	.....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's.1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st 6's.1925		553,000	M & N	44	May 11, '96	....	....	.....
Cent. Tst Co. ctf's of deposit		6,447,000	.....	40	July 23, '96	42½	40	32,000
St. Joseph & Grand Is'd 2d inc.1925		1,680,000	J & J	10	Aug. 2, '95	....	....	.....
Coupons off.				3	June 25, '96	....	....	.....
Kansas Cy & Omaha 1st g. 5's.1927		2,940,000	J & J	37¼	Oct. 16, '95	....	....	.....
St. Louis, A. & T. H. 1st 2T. g. 5's.1914		2,300,000	J & D	106¼	July 13, '96	106½	105	33,000
registered.			J & D	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Belleville & Southern I. 1st 6's.1896		1,041,000	A & O	103	Nov. 1, '95	....	....	.....
Belleville & Carott 1st 6's.....1923		485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '96	....	....	.....
Chic., St. L. & Pad 1st gtd. g. 5's.1917		1,000,000	M & S	102	Oct. 2, '95	....	....	.....
St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's.1931		550,000	M & S	70¼	May 23, '96	....	....	.....
2d inc. 5's.....1931		126,000	M & S	72½	Nov. 25, '91	....	....	.....
1st con. 5's.....1969		369,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Carbond'e & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's.1932		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	.....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A.1906		500,000	M & N	115¾	June 15, '96	....	....	.....
2d g. 6's. Class B.....1906		2,766,500	M & N	114	July 15, '96	115	114	9,000
2d g. 6's. Class C.....1906		2,400,000	M & N	115	July 14, '96	115½	115	5,000
1st g. 6's P. C. & O.....1919		1,042,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	....	....	.....
gen. g. 6's.....1931		7,807,000	J & J	110	July 7, '96	110¼	110	12,000
gen. g. 5's.....1931		12,233,000	J & J	94½	July 8, '96	94½	94½	8,000
1st Trust g. 5's.....1967		1,069,000	A & O	90	May 2, '96	....	....	.....
Trust Co. ctf's for Cons.				.....	.....	....	....	.....
4's.....		13,523,500	A & O	24	June 19, '96	....	....	.....
all installments paid.....				.....	.....	....	....	.....
Kansas City & So. W. 1st 6's. g.1916		744,000	J & J	85	Feb. 6, '91	....	....	.....
Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's.1910		335,000	A & O	100¼	May 16, '96	....	....	.....
St. Louis, Kan. & So. W. 1st 6's.1916		732,000	M & S	100	Jan. 19, '95	....	....	.....
Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's.....1937		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	.....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's.1969		20,000,000	M & N	63¾	July 31, '96	71¼	68	126,000
2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's....1969		8,000,000	J & J	25	July 31, '96	27½	24½	196,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con.g.5's.1937		2,480,000	J & J15	.....	.....	....	....	.....
gtd. gold 5's.....1937		1,133,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96	....	....	.....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's.....1913		1,000,000	F & A	114	Aug. 24, '94	....	....	.....
2d 5's.....1917		2,000,000	A & O	108	Apr. 20, '96	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's. 1909		357,000	J & J	103	July 3, '98	108	108	3,000
small			J & J	108	July 29, '84			
2d 6's. 1909		8,000,000	A & O	118	July 31, '98	119½	118	22,000
Dakota ext'n 6's. 1910		5,676,000	M & N	117	July 24, '98	117	117	1,000
1st con. 6's. 1908		18,344,000	J & J	121	July 21, '98	121	121	7,000
1st con. 6's, registered			J & J	120	Aug. 19, '98			
1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s.		20,318,000	J & J	104½	July 27, '98	104½	104	9,000
1st cons. 6's registered			J & J	105	Nov. 4, '98			
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1907		7,805,000	J & D	88	July 22, '98	89½	88	11,000
registered			J & D	89	Aug. 19, '98			
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. 1922		2,150,000	J & J	124	July 31, '98	124	124	1,000
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1907		6,000,000	J & J	112	July 8, '98	112	112	1,000
1st 6's, registered			J & J					
1st g. g. 5's. 1907		2,700,000	J & J	99	July 24, '98	100	99	13,000
registered			J & J					
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,700,000	A & O	109½	June 18, '98			
registered			A & O					
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1908		3,625,000	J & D					
registered			J & J					
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's. 1943		18,886,000	J & J	50	July 30, '98	55	49	122,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		3,572,000	J & J	100	Mar. 17, '98			
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. 1904		4,056,000	A & O	114	July 24, '98			
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. 1926		2,500,000	J & J	98	Apr. 18, '98			
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '98			
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's. 1919		5,250,000	M & N	94½	June 20, '98			
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	94½	July 9, '98	94½	94	11,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's. 1906-12		30,677,500	A & O	112	July 21, '98	112	110½	15,000
g 5's. 1888-1908		706,000	A & O	85½	May 19, '94			
1st con. gtd. g 5's. 1907		16,594,000	M & N	90½	July 29, '98	91½	90½	106,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. 1941		1,920,000	J & J	85	July 31, '98	85	84	180,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1907		5,500,000	J & J					
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. 1911		4,180,000	J & J	102	July 30, '98	109½	102	100,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's. 1904		25,898,000	J & J	81½	July 31, '98	89½	80½	789,000
registered			J & J					
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. 1908		4,500,000	M & S	91	June 27, '98			
registered			M & S					
Alabama Central 1st 6's. 1918		1,000,000	J & J	107½	June 19, '98			
Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's. 1897		500,000	A & O	121½	May 25, '98			
income. 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '98			
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. 1916		2,000,000	J & J	113	May 5, '98			
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. 1900		8,123,000	J & J	108	July 13, '98	108	108	27,000
divisional g 5's. 1900		8,108,000	J & J	110½	July 6, '98	111	110	9,000
con. 1st g 5's. 1906		12,770,000	M & N	100	July 30, '98	107	100	87,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. 1922		5,680,000	J & J	114	May 25, '98			
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. 1925		2,000,000	J & J	115½	June 29, '98			
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. 1915		5,567,000	J & J	114	July 30, '98	118	114	18,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's. 1909		1,323,000	M & S	88½	Apr. 30, '98			
deb. 5's stamped. 1927		3,368,000	A & O	100	Apr. 24, '98			
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		600,000	M & S					
small			M & S					
ser. B 6's. 1911		1,900,000	M & S					
small			M & S					
ser. C 6's. 1916		1,100,000	M & S					
small			M & S					
ser. D 4-5's. 1921		950,000	M & S					
small			M & S					
ser. E 5's. 1926		1,775,000	M & S					
small			M & S					
ser. F 5's. 1931		1,310,000	M & S					
Virginia Midland gen. 5's. 1906		2,392,000	M & N	95	July 27, '98	100	95	20,000
gen. 5's gtd. stamped. 1926		2,466,000	M & N	95	July 27, '98	95	95	2,000
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. 1924		1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '98			
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. 1914		2,531,000	J & J	104½	July 31, '98	109½	104½	12,000
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4's. 1943		500,000	J & D					
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1933		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94			
1st con. g. 5's. 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	104	July 31, '98	105	104	18,000
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's. 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103½	Oct. 9, '98			
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. 1914		414,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '98			
Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's. 1905		1,820,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '98			
Sabine d. 1st 6's. 1912		2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '98			
con. m. g 5's. 1943		1,620,000	F & A	92½	July 29, '98	94½	92½	117,000

## BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. { 1906		8,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
1st gold 5's.....2000		21,049,000	J & D	78½	July 31, '96	84	77½	231,000
2d gold income, 5's.....2000		23,227,000	MAR.	15½	July 30, '96	19	15	782,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's.....1887		5,000,000	J & J	119½	July 28, '96	120	119½	51,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....1885		3,000,000	J & J	105½	July 31, '96	106½	105½	7,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....1885		2,500,000	A & O	107½	July 25, '96	107½	107½	20,000
gen. g. 5's.....1885		1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's.....1890		2,840,000	A & O	81½	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's.....1917		4,800,000	J & D	69	July 28, '96	74½	69	16,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's.....1916		8,284,000	M & N	65	July 29, '96	68½	65	38,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's.....1828		1,862,000	J & D	100½	June 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Union Pacific 1st 6's.....1886			J & J	100	July 29, '96	104	100	8,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	99	June 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	108½	July 1, '96	108½	108½	2,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	95	July 8, '96	95	95	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	104½	July 1, '96	104½	104½	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	99½	June 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	102½	July 28, '96	105	101	10,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	99½	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
collat. trust 6's.....1906		3,988,000	J & J	97	July 21, '96	97½	97	19,000
5's.....1907		5,029,030	J & D	95	June 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
g 4's.....1918		2,068,000	M & N	50	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.			.....	50½	Apr. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
gold notes 6's stampd.....1894		8,566,000	F & A	97	June 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ext. sink'g f'd g 8's.....1899		2,070,000	M & S	88	July 16, '96	88	88	2,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....1900		1,391,000	.....	98	Apr. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's.....1886		1,461,000	F & A	111	July 8, '96	111½	111	6,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's.....1886		779,000	J & D	112½	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	95½	June 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
Denver div. ased. 6's.....1899		2,973,000	M & N	111	July 27, '96	111½	111	40,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps			.....	98½	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. 6's.....1919		2,914,000	M & N	60	July 23, '96	60	60	2,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....1919		1,237,000	.....	65	July 31, '96	66½	60	68,000
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. f'd cps 7's.....1895		680,000	M & N	96	June 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atch., Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's.....1905		4,070,000	Q F	30	July 31, '96	30	30	8,000
At. Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's.....1905		542,000	Q F	37½	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
U. P. Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1918		4,480,000	A & O	35	May 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g. 5's.....1899		15,801,000	J & D	28½	July 31, '96	33½	28	298,000
Or. S. L. & U. N. Tr. Co. 1st c. g. 5's.....1919		10,492,000	A & O	56½	July 30, '96	65	56½	120,000
assented.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's.....1822		4,171,000	F & A	110	July 13, '96	112½	110	25,000
Trust Co. cfs. of dep.....		10,780,000	.....	104½	July 30, '96	110½	104½	206,000
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's.....1906		680,000	J & J	115	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's.....1826		1,877,000	J & J	100	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Utah So'n Tr. Co. cfs. gen. mg 7's.....1909		858,000	J & J	64½	June 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. cfs. ext. 1st 7's.....1909		1,366,000	J & J	56	June 20, '96	68	56	4,000
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g. 6's.....1821		1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '92	.....	.....	.....
Coupon off.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's.....1899		31,664,000	M & N	103½	July 31, '96	106½	101½	155,000
2d mortgage gold 5's.....1899		14,000,000	F & A	71	July 30, '96	74½	71	102,000
deben. mtg series A.....1899		3,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
series B.....1899		25,740,000	J & J	22	July 22, '96	24½	22	79,000
1st g. 5's Det. & Chi. ex.....1940		3,500,000	J & J	97	July 3, '96	97	97	2,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B.			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's.....1908		1,000,000	A & O	108	July 21, '96	108	103	1,000
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g 5's.....1837		10,000,000	J & J	102½	July 30, '96	105½	102	65,000
gen g. 2-3-4's.....1943		10,000,000	A & O	37	July 31, '96	42½	37	28,000
Inc. 5's.....1943		10,000,000	Nov.	11	July 28, '96	12½	11	9,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's.....1911		3,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's.....1826		3,000,000	A & O	100	July 29, '96	100	100	2,000
Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.....1828		1,500,000	J & J	96	Jan. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
exten. and imp. g. 5's.....1830		1,608,000	F & A	91	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
consol mortgage 4's.....1832		1,600,000	J & J	62½	July 20, '96	68½	59	19,000
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g. 5's.....1837		2,364,000	J & J	33½	July 1, '96	33½	33½	1,000
eng. Trust Co. certificates.....		9,636,000	.....	29	July 31, '96	33½	28	280,000
income mortgage 5's.....1837		7,775,000	A & O	6	Jan. 9, '96	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		2,510,000	Q F	105½	July 31, '96	106	105½	70,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 8's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S					
Am. Water Works Co. 1st 6's. 1907		1,600,000	J & J	105	July 6, '91			
1st con. g. 5's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100½	May 18, '89			
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
Bost. Un. Gas 1st cts g. 8's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	81½	Sept. 6, '95			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		12,330,000	M & M	102½	July 31, '96	106½	101	177,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		16,000,000	F & A	96	July 30, '96	96½	96	36,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1967		10,000,000	J & J	87	July 27, '96	89½	87	16,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	105	July 8, '96	106	105	10,000
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	95½	July 21, '96	96	95 ¼	5,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	96	Feb. 8, '96			
Coupon off. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 10, '92			
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1942		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '96			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1917		980,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94			
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1907		1,250,000	J & J	157½	Feb. 29, '96			
Con'r's Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1936		4,346,000	J & D	82½	June 26, '96			
Detroit Gas Co. con. 1st g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	F & A	81½	June 20, '96			
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	105	July 31, '96	109	105	2,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1905		2,130,000	J & J	100	July 29, '96	102	100	19,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96			
registered. 1902		2,500,000	M & S	111½	May 7, '96	95	95	2,000
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's. 1906		2,000,000	J & J	95	July 6, '96	88	85	18,000
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1906								
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		10,000,000	J & D	85	July 15, '96			
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '96			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1923		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 8, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,779,000	M & S	110	May 31, '94			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	96	May 8, '96			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	92	Oct. 2, '95			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 16, '96			
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	91½	July 24, '96	93	90½	41,000
small bonds. 1919				97½	Nov. 1, '96			
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N					
Manh. Bch H. & L. lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '96			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92			
registered. 1942		2,000,000	M & S					
Mich. Penina. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		1,957,000	M & N	114	Apr. 11, '96			
Mutual Union Tel. S'kg. F. 6's. 1911								
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,837,000	J & J	95	July 30, '96	95	95	9,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1900-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,271,000	M & N	100	June 4, '96			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92½	May 5, '96			
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 13, '89			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	102	Feb. 29, '96			
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	106	July 8, '96	108	106	8,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	99½	July 11, '96	99½	99	11,000
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1899-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		590,000	M & N	106½	Oct. 14, '96			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '96			
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102½	June 3, '96			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,399,000	A & O	91	Mar. 24, '96			
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,490,000	J & J	80	July 27, '96	84	80	7,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '96			
(De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,434,000	F & A	92	Dec. 3, '96			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l paid.	LAST SALE.		JULY SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
U.S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. rect's		8,245,100	.....	19	July 27, '98	25½	19	195,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	112	July 22, '98	112	110¾	43,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		3,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
7's, registered.....1900			M & N	105	July 30, '98	105	105	10,000
debenture, 7's.....1884-1900		1,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
col. trust cur. 5's.....1908		8,405,000	J & J	104	July 24, '98	105½	104	28,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		877,000	J & J	70¾	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's.1908		570,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	YEAR 1898.		JULY SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,700	Q M	95	95	.....	.....	.....
4's registered.....1907		559,634,000	J A J & O	110½	108	108½	106	310,000
4's coupon.....1907			J A J & O	111½	107½	109½	107½	85,000
4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	118½	112½	116½	112½	88,000
4's coupon.....1925			Q F	119	112½	116½	112½	2,623,500
5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113½	110½	112½	110½	77,000
5's coupon.....1904			Q F	114½	110½	118	110½	256,000
6's currency.....1897		9,712,000	J & J	103½	103½	.....	.....	.....
.....1898		29,904,952	J & J	105	103	108	108	1,000
.....1899		14,004,560	J & J	107½	105	105	105	20,000
4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee) 1898		1,680,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....1897		1,680,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....1898		1,680,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
.....1899		1,680,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

New Counterfeit U. S. Silver Certificates.—One dollar, series of 1891, check letter C, J. Fount Tillman, Register, D. N. Morgan, Treasurer, portrait of Stanton.

Five dollar, series of 1891, check letter B, J. Fount Tillman, Register, D. N. Morgan, Treasurer, portrait of Grant.

These counterfeits are printed from etched plates and are very poor productions. The portraits, the work and small lettering especially are bad, being much blurred and indistinct. It is unnecessary to go into a detailed description of these notes, suffice it to be said that even the most careless handler of money should readily detect them. The paper is also poor; a few pieces of silk thread have been distributed through it.

Progress in Japan.—The Island Kingdom of Japan is attracting unusual attention from its progress in the arts and sciences and its advancement to a distinguished position amongst the great powers of the world. Few nations have made such rapid strides toward the acquirement of the means of industrial, commercial and political power. The antiquity of its civilization is not used as a cloak for non-progressiveness, but on the contrary there is a manifest disposition to take advantage of all the best experience of other countries.

This progressive characteristic which is placing the Japanese in the front ranks of nations is evidenced by a recent shipment to Japan of a large invoice of "PATTEN'S METHODS AND MACHINERY OF PRACTICAL BANKING," sent through the well-known house of D. Appleton & Co., New York.

Almost Indispensable.—EUSTICE A. HAIL, Cashier of the Pembroke (Ky.) Deposit Bank, writes as follows under date of July 3: "Herewith find our draft for \$5 to cover renewal of our subscription to your MAGAZINE. In our opinion it is almost indispensable to the country banker who desires to keep abreast of the times."



## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

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**Baldwin.**—Dudley Baldwin, First Vice-President of the Wick Banking and Trust Co., Cleveland, Ohio, died July 4. He was one of the pioneers of the city, having resided there since 1817, and was a large property owner. He was one of the founders of the Society for Savings and the Commercial National Bank. Mr. Baldwin was born in New York State in 1809.

**Batchelor.**—Charles W. Batchelor, Vice-President of the Keystone Bank, Pittsburg, died recently. He was an energetic business man and had been connected with banking affairs in Pittsburg for many years.

**Benedict.**—Howard B. Benedict, member of the firm of Benedict Brothers, bankers and brokers, New York city, died July 21.

**Bowman.**—Benjamin C. Bowman, President of the Susquehanna Trust and Safe Deposit Co., Williamsport, Pa., and a prominent manufacturer and philanthropist, died July 23, aged seventy-eight years.

**Burns.**—Col. Calvin F. Burns, President of the National Bank of St. Joseph, Mo., and one of the State's leading financiers, died July 29. His estate is estimated to be worth \$4,000,000.

**Crafts.**—Walter Crafts, President of the Commercial National Bank, Columbus, Ohio, was found dead in his room at a hotel in Pittsburg, Pa., on August 3.

**De Graaf.**—Henry P. De Graaf, President of the Bowery Bank, New York city, died July 11, aged seventy-two years. He was one of those who went to California in 1849, where he laid the foundation for his fortune in mining.

**Doughty.**—H. J. Doughty, Cashier of the Bank of Calhoun, Ga., and one of the progressive and wealthy business men of that section, died July 4.

**Garrett.**—Robert Garrett, ex-President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., and a member of the well-known banking house of Robert Garrett & Sons, Baltimore, died July 29 at Deer Park, Md. Since his retirement from the presidency of the railroad company, in 1887, Mr. Garrett's health was such as to prevent him from engaging in active business. He inherited a vast fortune.

**Graves.**—Nathan F. Graves, President of the New York State Banking Company, Syracuse, N. Y., died July 21, in his eighty-fourth year. He had been President of the bank and its predecessor for forty-four consecutive years.

**Martin.**—M. P. Martin, President of the Bank of Martin, Tenn., died July 22. He was about fifty years of age at the time of his death, and was one of the influential and wealthy men of the county where he lived.

**Mathews.**—John W. Mathews, Cashier of the Bank of New Castle, and Secretary of the Henry County Trust Co., New Castle, Ky., died July 14. Mr. Mathews was born at New Castle in 1842. As a banker, he was well known throughout the State.

**Myers.**—Benjamin F. Myers, Vice-President of the Tiffin (Ohio) Savings Bank, and a leading business man, died July 20, aged sixty years.

**Palmer.**—Elbridge Palmer, President of the City National Bank, Paducah, Ky., died July 9. His death occurred in Idaho, where had gone to look after his mining interests.

**Robbins.**—John E. Robbins, President of the Third National Bank, Greensburg, Ind., died July 22, aged seventy-two years.

**Taylor.**—John Taylor, President of the Exchange Bank, Lodi, Ohio, and one of the wealthy men of the county, died July 13.

**Williamson.**—S. F. Williamson, Vice-President of the Citizens' Bank, Bloomfield, Ky., died July 8, aged fifty-three years.





*A. Lullo*





*L. L. Lutton*

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

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IN VIEW OF THE DANGER of the introduction of the single silver standard in the United States, and the probability that the dollar will thereby be scaled down to much less than its present value, a consideration of the probability of special gold contracts being held valid by the Supreme Court of the United States becomes of much interest. The Act of February 28, 1878, which revived the coinage of the silver dollar on Government account, provided that these dollars and all dollars previously coined by the United States mints of like weight and fineness should "be a legal tender for all debts and dues, public and private, *except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract.*" This expression plainly shows that Congress intended to permit special contracts for the payment of debts and dues in any form of money selected. But the provision, while it undoubtedly applies to the silver dollars coined under the law of February, 1878, might not prove applicable to dollars coined under a free coinage law, especially if that law expressly enacted that the new dollars shall have unlimited legal-tender functions. That this will be the case is intimated very strongly in the Chicago platform. The free coinage law may very well give the same properties to the dollars coined under the law of 1878. Such a retro-active provision might or might not be constitutional as to previously existing contracts according to the attitude of the Supreme Court. If this Court shall firmly uphold the doctrine that all contracts made prior to the date that the free coinage law goes into operation can be enforced in dollars equivalent to the gold par, which were in circulation when the contracts were made, then as to these previously existing contracts there would be little doubt that they must be paid in gold whether they contain a special gold contract or not. The reason of this is that at present the silver dollar and all other dollars whether of paper or coin are equivalent to the gold dollar and the law expressly pro-

vides that the Government shall maintain them at this parity. All contracts have hitherto been based on this declaration of the Government, and in view of this it would be a question whether a creditor having a debt due in dollars as they now exist could not collect gold or its equivalent whether the contract contained a special gold contract or not.

If the courts should hold that such a creditor must accept the new silver dollars when tendered, a further question would arise, whether the creditor forced to accept these dollars would not have a claim against the Government itself for the amount by which the new dollars fell short in gold price of an equal number of gold dollars. The contract was entered into on the faith that the promise of the Government to maintain all its dollars at the gold par would be kept. This promise is just as binding as the promise that United States bonds will be paid, both principal and interest, in coin equivalent to gold. It can be readily seen that the confusion and consequent litigation arising from the assumed passage of a law for the free coinage of silver will be endless. It is not at all astonishing that the minds of investors in United States securities, and all who loan money or enter into contracts are turned to the attitude and powers of the Supreme Court in the premises.

This Court was designed by the framers of the Constitution as a barrier against all sudden and injurious attacks upon the conservatism of the country. That it has in the past acted as such a barrier to as great a degree as its creators intended may be a question. From the nature of its creation it is more or less subject to both the executive and legislative branches of the Government. The Constitution provides for a Supreme Court, but such Court must be ordained and established by Congress. Its members must be appointed by the President. The Constitution does not say of how many members the Supreme Court shall consist. This number is determined by Congress. As Congress has determined the present number of that Court, so it can increase the number if it shall see fit at any time. The President can appoint the new members authorized by Congress. Therefore, if the people of the United States shall at the coming election place in power a Congress and a President pledged to the enactment of a law authorizing the free coinage of silver, the present Constitution and opinions of the Supreme Court are not of much importance. It will be competent for Congress to amend the Judiciary Act, and so increase the number of the Supreme Court that the President, by appointing men of his own party, could secure a Court favorable to the most radical views. In fact the Supreme Court is more or less a creature of Congress and the President, and not nearly so strong a bulwark of conservatism as the framers of the

Constitution designed it to be. They hesitated to give too much power to the Court. If they had made it perfectly independent of Congress and the Executive it is easy to see that the Judiciary of the country might have entirely nullified the other branches of the Government. But the framers of the Constitution thought by providing for the manner in which the President should be elected, they had rendered it almost certain that the Executive would always lean towards the conservation of existing institutions and would resist dangerous innovations. The electors of the President were to be appointed by the legislatures of the States, but in course of time this has been modified to what is practically a popular election. The Executive is therefore more apt to stand with Congress and aid in carrying out the cruder wishes of the populace, than it is to side with the Supreme Court and maintain established and tried institutions against the periodical waves of popular excitement.

The action taken by the Supreme Court in the past on the question of legal-tender has shown that that body is swayed to some extent by its dependence on Congress and the President. The legal-tender Act of February 25, 1862, when first passed upon by the Supreme Court, was declared to be unconstitutional as far as it sought to permit the liquidation of pre-existing debts in legal-tender notes. The Court held the Act to be unconstitutional and void, by a majority of four to three. The Court during the argument numbered eight judges, there being one vacancy. Before the decision was rendered one judge resigned, but this judge as announced by the Chief Justice would have voted with the majority. This case was decided in the December term, 1869. (*Hepburn vs. Griswold*, 8 Wall. 603.) Of course this decision would have caused endless litigation and unsettlement of values if permitted to stand. A very large number of business transactions of the war period would have been open to question. Specie payments had not been resumed and the legal-tender notes then in circulation would have been seriously affected, jeopardizing all future business. It was contended that so important a question should not be decided by a divided court which when the decision was rendered was two short of its full legal number of judges. A few weeks after the decision of *Hepburn vs. Griswold* the Court determined to hear the question reargued. In 1870 President Grant filled the two vacancies with men who could be relied on to uphold the constitutionality of the legal-tender laws of 1862. A new case was brought before the Court in December, 1870, and decided May 1, 1871. This decision, sustained by a majority of five to four, reversed the former decision. The main point in this decision was that Congress could constitutionally give to United States notes the character and quality of money. Congress, the Court said, might not be able to make money of what



had no value, but it had power to enact that the Government's promises to pay money shall be, for the time being, equivalent in value to the coins of the State or multiples thereof. So it was even left open whether Congress could or could not make money of that which had no value. The necessity of the Civil War was the ground upon which the Court said that Congress constitutionally exercised this right of legal-tender. (Legal-tender cases, 12 Wall. 457.)

The Act of May 31, 1878, authorized the reissue of legal-tender notes that up to that date had been in process of retirement. The previous decision of May, 1871, seemed to settle the status of legal-tender notes already issued. But when these were retired and cancelled it became a question whether the new series of notes issued under a new Act in time of peace to take their places had an equal constitutionality. Another case came before the Court—that of *Juilliard vs. Greenman*—and was decided by a majority of eight to one in favor of the doctrine, that the constitutionality of an Act of legal-tender depended upon the emergency of the State, but that Congress was the only judge of this necessity, and that therefore Congress has power if it deems it expedient to authorize the issue of legal-tender notes at any time. This decision was rendered in 1883. In the course of fourteen years the Supreme Court has passed three times upon this question. It first decided that it was unconstitutional to make anything but coin a legal-tender. It then decided that it could make Government promises to pay coin a legal-tender in time of war, and last, in 1883, that Congress could make Government promises to pay coin a legal-tender at any time. Whether Congress can make a legal-tender of that which has no value was suggested but not passed on by the Court. The question as to the validity of special contracts seems therefore to be within the constitutional power of Congress to settle by retro-active enactment which, under the previous legal-tender decisions, would be binding on the Supreme Court. Thus Congress is its own judge of the emergency and necessity requiring the passage of any law. If it decided as a Congress imbued with populist ideas might decide, that an emergency had arisen requiring the free coinage of silver, and that these silver dollars and all previously coined should be received in payment of all debts, dues and contracts, regardless of special clauses, then even the present Supreme Court, if it adhered to precedent decisions would apparently have to sustain the constitutionality of such an enactment. But if they did not, and what court is there that cannot find plausible reasons for any breach of precedent, then it would be in the power of Congress to increase the number of the Supreme Court, and of a President in accord with Congress to appoint new judges, who would render any decision required.

We are accustomed to regard the decisions of courts of last resort

as very solemn things, and in their consequences they are to the litigants involved. To the disinterested spectator they have in all times afforded ground for amazement and laughter at their subtle inconsistencies. Rabelais represents Judge Bridlegoose, a type of the solemn jurisprudence of France in his day, as replying when asked by an admirer how he could decide such intricate legal questions, at the same time expressing wonder at his intellectual powers: "Why, I weigh the papers and give judgment for the side having the heavier." "But if the weight correspond?" "Oh, then I throw the dice." It is hardly a matter of doubt how the Supreme Court would decide, if the people are foolish enough to elect a Congress and a President in favor of the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1. The repudiationists would have documents of the greater avoirdupois.

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MCKINLEY'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE is a platform upon which all may stand who favor American institutions, irrespective of party ties. This contest in which the people are now engaged is not one of parties. Upon one side are those who would preserve the American Constitution and the national honor; and on the other side are those who would destroy them. Major MCKINLEY has made plain the vital issue of the campaign, which is simply whether we are a nation of honest men or of tricksters and repudiators. Those who advocate the free coinage of silver insult the honesty of the debtors of the country by offering them a chance to pay their debts in cheaper money than they received. This appeal is especially made to the supposed cupidity of the farming population, but it will be in vain, for the masses of the people of this country, farmers and all others, are absolutely honest and patriotic, and they will never sanction covert repudiation or turn for relief to dishonest expedients however cunningly veiled in the language of sophistry.

There is no doubt in the mind of Major MCKINLEY as to what is meant by the free coinage of silver. He says:

"It means the debasement of our currency to the amount of the difference between the commercial and coin value of the silver dollar, which is ever changing, and the effect would be to reduce property values, entail untold financial loss, destroy confidence, impair the obligations of existing contracts, further impoverish the laborers and producers of the country, create a panic of unparalleled severity, and inflict upon trade and commerce a deadly blow. Against any such policy I am unalterably opposed."

He also states what every intelligent man knows, and what the universal experience of the world shows, that free coinage of silver by

the United States alone will not mean bimetallism but silver monometallism.

As to the effect of free coinage upon the farmers and wage-earners the Republican candidate says:

"If there is any one thing which should be free from speculation and fluctuation it is the money of a country. It never ought to be the subject of mere partisan contention. When we part with our labor, our products, or our property, we should receive in return money which is as stable and unchanging in value as the ingenuity of honest men can make it. Debasement of the currency means destruction of values. No one suffers so much from cheap money as the farmers and laborers. They are the first to feel its bad effects and the last to recover from them. This has been the uniform experience of all countries, and, here as elsewhere, the poor, and not the rich, are always the greatest sufferers from every attempt to debase money. It would fall with alarming severity upon investments our already made; upon insurance companies and their policy holders; upon Savings banks and their depositors; upon building and loan associations and their families, and upon wage-earners and the purchasing power of their wages."

The Letter strongly condemns the planks in the Democratic and Populist platforms in favor of irredeemable paper currency issued by the Government, a scheme for which free silver is but the entering wedge.

As to the cause of hard times Major MCKINLEY says:

"It is a mere pretense to attribute the hard times to the fact that all our currency is on a gold basis. Good money never made times hard. Those who assert that our present industrial and financial depression is the result of the gold standard have not read American history aright, or been careful students of the events of recent years. We never had greater prosperity in this country, in every field of employment and industry, than in the busy years from 1880 to 1892, during all of which time this country was on a gold basis and employed more gold money in its fiscal and business operations than ever before. \* \* \*

Let us hold fast to that which we know is good. It is not more money we want; what we want is to put the money we already have at work. When money is employed, men are employed."

The Letter of Acceptance is strong in its condemnation of those who would relight the extinguished fires of sectional hatred between the North and South, and who would array the East and the West against each other, and seek to gain power by appeals to class prejudices.

Those who believe in upholding law, guarding the rights of prop-

erty and maintaining inviolable the obligation of contracts, must commend the vigor and manliness of the following paragraph:

“We avoid no issues. We meet the sudden, dangerous and revolutionary assault upon law and order, and upon those to whom is confided by the Constitution and laws the authority to uphold and maintain them, which our opponents have made, with the same courage that we have faced every emergency since our organization as a party, more than forty years ago. Government by law first must be assured; everything else can wait. The spirit of lawlessness must be extinguished by the fires of an unselfish and lofty patriotism. Every attack upon the public faith and every suggestion of the repudiation of debts, public or private, must be rebuked by all men who believe that honesty is the best policy, or who love their country and would preserve unsullied its national honor.”

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NO DOUBT THE REDUCTION OF THE RESERVES of the New York banks and of those of the other central cities, has been to some extent due to the demand for money from the interior to move the crops. This demand has come sooner than usual this year because the season has been exceptionally early. But this is not the whole reason of the reduction of the central reserves. Usually, when reserves are abnormally large, it is an indication of dull times; when they are drawn down towards the limit, it indicates a revival of business. This year, however, it would not be safe to conclude that the diminution of cash in the central banks is a sign of reviving prosperity, although it may in the end have a tendency to cause such revival. Other causes for the withdrawal of bank deposits from their agents by the country banks have been altogether too obvious to induce any one to deceive themselves by false hopes. The action of the New York banks in lending gold to the Treasury in order to restore the gold reserve to the limit, no doubt, caused a certain degree of alarm in their country correspondents, sensitive lest this was the beginning of a hopeless struggle to uphold the Government credit. Of course it was plain that the Government could repay the gold at any time as long as the reserve lasted, but the fact that the Treasury did not at once issue bonds in order to replenish the reserve, instead of calling on the banks for help, led to a suspicion that a point had been reached where bonds could not be advantageously sold. This suspicion might have been without sufficient foundation, but it led to protective action on the part of the country banks. Moreover, in view of the refusal of the central banks to supply their correspondents with gold, and turning such correspondents over to brokers, had a

tendency to cause those requiring the gold to get their balances in their own hands.

The free silver scare has had great influence in causing the withdrawal of money from the banks, so that those to whom it belongs may have it at hand to take measures to avoid loss by prospective depreciation. Undoubtedly, the depositors in country banks have been drawing down their accounts, causing the banks to draw on their city correspondents. It is in a rather less degree just what happened during the crisis of 1893, and might have gone to the same extent, if the public had not somewhat greater confidence in the resources of the Treasury than they did in 1893, and also if the silver purchase Act, then in full operation, had not been repealed. In 1893 bond sales as a remedy had not yet been tried. The experience of three sales since has been reassuring. In 1893 when the reserves began to run down in consequence of the panic, there was no relief from abroad. It was at a season of the year when there was little exportation, and consequently nothing to draw against. Now grain and cotton and reduced importations are placing the balance of trade in our favor. In addition American securities held in Europe have, during the past three years, been sold and absorbed by our markets, so that there is not now the same eagerness to return these securities. There is, too, a disposition on the part of foreign capitalists to aid the country to recover itself. They seem to understand that any course that will add to the depression of business at this time means votes for the platform that has declared for repudiation. Some of the most influential papers in London have recently appealed to English investors in the United States to be liberal with their debtors, to reduce or forego interest in order to effect the restoration of confidence. Some or all of these causes have induced a flow of gold to the United States. The high rates for money have attracted gold from abroad. It is not coming in response to a high premium as it did in August, 1893, when sight sterling was so high as to have warranted exportation. The exchange market now encourages the importation.

In fact, notwithstanding there are many reasons for distrust and financial pressure, there are still stronger reasons for believing that the country is much more able to endure than in 1893, and that with some concert of action the citizens of the country who stand firmly in favor of an honest policy, will be able to restore a degree of prosperity that will defeat those whose principal stock in trade is calamity.

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NOTWITHSTANDING THE FASHION OF DECRYING POLITICS and politicians that is so common among those who never have the opportunity of becoming such, there is often a secret hankering in the bosom

of the ordinary American citizen to shine as a leader in the government of his country. While all honest occupations and professions are honorable in their degree, yet in a republican country as well as in others it is most honorable of all to have an influence in the government. All men are not fitted for public positions. Success in private life is no safe criterion of such fitness. The qualities which fit to take the lead in the various functions which result in the selection of rulers under a republican form of government, are not apt to be found in the ordinary business man. In fact the qualities which make a successful business man, might have some scope to shine if their owner were placed in the position of an absolute monarch or a despot; but where forces have to be applied cunningly, quietly, in a manner to give least offense, where men have to be sought by appeals to their self-interest or by protracted argument, the training of the business leader places him at a disadvantage.

The independent business or professional man within the scope of his business is really as absolute as the leader of an army or even as the captain of an ocean steamer. To say nothing of the man who keeps a store or an office, who absolutely directs one or two clerks, let the position of the head of a great manufacturing interest, of a railroad, of a great banking concern, be considered. Do these men speak soft words to their followers to induce them to do their duty? There may be courteous manners but commands are absolute and must be implicitly obeyed. Such a leader in business does not try to mask his authority in the least. There is no reason why he should. Why should he seem to follow in order to lead, when time is gained and money saved by the exercise of direct authority? A moment's reflection will convince any one that a business man in directing his own business is essentially, whatever his charm of manner, a despot and frankly so. A man long in business or distinguished in business acquires this habit of mind. He cannot in most cases throw it off, when by any chance he has to undertake any branch of the complex politics of the country, from the running of a primary meeting to the handling of the national convention. After office is obtained business qualities again have a chance to shine, for Government business is to a very great extent like any other business. That is to say most administrative offices might be successfully run by a business man, but there are some offices and these the highest, in which political are of more importance than business qualifications.

The question of election or re-election is almost foremost in the mind of a truly qualified politician. If it were not so, with the republican system of short terms, no man could ever gain much experience.

The politician must approach men in a different spirit from the

business man. All citizens are on an equality with him, he can show no more superiority than he has, by judicious treatment, induced them to gratuitously admit. He must always seem to follow rather than lead, or when called upon to lead act as if he did it as a favor and rather against his will. If he has the real qualities, as a leader, which the people require, they will be recognized, but he must be careful not to force himself on the multitude. The mass of people are grateful for leaders who seem to be of their own making and selection. Such a one rises naturally from small followings to great. But he can never give absolute commands in an absolute tone. He has no written commission, and no definite term of rule. The business man seeking to become a political leader, is apt to use his business, clear-cut methods in dealing with the rank and file. He arouses jealousies or incurs animosities. A caucus composed of business men of the same rank could hardly ever accomplish any political end. It is the same to an almost equal extent with professional men, with doctors, lawyers, scientists, literary men, professors in colleges. They seldom make good politicians. Of course we except the political lawyer, who is a politician among real lawyers although not a lawyer among politicians. But many of these men, conscious of their honorable position in life and of their personal worth, little exposed to the temptations of politicians, and with cleaner hands, if examined by a strict censor, are apt to wonder why the people do not seek them to rule over them, instead of men whose records would not bear the very closest investigation either as to their public or private life. A great many persons condemned to honorable and lucrative but inconspicuous positions in life are never done bewailing, what great generals, or judges, or presidents, the public have overlooked. They are cursed with an ambition to shine that renders all their other advantages unsatisfactory. They are like Goldsmith who thought little of his literary eminence, but felt himself calculated to excel as a fine gentleman, or Marshall St. Cyr who, in the heat of the Russian campaign, left his soldiers to shift for themselves while he perfected himself on the flute, or Nero who, not content with being regarded as a very respectable tyrant, expressed his sentiments in his last dying words, "Oh! what an artist is about to perish."

Many modern instances of this difference in opinion as to an individual's capabilities between the man and the public could be cited, but the recent campaign has called attention to the case of an eminent banker turned politician. The public will watch with some curiosity the success of this transmutation. The truth is there is no sound foundation for the belief that has gained some currency that politics should be run by business men. The conditions are essentially different and a trained business man is apt to be as much out of place

in the arena of politics as most politicians prove themselves to be in business. Of course there are some exceptions but these only prove the rule.

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THE CHIEF REASON OF THE SUCCESS of the Populist and silver element in causing so many voters to look favorably upon their doctrines is the depression since the panic of 1893. This condition evident in almost all lines of business is patent to those familiar with the situation. It comes home to every one. Whether the remedy proposed is sound or not depends upon the causes of the depression. The followers of Mr. BRYAN of course seek to make out the cause to be the appreciation of gold money since the demonetization of silver in 1873. This appreciation of gold they claim is proved by the decrease in the prices of all other articles. And this they have no difficulty in proving to the satisfaction of the dissatisfied element of the population. This element consists of course of all who are out of employment and all who have produced or dealt in the articles which have gone down in price, and it is easy to point out to them facts with which they are already too well acquainted. Those who are out of employment are not directly affected by the fall of prices, but they are indirectly through the class of employers who deal in those productions and manufactures of which the price has decreased. Those who handle or produce articles that have not fallen in price are of course more contented, although the unfortunate condition of a certain proportion of the population must affect them unfavorably to some extent. To a man who has depended upon the high price of the wheat crop it is of little moment to point out that there are many other articles that still maintain the prices of 1873 while the price of wheat has gone down since that date. He is not prepared to admit that the cause of the low price of wheat is the greater acreage and greater facility of production of this staple throughout the world. This competition with foreign countries in the production of wheat is something that cannot be removed by any practical legislation that has yet been proposed, even if it can be at all. An export bounty on grain has been proposed, but this would be contrary to all the traditions of legislation in the United States. If politicians admit or claim that they do not know how to remedy the difficulty by legislation the wheat grower has no use for them. But those who ascribe the trouble to a cause which can be reached and removed by Congress secure a more ready hearing and acquiescence. They are believed because the people affected want to believe them. They do not want to consider that high prices for wheat have been done away with permanently by natural causes which are beyond the reach of legisla-



tion, even if sustained by the whole power of the American people. They had rather think that the real cause lies in the fact that the money power has conspired to demonetize silver and appreciate gold. If this is so it can be easily remedied by repealing the oppressive laws which the conspirators have caused to be enacted. It is therefore not difficult to see why such plain and easy remedies as the free coinage of silver are accepted.

NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE used to affirm that a plain, lucid statement made with confidence would always be accepted as truth by the masses of mankind. This is the principle the advocates of free silver have always acted upon, and is the secret of the success they have had. It is the main secret of the success of all charlatans, and NAPOLÉON understood this well, for he was a bit of a one himself. There must first be a bad condition of some kind to be relieved. Then comes forward the seemingly earnest one who knows all about it, is sure of all the causes, who knows who is to blame and boldly propounds a remedy. The evil conditions of affairs exists, and this to many minds proves all that is claimed for the remedy. As has been often said, a decided return to prosperous conditions from the present depression of business, would soon send the free coinage of silver remedy to the rear. Those who understand the financial question aright, and who are anxious to maintain the honor of the country, have, perhaps, made a mistake in prophecying so much immediate disaster from the mere promulgation of the Chicago platform. No doubt the principles advocated in that platform are such that if they were at once put in practical operation by the votes of a majority of the people, great disasters would ensue. But, in fact, the mere enunciation of such a platform is very far from its realization. The attempts that have been made to impress people with the dangers of the principle of free coinage and the repudiation of debts, have had a serious effect in heightening the already existing depression. If the class of people who know they will be injuriously affected by the principles of the Chicago platform, instead of magnifying their immediate danger, make an effort to boom business and restore shaken confidence, they can, no doubt, long before election day, cause a revival of credit that would tend to cut the ground from under the arguments of those who rely upon universal calamity for success. In the face of existing depression and the apprehensions of danger already excited, this course will, no doubt, cost some money from the greater risks that will have to be taken, but not more, perhaps, than an ordinary campaign fund. For instance, if the capitalists and the banks of the country, instead of pursuing a policy of retrenchment, of ceasing business and calling in loans, should boldly go forward and support each other in the con-

trary policy, much of the present lack of confidence would be dissipated. Of course this is opposed to ordinary business maxims, but in extraordinary and dangerous situations bold counsels are apt to prove successful. If for the next two months all manufacturers and employers should employ labor to the fullest extent possible, if all the banks of the country should agree to support each other in extending loans to feasible enterprises, the effect would be prodigious. It has been threatened by campaign orators that another policy would be pursued, and there are indications that such is likely to be the case.

The decrease of reserves in the central banks shows that the country banks are sensitive. The danger to the nation of the support of the policy of repudiation by the people is relatively as great as was the danger of the success of secession. Why should not capitalists, great and small, and all who desire to sustain the honor of the country, be willing to run risks that they might otherwise shun to restore the confidence that if restored before election will remove the danger. This will be a legitimate use of money for campaign purposes. It will not only procure votes on the right side, it will go far to restore a permanent condition of prosperity. Very often, in times of ordinary financial crisis, banks have found an advantage in extending their credit and helping their customers at greater than usual risk. Why should not this principle apply on a large as well as a small scale? On the other hand, if the opposite course is pursued, as is natural it will be, in the absence of any understanding among those who wish to defeat repudiation, the times will grow harder and harder until after election, and every degree by which the present depression is deepened means more votes for the free silver remedy and the consequent evils of repudiation. If the triumph of the existing standard in November is sure, there will be no risk in a policy of expansion on the part of the banks and those who direct the industries of the country. If there is danger of its defeat, this is the best course to avert such disaster. The banks of the central cities, by recommending a liberal policy for the next two months to their correspondents and customers and being willing to practice it themselves, can start the ball a-rolling.

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A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM HAS BEEN MADE of the statement in Mr. BRYAN's speech that the free coinage of silver will raise the price of silver bullion to \$1.29 per ounce. It is said that if it should have this effect there will be no relief from the alleged appreciation of gold money, which, as claimed by BRYAN and his supporters, is the cause of all our woes. In answer to this, BRYAN says that the money of the world will thereby be doubled and that with an in-

creased supply its relation in value to all other products will be diminished. In other words, \$1.29 in gold will be equal to \$1.29 in silver, but that neither the one nor the other will be equal in purchasing power to \$1.29 in gold now. Other critics of Mr. BRYAN's statement are among his own supporters, who do not wish to cheapen the dollar by any such round-about method as doubling the mass of primary money. These last say they would not support free coinage of silver at all, if it would not give them a cheap dollar right away, that is, a dollar worth between fifty and sixty cents in gold, instead of the present dollar worth 100 cents in gold. But if the principle evolved by Mr. BRYAN, that by adding an equal amount of silver primary money to the present stock of gold money, at a ratio of 16 to 1, the purchasing value of the two dollars will coincide, but will be less than the present purchasing power of the gold dollar, be correct, then the critics who contend for the cheap silver dollar are really in the same boat. They acknowledge this cheap silver dollar will drive gold out of circulation. Then they will have only silver dollars and, consequently, this will reduce the amount of primary money in the United States. If there is only one-half the amount of primary money, such money will increase half in purchasing power. So prices will not rise much according to one or the other.

Mr. BRYAN holds that free coinage will cheapen both the silver and gold dollar, and his critical supporters, if they agree to his quantitative theory of money, must admit that with silver primary money alone, the purchasing power of the silver dollar will increase. Thus, the diminution of the purchasing power of the bimetallic money of Mr. BRYAN will bring it to the same point as the increase of the purchasing power of the single standard silver dollar of his critics. So they both come out at the same point.

But Mr. BRYAN is both wrong and right in his statement. His contention that an ounce of silver will be worth \$1.29 is right if we take it to mean \$1.29 in silver. Free coinage of silver will make the silver dollar the sole standard of value, and an ounce of silver will supply exactly 129 cents towards the coinage of dollars. He is wrong if he means, as he appears to, 129 cents in gold. A great deal is heard about the honest dollar worth 100 cents, but unless it is distinctly stated whether the cent is a gold cent or a silver cent, there ensues great confusion in the minds of uninformed hearers. Many no doubt think it means 100 copper cents. The 100 cents in silver that the silver dollar will be worth in case of free coinage may mean 54 cents in gold which is the bullion value now, or it may mean less or more according to the gold price of silver bullion which prevails or according to the premium on gold money. In fact there is the greatest uncertainty as to what the silver dollar will be worth under free

coinage. That this expedient may at first cause some rise in the gold price of silver bullion is not improbable. For a time it may be an appreciating dollar that will rival all that the gold dollar is accused of in this respect. This appreciation will probably soon cease and be followed by a gradual and finally rapid depreciation. In any event it will be a fluctuating dollar. If as claimed by many of its advocates it follows the price of wheat, then in years when we have a scant wheat crop it will become very valuable, and when we have a plentiful crop it will become very cheap. At no time will it be worth more or less than 100 cents in silver, and silver bullion will always be worth exactly 129 cents per ounce in silver. All of this illustrates the vagueness and elasticity of the statements of those who advocate free coinage. In fact the only point on which those who claim bimetallism and those who admit silver monometallism agree is, that the purchasing power of the dollar will be diminished, and this is virtually repudiation in a greater or less degree. There is no escape either way.

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#### THE SEMI-CENTENNIAL MAGAZINE.

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Fifty years ago the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* was launched upon the financial sea, the first number having been issued in July, 1846. Although at the time somewhat of an experiment as to the feasibility of the undertaking, it soon made for itself a name and reputation among bankers for excellence and real merit that has not only been maintained but steadily increased until it is now without a peer in the banking field. It stands to-day not only the oldest publication of its kind in this country but the admitted standard authority on all banking and financial questions. It is proposed to celebrate its "Golden Anniversary" by issuing, at an early day, a Special Semi-Centennial Number.

This special edition will be of particular interest to bankers everywhere. It will contain a summary of all the important financial happenings of the past half century, to which will be added a history of banking interests throughout the country. Besides, there are to be specially prepared articles on Trust, Mortgage and Loan Companies, Life, Fire and Accident Insurance Companies and Real Estate interests—in fact, every industry allied with the financial interests of the country will receive proper attention.

A feature of marked interest will be artistic illustrations and portraits of leading banking institutions in all parts of the country, with pictures and historical sketches of prominent bank officials throughout the United States and Canada, together with a brief *résumé* of banking in the principal cities of the country, with references to the leading bankers in such localities, arranged alphabetically by States and cities.

It is needless to say that the anniversary edition will be superior to anything of the kind ever before offered to the banking fraternity and will form a valuable addition to any library. As it will practically be in the hands of every banker and financier in this country and Canada, as well as being extensively circulated in the principal European cities, its value as an advertising medium is apparent.

## BIMETALLISM.

### *EXPERIENCE OF CIVILIZED NATIONS.*

The term bimetallism has been used without much precision by those who have discussed it from partisan standpoints. It has been used to express almost any employment of both gold and silver as money. By some, the coinage of subsidiary silver coins on government account is considered to be bimetallism, and by a great many the coinage of the legal tender silver dollar from bullion purchased by the United States, is accepted as a true illustration of the term.

But real bimetallism implies such a use of the two metals, gold and silver, that the resultant coinage forms a mass of currency, every coin of which, whether of gold or silver, will remain contemporaneously in circulation, and where every gold coin is continuously the exact equivalent of silver coins corresponding to it in denomination, and moreover, where the market value of the pure metal in the silver coins of a given denomination in dollars corresponds exactly to the market value of the pure metal contained in gold coins of equal denomination in dollars. If this result could be obtained the whole mass of gold and silver in the world would become a homogeneous standard by which the value of all other objects could be arrived at. To attain this result practically, the believers in bimetallism assert that it is necessary to permit all holders of gold and silver bullion to present it at the mints, and have it formed into convenient pieces stamped with a term which indicates the weight of pure metal contained in each piece. Thus the United States adopts the term dollar for its coinage, containing 23.22 grains of pure gold, or 371.25 pure silver, but up to this time does not permit the holders of silver bullion to have it freely stamped at the mints, while it does permit the holders of gold bullion to enjoy this privilege free of charge. If the United States grants the same privilege to holders of silver bullion, then, it is claimed, real bimetallism will ensue.

The silver dollars now in circulation in the United States were coined on Government account during the period from 1878 to 1890, when the law compelling the coinage of these dollars ceased, although since 1890 it has still been within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to coin a limited amount. The success of bimetallism, according to its advocates, depends on the method that is adopted to secure the concurrent circulation of coins of gold and silver at a given ratio. The opponents of bimetallism claim that this result can be obtained by no method whatever. They base their arguments upon the history of the experience of the commercial nations. Some of the bimetallists of the United States assert that the experience of the past does not disprove their contention, and that if the mints of any great commercial country are thrown open to silver bullion as well as to gold bullion, the concurrent circulation of gold and silver coins at a given ratio can be maintained not only in that country but throughout the world. In this claim the bimetallists of the United States are not unanimous, some holding

that it would be necessary for the mints of all the commercial nations to be thrown open, and that such action on the part of one commercial nation would be inadequate. The bimetallists of Europe are similarly divided, with this difference, that the majority in the United States seem to agree to the one-nation theory, while in Europe those who agree with them are in the minority.

#### DESIRABILITY OF BIMETALLISM.

Before examining the historical evidence, it will be well to consider why, admitting that it can be attained, bimetallism is thought to be desirable. At the present time, the nations considered to be the representatives of Western civilization, almost universally base their financial operations upon the gold standard. Their definite declaration in favor of this standard has chiefly occurred within the past twenty-five years. Before 1873 there was but little uniformity of action, nor had the subject of the standard caused any great solicitude. Nations and peoples were content to leave the matter to the operation of natural laws. The two precious metals had been used for money from the earliest times, and traditional habit was very strong against abrogating the use of either. Business and investments had not felt the need of precise standards in early times, and it was only with the growth of commerce and industrial enterprise that the need of more exactitude was appreciated. Both bimetallists and their opponents now virtually concede the necessity of the most exact standard of value in all the business operations of the world. This desire for an accurate measure, first led to the adoption of one metal as the standard leaving the other subservient or subsidiary. In the selection silver appears to have been first chosen, but its various practical inconveniences led gradually to the adoption of gold in its place. The bimetallists tacitly claim that a single standard of either metal is a mistake, and that the evolution of the single gold standard has been a still greater one. In other words, that the quantity of the measure has an important effect upon its utility as a measure.

Any illustration drawn from weight or dimension is, of course, inadequate, because value is a changing relation and not a fixed object, but perhaps it is only by some such illustration that the idea of the bimetallists can be even inadequately expressed. Thus, if it were necessary to measure the world's wheat crop, one bushel measure could, no doubt, in time measure the whole mass of wheat. If this were conceived to be the only measure and that no sales or transfers could be made until the grain had all been poured into and out of this utensil of thirty-two quarts, the rent paid for the use of this bushel would be immense. Millions of people would be waiting their turn to use it to measure their wheat. They would suffer loss and detriment. So if there were only ten bushel measures, or a hundred, or a million. In other words, it is evident that the number of the bushel measures ought to be sufficient to determine the extent of the world's wheat crop with the least cost and delay. Of course bins can be made, and other contrivances put in practice by which an immense number of bushels of grain can be measured at once. But notwithstanding this, from the nature of the wheat crop, finally collected together from scattered sources, every grower of wheat must have his own bushel measure and, therefore, any scarcity in such measures would cause delay and trouble and undue expense.

In the same manner the bimetallists contend that wealth must have ade-

quate means of measurement for its exchange and utility. Wealth like grain must be collected into great masses from scattered sources. All along its course it must be measured again and again. Any lack of convenient means of measurement retards its movement and consequent utility. It is true that after wealth is collected in masses, it may be measured by other means than coined money. Even before such collection into large aggregates it may be measured for exchange by representative money the relation of which to real money may be imperfectly illustrated by the relation which sixty pounds' weight of wheat bears to the bushel measure of wheat. Thus if a man does not have a bushel measure he can weigh out sixty pounds on the scales and call it a bushel. So in transferring wealth he can use the paper representative of coined money instead of the coin itself. But after all is done, the bimetallicists claim that just as there must be a certain number of bushel measures as a foundation for the convenient measurement of the wheat crop, so there must be a certain number of money coins to form the basis of the measurement of the wealth of the world. This wealth has to be measured not once only but again and again. It is not constant like wheat, it varies from day to day. Every owner of wealth must be continually measuring it. The operation of measuring wealth is therefore almost infinite in its magnitude and continuance. The quantity of standard coins must therefore be incomparably greater than the number of bushel measures. It comes to this, however, that there must be an adequate quantity of these coins or else the relation they bear to the mass of wealth to be measured will change, and so render them an unjust standard.

#### WHAT BIMETALLISTS CLAIM.

The bimetallicists claim that by using gold alone as the standard, that the coins of this metal are inadequate in number to furnish the necessary means for the primary measurement of the wealth of the world. They insist that all the machinery of representative money of banks, of clearing-houses cannot remedy the want of means of primary measurement. The lack of these primary money measures, prevents the movement of wealth from its first sources, as the lack of bushel measures would cause inconvenience in the movement of wheat. The bank or Government bill; the bank check, the clearing-house may eke out the deficiency to some extent, but when all is said or done, the gold coins which are the primary basis of measurement under the gold standard do not bear a sufficient proportion to the work they have to do, and the increased demand for them increases the importance of their relation to other forms of wealth, and what is commonly called their intrinsic value. As the wealth of the world increases, the gold coins dependent for their quantity on the production of gold do not increase so as to maintain the previously existing relation of quantity. They therefore insist that coins of silver should also be made standards. Acknowledging that silver as compared with gold has less intrinsic value,\* they put enough silver in the silver coin to give it the same value as the gold coin of an equal denomination—the weight of the gold in the gold coin is considered as one, and the number of times the weight of the

\* Of course in a strict sense there is no such thing as intrinsic value in any metal or substance, but the term is a convenient one and indicates the greater fixed value of gold and silver as compared with other forms of wealth, which points them out as suitable for standards of value.

silver in the silver coin exceeds the weight of the gold in the gold coin constitutes the ratio or relation which binds the two metals into one standard. Thus if free coinage of the present silver dollar were authorized by law this ratio or relation would be 16 to 1. The quantity of silver and gold coins together at this relation would, were the double standard established throughout the world, be about double the amount of the gold coins. Therefore the number of primary measures of wealth would be doubled, they would be more easily obtained, and wealth now unattainable from want of means of measurement would be developed.

#### WHAT HISTORY SHOWS.

It must be further premised that the bimetallists more than the single standard men, demand experiment to prove their theories. The truth of them would be proved, by an increase of prosperity, by an increase in the value of silver as compared with gold, and by the maintenance of the parity between gold and silver bullion at the coinage ratio. But it must be remembered, that if the remedy of free coinage of both metals at a given ratio were adopted, the mere fact of the approximation, more or less perfect, of the bullion value of the two metals at the coinage ratio, would not prove the degree of appreciation or depreciation of either metal. The resultant double standard would not necessarily be fixed any more than two vessels chained together would be anchored. An approximation of gold and silver bullion to the ratio of 1 to 16 from the present ratio of 1 to 32, would indicate an appreciation of silver or a depreciation of gold. There is really no absolutely fixed and immovable position in the whole question of value standards. Every step towards its solution is necessarily approximate and to some extent tentative. Neither bimetallists or single standard men claim anything else. The history of the past about to be examined is a history of approximations. Giving full assent to the postulates of the bimetallists—first, that gold alone does not afford sufficient means for the primary measurement of wealth, and second, that gold and silver could be bound together in a permanent ratio by free coinage of both metals at that ratio, if not by one important commercial nation then by a combination among some or all of them and third, that the means of primary measurement need to be increased—it does not follow that a basis of both gold and silver would in view of the possible increase of the world's wealth, form a suitable standard. In time it might become as inadequate as the present gold standard is claimed to be.

The history of the past twenty-five years indicates a constant depreciation of the value of silver as compared with gold. The bimetallists claim this is due entirely to its demonetization, while the gold standard men say it is due to the immense increase in the production. Perhaps it is just to add that both parties agree that the demonetization has had considerable effect in this direction. The idea of an accurate and unchangeable standard of value is a comparatively modern one. It has grown with the growing freedom of civilized populations, and has its motive in the growing desire that every man should have exact compensation for his industry. The rulers of the world until comparatively modern times failed to learn the lesson that their own prosperity depended upon the prosperity of their subjects and citizens. When the bulk of the population were slaves, a standard of value was of comparatively small importance. The history of ancient and medie-



val times is the history of rulers struggling for dominion. The facts that can be obtained as to the relation existing between gold and silver prior to the last five hundred years, and for the greater part of this last period, are of little importance in behalf of the bimetallic standard. There was no desire on the part of rulers and governments to tie the two metals together, in fact, the fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver were a source of considerable profit to the governing classes. There was no public conscience in favor of protecting the poor and ignorant. The history of the attempt to secure an accurate standard of value dates from comparatively modern times, and is principally to be found in the histories of England, France, Germany and the United States.

#### THE POUND STERLING.

The original English pound sterling was a pound weight of silver divided into twenty parts called shillings and each shilling into twelve pennies. The silver penny originally weighed about two ounces of silver. Edward III. in the year 1345 A. D. fixed the ratio of gold to silver at  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to one. From 1345 to 1601 there were nine debasements of the coinage by the arbitrary acts of the reigning sovereigns, the last being in the forty-third of Elizabeth. The pound weight of silver was in this latter year coined into sixty-two shillings and the pound of gold into thirty-three and one half sovereigns of seven penny weight four grains each. The ratio of gold to silver was about 11 to 1. In the reign of James I. gold began to rise in value as compared with silver and their exportation was prevented by reducing the weight of the gold coin so that the ratio was a little more than 12 to 1. In the ninth year of the reign of James I. the gold coins were again exported. The weight of the coins was again reduced and the ratio fixed at 13 to 1. This was too great a change, and now silver began to disappear causing great inconvenience. In 1614 the King instead of changing the weight of the gold coins to conform to the market ratio, which he could only have done at a loss to himself, issued a proclamation forbidding the export of the precious metals. This had no effect, nor had subsequent ones issued in 1619, in 1622 and in 1624. During this period silver change was at a premium of two pence for twenty shillings. The price of gold slowly rose however and in the time of Cromwell the ratio of 13 to 1 established by King James was nearly or quite the same as the market ratio. Until the reign of Charles II. there was no further exportation of the precious metals. By 1633, the value of gold had so risen that Charles II. found it necessary to change the ratio to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to 1. He issued a new gold coin called a guinea expected to pass for twenty shillings. The ratio did not conform to the market ratio and instead of being worth twenty shillings in silver no one would part with the guinea for less than twenty-one or twenty-two shillings. As there was no attempt to prevent the exportation of coin, silver soon became the only money in circulation. Most of it was clipped and abraded so that a recoinage became necessary in the reign of William III. In the year 1717 George I. being in the third year of his reign the guinea was made a legal tender at twenty-one shillings in silver, a ratio of 15 and one seventh to 1. Gold was slightly over valued and there was a tendency to export silver. Only £584,000 sterling of the latter metal was brought to the mint for a period of eighty-three years. The only silver coin in circulation was light weight. The lighter pieces were always selected to make payments. The losses in the

receipt of payments on this account were so vexatious, that Parliament in 1774 limited the legal tender of the silver coins paid by the piece to twenty-five pounds. Above that limit they might be paid by weight. Although enacted to continue in force for two years only it was re-enacted from time to time until 1798 when the free coinage of silver was abrogated at the mint.

In 1816 an act of Parliament made gold coin the only full legal tender, limiting payments in silver to forty shillings. The experience of England from the reign of Queen Elizabeth seemed to Parliament in 1774 to warrant the restriction of the full legal tender function of the silver coin. In Cromwell's time for some years the legal and the market ratio coincided, but at all other periods attempts to establish bimetallism permanently, failed, either silver or gold being exported or hoarded so that the country virtually had the use of but one kind of money. It is true that chance seems to have had something to do with the final formal adoption of the gold standard. The clipping and abrasion of the silver coinage which was so prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, seems to have had much to do with limiting its legal tender use. John Locke had considered the standard question in the reign of William III. and had recommended the single silver standard with gold as a subsidiary money. The course of events, the great increase of trade and the preference of the people brought about the adoption of the gold standard. British law has always sought to conform to the custom of the people, and the enactments of Parliament in regard to standard money have adhered very closely to this principle.

#### UNITED STATES.

In 1792 Alexander Hamilton recommended the adoption of the double standard of gold and silver by the Congress then assembled under the new Constitution. In his report on the establishment of the mint, he entered very fully into the consideration of the true relation of value existing between gold and silver bullion and concluded it was as 1 to 15. The English ratio at this time was fifteen and one-seventh to one and was too high, and as to France, she was in the throes of the revolution and was entirely on a basis of assignats. Whether 15 to 1 was the true ratio at the time the mint law of Hamilton was adopted, the market ratio was soon changed. From 1793 to 1808 the gold coinage of the United States mint amounted to \$3,594,222. From 1808 to 1834 it was \$6,241,667. During the earlier period gold circulated to some extent, but afterwards began to grow scarce, and by 1817 none was ever seen. The silver coinage from 1793 to 1833 was \$36,285,297, of which \$1,439,517 were dollars, and \$32,978,981.50 half dollars. No dollars were coined after 1805 until 1836. It is generally admitted that from 1817 to 1834 the specie in circulation in the United States consisted wholly of silver. Gold coins were worth more than their face for bullion and consequently were melted for exportation. Even the silver coins of the United States being new and of full weight could not circulate alongside of the worn and abraded Spanish and Mexican coins that were recognized by the United States laws as a legal tender for debt. These laws permitting foreign coins as legal tender were in operation until 1857.

The circulation of these foreign silver coins had much to do in preventing the coinage and circulation of American silver, and the undervaluation of gold in the gold coinage caused the exportation of all the gold that was

stamped by our mints. As Senator Sherman said in his recent speech, in 1834 Congress changed the ratio from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1, by reducing the number of grains in the gold coins. The gold dollar, according to the mint Act of 1792 contained 24.75 grains of pure gold, the alloy added was one-twelfth of the whole. The Act of 1834 made the amount of pure gold in the gold dollar 23.2 grains; the dollar with alloy weighed 25.8 grains. The Act of 1837 changed the proportion of alloy. The dollar still weighed 25.8 grains, but contained 23.22 grains of pure gold. The ratio was changed by this last Act to a fraction over 16 to 1. Both the silver and gold dollars retain the same weights to-day, although the former is no longer coined for the public. The object of Congress in changing the ratio in 1834 and 1837 was to make gold the standard. This was declared by the Committee of the House of Representatives who had the bill of 1834 in charge, in their report. They said: "The committee think that the desideratum in the monetary system is a standard of uniform value; they cannot understand that both metals have ever circulated simultaneously," [The mints of France at this time and since 1803 had been open to both gold and silver at a ratio of 15½ to 1, and this statement of the committee seems to express the opinion of that day as to the success of the French mints in maintaining the parity at that ratio.] "concurrently and indiscriminately in any country where there are banks or money dealers, and they entertain the conviction that the nearest approach to an invariable standard is its establishment in one metal, which metal shall compose exclusively the currency for large payments." When in 1853 the free coinage of the silver half dollars, quarters, dimes and half dimes was abolished, the committee having the bill in charge, said in their report: "We propose, so far as these coins are concerned, to make silver subservient to the gold coin of the country. We intend to do what the best writers on political economy have approved, what experience when the experiment has been tried has demonstrated to be the best, and what the committee believes to be necessary and proper—to make but one standard of currency and to make all others subservient to it. We mean to make gold the standard coin."

It would, therefore, seem that Congress was tired of bimetallism in 1834. They found that it did not work in the United States without a constantly recurring change in the coinage. That either silver circulated to the exclusion of gold, or gold to the exclusion of silver. They adopted gold as the standard and made silver subsidiary. If, at this time, France had been having the distinguished success in maintaining a double standard at the ratio of 15.5 to 1, it would seem that Congress would have been aware of it and would have seen fit to modify the double standard legislation of 1792, rather than to practically supersede it by the gold standard. The changes in the market ratio of gold and silver bullion from 1792 to 1853 were by no means alarming, and yet a very slight change was sufficient to cause the exportation of gold from 1792 to 1834, and of silver from 1834 on. It is barely possible that had Congress in 1834-37 adhered to bimetallism and adopted the French ratio that both silver and gold coins might have been maintained in circulation, but even this is not conclusively proved.

#### FRANCE.

The experience of France herself with bimetallism does not warrant any such conclusion. In France as in England the original standard of value was

the livre or pound of silver. This was debased by royal authority from time to time, but even more rapidly than in England. In a public report made in France on the monetary question in 1802, it is stated that between 1602 and 1773, the ratio of gold to silver was changed twenty-six times, and by 1802 the livre had been reduced to one seventy-sixth part of its original weight. The general course pursued by the authorities was to lessen either the gold or silver livre or franc, according as the market value of the metals fluctuated and the gold or silver coinage became undervalued. They would make first one metal and then the other the standard making a profit to the Treasury every time. There were four recoinages in the reign of Louis XIV. and five in that of Louis XV. When Louis XVI. came to the throne the legal ratio of gold to silver adopted in 1726 was 14½ to 1. The legal rate in England at that time was 15 one-seventh to 1. Neither agreed with the market ratio. Silver was exported from England and gold from France. In 1785, therefore, a recoinage was ordered in the latter country. M. Calonne, Comptroller-General, had it in charge. He it was who selected the ratio of 15.5 to 1. In 1785 it was not exactly in conformity with the market ratio as it undervalued silver. The revolution however drove out both gold and silver.

When specie payments were resumed under the consulate the celebrated mint law of France was passed in 1803. The substance of the debates that led to the passage of this law indicates that the legislators had no idea of adopting a double standard. They meant to establish the single silver standard. The law recited that "Five grains of silver, nine-tenths fine, constitute the monetary unit, which retains the name of franc." In order to retain gold in circulation it was decided to allow gold coinage at the ratio of 15.5 to 1 with the understanding that if this should not in future coincide with the market ratio, gold but not silver should be recoined. The price of gold rose gradually over the market ratio, and after 1815 gold was exported so rapidly that according to Chevalier in twenty-five years after that date the circulation of France was silver alone. Bimetallism, that is, the concurrent circulation of gold and silver coins at a ratio of 15.5 to 1, did not exist in France between 1820 and 1847. There were from 1795 to 1874 7,815,603,950 francs in gold coined at the French mints. Of this 696,114,580 francs only were coined between 1824 and 1848, and 6,202,131,480 francs were coined after 1848. The total silver coinage from 1795 to 1874 was 5,305,395,854 francs. Of this 2,848,697,935 francs was coined between 1824 and 1848, and 847,800,499 francs after 1848. The discoveries of gold in Russia, California and Australia from 1849 to 1860 again changed the market ratio so that gold again began to circulate in France. Silver on the contrary began to be exported. The market ratio moved to 15.19 to 1 and remained below 15.5 until 1862. It is customary to point to the stability given by the open mints of France to the ratio. It is true that while the French mints were open from 1803 to 1873 the variation was not apparently very great to the casual observer.

The following table from Soetbeer gives the extreme market variations:

1803.....1 to 15.41	1832... ..1 to 15.72	1861..... 1 to 15.19
1806*.....1 to 16.08	1833.....1 to 15.93	1862.....1 to 15.35
1813*.....1 to 16.25	1843.....1 to 15.93	1869.....1 to 15.60
1814*.....1 to 15.04	1849.....1 to 15.78	1871..... 1 to 15.57
1820.....1 to 15.62	1850.....1 to 15.78	1873.....1 to 15.92
1830.....1 to 15.95	1859.....1 to 15.70	

Without referring to the fluctuations of the Napoleonic wars marked with a star, observe that in 1830 the market ratio of silver to gold was 15.95 to 1., while the legal ratio was 15.50 to 1, that is, 100 silver francs contained 450 grains or 6,944,553 grains of pure silver, and 100 francs of gold contained 448.03 grains of pure gold. If the market ratio be 15.95 to 1, then 100 francs in gold to correspond should contain but 435.39 grains. The difference is 12.64 grains of pure gold. Or to show the profit one would make by buying silver with gold, the 448.03 grains of pure gold in 100 francs will buy at 15.95 to 1, 7,146.0785 grains of pure silver, which presented for coinage at the mint would produce over 102 francs, representing a profit of two per cent. Though these fluctuations therefore appear small, they were important enough to drive first the gold and then the silver from France as the market ratio either caused gold or silver to be undervalued by the legal ratio. In 1857 the scarcity of silver became so great that the Government appointed a commission to investigate the reason of it. This commission recommended that an export duty be put on silver and penalties imposed on brokers for dealing in coins. These remedies were not adopted. In 1864 the dearth of small change still continuing and growing worse, it was proposed to lower the value of the silver coinage less than five francs and make it subsidiary. The legislature lowered the prices less than one franc but refused to do more. Nevertheless the difficulty with the supply of silver change still continued, and not only in France but in Belgium and Switzerland. A convention was called in which France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece joined. The result was the treaty of December 23, 1865, by which the present system of subsidiary coinage was adopted for the countries named, and its legal-tender function was limited to fifty francs. This was the beginning of the Latin monetary union.

In 1867 another international monetary conference was held, at which the delegates of France voted for the single gold standard. The nation, however, did not act on this proposition until 1873. The war of 1870 intervened. In 1873 silver poured into the mint in such quantities that the authorities became alarmed. There was a profit of one and a half per cent. in sending silver to the mint and buying gold for export. The market ratio was 15.75 to 1. The delegates of the Latin Union were called together and the coinage of silver was limited to 120,000,000 francs a year. In 1876 the ratio changed to 17 to 1. At the request of M. Leon Say, the minister of finance, the legislature passed a bill authorizing the suspension of the coinage of silver by decree. The mints were immediately closed to the free coinage of full legal tender silver and have never been re-opened. The history of the French coinage laws does not show that bimetallism was ever sustained in France, notwithstanding the claim so repeatedly made to that effect.

#### BELGIUM.

This country had the same monetary law as France until 1832, when the single silver standard was adopted. When gold began to pour in from California and Australia in 1861, the gold standard was adopted.

#### HOLLAND.

Holland tried the double standard prior to 1847 at a ratio of 15.60 to 1. Finding that first one metal and then the other circulated, Holland abandoned the double standard in that year, and adopted the single silver stand-

ard. When Germany adopted the gold standard a commission was appointed to examine the monetary question by the King of the Netherlands. A suspension of silver coinage was recommended. It was put in force for six months and extended from time to time until June, 1875, when the gold standard was adopted.

#### GERMANY.

Before 1871, Germany had the single silver standard. In fact, no argument for bimetallism can be drawn from her experience. In November, 1871, the single gold standard was adopted.

The history of bimetallism as far as it has had a trial is, therefore, not encouraging to those who look for a relief of depressing conditions by doubling the fund of primary money through bimetallism. If the United States alone throws open her mints to the free coinage of gold and silver, she cannot expect to do better than France. It is plain that under the law of 1803 France had an alternating and not a bimetallic standard. A change of forty-three one-hundredths in the ratio, that is from 15.50 to 15.93 to 1, gave a profit of two per cent. on the exportation of gold, and reduced France to an exclusively silver currency. If the United States should open her mints to the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1, in the face of the fact that the market ratio is 32 to 1, what would become of the gold in the country? It seems incredible that any one can believe that the free coinage of silver by the United States alone can raise the gold price of silver bullion to 1.29 per ounce.

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**BANKERS AND SCARCE MONEY.**—In the worst period of 1893, when many a business house with large assets was ruined by inability to get ready cash, the banks were gorged with money to an extent almost unparalleled. The constant failures were many of them due directly to the scarcity of money, and money was scarce because the bankers had locked it up.—*Case and Comment, Rochester, N. Y.*

A Western subscriber has brought the above to our attention. The extract, together with a lot of other equally foolish stuff, appeared in a law publication printed at Rochester, N. Y. As our Western correspondent says, What can be expected from cross-roads Populist newspapers, when a publication from which one would expect conservative and sensible views gives currency to such false statements?

In the worst period of the panic of 1893 the banks of the leading cities, by the issue of clearing-house certificates, threw millions of dollars into the channels of circulation, the banks took their pay in these certificates and gave cash to their customers.

It is nearly always characteristic of a bank panic that after the scare has run its course, paralyzing business, large sums of idle money accumulate in the banks.

Those who disseminate the idea that the bankers have some interest to subserve by locking money up and making it scarce are doing a most foolish and dangerous thing. To any intelligent person it is enough to say that banks make no profit on idle money in their vaults; every dollar held, beyond the reserve required by law, is a loss. Bankers make their profits by putting money in circulation in the form of loans and discounts, and not by hoarding it.

## THE BATTLE OF THE STANDARDS.

*THE PRESENT CONTEST IS BETWEEN OUR PRESENT SYSTEM, REAL BIMETALLISM, AND THEORETICAL BIMETALLISM, OR THE SILVER STANDARD.*

"That coin only is good money of which the bullion is worth as much after it is melted, as it is in the form of coin."—HENRI CERNUSCHI.

"Whatever might be said about the marvelous stability of  $15\frac{1}{4}$  to 1 under the old regime, the historic fact is that the actual market ratio was never and nowhere invariably in accord with the legal ratio."—M. FORSSEL, delegate from Sweden to the Brussels Monetary Conference, 1892.

"When you substitute an inferior standard of money it drives out of circulation the superior standard. *You can have but one standard*; you may maintain the other things up to that standard, *but you cannot have more than one standard of money, or of measure, or of weight.*"—JOHN SHERMAN: in the United States Senate, January 18, 1891.

"Bimetallism in Europe is absolutely a lost cause."—M. LEROY-BEAULIEU: in "The Forum," July, 1896.

The battle of the standards—the question whether one of the precious metals, of fixed weight and fineness, shall be the lawful standard of value, or whether two of the precious metals, both gold and silver, of fixed weight and fineness, at a certain stated ratio, shall be declared by law to be the standard of value; this contest of supreme importance, from the material standpoint, has heretofore been carried on within the confines of the college and the counting-room. Now, for the first time in history, the battle-ground has been shifted to the political and partisan arena, and the people of a great nation are to discuss and decide, in the heat of a Presidential campaign, a question which is more closely connected with their material welfare than any other—a question which presents in its broader and more general aspects, some difficult problems to the student of political economy; a question which might well have been left to the calm and dispassionate judgment of a commission representing all shades of thought. But, since the people have this issue presented to them for their decision, it is fortunate, indeed, for the future welfare of our country, and for its honor and credit among the nations of the earth, that the intelligence and morality of the American people can well be trusted to decide the question aright.

It should not be difficult—doubtless it *will not* be difficult—for any intelligent person to decide the question that is presented in the partisan contest now engaging attention. The proposition that this great nation should deliberately turn away from that standard of value which all the great civilized nations have adopted, and in its place adopt that standard which obtains only in nations of the second or third class, is so preposterous that it is difficult to understand how any intelligent person could for a moment entertain it.

### FREE COINAGE MEANS THE SINGLE SILVER STANDARD.

The issue presented now is not between the single gold standard, on the one side, and an attempt at bimetallism, or the double standard, on the

other; but it is, as presented in the party platforms, between the single gold standard, with the possible adoption of bimetallism through international agreement, on the one side, and the single silver standard, or silver monometallism, on the other side. The attempt of the United States alone to provide for free coinage of gold and silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 would, indeed, result in the free coinage of silver, *but of silver alone*; for what man, or what number of men, would offer gold to be coined into money at about half its real value; or if coined, who would exchange his gold coin for silver coin worth half as much? It can be shown—it has already been proven with mathematical precision—that free coinage at the ratio of 16 to 1 means simply and only the *free coinage of silver*—the silver basis of Mexico and Japan, for the United States—the destruction of our national credit, and to our people as individuals disaster beyond description. The choice between the single gold standard, with concurrent circulation of silver, as at present, and the shame and loss involved in the single silver standard—not bimetallism but silver monometallism—is the choice presented to the American people by the party platforms and candidates. It is a choice that our people may be trusted to decide on the side of simple right and justice: on the side of national honor and good faith; on the side of industrial progress and individual prosperity.

But, underlying the immediate question as presented to the American people, lies the broader question of the single or the double standard—a question that has always had great interest for the student of economics; never more so than at present. This question, through the gradual process of evolution, extending over nearly a century, and working by the usual methods of “natural selection” and “survival of the fittest,” appears to have already reached its solution, although this fact is not yet acknowledged by all students of the subject. The adoption of the single gold standard by nearly all the great commercial nations, some of them having adopted it after careful consideration of the subject, as England and Germany; others having done so without direct intent but by force of the higher law of commerce, which has made gold the single standard, as France and the United States: this fact of general adoption has made gold the standard by a natural law more effective than the laws of Congress or Parliament. By the same natural law silver has been relegated to a second place, for use as subsidiary coin, and this relation of the two metals, which has existed for many years, will doubtless continue for many years in the future, if not for all time. Only through the greatly increased production of the one, or the greatly decreased production of the other, could the old relation of 16 to 1, or any approximation to it, be restored.

#### THE KIND OF BIMETALLISM THE FREE SILVER MEN TALK OF NEVER EXISTED AND NEVER WILL.

Even under the old relations or ratios, whether of 15 to 1, 15½ to 1, or 16 to 1, it is demonstrated by the facts that no true bimetallism ever existed. In fact, a real bimetallism—a double standard of gold and silver, the free coinage of the two metals at a fixed legal ratio intended to extend over long periods of time—is a *practical impossibility*. The double standard is false in theory and a failure in practice.

The advocate of bimetallism will at once exclaim: “Prove that! Give us reasons to show that the double standard is false in theory; let us have some



facts that prove that it is a failure in practice." It is the purpose of this article to offer such reasons and to refer to such facts.

First, as to the theory of bimetallism and the opposing theory of the single standard, it may be said that it is at times difficult to prove an axiom. An axiom is defined as "a self-evident, undemonstrable, theoretical and general proposition, to which every one who apprehends its meaning must assent." Aristotle defined it as "a principle which he who would learn must bring of himself." When, in his report of May 4, 1830, the then Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gorham, referring to the difficulties in the way of maintaining a double standard, said: "The remedy is to be found in the establishment of *one standard measure of property only*," and added: "The proposition that *there can be but one standard in fact is self-evident*," we may believe that these statements had to his mind all the force and conclusive weight of an axiom, or self-evident truth. When Mirabeau in his memoir of December 12, 1803, which was largely instrumental in leading France to the adoption then of the single silver standard, wrote these words: "Money, being the measure of everything that is sold, this measure ought not only to be invariable, but also to have the same relations in all its parts, which cannot be if gold and silver are employed conjointly as constitutional measures, because the proportion between these metals is very susceptible of variation, and *therefore one metal only ought to serve as the measure, or as constitutional money*"—the conclusion he arrived at no doubt had to him all the weight of self-evident truth. When, during the debate in the House of Representatives, on the bill which afterward became the much-disputed Law of February 12, 1873, Hon. Wm. D. Kelley said (on April 9, 1872), "*It is impossible to retain the double standard*;" the values of gold and silver continually fluctuate; you cannot determine this year what will be the relative values of gold and silver next year; they were 15 to 1 a short time ago, they are 16 to 1 now"—he doubtless stated what appeared to him to be the truth at that time. When Senator Sherman, in his speech in the United States Senate, on January 13, 1891, declared that, "You cannot have more than one standard of money, or of measure, or of weight," he was stating in a negative form what was to his mind an axiom, and the present Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. John G. Carlisle, did the same thing, when, in his speech at Memphis, on May 23, 1895, he said: "I confess my inability to understand what is really meant by a double standard or measure of value; *the idea is incomprehensible to my mind*, because I cannot conceive how it is possible to have two different legal and authoritative measures of the same thing in use at the same time, as, for instance, a pound weighing sixteen ounces and a pound weighing eight ounces, or only half as much, and both declared by law to be legal pounds."

To very many minds, probably to the great majority, the statements made by the distinguished men, whose utterances are above quoted, will appear to have all the authority of axioms, or "self-evident truth." To other minds, not able to so regard them, the following reasons may be offered to show why the double standard is false in theory, although to offer reasons here will seem like an attempt to prove an axiom.

1. The commercial ratio between gold and silver to-day is about 32 to 1. To declare by legal enactment that the ratio be 16 to 1, is equivalent to the attempt to make 2 equal to 1. Law might indeed declare that this should be, but it could never make it be.

2. The double standard is false in theory, because it attempts to make fixed and stationary a relation or ratio which in the nature of things is and will be constantly changing. This reason is clearly stated in the words of Mirabeau, and also in those of William D. Kelley, as given above, and has been recognized by most minds which have studied the subject.

**EVERY ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH BIMETALLISM BY FREE COINAGE  
HAS FAILED.**

The history of attempted bimetallism during the past century amply supports the fact that the double standard is false in theory and impossible in practice; in this instance, at least, the historic fact as to its failure in practice fully illustrates and supports the claim as to its falsity in theory. Not only does the experience of England and France show this, but the bimetalism experiments of our own country also prove it. England, after full deliberation, adopted the single gold standard in 1816, and her wonderful material development since then is probably due to that act more than to any other. The Bank of England notes command gold around the world and frequently command a premium in gold. What other nation enjoys a credit equal to this? Americans may well wish that the notes issued by their own national Treasury shall some day enjoy equal credit. That day will come when, by deliberate Act of Congress and the Executive, they shall take the decisive step which England took eighty years ago.

The financial history of France is another striking illustration of the failure of bimetallism. Adopting the single silver standard in 1803, that country was soon brought face to face with the fact that gold was the acknowledged international standard and the standard of commerce, and the law of commerce overthrew the law of the statute books, and the single gold standard, with concurrent circulation of silver, became the real standard. Later, France and the Latin Union attempted the restrictive coinage of silver, but even this was given up after an experiment lasting only ten years, and twenty years ago (in August, 1876), the French Mint was closed to silver, and has not been reopened since. It is a remarkable fact that just about the time the United States Government began the wholesale coinage of silver dollars, the French Government deliberately discontinued the coinage of the five-franc piece, the coin which most nearly corresponds to our dollar. And yet France is continually referred to by the advocates of the double standard as a shining example of the success of bimetallism!

Our own history is another illustration of the failure of the double standard. When the ratio of 15 to 1 was recommended by Hamilton in 1792, at the time of the founding of the United States Mint, it was his intention to make the legal ratio coincide with the commercial ratio at that time. But, owing to the "constantly fluctuating" relative values of gold and silver, an ounce of gold soon became worth more than 15 ounces of silver, and being undervalued it soon began to disappear as a coin of circulation, and by 1810 or 1812 had almost entirely disappeared from circulation. The Law of 1834 was enacted with the intention of bringing gold again into circulation, and fixed the ratio at 16 to 1. This was virtually the adoption of the single gold standard in this country, for, silver being slightly undervalued by law, it soon disappeared as a coin of circulation—so much so, indeed, that the law of 1853 provided for subsidiary coins of silver containing less than the pro-

portionate weight of silver, as compared with the silver dollar. So completely did the silver dollar disappear as a coin of circulation, that scarcely any were to be seen for years prior to the war of 1861-65. The law of February 12, 1873, was a revision of coinage laws passed prior to that date, and as the silver dollar had ceased to be a coin of circulation it was discontinued by that law, and the gold standard was definitely adopted by law—as it had in reality been by practice since 1834—by the declaration that the gold dollar was the unit of value. Thus for a period of over sixty years past gold has been the commercial standard in this country, and since 1873 has been the legal standard as well.

When the price of silver began to decline, shortly after 1873, because of the largely increased production, then demands for the restoration of silver to full coinage privilege began to be heard. As showing how great the increase in the production of silver in the United States really was, the following figures, showing the production *in ounces* for the years mentioned, are presented: 1851, '52 and '53, 120,000 ounces; for 1871, '72 and '73, 67,600,000 ounces, and for 1891, '92 and '93, the production was 181,800,000 ounces. This enormous increase in production necessarily reduced the price of silver, and then the clamor for free coinage began. The law of February 28, 1878, originally introduced as a free coinage measure, provided for the coinage of 2,000,000 silver dollars per month. This continued until the Silver Purchase Act of June, 1890, was passed. This provided for the purchase of four and one-half million ounces of silver per month, and the issue of Treasury notes for the cost of the same. This law was repealed in October, 1893, since which time no silver bullion has been purchased by the Government.

#### HOW BAD MONEY DRIVES OUT GOOD MONEY.

This brief review of the history of coinage and attempted bimetallism in our own country shows how fully our experience accords with that of the other great commercial nations. In fact, world-wide experience during the past century has conclusively shown that true bimetallism is impossible, and for a reason that can be fully understood by the most moderate intellectual endowment. This reason is that *inferior or depreciated money drives good money out of circulation*. Let gold be worth more commercially than it is by the legal ratio, and it will be hoarded, melted and exported, as happened in this country between 1792 and 1812. Let silver be worth more commercially than it is said to be worth by law, and the same thing happens—it disappears from circulation, as happened between 1834 and 1860. Men deal in gold and silver as commodities, and whenever there occurs a very slight difference between the commercial and the legal ratio—and these slight variations are continually occurring—they will take advantage of the difference to buy and sell one or the other metal. Nearly forty years ago Chevalier, the great French economist, wrote that “a change of 1½ per cent. in favor of gold had sufficed, thirty or forty years ago, to cause that metal to disappear wholly from commercial payments.” (Written in 1859). The problem that is now presented to the intelligent mind, therefore, is this: If such slight variations between the legal and commercial ratios of the two metals always caused the undervalued one to disappear from circulation, thus practically resulting in the single standard—what was left of bimetallism?

And if such was the result of slight variations seventy or eighty years ago, before the era of steam and electricity, when communication and transportation were very slow, how eagerly would even slighter variations be taken advantage of now, when all the great markets of the world are joined by electricity, and when Europe is distant from us in days instead of weeks.

Not only have the leading statesmen of the great civilized nations, and their most active business men, manufacturers, merchants and bankers, adopted, or been forced by the facts to the conclusion stated above—that bimetallism is impossible in practice, that there can be in truth only one single standard of value, of measure, or of weight—but the leading scholars of the world, men who have made a thorough scientific study of the subject, have arrived at the same conclusion. Even those inclined towards bimetalism are compelled by the historic facts to admit the impossibility of the double standard in practice. Thus Professor W. S. Jevons, who is often claimed as a bimetallist by the advocates of the double standard, says, in his well-known work, "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," (in chapter XII.) that "at any moment the standard of value is doubtless one metal or the other, and not both,"—an admission that appears to utterly destroy the theory of bimetallism, for if it is true that the double standard does not exist at any one moment, it certainly seems fair to inquire: When, when, then, can it exist?

It is true that some bimetallists (notably Professor Francis A. Walker, probably the most distinguished bimetallist in the United States), hold that the concurrent circulation of the two metals in the same country is not a necessity of the system of bimetallism, but that "if it results only in establishing an alternating circulation, the chief results of the system will be achieved." Doubtless this will appear to most minds as a very peculiar sort of double standard, which is at no single moment *double*, but continually shifting from one metal to the other—always, therefore, a single standard, constantly changing and alternating. How much better than such an indefinite, uncertain, shifting standard of value, is our present single gold standard, under which we have the concurrent circulation of both metals, the inferior being maintained at par with the standard by the action of the Government?

Referring to the claims of the bimetallists that France had maintained the double standard system for many years, Horace White, in an article entitled "Bimetallism in France" (published in the "Political Science Quarterly," June, 1891), said: "So far is it from being true that the French law of 1803 held the two metals together—in fact, they never were held together by that or anything else," and adds: "When people talk to me of the double standard I say there is no such thing. It is the Mrs. Harris of monetary science. *An alternate standard is not a double standard.*"

Another well-known writer on financial questions, a recognized authority in the scientific field of the subject, Professor J. Laurence Laughlin, author of "Bimetallism in the United States," says, in the concluding chapter of this great work, when considering the probable effect of the silver policy of the Government: "So soon as any depreciation is manifested, the silver will begin to drive out the gold from circulation. We shall then have reached a silver basis, and our prices will be changed to suit the silver standard. In the existing state of trade so stupid a policy can not be too harshly condemned."

Our present Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. John G. Carlisle, taking a similar look ahead at the probable result of an attempt to restore the double standard, said (in his speech at Memphis, Tenn., May 23, 1895), "Values will always be measured by the kind of money in actual circulation, no matter what the law may declare; and, therefore; if the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 should drive out gold and substitute silver and paper redeemable in silver in its place, we should have a single silver standard and actual silver monometallism."

The reasons given to show the falsity of the theory of bimetallism seem to be convincing to the average intelligence. When we further examine the facts of history, we are forced to the conclusion that the double standard is an utter failure and impossibility in practice. When we consider, in connection with these reasons and these historic facts, the opinions of trained financiers of long experience, of eminent statesmen, and of able scholars, who have investigated the subject scientifically and thoroughly, and find them all to agree, the conclusion is irresistible that the double standard is false in theory and impossible in practice. As Secretary Carlisle further said in the speech just referred to: "This is neither speculation nor prophecy, but a conclusion based on facts established by the experience of all nations in all ages."

ISAAC ROBERTS.

**PECULIAR FREE SILVER ARGUMENT.**—"The Detroit Tribune" thus replies to a subscriber's inquiry as to the effect of free coinage:

"Does or does not 'The Tribune' think it in the interest of the wage-earners of our country to decrease the purchasing power of our dollar to the value of the bullion in the silver dollar or thereabouts? What would be the effect upon the 5,000,000 depositors in our Savings banks, and an equal number probably in our other banks?"

The effect upon depositors in Savings banks would not be perceptible. The person who has a certain sum in the bank would still have that same sum. If he drew it out he would receive the same National bank bills or Treasury notes that he would receive were he to draw it out to-day. He would never be conscious of any change. The only way in which a change of standards would be apparent to the average citizen would be *the higher prices which would prevail and in the greater activity of trade.*"

It is difficult to understand how the free silver craze could so addle anybody's brain as to arrive at such contradictory conclusions. Here is an editor who contends that free silver would have no effect on Savings bank depositors, but almost in the same breath admits that it would increase prices. If the purchasing power of the dollar is lessened by free coinage it would certainly have a most important effect on Savings bank depositors.

THE value of real estate and of all things salable is fixed by the quantity of redemption money.—*Rocky Mountain News, Denver.*

Why, of course, if there were no "redemption money" nothing would have any value, for the value of all things depends upon the number of gold and silver dollars in existence. Likewise the weight of all things depends upon the number of balancees, and the length of all things upon the number of rules and yardsticks, so that if there were no balances there would be no weight, and no length if there were no rules or yardsticks. There is no balance delicate enough to weigh the brain of an editor who believes such things.

## HARD TIMES AND THEIR CAUSES.

*OUR CURRENCY LAWS NOT THE CHIEF CAUSE OF THE EXISTING BUSINESS DEPRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES.*

The present unhappy state and temper of the public mind on the question of our national currency is most unfortunate for the prosperity and tranquillity of the American people. It can be seriously doubted if at any time in our history, excepting only the period covered by the Civil War, there was ever so much unnecessary bitterness of feeling, so much grave apprehension of consequences, and so much concern for the credit of the nation on the one hand and so much indifference for the credit of the nation on the other hand, as exist at the present time.

It is both sad and strange that this is so, for no one questions the honesty and patriotism of the masses of the people in this country; and what is even sadder and more strange is that almost by common consent our currency system is blamed for all our past and present woes. The issue cannot be changed now, and the present political campaign will be fought out on the question of our national currency, but it is to be hoped reason will regain sway long enough to enable the people to see many of the real causes of existing troubles in the United States, and to realize that, despite the admitted faults in our monetary system, that system had little to do with existing hard times and the prevailing discontent.

The complaint about the monetary system has been mainly confined to the South and West, and no doubt a system could be devised which would be more just and more beneficial to those sections and at the same time not hurtful to the East and North, and yet the writer, a Southern man both by birth and by choice, is convinced that, comparatively speaking, our monetary system had and has little to do with our present business depression.

### PROSPERITY DOES NOT COME BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT.

Many persons who attribute all our troubles to our currency laws ignore entirely the great necessity of industry and intelligence, honesty and virtue, economy and frugality, good judgment and vigilance as indispensable aids to commercial prosperity. Such persons, failing to acquire fortune or to secure more than a bare means of livelihood, place the blame upon our national Government. They forget that all legislative enactments are futile unless they reflect the real needs of the public, and that mere makeshift policies, intended simply to appease this clamor, only serve in the end to further complicate the already serious problem of government.

No system of finance can make all the people prosperous any more than the best code of morals can make all the people moral. It is after all the individual citizen in the community who holds in his hands his own individual destiny and the destiny of his country.

Therefore whichever party wins in the approaching political conflict, the

champion of a gold standard or the champion of free and unlimited coinage, the masses of the people are certain to be disappointed in their expectations of quickly returning prosperity.

The currency is not the only cause, it is not the prime cause of our distress, and hence a change in our monetary system, however desirable it may seem, is not the only remedy.

It may be well at this time to bring to the notice of those who have never thought of them, and recall to the attention of others who have forgotten them, some of the underlying causes for existing commercial distress in the United States. These causes affect all the people of the country, but more particularly those living in the South and West.

#### WASTE IN ITS RELATION TO OUR DISTRESS.

Of the underlying causes of our distress one of the very greatest is waste. This great evil, while it is not confined to any one locality or section, is more general and is more apparent in the South and the West. Waste is most common in new countries where the experimental stage has not been passed, and where the value of property is lightly regarded. It has been aptly observed that "the states in which the citizens have enjoyed their rights longest are those in which they make the best use of them." Waste means not only the destruction of property, but the failure to utilize waste products. What we waste in the United States in a single year would easily pay off our entire national debt. For this statement that waste is most common in new countries some reasons in its support may be demanded. Pioneers in the very nature of things are daring, sometimes reckless, seldom frugal; as a rule, wasteful. They count on inexhaustible resources always at their command, and what they do is only for to-day, regardless of the future. The houses they build are to serve only for immediate use, and no thought is taken as to what may be needed a year or ten years hence. In the same way the pioneer cultivates lands. The economic use of land and scientific farming are never given a moment's consideration. This same makeshift policy is practiced in everything. In short, pioneer life does not go well with economy, frugality and methodical habits, and the reward of that untiring industry, that heroic self-sacrifice of our pioneers, is not for them nor for their immediate posterity, but for a posterity a few generations removed. Each succeeding generation in the pioneer stage destroys what its predecessor built, and inasmuch as the adequate thing could have been provided in the first place, posterity is forced to pay for just so much wasted labor and substance. Old communities, therefore, have a tremendous advantage over their younger neighbors to whom they sell their experience and from whom they exact tribute until wisdom has rendered this act no longer necessary or folly has made it impossible.

This partly explains our dependence as a nation upon older nations, and our dependence as Southern or Western States upon the mature and wealthy States of the East. A young nation, like a young man, will have its way; it will defy example and spurn wise counsel, and it must, therefore, in some way and at some time, pay the penalty of youthful pride and indiscretion.

#### FIRES AS AN ELEMENT OF WASTE.

One of the greatest items of waste is that which results from fires. This is due to many causes, among which may be mentioned imperfect construc-

tion of our buildings, which might be rendered more secure against fire by the enforcement of rigid building laws. The ease with which incendiaries collect losses from insurance companies and the difficulty of convicting and punishing these criminals make their crimes very frequent.

Our fire losses are greater each year than in all the countries of Europe combined, and when we reflect upon the vast population and the enormous wealth of the European countries this is indeed an astonishing fact.

Our fire losses range from \$150,000,000 to \$170,000,000 each year, and of this vast sum the insurance companies pay from \$75,000,000 to \$85,000,000 per annum, but to secure the payment of this \$75,000,000 to \$85,000,000 we pay premiums annually aggregating \$130,000,000. Of the \$130,000,000 paid by us in premiums every year, \$50,000,000 is paid to foreign companies. In return they pay us in fire losses not exceeding \$25,000,000.

It will be readily observed that the insurance business as a whole is very profitable, and it must also be plain that the South and West do not share very generously in the profits of this branch of business, but that these vast profits go to the Eastern States and to Europe.

The fault is not with European and eastern capitalists, but with ourselves, because we do not better protect ourselves against loss by fire so that we could more easily take our own risks, or if we insured against loss, could get insurance at the minimum instead of the maximum premium; and further, so that we could more easily carry the risks in our own companies, and thus pay the premiums to the people of our country.

The South and West need more home insurance companies that will take the risks and that will keep an eye on the property which they insure, preventing the crime of arson, and saving the country from that enormous waste which we now suffer every year.

As an example of the short-sighted policy of our people and of our law-makers, and to illustrate how and why in some localities progress and advancement are slow, the following case may be cited: In one of the oldest and most conservative cities of the South, and in the very heart of that city, easily accessible to the entire fire department, on our costly and stately buildings, the premium for insurance is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum. Why is this? Because the city is without proper building and insurance laws. The buildings are costly but not secure against fires, and besides due watchfulness is not exercised by their owners or custodians. The aggregate rate of taxation, municipal, county and State, is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per annum. What currency or banking laws can correct such a state of things, or make such property remunerative? It is to such evils that public attention should be directed, because they are more easily controlled and are within the mental grasp of the masses.

#### IGNORANCE OF SCIENCE A CAUSE OF OUR DISTRESS.

The currency system has no more to do with much of our distress than the Gulf Stream, but still it is a good thing on which to saddle the blunders and mistakes of individuals. The iron industry, for instance, should have made the South rich long ago, and some day it will make the South rich, but this longed-for time has been postponed by the ignorance, shortsightedness and cupidity of many so-called "practical" men. Millions upon millions of dollars have been wasted in southern iron plants which could have been saved



by the application of business sense and honesty to business matters and by the employment of scientific men and the application of scientific knowledge in the manufacturing branch of the iron industry. Scientific knowledge was ignored and so were safe and tried business methods. The "practical" man was too often a law unto himself in science and in business, and while he himself may have profited for a time, the poor dupes who bought the company's bonds or subscribed to the company's capital stock, paid the losses, and many such dupes are to-day blaming our currency laws for their distress, from which they try to find relief in the universal cure-all of the free coinage of silver. A case in point may be mentioned by way of illustration:

An iron company was formed in the South some years ago, the capital of which was fixed at \$5,000,000, and the property was afterwards bonded for \$6,000,000. Some of the insiders let some of their stock go at, say fifty cents, and their bonds at ninety cents. The small incomes and savings of the unsuspecting public were invested and for a very short time interest was paid them on the bonds. One misfortune followed another until now the company that was capitalized at \$5,000,000 is capitalized at \$1,000,000, and instead of \$6,000,000 of six per cent. bonds there are only \$450,000 five per cent. bonds. Many of the innocent and unsuspecting share or bondholders have lost out and the property will doubtless revert to a few only of the less scrupulous and more cunning of the original owners who ignored science and believed only in "practical" methods. The dupes who remain, as can be readily seen, have pocketed their losses and sit chewing the cud of bitter disappointment. Of the dupes who have entirely lost out or who still hang on the ragged edge, many of them blame our currency and banking laws and hope to find relief in a wild and vicious monetary system.

If all such unfortunate ones could only be brought to their senses long enough to appreciate the real facts not one of them would contend for a moment that the present monetary system was even remotely responsible for their sad misfortune.

This is only one instance, but it illustrates many cases that could be mentioned, where losses arising from misplaced confidence in men are being charged to the defects of our currency laws.

#### NEEDLESS TRANSPORTATION OF RAW AND MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS.

In the matter of transportation the item of waste is very great and at the same time is often entirely overlooked. This is notably true in the South and West, where raw products are shipped great distances at a heavy cost and then returned as manufactured articles or commodities. Nature has placed no embargo upon us to limit us in the enjoyment of a reasonable profit upon raw material only, and therefore what we pay for needless transportation, and what we lose in the way of profits earned by others upon the products of our soil, is just so much capital wasted. These products of the soil, if manufactured at home, would supply our wants and thus save not only in the matter of transportation but in the cost of labor, and at the same time would give employment to our laborers and assure to ourselves the profit of the manufacturers now enjoyed elsewhere. Industry is now deprived of its fruits in the South and West and it will always be so unless we avail ourselves of the opportunities and advantages which nature has so

generously placed at our disposal, and it may be added that were it not for the South's unrivalled resources it would have been utterly bankrupt long ago.

#### WASTE BY DEFERRED DISPLACEMENT OF OBSOLETE MACHINERY.

It is also a waste of capital and labor to continue the use of expensive methods and obsolete machinery where more approved methods and labor-saving machinery have been adopted by bolder and more far-seeing competitors, and nowhere has this adherence to discarded methods been more common than in the Southern States. Not only have millions upon millions of dollars been wasted in this way, but oft-repeated failures have been improperly and unjustly attributed to some cause inherent in our country, thus delaying or entirely preventing the investment with us of vast sums of money for which its owners eagerly sought fairly remunerative employment.

#### UTILIZATION OF WASTE PRODUCTS.

What we lose by refusing to utilize "waste products" cannot be called trifling. The waste products of slaughtered animals are now everywhere utilized save with us, excepting in rare instances. The waste products in mines, furnaces, mills, etc., we scarcely touch, notwithstanding the fact that their use would yield considerable returns.

Americans as a people, and notably Southerners as a part of the American people, are wasteful and improvident. Without doubt waste is our great besetting national sin. It prevades every department of our commercial, industrial and domestic life. This may in a great measure be due, as has been charged, to the vast area of our country, to its enormous territorial limits. Even in the matter of land we have been criminally wasteful. We have imperfectly cultivated ten acres where it would have paid us better to have properly cultivated one acre. Having so much land to spare has had the effect of making us careless, of making us slipshod, of making us wanting in appreciation of what really was intended as a blessing. The wasteful destruction of our forests has consumed millions of dollars worth of valuable property. In Japan it is said that when one tree is cut down another is immediately planted to take its place. Here there is not only an entire absence of such forethought, but our forests are annually devastated by the most destructive fires, most of which might easily be prevented.

#### WASTE IN STREET CONSTRUCTION.

The enormous loss we suffer, particularly in cities, from street construction, have not been touched upon. The subject is one too vast and intricate to admit of brief or hasty treatment. It is sufficient to say that we lose hundreds of millions of dollars every year by the improper construction of streets where streets are needed, and by constructing streets at an enormous cost where streets are not at all needed.

#### WHERE OUR MONEY GOES.

The question is often asked: What becomes of our money? Where does it go? It is estimated that American tourists spend abroad about \$100,000,000 annually. This does not represent an investment to this country, but it

represents a clear loss to us and a clear gain to Europe. We have been spending money in Europe at this rate for some years and there is no abatement, but on the contrary it is on the increase.

The owners of our vast fortunes are living much, if not entirely, abroad. While their estates may be allowed to remain here they spend their income abroad. It is not wholly unlike landlordism in Ireland where the peasant is always paying over his earnings to his English master but never receiving a penny in return.

It is asserted that we pay to European countries annually for interest on American securities held abroad from \$200,000,000 to \$250,000,000. This interest is, under the circumstances, money well spent, but if we were half as frugal as our foreign creditors we might easily be very large holders of our own securities.

#### DISPLACEMENT OF AMERICAN CAPITAL.

Few of the agitators who are so clamorous for a change and so out of sympathy with the existing order of things, take any account of the recent displacement of capital, the change in methods and of altered customs. The adoption of improved labor-saving machinery in the past decade has been upon a gigantic scale, and while this, under normal conditions, would have been greatly helpful, under existing conditions it added only to our embarrassment and aggravated our disorders. It meant heavy debt for the enterprising manufacturer upon which interest had to be paid when due, without sufficiently satisfactory returns from the investment to make the change, under the circumstances, desirable.

Again, this displacement of capital usually inured to the benefit of the few while entailing loss upon the many. Take, for example, the introduction of the bicycle. The statement has been made upon authority that is deserving of confidence, that the displacement of capital attending the manufacture of bicycles amounts to \$70,000,000. Then take the changes that its introduction has effected in many channels of trade. To indulge the desire for a bicycle has in most instances necessitated economy or self-denial in other things. A dress or suit of clothes less, a watch or buggy sacrificed, a trip to some favorite resort abandoned, fewer theatre or opera tickets during the winter, etc., through the list of human needs and desires. Next, take the introduction of the bicycle and the electric car almost concurrently and note the displacement of capital in horse flesh. The sum seems incredibly large, but nevertheless it is given out on more or less reliable authority that since the introduction of the electric car and the bicycle that the depreciation in the value of horses in the United States has touched the sum of \$500,000,000. In the very nature of things these great and wonderful changes must of necessity work a hardship upon many for some years to come. Time, industry and economy alone can overcome such hardships and repair such losses.

#### THE FARMERS AND HARD TIMES.

The cry of hard times—the demand for cheap money and plenty of it—comes loud and strong from the agricultural communities of the South and West. The ills of the farmer are charged by him to the account of our currency system, and in obedience to the advice of the ubiquitous demagogue, he invokes legislation to produce a plethora of money, advance the prices of

what he has to sell, and reduce the prices of things he wants to buy. He is induced to imagine that city people, without exception, live in clover while the condition of the farmer is pitiable. That he has gotten into this frame of mind is most unfortunate for the whole country, but the farmer is not so much to blame as the designing creatures who have coddled him for selfish purposes, and like half sick or complaining people, once coddled they expect it at all times and from every one.

A survey of the whole question of the relation of the farmer to the present disordered state of the country should satisfy every reasonable mind that the truth plainly told is better for him, as it is for every one else, than flattery or coddling.

After all, is the average farmer so bad off? Is it not a fact that he has less care, takes fewer business risks, and less frequently suffers reverses than the average banker, merchant or manufacturer? He may not have so great wealth as a very, very small percentage of bankers, merchants and manufacturers possess, and he may not have many of the comforts and conveniences vouchsafed to city people, but he is seldom in great distress, and he rarely, if ever, knows the cares and anxieties of his city cousin. It is estimated that in our large cities ninety-seven per cent. of business men fail. Among the farming classes failures are much less common, because the farmer takes fewer business risks, and the opportunities for dangerous business ventures, which so often culminate in disaster, are rare.

The simple truth plainly told is, that the farmer who is intelligent and industrious, who attends to his own legitimate business and lets politics alone; who studies the science of farming and leaves the science of government to others, is prosperous; while the farmer who works only when he must and then in a slovenly manner; who adheres to obsolete methods; who spends his time at the grog-shop or hangs around the country store discussing politics, gets into worse condition every year and, of course, blames our monetary system for it.

Where the farmer is in distress, or where he goes on his course from year to year without any improvement, there will be found, as in the case of the city merchant, the banker, the manufacturer, the doctor, the lawyer, or the artisan whose position he foolishly envies, some underlying causes, and of these underlying causes our monetary system is not of the number. Where the farmer does not make any headway it is because he does not put heart and brain into his work. Obsolete methods, old-fashioned implements, utterly ignorant and ignorantly directed labor, will not answer even in the fertile fields of Tennessee and Kentucky. It takes hard, persistent, intelligent work—as in everything else—all the latest and most approved methods and appliances to insure success. Some of the poorest lands in Tennessee were at one time found in the counties of Lawrence, Franklin and Grundy; they were very poor for Tennessee, but German and Swiss industry, intelligence and thrift have made them richly productive and the envy of idlers. Our monetary system had nothing to do either with their former impoverished or their present fertile condition. These sturdy people put heart and mind into their work; they ploughed deep; they planted good seed; they watched their crops and tended their herds instead of running to town or to the railway station to gad or to talk politics, and as a result these aliens are among the most prosperous, contented and law-abiding inhabitants of the State.

Where the farmer of the South is not prosperous it will be found that he neither helps himself nor does he help nature. The thrifty farmer, and his name is legion in the South and West, has his incubators, his modern and approved dairy, and his improved agricultural implements; he cultivates diversified crops, raises everything necessary for his table; sells his products in the best markets for the highest current prices, and pays cash for what he buys. Debt is the curse of many a Southern and Western farmer, and while he would protest, it would be a very great blessing if no one would give him credit. Running accounts six and twelve months means simply that he is paying at least two dollars for what, with cash in hand, he could buy for one dollar. It is utterly absurd to dream even of a monetary system that could counteract and overcome ignorance, sloth and wastefulness.

Another fruitful source of discontent with the farmer is found in his unnatural hostility to capital, and the aid he gives to designing men in legislating to injure corporate interests. Does he not stand in his own light and injure himself most? How much better if the farmer would urge the enactment of wise and just laws that admit of an equitable division of the burdens and blessings of life. If he puts a heavy tax upon capital he himself must ultimately pay it, for everything comes out of the soil, even interest. The farmer should know that if protection is not afforded the capitalist in one State he will go where, wisely, it will be freely afforded. Who will be the loser thereby? The farmer of course, for competition among money-lenders inures to the benefit of the borrower, and the greater the number of lenders and the better the security the cheaper the rate of interest. The sooner all men act upon the principle that we must be mutually helpful the sooner will the cause and occasion for discontent and complaint disappear.

The question with the farmer then is not how to get "cheap money," or how to grow rich by legislative enactment, but rather how can he make his farm yield the maximum instead of the minimum; how can he buy the best of everything at the very lowest market price, and if he is a borrower how may he arrange to borrow upon the most favorable terms?

The intelligent farmer well knows, though like many another he too often forgets it, that where the highest credit is maintained there the rate of interest is lowest, and that universal confidence tends to circulate and will call into active use the currency of the country. The farmer also knows, when he takes time to reflect, that no matter how great the general volume of money may be and how equal its distribution, the amount held must necessarily fluctuate very soon unless the productive power of each is exactly equal. The community producing the greatest quantity of wheat, corn, watches, wagons, cloth, etc., very naturally and properly receives the larger share. It would be impossible to frame a currency law that could or should change this natural and just dispensation, and whether we have a debased currency or sound currency the law is inexorable which carries the currency to the greatest and most active centres of trade.

The science of farming therefore is of greater concern to the farmer than the intricate science of finance, because it is in the immediate line of his daily thought and daily avocation, while the study of finance is not. Every man, in addition to being a farmer, cannot at the same time be a physician, a lawyer or a chemist. He can be only one thing thoroughly and then only by unceasing effort and by close application. But if he feels that he must know

something of the science of finance, and it is well he should understand fundamental principles, let him study it at home in the best books on the subject, or under the teaching of men who are not always seeking office and who have no selfish motives to subserve.

#### INCREASED OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON THE WAGE-EARNER.

By the adoption of new methods and the change of customs new uses are found for money, or if the uses are not new it is into new channels into which it finds its way. In this age of specialization the all-around man has been displaced, and in the great pressure of population upon the means of livelihood, dependence of the individual upon his strong right arm and his active mind has given way to dependence upon life and accident insurance companies and to benevolent orders. The clamor for more money comes from the South and the West, while the great life and accident insurance companies and the fiscal departments of benevolent orders are in the East. Thus what is now an indispensable agency for the protection of families left without their natural supporters, and what is now a legitimate business come to stay, while it fully affords the protection it promises, pours its profits into the already overflowing coffers of the wealthy East. This will continue until State legislatures in the South and the West give adequate protection to capital and enact laws for the benefit of insurance companies, Savings banks, etc., similar to those now upon the statute books of the most advanced States of the East.

#### TRUSTS, CORPORATIONS AND DEPARTMENT STORES *vs.* MODEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AND THE SMALLER MERCHANTS.

The present limited opportunities of men with small capital is in striking contrast with their opportunities thirty or forty years ago. Powerful trusts now monopolize some lines of business, great corporations have absorbed others, and large department stores have destroyed great numbers of small mercantile establishments. This is not the place for elaborate argument on a question of such far-reaching importance. From one side will come the cry that corporations, combines, trusts, department stores, etc., cheapen all commodities, and therefore the consumer is benefited. The wage-earners on the other hand strenuously maintain that these great combinations reduce the price of labor without reducing taxes or rents, and what they gain by cheapened supplies is more than offset by other considerations. Be this as it may it is certain that for the time being at least the evolution in methods and systems of business seriously affects the many while it benefits only the few, and of the underlying causes for widespread distress in the United States this is one the gravity of which can hardly be appreciated.

Besides the influence upon labor, and the subordination of merchants and artisans with small capital, the rise and progress of combined capital has had an influence injurious to our whole social system. The concentration of very great wealth in the hands of the few is always and everywhere harmful, but notably so in a free country where suffrage and legislation both are brought under its corrupting influence. Great corporations primarily only desired approximate justice from State legislatures and from Congress, but the opportunities open to faithless representatives for illegitimate gain were

soon manifest and soon used. Thenceforward corporations directly and the public ultimately became the prey of these corrupt servants of the people, and now though the burden is heavy upon corporations and upon the public, there has yet been found no power strong enough to stop the evil. As a result legislation grows year by year more expensive and less fruitful of good results, and the spectre of unwise legislation and the shadow of politics seem to be ever hovering over our American business life. If we are not kept in suspense by one cause, we are by another. Either we must wait and see the result of the election, or if the election is over we must wait to see its effects. If it is not the executive power the people fear, it is the legislative branch of our Government, and usually it is the latter.

#### ECONOMY IN THE INDIVIDUAL A PRIME REQUISITE.

It is by economy, by saving the pennies, that we are to have dollars with which to increase our wealth, extend our influence and provide all reasonable and desirable comforts. We have wholly erroneous ideas of the real reason why the East is rich and why the money goes to the money centers instead of remaining at home. In the East people save their money, at the South they spend it. A glance at the deposits of Savings banks in eastern cities shows what makes people more prosperous in the one section than in the other. It is by the united effort, influence and savings of great numbers of men, women and children that the eastern cities have grown rich and powerful, while the South and West continue to pay them tribute every year.

A recent statement of the deposits of the Savings banks of New York city reveals the fact that they aggregate the fabulous sum of \$400,000,000. This is not the money of the rich, it is not the money of the gold bug or the silver man; it is not the money of the Wall street speculator; it is the money of the poor, the working classes, of the great middle class, who, out of their earnings, save a little every month, laying it by in some safe place where it will earn something and where it will grow itself.

If the deposits in New York Savings banks alone amount to \$400,000,000, what must they not be throughout the Eastern States? Like methods produce like results, and if the South and West are to be rich and independent, they must save pennies, trade at home, strengthen their credit and be mutually helpful to one another.

#### ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOME INDUSTRY.

What we must do first of all is to buy every article we use, where it is possible to do so, in our immediate community. If it is not possible to buy in our own immediate community, then we should go to the community nearest to us, and the reason for this should be clear to every intelligent mind. Our near neighbors are more likely to patronize us than friends living at a great distance. In this way money is kept at home, and year by year our surplus increases, and as it increases we shall be enabled each year to be the purchasers of our own municipal, county and State bonds and all the rest of our best interest-bearing securities. Having accomplished this, we shall draw the interest ourselves, and this will thus end the necessity of sending our best securities abroad, and the income on these will then be circulated among our own people, giving employment to labor now so often idle,

and a safe investment for capital now piled up in our banks and a benefit to no one. Pursuing our present course and continuing our present pace, our condition will get steadily worse. The breach between capital and labor will widen, and conditions generally will become more and more unequal.

EXPERIENCE, WHICH SHOULD BE AN UNERRING GUIDE, IS IGNORED.

Just as we find the individual, so also will be found the community or the State. Maturity and experience give counsel to youth and inexperience, but generally this counsel is not heeded. "The old man is a foggy, he is twenty-five or fifty years behind the times," says the young man, impatient of restraint. Ours is the youngest of the nations and yet we have surprised not only ourselves but the rest of the world. In many respects our achievements are without parallel, and we have been a wonder and surprise to mankind, whose applause long rang in our ears to our delight, intoxicating our very senses. So spoiled were we by brilliant achievements and their attendant praises that we never stopped to inquire if our success was due to our wisdom or if it was achieved despite our folly. At any rate, we placed ourselves at the head of the civilized nations of the world, serene and happy in the belief that no rival would be found and that no calamity could befall us to disillusionize us and prick the bubble of our national conceit. Everywhere throughout our land, notably in the younger States, were heard exultations over the effete and crumbling monarchies of Europe, and as for China and Japan, why, they were beneath our notice.

The wealth, power and influence of the European monarchies are not on the decline. They are rich, active and powerful, and each year they add to their resources. Ours is not the only country that attracts foreign capital. Far from it, and unless we maintain our credit we shall see other countries getting what we should have. Belgium alone in the past two years has invested 181,000,000 rubles in Russia in industrial enterprises, and Peru in the past ten years has attracted over \$100,000,000 of foreign capital. And so it will be found all over the world, that while we are fighting our currency battles and leaving the policy of our Government in doubt, our rivals are reaping a rich harvest.

The old countries of Europe are guided by the experience of hundreds of years; some of them by the experience of a thousand years or more. Their task of to-day is taken from the lesson of yesterday, and this task they perform deliberately and after mature consideration. In legislation and in the administration of public affairs they avail themselves of expert knowledge, while in business matters they are guided by well-directed and authentic information. They are deliberate and careful in all they do. Our troubles are largely rather the penalty of youth ignoring the experience of the thoughtful and mature. It would be well if we could learn in this country that expert knowledge is valuable and that we cannot afford to forever pay for our experience by constant and costly mistakes. We have grown old enough it would seem to know that expert knowledge, for instance, is required in framing our currency and banking laws; that the determination of our currency and banking laws ought not to be left to wily politicians and demagogues.

That public questions are turned and twisted by appeals to ignorance and prejudice and to the selfish desires of the voter, is not creditable to our intel-



ligence as a people. It is absurd that the great question of finance should be dragged into party politics at all. A question of so much importance, a question of such universal and vital interest, a question so difficult even to the student of finance, is one that in a public way should receive the closest attention of a non-partisan commission composed of the ablest financial experts in the land, and until these questions are thus handled we shall find that every succeeding panic will be more severe than its predecessor.

#### EQUALITY OF CONDITIONS NECESSARY.

This condition of things must be changed and it can be changed by economy, by mutual helpfulness, by observing the laws of self-preservation, by self-help, by industrial education, by fostering home industries, by insuring greater permanence in all public works and private enterprises and by the development of our vast resources. By less idle and bitter talk on politics, by a more friendly and generous spirit, we shall bring the conditions of the people of the various sections into a more perfect state of equality. What greater need exists if our people are to be happy and our Government is to endure? Equality of conditions, as has been well said, contributes to good morals.

As social conditions become more equal manners are softened, and *vice versa*. This equality therefore should be the aim of Americans whose form of government proclaims equality, in many respects as rare here as under some monarchical forms of government.

This observation was made by the ablest and the friendliest and the wisest critic of our country as far back as 1832, and what he said at that time is true to-day. Not only would this equality of conditions contribute to improved general social surroundings, but it would influence morals as nothing else could. That brutality which proceeds from the power of the rich on the one hand and that spirit of resentment and of treachery caused by a biting want and servility on the other, would yield to a better understanding and a kindlier feeling. Conditions can become more equal only by mutual concession, mutual helpfulness and united effort. The nearer alike people are in social and material relations the more certain is it that real sympathies will exist. Otherwise it will be said of the relations of the rich to the poor in America as it was said by a Queen of France in speaking of the estranged relations of the high to the low in her own beloved country: "As they had formed no clear notion of a poor man's sufferings, they cared but little for his fate."

The source of our distress is in the unwisdom of the individual, and the cure for our distress will be found when light breaks upon the mind of the American citizen and attention is diverted from evils that he cannot correct to evils that will readily yield to his careful treatment.

NASHVILLE, TENN.

HERMAN JUSTI.

THE REAL CAUSE.—The present trouble with regard to silver is wholly due to the demand that the ratio of its value to gold shall be determined and declared by the Government; that Congress shall say that so much of the one metal must be accepted as the equal in value of so much of the other—notwithstanding it is known that the relative values are not subject, in fact, to Congressional control.

## BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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### IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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#### *DIRECTORS—LIABILITY—ACTION BY DEPOSITOR.*

Supreme Court of North Carolina, April 7, 1896.

SOLOMON, *et al* vs. RATES, *et al*.

The depositors of a bank may maintain an action against the directors to recover damages incurred through the wrongful acts of the latter.

To render directors liable it is not necessary that they should actually know that the reports published by them are untrue; it is sufficient that they did not know the reports to be true.

The liability of the President and Vice-President to depositors and other creditors for losses sustained by them in dealing with the bank on the faith of misrepresentations by them as to its financial condition, or other facts forming a material inducement to the contract, is the same as that of directors.

Where the object of the suit is to charge the directors for liability for breach of trust, relief may be had against any or all who concurred in the wrong.

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This was an action brought by a depositor in the Bank of New Hanover against the directors of that bank personally.

CLARK, J. (after considering some questions of practice): It is further insisted *ore tenus* that the action cannot be maintained because a cause of action is not stated:

"Because the action cannot be brought by a depositor or creditor, but must be brought by the corporation or the Receiver, or, at least, that it must appear that application has been made to them to bring such action, and that there had been a failure or refusal to do so." "For a breach of duty to their principal (the corporation) redress can only be had against the directors by that principal (the corporation) or its Receiver, or by the shareholders, if the corporation, or its Receiver, refuses to sue. But for any breach of duty towards a stranger to the company (as a creditor or depositor), such stranger may have redress against them (the directors) either at law or in equity, according to the nature of the injury; and it will be no defense that their principal is also liable." (3 Thomp. Corp. §§ 4132, 4138, 4145; *De-lano vs. Case*, 121 Ill. 247.) As to National banks, this may be otherwise as to them when a Receiver has been appointed, since the manner of enforcing the personal liability of the directors is prescribed by Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5234, 5239; *Bailey vs. Mosher* (11 C. C. A. 304, 63 Fed. 488.) But we do not here pass upon that proposition, for the defendants are sued as directors of a State bank.

"That the complaint is not sufficient as a charge of actionable deceit

against the defendants, because it does not distinctly charge that the defendants, when the plaintiff deposited his money in the bank, knew or believed he would not get it back, or that they intended by deceit to obtain it from him or cause him to lose it." It is sufficient to allege that, the bank being insolvent, the defendants caused false and fraudulent statements of the condition of the bank to be published, representing it to be solvent and with capital stock unimpaired, and declaring dividends; all this with a view to conceal its insolvent condition, and induce the public to make deposits, whereby the plaintiffs were deceived and made the deposit which they are now seeking to recover. Indeed, the directors are liable for injury caused by relying upon a statement issued by them which they did not know to be true, as well as when they knew it to be false. (*Hubbard vs. Weare*, 79 Iowa, 678; *Huntington vs. Attrill*, 118 N. Y. 365, *Id.* 42 Hun, 459, 3 Thomp. Corp. § 424.)

If bank directors do not manage the affairs and business of the bank according to the charter and by-laws, and use ordinary diligence to supervise the conduct of their office, and to understand the condition of the bank, and loss ensues, they are liable for all losses their misconduct may inflict either upon stockholders or creditors. (1 Morse, Banks, § 138; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 109, and cases cited.) They are trustees for depositors, and can be held liable for injuries resulting from gross negligence on their part in allowing the bank to be held out to the public as solvent, when it is in fact insolvent. (1 Morse, Banks, § 130a.) We adopt what is so well and forcibly said in *Delano vs. Case* (*supra*):

"Ordinarily, the character of the directory for integrity and business capacity increases the degree of confidence reposed in the corporation by the public. Were depositors, when intrusting to a bank their entire fortune, to be informed that the directors, upon whose honor and careful watchfulness they were relying, owed them no duty, were under no obligation to take, at least, reasonable precautions to guard their money from the itching fingers of dishonorable officials, they would certainly hesitate long before surrendering it upon such terms."

For false statements of the condition of the bank, published by authority of the directors when they knew of the falsity, or with reasonable care might have known it, the directors are personally liable. (1 Morse, Banks § 132, and cases cited; Bolles, Banks, § 4; *Shea vs. Mabry*, 1 Lea, 319; *Townsend vs. Williams*, 117 N. C. 330.) "While directors are bound to exercise ordinary skill, and are liable for losses resulting from mismanagement of the affairs and business of the bank, they are not liable for excusable mistakes concerning the law, and for errors of judgment, either as to the law or the management, when acting in good faith" (2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 115, and cases cited), though good faith alone will not excuse them when there is lack of the proper care, attention, and circumspection in the affairs of the corporation, which is exacted of them as trustees. (*Shea vs. Mabry* and *Townsend vs. Williams*, *supra*.) The degree of care required of directors depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied. They are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they appoint, nor are they responsible for losses caused by the wrongful acts of such agents, unless there was gross negligence in making such appointment, or in lack of proper supervision. (3 Thomp. Corp. §§ 4106, 4113; *Briggs vs. Spaulding*, 141 U. S. 132; Paine, Banking Laws, § 1781.)

Where the object of the suit is to charge the directors with liability for a breach of trust, the rule is well settled that relief may be had against any or all those who concurred in the wrong, the tort being treated as several as well as joint. (4 Thomp. Corp. § 4582, and cases cited.) The liability of the President and Vice-President to depositors and other creditors for losses sustained by them in dealing with the corporation on the faith of misrepresentations by such officers as to its financial condition, or other facts forming a material inducement to the deposit or contract, is the same as that of directors. (*Id.* §§ 4670-4672, and cases cited.)

While it is quite well settled that an action can be brought against the directors by the depositors and other creditors for damages caused by their gross mismanagement, neglect, and false representations, and this without first applying to the corporation itself, or to the Receiver to bring such action, there have been authorities that a stockholder could not maintain such action without such prior demand and refusal; but it is made clear that this was only at law, and that in equity, upon proper allegations, a stockholder, as well as a creditor, may now maintain the action directly, and, in the first instance, against the directors. (3 Thomp. Corp. § 4090; 2 Morse, Banks, § 717.) But, both as to third parties and stockholders alike, it is a good cause of action against directors that they declare the dividend, as in this case, out of the capital stock or deposits of the bank, and not out of its earnings (2 Morse, Banks, § 717; *Gaffney vs. Colvill*, 6 Hill, 567); and also that they caused false reports to be published by the directors of the condition of the bank. As said above, it is not necessary that the directors should know that such reports are false; it is their duty to know that they are true. (*Huntington vs. Attrill*, *supra*; 3 Thomp. Corp. § 4244; *Hauser vs. Tate*, 85 N. C. 81, citing *Bank vs. Wulfekuhler*, 19 Kan. 60; *Bank vs. St. John*, 25 Ala. 566, and *United Soc. vs. Underwood*, 9 Bush, 609.)

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#### DEPOSIT OF COUNTY FUNDS—LOANS.

Supreme Court of South Dakota, July 15, 1896.

ALLIBONE, TREASURER, *vs.* AMES, *et al.*

The deposit of county funds in a bank is not a loan within the meaning of a constitutional or statutory provision forbidding the Treasurer to lend any of such funds.

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This was an action upon a bond or undertaking containing the following conditions:

"That whereas, the said Bank of Beresford has been designated by the said John Allibone, treasurer of the said Lincoln County, S. D., as one of the depositories for the public funds coming into his hands as such treasurer. Now, therefore, if the said Bank of Beresford shall safely keep all the funds deposited therein by said treasurer, and shall promptly honor and pay all checks drawn against such funds by said treasurer, and shall promptly pay over any or all of such funds so on deposit to said treasurer, or such person as may be designated by law to receive the same, upon proper vouchers, then and in that case this bond shall be null and void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect." It bears date February 6, 1893, and is signed by the Bank of Beresford as principal, and certain of the defendants as sureties. The sureties, answering, admit its execution, but deny any knowledge, or infor-

mation sufficient to form a belief, concerning its alleged breach. There was a trial, wherein the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment was rendered accordingly, a new trial was denied, and defendants appealed.

HANEY, J. (omitting part of the opinion): Defendants contend the complaint does not state a cause of action, and upon the evidence, plaintiff cannot recover, because the contract between plaintiff and the bank is unlawful. They say the money deposited was, in effect, loaned to the bank; it was a crime for the treasurer to loan public money; therefore defendants are not liable. We think the evidence clearly establishes the fact that the deposits were made by plaintiff in his official capacity, and that they consisted exclusively of public money. Hence the important question arises, whether plaintiff violated the law by depositing such money with the bank for safe-keeping, subject to checks drawn against the same. For the purposes of this case only, it will be assumed that, if such deposits were in violation of law, plaintiff cannot recover in this action. Counsel for appellants contend that the loaning of public money by a county treasurer constitutes a crime, under Comp. Laws, § 1665; that there is no distinction between a general deposit and a loan—and, in support of this position, cite *State vs. Keim* (8 Neb. 63) and other early decisions by that court; claiming that our statute was taken from Nebraska, and should receive the construction given it by the court of last resort therein.

This argument is vulnerable in more than one respect: First—It is doubtful whether the section was taken from Nebraska, and, if it was, it is evident that an essential portion of it was inadvertently omitted, leaving it ineffectual for any purpose (*State vs. Taylor*, [S. D.] 64 N. W. 548.) Second—If taken from Nebraska, the section was enacted in the territory prior to the decision in *State vs. Keim*, and the legislature cannot be presumed to have considered a construction which had not then been given it. Third—*State vs. Keim*, and the decisions based thereon in Nebraska, have been, in effect, overruled in a recent decision by the Supreme Court of that State, published since the case at bar was argued. (*State vs. Hill*, [Neb.] 66 N. W. 541.)

And it may be added that while the doctrine of these earlier Nebraska cases has not, so far as we can discern, been followed elsewhere, it has frequently received adverse criticism—none more severe, perhaps, than in the recent case of *State vs. Hill*, *supra*. So far as it rests on section 1665 and the adjudications in Nebraska, defendant's contention must fall, but there is another view of the matter which demands attention. Section 11, Art. 11, of the State constitution, is as follows:

"The making of profit, directly or indirectly, out of State, county, city, town or school district money, or using the same for any purposes not authorized by law, shall be deemed a felony, and shall be punished as provided by law."

And Comp. Laws, § 1662, formerly section 101, c. 28, Pol. Code, which seems to be still in force, reads thus:

"If any county treasurer shall loan any money belonging to his county, with or without interest, or shall use the same for his own individual purpose, he shall forfeit and pay for every such offense a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, to be recovered in an action at law at the suit of the State, for the use of the county."

It is therefore certainly unlawful for a county treasurer to loan any money

belonging to his county, either with or without interest. Assuming that, if the contract between plaintiff and the bank is unlawful, its sureties are not liable, we proceed to consider whether the transaction was, in fact or effect, a loan, within the true intent and meaning of any constitutional or statutory inhibition. Plaintiff acted within the terms of the undertaking. He did precisely what was contemplated by the contract and all concerned. He did only what State, county, city, town, and school treasurers are doing every day, and have done since banks began to exist in the territory. The transaction was one peculiar to banking business—a general deposit, in which the return of the identical coin or currency was not intended. For some purposes such deposits are spoken of as equivalent to loans, because, like loans, they create the relation of debtor and creditor. (*Marine Bank vs. Fulton Bank*, 2 Wall. 252; *McLaughlin vs. Bank*, 6 Dak. 406, 43 N. W. 715; Comp. Laws, 3662, 3697.) But it does not follow that every general deposit is a loan, or that this transaction was unlawful. A voluntary deposit for exchange is made by one giving to another, with his consent, the possession of personal property to keep for the benefit of the former, or of a third party—the depository being only bound to return a thing corresponding in kind to that which is deposited—and creates between the depositor and depository the relation of debtor and creditor. (Comp. Laws, §§ 3658, 3662, 3697.)

A loan of money is a contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that which he borrowed (Comp. Laws, 3715). It, of course, creates the relation of debtor and creditor. When the personal property involved is money, it may be difficult, under some circumstances, to determine whether the transaction should be called a deposit or a loan; but the two are not the same, and are never so regarded by any one in business, or the ordinary affairs of life.

Certainly the thousands who daily deliver money to banks for safe-keeping, and return in corresponding currency, do not regard the transaction as a loan, nor do they so speak of it. A careful examination of the definitions given in the Civil Code will show the distinction between these terms. A deposit is for the benefit of the depositor; a loan, for the benefit of the borrower. It is true, a deposit may also benefit the depository, but such is not the primary object of the transaction. When the deposit is made for a fixed period, during which the depositor has no right to demand a return of the money, the transaction may be regarded as in all substantial respects a loan, but herein lies an essential distinction between a loan and a general deposit. In the former the person receiving the money agrees to return it at a future time; in the latter, at any time it is demanded. If it is agreed that the money shall remain for a fixed period, there is a loan, and not a deposit. This distinction is clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a case wherein, as in the one at bar, it was contended that a certain transaction should be regarded as a loan, and consequently unlawful. That court says:

“A deposit is where a sum of money is left with a banker for safe-keeping, subject to order, and payable, not in the specific money deposited, but in an equal sum. It may or may not bear interest, according to the agreement. Whilst the relation between the depositor and his banker is that of debtor and creditor, the transaction cannot, in any proper sense, be regarded

as a loan, unless the money is left, not for safe-keeping, but for a fixed period, at interest, in which case the transaction assumes all the characteristics of a loan." (*Law's Estate*, 144 Pa. St. 499.) To the same effect, in principle, are the recent cases of *State vs. McFetridge* (84 Wis. 473) and *State vs. Hill* (*supra*.)

We think the transaction between plaintiff and the bank, as expressed in the undertaking sued upon, and as it in fact existed, was not unlawful. The supposed consequences of deciding this question for or against defendants' contention have been urged with earnestness and eloquence by counsel for the respective parties. In this, as in other cases, the Court has considered the probable results of its conclusions only for the purpose of aiding it in ascertaining, if possible, the legislative will, and in giving to its enactments, and the language of the constitution, such construction as the lawmakers of the territory and State intended. We believe the law of this State did not prohibit what was done by plaintiff, and so decide. That is all we do decide. The liability of the treasurer to his county for the loss of funds while on deposit is not involved, nor is it intended that any doubt concerning such liability shall be inferred from any language contained herein. Whether custodians of public funds should be prohibited from making deposits in banks, under any and all circumstances, is a question of public policy, for the legislature, not the courts, to determine. As shown by the briefs before us, very convincing arguments may be made for and against the proposition.

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PROMISSORY NOTE—STIPULATION FOR EXCHANGE.

Appellate Court of Indiana, June 18, 1896.

NICELY, *et al.*, vs. COMMERCIAL BANK OF UNION CITY.

A note payable "with exchange and cost of collection" is not negotiable.

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This was an action upon a note in the following form:

"\$500.00. Janesville, Wis., 28th March, 1892. On June 1, 1893, for value received, we, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of Galbraith Bros., of Janesville, Wis., the sum of five hundred dollars, negotiable and payable at the Commercial Bank, Union City, Ind., with exchange and cost of collection, with interest at 8 per cent. per annum, payable annually from date. D. J. Nicely, T. J. Mason, Jr., Jesse A. Baker, John Puderbaugh, A. J. Bennett, D. A. Puderbaugh, James L. Downing, S. D. Fuls, Simon Snyder."

Ross, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): It is conceded by the parties, both the appellants and the appellee, that the only question presented on this appeal is whether or not the note sued on is governed by the law merchant. The appellants contend that "the note in suit is not governed by the law merchant, because the clause in the note, 'with exchange and costs of collection,' makes it indefinite and uncertain as to amount when due." Ordinarily, the essential requisites of a promissory note to be negotiable by the law merchant, are: (1) A date; (2) an unconditional promise to pay money; (3) a fixed time for payment; (4) a definite amount to be paid; (5) a place where payment is to be made.

It is conceded by counsel for the appellants that it is apparently settled, not only in this State, but in many other jurisdictions, that provisions waiv-

ing the benefit of valuation or appraisal and exemption laws and for the payment of attorney's fees do not destroy their negotiability by rendering the amount to be paid uncertain, because, if the note is paid promptly at maturity, the contingency upon which they would arise does not become effective. But it is insisted that the agreement in the note sued upon to pay "exchange and costs of collection" do not depend upon the failure of the maker to pay, but that they are as much a part of his original promise to pay as the sum of money therein designated, and that, as the amount of "exchange and costs of collection" are not stated, the obligation is uncertain as to the amount to be paid.

We think it is clear that the stipulation to pay "costs of collection" does not render the promise as to the amount uncertain, because no costs for collection could accrue if the note was paid promptly at maturity. The only stipulation which we are to consider in determining whether the note sued on is indefinite or uncertain as to the amount to be paid is that for the payment of "exchange." Many cases hold that, even though the principal sum to be paid is certain and fixed, if the obligation provides for "exchange on New York," that renders the sum to be paid indefinite and uncertain; hence the obligation is non-negotiable under the law merchant. (*Lowe vs. Bliss*, 24 Ill. 168; *Bank vs. Bynum*, 84 N. C. 24; *Cazet vs. Hirk*, 4 Allen [N. B.] 543; *Nash vs. Gibbon*, Id. 479; *Read vs. McNulty*, 12 Rich. Law. 445; *Bank vs. Strother* [S. C.] 6 S. E. 313; *Russell vs. Russell*, 1 McArthur, 263; *Fitzharris vs. Leggett*, 10 Mo. App. 529; *Flagg vs. School Dist.* [N. D.] 58 N. W. 499; *Bank vs. McMahon*, 38 Fed. 263.) And the following cases hold that a stipulation in the obligation providing for "exchange on New York" does not destroy the negotiability of the obligation: *Smith vs. Kendall* (9 Mich. 240); *Johnson vs. Frisbie* (15 Mich. 286); *Leggett vs. Jones* (10 Wis. 34); *Hastings vs. Thompson* (54 Minn. 184). In *Bank vs. Newkirk* (2 Miles. 442); *Saxton vs. Stevenson* (23 U. C. C. P. 503); *Hughitt vs. Johnson* (28 Fed. 865); and *Culbertson vs. Nelson* (Iowa) 61 N. W. 854—it was held that the mere stipulation, "with exchange," destroyed the negotiability of the obligation. On the other hand, in *Hill vs. Todd* (29 Ill. 101); *Clauser vs. Stone* (Id. 114); *Whittle vs. Bank* [Tex. Civ. App.] (26 S. W. 1106); *Bullock vs. Taylor* (39 Mich. 137); *Orr vs. Hopkins* (3 N. M. 45)—it was held that a stipulation, "with exchange," does not destroy the negotiability of the obligation. Daniel, in his work on "Negotiable Instruments" (section 54) says:

"If there be added to the amount 'with current exchange' on another place, the commercial character of the paper is not impaired, as that is capable of indefinite ascertainment. Exchange is an incident to bills for the transmission of money from place to place. Its nature and effect are well understood in the commercial world, and merchants having occasion to use their funds at their place of business sometimes make the currency at that point the standard of payments made to them by their customers at a different point. Exchange preserves the equivalence of amounts in value, and does not introduce such an element of uncertainty as destroys the negotiability of the bill or note which embodies it in its terms."

And the same author, at section 54a, says: "It has been urged that an instrument payable 'with exchange' on another place, cannot be regarded as a bill or note, (1) because the fluctuations in the rate of exchange make it impossible to ascertain the amount payable when the bill is issued; and (2)



because, if this were not so, evidence *dehors* the instrument would be necessary to ascertain the amount due at maturity. The words of the rulings as to the requisites of negotiable instruments would lead to these conclusions, and the doctrine of the text has been declared 'a slight modification of the general rule.' But reply may be made that instruments payable with exchange have been generally treated as commercial instruments by the business world and the courts:" and "the rule requiring precision in the amount of negotiable instruments applies rather to principal amount than to the auxiliary and incidental additions of interest or exchange."

Randolph, in his work on Commercial Paper (section 200), in speaking of the stipulations which do not affect the negotiability of notes or bills, says: "Another common addition, not in general affecting the negotiability of a bill of exchange, is a provision for exchange between the place of drawing and the place of payment."

\* \* \* \* \*

While we are impressed with the reasoning contained in many of the cases cited wherein it is held that promissory notes containing stipulations of this character should be held to be negotiable if those who deal therein accept them as such, that the law merchant is simply the general custom accepted and acted upon by common consent of those trading and doing business together, so if paper passes from hand to hand in the general routine of business, and is accepted as negotiable, the law should recognize it as such, nevertheless we are bound to take notice of the fact that the negotiability of such obligations is quite often disputed, and, when questioned, the holdings of the courts as to their negotiability are inharmonious. The line of cases holding that the provision "with exchange" introduces into the obligation an element of uncertainty which destroys its negotiability, seems to meet the approval of at least a majority of this court, and, inasmuch as we have no precedents on the question in this State, we will follow that line of the adjudications.

The judgment is therefore reversed, with instructions to overrule the demurrers to the answers.

#### SET OFF—NOTE NOT DUE.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department, July 7, 1896.

CLUTE *vs.* WARNER.

A depositor in an insolvent National bank has the right to set off his deposit against the amount due from him to the bank on his promissory note, though the note did not mature until after the bank had become insolvent and a Receiver had been appointed therefor.

This was an action by John A. Clute against John W. Warner, as Receiver of the First National Bank of Watkins, to procure a judgment directing the defendant to allow the plaintiff to set off his deposit of \$1,381.16 against his note held by the Receiver. There was judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

HERRICK, J.: On January 18, 1894, W. W. Clute and Smith G. Clute, as accommodation makers, and for his accommodation, gave the plaintiff their note for \$2,500, payable in 90 days after date to the First National Bank of Watkins, N. Y. On that day the plaintiff procured said note to be discounted by the First National Bank of Watkins, N. Y., and the avails thereof were

placed to his credit. On January 31, 1894, the First National Bank of Watkins, N. Y., made its note for \$5,000, dated that day, payable to the Third National Bank of New York, two months after date; and, as collateral security for the payment of such note, it gave to the Third National Bank of New York the note of plaintiff, above referred to, together with a number of others. The First National Bank of Watkins became insolvent, and the defendant was appointed Receiver thereof February 24, 1894. At the time of such insolvency there was deposited in said bank, to the credit of plaintiff, the sum of \$1,381.16. Before the commencement of this action the note given by the First National Bank of Watkins to the Third National Bank of New York had been paid, and the plaintiff's note had been returned to the Receiver.

The plaintiff seeks to have the deposit in the bank to his credit set off against the amount remaining due upon the note. Without further statement of facts, I think the judgment herein should be affirmed. By transferring the note in question to the Third National Bank of New York as collateral to its own note, the Watkins National Bank did not cease to be the owner thereof, and was such owner at the time it became insolvent and the Receiver was appointed. (*Wheeler vs. Newbould*, 16 N. Y. 392; *Farwell vs. Bank*, 90 N. Y. 483; *Smith vs. Savin*, 141 N. Y. 315.)

The plaintiff was primarily liable to the Watkins National Bank upon the note made by W. W. Clute and Smith G. Clute for his benefit. While that note was not due when the bank became insolvent, and its collection could not be enforced before maturity, the plaintiff had the right to waive the additional time, and elect to have it become due at that time, and to make payment thereof by applying the amount of his money in the possession of the bank to such payment. There is, under such circumstances, an equitable right to offset one claim against the other. (*Fera vs. Wickham*, 135 N. Y. 223; *Hughitt vs. Hayes*, 136 N. Y. 163; *Scott vs. Armstrong*, 146 U. S. 499.)

The cases last referred to contain a very thorough discussion of the principles set forth, and under circumstances similar to those in this case, together with a review of previous cases, and it seems to me that it is useless to attempt a restatement here.

Judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

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#### PROMISSORY NOTE—STIPULATION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, June 12, 1896.

OPPENHEIMER, *et al.*, vs. FARMERS AND MERCHANTS' BANK, *et al.*

The negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision for an attorney's fee in case payment be not made at maturity.

Where notes are fraudulent in their inception, and without consideration between the original parties, a *bona-fide* holder in due course will be entitled to recover on them only the amount he actually paid for them.

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This was a suit in equity to restrain the defendant from prosecuting suit for the collection of certain notes.

MCALLISTER, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): The next question is whether the stipulation in respect of payment of attorney's fees, written in the face of the note, destroys its negotiability, and thus dismantles the note, allowing proof of fraud in its execution. The question presented has given

rise to much judicial controversy, and the decisions announced in different States and jurisdictions are by no means reconcilable; and, since the question is one of first impression in this State, we shall, after a review of the authorities, adopt that view which most commends itself to our reason and judgment.

\* \* \* \* \*

Upon a careful review of the authorities, we can perceive no reason why a note otherwise imbued with all the attributes of negotiability is rendered non-negotiable by a stipulation which is entirely inoperative until after the maturity of the note, and its dishonor by the maker. The amount to be paid is certain during the currency of the note as a negotiable instrument, and it only becomes uncertain after it ceases to be negotiable by the default of the maker in its payment. It is eminently just that the creditor who has incurred an expense in the collection of the debt should be reimbursed by the debtor by whom the action was rendered necessary, and the expense entailed.

So far from such a stipulation discounting the negotiability of the instrument, we think with Mr. Daniel, that it is an indemnification assured by the maker against the consequences of his own act; that it is consonant with public policy, because it adds to the value of the paper; has a tendency to lower the rate of the discount, not only because it promises less expensive collection, but bears evidence of a greater degree of confidence on the part of the maker in his ability to pay without suit.

We are therefore of the opinion that the decree of the chancellor, adjudging said notes non-negotiable, was erroneous. We hold, however, that these notes being fraudulent in their inception, and without consideration between the original parties, the bank will only be entitled to recover to the extent of the sum actually paid by it, to wit, the sum of \$1,200 and interest. In other words, we hold that there was a negotiation of the notes in due course of trade only to the extent of the amount actually paid. (*Petty vs. Hannum*, 2 Humph. 102; *Holeman vs. Hobson*, 8 Humph. 127; *May vs. Campbell*, 7 Humph. 450; *Green vs. Stuart*, 7 Baxt. 422.) The reason of this rule is thus stated by Mr. Daniel, viz.:

"When the execution of a bill or note has been induced by fraud, a different rule applies. The *bona-fide* holder of it for value and without notice is undoubtedly entitled to be protected against a loss which would befall him if the party defrauded were permitted to set up the defense of fraud on the part of the payee against him. But it does not therefore follow that he may recover of such party the whole amount, when he has paid a less sum. For his protection and security against loss, it is only necessary that he should be paid back the amount which he was induced to give for the instrument by its appearance of validity, and therefore such amount is the limit of the recovery against the drawer or maker who was defrauded into the execution of the instrument. The paper derives its vitality wholly from the circumstance that it has been obtained for value, without notice, by an innocent purchaser. For his protection, it is maintained in his hands as a legal obligation. The object of the law is to save him from loss, and, to do that, a recovery of the amount he may have advanced is all that can be required. To go beyond it would be inequitable, and unjust to the party after that equally entitled to be protected from loss." (1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 758; *Todd vs. Shelbourne*, 8 Hun. 510.)

## PRESENTMENT BY NOTARY—CERTIFICATE—EVIDENCE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, June 30, 1896.

DOUGLAS vs. BANK OF COMMERCE, *et al.*

The certificate of a notary public that he made demand at the bank where the instrument protested was by its terms made payable, is sufficient evidence of demand, though he fail to certify that he made demand of the teller or some other person.

The certificate of a foreign notary public will be received in evidence in the courts of Tennessee.

This was a bill in equity by Howard Douglas, as assignee of John Streight, against the Bank of Commerce and others, to determine the respective right and priorities of the parties to the proceeds of sale of the personalty of said Streight, situated in the State of Tennessee.

One of the questions involved was whether legal demand had been made for payment of a promissory note, so as to render Streight liable as indorser.

GILLHAM, J. (omitting part of the opinion): The certificate of the New York notary certifies that he did present the original note hereto annexed to the Fourteenth Street Bank, and demand payment, who refused to pay the same. He fails to certify that he sent out notices of protest, but it is proved that on July 14, 1893, the Bank of Commerce received from the notary proper notices of dishonor, one of which is mailed on the same day to John Streight, at Cincinnati, Ohio.

The chancellor disallowed the claim, from which decree the bank appeals. We think that the demand, having been made at the Fourteenth Street Bank, where it was on its face made payable, was a good and legal demand, notwithstanding the fact that the notary fails to certify that he made it of some person—the teller, or some such party. (1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 955; *Wormly vs. Waldran*, 3 Sneed, 548; *Gardner vs. Bank*, 1 Swan, 423; *Bank vs. Napier*, 6 Humph. 270; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 656; 3 Rand. Com. Paper, § 1134; *Hildeburn vs. Turner*, 5 How. 69.)

It is further earnestly contended that as this was on an inland bill the certificate of the notary is not competent evidence, as here offered, and that there is no proof of a demand having been made. We think that the certificate is proof of the demand and dishonor. Courts admit such certificates as *prima facie* evidence. (2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 945.) Notice given by any party to the bill is sufficient. (Id. §§ 986, 991.) We think it was error in the chancellor to disallow this claim, and in this respect the decree will also be modified.

*On Rehearing:* A petition for rehearing has been filed by the American National Bank, asking us to reconsider our former ruling as to the sixth assignment, involving the Vos Naac, Lee & Co. note, and its allowance to the Bank of Commerce. This we have carefully considered.

The point made and relied upon in the petition is that the certificate of the notary in New York is not evidence of demand having been made; that it is not admissible in evidence to prove such fact. Mill. & V. Code, § 2470, provides: "The attestations, protestations and other instruments of publication, made or done by any notary public under seal, shall be received in evidence." And section 2471 says, "In an action against the drawer or endorser of a bill of exchange, or any negotiable paper protested for non-

acceptance or non-payment, the notary's certificate, either in or on the protest, that he gave notice of the dishonor of the paper by the drawer or endorser, shall be *prima facie* evidence of the fact of such notice." That such certificate of a Tennessee notary is admissible is well settled. (*Rosson vs. Carroll*, 90 Tenn. 120, 16 S. W. 66, and cases there cited.)

But it is contended that the statute includes only notaries of this State and does not apply to the certificates of such officers of other States or countries. It is said that this precise question has never been decided by this court. By the Act of 1835, c. 11, § 5, it was provided, "The attestation, protestation and other instruments of publication of the several notaries public of this State shall and may be received in evidence in any court of record, or before any justice of the peace in this State."

It will be noticed that this statute refers only to certificates of notaries of this State. But in the Code of 1858 the compilers changed this Act to read, "The attestations, protestations, and other instruments of publication made or done by any notary public under his seal, shall be received in evidence."

Section 1799. Section 1800 of that Code reads: "In an action against the drawer or endorser of a bill of exchange or any negotiable paper protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, the notary's certificate, either in or on the protest, that he gave notice of the dishonor of the paper by the drawer or endorser, shall be *prima facie* evidence of the fact of such notice."

These sections have been carried into our Code of 1884, as sections 2470 and 2471, without change. It will thus be seen that the compilers of the Code of 1858 changed the phraseology of section 1799 by omitting the words, "the several notaries of this State." The manifest intention was to make the section apply to the certificates of all notaries who act over their official seals, whether acting under the authority of this or any other State or county. Such we think has been the understanding of the profession and the commercial classes of the State ever since the adoption by the legislature of the Code of 1858. We therefore think, both upon the authorities cited in the original opinion, and upon a review of our statutes, that the certificate of a foreign notary, when offered in evidence in our courts, is *prima facie* evidence, when it so recites, of demand for payment and dishonor of the paper. The petition for a rehearing is therefore dismissed.

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#### CERTIFICATION OF A NOTE—LIABILITY OF CERTIFYING BANK.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, May 12, 1896.

RIVERSIDE BANK *vs.* FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SHENANDOAH.

Where a bank at which a note is made payable certifies the same, it will not be permitted to afterwards rescind the certification upon discovering that it was mistaken as to the state of the customer's account.

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In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This was an action to recover the amount of a promissory note which had been drawn payable at the plaintiff bank, and had been certified by that bank under a misapprehension as to the state of its customer's account, and afterwards paid by the clearing-house agent of the plaintiff bank.

WALLACE, *Circuit Judge* (after stating the facts as above): We are

unable to discover any ground upon which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The certification of the note by the plaintiff was an agreement to pay the amount, and the contract can no more be rescinded than could any other contract because one of the parties in making it was under a misapprehension of fact. A note made payable at a bank where the maker keeps an account is equivalent to a check drawn by him upon the bank; and the bank, if in funds, owes him a duty to pay it on presentation. (*Aetna Nat. Bank vs. Fourth Nat. Bank*, 46 N. Y. 88; *Indig vs. Bank*, 80 N. Y. 100). The certification of a check drawn upon a bank is equivalent to the acceptance of a bill of exchange, and imposes upon the bank an obligation to pay the amount for which the check is drawn to the holder, upon demand, at any time before the statute of limitations attaches. *Farmers and Mechanics' Bank vs. Butchers and Drovers' Bank*, 16 N. Y. 125. In *Merchants' Bank vs. State Bank*, 10 Wall. 604, the court used this language:

"By the law merchant of this country the certificate of the bank that a check is good is equivalent to acceptance. It implies that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the hands of the drawee, that they have been set apart for its satisfaction, and that they shall be so applied whenever the check is presented for payment. It is an undertaking that the check is good then, and shall continue good; and this agreement is binding on the bank as its notes of circulation, a certificate of deposit payable to the order of the depositor, or any other obligation it can assume."

In *Meads vs. Bank* (25 N. Y. 143) it was held that the certification as good of a promissory note payable at bank, where the course of business between banks is, instead of actually paying notes of customers, when in funds, on presentment, to mark them as good, and settle in the exchanges, is an absolute promise to pay; not the agreement to pay the debt of another, but the engagement of the bank to pay its own debt to the holder of the note. The certification entitles the holder to suspend any remedy against the maker, and relax steps to charge the indorser of the paper. The bank has authority from the note itself to apply to its payment the funds of the maker (*Kymer vs. Laurie*, 18 Law J. Q. B. 218), and when the holder accepts the certification the customer becomes a debtor to the bank. Thus the contract implied by the certification has both the elements of a good consideration, a resulting disadvantage to the promisee, and an accruing advantage to the promisor. Money paid under a mistake of fact is recoverable of the party receiving it, because good conscience forbids him to retain that which justly belongs to the other party; but the principle has no application to the case where the recipient has a right to retain the money because it has been paid pursuant to a contract which he was entitled to enforce. Assuming that the certification of the note, and its payment through the clearing-house, was equivalent to a payment by the plaintiff over its counter to the defendant, the case falls within one of those exceptions to the general right to recover back money paid by mistake which are found in the law of negotiable paper. One of these exceptions is that the drawee of a bill of exchange is presumed to know the signature of the drawer, and payment by the drawee of the bill is ordinarily an admission of the genuineness of the signature, which he is not afterwards, in a controversy between himself and the holder, at liberty to dispute. Another exception, recognized by the decided weight of authority, is that the payment of a check or of a note by the bank at which it is made payable,

although made under misapprehension of the state of the maker's account with the bank, concludes the bank as against the holder of the paper. (*Bolton vs. Richard*, 6 Term R. 139; *Aiken vs. Short*, 1 Hurl. & N. 210; *Levy vs. Bank*, 4 Dall. 236; *Peterson vs. Bank*, 52 Pa. St. 206; *Oddie vs. Bank*, 45 N. Y. 735; *Bank vs. Swift*, 70 Md. 515; *Bank vs. Burkham*, 32 Mich. 328.) The cases of *Bank vs. Wetherald* (36 N. Y. 335) and *National Park Bank vs. Steele & Johnson Manuf'g Co.* (58 Hun. 81), are cited as authorities to the contrary. In *Bank vs. Wetherald* the question was not whether the money could be recovered back from the party to whom it had been paid, but whether a payment made to that party, the holder of the note, after the bank had discovered its mistake, and made to enable the bank to resume the control of the paper, and take steps to charge the indorsers, was an extinguishment of the note. That adjudication is, therefore, not in point. The case of *National Park Bank vs. Steele & Johnson Manuf'g Co.* is in point, and is entitled to respectful consideration, although not a judgment of the court of last resort; but we are unable to accede to its conclusions.

Upon principle, where the holder of a note presents it at the bank at which it is made payable, receives the money, and surrenders the paper, the transaction is, in effect, a purchase from the holder. It is a completed transaction, which cannot be rescinded except for fraud, or in case of mutual mistake. Where forged paper is delivered, the consideration fails and a different rule obtains. A case strictly analogous is where a bank accepts the check of a customer, and credits the amount to the account of the depositor. Of such a case the supreme court used this language:

"When a check on itself is offered to a bank as a deposit, the bank has the option to accept or reject it, or to receive it upon such conditions as may be agreed upon. If it be rejected, there is no room for any doubt or question between the parties. If, on the other hand, the check is offered as a deposit, and received as a deposit, there being no fraud, and the check genuine, the parties are no less bound and concluded than in the former case. Neither can disavow or repudiate what has been done. The case is simply one of an executed contract. There are the requisite parties, the requisite consideration, and the requisite concurrence and assent of the minds of those concerned." (*Bank vs. Burkhardt*, 100 U. S. 686.)

To permit a bank which has paid a note or check of a customer to rescind the transaction because it discovers that it was mistaken in the state of the customer's account, would, as is pointed out by Judge Cooley in *Bank vs. Burkham* (*supra*), reverse the rule of commercial law, and transfer from the acceptor to the payee the responsibility which the former assumes by the acceptance and the loss, which should be left where it fell. He said:

"We think it would be an exceedingly unsafe doctrine in commercial law that one who has discounted a bill in good faith, and received notice of payment, the strongest possible assurance that it was drawn with proper authority should afterwards hold the money subject to such a showing as the drawee might be able to make as to the influences operating upon his mind to induce him to make payment. The beauty and value of the rules governing commercial paper consists in their perfect certainty and reliability. They would be worse than useless if the ultimate responsibility for such paper, as between payee and drawee, both acting in good faith, could be made to depend on the motives which influenced the latter to honor the paper."

The facts of this case illustrate the truth of these observations. The defendant, relying upon a certification by the plaintiff, took no steps to charge the indorser upon the note; and, if this action could be maintained, in order to regain the situation in which it was placed by the act of the plaintiff, would be obliged to resort to the uncertain chances of a litigation with the indorser. Treating the case as one in which the money was paid by the plaintiff over its counter to the defendant, the language of the court in *Aiken vs. Short* is apposite:

"The plaintiffs, having voluntarily parted with their money to purchase that which the defendant had to sell, though no doubt it turned out different to and of less value than what they expected, cannot maintain the action."

The conclusions thus reached render it unnecessary to consider the question whether the defendant's situation was changed to its injury because the note was not protested upon Labor Day—Sept. 5—instead of Sept. 6.

The trial judge properly directed a verdict for the defendant, and the judgment should be affirmed.

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PROMISSORY NOTE—BONA FIDE HOLDER—GIVING CREDIT.

Supreme Court of Michigan, June 30, 1896.

DROVERS' NATIONAL BANK vs. BLUE.

A mere credit given by a bank to its depositor for a note procured by fraud does not constitute a purchase for value, in the absence of evidence that the credit was ever drawn upon, or that the account of which it became a part was exhausted, before maturity of the note, or before notice of the fraud.

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This was an action upon a promissory note. One of the questions presented was whether the bank was a *bona fide* holder for value, the note having been obtained from the maker by fraud. The testimony shows that no money or valuable thing passed at the time of the purchase. A mere credit was given by the bank for the note—a promise to pay, in other words; and there is nothing to show that this credit was ever drawn upon, or that the account of which it became a part was exhausted, before the maturity of the note, or before notice of the fraud. This did not show the bank to be a purchaser for value, within the rule. (1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 7796, and cases cited, viz.: *Dresser vs. Construction Co.* 93 U. S. 92; *Dougherty vs. Bank*, 93 Pa. St. 227; *Bank vs. Huver*, 114 Pa. St. 216, 6 Atl. 141; *Mann vs. Bank*, 30 Kan. 412, 1 Pac. 579; *Fox vs. Bank*, 30 Kan. 444, 1 Pac. 789.)

The testimony offered was therefore erroneously excluded, and the circuit court was right in reversing the judgment of the justice. The judgment is affirmed. The other justices concurred.

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REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

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Editor Bankers' Magazine:

PARIS, Ill., August 1, 1896.

SIR:—A party draws a check on another bank in our town and writes or has printed in the body thereof "payable in St. Louis or Cincinnati exchange, if desired." The check is for-



warded to us for collection by a bank in Indianapolis. We present to the bank on which it is drawn, and demand our usual fee for writing Cincinnati exchange. They refuse to pay the exchange, but offer us St. Louis or Cincinnati exchange in payment of check. Now, can we insist on the payment of exchange and protest if not paid?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The drawee bank is probably correct in its position. The language means that the holder shall have the choice of payment in money or in Cincinnati or St. Louis exchange. If he demands the exchange, then the bank fully performs its duty by tendering exchange. There is nothing which gives the holder the right to demand the cost of exchange to be bought at some other bank; and the bank making the collection, as it is only the agent of the holder, can have no other or different rights from what he would have.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SUN PRAIRIE, WIS., August 27, 1896.

SIR:—On a promissory note on which the interest is payable annually a partial payment was made before the annual interest was due. The holder of the note, in computing the interest on this note, takes out of this partial payment the interest accrued on the whole of the principal to the time the partial payment was made and applies only the remainder on the principal. Is he justified in taking this interest before it is due?

J. M. B.

*Answer.*—The rule is that if payment is made before the principal is due, it will be applied first to the extinguishment of the accrued interest, and the residue to that part of the principal which first became due; but if nothing is due, either for principal or interest, it is to be applied ratably to principal and interest, so as to extinguish a part of the principal and the interest which has accrued on the part so extinguished. (*Jencks vs. Alexander*, 11 Paige. [N. Y.] 619; *Miami Exporting Company vs. Bank of U. S.*, 5 Ohio, 260; *McCornick vs. Mitchell*, 57 Ind. 248.) In the case stated in the inquiry, therefore, the holder of the note was not justified in taking out the interest on the whole of the principal to the date of the payment; but he should have paid only the interest on the amount of the principal extinguished by the payment.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LINCOLN, ILL., August 22, 1896.

SIR:—If a check is payable to "John Smith, Sr.," would the indorsement "John Smith" be correct?

J. D. F.

*Answer.*—The word Senior or Sr., Junior or Jr., or words of similar import, are ordinarily mere matters of description, and no part of a person's legal name. (*Fleet vs. Youngs*, 11 Wend. [N. Y.] 522; *People vs. Collins*, 7 Johns. [N. Y.] 549; *Neil vs. Dillon*, 3 Mo. 59; *Geraghty vs. State*, 110 Ind. 103; *Ross vs. State* 116 Ind. 495.) If, therefore, the indorsement be actually made by the person who is intended as the payee, it is legally sufficient that he sign his name without adding the letters "Sr."

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

BLACK RIVER FALLS, WIS., August 20, 1896.

SIR:—Is the indorsement "John Jones" on a draft payable to "John Jones, Secy." correct?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The abbreviation "Secy" added to the name of the payee in the body of the instrument is merely *descriptio personæ*, that is to say, is merely descriptive of the person, and does not mean that the draft is payable to him in some official capacity. A draft so drawn is payable to the payee in his individual capacity, and in such capacity he can transfer the title therein; and his own signature, without any addition, is all that is required for this purpose. The indorsement "John Jones" is therefore sufficient.

## \* ARABUT LUDLOW.

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ARABUT LUDLOW was born in Burlington, Vt., June 21, 1818. He was left an orphan at the age of twelve years, was reared upon a farm and obtained his education in the common schools.

When twenty years of age he went to Lyons, Michigan, where he was employed as mail carrier, carrying mail on an Indian pony from Grand Rapids to Livingston Centre. Eighteen months later he went to Chicago, where he was engaged to take goods to Green Bay, Wis., in exchange for furs. Being successful in this undertaking, he concluded to enter the same business for himself. He thereafter sold goods from Chicago through to Madison, Wis., making monthly trips in his two-horse wagon. In this venture he was very successful and old settlers relate how every one along the route would wait for "Lud" and his wagon.

In 1846 he married and settled in Monroe, engaging in the general merchandise business. Having accumulated some property and good credit, he was able to procure from the East what goods he wanted. His industry and push brought success in this line and in 1854 he opened an exchange office.

Two years later the firm of Ludlow, Bingham & Co. was organized and obtained a charter from the State as the Bank of Monroe. In May of the same year the first notes of the bank were issued.

In 1864 the First National Bank of Monroe was organized, its charter number being 290. The old Bank of Monroe was merged into the First National Bank in June, 1865, at which time Mr. Ludlow purchased a large interest in the National bank, taking with him Mr. J. B. Galusha, who had been Cashier of the Bank of Monroe since its organization. Mr. Galusha was immediately elected Cashier of the First National Bank, in which capacity he ably served until his resignation in 1887.

Mr. Ludlow was at once made a director and remained upon the board continuously until his death. In 1870 he was made Vice-President and three years later was elected to the presidency. This position he held until his voluntary resignation, January 9, 1894.

From the moment of his acquiring an interest in the First National Bank, his was the moving spirit and to him the bank is indebted for its success and prosperity during the years that followed his selection as President.

Under his management the bank became known as a solid, safe and conservative institution. In the community doing business with it the bank was better known as "Ludlow's Bank" than by its real title.

Mr. Ludlow was possessed of a good constitution, a strong will and unusual executive ability. He believed in giving his undivided attention to regular business and avoided side issues.

Everything he did was characterized by prompt and energetic action. He intuitively grasped the outcome of affairs and was able to determine his course of procedure in a given matter almost instantly. That his judgment and methods were good is evidenced by the fact that he accumulated a fortune and at the same time retained the hearty good will of all those doing business with him. Much of his means was loaned upon mortgages to the farmers of the county in which he lived.

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\*A portrait of Mr. Ludlow especially engraved for the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, appears in this issue as a title illustration.

These people trusted him implicitly and in no instance was this trust betrayed in the slightest degree.

Outside the bank Mr. Ludlow was actively interested in but one thing, that being his farm of about fourteen hundred acres, adjoining the city of Monroe. He took great interest and pleasure in this work, especially in the raising of thoroughbred cattle. His residence was situated upon this farm, less than a mile from the bank.

He was a careful reader of the daily papers and kept well posted upon current events, being always interested in their progress. In politics he was, previous to the birth of the Republican party, a Whig; since then a Republican.

He never had political aspirations although well equipped for the political field had he chosen to enter. He was a delegate from Wisconsin to the Republican convention of 1872, held in Philadelphia, when Gen. U. S. Grant was nominated for the second term.

His death occurred at his residence upon Easter morning, April 5, 1896, in his seventy-eighth year.

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**BANKING PROGRESS IN JAPAN.**—The annual statistical abstract of the Japanese Empire for 1894, just received, contains some interesting facts illustrating the effects of the policy of retiring the notes of independent banks and substituting those of the Bank of Japan. The Empire has had a varied experience in currency matters, and the independent banks which are now to be gotten rid of were authorized in 1872 upon a basis similar to that of the National banking system of the United States. The purpose of the Japanese Government was similar to that of Secretary Chase in 1863, in forcing a market for the public securities by compelling the banks to purchase them as the basis of circulation. The Japanese banks were at first required to redeem their notes in gold, but were naturally forced to the level of the Government paper money, while the number of banks was expanded under the stimulus of speculation. The Government succeeded in 1882 in establishing the Bank of Japan, with a capital of 20,000,000 silver yen, and provided in 1883 and 1884 for the gradual retirement of the notes of the local banks and the substitution of those of the new national bank. The Act of 1883 required the local banks to surrender the privilege of note issue at the expiration of the twenty years for which each was originally chartered. The attempt to conclude and enforce this policy in 1894 led to strong resistance from the banks, which demanded an extension of their charters for ten years. The Government finally succeeded, however, at the session of Parliament which recently closed, in regulating the matter according to its will.

The new law provides that as the charter of each bank expires it shall cease to be a National bank, and the notes issued under the old charter shall be withdrawn. Such banks are permitted to reorganize as private banks, but without the power of note issue. The last charter of a national bank will expire in about ten years, and the Bank of Japan will then be the only bank empowered to issue circulating notes. The Government retains general supervision over the currency and the power to issue exchequer notes in case of emergency. The comparative unity of Japanese commercial interests makes a central bank more efficient, in the opinion of Japanese statesmen, than the system of independent local banks. That system has been unfortunate in being tested with a secured circulation based upon evidences of the public debt, which have followed the ups and downs of the public credit. The credit of Japan is now unassailable, but the Government have thought proper to make banking credit independent of public credit, upon the principle of the banks of England, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

## BANKING IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

### CIRCULATION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.

Another enlargement of the secured circulation of the Bank of England is possible within a short time. The Bank Act of 1844 authorized the increase of the secured circulation by Order in Council to the amount of two-thirds of the issues of country banks which lapsed, and seven such orders have increased the secured circulation from £14,000,000 to £16,800,000. The consolidation of a number of small banks with Messrs. Barclay & Co. will terminate £377,345 of existing circulation and there have been other lapses since the last increase, amounting to £150,237. There is some doubt, however, whether an increase is to be made at once, in view of the fact that the average circulation of the bank has not increased steadily of late years and is less now than in 1861. The English have become so accustomed to operations by means of credit instruments, and their accumulation of gold is so large, that an increase in the note circulation is of minor importance in carrying on the business of the country. It was expected by the supporters of the Bank Act of 1844 that the country circulation would soon disappear under the regulations then adopted. Nearly half of the £8,681,647 then authorized is still nominally out, but the lapsed issues not yet officially noticed would reduce the official limit to £3,397,000.

### THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.

The Bank of France appears to be pursuing a Fabian policy in regard to the extension of its charter, which expires on December 31, 1897. The question of the renewal of the charter is a delicate one, because of the socialistic schemes which are being suggested in reference to banking in France. It has always been the weakness of the bank that it did not carry facilities for credit to the remote corners of the country. This has led to demands for new branches and for the reorganization of the bank as a State institution, with an agricultural credit department. The subject of continuing the charter upon substantially existing terms has been several times discussed between the Government and the officers of the bank, but nothing has yet been accomplished and the bank officers have seemed in no hurry. The subject was broached in the Chambers last fall and M. Mesureur intimated that the Government were still hesitating between the present state of things and a bank of State. M. Ribot, the former Minister of Finance, has published a letter, declaring that if the Government delayed until the last moment, "the bank would be mistress of the conditions to be imposed, for it is not for a new *regime* to be improvised in a few weeks."

M. Ribot has apparently uncovered the real strategy of the bank. While the officers have been criticized for permitting matters to drift aimlessly towards the date of the expiration of the charter, they probably feel that public opinion will overwhelmingly sustain their demand for its continuance rather than for a sudden liquidation when no other great banking institution is ready to take its place. Liquidation would not only mean the paralysis of credit to a large extent, but provision for the redemption of the outstanding notes of the bank and the substitution of coin for paper in general circulation. The bank will very likely be found willing to make some concessions to the Government for the continuance of the charter such as were proposed in a bill drawn up by the ministry in 1892. These provisions did not change the essential character of the bank, but remitted the interest on certain loans to the Government and required the opening of eighteen new branches and thirty auxiliary offices. There was also a provision for carrying to the reserve fund the earnings above five per cent. when the bank rate was raised above that figure.

The proposal for agricultural loans is not likely to be received with much favor by financiers, but may be forced upon the bank if socialistic demands prevail. A plan for such loans would probably follow that of the Bank of Russia, whose purpose was declared by the new statutes of 1894 to be "to facilitate, by means of credit for short terms, the movement of commerce and to promote the success of national industry and agricultural production." Loans are made in Russia on agricultural and industrial material under the charge of the Ministry of Finance. The maximum term for loans on material is three years, but periodical payments are required when the term exceeds six months. The Bank of Russia has not thus far carried its agricultural loans beyond one-eighth of the commercial discounts and the power of the Government can be appealed to for enforcing collections. The Bank of France has been for some years extending its accommodations to small traders and in 1894 discounted

2,188,957 pieces of commercial paper for 100 francs or less, more than half being for less than fifty francs (\$10).

#### THE IMPERIAL GERMAN BANK.

The annual report of the transactions of the Imperial Bank of Germany for 1895 indicates complete recovery in that country from the temporary depression of 1893 and 1894. The total transactions of the bank increased during 1895 nearly ten per cent., the securities entrusted to the bank reached a higher value than ever before, and the extension of business and branches permitted an increase of the number of employees from 1,745 in 1894 to 1,819 at the close of 1895. The growth in the transactions of the bank since its foundation in 1876 is indicated in the following table:

Year.	Total transactions. Marks.	Face value of securities held Dec. 31. Marks.	Rate of dividend. Per cent.
1876.....	36,684,593,600	424,139,480	6½
1880.....	52,193,508,000	895,470,238	6
1884.....	71,590,793,700	1,584,572,752	6½
1888.....	84,337,564,300	1,900,525,661	5.4
1890.....	108,595,412,900	2,198,090,713	8.1
1891.....	109,936,249,000	2,556,612,530	7.55
1892.....	104,436,335,000	2,472,329,680	6.36
1893.....	110,942,345,400	2,604,654,800	7.53
1894.....	110,765,951,000	2,636,594,965	6.26
1895.....	121,318,106,800	2,721,026,409	5.86

The managers of the bank, in spite of its close connection with the Government, do not appear to be hostile to foreign capital. The number of foreign shareholders is 1,756 and they hold 10,443 shares out of the 40,000 which have been issued. The figures of foreign holdings show a slight increase over those for the close of 1894. The preference of modern society for paper currency instead of coin is illustrated by the fact that the outstanding notes of the bank at the close of 1895, at their minimum on Dec. 3, were 853,077,000 marks (\$210,000,000), while the mean metallic reserve throughout the year was 92.35 per cent. The favorite bills are those of 100 marks (\$28.80), representing a value of 847,258,750 marks. These are the smallest bills which are issued, smaller transactions being conducted by means of coin.

The metallic reserve of the bank has suffered somewhat during 1895, consisting of 853,000,000 marks at the close of the year, against a mean during 1894 of 994,000,000 marks. The gold in the bank at the close of 1895 was 570,900,000 marks. The gross dividend for the year was 21,713,263 marks, and the net dividend, less expenses, 9,919,434 marks. Of this sum 2,859,718 marks go to the State under the apportionment of profits made by the law of 1889.

The fact that affairs in Germany were in good condition in 1895 is indicated by the statistics of the other credit institutions as well as of the Imperial Bank. M. Arthur Raffalovich says upon this point, in "Le Marché Financier en 1895-6:—"

"If one casts a glance over the principal institutions of credit in Germany, one sees that the year 1895 has been a fertile one. Dividends are satisfactory, the volume of transactions has increased, and one is almost convinced that the increases of capital which have taken place in recent years do not yet represent the limit which may be attained."

#### RUSSIAN STOCK COMPANIES AND SAVINGS BANKS.

The paternal theory of government has rarely been more successful than in Russia at the present day, where the educated ruling classes are forcing reforms and modern business methods upon the people with surprising success. One of the best evidences of the education of a people in modern financial methods is afforded by the growth of stock companies. A careful calculation of the amount thus invested in Russia has just been made by the editor of the admirable official publication, "Le Bulletin Russe De Statistique Financière." He gives the face value of the negotiable securities in Russia at 23,163,784,242 francs, or about \$4,500,000,000, and their market value on December 31 last at 25,439,111,585 francs. This total does not include temporary Treasury loans, income bonds of the railways, the new shares issued during 1895, nor the issues of the various institutions of credit. Nearly two-thirds of the outstanding Russian securities (15,059,383,520 francs), represent the national debt and 122,585,200 francs municipal loans. The classification of the others, by face value, is 4,595,920,900 francs in mortgages and land obligations, 2,014,702,155 francs in railway securities, 705,918,101 francs in industrial stocks, 514,577,600 francs in the stock of credit institutions, and 155,746,667 francs in insurance and navigation.

The Savings bank deposits in Russia on January 1, 1895, were 313,598,306 credit rubles, or about \$160,000,000. This is only a beginning, but the farming population have 59,331,194 credit rubles on deposit and rank highest of any single class of the community. Mechanics in the cities have deposits of 18,486,349 credit rubles; factory employees 15,523,888; merchants,

20,300,156; and even domestics, 22,145,842. The soldiers show the smallest deposits, amounting to 10,591,750 credit rubles, or about \$5,500,000. The number of depositors with 100 rubles and less is 899,600; from 101 to 500 rubles, 396,200; with 501 rubles and more, 198,600. The extension of land credits, which has been independent of the Savings banks, has been rapid of recent years. The rural loans alone have increased from 573,901,532 credit rubles on January 1, 1897, to 1,097,704,828 rubles (\$600,000,000) on January 1, 1898. The total land loans, rural and urban, have increased between the same dates from 654,445,048 credit rubles to 1,293,082,905 credit rubles.

#### MISCELLANEOUS NOTES.

The President of Uruguay recommended last fall the creation of a new State bank, with monopoly of note issues. His recommendation has been adopted by the legislative body and the capital of the new bank fixed at \$10,000,000. Half of the capital is to be the property of the State and the remainder to be furnished by public subscription at home and abroad. Forty per cent of the capital invested by the State is to be for the use of the branches of the bank, and no other bank is to be permitted to issue notes when its present rights expire. The bank will be allowed to issue half its capital in notes not over \$10 in value, convertible into gold or silver at its own option.

The troubles which arose in Australia in 1893 from the abuse of credit and needless multiplication of banks do not seem to have come entirely to an end. The Commercial Bank has been compelled to propose a new plan of reconstruction, with further postponement of its liabilities to depositors, and the Union Bank, one of the few which weathered the storm in 1893, has transferred £250,000 from its reserve to a contingent fund, to be used in meeting possible losses.

The Russian Government is reported to be seeking for the new Russo-Chinese bank the privileges of a State bank in China. It has been suggested that the bank collect the Chinese inland revenues, which are now farmed out to the provincial governors. It would be possible for the bank to inaugurate some radical reforms in taxation with the possession of this power, but as it is in many respects a Russian political enterprise, it would give the Russian government a peculiar power over Chinese finance and Chinese politics.

The Land Bank of Turkey has established seven new branches during 1896, making the present number 435. The capital of the bank has increased by 34,490,481 piastres (\$1,800,000) and now amounts to 290,126,622 piastres (\$10,000,000). Loans have been made during the year to 75,514 farmers, at the rate of five per cent., to the amount of 66,267,123 piastres.

C. A. C.

**Fallacious Free Silver Arguments.**—An esteemed Baltimore correspondent refers to some of the staple arguments of the silver advocates as follows:

"Regarding the argument that free silver coinage will raise the price of products and enable the debtor-farmer to pay his debts at 50 cents on the dollar, it can readily be realized that Bryan and his co-laborers in the cause of revolution and repudiation are not honest, but are speaking with a double tongue. If, as they profess to believe, the stamping of fifty-cents worth of silver will make it pass as a dollar, or in other words, if the Government can by opening its mints to the free coinage of the silver of the world, make silver bullion worth \$1.20 instead of 66 cents per ounce, the present price, how will the product of the farmer be enhanced in value, and how would free silver coinage put more dollars in his pocket? On the other hand, if the products of the farmer are to be raised in value it is certain that the silver dollar will pass only for the value of the bullion it contains, in which event the purchasing power of the dollar would be cut in half. Mr. Bryan is telling his hearers in one breath that the stamp of the Government will make the silver dollar as good as a gold dollar and in the next breath, that free silver coinage will cheapen the dollar and thus make higher prices for their products. Both of these propositions cannot be true.

The combined and individual nations of the world have, for five hundred years, been trying to find a ratio at which gold and silver could be made to circulate together and thereby form a double standard or measure of value. It is scarcely probable that the "boy orator" and would-be "hired man" of the Chicago Convention can accomplish what the sages of ages have failed to perform. It is totally and utterly impossible to have a double measure of value where the measures differ in the slightest degree. It has been tried by nearly every nation in the world and by a combination of nations—the Latin Union—and has invariably failed. The United States tried to fix and maintain a legal ratio between gold and silver and for eighty years prior to 1873, when the single gold standard was adopted, *gold and silver never circulated together*. It is not true that bimetallism or a double standard was ever successful; and no visionary assumption or theoretical argument can countervail the experience of centuries."

## THE FARMERS AND THE SILVER MOVEMENT.

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It has been assumed by the advocates of the free coinage of silver that the great beneficiary of the triumph of their theory will be the farmer. For some reason or other the advocates of the gold standard have appeared to assent to this proposition, but no fallacy of the policy or movement which has resulted in the nomination of Mr. Bryan to the Presidency can be more easily disproved than this.

The farmers of the United States are not the paupers that the free silver men would have us believe, nor have they suffered from the passage of the Act of 1873 which dropped from the coinage of the country the silver dollar, in recognition of the fact that the silver dollar had never circulated, and that, on account of the high cost of silver ore, very little of it was presented to the mints for coinage. On the contrary, the farmer has prospered with the rest of the country within the period which has elapsed since the passage of that Act, and especially between 1879—when specie payments were resumed—and 1892, when the silver agitation began to work its disastrous consequences.

There is no doubt that the agriculturists of the United States have suffered from economic conditions brought about by legislation. They are to be sympathized with on account of unfair and burdensome taxation, which they, as the exporters of the country, have been obliged to endure. It can probably be shown also, that in some parts of the country—especially in the rainless portions—much wrong has been inflicted by the building of railroads in advance of the need of them. But the most serious evil from which the American farmer has suffered is the silver agitation, which, becoming intensified by the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890, resulted in the panic of 1893.

Whatever may be the evils under which the farmers have suffered or are suffering, the remedy which Mr. Bryan and the silver men propose is no remedy at all. On the contrary, if we can learn anything from the experiences of history, a change in our money standard would simply increase the misery of men who are now suffering from the effects of the panic of 1893 and from the continuance of the silver agitation through the Presidential campaign.


Not one of the leading and controlling theories laid down by the silver men for the purpose of converting the farmer to their cause is true. It is not true, for example, that prices depend upon the quantity of money in existence or in circulation. Mr. Bryan has asserted that the law of supply and demand determines the relations between money and commodities. The law of supply and demand does indeed control prices but it has nothing to do with money as a measure of value. It is necessary for the support of Mr. Bryan's theory to assume that the farmer raises his crops simply for the purpose of securing money; that money itself is the object of his work. If this were so it might be true that the more money there is in the world the more pieces of it, or units of it, he will obtain in return for his crops. But it is not for money that the farmer or anybody else works; it is for the power of money to procure other things. The farmer procures with it the food, shelter and raiment needed by his family, his own implements for carrying on his business, and all the necessities and comforts of life. Money simply measures the relative values of products that he sells and the commodities that he buys. One thousand dollars' worth of breadstuffs means \$1,000 worth of clothes, of food,

of fuel, of agricultural implements, of education for his children, of anything else that the farmer wishes to buy. If the price of wheat is comparatively low it does not mean that there is too little money in the world, but that, measured by other commodities, there is more wheat than will satisfy the demands of the market.

One reason why the price of wheat has gone down is the fact that the wheat crops of the Argentine Republic, India and Russia have increased to so great an extent that they have more seriously competed with the American wheat in the London market. Another reason is that the cost of producing wheat has been so reduced and the acreage planted so enlarged, that our own crops have been greatly increased. Herein we see the illustration of the operation of the law of supply and demand. Mr. Bryan applies the law to the wrong end of the problem. Moreover, it is not true that there is any deficiency of money in this country. In 1878 we had in circulation in this country money and its representatives to the amount of \$751,881,809, and in 1895 we had \$1,601,968,478. In 1878 the money in circulation in this country amounted to \$18.04 per capita, and in 1895 it had increased to \$22.97 per capita. So that if prices depended upon the quantity of money, they should have been very much higher in 1895 than they were in 1878. Nor is it true that prices are low because of the abandonment of silver as money in this country. In 1878 there were only about eight million dollars of American silver dollars in existence. On July 1, 1896, through the operation of the Acts of 1878 and 1890 there were \$478,652,868 of silver in circulation.

I have alluded to the fact that the price of American wheat is affected by competition with the wheat of certain foreign countries whose product in recent years has grown in importance. The price of American wheat is fixed in London. Whatever the farmer gets is the London price minus the cost of transportation, insurance and exchange. The London price is a gold price and always will be a gold price so far as can now be foreseen. Therefore it is most important to the American farmer that the United States shall remain upon a gold basis. If we go to a silver standard the complications of exchange will become so great that the farmer will never know, from a study of the London market, what the price of his wheat will be. Moreover as silver fluctuates violently he will be the victim of the exchange broker and will have to pay insurance against the possible fluctuations of the metal at every step of the transaction, from the moment that he sells his crop to the local buyer to the moment that the London purchaser procures a bill of exchange for the final payment. In other words, in the great transactions of commerce, between our own and foreign countries, in which the farmer's product plays the largest part so far as the United States is concerned, the adoption of the silver standard will result to the profit of the speculator and the exchange broker.

It is difficult to meet the arguments of the silver men for the reason that they consist of assumptions and assertions. For instance, Mr. Bryan has said that the cost of silver bullion would be increased to \$1.29 an ounce by free coinage. It has been proved over and over again that coinage laws have not affected the price of silver. The Act of 1890 was better for silver, from the silver advocates' point of view, than free coinage could possibly be, for it forced the Government to coin every year practically the whole product of the mines of the United States, and yet notwithstanding this favoritism on the part of the Government, and its effort to force it up, and contrary to Senator Sherman's own prediction, the price of silver fell year by year. In 1890 it was \$1.04633 an ounce and in 1893—when the Act was finally repealed—it was \$.78081 an ounce. The fiat of the Government has been able to accomplish absolutely nothing. The Government undertook to keep silver and gold in circulation from 1792 until 1873, and at no time were both metals in circulation. There is nothing, therefore, in the history of this country, as there is nothing in the history of the world, to support Mr. Bryan's assertion that free coin-





age of silver would increase the price of silver bullion and make a silver dollar equal to a gold dollar if the two were again coined at the ratio of 16 to 1. On the contrary, all experience teaches that the price of silver as a commodity, like all other prices, is governed by the law of supply and demand. Even if the price of silver could be raised to \$1.29 what good would that do to the farmer or to any one else who expects to be benefited by cheap money? Such an increase of price would make the silver dollar equal to the gold dollar of to-day, and it is the high price of the gold dollar of to-day of which Mr. Bryan and his associates complain.

Again, the silver men contend that what we need is cheaper money. This is a direct contradiction to the statement that we have already discussed, but contradictions do not seem to bother the silver men. The silver dollar to-day is worth about fifty-three cents in gold. If it were not for the promise of the Government—a promise which has been fulfilled—to maintain the silver dollar on a par with the gold dollar, the silver dollar would circulate at its market value, just as the Mexican dollar and the silver yens of Japan circulate at their true value.

But if prices are measured in a 53 cent dollar, how is the farmer to be benefited? If he receives two 50 cent dollars instead of one full dollar for his wheat, he may flatter himself that he is obtaining double the present price, but when he comes to take his measure of value to the market for the purpose of buying something that he needs he will find that everything else has also doubled in price.

Free coinage of silver means that we shall have a silver standard and silver money. For a time this will mean contraction; and then we shall have a great flood of irredeemable paper—a flood that always follows every attempt to establish a cheaper coin as the basis of circulation and the measure of values. Chili is just now recovering from a debauch in cheap money in which this law of money was illustrated, and Mr. Bryan's proposition is that we shall follow her example. But why should we follow Chili, or Japan or Mexico at a time when Chili—having learned better by bitter experience—is coming back to the gold standard? And why should we disregard our own hard experiences with cheap money? It is true that prices were raised by the cheap money with which the country was burdened from 1861 to 1865, but does the American farmer want to repeat the experiences of that disastrous time? What were they so far as he was concerned? According to the report of the Senate committee on prices—the most exhaustive and thorough report that has ever been made—the farmer suffered, next to labor, most severely from that period of inflated prices and cheap money.

Assuming, in 1860 the index figure 100 to indicate all prices, in 1865 wheat was 140.5, corn 132.4, oats 156.9 and the general average of all agricultural products 194.6. Here was an increase in price apparently of from 132.4 for corn to 194.6 for the general average of the whole. Did the farmer prosper by this increase? During the same period the price of clothes increased to 299.2, the price of fuel to 237.8, the price of implements to 191.4; therefore, the wheat grower who received an increase of 40.5 on his product could not buy with \$140.50 as much clothes by the value of \$158.70 as he could have bought with \$100 in 1860. In other words, from 1860 to 1865 the prices of all manufactured products increased so much more rapidly than the prices of agricultural products that the period was one of the most disastrous to the farmer in the history of the country.

Some recent figures prepared by Mr. L. C. Powers, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, of Minnesota, demonstrate more conclusively than any statistics that have yet been published, that the farmer has not suffered from what Mr. Bryan and his friends call the "demonetization of silver."

The lowest prices for farm products that were reached in the free coinage period ruled in the years 1870 and 1871. In the ten States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas and Missouri the acreage

planted in oats, wheat and corn in 1871 was 32,669,672 and the tons of grain produced were 24,535,256. The price per ton received by the farmers for this product was \$15.81; the price per bushel was 41.8 cents. No increase of price followed until after the passage of the "Resumption Act" of 1879—when on account of the full restoration of gold and the consequent rise of the greenbacks to par, there was a great era of prosperity in this country. The acreage planted in these ten States more than doubled by 1881, becoming 71,876,200 and the number of tons produced increased to 34,126,444, while the home value of the product ran up to 68.7 cents.

During the free coinage period from 1862 to 1871, the value of wheat per ton in this country ranged from \$27.40 to \$34.87. After the "crime of 1873" was committed the average price of wheat ran up to \$39.07, and it was only after the assault made upon the credit of the country through the silver agitation that this price fell below the price that prevailed in the free coinage period. In 1895 it fell to \$16.65. The figures for the whole country are not yet available but I take the following table practically correct from a paper written for "Harper's Weekly" by Mr. Edward Atkinson, the figures which are to be hereafter corrected having been furnished by Mr. Powers from advanced sheets of his forthcoming report:

Year.	Acreage.	Bushels.	Value per Bushel, Gold.	Value of Crop.
1862.....	31,200,000	921,000,000	44 cts.	\$416,000,000 gold.
1871.....	62,400,000	1,480,000,000	53 "	871,000,000 currency.
1881.....	118,800,000	1,995,000,000	70 "	1,410,000,000 gold.
1891.....	142,000,000	3,410,000,000	46 "	1,562,000,000 gold.
The evil influence of the acts of 1890 is disclosed by the figures of 1895:				
1895.....	144,000,000	3,440,000,000	28 cts.	\$970,000,000 gold.

These figures show conclusively not only that the farmer has not suffered as seriously as the silver men contend, but that the prices of his product must have depended upon the competition of foreign countries, and upon the increasing facilities of production and transportation resulting from modern discoveries and inventions, while the low prices of which he now complains are due entirely to the assault made upon the credit of the country and to the threat that the United States shall adopt a depreciated currency and a different money standard from that which obtains in the market in which he sells his product, and in which his prices are fixed.

It might be shown, if space permitted, that the farmer has been abundantly prosperous in this country and that while there has been suffering in certain States and in certain parts of the country the general history of agriculture has been one of prosperity, checked only by occasional excursions into the regions of financial fallacies. Freight charges have been reduced more than one-half; public debts are less than they were twenty years ago; taxes per capita are also less, and there is every reason to expect abundant prosperity for the immediate future if Mr. Bryan and the silver cause are overwhelmingly defeated at the coming election.

There is one thing more to which I would like to call the attention of the farmer before leaving this subject. It is that while modern inventions have made the prices of manufactured articles cheaper, that that cheapness is not a curse but a blessing, and especially is it a blessing to the farmer. It is a new doctrine that cheap clothes, cheap tools, cheap fuel and cheap food are a curse to the consumers. It is one of the most preposterous of all preposterous arguments advanced in behalf of the free coinage of silver. But such has been the growth of the demand for food that agricultural products while cheaper than they were in 1860 and a little more than one-third of the price that prevailed in 1865, were a little dearer in 1895 than they were in 1840. In 1840 the average price of agricultural products was 87.3, on the basis of the index figure of 100 in 1860, and in 1895 the price was 97.1

an increase of nearly 10. But in that same period and on that same basis, clothes fell from 100.7 to 81.1, fuel from 895.8 to 91, implements from 128.5 to 74.9, house-furnishings from 116.4 to 70.1.

The increase of the price of the farmers' product during the period of inflation from '60 to '65 did not equal the increase of the prices of the commodities that he was obliged to buy. The same story would doubtless be repeated if we followed the advice of the free silver men and again adopted a depreciated currency, and added a fluctuating standard of value. Under the gold standard the price of food was maintained while the price of the commodities that the farmer must have, was greatly reduced. The disastrous fall in prices did not come until the silver agitation assumed an importance which excited the alarm of the commercial world, and seemed to indicate that the United States was about to become a silver mono-metallic country.

HENRY LOOMIS NELSON.

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### IMPORTANT NOTICE.

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The following letter has just been sent out by the publishers of the "Bond Record" a high class journal of economics and finance which had built up a considerable circulation mainly among investors throughout the Eastern States. The unexpired subscriptions for the "Bond Record" will be completed by furnishing the BANKERS' MAGAZINE in its stead, and it will be our aim to merit a continuance of all such subscriptions. The "Record" subscribers gain by getting a five dollar Magazine in place of a publication costing only three dollars, for the unexpired portion of their subscriptions.

[Copy of letter sent to "Bond Record" subscribers.]

Two years ago, this company undertook the publication of "The Bond Record" with the view of making it a reliable work of reference for the use of investors generally. Our aim was to supply a want which, we believed existed. It is unnecessary to say that no effort or expense has been spared to make "The Bond Record"—in the field which it specially selected—fully equal to the more expensive publications. In many respects, it has gone into the examination of the financial standing of corporations, and of the condition of their properties, with a thoroughness never before known. We have, however, been disappointed in our expectation that the investing public would make use extensively of such a publication. At the low price of Three Dollars (\$3.00) a year, it is impossible to meet the heavy expenses necessarily involved, to say nothing of obtaining a business profit, unless a very large number of subscribers can be secured. At the higher rates which the other publications in the field are obtaining, our present subscription list would be quite satisfactory; but, at the price at which "The Bond Record" was offered, the number of subscribers is too small to warrant us in continuing its publication. We have, therefore, decided to discontinue its further issue.

We have, however, made arrangements with the publishers of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE (and RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING, Consolidated) to fulfill our obligation to you for the unexpired portion of your subscription. Under this arrangement, the first number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE which you will receive, will be that issued in September. The MAGAZINE is issued about the tenth of each month, and is one of the oldest and most reliable financial publications in the United States and contains many of the features which have made "The Bond Record" of especial value to investors. We have no doubt, therefore, that this arrangement will be more than satisfactory, and we trust that when the time comes to renew, you will continue with the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

Yours very truly,

THE BOND RECORD PUBLISHING COMPANY.

20 Nassau Street, New York,  
August 25, 1896.

By GEO. H. ROBINSON, Treasurer.

## AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

*PROGRAMME OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION, TO BE HELD AT  
ST. LOUIS, MO., SEPTEMBER 22, 23 AND 24.*

The Twenty-second Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association will be held at the Olympic Theatre, St. Louis, Mo., Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, Sept. 22, 23 and 24. Headquarters of the association, during the convention, will be established at the Planters' Hotel. One and one-third fare for the round trip has been granted by the principal trunk lines of railway, on the certificate plan. Following is the official programme:

### FIRST DAY—TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22.

Convention called to order at 10 o'clock A. M., by the President. (Vice-Presidents are requested to take seats upon the platform.)

Prayer by the Right Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, Bishop of Missouri.

Roll Call.

Address of Welcome to the City of St. Louis, by Hon. C. P. Walbridge, Mayor.

Address of Welcome to the American Bankers' Association, by W. H. Thompson, President St. Louis Clearing House.

Annual Address by the President of the Association, Mr. E. H. Pullen.

Report of the Executive Council, by the Chairman, Mr. Joseph C. Hendrix.

Report of the Protective Committee.

Treasurer's Report.

Report of the Auditing Committee.

Secretary's Report.

Report of the Committee on Express Money Orders. Discussion.

Meeting of the delegates from the States and Territories to choose a list of names from which the Nominating Committee shall be selected by the President, in accordance with Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.

### SECOND DAY—WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23.

Convention called to order at 10 o'clock A. M., by the President.

Prayer by Most Rev. John J. Kane, Archbishop of St. Louis.

Announcements.

Call of States. Brief statements by bankers of the general condition of banking in their various States.

Practical Banking Questions. (Discussion limited to thirty minutes for each topic, open to all delegates under five minute rule, time to be extended by unanimous consent.)

1. Diligent presentation of checks payable at a distance. The law and the practice.
2. Discussion of the rule abolishing restrictive indorsements.
3. Payment of depositor's notes. Discussion of practice in different States.
4. Necessity of uniform laws governing commercial paper. What can the American Bankers' Association do to bring the various State laws into harmony?
5. Is a bank check revocable before presentation for payment? Discussion of the practice in the various States.
6. Warehouse receipts as collateral. Risks in loaning upon them.
7. Uniformity of Holiday Laws.
8. Equality in the taxation of bank stock.
9. Bank Statements. Can they be improved?
10. The partial payment of checks.
11. Recourse of bank against account of an insolvent customer.
12. Should not exchange be charged on all items that cost to collect?
13. Is it good banking to pay interest on daily balances?
14. Is it desirable to have a National Bankrupt Law?

15. Is it desirable to have the ten per cent. tax on State bank circulation repealed?
  16. Should not the National Banking Law permit the organization of banks of small capital in small towns?
  17. Ought there to be legislation to prevent "kiting"?
  18. What is the best method to safeguard bankers' drafts from forgery and alteration?
- (Other practical banking questions submitted before the date of the Convention will be added to the above.)

### THIRD DAY—THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24.

Convention called to order at 10 o'clock A. M., by the President.

Prayer by Rev. Samuel J. Niccolls, D. D., Pastor Second Presbyterian Church.

Unfinished Business.

Report of Committee on Nominations. Elections.

Clearing House Discussion:

1. Uniform Clearing House Returns. Their value. Diversity in methods of reporting the daily exchanges by the various Clearing Houses.

2. How the Clearing House idea may be extended. May not groups of banks organize District Clearing Houses? Is it practicable to clear by telegraph or telephone through a centrally located bank in country districts?

3. The value of Clearing House Certificates in money stringencies. Are they not as practical in groups of country banks as in cities?

All Clearing House Officers in attendance upon the Convention are especially invited to join in the discussion of the above questions.

Continuation of discussion of practical banking questions.

Installation of officers elected.

### ENTERTAINMENTS.

*First Day.*—Visit to Union Station, where lunch will be served. Inspection of the terminal facilities, the inter-locking plant, etc. Trip over the Association's properties. Visit to the premises of the Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association. Inspection of Cupple's Station. Ride over the Merchants and Eads' Bridges, and a visit to Madison and Granite City.

*Second Day.*—An Evening Reception at the residence of Mr. J. C. Van Blarcom, No. 1 Westmoreland Place.

*Third Day.*—Lunch at St. Louis Club, followed by a drive through the famous parks of the city.

Banquet at 7:30 P. M. at the Planters' Hotel, to delegates and ladies accompanying them.

It is expected and earnestly desired that ladies accompanying delegates to the Convention will participate in all that is offered for the comfort and entertainment of the guests of the bankers of St. Louis.

The Association has been invited by the bankers of Springfield, Ill., to visit them at the close of the Convention, and to hold a meeting at Lincoln's Tomb on the afternoon of the 25th of September, 1896.

Addresses will be delivered by E. H. Pullen, President of the Association, and Jos. C. Hendrix, Chairman of the Executive Council. Five minute speeches will be made by R. M. Nelson, Selma, Ala., and other prominent members.

Lunch will be served at the Leland Hotel after the ceremonies.

The beautiful State House of Illinois and the Lincoln Home may be visited by members while awaiting the return train.

The train will leave St. Louis for Springfield at about 8 o'clock A. M., September 25, and returning will leave Springfield about 5 o'clock P. M.

### MICHIGAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The ninth annual meeting of the Michigan Bankers' Association was held at Grand Rapids, September 1, 2 and 3, the proceedings following closely the outline of the official programme, which was as follows:

#### FIRST DAY—TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1.

*Address of Welcome:* Roger W. Butterfield, of Grand Rapids.

*Response:* George H. Russell, President of the State Savings Bank, Detroit.

*President's Annual Address:* L. H. Withey, President of the Michigan Trust Company Grand Rapids.

*Address:* Harvey J. Hollister, Cashier Old National Bank, Grand Rapids: "Gold or Silver: Which One, or Both?"

*Address:* Hon. T. C. Sherwood, Commissioner of the Banking Department of Michigan: "John Law, and his Financial Scheme."

Report of delegate to convention of American Bankers' Association.

*Address:* C. W. Garfield, President of the Grand Rapids Savings Bank: "Incidental Responsibility of Bank Officials."

Appointment of committee for nomination of officers.

## SECOND DAY—WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2.

Reports of officers, etc.

*Address:* R. W. Smylie, Auditor People's Savings Bank of Detroit: "Bankers and Moral Cowardice."

*Address:* L. Z. Caukin, Auditor Fourth National Bank, Grand Rapids: "Convertible Assets."

*Address:* W. J. Cocker, President Commercial Savings Bank, Adrian: "History of American Money."

*Discussion:* "Gold Standard vs. Silver Standard." To be participated in by all delegates.

*Address:* Edwin J. Phelps, President Kalamazoo National Bank, of Kalamazoo: "Credit and Credit Giving."

*Address:* C. T. Hills, Vice-President Hackley National Bank, Muskegon: "What Manufactures are Best Adapted to Our State, and How Shall We Encourage Them?"

*Address:* Col. D. E. Lyon, of Dubuque, Iowa, representative of Express Companies: "Express Money Order Systems, and Their Relation to the Banking Interests."

*Address:* E. F. Mack, Cashier of the Citizens' Savings Bank, Detroit: "The Value of Experience."

Election of officers and miscellaneous business.

On Wednesday evening, September 2, there was a banquet at the Morton House for delegates, at 8 P. M.

The third day, Thursday, September 3, was devoted to social features and any unfinished business.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, F. W. Hayes, of Detroit; first vice-president, Charles T. Hills, of Muskegon; second vice-president, Daniel Striker, of Hastings; secretary, A. E. Wing, of Detroit; treasurer, George Stickney, of Grand Haven; Executive Council for two years, Julius C. Hass, of Detroit, E. W. Sparrow, of Lansing, H. H. Knowlton, of Cadillac, H. J. Gregory, of Manistee, C. M. Hemphill, of Ypsilanti.

By a unanimous vote Kalamazoo was selected as the place for holding the next convention.

A further report of the proceedings will appear in the October number of the *MAGAZINE*.

## PLACES AND DATES OF FUTURE MEETINGS.

**ILLINOIS STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The next annual convention of the Illinois State Bankers' Association will be held at Springfield, Oct. 14 and 15.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**—The second annual convention of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association will be held at Pittsburgh, November 18 and 19.

**OHIO BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.**—The next convention of the Ohio Bankers' Association will be held at Dayton, October 7 and 8. C. E. Niles, President of the First National Bank of Findlay, is president of the association, and S. B. Rankin, Cashier Bank of South Charleston, secretary.

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**A French View of Bryan.**—The "Courrier des Etas Unis" (New York city) refers as follows to Mr. Bryan's statement, in a recent speech, that France is a bimetallic country: "An allusion made by Mr. Bryan to France is noteworthy. The Democratic candidate says that the Bank of France reserves to itself the right of paying its notes in either gold or silver, and, for all that, he adds, gold and silver have the same value in France. Mr. Bryan omitted to say that if the French five-franc piece has a value equal to that of gold, it is because, since 1873, five-franc pieces are no longer coined in France. It would be impossible to do in Paris that which Mr. Bryan would like to see done in Washington. One cannot bring to the Mint pieces of silver worth 2 francs 50 centimes and have them transformed into five-franc pieces. Bimetallicism exists in name only in France. In reality, gold is the only metal that the public can get coined in the French mints."

## OPEN LETTERS FROM BANKERS.

AN INTERCHANGE OF OPINION BY READERS OF THE MAGAZINE.

### A SUGGESTION IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMY.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—Permit me to make a suggestion which, if you can aid in having it carried out, will lighten materially one important feature in the daily routine of bank work.

It is this: That the banks in New York print on the checks which they furnish their dealers their clearing-house numbers, and that the banks throughout the country in having their drafts on their New York correspondents prepared have the clearing-house numbers of such correspondents shown. The numbers could be in small type and placed adjacent to the title of the bank drawn on, for example:

THE IMPORTERS AND TRADERS' NATIONAL BANK.

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TO THE NATIONAL PARK BANK,  
NEW YORK.

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The economy of labor in the above idea lies in the fact that as soon as the numbers of the banks begin to be used to any extent the Cashier and corresponding clerks in the out-of-town banks would use the numbers in listing the items in their letters instead of the titles as they now do, and thus save annually many millions of needless strokes of the pen and much ink. In a very few cases corresponding clerks have familiarized themselves with the clearing-house numbers and now list the letters as I have indicated.

In investigating the matter the writer learned that the clearing-house numbers are now in use on the orders for transfer of custom duties from the deposits made by some of the New York banks with the Assistant Treasurer of the United States. This is for convenience in sorting for the clearing-house in the office of the Assistant Treasurer.

New York is named as the most desirable point in which to adopt the scheme, but the example of the banks there in the matter would be followed by the banks in all of the large cities of the country.

The writer has spoken to the officers of three of the larger banks in New York regarding the matter and as a result feels warranted in saying that if any general interest is shown on the subject by a large proportion of out-of-town banks these institutions would co-operate. If you will kindly bring this matter to the attention of your readers and request them to assist in the development of some plan that may be devised by you for obtaining an expression of opinion, I feel sure that the mild but beneficial reform would soon be adopted and hundreds of your readers would have daily cause for gratitude to you.

PASSAIC, N. J., Aug. 26, 1896.

ROBERT D. KENT, *Cashier*.

[Mr. Kent has made a very practical suggestion, and if his idea should be adopted much time and labor would be saved. There is nothing radical in the reform, and there would appear to be no difficulties in the way of its adoption.

Subscribers of the MAGAZINE are invited to express their views on the matter.]

### WHY GOLD GOES ABROAD.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—We see and hear a great deal about the balance of trade being in our favor and still we have to ship large sums of gold and silver to the old country and have since 1899. Is there any table or information showing why this is so? I understand that it is largely because the foreigner is selling his American securities. What amount of securities held by foreigners has there been returned? Where can one find statements showing these things?

CANTON, S. D., Aug. 17, 1896.

CHAS. E. JUDD.

*Answer.*—There is no accurate way of telling to what extent American securities have been returned by foreign investors. Gold goes abroad for the reason that the balance of

payments is against us, irrespective of the balance of trade. Included in this balance of payments are the amount of principal of American securities returned, interest on foreign capital invested in this country, expenditures of American tourists abroad, payments for transportation to foreign ship-owners, payment of premiums to foreign insurance companies, etc., etc. While the balance of trade is, therefore, one of the leading factors in determining the movement of specie, there are other conditions that are of great importance. Among these may be mentioned the interest rate—a high interest rate tending to attract gold and *vice versa*. The operation of this principle is to be seen at present in the importation of gold, due in part to the comparatively high rate of interest prevailing in New York.

### ANOTHER CURRENCY SUGGESTION.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

**SILVER:**—Everybody is full of "Free Silver Coinage vs. Sound Money." Although the sound money proposition will probably win at the coming election, still the same is a subject to be put forward at each succeeding election like the "free trade" proposition; whereby prosperity arising from a stable method is retarded and kept from coming to the people of our country.

Supposing the legal-tender quality of coins—gold and silver dollars—was taken away from them by legal enactment and instead a law enacted whereby the United States Treasury shall receive deposits of refined gold and silver bullion in ratio of 25.8 grains of gold 900 fine (\$1 gold) to 412.5 grains of silver 900 fine (\$1 silver) and issue certificates of deposit therefor in sums of \$5 and multiples thereof redeemable from the bearer in sums of \$100 and multiples thereof, in gold and silver bullion, in the ratio as deposited. That to the said certificates a legal tender quality be given whereby they shall be receivable in payment of all debts public and private whatsoever.

If, on a proper study of the idea above set forth the ratio is judged to be not according to the probable store of gold and silver in the world or to their annual yield, the ratio of 16 of silver to 1 of gold can be made such as will nearer fix the balance and "marry" the two precious metals into "bimetallism," so that the free silver coinage advocates will be silenced, and those who think the stamp or mintage gives no value to the metals will be placated. If the demand for gold for exportation arises then the exporter will have to take an equal amount (16 to 1) of silver. To bring such a system of money into being the present forms of paper money must be funded or retired whereby the field will be clear for the circulation of the suggested form of currency. It is said we have in the country about \$500,000,000 of gold and \$500,000,000 of silver coins so that to the extent of \$1,000,000,000 of the present money in the United States the field will be supplied. The National bank currency—some \$200,000,000—would have to be retired and the banks do business on capital and deposits as do the banks principally in San Francisco and California.

CHAS. SLEEPER.

SAN FRANCISCO, Cal., August 22, 1896.

**Mexico and the Silver Standard.**—While in St. Louis recently Senor Limantour, the Mexican Minister of Finance, talked freely of existing conditions in Mexico under the silver standard. He said:

"Legally we have a double standard in Mexico, but practically it is a silver standard, as there is no gold in circulation. Every ounce of gold we produce is immediately drawn out of our country by foreign nations. We coin silver at the ratio of 16½ to 1. We do not coin gold, but as quick as it assumes its bullion form, it leaves Mexico or is locked up in our vaults as the property of foreigners.

Mexico has had four gold bond issues since 1888, and a number of domestic silver bond issues. The gold bond issues aggregate about \$100,000,000. Most of the bonds bear 6 per cent. interest. The interest on the gold bonds amounts to about \$6,000,000 in gold annually, but when the time comes around to pay the interest we have to give up \$12,000,000 of our money. So we really pay double interest on our loan. Then, the question presents itself, What amount will it take to redeem the bonds at maturity? It is a guess now as to what we will owe at the time of redemption. If silver goes up we will owe less; if it goes down, it will take so much more of our money to pay our creditors. It's all according to what our dollar will bring in the markets of the world.

What Mexico wants most to-day is a fixed price of silver. What we fear most is the continual fluctuations of the white metal. With silver up and down alternately, our merchants cannot make calculations for future transactions. In a commercial sense, we live from day to day."



## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—The Governors of the Stock Exchange took advantage of the recent closing of the Exchange on account of Labor Day, to have a new, Georgia pine floor laid in the large trading room. The Stock Exchange members use up a floor in about five years.

—A petition is before Gov. Morton asking that Lewis A. Hill, who was receiving teller in the St. Nicholas Bank and who pleaded guilty to stealing funds from the bank in March, 1894, may be released from prison, where he is now serving a four years and three months' sentence.

—The Bank of New York, National Banking Association, has recently made a number of handsome improvements, enlarging its safe deposit department, and opening a new entrance on Wall street. Additional safe doors of the most approved pattern have been fitted to every vault, and all avenues of entrance are protected by an electric burglar alarm. The effect of the white ceiling and walls and of the mosaic floors is to give the place an air of coolness and cleanliness that is pleasing.

—No applications for loan certificates having been made to the Loan Committee of the Clearing-House Association, the committee has adjourned.

—Efforts are being made to reorganize the Murray Hill Bank, which recently suspended, and to that end two temporary Receivers have been appointed. Superintendent Kilburn, of the State Banking Department, has refused to turn over the assets to the Receivers, and the bank is still under the control of the department. The Attorney-General objected to the appointment of Receivers, and this is the first instance on record where a successful application for the appointment of Receivers for a bank has not been made or assented to by the Attorney-General. He proposes to make a test case and carry his contention to the highest court.

—William F. Bishop, of Hamilton & Bishop, Stock Exchange brokers, who failed two or three years ago, has been reinstated by the Governors to the full privileges of membership in the Exchange. Mr. Bishop was originally made a member of the Stock Exchange in May, 1890.

—The statement which was recently published to the effect that the ground on which stands the building of the Union Dime Savings Bank, at Thirty-second street, Broadway and Sixth avenue, had been purchased as a site for a leading daily newspaper is emphatically denied by President Charles E. Sprague, of the bank. There is absolutely no truth in the rumor. No negotiations for a sale have been opened, and there is no thought of doing business elsewhere than at the old stand. There is not the slightest foundation for the report.

### NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston Five Cents Savings Bank.**—In regard to the vacancy in the treasuryship of this bank, it is understood that no immediate action will be necessary, Assistant Treasurer Holmes having practically filled the position during the past four months of Treasurer Nichols' illness, and being now, according to the by-laws, authorized to carry on the duties until definite action will be taken by the trustees.

**The Lebanon (N. H.) Savings Bank** has been enjoined by the Court from receiving or paying out any deposits. This action was taken to protect the interests of all concerned. The amount withdrawn previous to the time of making this move was not large and it is said that none of the bank's assets have been sacrificed to meet payments. The action was a surprise to its 3,500 depositors as well as the general public, for no unusual call had been made upon the bank for money. It is said that depositors will probably realize full face value and interest on their deposits.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—The Manayunk National Bank celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of its opening on August 14. Cashier John J. Foulkrod and C. J. McGlinchey and Leander M. Jones have served the bank continuously for the past quarter of a century.

**To Support the Gold Reserve.**—At a meeting of the Council of Administration of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association held at Atlantic City, N. J., August 16, the following was unanimously adopted:

"Resolved, That this Council earnestly recommends that banks and bankers of Pennsylvania as a high patriotic duty, follow the example of the banks of New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago and deposit at an early day largely of their holdings of gold with the Treasurer of the United States, in exchange for legal-tender notes, to assist the Government in maintaining the gold reserve intact."

**The Long Island Bank**, of Brooklyn, N. Y., which has recently gone out of business, was one of the oldest institutions of its kind in that city. The bank was established over seventy-two years ago and was as sound when it closed as when it first opened. The depositors have all been paid in full, and the stockholders have not sacrificed a dollar. The closing is due, it is said, mainly to the fact that the trust companies have been taking away the business formerly transacted by the banks.

**The Citizens' National Bank** of Jeannette, Pa., recently chartered has absorbed the First National Bank of that place. The latter was organized in 1889. Dr. J. H. Ringer is President and John Keltz Cashier of the new bank.

**A Millionaire's Birthday.**—On August 22, Mr. John I. Blair, of Blairstown, N. J., celebrated his ninety-fourth birthday in a quiet way. A large number of his friends called at his home to extend their congratulations and well wishes. Because of his objections no public demonstration was made by the citizens of Blairstown. He is President of the Belvidere (N. J.) National Bank and senior member of the banking firm of Blair & Co., New York city.

**The Comptroller of the Currency** has declared a second dividend of 20 per cent. in favor of the creditors of the Fort Stanwix National Bank, of Rome, N. Y., making in all 50 per cent. on claims proved, amounting to \$599,877.02.

**Overdrawn Accounts.**—The Pittsburg (Pa.) Clearing-House has recently sent out the following circular: "The attention of the clearing-house committee has been called by the members of the association to the large number of checks that are being returned for want of sufficient funds to meet them. The drawers in most instances make a constant practice of giving their checks, well knowing they will not be paid, thus making work for which there is no remuneration, and, from persons of this class, no hope of any. The committee think it within the line of their duty to recommend to all members of the association, and to all houses clearing through the members, that when depositors of this class show a disposition to overdraw their accounts that the accounts be closed, and that they be refused further banking accommodations. The committee believe that, if this were done, in a short while a great deal of time and labor would be saved, and the taking of checks be attended with less risk than now."

**The Directors of the Braddock (Pa.) National Bank** have had plans prepared for the building of an annex to the present bank building. Work will shortly be commenced, and it is estimated that the new improvement will cost in the neighborhood of \$2,000. Increased business has made it necessary to enlarge the present quarters.

**Robert Garrett & Sons**, Baltimore, Md.—Since the death of the senior member of this well-known firm, the probable future of the business has been discussed with much interest in banking circles. A close friend of the family is authority for the statement that the firm's name would hardly be allowed to die out, although there may be some changes in the personnel. It is expected that Messrs. John W. Garrett and Robert Garrett, sons of the late T. Harrison Garrett, who are now in London with their brother Horatio, and their mother, will become interested in and perpetuate the house. Mrs. Robert Garrett, it was said, may also decide to continue its affairs.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Orleans, La.**—The recent failure of the American National Bank was followed on August 10 by a slight run on another bank, which was assisted with all needed funds by the Clearing-House. Provisions were made for meeting any possible demands, and with the additional money brought into the city by the payment of the Government bounty on sugar the banks were placed in a position to readily meet any unusual calls.

**The Following Dividends** on failed Texas banks have recently been declared by the Comptroller of the Currency:

A second dividend of 30 per cent. in favor of the creditors of the First National Bank, of

Dublin, Texas, making in all 60 per cent. on claims proved, amounting to \$5,996.03, and a fourth dividend of 10 per cent. in favor of the creditors of the First National Bank, of Texarkana, Texas, making in all 90 per cent. on claims proved, amounting to \$36,299.22.

**Resigned on Account of Politics.**—H. W. Reed has resigned the Presidency of the National Bank of Brunswick, Ga., to accept the Chairmanship of the Populist National Finance Committee. Mr. Reed gives the following reasons for his action:

"Some people have remarked that it was very strange that I, a National banker, should be working for the populist party when their platform declares against National banks. The People's party is not fighting National bankers, but the National banking system. The principle of the thing is what they object to, and I object to the National banking system just as much as any other Populist alive. You may think that my banking interests will not be subverted if the National banks are done away with. I think, on the contrary, that if the State banking system was revived it would not only benefit me personally, but the entire business of the State. My investments, which are now almost entirely in bank stocks, could be transferred to other stocks and they would realize much greater profits."

Messrs. John L. Williams & Sons, the well-known banking firm of Richmond, Va., have issued an interesting chart giving a graphic history of silver and silver coinage in the United States from 1787 to date, together with other data relating to the monetary system. We hope to reproduce the same in the next issue of the MAGAZINE.

### WESTERN STATES.

**The Peru State Bank, of Peru, Ill.,** was reported as having closed on August 14. A meeting of the stockholders was held at which they voted to voluntarily assess themselves 50 per cent., whereupon the depositors signed an agreement giving the bank an extension of four months to make collections. The directors also held a meeting and elected G. Læssig, Cashier in place of H. Bellinghausen, who is said to have caused the trouble by loaning the bank's funds to irresponsible parties—even encroaching on the reserve. A statement of the bank's condition August 24 shows capital \$25,000; undivided profits, \$6,000; individual deposits, \$49,000; time and demand certificates, \$55,000, and total resources, \$172,000. The bank reopened on August 18 apparently none the worse for its temporary suspension.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—The National Bank of Kansas City recently paid a dividend of 10 per cent. in liquidation, making a total of 65 per cent. thus far paid.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—A local bank has taken a new departure in the matter of collecting an account from an alleged insolvent debtor. Heretofore it has been customary for a party to bring an action for the appointment of a Receiver, but this bank does not propose to do anything of the kind. It has begun a direct action against the stockholders of a clothing company on its own behalf and that of other creditors.

In the complaint, the bank states that the clothing company has no other assets aside from a stock of clothing, which cannot be sold for more than \$2,000. This being the case, the company is not in condition to pay off more than 20 per cent. of its debts, not counting the expense of a receivership, and therefore it is urged that a judgment be given the plaintiff, and all other creditors, against the stockholders of the corporation.

**In the Right Direction.**—It is asserted, by a well-informed banker correspondent, that at the present rate of reorganization Minnesota will soon have no private banks, but all will be State banks. The change is due to the new banking law and the strict regulations imposed upon State banks. These seem to increase confidence, and naturally they are outstripping the private concerns.

**The Monticello State Bank, at Monticello, Iowa,** has on exhibition in the window sixteen silver dollars, displayed in a circle on a card with a bright gold dollar in the centre. As an object lesson it is not only a novelty but a decided success.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Banks will Retaliate.**—A very late report from Seattle, Washington, states that the banks in that section will retaliate on Canadian banks for discounting the money of the United States. The matter has been discussed informally by the Clearing-House, and final action will be taken at once. The Canadians have been making a discount of 10 per cent. on American money, and the proposed action of the local banks, which will undoubtedly be taken, will be at a discount of two per cent. on paper, while 50-cent pieces will be received for 40 cents, and 25-cent pieces for 20 cents. The banks will give ten days' notice to their customers of the new rule.

**The Merchants' Exchange Bank, of San Francisco, Cal.,** in liquidation since 1875, has returned \$84 per share to the stockholders, with good prospects of making the amount an even hundred before disincorporating.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

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**Arkansas.**—The Spring River Bank, of Hardy, failed August 7. The failure is said to have been caused by the embezzlement of the bank's funds by the Cashier, who has been speculating in stocks. The County is a creditor to the extent of \$9,000.

**California.**—The Bank of National City, in San Diego County, suspended August 12, and was subsequently declared insolvent by the State Bank Commissioners, C. B. Whittlesey, Cashier, has been placed in charge.

**Illinois.**—The Avenue Savings Bank, of Chicago, made an assignment August 27. According to the statement filed liabilities are \$170,000 and assets about the same.

—The Haymarket Produce Bank, of Chicago, failed August 24. It was a small, private concern owned by two partners, with a claimed capital of \$50,000. Is said to have been in a shaky condition for some time.

—North & Taylor, private bankers, doing business at 959 West Madison St., Chicago, suspended August 11. The failure is attributed to the unusual condition of the money market. The amount of deposits, placed at over \$100,000, is due principally to workingmen.

—The Peru State Bank, of Peru, closed on August 14 but resumed business on the 18th, after appointing a new Cashier.

**Indiana.**—The Lake County Bank, of East Chicago, has failed and is in Receiver's hands. Loss said not to be large.

**Iowa.**—The Sioux National Bank, of Sioux City, closed its doors August 28. Had a capital of \$300,000 and assets and liabilities of about \$1,000,000. Heavy withdrawals of deposits caused the suspension.

**Kansas.**—The Argentine Bank, of Argentine, failed August 19. It had \$50,000 capital and liabilities are about \$200,000 of which \$122,000 is due depositors. Bad loans and slow collections are alleged as the cause of suspension. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against the Cashier.

**Louisiana.**—In regard to the American National Bank of New Orleans, which failed August 6, the Acting Comptroller of the Currency has caused the arrest of the President and Vice-President, charged with having used the funds of the bank to a large amount to buy up its own stock, also with making large loans in their own interest and making false reports of condition.

**Michigan.**—The private bank of C. J. Church & Son, of Lowell, suspended August 24. Inability to realize on assets said to be the cause. Deposits were about \$40,000 and assets unknown.

—The Exchange Bank of Osgood Bros., at Mendon, it is reported, will go out of business about October 1.

**Minnesota.**—The Security Bank of Duluth failed August 11. It had \$100,000 capital and \$300,000 deposits. Assets unknown.

—The Mapleton Bank of J. E. & C. H. Brown, at Mapleton, has closed its doors on account of difficulty in making collections. An effort is being made to reorganize under National or State laws.

—The Manufacturers' Bank of West Duluth has been placed in Receiver's hands. Deposits are \$40,000 and assets placed at \$86,000.

**Missouri.**—The Farmers and Merchants' Bank, of Trenton, has gone into voluntary liquidation. Its affairs will be wound up by the Trenton National Bank.

**Montana.**—The First National of Helena suspended September 5. It has been considered one of the strongest banks on the Pacific coast, having a capital and surplus of over \$1,000,000 and deposits of \$3,000,000, including a large amount of United States deposits. Heavy demands from Eastern creditors and inability to realize on assets is said to be the cause of failure. No statement of assets and liabilities has been published.

**Nebraska.**—The First National Bank of Beatrice failed September 1. The bank was organized in 1873, and has been considered a strong institution. Last report shows capital of \$100,000, assets, \$300,000 and liabilities, \$205,000. Inability to secure Eastern assistance and large withdrawals of deposits caused the failure.

—The Beatrice Savings Bank, which was principally owned by the First National, was carried down by the failure of the latter.

—The Hitchcock County Bank, at Culbertson, has failed. It was one of the oldest institutions in the State.

—The Bank of Filley closed September 4. It has a capital of \$10,000, and assets are claimed to be largely in excess of liabilities.

—The State Banking Board took possession of the State Loan and Trust Company of Ogallala, September 2. Assets and liabilities not given.

—The Bank of Wymore suspended August 21. Assets said to exceed liabilities.

**New Hampshire.**—The Sullivan Savings Institution, of Claremont, has decided to go into liquidation, as the only course left to protect depositors.

—The Lebanon Savings Bank, of Lebanon, was enjoined September 1 from receiving or paying out deposits.

—The Wilton Savings Bank, at Wilton, has been closed by injunction. The principal part of its assets are in Western farm mortgages.

**New York.**—The South End Bank, of Albany, has decided to go into voluntary liquidation September 16.

—The Long Island Bank, of Brooklyn, has gone out of business and paid off all its depositors. Had capital of \$400,000 and over \$1,000,000 deposits.

—A Receiver has been appointed for the Hydraulic Bank of Buffalo, pending its final dissolution. The bank has not been a financial success, owing to disagreement of the directors.

—The Murray Hill Bank, in New York city, failed August 11. Temporary receivers have been appointed, but the Superintendent of the State Banking Department refuses to turn over the assets to them. The failure was not unexpected in banking circles.

—John Bloodgood & Co., bankers in New York city, failed August 27. The firm was prominent in Wall street for many years. No statement of assets and liabilities has been given out.

**Ohio.**—Henry M. Thorp, owner of the Citizens' Bank, at Sabina, made an assignment September 4. No details are given. He has been in banking and mercantile business for many years.

**Oregon.**—The National Bank of Heppner has gone into voluntary liquidation, for the reason that its business is no longer profitable.

**South Dakota.**—The Citizens' Bank, of Centerville, assigned August 20, with liabilities of \$6,000 and claimed assets of \$25,000. It is thought the depositors will be paid in full and the bank resume under new management.

**Tennessee.**—The Lafayette Banking Company, of Lafayette, failed August 22.

**Texas.**—The Citizens' National Bank, of San Angelo, failed August 15. Liabilities are \$72,000 and its affairs are said to be in bad shape.

**Washington.**—John G. Melville has been appointed Receiver of the First National Bank of Cheney, recently failed.

—The Bank of Auburn suspended August 10, with liabilities of \$21,000. The reason given for the suspension is stringency of the times and shrinkage in values. A Receiver has been appointed.

**Wisconsin.**—The Jackson County Bank at Black River Falls, has been placed in Receiver's hands.

The Bankers' Mutual Casualty Company, of Des Moines, Iowa, was organized in March last. The first suggestion to organize this company was in February, 1895; but as those interested in the matter were disposed to move with caution no active efforts were made until October of that year. The final organization was effected March 4, 1896, under articles of incorporation known as the charter, which had already been filed on January 22.

The company was organized in Iowa because the insurance laws of that State are better adapted to the plan proposed. The only difference in this State between a mutual insurance company and a stock insurance company is that the profits belong to the policy-holders rather than to the stockholders. The articles of incorporation as well as the by-laws of this company have been so framed as to emphasize this feature of its business and place it beyond dispute.

The business of the company is divided into two departments, viz: The shipping and the burglary department. In the shipping department the company issues its policy protecting funds and securities in course of shipment by registered mail. This method of moving currency is receiving attention from all parts of the country, and the business is growing rapidly. It is becoming one of the important features in the problem of moving currency safely and quickly. As compared with the cost of moving currency by express, it works a saving on local business in Iowa of a little over 20 per cent. In some States, where the express rate is higher (local express rate in Iowa is 50 cents per \$1,000), the saving is more than 50 per cent. on the cost of the express service; in some cases 75 per cent. is saved.

In the burglary department the company issues a policy which indemnifies the bank for loss or damage by burglary and robbery. This important part of the business of the company is operated on a level premium as determined by the fixed rates which have been established by the executive committee. The rates are about 40 per cent. less than those demanded by other companies before this competition was placed in the field. The policy of this company is also drawn with a view to furnish full indemnity, protecting the premises owned by the bank as well as the vault, safe and contents. The insurance against robbery in the day time is not limited to a percentage, and the company does not require the presence of more than one clerk in the bank during business hours.

It is the policy of the company to maintain and create such a surplus as will make itself amply secure and its condition strong. The surplus, of course, belongs to the policy-holders, but it will be maintained and kept intact to meet the contingency of unfortunately large losses and their frequent occurrence, if such should be the case.

Although but a short time in existence and in an entirely new field the business of the company has been very gratifying, and it is confidently believed that in the near future it will be able to transact its business on a basis of net cost to the policy-holders much less than is now required to be collected in premiums.

It will be the endeavor of the company to give the very best service possible to the banking fraternity in both departments of its business.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The Comptroller of the Currency furnishes the following statement of New National banks organized since our last report. Names of officers and other particulars regarding these New National Banks will be found under the different State headings.

5051—Citizens' National Bank; New Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Capital, \$80,000.

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ARKANSAS.

HOT SPRINGS—Security Bank; capital (subscribed), \$75,000; Pres. E. F. Klein; Cashier, Ed. H. Johnson.

#### ILLINOIS.

ASHKUM—Ashkum Bank (M. R. Meents & Sons.); capital, \$25,000.

HERCHER—Exchange Bank (Easton & James).

PLYMOUTH—Citizens' Bank (Monk Bros.); capital, \$25,000.

UNION HILL—Bank of Union Hill.

#### INDIANA.

CAYUGA—Cayuga Exchange Bank (successor to Cayuga Exchange Bank of H. O. Peters); Cashier, F. A. Otte.

#### IOWA.

COLORADO—Citizens' Bank (successor to Exchange Bank); Cashier, Ed. Stillman; Asst. Cashier, A. O. McClay.

POPEJOY—Bank of Popejoy; Pres., J. I. Popejoy; Cashier, E. P. Popejoy.

#### LOUISIANA.

HOUMA—Citizens' Bank.

#### MICHIGAN.

PINCONNING—Pinconning Bank (F. W. Hubbard & Co.); capital, \$25,000.

#### MINNESOTA.

NEW DULUTH—New Duluth Bank (successor to New Duluth State Bank).

ST. PAUL—Provident Trust Co.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

MERIDIAN—Provident Loan and Trust Co.

#### MISSOURI.

BUTLER—Walton Trust Co.; capital, \$110,000.

IRONTON—Iron Co. Bank; capital, \$10,000.

#### MONTANA.

ANACONDA—State Bank; capital, \$75,000.

#### NEW YORK.

ANDES—David Ballentine.—James F. Scott.

#### OHIO.

BEDFORD—Produce Exchange Banking Co. of Cleveland (Branch.)

LYNCHBURG—Farmers' Exchange Bank; Pres., Hugh Murphey; Vice-Pres., Owen West; Cashier, W. L. Stautner.

TOLEDO—David Robinson, Jr. & Son.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

NEW BETHLEHEM—Citizens' National Bank; capital, \$80,000; Pres., Jno. F. Craig.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

CLIFTON—Clifton Savings Bank; capital, \$5,000; W. E. Fowler, Cashier and Prop.

#### TENNESSEE.

TRACY CITY—Bank of Grundy Co.; capital, \$25,000; Pres., E. O. Nathurst; Cashier, W. N. Byers.

#### TEXAS.

HIGGINS—Bank of Higgins (successor to Exchange Bank); capital, \$5,000; Pres., W. F. Peugh; Cashier, H. J. Holm.

MIDLOTHIAN—Citizens' Bank.

SANTA ANA—Citizens' Bank.

#### WISCONSIN.

CADOTT—Bank of Cadott (F. L. Monroe); capital, \$7,500.

DARIEN—Farmers' State Bank; cap., \$25,000.

#### CANADA.

##### MANITOBA.

DAUPHIN—G. L. Irwin.

STONEWALL—Donald Leslie.

WINNIPEG—Bank of Hamilton; Benjamin Willson, Mgr.

##### ONTARIO.

HASTINGS—Union Bank of Canada; Fred. W. Ashe, Mgr.

##### QUEBEC.

QUEBEC—People's Bank of Halifax; Jean Lache, Agent.

### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

BIRMINGHAM—Berney National Bank; J. H. Barr, Cashier in place of W. P. G. Harding;

no Assistant Cashier in place of J. H. Barr.

OPELIKA—Shapard Bank; Wm. P. Shapard, Pres., deceased.

TALLADEGA—Isbell National Bank; W. H.

Boynton, Cashier; F. B. McConnell, Asst. Cashier in place of W. H. Boynton.

TUSCALOOSA—J. H. Fitts & Co.; Festus Fitts, Treas., deceased.

#### ARKANSAS.

HARRISON—Bank of Harrison and Boone County Bank consolidated.

**CALIFORNIA.**

**CAMPBELL**—Bank of Campbell; incorporated as a State Bank; capital stock, \$50,000; John F. Duncan, Cashier.  
**DOWNEY**—Los Nietos Valley Bank; S. W. Blythe, Pres. in place of D. P. Smart.  
**PETALUMA**—Wickersham Banking Co.; Fred A. Wickersham, Pres. in place of I. G. Wickersham; Daniel Brown, Vice-Pres.  
**SANTA ROSA**—Exchange Bank; W. F. Wines, Cash. in place of Thomas Shelton, deceased.  
**VALLEY FORD**—Dairymen's Bank; M. J. Pellascio, Asst. Cashier.

**COLORADO.**

**COLORADO SPRINGS**—First National Bank; J. A. Hayes, Pres. in place of J. J. Hagerman; A. Sutton, Cashier in place of J. A. Hayes; A. H. Hunt, Asst. Cashier in place of A. Sutton.—Exchange National Bank; D. M. Holden, Pres., deceased.

**CONNECTICUT.**

**FALLS VILLAGE**—Falls Village Savings Bank; H. C. Gaylord, Treas. in place of U. H. Miner, deceased.  
**NORWALK**—Central National Bank; corporate existence extended until Aug. 21, 1916.

**GEORGIA.**

**ATLANTA**—American Trust and Banking Co.; Chas. Beermann, director, deceased.  
**BRUNSWICK**—National Bank of Brunswick; C. Downing, Pres., in place of H. W. Reed; E. H. Mason, Vice-Pres. in place of C. Downing.  
**SAVANNAH**—National Bank of Savannah; F. D. Bloodworth, Cashier in place of Thos. F. Thomson.

**ILLINOIS.**

**CHICAGO**—Union National Bank; Samuel K. Martin, director, deceased.—Union Trust and Security Co.; C. M. Hotchkiss, Pres., deceased.  
**HANOVER**—Hanover Union Bank; J. R. Speer, Pres.; Thos. Killough, Cashier.  
**PERU**—Peru State Bank (closed Aug. 14; resumed Aug. 18); G. Lassig, Cashier in place of H. Bellinghausen.

**INDIANA.**

**SOUTH BEND**—First National Bank; Josiah E. Kelley, Asst. Cashier, deceased.  
**SWAYZER**—Farmer's Banking Co.; capital, \$10,000.

**IOWA.**

**CHEROKEE**—T. S. Steele & Sons; T. S. Steele, deceased.  
**FOREST CITY**—Winnebago Co. Bank; incorporated and title changed to Winnebago Co. State Bank.  
**MALVERN**—Farmer's National Bank; T. B. Lacey, Vice-Pres. in place of A. H. Dolph.  
**MARENGO**—Marengo Savings Bank; M. W. Stover, Pres. in place of N. B. Holbrook.  
**PARNELL**—Parnell Savings Bank; F. V. Mullin, Cashier in place of B. H. Kelly.

**WEBSTER CITY**—First National Bank; W. J. Covil, Vice-Pres. in place of L. L. Estes.  
**WILTON**—Union Bank; W. D. Harris, Cashier in place of Jas. L. Giesler.

**KANSAS.**

**ONAGA**—Onaga City Bank; Grover, Gillett & Moore, proprietors.  
**SHARON SPRINGS**—Bank of Sharon Springs; G. E. Woodhouse, Cashier in place of W. D. Harris.

**KENTUCKY.**

**CYNTHIANA**—Farmers' National Bank; A. S. Rice, Cashier in place of J. G. Montgomery.  
**LOUISVILLE**—Citizens' National Bank; Sebastian Zorn, elected director in place of Jno. Echols, deceased.  
**NEW CASTLE**—Henry County Trust Co.; S. J. Dauthitt, Secretary.—Bank of New Castle; Leslie K. Smith, Cashier in place of J. W. Matthews.  
**NICHOLASVILLE**—First National Bank; G. L. Knight, Cashier in place of A. H. Brown, deceased; W. R. Smith, Asst. Cashier in place of G. L. Knight.  
**PADUCAH**—City National Bank; S. B. Hughes, Pres. in place of Elbridge Palmer, deceased; W. H. Slack, Vice-Pres.

**MARYLAND.**

**BALTIMORE**—Manufacturers' National Bank; Chas. W. Dorsey, Pres. in place of Wm. J. Dickey, deceased; Wm. A. Dickey, Vice-Pres.; no Cashier in place of Chas. W. Dorsey.  
**PRINCESS ANNE**—People's Bank; M. S. Lankford, Asst. Cashier.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**ATHOL**—Athol National Bank; post-office address changed to Athol Center.  
**BOSTON**—Massachusetts Loan and Trust Co.; Frank W. Hunt elected director in place of Edward Whitney, deceased.—Boston Five Cents Savings Bank; Curtis C. Nichols, Treas., deceased.  
**CONCORD**—Concord National Bank; C. Fay Heywood, Cashier in place of B. L. Fabens; no Asst. Cashier in place of C. Fay Heywood.  
**WOBURN**—Woburn Five Cents Savings Bank; Jacob Brown, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**MICHIGAN.**

**BELDING**—Belding Savings Bank; Chas. S. Felch, Cashier in place of C. E. Hills.  
**MENDON**—Exchange Bank; will retire from business October 1.

**MINNESOTA.**

**CHOKIO**—Bank of Chokio; capital, \$10,000; Chas. B. Westfall, Pres.; David E. Olson, Cashier.  
**MINNEAPOLIS**—Washington Bank; O. E. Brecke, Cashier; August Ekman, Asst. Cashier.  
**PRINCETON**—Bank of Princeton; J. J. Skahan, Cashier.  
**WINDOM**—Peoples' Bank; capital increased to \$30,000; A. D. Perkins, Cashier.

## MISSOURI.

**BUTLER**—Missouri State Bank; capital decreased from \$110,000 to \$55,000.  
**MANSFIELD**—Bank of J. C. Spence & Co.; merged into Bank of Mansfield.  
**OSCEOLA**—Johnson-Lucas Banking Co. and State Bank; consolidated.  
**RUSSELLVILLE**—Exchange Bank; T. J. Scott, Jr., Asst. Cashier.  
**ST. JOSEPH**—National Bank of St. Joseph; James N. Burnes, Jr., Vice-Pres. in place of W. M. Wyeth and I. C. Burnes.  
**ST. LOUIS**—A. G. Edwards & Sons, Brokerage Co.; capital stock increased from \$50,000 to \$100,000.

## NEBRASKA.

**DORCHESTER**—Dorchester State Bank; W. P. Thompson, Asst. Cashier.  
**ELK CREEK**—State Bank; Ira T. McClure, Asst. Cashier.  
**ELM CREEK**—First National Bank; J. M. Forristall, Cashier in place of F. H. Farnsworth.  
**GREELEY**—Greeley State Bank; P. J. Kenigan, Asst. Cashier in place of R. E. Samson.  
**LINCOLN**—Merchants' Bank; W. B. Ryons, Asst. Cashier in place of W. E. Taylor.  
**NEWCASTLE**—Ed. Wilkinson, Pres., in place of John Connery; John Connery, Vice-Pres. in place of D. T. Gilman.  
**OMAHA**—East Omaha Bank; C. H. Wilson, Pres.; G. W. Sues, Vice-Pres.  
**ORD**—Ord State Bank; E. N. Mitchell, Cashier in place of F. B. Bartlett.  
**PLAINVIEW**—Bank of Plainview; W. L. Mote, Cashier.  
**RANDOLPH**—Security State Bank; C. H. Randall, Cashier.  
**RULO**—Bank of Rulo; B. F. Cunningham, Cashier, resigned.

## NEW JERSEY.

**FRENCHTOWN**—Union National Bank; E. W. Bloom, Asst. Cashier.  
**TOM'S RIVER**—First National Bank; Amos Birdsall, Pres. in place of John Aumack, deceased.

## NEW YORK.

**FONDA**—National Mohawk River Bank; Daniel Spraker, Pres., deceased.  
**KINGSTON**—Ulster Co. Savings Institution; Chas. W. Deyo, Pres., deceased, also Cashier State of New York National Bank.  
**NEW YORK CITY**—Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank; James OIwell, Vice-Pres., deceased.—Benedict Bros.; J. H. Benedict, Jr., admitted to firm.—Second National Bank, Fifth Avenue Safe Deposit Co. and Union Dime Savings Bank; Alfred B. Darling, director, deceased.  
**STAMFORD**—National Bank of Stamford; F. E. Gilbert, Vice-Pres. in place of I. H. Maynard, deceased.  
**TROY**—National Bank of Troy; W. P. Alledorff, Cashier in place of Geo. H. Morrison.

## NORTH DAKOTA.

**CARRINGTON**—Carrington State Bank; A. I. Hegge, Cashier in place of P. W. Farnham.  
**CRYSTAL**—First Bank; Fred O. Appleton, Asst. Cashier.  
**ENDERLIN**—Enderlin State Bank; Fred Underwood, Cashier in place of S. T. Wolfe.  
**LAKOTA**—People's State Bank; S. A. Flooen, Asst. Cashier.

## OHIO.

**CLEVELAND**—German-American Sav. Bank; Wm. M. Reynolds, Pres. in place of James M. Jones; Wm. H. Beavis, Secretary; Max Levi, Asst. Cashier.  
**COLUMBUS**—Commercial National Bank; W. T. Cope, Pres. in place of Walter Crafts, deceased.  
**LEONTONIA**—First National Bank; R. P. Hartshorn, Cash. in place of John Leavitt.  
**TOLEDO**—Northern National Bank; Matthew Shoemaker, director, deceased.  
**VAN WERT**—First National Bank; A. B. Gleason, Pres. in place of Alonzo Conant, deceased.

## OKLAHOMA.

**BLACKWELL**—Bank of Blackwell; John Grattan, Pres.; M. E. Richardson, Cashier.  
**ENID**—Enid State Bank; H. H. Champlin, Cashier in place of Geo. W. Graham.  
**MEDFORD**—Grant Co. Bank; T. T. Godfrey, Asst. Cashier.

## OREGON.

**JOSEPH**—First Bank; R. H. Miller, Cashier

## PENNSYLVANIA.

**BEAVER**—Beaver National Bank; Wm. P. Judd, Asst. Cashier.  
**BROWNSVILLE**—Second National Bank; M. G. Bulger, Cashier; no Asst. Cashier in place of Wm. Parkhill.  
**JEANNETTE**—First National Bank; J. H. Ringer, Pres. in place of H. Sellers McKee; John W. Keltz, Cashier in place of C. R. Smith.  
**KANE**—First National Bank; C. H. Kemp, Cashier in place of F. A. Lyte, deceased.  
**NEW CASTLE**—First National Bank; Saml. Foltz, Cashier in place of Roy S. Foltz.  
**WELLSBORO**—First National Bank; L. Harrison, Pres. in place of J. M. Robinson, deceased.

## RHODE ISLAND.

**PROVIDENCE**—Roger Williams Nat. Bank; James W. Taft, Pres. *pro tem.*—Old Nat. Bank; Julius Palmer, Pres. in place of Christopher Lippitt.

## SOUTH DAKOTA.

**VERMILION**—First National Bank; Orville W. Thompson, Cashier in place of Martin J. Lewis, deceased.

## TENNESSEE.

**TRIMBLE**—Trimble Banking Co.; J. H. Pierce, Pres. in place of James R. Del Vecchio; T. A. Pierce, Cash. in place of G. P. McCorkle.



**TEXAS.**

**ARLINGTON**—Citizens' Bank; Thomas Spruance, Pres. in place of A. J. Rogers.  
**BROWNWOOD**—First National Bank; W. H. Thompson, Cashier; J. R. Taylor, Asst. Cashier in place of W. H. Thompson.

**VERMONT.**

**BRADFORD**—Bradford Savings Bank and Trust Co.; G. W. Chapman, Pres., deceased.  
**RUTLAND**—Merchants' National Bank; John A. Mead, Pres. in place of John N. Baxter; N. P. Kingsley, Vice-Pres.

**WASHINGTON.**

**SEDRO**—Bingham & Holbrook; succeeded by C. E. Bingham & Co.

**WEST VIRGINIA.**

**SISTERSVILLE**—Farmers and Producers' Na-

tional Bank; no Cashier in place of W. H. Kohl.

**WISCONSIN.**

**ELLSWORTH**—Bank of Ellsworth; Hans B. Warner, Pres., deceased.

**CANADA.****ONTARIO.**

**BLENNHEIM**—Canadian Bank of Commerce; S. M. Daly, Acting Manager.

**NEW BRUNSWICK.**

**NEW CASTLE**—Merchants' Bank of Halifax; F. McDougall, Agent in place of J. McKane.  
**SACKVILLE**—Merchants' Bank of Halifax; ———— McCurdy, Agent in place of F. McDougall.

**BRITISH COLUMBIA.**

**ROSSLAND**—Bank of Montreal; F. S. C. Fraser, Mgr.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****CALIFORNIA.**

**NATIONAL CITY**—Bank of National City.

**ILLINOIS.**

**CHICAGO**—Haymarket Produce Bank; assigned to Chas. L. Boyd.——— Avenue Savings Bank; assigned to Title Guarantee & Trust Co.——North & Taylor; in hands of Equitable Trust Co., Receiver.

**IOWA.**

**SIoux CITY**—Sioux City National Bank.

**KANSAS.**

**ARGENTINE**—Argentine Bank.  
**LARNED**—First National Bank; in hands of Wm. C. Stainsby, Receiver, Aug. 26.

**MICHIGAN.**

**HOMER**—Farmers' Bank.  
**LOWELL**—State Bank (C. J. Church & Co.)

**MINNESOTA.**

**MAPLETON**—Bank of Mapleton closed Aug. 22.  
**WEST DULUTH**—Manufacturers' Bank.

**MONTANA.**

**HELENA**—First National Bank.

**NEBRASKA.**

**BEATRICE**—First National Bank.——Beatrice Savings Bank.  
**CULBERTSON**—Hitchcock County Bank.  
**OGALLALA**—State Loan and Trust Co.  
**WYMORE**—Bank of Wymore.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**CLAREMONT**—Sullivan Savings Institution; in voluntary liquidation.  
**LEBANON**—Lebanon Savings Bank; enjoined from doing business September 1.  
**WILTON**—Wilton Savings Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

**BUFFALO**—Hydraulic Bank; in the hands of W. S. Sizer, Receiver.  
**NEW YORK CITY**—John Bloodgood & Co.  
**PENN YAN**—Yates County National Bank; in the hands of Josiah Van Vranken, Receiver, August 17.

**OHIO.**

**SABINA**—Citizens' Bank (Henry H. Thorp) assigned.

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**Angus R. Macfarlane,**  
**DULUTH, MINNESOTA.**

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, September 3, 1896.

THE STRINGENCY IN THE LOCAL MONEY MARKET is so unusual, as far as recent experience goes, as to make its happening at this time an event of more than ordinary importance. It is not very long since that money was practically unlendable on call at 1 per cent., yet it loaned at as high as 15 per cent. last month and time money went a begging at 8 per cent., while now it is scarcely to be had at any price.

Only about six months ago the New York Clearing-House banks were carrying a surplus in excess of the 25 per cent. reserve against deposits of about \$40,000,000, now it is less than \$9,000,000 and the question was seriously considered of issuing clearing-house certificates to help out the banks whose reserves had fallen below the 25 per cent. limit. The banks have been compelled to contract their loans, the necessity for which is apparent in the reduction which has occurred in deposits.

On July 18 last the total deposits of the banks in the New York Clearing-House Association were nearly \$506,000,000, at which time the loans were \$479,500,000. In the six weeks following deposits were reduced \$54,000,000 and loans about \$24,000,000. The drain of deposits had become very heavy before the banks began to call in their loans. The reduction in deposits and loans each week since July 18 is shown as follows:

Week ended	Decrease in deposits.	Decrease in loans.
July 25.....	\$12,632,900	\$5,301,000
August 1.....	8,844,200	4,704,000
" 8.....	7,849,500	1,498,300
" 15.....	9,770,800	3,119,400
" 22.....	9,085,100	5,984,700
" 29.....	6,362,800	3,143,300

In view of the heavy decrease in deposits there was nothing for the banks to do but to reduce their loans; that they have been conservative in the matter the above figures plainly testify. The withdrawal of deposits was exceptional, and indicates the hoarding of money as incidental to the present agitation of the silver question. Last year in the six weeks prior to September 1 deposits *increased* \$6,500,000, in 1894 they decreased \$3,000,000, in 1893 \$16,000,000 and in 1892 \$15,000,000.

The proposal to issue clearing-house certificates seems to have been justified not only by the existing situation, but by past experience. Although no banks availed themselves of the opportunity to obtain assistance, the issue of certificates under the circumstances seemed almost as necessary as on former occasions, when similar means were taken to sustain the banks.

Clearing-house certificates were issued in 1873, 1884, 1890 and 1893. The amounts issued were as follows:

Year.	New York.	Philadelphia.	Boston.
1873.....	\$26,586,006	\$6,786,000	.....
1884.....	24,915,000	.....	.....
1890.....	15,206,000	8,870,000	\$5,065,000
1893.....	33,280,000	10,986,000	11,445,000

In 1898 the Baltimore banks also issued \$1,475,000 certificates and the Pittsburg banks \$987,000.

The drain of deposits in the past six weeks was scarcely equalled in the panics of 1884, 1890 or 1893. In 1884 the deposits fell from \$363,500,000 on February 16 to \$280,700,000 on June 21, a loss of \$82,800,000 in 18 weeks. Loans were reduced \$52,800,000 in the same time. In 1890 deposits fell from \$413,000,000 to \$376,000,-

700, or \$36,800,000 between October 4 and December 13, a period of 10 weeks, while loans were reduced \$15,900,000. In 1898 from February 4 to August 19, a period of 28 weeks, deposits declined from \$495,500,000 to \$370,800,000 or \$125,200,000 and loans were reduced \$58,400,000.

The precedent established in the years mentioned warranted last month a resort to the same precautionary measures as were then adopted. It is a matter of congratulation that there was apparently no need on the part of any bank to protect itself in this way but if the only alternative is a further contraction of loans it would seem to be better to try the remedy that worked so well before.

No more remarkable change has taken place in the financial situation in recent years than the sudden drop in sterling exchange and the resumption in gold imports witnessed last month. In July the bankers of New York were engaged in the difficult task of helping the government to maintain its gold reserve and in trying to prevent a continuance of the gold export movement. The drain of gold from the Treasury has not yet ceased, but the movement of gold has set in towards this country and has already assumed considerable proportions. About \$25,000,000 of gold has been engaged for shipment to New York, part of which has arrived, and it is estimated that as much as \$50,000,000 will come before the movement ceases.

After exporting gold almost continuously for thirteen months and having parted with \$300,000,000 of the precious metal in the past six years, the importation of gold is rather a welcome change and particularly so if it is to assume any great volume. If gold is to come in freely during the remaining months of the year, there will be a complete reversal of the conditions that existed in the latter portion of 1895 and in fact during either of the past four years.

Last year we exported nearly \$32,000,000 of gold in August and September and nearly \$28,000,000 more in November and December. In 1894 we imported about \$2,500,000 from September 1 to December 1, but exported \$85,000,000 in December and January following. In 1893 we imported \$51,000,000 between August 1 and December 1, but nearly \$41,000,000 was imported in August by a forced process and it was all lost before June 30 following.

The gold import movement was anticipated by a decline in sterling exchange, but the first shipments were made while the sterling market was too high to permit any apparent profit in the operation. But rates fell rapidly until there was no question about the profitable character of gold imports and until rates go considerably higher the movement is not likely to be checked. Exchange rates are now lower than at any time since 1893 and on September 1 were lower than on the corresponding date in any year since 1887. We give below a table showing the rates for long and short sterling on September 1 and the range from September 1 to December 31 in each of the past eleven years with the net movement of gold in the last four months of each of those years:

Year.	September 1.		September 1 to December 31.		Gold movement, Sept. 1 to Dec. 31.
	60 day.	Demand.	60 day.	Demand.	
1885.....	4.84	4.86	4.83 @ 4.87	4.85 @ 4.90½	Imports, \$12,507,354
1886.....	4.82	4.85	4.80 @ 4.83	4.84 @ 4.86	" 30,041,054
1887.....	4.81	4.85	4.80½ @ 4.83½	4.84½ @ 4.87	" 29,492,255
1888.....	4.85½	4.88½	4.84½ @ 4.85½	4.88½ @ 4.89½	Exports, 8,746,618
1889.....	4.84½ @ 4.85	4.88½	4.80 @ 4.85½	4.84 @ 4.89	Imports, 2,573,591
1890.....	4.82½ @ 4.83	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.79½ @ 4.83	4.84 @ 4.88½	" 10,100,316
1891.....	4.82½ @ 4.83	4.85½	4.80 @ 4.84	4.84 @ 4.86	" 8,448,608
1892.....	4.87½	4.89½ @ 4.89	4.83½ @ 4.87½	4.86 @ 4.87	Exports, 9,590,671
1893.....	4.82½ @ 4.83	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.81 @ 4.86½	4.84 @ 4.89	Imports, 8,548,584
1894.....	4.86 @ 4.87	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.85 @ 4.89	4.83½ @ 4.90	Exports, 6,979,082
1895.....	4.89 @ 4.90	4.90 @ 4.91	4.87 @ 4.90	4.88 @ 4.91	" 44,300,553
1896.....	4.82 @ 4.82½	4.84 @ 4.84½	.....	.....	.....

Comparing the present rates of exchange with those which prevailed during the years of large gold imports, 1886, 1887 and 1891 for instance, it is apparent that the

sterling market and the present gold movement are in harmonious relations. Were we to go further back it would be seen that the natural movement of gold after September 1 is in this direction.

The arrivals of gold in August were not very large, but during the present month they will reach a large aggregate. It is possible that \$25,000,000 will not measure the total. Excluding the large imports of nearly \$41,000,000 in August, 1893, which were brought about by the syndicate of bankers engaged in helping the government, we should have to go back many years to find gold imports aggregating so much as \$25,000,000 in a single month. No month in the past fifteen years has such a record. In October, 1891, we imported gross about \$17,000,000; in October, 1887, \$18,000,000; in September, 1887, \$14,000,000; in December, 1886, \$12,000,000; in September, 1881, \$11,000,000; in April, 1881, \$15,000,000; in December, 1880, \$16,500,000; in October, 1880, \$16,000,000 and in September, 1880, \$19,000,000. These are all the large records since January 1, 1880.

If there were no question of confidence in American credit abroad, there could be no doubt that the future movement of gold would be favorable to the United States. The foreign trade balances are very large, exceptionally so. For the seven months ended July 31 we exported net \$90,700,000 of merchandise, \$26,800,000 of gold and \$28,800,000 of silver, a total of \$146,300,000, less about \$11,000,000 of gold and silver imported in ores. Last year we imported net \$21,200,000 of merchandise and exported \$12,500,000 of gold and \$23,600,000 of silver, making the total net exports about \$15,000,000, less \$7,500,000 ores imported. In the first seven months of 1894 our total net exports were about \$148,000,000; in 1893, \$7,000,000; in 1892, \$91,000,000 and in 1891 \$59,000,000. Our exports of merchandise in July were \$11,000,000 larger than in the corresponding month of last year, while the imports were \$21,000,000 less, making a change in the net balance of more than \$32,000,000. Such a movement continued any length of time will draw gold or securities from abroad.

The general business situation in the country is not as favorable as our foreign trade. Failures have been increasing both among commercial houses and banks. Evidences of dry rot have been disclosed in some of the failures; the cause of many of the wrecks has been lack of business rather than over speculation, and in some cases poor collections have forced suspensions.

Bank clearings are falling behind last year's totals, almost sufficient to wipe out the gains made in 1895, as compared with 1894. Credits are being curtailed and large business houses are not offering inducements to customers to increase their purchases except for cash.

Of late, railroad earnings have been showing decreases as compared with last year, although the aggregate loss is small, only about 2 per cent. The figures compiled by the "Financial Chronicle" for the first six months of the year show an increase in gross earnings of \$17,917,779, or 4.64 per cent. and in net earnings of \$4,186,586, or 3.71 per cent., on an increased mileage of less than  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. When the statements of individual roads come to be examined the results are not entirely satisfactory. In many cases increased business has not brought increased profits. Some of the largest gains in net earnings have been independent of any gain in gross earnings, while some roads reporting very large gains in gross earnings, show small gains in net earnings.

The Atchison has \$1,184,000 gain in net earnings, although the gross increased only \$187,000 in the six months. On the other hand the St. Paul, with an increase of \$2,073,000 in gross has again of only \$144,000 in net; the North Western a gain of \$1,980,000 gross and only \$234,000 net, and the Pennsylvania a gain of \$1,490,000 gross and only \$201,000 net. But one conclusion is to be drawn from these figures—that the railroads are doing business at the expense of rates.

**THE NATIONAL BANKS.**—The abstract of reports made to the Comptroller of the Currency, showing the condition of the National banks in the United States on July 14, 1898, shows little change in the direction of improvement. There has been a further decrease of 5 in the number of these institutions since May 7, 1898, a decrease since 1893 of 141. The capital stock has been reduced nearly \$1,000,000, making the total \$37,000,000 less than in 1893. The deposits are \$19,000,000 less than they were in May last and \$81,000,000 less than they were three years ago. The aggregate surplus is about \$800,000 more than in May, but the undivided profits are nearly \$6,000,000 less. There has been an increase in circulation of nearly \$2,000,000 and of about \$2,200,000 in government bonds to secure circulation, but a reduction in the bonds held to secure public deposits of nearly \$10,000,000. Altogether the banks hold about \$9,000,000 less of government bonds than they did about two months ago.

The loans of the National banks are about \$11,000,000 less than in May, the gold holdings have increased \$4,000,000, silver holdings have decreased \$2,500,000 and legal-tenders nearly \$7,000,000. The capital, surplus, deposits and reserves of the National banks during the past two years were as follows:

CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual Deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
Oct. 2, 1894.....	\$688,861,847	\$345,197,517	\$1,728,418,819	\$196,927,221	\$40,323,423	\$165,644,028
Dec. 19, 1894.....	666,271,045	244,937,179	1,695,439,346	175,794,767	42,246,455	156,003,472
Mar. 5, 1895.....	662,100,100	246,180,065	1,667,843,286	178,160,425	42,771,206	144,906,322
May 7, 1895.....	659,143,756	246,740,237	1,660,961,289	177,264,386	41,892,212	145,459,159
July 11, 1895.....	658,224,179	247,732,176	1,736,022,006	171,217,457	43,209,757	168,515,172
Sept. 28, 1895.....	657,185,498	246,448,426	1,701,653,521	162,825,280	38,812,021	148,866,085
Dec. 13, 1895.....	656,953,245	246,177,563	1,720,550,241	168,244,430	38,467,979	130,649,438
Feb. 26, 1896.....	653,994,915	247,178,188	1,648,082,898	156,894,080	39,123,428	141,242,513
May 7, 1896.....	652,089,730	247,546,067	1,667,629,515	157,761,800	44,611,646	147,008,652
July 14, 1896.....	651,144,855	248,368,423	1,668,413,507	161,853,560	41,961,889	140,373,280

**THE DECLINE IN RAILROAD BONDS.**—Since June there has been a very heavy decline in the prices of investment securities, among them those of the very best class. The stock market has had many serious breaks and there is hardly a stock listed at the Stock Exchange which did not sell at the lowest price of the year last month. August 7 was the date when prices generally reached their minimum point, since which time there has been some recovery. The declines in railroad stocks have ranged from 10 to 20 per cent. and over in many cases, and the most stable of bonds have fared almost as badly. The declines in some of the leading railroad bonds as compared with the highest prices at which they sold earlier in the year are shown in the following list:

	Decline Per cent.		Decline Per cent.
Central New Jersey gen. 5's.....	10	St. Louis and San Francisco 6's, Class C. 1's	10
Chesapeake and Ohio 1st consol. 5's.....	11½	St. Paul, Minn. and Man. Dak. ext'n 6's	7½
Chic., Burlington and Quincy deb. 5's....	16½	East Tenn., Vir. and Georgia con. 5's...	9½
Chicago and Erie 1st 5's.....	10½	Rich. and Danville con. 6's.....	10½
Chic., Milwaukee and St. Paul con. 7's...	13½	Virginia and Midland gen. 6's.....	10
Chicago and North Western con. 7's.....	11½	Wabash 1st 5's.....	10
Rock Island 6's coupon.....	10½	Canada Southern 2d 5's.....	7
Omaha 6's.....	12	Lake Shore con. 1st 7's.....	7
Clev., Cinn., Chicago and Ill. consol. 7's	15½	Michigan Central 1st con. 7's.....	8
Milwaukee, Lake Shore and West. 1st 6's	10½	New York Central 1st 7's.....	8½
New York, Lack. and Western, 1st 6's...	13½	West Shore guar. 4's.....	7½
New Haven con. deb. certificates.....	9½	New York, Chicago and St. Louis 4's...	5½
Northern Pacific Terminal 6's.....	9½	Union Pacific gold 6's.....	7

Each bond in the above list sold at above par during the year and very few are selling below even at the present time. The declines in such securities mark the selling by investors rather than by speculation. It is the almost invariable rule that an improvement in the stock market after a long period of depression is ushered in by a good buying movement in bonds. With the prices of first class rail-

road bonds now ruling at a point where purchases may be made so as to realize 5 per cent. or even better on the investment, there is certain to be an active and advancing bond market whenever confidence begins to grow. That may be soon or it may be a long way off; predictions are not safe, for the situation is very problematical.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—It is so long since anything like stringency has been apparent in the money market, that the experience of the last month has been in the nature of a novelty. Money has been tight and rates high. Money on call touched 6 per cent. in the first week of the month and 8 per cent. in the second although sometimes falling to as low as  $1\frac{1}{2}$  @ 2 per cent. In the last week of the month 15 per cent. was reached with 4 per cent. the minimum rate and 6 about the average. Time money rules high and commissions are being paid which carry the rate up to 8 @ 10 per cent. and even higher according to the length of time the loan is to run. Gold notes and gilt edged collateral are demanded. Commercial paper is not easy to sell and rates are not quoted, every transaction being a matter of private arrangement. At the close of the month call money ruled at 6 @ 8 per cent. with the average rate about 6 per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 6 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 6 @ 8 per cent. for 30 to 60 days, 9 @ 11 per cent. for 90 days to 4 months, 10 @ 11 per cent. for 5 to 6 months. For commercial paper the rates are 9 per cent. for choice endorsed bills receivable. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the following table.

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	Apr. 1.	May 1.	June 1.	July 1.	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	2 —3	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	2 —3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	6 —8
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$ —3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	2 —3	6
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	4	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6 —8
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	3	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	9 —11
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 —11
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — $4\frac{3}{4}$	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	9
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	6	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	6 —7	.....
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6 — $6\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	7 —8	.....

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The gold movement in favor of the United States which set in last month has, so far, been at the expense of the Bank of England, that institution at the close of the month holding about \$7,500,000 less gold than a month ago. It still has \$25,000,000 more than at this time last year. There was a slight increase in the gold holdings of the Bank of France and a gain of \$3,000,000 by the Bank of Germany and of \$7,000,000 by Austro-Hungary.

GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 1, 1896.		August 1, 1896.		September 1, 1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	\$24,980,066		\$27,880,142		\$26,372,048	
France.....	78,010,739	\$29,386,202	82,711,128	\$50,163,662	82,728,549	\$50,215,122
Germany.....	31,085,775	18,312,475	30,198,100	15,068,700	30,849,384	15,424,666
Austro-Hungary...	24,402,000	12,775,000	27,352,000	12,907,000	28,552,000	12,864,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,406,000	11,480,000	8,456,000	10,710,000
Netherlands.....	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,684,000	6,321,000	2,684,000	6,886,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,633,333	1,331,667	2,602,000	1,301,000	2,684,000	1,342,333
Totals.....	£192,708,903	£93,901,344	£201,783,370	£97,371,362	£202,276,598	£97,444,121

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	May 13, 1896.	June 17, 1896.	July 15, 1896.	Aug. 12, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills) .....	£26,194,170	£26,589,515	£27,387,770	£27,476,430
Public deposits .....	14,152,165	13,150,787	6,961,991	6,215,380
Other deposits .....	49,441,964	52,825,365	56,448,143	55,094,111
Government securities .....	15,290,785	15,205,022	14,900,281	14,956,965
Other securities .....	28,501,086	28,734,489	28,860,421	28,506,618
Reserve of notes and coin .....	87,672,586	90,389,678	87,599,866	86,462,190
Coin and bullion .....	47,068,756	49,079,193	48,187,668	47,133,600
Reserve to liabilities .....	59 1/2%	59 1/2%	59%	58 3/4%
Bank rate of discount .....	2%	2%	2%	2%
Market rate, 3 months' bills .....	3 1/2%	1 1/2%	1 1/2%	1 1/2%
Price of Consols (2 1/2% per cents.) .....	111 1/2	112 1/2	118 1/2	112 1/2
Price of silver per ounce .....	30 1/4d.	31 1/4d.	31 1/4d.	31 1/4d.
Average price of wheat .....	25s. 7d.	25s. 1d.	24s. 7d.	23s. 6d.

**SILVER.**—The recent course of silver both in New York and London has been disappointing to those who were looking for a rise. In July there were evidences that silver was being bought for the account of foreign investors in American securities who feared a slump in values should free coinage become the Government policy and thought they might hedge by buying silver for a rise. But last month silver declined even faster than it had recently been advancing and fell to the lowest point it has reached this year. Sales of silver came from America, and the price in London fell to 30 3/4d per ounce on August 19, a decline of one penny from the closing price in July. There was a recovery to 30 18-16d on August 21, but the price again fell off to 30 5/8d closing at 30 11-16d at the end of the month, a net loss of 11-16d.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894, 1895, 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	31 3/4	30 3/4	27 1/2	27 1/4	30 3/4	30 7/8	July.....	28 1/2	28 7/8	30 3/4	30 1/4	31 1/2	31 1/4
February	30 1/4	27 1/2	27 1/2	27 1/4	31 1/4	30 3/4	August ..	30 1/4	28 1/2	30 3/4	30 1/4	31 1/2	30 3/4
March....	27 1/2	27	30 3/4	27 3/4	31 1/4	31 1/8	Septemb'r	30 1/4	29 1/4	30 3/4	30 3/4	31 1/2	30 3/4
April.....	29 3/4	29 1/4	30 3/4	29 3/4	31 1/4	30 1/2	October...	29 1/2	28 1/2	31 1/2	30 3/4	31 1/2	30 3/4
May.....	29 1/4	28 3/4	30 3/4	30 1/4	31 1/4	30 1/2	Novemb'r	29 1/2	28 3/4	31 1/2	30 3/4	31 1/2	30 3/4
June.....	28 1/2	28 1/4	30 1/2	30 3/4	31 1/4	31 1/8	Decemb'r	29 1/2	27 1/2	30 1/2	30	31 1/2	30 3/4

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—A very remarkable change has occurred in the sterling exchange market in the last few weeks. Early in the month the market was dull and quiet. About the time the Government published the foreign trade returns for the month of July showing a very large excess of exports over imports the rates for sterling began to decline. The fall was rapid until rates touched the gold importing

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	May. 1.	June 1.	July 1.	August 1.	Sept. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days .....	4.87 1/2 — 88	4.87 1/2 — 3/4	4.87 — 1/4	4.88 —	4.82 — 2 1/4
" " Sight .....	4.88 1/2 — 89	4.88 1/2 — 3/4	4.88 — 1/4	4.89 —	4.84 — 1/4
" " Cables .....	4.89 — 1/4	4.89 1/2 — 9	4.88 1/2 — 1/4	4.89 1/2 —	4.84 1/2 — 1/4
" " Commercial long .....	4.87 1/2 — 88	4.87 — 1/4	4.86 1/2 — 3/4	4.87 1/2 — 3/4	4.81 1/2 — 3/4
" " Documentary for paym't. ....	4.86 1/2 — 87	4.86 1/2 — 3/4	4.86 — 3/4	4.87 — 1/4	4.81 — 1/2
Paris—Cable transfers .....	5.14 1/2 — 18 3/4	5.14 1/2 — 18 3/4	5.15 1/2 — 15	5.14 1/2 — 3 3/4	5.20 — 19 1/4
" " Bankers' 60 days .....	5.16 1/2 — 1/4	5.16 1/2 — 1/4	5.17 1/2 — 6 3/4	5.16 1/2 —	5.22 1/2 — 1 1/2
" " Bankers' sight .....	5.14 1/2 —	5.15 — 4 3/4	5.15 1/2 —	5.15 — 4 3/4	5.20 1/2 — 20
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days ..	5.18 1/2 — 1/2	5.18 1/2 — 1/2	5.18 1/2 — 6 3/4	5.18 1/2 — 1/2	5.22 1/2 — 4 3/4
Swiss—Bankers' sight .....	5.16 1/2 — 15 3/4	5.16 1/2 — 5 3/4	5.16 1/2 —	5.16 1/2 — 5 3/4	5.21 1/2 — 1/2
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days .....	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 —	94 1/2 — 1/2
" " Bankers' sight .....	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 — 1/2	95 1/2 — 1 1/2	94 1/2 — 5
Brussels—Bankers' sight .....	5.15 — 14 3/4	5.15 —	5.15 1/2 —	5.15 1/2 — 15	5.20 1/2 — 20
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight ....	40 1/2 — 1/2	40 1/2 — 3/4	40 1/2 — 3/4	40 1/2 — 3/4	40 — 1/2
Kroners—Bankers' sight .....	28 1/2 — 7 1/2	27 — 1/2	27 — 1/2	27 — 1/2	28 1/2 — 1 1/2
Italian lire—sight .....	5.62 1/2 — 52 1/2	5.47 1/2 — 45	5.50 — 45	5.50 — 40	5.60 — 50

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Aug. 1.....	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.89 @ 4.89½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.86½ @ 4.87
8.....	4.87½ @ 4.88	4.88½ @ 4.89	4.89 @ 4.89½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.86½ @ 4.87
15.....	4.86 @ 4.86½	4.87 @ 4.87½	4.87½ @ 4.87½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.85 @ 4.85½
22.....	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.85½ @ 4.86	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.83½ @ 4.83½
29.....	4.81½ @ 4.82	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.81

point, and large engagements for shipments of gold to the United States were made in the last half of the month. The high rates which have ruled in our local money market and the large export balances with the cessation of foreign selling of American securities are the principal causes for the decline in sterling. The preceding tables show the condition of foreign exchange markets.

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—The ruling rates for money in the foreign markets continue low without any significant change in quotations. In both Paris and London the open market rates continue below one per cent. The nominal rate of the Bank of England remains at the minimum point, two per cent.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Mar. 13.	Apr. 17.	May 15.	June 19.	July 17.	Aug. 14.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½	1½—1½
Loans—Day to day.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Berlin, .....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Hamburg, .....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Frankfort, .....	2	2	2	2	2	2
Amsterdam, .....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Vienne, .....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
St. Petersburg, .....	6½	6½	6½	6½	6	6
Madrid, .....	4½	4½	4½	5	5	5
Copenhagen, .....	3½	3	3	3½	3½	3½

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The deficit in the revenues of the Government in the past two months is the largest for any two months since the Government began to run behind. In July the deficit was \$18,059,257 and in August \$10,438,908, a total for the two months of nearly \$28,500,000, or within \$5,000,000 of as much as the total deficiency for the twelve months ended June 30, 1896. The revenues were only about \$25,560,000, a decrease of \$3,400,000 as compared with August, 1895. There was a decrease in customs of \$3,800,000 and of \$200,000 in internal revenue receipts, and an increase of \$100,000 in miscellaneous. Expenditures were \$36,001,000, an increase of \$3,400,000 over 1895. The principal increases are \$4,800,000 in civil and miscellaneous, and \$1,100,000 in interest, the other items showing small decreases. The deficit for the month is \$6,800,000 larger than last year's, and for the two months \$10,800,000 larger.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	August, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.	Source.	August, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.
Customs.....	\$12,326,496	\$24,496,826	Civil and mis.....	\$12,046,000	\$24,398,981
Internal revenue...	11,961,338	26,263,871	War.....	4,503,000	9,728,425
Miscellaneous.....	1,271,263	3,840,909	Navy.....	2,222,000	5,978,251
			Indians.....	1,848,000	2,799,582
Total.....	\$25,562,097	\$54,591,606	Pensions.....	12,362,000	25,492,775
Excess of expenditures.....	\$10,438,908	\$23,496,162	Interest.....	2,980,000	9,700,504
			Total.....	\$36,001,000	\$78,098,468



## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	May 31.	June 30.	July 31.	August 31.
Net gold.....	\$108,663,399	\$102,418,008	\$110,567,322	\$101,706,672
Net silver.....	28,237,885	36,331,904	38,630,416	25,776,690
U. S. notes.....	87,629,865	88,980,861	67,704,864	75,139,381
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).....	22,244,338	22,432,899	28,780,225	27,589,108
Deposits in National banks.....	22,068,400	16,778,461	16,284,421	16,624,322
Available cash balance.....	\$268,868,751	\$266,942,129	\$262,147,249	\$246,786,161

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$27,804,400	\$34,523,447	\$44,705,967	\$29,237,670	\$32,529,340	\$49,845,507
February.....	22,888,057	25,096,035	87,085,511	26,059,228	26,749,956	123,962,979
March.....	25,470,576	25,716,957	90,403,307	20,041,149	27,274,994	123,646,461
April.....	24,247,836	32,960,676	91,247,144	24,282,893	28,967,381	125,393,900
May.....	25,272,078	28,558,214	99,151,409	24,043,718	28,426,592	108,345,234
June.....	25,615,474	21,683,029	107,512,362	27,794,219	25,444,789	101,699,095
July.....	29,069,698	38,548,064	107,236,487	29,029,309	42,088,468	110,718,746
August.....	28,662,096	32,588,185	100,329,637	25,562,097	36,001,000	*101,706,672
September.....	27,549,678	24,320,482	92,911,974			
October.....	27,901,748	34,563,425	92,943,180			
November.....	25,986,503	27,199,283	79,533,966			
December.....	26,288,938	25,814,317	63,262,268			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—There was an unusual increase in National bank circulation last month, \$3,588,994, making an increase in twelve months of \$17,277,276. Nearly \$5,500,000 of Government bonds were deposited to secure circulation. The circulation based on Government bonds amounts to \$210,293,574 and secured by lawful money deposited \$19,232,875.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	May 31, 1896.	June 30, 1896.	July 31, 1896.	Aug. 31, 1896.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$225,200,348	\$225,912,980	\$225,942,455	\$229,526,449
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	205,215,839	205,538,929	206,108,504	210,293,574
Circulation secured by lawful money....	19,984,509	20,374,061	19,833,951	19,232,875
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Four per cents. of 1895.....	31,963,550	31,783,550	32,630,050	34,954,550
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	10,407,000	10,046,000	9,831,000	9,638,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,384,950	22,078,100	22,241,100	22,368,850
" " 1907, 4 per cent.....	151,539,450	151,950,450	151,774,450	152,984,450
Five per cents. of 1894.....	12,956,850	13,067,850	13,067,850	13,182,850
Total.....	\$228,651,800	\$228,915,950	\$229,544,450	\$235,078,700

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1895, \$1,380,000; Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$880,000; 2 per cents. of 1891, \$983,000; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$12,195,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$625,000, a total of \$15,963,000.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$37,447.

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—There was a heavy drain of deposits in our local banks last month more than \$33,000,000 being withdrawn, making about \$54,000,000 since the middle of July. Loans were reduced less than \$14,000,000 causing a decrease in the surplus reserve of nearly \$9,000,000, the latter now being only \$8,836,000 as compared with more than \$39,000,000 a year ago. The deposits are now \$128,000,000 less than on September 1 last year.

## NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Aug. 1....	\$469,535,900	\$46,254,700	\$92,727,400	\$485,014,000	\$17,728,800	\$14,800,000	\$444,781,100
" 8....	468,087,800	46,545,800	86,560,900	477,164,500	13,615,575	14,983,200	502,877,400
" 15....	464,918,200	46,863,000	79,885,800	467,363,700	9,400,175	15,789,800	467,666,900
" 22....	458,963,500	46,796,600	77,050,700	458,286,600	9,272,650	16,065,800	441,280,500
" 29....	455,790,200	47,345,700	74,474,200	451,984,800	8,836,200	17,055,500	416,580,211

## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$506,437,800	\$80,815,150	\$549,291,400	\$35,268,850	\$501,089,200	\$15,989,675
February.....	551,808,400	111,623,000	548,965,200	36,751,500	490,447,300	39,632,400
March.....	531,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,054,500	489,612,200	24,442,150
April.....	547,744,200	83,600,150	504,240,200	13,413,450	481,795,700	17,006,975
May.....	573,853,800	88,417,950	536,998,100	27,233,575	495,004,100	22,944,275
June.....	572,138,400	77,965,100	546,229,400	41,221,250	498,874,100	22,230,675
July.....	573,337,800	74,803,850	570,436,200	34,225,925	499,046,900	20,328,275
August.....	581,556,000	69,063,700	574,304,500	40,917,175	485,014,000	17,728,600
September.....	585,978,900	65,820,825	574,329,900	39,149,925	451,934,800	8,536,200
October.....	586,683,500	60,791,825	549,136,500	22,296,175		
November.....	595,104,900	63,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400		
December.....	579,836,600	52,230,800	520,788,000	18,613,300		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$595,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table:

## BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Aug. 1.....	\$162,209,000	\$138,211,000	\$7,571,000	\$7,369,000	\$9,986,000	\$96,420,800
" 8.....	162,001,000	138,650,000	7,058,000	7,248,000	10,209,000	81,170,700
" 15.....	160,840,000	136,111,000	7,107,000	7,337,000	10,014,000	73,785,100
" 22.....	161,793,000	134,875,000	7,119,000	7,613,000	9,978,000	71,022,500
" 29.....	160,921,000	131,398,000	7,146,000	6,833,000	10,046,000	59,767,700

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
August 1.....	\$102,628,000	\$98,422,000	\$27,479,000	\$6,482,000	\$49,394,862
" 8.....	102,781,000	96,982,000	26,227,000	6,505,000	52,522,900
" 15.....	102,505,000	94,874,000	25,880,000	6,556,000	53,192,300
" 22.....	102,599,000	95,072,000	26,040,000	6,599,000	54,454,300
" 29.....	102,852,000	96,280,000	25,890,000	6,547,000	50,344,700

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion:

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ 60		Twenty marks.....	\$4.75	\$4.80
United States dollars.....	51½	\$ 52½	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos.....	47½	48½	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.79	4.83
English silver.....	4.86	4.87½	Mexican doubloons.....	15.55	15.75
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.88	4.90	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.60
Five francs.....	94	97	Ten guilders.....	3.95	3.99
Twenty francs.....	3.86	3.91			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 80½d per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 66½ @ 66¾c. Fine silver (Government assay), 66¼ @ 67½c.

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The coinage of the mints in August was: gold, \$3,815,000; silver, \$2,686,000, of which \$2,650,000 was silver dollars; minor coin, \$37,220; a total of \$6,068,220.

**COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES MINTS.**

	1895.		1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$3,668,900	\$574,000	\$12,914,600	\$95,000
February.....	6,143,900	491,000	1,240,000	1,500,000
March.....	2,866,102	573,537	1,540,555	1,693,531
April.....	4,699,900	595,000	1,500,000	1,831,000
May.....	4,183,938	440,508	2,857,200	1,826,460
June.....	1,750,000	440,043	2,471,217	1,650,668
July.....	2,910,000	277,000	2,918,300	1,062,000
August.....	3,672,200	748,000	3,315,000	2,666,000
September.....	7,543,573	473,167		
October.....	7,215,700	890,000		
November.....	6,916,900	190,169		
December.....	8,097,145	75,562		
Year.....	\$59,616,357	\$5,698,011	\$28,756,373	\$12,634,714

**FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.**—The export movement in July was very large, exceeding that of June by \$1,000,000, and of July, 1895, by \$11,000,000. The exports of merchandise aggregated \$67,714,735, the largest for any corresponding month in seven years. The imports were \$51,927,566, or \$4,000,000 less than in June and \$11,000,000 less than in July last year. The net exports were \$15,787,169, a showing unequalled in a good many years. We exported net \$9,097,788 gold and \$4,891,399 silver, and imported \$138,119 gold and \$1,786,287 silver in ore, making a total balance of nearly \$28,000,000 exported for the month. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and seven months ended July 31, for the past six years:

**EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.**

MONTH OF JULY.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$62,068,896	\$67,042,035	Imp., \$4,373,142	Exp., \$5,633,526	Imp., \$244,406
1892.....	58,401,758	65,670,021	7,268,263	10,240,198	Exp., 597,008
1893.....	60,113,857	63,186,067	Exp., 5,927,790	Imp., 5,776,401	" 4,007,976
1894.....	52,614,176	65,302,066	Imp., 12,687,890	Exp., 12,823,572	" 2,256,175
1895.....	56,541,589	73,025,646	16,484,057	3,200,067	" 4,041,728
1896.....	67,714,735	51,927,566	Exp., 15,787,169	" 9,097,788	" 4,891,399
SEVEN MONTHS.					
1891.....	482,053,344	499,688,057	Imp., 17,634,713	Exp., 72,787,660	Exp., 3,084,966
1892.....	537,554,711	497,397,562	Exp., 40,157,149	43,773,740	8,035,094
1893.....	457,511,344	520,383,575	Imp., 62,872,231	56,182,494	13,987,176
1894.....	456,863,637	397,680,928	Exp., 59,182,709	72,297,978	21,386,171
1895.....	443,406,784	464,625,876	Imp., 21,219,092	12,542,560	23,636,724
1896.....	512,326,732	421,583,123	Exp., 90,743,609	26,866,642	28,874,247

**GOLD MOVEMENT FOR FOUR YEARS.**

	1893-1894.	1894-1895.	1895-1896.	1896-1897.
July.....	Imp., \$5,776,401	Exp., \$12,823,572	Exp., \$3,296,067	Exp., \$9,097,788
August.....	" 40,622,529	" 1,935,308	" 15,133,175	
September.....	" 5,242,063	Imp., 418,118	" 16,674,009	
October.....	" 1,072,919	" 519,851	" 76,857	
November.....	" 4,139,632	" 1,507,388	" 13,468,188	
December.....	Exp., 1,908,300	Exp., 9,424,439	" 14,170,899	
January.....	573,790	24,698,489	" 198,598	
February.....	" 1,068,335	Imp., 4,067,008	Imp., 9,775,389	
March.....	" 2,929,241	" 4,120,290	" 298,663	
April.....	" 9,402,110	" 2,029,761	Exp., 2,689,764	
May.....	" 23,124,058	" 3,271,193	" 18,493,709	
June.....	" 22,376,872	" 1,993,750	" 6,015,741	
Year.....	Exp., \$4,528,942	Exp., \$30,964,449	Exp., \$30,521,287	

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of August, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				AUGUST, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	23½	3½	17¾-Feb. 24	8¼-Aug. 7	7	11¾	8¼	11½	
" preferred.	38½	16	28½-Feb. 24	14½-Aug. 7	7	17½	14½	17	
Atlantic & Pacific.	2	½	¾-Feb. 6	¾-Jan. 7	7	.....	.....	.....	
Baltimore & Ohio.	66½	32½	44-Jan. 27	12½-Aug. 26	16	12½	13½	13½	
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts....	24	19	25-May 16	15-Feb. 11	11	.....	.....	.....	
Canadian Pacific.	62½	33	62½-May 27	52-Jan. 4	4	57½	55	57½	
Canada Southern.	57½	42	51½-Feb. 10	40½-Aug. 7	7	44½	40½	44½	
Central of New Jersey.	116½	51½	109½-Apr. 23	87½-Aug. 10	10	95½	87½	95	
Central Pacific.	21½	12	15½-Feb. 15	18½-Aug. 22	22	12½	18½	13½	
Ches. & Ohio vtg. ctf's.	59½	12½	18½-Apr. 23	11-Aug. 8	8	18½	11	18½	
Chicago & Alton.	180	147	180-Jan. 18	145-Aug. 11	150	146	146	146	
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy.	92½	69	82½-Apr. 24	53-Aug. 7	68	58	61½	61½	
Chicago & E. Illinois.	57	43½	45-Feb. 13	37½-Aug. 10	40½	37½	37½	37½	
" preferred.	106	90	100½-Mar. 5	90-Aug. 11	90	90	90	90	
Chicago Gas.	78½	49½	70½-May 4	44½-Aug. 8	54½	44½	53½	53½	
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	78½	53½	79½-June 17	59½-Aug. 10	69½	59½	66½	66½	
" preferred.	180	114½	180½-Mar. 2	117½-Aug. 7	123½	117½	121	121	
Chicago & Northwestern.	107½	87½	106½-Apr. 23	86½-Aug. 10	98	86½	95½	95½	
" preferred.	161	137	150-June 30	140½-Aug. 28	140½	140½	140½	140½	
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	84½	59	74½-Feb. 24	49½-Aug. 7	59½	49½	58½	58½	
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om..	46	28½	45½-Apr. 27	30½-Aug. 8	30½	30½	35	35	
" preferred.	123½	104	125½-July 3	117-Jan. 7	120	119	120	120	
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis.	50	28	36½-Feb. 10	19½-Aug. 8	24½	19½	24	24	
" preferred.	97	59½	90½-Feb. 30	73-Aug. 7	73½	73	73½	73½	
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	11½	3	4½-Jan. 16	14-July 18	14	14	16	16	
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41½	20½	34½-Feb. 24	14½-Aug. 7	17½	14½	16	16	
Columbus & Rock. Val. Coal.	9½	2	4½-Mar. 7	¾-July 9	9	9	11½	11½	
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	27½	14½	18½-Jan. 27	12½-Aug. 10	15	12½	14½	14½	
" preferred.	69½	55	60-July 22	50-June 22	59½	53½	59½	59½	
Consolidated Gas Co.	161½	126	164½-Apr. 29	133-Aug. 10	143½	133	142	142	
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co....	134½	118	128½-Feb. 11	114½-Aug. 10	119½	114½	116	116	
Delaware, Lack. & Western.	174	154	166-June 5	138-Aug. 10	151½	138	150½	150½	
Denver & Rio Grande.	17½	10	14-Feb. 4	10-Aug. 25	10	10	10	10	
" preferred.	55½	32½	51-Feb. 24	37-Aug. 7	40½	37	39	39	
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102½	94	100½-May 6	89-Jan. 2	90	90	90	90	
Erie.	159½	127	159½-Mar. 12	104½-Aug. 7	127½	104½	127½	127½	
" 1st pref.	41½	27	41½-Mar. 17	27-July 29	28½	24	28	28	
" 2d pref.	25	16	25-Mar. 16	13-Aug. 6	16	13	16	16	
Evansville & Terre Haute.	51	28	34½-Feb. 24	24-Aug. 15	27	24	24	24	
Express Adams.	133	140	150½-Apr. 28	135-Aug. 25	148	135	140	140	
" American.	118½	109	116-May 25	105-Aug. 18	109	105	108	108	
" United States.	50	36	48-Apr. 24	35-Aug. 25	40½	35	35	35	
" Wells, Fargo.	115	85	101-Feb. 15	80-Aug. 14	90½	80	90	90	
Great Northern, preferred....	124	100	121-May 7	106½-Mar. 13	109	109	109	109	
Illinois Central.	108	81½	98-Jan. 31	84½-Aug. 11	91	84½	85½	85½	
Iowa Central.	11½	5½	10½-Feb. 8	5½-Aug. 13	6½	5½	6	6	
" preferred.	38	19	38-Apr. 23	19-Aug. 7	22½	19	22½	22½	
Laclede Gas.	38½	14½	30-Apr. 27	17-July 20	20	18	18½	18½	
Lake Erie & Western.	28	15½	22½-Feb. 5	12½-Aug. 10	14½	12½	14½	14½	
" preferred.	38	15	75-Feb. 7	52½-Aug. 8	63½	55½	62½	62½	
Lake Shore.	153½	134½	154½-June 17	134½-Jan. 7	143½	134½	142	142	
Long Island.	89½	83	84-Jan. 7	68-July 29	69	68	68	68	
Long Island Traction.	22	5	22-Feb. 19	16-Jan. 10	16	16	16	16	
Louisville & Nashville.	66½	39	55½-Feb. 24	37½-Aug. 28	44½	37½	40½	40½	
Louis., N. A. & Chic., Tr. ctf's.	10½	6	10½-Feb. 18	4-Aug. 26	6½	4	2½	2½	
" preferred.	26½	15½	24½-Feb. 13	1-Aug. 26	13½	1	5	5	
Manhattan consol.	119½	85	113½-Feb. 11	73½-Aug. 13	89½	73½	81½	81½	
Michigan Central.	108	91½	97½-Feb. 11	89-Aug. 28	97½	89	90	90	
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	26½	14	21½-Feb. 21	12-Aug. 21	13½	12	12	12	
" 1st pref.	88	78	86-Feb. 21	54-Aug. 8	82	54	60	60	
" 2d pref.	62	39½	53½-Apr. 22	30-Aug. 10	38	30	33	33	
Mobile & Ohio.	27	13½	25-Jan. 11	14-Aug. 10	15	14	15	15	
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9½	13½-Feb. 21	9½-Aug. 6	10½	9½	10½	10½	
" preferred.	41	18½	31½-Feb. 25	16-July 20	22½	16½	22½	22½	

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.		AUGUST, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{5}{8}$	29 $\frac{3}{4}$ —Apr. 24	15 —Aug. 7	17 $\frac{7}{8}$	15	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis.....	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	64	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104 $\frac{5}{8}$	90	109 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	88 —Aug. 6	92 $\frac{3}{4}$	88	92
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	15 —Jan. 22	9 —Aug. 11	10	9	10
1st preferred.....	75	65	80 —Jan. 22	67 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 23	.....	.....	.....
2d preferred.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	35 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 13	20 —Aug. 10	25	20	25
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	159 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 20	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 7	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	30	16	29 —Feb. 20	25 —Jan. 22	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England.....	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	29	51 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 28	35 —July 21	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.....	218	174	186 —Feb. 10	160 —July 23	163 $\frac{1}{2}$	160	165 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	194	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	157 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 31	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 10	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	128 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	143 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	117 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 31	6 —Aug. 11	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 6	12 —Aug. 8	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
Norfolk & Western.....	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 15	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 29	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	8
preferred.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	13 —Aug. 31	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 8	13	11	13
North American Co.....	7	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 7	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 31	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ —May 23	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
pref tr. receipts.....	27	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 31	10 —Apr. 16	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	18
Ohio & Mississippi.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	44 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 4	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ —June 12	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	32	17	22 —Apr. 14	10 —Feb. 18	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line.....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 —Aug. 10	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 14	11	11	11
Pacific Mail.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	31 —Feb. 10	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 7	19	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	74	2	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	14 —June 23	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
Phila. & Reading 2d Ins. pd.....	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 —June 16	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 26	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 7	11 —Aug. 7	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	12
preferred.....	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	59 —Feb. 27	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 12	42	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	42
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 31	17 —Jan. 15	.....	.....	.....
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178 $\frac{1}{2}$	146	164 —Feb. 11	138 —Aug. 7	144	138	141
Rio Grande Western.....	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	16 —Feb. 8	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	30	46 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	39 —Jan. 27	.....	.....	.....
Rome, Wat. Ogden's g.....	120	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 27	110 —Aug. 15	112	110	112
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 3	53 —Aug. 14	53	53	53
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	104	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	54 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 7	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 10	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	13 —Feb. 26	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 7	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
St. Paul & Duluth.....	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 24	18 —Feb. 4	18	18	18
preferred.....	95	86	91 —Feb. 10	90 —Aug. 4	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	115 —Jan. 11	105 —Aug. 11	105	105	105
Southern Pacific Co.....	223 $\frac{1}{2}$	163 $\frac{1}{2}$	224 —Jan. 14	164 —Aug. 27	189 $\frac{1}{2}$	164	166 $\frac{1}{2}$
Southern Railway.....	147 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	11 —Feb. 6	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 7	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	33 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	15 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 8	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 10	13 —July 20	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
Texas & Pacific.....	148 $\frac{1}{2}$	67 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 25	5 —Aug. 7	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	10 —Apr. 21	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Jan. 25	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 13	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ —July 29	2	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wabash R. R.....	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	74 —Feb. 24	41 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 7	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	54 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	264 $\frac{1}{2}$	123 $\frac{1}{2}$	193 —Feb. 24	11 —Aug. 7	144 $\frac{1}{2}$	11	134 $\frac{1}{2}$
Western Union.....	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 22	72 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 10	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	184	67 $\frac{1}{2}$	134 —Feb. 14	54 —Aug. 27	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	64
preferred.....	547 $\frac{1}{2}$	29	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 13	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 8	254	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	234
Wisconsin Central.....	74	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 —Feb. 24	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 21	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	13
STOCKS: "INDUSTRIAL"							
American Co. Oil Co.....	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	19 —Jan. 27	8 —July 20	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	9
preferred.....	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	68 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 14	37 —Aug. 10	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	37	42 $\frac{1}{2}$
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	84 $\frac{1}{2}$	126 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 21	95 —Aug. 10	108 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	108 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	107 $\frac{1}{2}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	104 —May 27	92 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 8	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	92 $\frac{1}{2}$	98
American Tobacco Co.....	17	63	95 —Apr. 2	51 —Aug. 10	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	51	50 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	116	90	103 —Feb. 13	95 —Aug. 4	95	95	95
Dis. & Cattle Feed Co.....	254 $\frac{1}{2}$	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	204 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 23	94 —Aug. 7	106 $\frac{1}{2}$	94	94
General Electric Co.....	41	20	39 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Mar. 13	20 —July 16	25	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$
National Lead Co.....	38	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 21	16 —Aug. 10	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	943 $\frac{1}{2}$	73	91 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Apr. 17	75 —Aug. 27	83	75	80
National Linseed Oil Co.....	318 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	214 —June 23	13 —Aug. 21	15	13	13
National Starch Manfg. Co.....	12	5	64 —Feb. 21	44 —Jan. 14	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	63 —Feb. 9	34 —Aug. 31	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	34	34
preferred.....	17	14	123 —Feb. 7	64 —Aug. 31	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	64	79
U. S. Leather Co.....	243 $\frac{1}{2}$	58	117 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Feb. 8	54 —July 16	67 $\frac{1}{2}$	64	67
preferred.....	973 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	694 —Feb. 14	414 —Aug. 10	484	414	464
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	20 —Jan. 13	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ —Aug. 8	16	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	984	75	89 —Jan. 15	694 —Aug. 18	71	694	71

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 13, '96	....	....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1995	7,000,000	Q J	65	Aug. 31, '96	65½	65	16,000
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	95,488,000	A & O	73½	Aug. 31, '96	74½	69½	1,302,000
adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	51,728,000	NOV	81½	Aug. 31, '96	83½	28½	1,594,000
Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colorado Midland 1st g. 5's.....	1908	428,000	J & D	77½	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng Tr. Co. certs of dep.	.....	5,821,000	.....	65	July 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	978,000	F & A	21	June 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certs of dep.	.....	3,868,000	.....	19½	July 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,288,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1937	18,790,000	J & J	50	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d W. d. g. g. a. f. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	92	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
Western div. inc.....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	1½	July 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
div. small.....	1910	.....	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....
Central div. inc.....	1922	1,811,000	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).....	1919	3,000,000	A & O	105	July 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
5's, gold.....	1885-1925	10,000,000	{ F&A	82	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F&A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1988	11,988,000	{ F&A	103	July 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F&A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd.....	1990	6,000,000	M & N	83½	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
W. Virginia & Pitta. 1st g. 5's.....	1990	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s.....	1990	10,687,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1903	10,483,000	J & J	79	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
"B".....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1930	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. s. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's.....	1943	7,650,000	{ J&D	111½	Aug. 31, '96	111½	109½	98,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ J&D	112½	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	110½	Aug. 24, '96	110½	110½	1,000
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s.....	1924	8,500,000	A & O	77½	Aug. 29, '96	78	77	26,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	52	June 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
Union Elevated 1st g. g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	76	Aug. 24, '96	76	75	7,000
Seaside & Bkin Bdge 1st g. g. 5's.....	1942	1,365,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	72½	Aug. 29, '96	73	70	7,000
Brunswick & Western 1s g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitta. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	97	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	120	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	112	Aug. 15, '96	112	112	3,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121½	May 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.....	1913	1,348,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.....	1908	6,500,000	J & D	102	Aug. 12, '96	102	100	7,000
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	{ A & O	102½	July 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	97	Feb. 9, '93	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st 7's.....	1927	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
{ Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's, 1920 1st 5's.....		825,000 1,905,000	A & O A & O	105½	May 21, '98	....	....	....
				102	July 28, '98	....	....	....
{ Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's, 1908 2d mortg. 5's.....		13,920,000 5,100,000	J & J M & S	108	Aug. 31, '98	108	105	84,000
				100½	Aug. 24, '98	101	100	18,000
{ Col. & Cin. Midl'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s, 1939		2,000,000	J & J	108½	Apr. 7, '98	....	....	....
				92½	Aug. 31, '92	....	....	....
{ Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's, 1937 Chat., Rom. & Colu's g. g. 5's, 1937		4,880,000 2,080,000	M & N M & S	95	July 3, '98	....	....	....
				70	July 25, '98	....	....	....
{ Central Railroad of New Jersey, 1st consolidated 7's..... convertible 7's..... deb. 6's..... gen. mtg. 5's..... registered..... Lehigh & W.-B. con. ass'd. 7's..... mortgage 5's.....		3,836,000 1,167,000 466,000 41,604,000 5,500,000 2,887,000 4,987,000	Q J M & N M & N J & J Q J Q M M & N	103½	Aug. 31, '98	108½	103½	11,000
				115	June 23, '98	....	....	....
				114	Apr. 2, '98	....	....	....
				112	Aug. 31, '98	114½	109	175,000
				111	Aug. 21, '98	112½	110	40,000
				102	Aug. 28, '98	102½	101½	27,000
				90	May 15, '98	....	....	....
{ Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's, 1921 N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's.....		4,987,000 411,000	J & J J & J	110	Aug. 28, '98	110	108	12,000
				108½	July 23, '98	....	....	....
{ Central Pacific g'd bonds..... San Joaquin br. 6's..... Mtte. gold gtd. 5's..... Central Pacific land grant 5's..... ext g 5s series A B C D..... Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's, 1918 Western Pacific bonds 6's..... North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's, gtd. 1907 50 year m. g. 5's.....		19,493,000 6,080,000 11,000,000 2,528,000 5,598,000 4,368,000 2,735,000 3,964,000 4,800,000	J & J J & J A & O A & O J & J J & J J & J J & J A & O	102	May 20, '98	....	....	....
				100	Aug. 31, '98	100	100	6,000
				104	Aug. 21, '98	104	104	3,000
				91	Mar. 14, '98	....	....	....
				98	May 8, '98	....	....	....
				98	Aug. 27, '98	98	98	1,000
				107½	Nov. 27, '98	....	....	....
				98	Aug. 4, '98	98	98	5,000
				101	Aug. 5, '98	....	....	....
				92	Aug. 31, '98	92½	91½	135,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's.....		1,500,000	J & J	108½	Dec. 13, '98	....	....	....
{ Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd..... 6's, g., Series A..... Mortgage gold 6's..... 1st con. g. 5's..... registered..... Gen. m. g. 4½'s..... registered..... (R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's..... 2d con. g. 4's..... Craig Val. 1st g. 5's..... Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's..... Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's, 1902		2,287,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 23,553,000 21,798,000 6,000,000 1,000,000 650,000 400,000 3,007,000	J & J A & O A & O M & N M & N M & S M & S J & J J & J J & J M & S M & S	108½	June 17, '98	....	....	....
				111	Aug. 29, '98	111	111	1,000
				115	Aug. 31, '98	115½	113	15,000
				102½	Aug. 31, '98	108	100	222,000
				108	June 10, '98	....	....	....
				67½	Aug. 31, '98	69	65	282,000
				85	Dec. 30, '98	....	....	....
				93½	Aug. 31, '98	94	90	70,000
				80	Aug. 24, '98	80	75	12,000
				92½	June 17, '98	....	....	....
{ Ches. Ohio & S'thwestern m. 6's, 1911 2d mtge. 6's.....		6,176,800 2,886,000	F & A F & A	105½	Feb. 15, '98	....	....	....
				48½	Sept. 10, '98	....	....	....
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....		1,984,000	J & J	110½	Aug. 22, '98	....	....	....
{ Chicago & Alton's sinking fund 6's, 1903 Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's..... 2d 7's..... St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's..... Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. fd g. 6's, 1912		1,832,000 1,735,000 300,000 188,000 547,000	J & J F & A M & N J & J A & O	111½	July 8, '98	....	....	....
				111	Apr. 15, '98	....	....	....
				111	July 10, '98	....	....	....
				104½	Dec. 7, '98	....	....	....
				105½	Oct. 30, '98	....	....	....
{ Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's..... deb. 6's.....		8,241,000 985,000	A & O J & D	99	Aug. 6, '98	99	99	21,000
				97	Jan. 24, '98	....	....	....
{ Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's, 1903 5's, sinking fund..... 5's, debentures..... convertible 5's..... (Iowa div.) sink. fd 5's, 1919 4's..... Denver div. 4's..... 4's..... Chic. & Iowa div. 5's..... Nebraska extens'n 4's, 1927 registered..... Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's, 1911		28,924,000 2,315,000 9,000,000 15,233,900 2,880,000 7,753,000 6,240,000 3,400,000 2,320,000 26,730,000 8,000,000	J & J A & O M & N M & S A & O A & O F & A M & S F & A M & N M & S	111½	Aug. 28, '98	113½	110	260,000
				101	Aug. 5, '98	101	101	2,000
				90	Aug. 28, '98	90	85	9,000
				98	Aug. 20, '98	98	93	4,000
				104½	July 23, '98	....	....	....
				92	Aug. 28, '98	99	92	12,000
				87½	Aug. 27, '98	88	87½	10,000
				88½	Nov. 6, '98	....	....	....
				107½	Jan. 18, '98	....	....	....
				84½	Aug. 31, '98	84½	80	78,000
				90½	July 10, '98	....	....	....
				111½	Aug. 31, '98	114	111	46,000
{ Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. fd c'y. 6's, 1907 small bonds.....		2,989,000	J & D J & D	110	Aug. 14, '98	111½	110	6,000
				112	Apr. 2, '98	....	....	....

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,413,000	J & D	118	Aug. 31, '96	118½	117	51,000
{ Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	122	Aug. 18, '96	122	122	2,000
{ North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	125	May 4, '88			
{ St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	125	Aug. 21, '96	125	122	14,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s.k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		1,234,000	M & N	100½	May 15, '95			
{ gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,652,666	Q M	115	July 28, '96			
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13, '93			
{ coupons off. ....								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s.k. f'd 7's. 1905		996,000	A & O	120	July 15, '96			
{ 2d g. 4½'s. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	107½	Dec. 7, '95			
{ Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	100½	Aug. 24, '96	101½	100	8,000
City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 17, '95			
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cts. 1st 5's for. 1917		2,000,000		70	Aug. 4, '96	70	70	5,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1938		5,000,000	J & D	86	May 25, '95			
{ do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		4,763,000	J & J	93	Oct. 2, '95			
{ St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1930		9,750,000	M & N	90	Aug. 28, '96	90	90	9,000
{ registered. ....				90	June 10, '96			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,085,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16, '95			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1901		4,000,000	J & J	90	July 20, '96			
{ Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,790,000	Q F	98½	July 8, '96			
{ registered. ....				95	Nov. 15, '94			
{ con. 6's. .... 1930		738,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29, '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's 1928		2,571,000	J & J	106	Jan. 31, '96			
Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	109	June 9, '96			
Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's. 1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	64	Aug. 29, '96	67½	60	16,000
{ income 4's. .... 1930		4,000,000	A	10	Aug. 25, '96	10	10	19,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s.k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	104	Aug. 14, '96	104½	104	12,000
{ consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914		3,991,000	J & D	134½	May 13, '96			
{ sink. fund 7's. .... 1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '99			
{ gen. consol 6's. .... 1934		3,205,000	J & J	126½	June 29, '96			
{ registered. ....			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	105	Aug. 18, '96	105	105	5,000
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1933		4,300,000	A & O	102½	Aug. 31, '96	102½	102	6,000
{ Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,481,000	J & J	120½	July 21, '96			
{ registered. ....			Q J					
Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1933		3,000,000	M & S	111	Aug. 28, '96	112½	109	122,000
{ registered. ....			M & S					
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. 1931		8,000,000	M & S	88½	Aug. 31, '96	85½	80	70,000
{ gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		2,000,000	J & D	80	Aug. 27, '96	85	80	35,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	120½	Aug. 25, '96	130	129½	2,000
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1908		1,966,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4, '95			
{ Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	135	Aug. 25, '96	135	131	2,000
{ bonds, 7's. .... 1900		281,000	J & J	105½	July 25, '96			
{ 7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	115	May 7, '95			
{ 1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	133	Aug. 28, '96	133	128	28,000
{ registered. ....			J & D	136	June 4, '93			
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	125	Aug. 24, '96	128	120	10,000
{ const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	113½	Aug. 29, '96	113½	113½	8,000
{ Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	113½	Nov. 6, '95			
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
{ 1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. 1917		5,000,000	M & S	137½	Aug. 24, '96	137½	137½	10,000
{ reg. .... 1917			M & S	140	Sept. 13, '95			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. 1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Aug. 18, '96	117	117	1,000
{ registered. ....			A & O	128½	Feb. 12, '94			
{ 6's. .... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	115	May 8, '96			
{ registered. ....			A & O	115	July 29, '96			
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	May 21, '96			
{ 1st r 7's. .... 1921			M & N	141½	Apr. 20, '96			
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 24, '93			
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O					
Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,465,000	J & J	85½	Aug. 31, '96	87	83	80,000
{ 1st mortg. g. 7's. .... 1900		6,382,500	M & N	111½	July 15, '96			
{ impt. m. g. 5's. .... 1928		8,163,500	J & D	86	July 14, '96			
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. ld gtd. 3½ S A. 1911		3,040,000	A & O	13	Aug. 22, '96	15½	13	15,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s. .... 1905		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    g. 4s. .... 1905		1,250,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's. .... 1937		6,332,000	A & O	100	July 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    registered		.....	A & O	101½	July 23, '89	.....	.....	.....
"    2d 1 m 6s. .... 1916		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's. .... 1928		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's. .... 1937		4,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 26, '96	94	92½	31,000
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's. .... 1897		2,482,000	M & S	103	Aug. 7, '96	104	103	7,000
"    2d extended 5's. .... 1919		2,149,000	M & N	114	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    3d extended 4½ s. .... 1923		4,618,000	M & S	106¾	July 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    4th extended 5's. .... 1920		2,923,000	A & O	114½	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    5th extended 4's. .... 1923		709,500	J & D	104¾	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    1st cons. gold 7's. .... 1920		16,890,000	M & S	131	Aug. 25, '96	131	131	2,000
"    1st cons. fund c. 7's. .... 1920		3,703,977	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's. .... 1953		7,500,000	A & O	131½	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's. .... 1916		2,380,000	J & D	132¾	July 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's. .... 1908		1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    small		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's. .... 1906		2,800,000	A & O	102½	Aug. 14, '96	102½	102½	2,000
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's. .... 1982		12,000,000	M & N	103½	Aug. 25, '96	104	101½	104,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co.		1,100,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st g. currency 6's. .... 1922		.....	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '96	102	102	10,000
"    N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp.		3,396,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    Co. 1st currency 6's. .... 1913		.....	J & J	85	Aug. 31, '96	85	83	61,000
Erie R. R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds. .... 1906		30,000,000	J & J	59¼	Aug. 31, '96	58¾	54¾	302,000
"    "    registered		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    gen. lien 3-4s. .... 1906		30,927,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    "    registered		.....	J & J	95	Dec. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g. .... 1933		500,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Evans, & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's. .... 1921		3,000,000	J & J	109½	May 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    1st General g 5's. .... 1942		2,066,000	A & O	95	Apr. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
"    Mount Vernon 1st 6's. .... 1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....
"    Sul. Co. Beh. 1st g 5's. .... 1930		450,000	A & O	95	Sep. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans, & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's. .... 1926		1,591,000	J & J	90	Dec. 11, '95	.....	.....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's. .... 1920		3,990,000	A & O	114	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. gold 5's. .... 1939		2,100,000	M & N	91	Apr. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    Port Huron d 1st g 5's. .... 1939		3,083,000	A & O	80	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's. .... 1918		3,000,000	J & J	103	Aug. 14, '96	103	103	5,000
"    1st land grant ex. g 5's. .... 1930		423,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st con. g 5's. .... 1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½ s. .... 1941		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. cfts. dep. 1st 6's. .... 1921		7,699,000	.....	49	Aug. 31, '96	49	46¾	63,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's. .... 1928		2,888,000	J & J	52	Aug. 7, '96	52	52	1,000
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's. .... 1910		4,756,000	F & A	105	Apr. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    2d mortgage 7's. .... 1905		1,000,000	J & D	96	Aug. 20, '96	96	96	1,000
"    Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's. .... 1931		13,418,000	M & N	90½	Aug. 31, '96	90½	90	144,000
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's. .... 1927		5,360,000	J & J	80¾	Apr. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Gd. Rapids & Indiana gen. 5's. .... 1924		3,746,000	M & S	75	Jan. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    registered		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's. .... 1937		2,838,000	M & N	120	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
New Haven & Derby con. 5's. .... 1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
Houston & Texas Central R. R.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
"    1st Waco & N. 7's. .... 1903		1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92	.....	.....	.....
"    1st g. 5's (int. gtd.) .... 1937		7,381,000	J & J	102	July 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    Con. g. 6's (int. gtd.) .... 1912		3,455,000	A & O	101	July 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    Gen. g. 4's (int. gtd.) .... 1921		4,207,000	A & O	67½	Aug. 31, '96	67½	67½	10,000
"    Deben. 6's p. & int. gtd. .... 1897		705,000	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    Deben. 4's p. & int. gtd. .... 1897		411,000	A & O	88	Mar. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's. .... 1951		1,500,000	J & J	110	Aug. 17, '96	110	110	1,000
"    registered		.....	J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
"    gold 3½ s. .... 1951		2,499,000	J & J	104	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
"    registered		.....	J & J	97	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Illinois Central gold 4's.....	1962	15,000,000	A & O	98	Aug. 27, '96	98	98	2,000
gold 4's regist'd.....	1962	15,000,000	A & O	101	July 27, '96	100	99	14,000
gold 4's.....	1963	24,679,000	M & N	99½	Aug. 31, '96	100	99	14,000
gold 4's registered.....	1964	4,906,000	J & J	99	June 10, '96	100	99	14,000
2-10 g. 4's.....	1964	4,906,000	J & J	99	June 10, '96	100	99	14,000
2-10 g. 4's registered.....	1961	2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '96	100	97	9,000
1st g & sterl. 2500,000.....	1961	2,500,000	M & S	100	Aug. 31, '96	100	97	9,000
registered.....	1961	3,550,000	F & A	101½	Sept. 10, '96	100	97	9,000
West'n Line 1st g. 4's.....	1961	3,550,000	F & A	101½	Sept. 10, '96	100	97	9,000
registered.....	1960	3,000,000	J & D	100½	Aug. 17, '96	100½	100½	3,000
Cairo Bridge 4's g.....	1960	3,000,000	J & D	116½	Aug. 16, '96	100½	100½	3,000
registered.....	1888	1,000,000	F & A	108½	Nov. 21, '94	112	112	23,000
Springfield div. coupon 6's.....	1891	600,000	M & N	106	Dec. 13, '95	112	112	23,000
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1891	536,000	M & N	106	Dec. 13, '95	112	112	23,000
Chic., St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....	1897	826,000	J & D	115	Oct. 25, '94	112	112	23,000
1st consol. 7's.....	1897	16,526,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '96	112	112	23,000
gold 5's.....	1961	8,500,000	J & D	120	Apr. 26, '96	112	112	23,000
gold 5's, registered.....	1961	8,500,000	J & D	120	Apr. 26, '96	112	112	23,000
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1951	8,500,000	J & D	120	Apr. 26, '96	112	112	23,000
registered.....	1907	1,884,000	J & J	120	Apr. 26, '96	112	112	23,000
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....	1907	1,884,000	J & J	120	Apr. 26, '96	112	112	23,000
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex bonds.....	1906	1,800,000	A & O	98	Apr. 13, '96	112	112	23,000
stamped.....	1895	1,824,000	J & J	95	Aug. 31, '96	112	112	23,000
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1895	1,824,000	J & J	95	Aug. 31, '96	112	112	23,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....	1929	600,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 30, '96	112	112	23,000
1st ext. g. 5's.....	1943	7,954,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '95	112	112	23,000
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's, gold.....	1919	7,954,000	M & S	114	Aug. 24, '96	114	114	1,000
2d mortgage 4½-5's.....	1920	6,563,000	M & S	87	Aug. 24, '96	67	66½	4,000
3d mortgage 5-4's.....	1921	2,701,000	M & S	14	Aug. 11, '96	14	14	1,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1936	6,522,000	J & D	39	Aug. 31, '96	89	87	24,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,000,000	A & O	90	Aug. 1, '96	80	80	9,000
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....	1925	3,177,000	J & J	90	Mar. 30, '96	118	110	8,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....	1929	1,979,000	M & S	113	Aug. 28, '96	118	110	8,000
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	102½	June 18, '96	118	110	8,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1941	2,100,000	J & J	102½	June 18, '96	118	110	8,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	102	June 8, '96	118	110	8,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.								
Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....	1896	2,755,000	A & O	106	July 10, '96	106	106	1,000
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....	1906	824,000	F & A	123	July 1, '96	106	106	1,000
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....	1899	1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '96	106	106	1,000
con. co. 1st 7's.....	1900	14,800,000	J & J	109	Aug. 28, '96	106	106	1,000
con. 1st registered.....	1900	14,800,000	J & J	108½	Aug. 28, '96	106	106	1,000
con. co. 2d 7's.....	1903	24,692,000	J & D	118	July 20, '96	106	106	1,000
con. 2d registered.....	1903	24,692,000	J & D	118½	Apr. 27, '96	106	106	1,000
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....	1901	1,000,000	A & O	106	Aug. 12, '96	106	106	1,000
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1938	840,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '96	106	106	1,000
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '96	106	106	1,000
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....	1940	15,000,000	J & J	99½	July 27, '96	106	106	1,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1941	10,000,000	A & O	109	June 30, '96	106	106	1,000
registered.....	1893	10,280,000	J & J	110	Feb. 6, '94	106	106	1,000
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1893	10,280,000	J & J	103	July 27, '96	106	106	1,000
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	J & J	92	Mar. 24, '96	106	106	1,000
registered.....	1914	750,000	M & S	111½	Aug. 31, '96	114½	109	85,000
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st ptd 6's.....	1914	1,250,000	A & O	111½	Aug. 31, '96	114½	109	85,000
g. gtd 5's.....	1914	5,000,000	A & O	111½	Aug. 31, '96	114½	109	85,000
Lex. Av. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1933	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '96	114½	109	85,000
registered.....	1916	3,145,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '96	114½	109	85,000
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....	1916	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '96	114½	109	85,000
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. ctf's for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '96	114½	109	85,000
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....	1898	1,121,000	M & N	104	July 21, '96	102½	102½	2,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1931	3,610,000	Q & J	119½	June 29, '96	102½	102½	2,000
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & D	90	Aug. 6, '96	90	90	1,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,500,000	M & S	91	Aug. 24, '96	90	90	1,000
g. 4's.....	1922	325,000	J & D	91	Aug. 24, '96	90	90	1,000
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D	102½	Aug. 3, '96	102½	102½	2,000
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....	1927	984,000	M & S	40	Mar. 23, '96	102½	102½	2,000
2d m. inc.....	1927	1,000,000	S	40	Mar. 23, '96	102½	102½	2,000
N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....	1937	500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '96	102½	102½	2,000
N. Y. B'k'n & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....	1935	1,228,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '96	102½	102½	2,000
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....	1911	250,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '96	102½	102½	2,000
1st 6's.....	1911	750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '96	102½	102½	2,000

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1932		1,075,000	QJAN	103½	June 17, '95	....	....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's, 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Bv. & St. Louis								
1st con. TrCo. et. gold 5's, 1939		3,406,000	J & J	25	Aug. 20, '96	25	25	2,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1933		2,432,000	M & S	14	May 8, '95	.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's, 1898		7,070,000	A & O	105½	July 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Cecilian branch 7's, 1907		600,000	M & S	103	July 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1930		5,000,000	J & J	113½	Aug. 13, '96	114	113½	6,000
2d 6's, 1930		1,000,000	J & J	96	Aug. 31, '96	96	96	5,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		2,110,000	J & D	110	Aug. 20, '96	110	110	25,000
general mort. 6's, 1930		10,486,000	J & D	110	Aug. 29, '96	113½	110	24,000
Pensacola div. 6's, 1920		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1921		3,500,000	M & S	118	Aug. 28, '96	118	118	2,000
2d 3's, 1930		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	110	Aug. 19, '96	110	110	4,000
So. N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	94½	June 28, '92	.....	.....	.....
5½ 50 year g. bonds, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	85	Aug. 10, '96	85	85	2,000
Unified gold 4's, 1940		14,994,000	J & J	70	Aug. 31, '96	71	68½	100,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. g, 1921		2,870,000	F & A	100	June 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4's, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	105½	Dec. 20, '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's, 1937		2,096,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's, 1936		3,673,000	F & A	87½	Aug. 20, '96	87½	87½	5,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1937		6,742,000	J & J	84	July 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	112	July 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
cons. g. 6's, 1916		4,700,000	A & O	80	Aug. 28, '96	91	74	67,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's, 1940		2,800,000	M & N	42½	Aug. 31, '96	60	40	127,000
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1990		22,973,000	A & O	88	Aug. 20, '96	90½	88	21,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Memphis & Charlestown 6's, g., 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1908		10,818,000	J & J	113	Aug. 26, '96	114	111½	125,000
2d 6's, 1909		4,000,000	M & N	103	Aug. 31, '96	103½	101	20,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtg. 4's, 1911		58,003,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's, 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mexican International 1st g. 4's, 1942		14,000,000	M & S	75	Aug. 31, '96	76	74¾	170,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A", 1917		12,265,000	M & S	30	July 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
coup. stamped, 1917			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "B", 1917		12,265,000	A	5½	July 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered, 1910		1,411,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's, 1902		8,000,000	M & N	112	Aug. 26, '96	118½	111	33,000
1st con. 5's, 1902		2,000,000	M & N	103	July 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
6's, 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's, 1931		3,576,000	M & S	111½	July 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's, 1931			Q M	115	Apr. 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's, 1940		2,600,000	J & J	105	July 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
mtg. 4's reg., 1940			J & J	102	Jan. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's, 1939		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light Con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1925		5,500,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's, 1934		5,000,000	M & N	97	Aug. 15, '96	99	96	4,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1900		1,015,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		636,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	115	Aug. 19, '96	115	115	2,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1936								
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.,		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1928		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '98	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M. 1st c. g. 4's. 1898		6,710,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				....	....	....	....	....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,050,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '98	....	....	....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,774,000	J & D	79	Aug. 31, '98	81	75½	154,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	50	Aug. 31, '98	51	44	582,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30, '98	....	....	....
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	71	Aug. 31, '98	71½	69½	8,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	71	June 30, '98	....	....	....
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,840,000	M & N	77	July 15, '98	....	....	....
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		599,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	82	Aug. 31, '98	88	81	40,000
Mob. & Birm. prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" small. ....		226,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	79	Aug. 25, '98	82	78	14,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	107	July 10, '98	....	....	....
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	70	Aug. 14, '98	70	70	2,000
" registered. ....		7,000,000	F & A	45	July 28, '98	....	....	....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	....
" registered. ....		7,000,000	M & S	100	Aug. 17, '98	108½	100	33,000
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1908		2,573,000	F & A	105	May 1, '98	....	....	....
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1908		750,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		4,000,000	F & A	98	Aug. 21, '98	99	95	5,000
St. L. & I'n. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1907		6,000,000	M & N	97½	Aug. 11, '98	100½	97½	4,000
St. Louis & I'n. Mount. 2d 7's. 1907		2,500,000	J & D	101	May 4, '98	....	....	....
" Ark'nasas b'nchert 5's. 1896		1,450,000	J & D	99½	July 11, '98	....	....	....
" Carlo, Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1897		18,345,000	A & O	70	Aug. 31, '98	70	68	14,000
" g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5, '98	....	....	....
" stamped gtd gold 5's. 1931		....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	113	Aug. 26, '98	113½	113	8,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	112	May 1, '98	....	....	....
" gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1908		9,489,500	Q J	61	Aug. 29, '98	61	58	54,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '98	....	....	....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	111	July 21, '98	....	....	....
" 1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23, '98	....	....	....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	127½	July 22, '98	....	....	....
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27, '98	....	....	....
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		5,094,000	A & O	98	Aug. 14, '98	98	98	12,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '98	....	....	....
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,820,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	....	....	....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		30,000,000	J & J	115	Aug. 26, '98	115½	112	27,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903		....	J & J	114	July 27, '98	....	....	....
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		10,000,000	M & S	102½	Aug. 25, '98	102½	102½	1,000
" debenture 5's reg. .... 1904		1,000,000	M & S	104	Aug. 5, '98	104	101½	6,000
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904		15,000,000	M & S	105	Apr. 1, '94	....	....	....
" debenture g. 4's. .... 1906		6,450,000	J & D	103½	May 4, '98	101½	101	20,000
" registered. ....		....	J & D	101½	Aug. 13, '98	104	104	1,000
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		....	M & N	104	Aug. 18, '98	....	....	....
" registered. ....		....	M & N	100½	May 12, '98	....	....	....
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	120½	July 31, '98	....	....	....
" 7's registered. .... 1900		....	M & N	111½	June 1, '98	....	....	....
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1906		1,650,000	F & A	102	Oct. 8, '94	....	....	....
" reg. certificates. ....		....	F & A	....	....	....	....	....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	102½	Aug. 31, '98	102½	100	297,000
" registered. ....		....	J & J	101	Aug. 27, '98	101½	100	187,000
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's. .... 1896		5,000,000	J & J	107	May 21, '98	....	....	....
" registered. ....		500,000	J & J	106½	June 12, '98	....	....	....
" 2d gtd. 5's. .... 1898		....	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" registered. ....		....	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, /		770,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940		33,100	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" small bonds series B. ....		300,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Gouv. & Oswega 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		....	J & D	....	....	....	....	....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. 1922		9,061,000	A & O	115	July 24, '96	....	....	.....
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		180,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		875,000	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	....	....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	108	Dec. 4, '95	....	....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1921		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	....	....	.....
Carthage & Adirond 1st gtd g. 4's. 1921		1,100,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1923		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1927		19,425,000	A & O	100½	Aug. 31, '96	108½	99½	74,000
registered.....			A & O	100½	July 11, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. 1905		6,000,000	J & J	116	Aug. 7, '96	116	116	1,000
1st 6's. 1905		4,000,000	J & J	111	Aug. 7, '96	111	111	3,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1908		2,000,000	J & D	106	Dec. 4, '94	....	....	.....
con. deb. receipts.....\$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	127½	Aug. 27, '96	129	127½	4,000
small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	....	120½	May 29, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. 1927		1,200,000	A & O	119	Apr. 15, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1929		5,600,000	J & D	108½	Aug. 31, '96	108	108½	28,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's. 1922		8,125,000	M & S	84	Aug. 20, '96	84½	82	108,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.		....	M & S	83½	Aug. 25, '92	....	....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refunded 5's. 1927		3,750,000	J & J	94	Aug. 31, '96	94	92½	8,000
2d mortg. 4½'s. 1927		636,000	F & A	63	Aug. 31, '96	63	63	10,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's. 1940		2,300,000	F & A	68½	Aug. 31, '96	68½	60	20,000
term. 1st mtg. g. 5's. 1943		2,000,000	M & N	108½	July 29, '96	....	....	.....
registered.....\$5,000		....	M & N	....	....	....	....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		3,000,000	J & D	85	June 11, '96	....	....	.....
Midland R. of N. Jersey 1st 6's. 1910		3,500,000	A & O	116	June 22, '96	....	....	.....
N. Y., Texas & Mexico g. 1st 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O	....	....	....	....	.....
N.P. 1st m.R.R.&L.G.S.F.g.c.6's. 1921		30,067,000	J & J	112	Aug. 31, '96	112	109½	57,000
registered.....		....	J & J	109	Aug. 29, '96	111	109	37,000
J.P.M.&Co. eng. ctf dep. ....		17,500,000	....	114½	June 17, '96	....	....	.....
2d 1st g. 6's Tr. Co. c. ass. ....		19,000,000	....	105	Aug. 29, '96	105	103	12,000
3d 1st g. 6's Tr. Co. c. ass. ....		11,408,000	....	61½	Aug. 31, '96	62½	59	30,000
Ind. g. con. g. 5's Tr. Co. c. ass. ....		44,900,000	....	41½	Aug. 31, '96	42	38	737,000
colts 6's g. nts J.P.M.&Co. ....		9,450,000	....	85	Aug. 31, '96	85	80½	43,000
rece. ctf. g. 6's July 1, 1927		4,900,000	J	79	Jan. 25, '96	....	....	.....
James Riv. Val. 1st g. 6's Tr. Co. c. 1926		932,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Spok. & Pal. eng. ctf. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1926		1,793,000	M & N	85½	June 19, '96	....	....	.....
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's. 1923		7,985,000	F & A	124	June 4, '96	....	....	.....
registered certificate.....		....	Q F	122½	May 18, '96	....	....	.....
Helena & Red M'tain 1st g. 6's. 1927		400,000	M & S	100	Dec. 30, '91	....	....	.....
Dul. & Man. 1st g. 6's. stpd cpns. ....		236,000	J & J	121	July 23, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. of dep. stmpd. ....		1,364,000	....	87	July 17, '96	....	....	.....
10 p c purchase price paid		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Dak. dl. 1st s. f. d. g. 6's.		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. stamped.		1,418,000	....	90	June 23, '96	....	....	.....
N. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1923		4,090,000	J & J	100	Aug. 25, '96	100	99½	8,000
N.P.&Mon.J.P.M.&Co. ctf. 1g. 6's. 1928		5,256,000	M & S	28	Aug. 24, '96	32½	26	53,000
Cœur d'Alene 1st gold 6's. 1916		390,000	A & O	104	May 5, '92	....	....	.....
gen. 1st g. 6's. 1928		878,000	M & S	102	Jan. 2, '92	....	....	.....
Central Wash. Tr. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1928		1,497,000	....	54	Apr. 27, '96	....	....	.....
Chic. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's. 1940		25,523,000	A & O	42	May 12, '96	....	....	.....
U. S. Trust Co. eng. ctf. ....		....	....	38½	Aug. 31, '96	39½	35½	294,000
Seat. L.S. & E. Tr. rec. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1931		4,991,000	F & A	40	May 29, '96	....	....	.....
assessment paid.....		....	F & A	43½	Apr. 28, '96	....	....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. 1941		750,000	M & N	106	Aug. 1, '96	106	106	1,000
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	122½	June 25, '96	....	....	.....
New River 1st 6's. 1932		2,000,000	A & O	114	June 23, '96	....	....	.....
imp'ment and ext. 6's. 1934		5,000,000	F & A	97	Feb. 19, '94	....	....	.....
coupons off.....		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. adj'tmnt mtg		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
7's. 1924		1,488,000	Q M	107½	May 18, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. exp'mnt g. 5's. ....		4,066,000	....	82	Apr. 24, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. gold 5's. 1920		8,875,000	J & J	66	Apr. 28, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Nos. above 10,000		3,200,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Clinch V. div. g. 5's		2,475,000	....	55	Feb. 7, '96	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Md. & W. div.		....	....	....	....	....	....	.....
1st g. 5's. 1941		6,809,500	J & J	69½	May 6, '96	....	....	.....
Sci'o Val. & N.E. 1st g. 4's. 1929		5,000,000	J & N	80	July 15, '96	....	....	.....
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g. 5's. 1922		600,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
Ogd'b'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's. 1920		3,500,000	A & O	94	Apr. 13, '96	....	....	.....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ogdensburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1890		800,000	o	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdensburg & L. Chapl. inc. small		200,000	o	82	Feb. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. con. skg. fund 7's... 1896		3,425,000	J & J	101	Aug. 25, '96	101	100	2,000
" consolidated 7's... 1898		3,096,000	J & J	105	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 2d consolidated 7's... 1911		2,962,000	A & O	111	Apr. 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st Springf'd d. 7's... 1905		1,984,000	M & N	101	June 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st general 5's... 1922		405,000	J & D	96	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's... 1896		2,000,000	J & D	88	June 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's... 1957		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's... 1921		3,924,000	J & D	79	Aug. 25, '96	80	73	23,000
" gen. mortg. g 4's... 1921		1,548,000	M & N	25	July 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certs... 1921		1,255,000	.....	45	May 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's 1967		2,717,000	.....	39	July 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Oregon & California 1st g 5's... 1927		18,842,000	J & J	75	Aug. 23, '96	75	75	1,000
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's 1910		4,148,000	J & D	75	July 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" con. mortg. g 5's... 1939		1,258,000	A & O	124	June 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Trust Co. certificates... 1939		5,291,000	.....	84	Aug. 18, '96	84	84	10,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. 1st 6's... 1909		5,078,000	J & J	105 1/4	Aug. 25, '96	106	104	125,000
" consol. m 5's... 1925		495,000	J & D	92	June 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Trust Co. certs... 1925		12,488,000	.....	60	July 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cts for col. tr g 5's 1919		5,092,000	.....	92	Aug. 17, '96	92	90	55,000
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's... 1920		1,815,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1890... 1920		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1892... 1920		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Panama s. f. subeidy g 6's... 1910		1,953,000	M & N	101 1/4	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4 1/2's 1st... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	107 1/4	Aug. 27, '96	107 1/4	105	60,000
" reg. 4 1/2's... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	111	June 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. & St. Louis con. g 4 1/2's								
" Series A... 1940		10,000,000	A & O	105	Aug. 24, '96	105	105	5,000
" Series B... 1942		10,000,000	A & O	103 1/4	Aug. 20, '96	103 1/4	103 1/4	2,000
" Series C... 1942		2,000,000	M & N	110 1/2	July 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Series D gtd. 4's... 1945		3,000,000	M & N	102	July 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's... 1900		6,863,000	F & A	111	July 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st reg. 7's... 1900		6,863,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's... 1912		2,917,000	J & J	140 1/4	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's... 1912		2,546,000	J & J	134 1/2	July 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 3d 7's... 1912		2,000,000	A & O	128	Aug. 28, '96	126	126	10,000
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's... 1932		1,508,000	A & O	115 1/4	July 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1932		1,508,000	A & O	110	May 8, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's... 1900		1,505,000	M & N	114	Aug. 4, '96	114	114	2,000
" Series A... 1942		3,000,000	J & J	113 1/4	Apr. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 4 1/2 Series B... 1942		1,561,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's... 1937		1,899,000	J & J	100 1/4	Aug. 6, '96	100 1/4	100 1/4	1,000
" 2d 7's... 1938		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 7's... 1938		1,800,000	M & N	105 1/4	Jan. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4 1/2's 1941		3,910,000	J & J	107	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's... 1942		5,389,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's... 1923		1,675,000	.....	108	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds... 1920		22,762,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sterling Gold 6 per cent... 1920		4,718,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Currency 6 per cent... 1905		4,718,000	Q Mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 5 per cent... 1919		4,998,000	Q Mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 4 per cent... 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g 4 1/2's... 1935		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's... 1944		5,644,000	M & S	110	Dec. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's... 1920		1,287,000	J & J	98 1/4	July 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Evansville div. 1st 6's... 1920		1,470,000	M & S	101	Mar. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cts. 2d mort 5's... 1926		1,778,000	M & N	23	May 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's... 1921		1,500,000	Q F	109 1/4	June 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 2d m 4 1/2's... 1921		1,499,000	M & N	65	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....

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				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Phil. & Read. gen. g 4's Tr. Co. ctf's. assented.....		44,663,000	.....	72	Aug. 31, '96	73	67	617,000
• 1st pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs. 3d instal. pd.....		23,424,000	.....	26½	Aug. 31, '96	27	23¾	600,000
• 2d pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs. 3d instal. pd.....		15,442,000	.....	12¾	Aug. 31, '96	16	10½	954,000
• 3d pref. inc. .... 1898				18¼	Feb. 7, '96			
• 3d pr. in. con. .... 1898		21,634,462	F	5¼	Jan. 10, '96			
• Tr. Co. ctf's 3d instal. pd.....				13¼	July 31, '96	12¾	8	849,000
Pine Creek Railway 6's..... 1922		3,500,000	J & D	123½	Oct. 26, '96			
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's..... 1922		2,400,000	A & O	108¾	Apr. 5, '96			
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's..... 1922		1,440,000	J & J	124	Mar. 12, '96			
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A..... 1923		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '96			
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's..... 1922		2,250,600	J & J	117	May 31, '96			
• 2d g. 6's..... 1924		900,000	J & J					
{ McK'port & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's..... 1918		600,000	J & J					
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's..... 1916		1,000,000	J & J	95¼	Apr. 2, '96			
Pitts., Shema'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's..... 1940		3,000,000	A & O	88	Aug. 6, '96	88	86	3,000
• 1st cons. 5's..... 1943		786,000	J & J	83¼	June 5, '96			
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's..... 1917		9,700,000	J & J	66	Aug. 31, '96	66	64	88,000
• Mort. g. 5's..... 1891-1941		3,500,000	M & N	79½	Sept. 9, '96			
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's..... 1927		1,562,000	M & N					
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's..... 1929		15,200,000	J & J	67½	Aug. 31, '96	67½	63	116,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's..... 1929		1,850,000	J & D	96	Jan. 13, '96			
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4..... 1940		4,510,000	J & J	67½	Feb. 10, '96			
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's..... 1913		297,000	J & J					
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st 6's..... 1925		553,000	M & N	44	May 11, '96			
• Cent. Tst Co. ctf's of deposit.....		6,447,000	J & J	39	Aug. 31, '96	39	37	16,000
{ St. Joseph & Grand Is'd 2d inc. .... 1925		1,680,000	J & J	10	Aug. 2, '96			
• Coupons off.....				3	June 25, '96			
{ Kansas C'y & Omaha 1st g. 5's..... 1927		2,940,000	J & J	87½	Oct. 16, '96			
St. Louis, A. & T. H. 1st 2T. g. 5's..... 1914		2,200,000	J & D	102	Aug. 27, '96	102	102	1,000
• registered.....			J & D					
{ Belleville & Southern 1. 1st 5's..... 1896		1,041,000	A & O	103	Nov. 1, '96			
• Belleville & Carodr. 1st 6's..... 1923		485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '96			
Chic., St. L. & Pad 1st gtd. g. 5's..... 1917		1,000,000	M & S	102	Oct. 2, '96			
{ St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's..... 1931		550,000	M & S	70¼	May 23, '96			
• 2d inc. 5's..... 1931		126,000	M & S	72½	Nov. 25, '91			
• 1st con. 5's..... 1939		399,000	M & S					
{ Carbond'e & Shaw't'n 1st g. 4's..... 1932		250,000	M & S					
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's, Class A..... 1906		500,000	M & N	115¾	June 15, '96			
• 2d g. 6's, Class B..... 1906		2,786,500	M & N	114	July 15, '96			
• 2d g. 6's, Class C..... 1906		2,400,000	M & N	108	Aug. 10, '96	108	108	1,000
• 1st g. 6's P. C. & O..... 1919		1,042,000	F & A	118	May 23, '96			
• gen. g. 6's..... 1931		7,807,000	J & J	110	July 7, '96			
• gen. g. 5's..... 1931		12,293,000	J & J	93	Aug. 20, '96	93	93	5,000
• 1st Trust g. 5's..... 1937		1,099,000	A & O	90	May 2, '96			
• Trust Co. cefs for Cons. 4's.....		18,523,500	A & O	24	June 19, '96			
• all installments paid.....								
{ Kansas City & So. W. 1st 6's, g..... 1916		744,000	J & J	85	Feb. 6, '91			
• Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's..... 1910		335,000	A & O	100¼	May 16, '96			
• St. Louis, Kan. & So. W. 1st 6's..... 1916		732,000	M & S	100	Jan. 19, '96			
{ Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's..... 1937		1,608,000	J & D					
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's..... 1939		20,000,000	M & N	66	Aug. 31, '96	70	65	188,000
• 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's..... 1939		8,000,000	J & J	23½	Aug. 12, '96	25¼	23¼	63,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's..... 1937		2,480,000	J & J	90	Aug. 8, '96	90	90	1,000
• gtd. gold 5's..... 1937		1,188,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96			
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's..... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	114	Aug. 24, '96			
• 2d 5's..... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	106	Apr. 20, '96			



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's, 1909		357,000	J & J	103	July 8 '98	....	....	....
small .....		108	J & J	108	July 29 '84	....	....	....
2d 6's .....	1909	8,000,000	A & O	114	Aug. 10 '98	116	114	2,000
Dakota ext'n 6's .....	1910	5,676,000	M & N	113½	Aug. 26 '98	113½	113½	8,000
1st con. 6's .....	1938	18,344,000	J & J	118	Aug. 24 '98	118½	118	8,000
1st con. 6's, registered .....			J & J	120	Aug. 19 '98	....	....	....
1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s .....		20,318,000	J & J	100	Aug. 20 '98	100	100	3,000
1st cons. 6's register'd .....			J & J	105	Nov. 4 '98	....	....	....
Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's .....	1937	7,805,000	J & D	87½	Aug. 21 '98	87½	87	17,000
registered .....			J & D	89	Aug. 19 '98	....	....	....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's .....	1922	2,150,000	J & J	124	July 31 '98	....	....	....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. .....	1937	6,000,000	J & J	112	July 8 '98	....	....	....
1st 6's, registered .....			J & J	99	July 24 '98	....	....	....
1st g. g. 5's .....	1937	2,700,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
registered .....			J & J	106½	June 18 '98	....	....	....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's .....	1908	4,700,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
registered .....			A & O	....	....	....	....	....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's .....	1938	3,625,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
registered .....			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's, 1943		18,886,000	J & J	49	Aug. 31 '98	50	45	60,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100	Mar. 17 '98	....	....	....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's .....	1934	4,056,000	A & O	114	July 24 '98	....	....	....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's .....	1923	2,500,000	J & J	98	Apr. 18 '98	....	....	....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4 '98	....	....	....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,250,000	M & N	94½	June 20 '98	....	....	....
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	93	Aug. 28 '98	93½	93	220,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's .....	1905-12	30,677,500	A & O	107½	Aug. 28 '98	107½	107½	3,000
g 5's .....	1888-1938	706,000	A & O	85½	May 19 '94	....	....	....
1st con. gtd. g 5's .....	1937	16,834,000	M & N	87½	Aug. 18 '98	89½	87½	16,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's .....	1941	1,920,000	J & J	82½	Aug. 29 '98	84½	82	98,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's .....	1937	5,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's .....	1911	4,180,000	J & J	102½	Aug. 29 '98	103	102	112,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g 5's 1934		25,839,000	J & J	83	Aug. 31 '98	83½	76	505,000
registered .....			J & J	91	June 27 '98	....	....	....
East Tenn. reorg. 1st g 4's .....	1938	4,500,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
registered .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Alabama Central 1st 6's .....	1918	1,000,000	J & J	107½	June 19 '98	....	....	....
Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's .....	1907	500,000	A & O	121½	May 26 '92	....	....	....
income .....	1900	750,000	A & O	104	May 24 '98	....	....	....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's .....	1916	2,000,000	J & J	113	May 5 '98	....	....	....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's .....	1900	3,123,000	J & J	108½	Aug. 14 '98	109½	108½	7,000
divisional g 5's .....	1930	3,106,000	J & J	109	Aug. 18 '98	110	107	16,000
con. 1st g 5's .....	1936	12,770,000	M & N	101½	Aug. 29 '98	102½	100½	44,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's .....	1922	5,680,000	J & J	105	Aug. 27 '98	105	105	2,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's .....	1925	2,000,000	J & J	115½	June 29 '98	....	....	....
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's .....	1915	5,567,000	J & J	112½	Aug. 21 '98	113½	110½	14,000
equip. sink. f'd g 5's .....	1909	1,328,000	M & S	98½	Apr. 30 '98	....	....	....
deb. 5's stamped .....	1927	3,368,000	A & O	100	Apr. 24 '98	....	....	....
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's .....	1906	600,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. B 6's .....	1911	1,900,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. C 6's .....	1916	1,100,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. D 4-5's .....	1921	950,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. E 5's .....	1926	1,775,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
small .....			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
ser. F 5's .....	1931	1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's .....	1936	2,332,000	M & N	95	July 27 '98	....	....	....
gen. 5's gtd. stamped .....	1926	2,466,000	M & N	94	Aug. 4 '98	95	94	4,000
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's .....	1924	1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3 '98	....	....	....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's .....	1914	2,531,000	J & J	104½	July 31 '98	....	....	....
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4's .....	1943	500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s .....	1939	7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12 '94	....	....	....
1st con. g 5's .....	1934-1944	4,500,000	F & A	104	July 31 '98	....	....	....
St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd g. 5's .....	1930	3,500,000	A & O	103½	Oct. 9 '98	....	....	....
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's .....	1914	414,000	QJAN	105½	Dec. 18 '98	....	....	....
Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's .....	1905	1,820,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19 '98	....	....	....
Sabine d. 1st 6's .....	1912	2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16 '98	....	....	....
con. m. g 5's .....	1943	1,820,000	F & A	93½	Aug. 29 '98	93½	92	160,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. { 1905		3,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth { 2010		21,049,000	J & D	78	Aug. 31, '98	78	73	188,000
1st gold 5's. .... 2000		23,227,000	M & S	159	Aug. 31, '98	169	139	774,000
2d gold income, 5's. .... 2000		5,000,000	J & J	115	Aug. 18, '98	116	114	12,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. .... 1987								
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's. .... 1985		3,000,000	J & J	105	Aug. 28, '98	106	105	8,000
1st M. g 5's West. div. .... 1985		2,500,000	A & O	107	July 25, '98	....	....	.....
gen. g. 5's. .... 1985		1,500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's. .... 1990		2,340,000	A & O	81	June 20, '98	....	....	.....
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's. .... 1917		4,400,000	J & D	69	July 28, '98	....	....	.....
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's. .... 1916		3,284,000	M & N	64	Aug. 24, '98	64	62	45,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's. .... 1928		1,852,000	J & D	100	June 30, '98	....	....	.....
Union Pacific 1st 6's. .... 1896			J & J	100	Aug. 31, '98	100	98	24,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1897			J & J	99	June 15, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1897		27,229,000	J & J	100	Aug. 29, '98	100	100	6,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1898			J & J	95	July 8, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1898			J & J	100	Aug. 19, '98	100	100	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1899			J & J	90	Aug. 25, '98	90	90	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1899			J & J	102	July 28, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1908		3,988,000	J & J	93	Aug. 25, '98	93	93	4,000
collat. trust 6's. .... 1908		4,970,000	J & D	95	Aug. 20, '98	95	95	2,000
5's. .... 1907		2,058,000	M & N	50	May 22, '98	....	....	.....
g 4's. .... 1918				50	Apr. 4, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1894		8,598,000	F & A	97	June 29, '98	....	....	.....
gold notes, 6's stampd. .... 1899		2,070,000	M & S	80	Aug. 14, '98	80	77	31,000
Ext. sink'g f'd g 8's. .... 1899		1,291,000		93	Apr. 24, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1895		1,461,000	F & A	111	July 8, '98	....	....	.....
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's. .... 1895		779,000				....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1896		2,189,000	J & D	112	June 10, '98	....	....	.....
1st 6's. .... 1896		1,894,000		95	June 2, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1899		2,973,000	M & N	111	July 27, '98	....	....	.....
Denver div. ascd. 6's. .... 1899		2,914,000		95	June 10, '98	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps { 1919		1,287,000	M & N	60	July 23, '98	....	....	.....
1st con. 6's. .... 1919		10,488,000		60	Aug. 28, '98	65	56	58,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1905		630,000	M & N	96	June 22, '98	....	....	.....
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. f'd cps 7's. .... 1905		4,070,000	Q & F	29	Aug. 3, '98	29	29	8,000
Atch., Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's. .... 1905		542,000	Q & F	87	Apr. 28, '98	....	....	.....
At. Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's. .... 1905		4,480,000	A & O	35	May 7, '98	....	....	.....
U. P., Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g 5's. .... 1918		15,801,000	J & D	25	Aug. 31, '98	29	25	177,000
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g 5's. .... 1939		10,482,000	A & O	57	Aug. 31, '98	57	48	112,000
Or. S. L. & U. N. Tr. Co. cts. 1st g 5's. .... 1919						....	....	.....
assented. .... 1922		4,171,000	F & A	102	Aug. 28, '98	108	101	7,000
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's. .... 1922		10,780,000		104	Aug. 31, '98	104	100	150,000
Trust Co. cts. of dep. .... 1908		689,000	J & J	115	May 2, '98	....	....	.....
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's. .... 1908		1,877,000	J & J	100	May 14, '98	....	....	.....
gold 5's. .... 1926		858,000	J & J	64	June 30, '98	....	....	.....
Utah So'n Tr. Co. cts. gen. mtg 7's. .... 1909		1,366,000	J & J	56	July 20, '98	....	....	.....
Tr. Co. cts. ext. 1st 7's. .... 1909						....	....	.....
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g 6's. .... 1921		1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '98	....	....	.....
Coupon off. .... 1939		31,664,000	M & N	102	Aug. 31, '98	103	99	244,000
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's. .... 1939		14,000,000	F & A	68	Aug. 31, '98	71	64	52,000
2d mortgage gold 5's. .... 1939		3,590,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
deben. mtg series A. .... 1939		25,740,000	J & J	18	Aug. 26, '98	20	18	81,000
series B. .... 1939		3,500,000	J & J	97	July 8, '98	....	....	.....
1st g 5's Det. & Chi. ex. .... 1940						....	....	.....
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. { 1908		1,000,000	A & O	108	July 21, '98	....	....	.....
1st 6's. .... 1937		10,000,000	J & J	101	Aug. 31, '98	102	100	38,000
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g 5's. .... 1943		10,000,000	A & O	33	Aug. 12, '98	33	33	5,000
gen g. 2-3-4's. .... 1943		10,000,000	Nov.	10	Aug. 7, '98	10	10	20,000
inc. 6's. .... 1911		3,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '98	....	....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g 6's. .... 1926		3,000,000	A & O	100	Aug. 14, '98	100	100	5,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's. .... 1926		1,500,000	J & J	96	Jan. 27, '98	....	....	.....
Wheeling div. 1st g 5's. .... 1926		1,806,000	F & A	91	May 8, '98	....	....	.....
exten. and imp. g 5's. .... 1930		1,600,000	J & J	62	July 20, '98	....	....	.....
consol mortgage 4's. .... 1932						....	....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g 5's. .... 1937		2,364,000	J & J	27	Aug. 24, '98	27	27	1,000
eng. Trust Co. certificates. .... 1937		9,636,000		28	Aug. 29, '98	30	25	279,000
income mortgage 5's. .... 1937		7,775,000	A & O	6	Jan. 9, '98	....	....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	Hgh.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		2,310,000	Q F	108	Aug. 14, '98	108 3/4	102 3/4	21,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 8's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	63	Aug. 31, '98	65	58 1/2	85,000
Am. Water Works Co. 1st g. 8's. 1907		1,800,000	J & J	105	July 6, '91			
1st con. g. 8's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100 1/4	May 13, '98			
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
Boet. Un. Gas & t'f s's k' f'd g. 5's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	81 1/4	Sept. 5, '95			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		12,386,000	M & M	101	Aug. 31, '98	101 1/4	100	167,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		16,000,000	F & A	92	Aug. 31, '98	98	90	44,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1987		10,000,000	J & J	87	Aug. 24, '98	88	86	6,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	105	July 8, '98			
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	95	Aug. 11, '98	95	95	21,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	99	Feb. 8, '98			
Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108 1/4	Nov. 10, '92			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '98			
Colo. Hock. Val. C'l & I'n g. 6's. 1917		980,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94			
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1897		1,250,000	J & J	157 1/4	Feb. 29, '98			
Con'rs Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1886		4,346,000	J & D	82 1/4	June 25, '98			
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	107	Aug. 14, '98	107 1/4	107	16,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1935		2,130,000	J & J	100	Aug. 31, '98	100	99	17,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96			
registered.			A & O					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. 1st con. g. 5's. 1882		2,500,000	M & S	111 1/4	May 7, '95			
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1905		2,000,000	J & J	90	Aug. 24, '98	90	86	4,000
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		10,000,000	J & D	82	Aug. 31, '98	85	82	16,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 25, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107 1/4	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s's k' f'd g. 6's. 1981		1,755,000	M & S	110	May 31, '94			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	86	May 8, '98			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	92	Oct. 2, '95			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75 1/4	Dec. 4, '95			
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 16, '95			
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	85	Aug. 31, '98	90	86	56,000
small bonds.				97 1/4	Nov. 1, '95			
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,260,000	M & N					
Manh. Bch H. & L. Lim. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s's k' f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108 1/4	Jan. 5, '92			
registered.			M & N					
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S					
Mutual Union Tel. Skg. F. 6's. 1911		1,957,000	M & N	114	Apr. 11, '98			
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,837,000	J & J	94 1/4	Aug. 6, '98	95	94 1/4	2,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1960		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,271,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92 1/4	May 5, '98			
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 13, '89			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	102	Feb. 29, '98			
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	104	Aug. 20, '98	104	104	1,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	94 1/4	Aug. 20, '98	94 1/4	92 1/4	18,000
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & N	106 1/4	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '95			
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102 1/4	June 3, '98			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,299,000	A & O	91	Mar. 24, '98			
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,490,000	J & J	80	July 27, '98			
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,434,000	F & A	92	Dec. 8, '95			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		AUGUST SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
U.S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. rects		3,245,100	.....	15	Aug. 29, '98	20	14	167,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6% g s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	110	Aug. 24, '98	111	108	34,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's. 1875-1900		3,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 7's, registered. 1900			M & N	105	July 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture, 7's. 1904-1900		1,000,000	M & N	105	Aug. 25, '98	105	105	11,000
" registered. 1900		8,405,000	M & N	101½	Aug. 26, '98	101½	101	5,000
" col. trust cur. 5's. 1903			J & J					
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919		868,000	J & J	70¾	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's. 1908		570,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1898.		AUGUST SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered. .... Opt'l		25,364,100	Q M	95	94	94	94	10,000
" 4's registered. .... 1907		559,634,000	J A J & O	110½	104½	106½	104½	136,000
" 4's coupon. .... 1907			J A J & O	111½	108	107½	108	187,000
" 4's registered. .... 1925		162,315,400	Q F	118½	111½	113½	111½	29,000
" 4's coupon. .... 1925			Q F	119	111½	113½	111½	440,000
" 5's registered. .... 1904		100,000,000	Q F	113½	109	109½	109	37,000
" 5's coupon. .... 1904			Q F	114½	108½	109	108½	25,000
" 6's currency. .... 1897		9,712,000	J & J	103½	103½	.....	.....	.....
" ..... 1898		29,904,952	J & J	105	103	.....	.....	.....
" ..... 1899		14,004,560	J & J	107½	105	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee) 1898		1,680,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ..... 1897		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ..... 1898		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" ..... 1899		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Can Not Get Along Without the Magazine.—From D. A. Keister, Accountant and Auditor, Cleveland, Ohio, under date of July 7:

"I am pleased to enclose herewith check for \$5 for one year's subscription to the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

For many years I have read your valuable publication at Case Library, where they have almost a complete file. I do not feel as though I can get along without it in my own office, therefore would kindly ask you to date my subscription from January, 1898, and send all back numbers at your earliest convenience.

I read the June issue with much interest, and am glad you have given our profession such worthy note.

I hope to receive the copies by early mail."

Finds it Ideal.—W. F. Day, Cashier of the Sellersville (Pa.) National Bank, writes on July 18:

"I have just received my first copy of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE, and find it an ideal of what I desired.

Please send me PATTERNS' PRACTICAL BANKING, as per your offer to subscribers. Enclosed find draft for \$8 in payment."

Think Highly of the Magazine.—Geo. C. Bradley, Cashier of the First National Bank, Ypsilanti, Mich., writes on July 18:

"Enclosed please find our New York draft for \$5 for one year's subscription to the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

Please receipt and return enclosed bill. We think highly of your MAGAZINE and renew our subscription with pleasure."

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Amend.**—Bernard Amend died at his residence in New York city, August 28, aged 70 years. He was engaged in the real estate business for many years. At his death he was Vice-President of the Yorkville Bank and a Trustee of the German Savings Bank.

**Aumack.**—John Aumack, founder and for thirty-four years President of the First National Bank, Tom's River, N. J., died August 16. He was extensively interested in business enterprises and left a considerable fortune.

**Bloodgood.**—John Bloodgood died at New Marlboro, Mass., August 15. He was senior member of the late banking firm of John Bloodgood & Co., New York city and reputed to be several times a millionaire.

**Church.**—Charles A. Church, a member of the banking firm of Church & Son, Lowell, Mich., died suddenly August 25.

**Deyo.**—Charles W. Deyo, a prominent citizen of Kingston, N. Y., died suddenly August 31, fifty-seven years of age. He graduated from Bellevue Hospital Medical College, N. Y. city, and practiced medicine for a number of years. At his decease he was President of the Ulster County Savings Institution and Cashier of the State of New York National Bank of Kingston. He was previously Cashier of the Huguenot National Bank of New Paltz for eleven years.

**Dickey.**—Wm. J. Dickey, who in 1882 organized the Manufacturers' National Bank, of Baltimore, Md., and who has been its President since that time, died August 18. Mr. Dickey was one of the leading cotton and woolen manufacturers of Maryland. He was born in Ireland in 1814.

**Holden.**—D. M. Holden, President of the Exchange National Bank, Colorado Springs, Colo., died August 12, aged sixty-three years. Mr. Holden and others established the Exchange National Bank in 1888, and he had been its President since 1890. He was largely interested in real estate and in the cattle business, and was a public-spirited citizen.

**Nichols.**—Curtis C. Nichols, Treasurer of the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, Boston, Mass., died August 19.

**Ollwell.**—James Ollwell, who was one of the last surviving founders of the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, New York city, for several years its President, and more recently Vice-President, died August 12, aged eighty-nine years.

**Pope.**—Elias R. Pope, one of the best known bankers of New Jersey, President of the First National Bank and Treasurer of the Dime Savings Bank, Plainfield, died August 10. His business interests were large. He was for many years postmaster at Plainfield.

**Robinson.**—Jesse M. Robinson, President of the First National Bank, Wellsborough, Pa., died from the results of a surgical operation, August 6, aged forty-three years.

**Shapard.**—William B. Shapard, President of the Shapard Bank, Opelika, Ala., and long and prominently connected with banking in that State, died August 16 at the age of sixty-seven years.

**Spraker.**—Daniel Spraker, President of the National Mohawk River Bank of Fonda, N. Y., died September 1. On August 26 he celebrated his 96th birthday. He had been President of the bank since its establishment over forty years ago and was at his desk almost up to the day of his death. He enjoyed the distinction of being the oldest bank President in the United States and probably in the world.

**Warner.**—Hans B. Warner, President of the Bank of Ellsworth, Wis., died August 18. He was a prominent factor in Wisconsin politics, having held the positions of Secretary of State, State Senator and President of the State Board of Control—holding the last named at the time of his death. He had also held many important local positions. He was a man generally loved and respected.

**Woods.**—John B. Woods, a retired and wealthy banker of Akron, Ohio, died August 14, aged seventy-two years. He founded the City National Bank and was its President for many years.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

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THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PARITY of the standard silver dollars and silver certificates with gold under present laws is the subject of much discussion in the present campaign. The advocates of the free coinage of silver use the fact that the two forms of currency named do circulate and are maintained at the gold par, as a strong argument in favor of their confident assertion that silver dollars coined under a free coinage Act will in a similar manner maintain themselves at a parity with gold coin.

The reason of the parity of the existing silver dollars has recently been asked of Secretary CARLISLE, and he has replied in a letter, the substance of which is that the limitation in the aggregate amount of the silver dollars, together with the declaration of Congress in the Act of July 14, 1890, requiring the Treasury to maintain the parity of the gold and silver dollars, enables the silver dollars and silver certificates to circulate at par. The Secretary adds that the Government has so far never given gold coin for silver dollars or silver certificates on the demand of the holders, but gives it as his opinion that the Act of July 14, 1890, supplemented by the silver purchase repeal Act of 1893, gives ample authority to the Secretary to so redeem either silver dollars or silver certificates in gold in case it became necessary to do so, in order to maintain the parity of the gold and silver dollars.

Mr. CARLISLE's letter is clear and succinct as to the principle which underlies the circulation of the existing silver certificates and silver dollars at the gold par. It does not however go as fully as it might into the influence that the exchange transactions of the country have in upholding and aiding the influence of the Government in maintaining the parity of the silver and gold money now in circulation. The limit of which he speaks would have to be placed at a point much less than the aggregate of silver money now in circulation, if it were not for the influence mentioned above.

The Government, as the Secretary says, purchases the silver bullion from which these dollars are made, coins them and pays them out for its debts to any one who will receive them, and likewise it receives them from the people for dues and taxes in the same manner as it pays and receives gold coin. The immense payments and receipts of the Government no doubt give ample circulation to a very large portion of the full legal-tender silver money. In the business exchanges of the country there is found a use for a still larger amount than is kept in circulation by the revenues and expenditures of the Government.

Any money, inferior intrinsically to the acknowledged standard, whether paper or coin, will circulate at par with that standard, even if not directly redeemable in it, if there is business enough to constantly employ it as a medium of exchange. For instance the Bank of England issues a certain amount of paper notes, upon the theory that, because this amount of such paper will at all times be kept in active use by the public, no part of this amount will as a rule be presented for redemption. In other words this amount of paper money is constantly needed to effect the business exchanges of the country, and the public will never divert it from this occupation to present it for redemption. The amount that will so continually circulate can be determined almost to a certainty, and has been denominated by the English Banking Act of 1844. Upon this portion of its notes the Bank of England theoretically keeps no coin reserve, but for all notes issued over this amount it keeps a gold sovereign for every paper pound issued.

The place taken by this permanently outstanding circulation of the Bank of England in the business exchanges of Great Britain is in the business transactions of the United States taken by silver dollars, and their representatives the silver certificates.

In his address before the World's Congress of Bankers at Chicago in 1893, Mr. BRADFORD RHODES illustrated this principle. He said: "The theory upon which the note issues of the Bank of England are based is that, as proved by experience, a certain amount of paper notes will at all times be kept in use by the public. The public is the air in which the bank, the juggler, keeps several balls flying, only one coming to hand at a time. This certain amount that can be kept flying was determined by actual experiment. No gold coin is behind this amount, but its ultimate redemption is secured by Government debt owned by the bank."

In the same manner the silver certificates in the United States have Government credit behind them for their maintenance at par in gold, although no gold reserve is kept for their immediate redemption. Like the permanent circulation of the Bank of England they are limited to an aggregate amount which the business of the country

keeps in actual use. This limit was determined by experiment. Before November 1, 1893, this limit was an increasing one, but the experiences of the early part of that year indicated that the public exchanges would not absorb much more silver money than that then issued. So on November 1, 1893, the limit of increase of the silver dollars and silver certificates was fixed by law.

In addition to the principle that the general business of the country will absorb a certain amount of representative circulation, and keep it so exclusively at work effecting exchanges that it will seldom if ever be presented for redemption, which sustains silver dollars and silver certificates although not redeemable in gold, there is yet another safeguard. This consists in the fact that there are other forms of paper money circulating co-ordinately with the silver certificates, viz. : legal-tender and National bank notes. These last two kinds of paper money are redeemable in gold.

A holder of silver certificates or silver dollars, for which he can procure silver certificates, can if he wants gold change them for National bank or legal-tender notes. Ordinarily the class who desire gold either to hoard or to use in actual business is very small in comparison with the class who only require current money to effect payments. Therefore the banks and other offices of exchange have no difficulty, when a proper limit is fixed on the amount of silver money, in giving gold to the few holders of it who want gold, for the bank can place the silver money in circulation again without delay. Before the amount of silver money in circulation became proportionately too large as compared with gold money, no holder of silver dollars who wanted gold had any trouble in exchanging silver dollars for gold dollars.

The proportion of silver money to gold became alarming in 1893, and although further increase was prevented by the Act of November 1 of that year, is still too large for the amount of business carried on in times of depression.

The amount of the permanent circulation of the Bank of England is kept at a figure which will be absorbed in the times of dullest business. The silver money of the United States is redundant when business is dull. When not fully occupied it drives out gold and becomes to some degree suspected. This fact shows that it is not the Government receipts and payments alone that keep silver money at par with gold. When business revives the credit of the silver dollar will revive with it. With the growth of the country, the amount of silver money now existing will be more easily kept in constant use by increasing business. Its proper limit is the amount that can be easily kept in constant use in the times of greatest business depression. So limited, it will be so constantly passing from hand to hand in the



various operations of exchange that there will never arise any desire to present it for redemption.

The declaration of Secretary CARLISLE that the Government is pledged by the Acts of July 14, 1890, and November 1, 1893, to redeem silver dollars in gold if such redemption at any time becomes necessary to maintain the parity of the gold and silver dollars, is a most timely and useful one, and cannot fail to help on the restoration of confidence.

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THE BRITISH SILVER CURRENCY was made the subject of some criticism by one of the stockholders of the Bank of England, at the last semi-annual meeting.

The mints of Great Britain coin no full legal-tender silver, that is to say the silver coinage issued from those mints is subsidiary, as it is called. The silver bullion is purchased at the market price, at present about 2s. 6d. an ounce, and issued in coins at a nominal value of about 5s. 6d. per ounce. The subsidiary silver coinage is therefore merely a token coinage worth intrinsically about fifty per cent. only of its face value. The British Government moreover does not undertake to redeem these coins once put in circulation in full legal-tender money. They circulate entirely on the strength of their convenience, and the necessity of having small coinage. The attack made by the stockholder of the Bank has therefore according to American ideas a sound basis of justice.

The silver currency of Great Britain, when it becomes by use so worn or mutilated that it will no longer pass current, can only realize to its holders the value of the silver bullion it contains. Every coin must in time reach a point of decadence that causes loss to some of the inhabitants of Great Britain. Even when still current it is only a legal tender to the extent of forty shillings, a little less than ten dollars.

There is also trouble in France, and in the other nations composing the Latin Union, with some of the subsidiary silver coinage. There is a quantity of small silver coins in circulation of issues made before the Union was established and which do not have the benefit of laws giving currency to the greater part of the subsidiary silver. These outlawed silver coins are in the same condition as the trade dollar is in the United States. Although bearing the government stamp they have no legal currency and are only worth the market value of the pure silver bullion they contain. Some of them may have a legal standing in Italy but not in France, and *vice versa*, and are in the condition of Mexican dollars in the United States. They are used by petty swindlers to deceive the ignorant and unwary.

In this country the status of the subsidiary silver coinage was firmly fixed by the Act of June 9, 1879. The half-dollars, quarters and dimes, and silver of all other small denominations bearing the stamp of the Government, are by that Act a legal tender to the amount of ten dollars, and are also, when presented in sums of twenty dollars at any Treasury or sub-Treasury of the United States, exchangeable for full legal-tender money; that is, either silver dollars, gold dollars, or legal-tender notes. In fact the United States in law and practice recognizes that the subsidiary silver coinage in this country is a token coinage simply, redeemable in the same manner as any other obligation of the United States. There are of course laws against its mutilation or destruction, but the redeemability of the coins leaves so little motive for clipping or punching them that very little of this nefarious business has been carried on since the passage of the law of 1879.

The superior standing of the subsidiary silver currency on account of this redeemability is marked. In 1885 when the Treasury was short of gold it had no difficulty in borrowing several millions of dollars in gold coin from the New York banks on the security of an equal amount of subsidiary silver. In regard to this portion of its coinage the United States stands to-day in advance of any other nation. It was probably the lack of this redeemability in the silver coinage of Great Britain that excited the criticisms at the meeting of the Bank of England.

If there is any portion of the coinage of any country which requires the utmost vigilance and care of the government it is the fractional and minor coinage. These coins circulate among the poorer citizens, and perhaps the greatest bulk of the every-day business concerning the actual necessities of life is carried on by their means. They are subjected to the greatest wear and abrasion. Some idea of the wear that the active circulation of the minor silver coins entails upon them may be obtained from the history of the paper fractional currency of the period during and following the Civil War. The amount of these fractional notes authorized by law to be outstanding at any one time was fifty millions of dollars; they were a legal tender for five dollars and were redeemable in full legal-tender money when presented in sums of three dollars. They wore out rapidly and were frequently redeemed. The total issues and reissues amounted to \$368,720,074, and there were about fifteen millions of dollars never presented for redemption when these little notes were finally superseded by the silver subsidiary coins. Portions of this amount are perhaps held as curiosities, but the larger portions probably were actually worn out and destroyed, a loss of over four per cent. to the people on the whole amount issued.

The loss on bank notes and other paper money in denominations of one dollar and upwards very rarely exceeds one per cent. and is usually much less than that percentage. The wear on subsidiary coinage as compared with the wear of coinage of the larger denominations must therefore be in nearly the same proportion.

The United States, in protecting its silver fractional coin, has therefore had the greatest welfare of the masses of the people in view. The strictures of the stockholder of the Bank of England upon the subsidiary silver coins of England in this particular appear to be well founded.

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THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE ought to be the safest guide in showing the way to a proper determination of the pending controversy in regard to free coinage. That this alleged remedy for the cure of poverty has been tried and abandoned by nearly all the progressive European nations is an established fact. On the Western Continent the attempt to circumvent natural economic law has also met with the same end—failure.

Only recently the experiment of passing from a gold standard to what our free coinage friends call bimetalism, has been tried in Colombia, South America. In that country the Congress passed a law in the year 1885 making paper money, payable in either gold or silver, a legal tender for all debts. The result was an advance in the premium on gold from twenty per cent. in 1885 to 190 in 1895. That is with the gold standard prevailing before 1885 there was a difference of twenty per cent. between the paper and the gold, but when the State adopted so-called bimetalism the premium on gold as compared with paper went to 190 in ten years.

Mr. L. F. MCKINNEY, United States Minister to Colombia, has recently given a few facts as to the effect on wage earners in that country of this change of standard. In 1885 when gold was at a premium of 20 per cent. the wages of workmen were 40 cents, or in the hot part of the country 60 cents a day. Wages in 1896 when gold is at a premium of 190 are 60 and 90 cents a day, an advance of fifty per cent. Provisions have increased 200 per cent. Meat that was selling at twelve to fifteen cents a pound in 1885 has risen to forty and fifty cents. House rents have gone up from 100 to 200 per cent. Table board at the best hotels has gone from \$1 to \$2 a day. The people have to wear poorer garments as the price of the grade they used to wear has gone beyond their reach.

The same state of facts exists in every country where the free coinage of silver has sent gold money out of circulation. The answer to this by the silverites in the United States is, that the United States

is not Colombia or Mexico. "Would you," they ask, "compare the United States with semi-barbarous Mexico or uncivilized Colombia?" But nations are like individuals, they cannot have the unwritten laws of political economy reversed for them, be they rich and enlightened or poor and struggling in the darkness of semi-civilization. Nor are Colombia and Mexico so far behind us as they who ask the question, in order to make a point, endeavor to have us believe.

The rich man who violates the laws of nature cannot escape the penalty because he is rich and intelligent any more than the poor man because he is poor and perhaps ignorant. This retort calls to mind the remark of the lady at the court of Louis XV., when the improbable salvation of a great nobleman who had recently died was under discussion. "God," she said, "would think twice before he damned a man of such rank."

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INTELLIGENT PUBLIC OPINION is a force which no popular fallacy can long withstand. This is shown by the results which are beginning to appear in response to the energetic promulgation of hard facts in regard to the currency question. The prospect of the defeat of the free coinage of silver is becoming brighter every day. Not that this should involve any relaxation of effort on the part of those who desire to sustain the honor and restore the prosperity of the nation. It should rather be an encouragement to further and still more overwhelming attacks on the battlements of fallacy and false statement.

For years previous to the present campaign the honest majority had been resting in the belief that the question of the debasement of the money standard of the country had been settled by the rout of the rag baby in 1877 and 1878. While they slept in peace and confidence, the cheap money advocates were hard at work over the corpse of the rag baby, galvanizing it into renewed life and gilding it into a new idol shining with silver. The hallucination of one portion of the people made progress, and the hypnotism of the larger portion grew deeper. Some portions of the press, especially those devoted to the currency question, understood and were continually calling attention to the danger of the situation, but they seemed to produce little effect. This MAGAZINE has for years called attention to the dangers of free silver. But politicians and statesmen were inclined to belittle the apprehensions of the real prophets. The direct issue was avoided by them as long as possible; they tampered and paltered with the interested advocates of a discarded money system. They were only aroused from their apathy by the actual presence of disaster. The panic of 1893 awakened many, but even this severe blow was sought to be attributed to merely secondary causes. It was finally the arro-

gance of the silver party triumphing in the catastrophe they had caused that aroused the politicians and statesmen of the country. When this party, in their place of pride, the United States Senate, refused to do anything to aid the revenues of the Government unless all would unite and place them on the pinnacle of their wishes, the necessity of antagonizing them absolutely and forever became apparent.

"Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad." It was the mad impracticability of TELLER and his following in the Senate that drove them into a position of undisguised opposition to all the elements of honesty and conservatism in the country. Pride and lust of power seized upon the hearts of the vainglorious chieftains of the silver ring, and luckily for the country they would listen to no compromise. They revelled in the dissatisfaction and misery that a false currency policy had brought upon the people. They thought they could ride the storm. They were seized with fratricidal fury and prophesied no hope for mankind but through the free coinage of silver. The unhappy and the ambitious were the recruits of their cause; the former cannot easily be persuaded that sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, and the ambitious paint glorious triumphs on the cloud curtain of the future. These leaders of the silver craze were joined by all the other false prophets. The casual delirium of the few became by the action and reaction of mind on mind the frenzy of many. Men seemed to lose not only their understandings but even the use of their bodily senses in appreciating facts.

A well-known writer in commenting on the course of popular excitement has said that it was grievous to think how the noble omnipotence of the sympathy of mind with mind is so rarely the Aaron's rod of truth and virtue and so often the enchanter's rod of wickedness and folly. No solitary miscreant, scarcely any solitary maniac, would venture on such actions and imaginations as large communities of sane men have, when so misled, entertained as sound wisdom. Every country has had its share of such frenzies. They may be reckoned on at intervals like any other natural visitation. The men who still remain reasonable, however, should deal with it as they do with a fog, patiently carry lanterns for the benefit of the benighted, remembering that the sun still exists and will one day reappear.

The honest and reasonable men of the country, aroused at last, have been striving during the last three or four months to dissipate the deceptive gray mist which the silver barons by thaumaturgic processes evolved out of moonshine. Some have carried rushlights, others candles, some have made a blaze with more powerful illuminants, but they are beginning to convince the majority of the people that after all this silver craze is only a fog, and that the sun still shines and will one day put to flight the benumbing mist.

The appearance of things at the present time, the results of the elections in Vermont and Maine, the reports from almost every part of the country, point to a final destruction of the silver gilt image of the rag baby as absolute and decisive as was the demolition of that rag simulacrum itself in 1877 and 1878.

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MR. BRYAN evidently considers the following statement to be one of his brightest gems of economic wisdom: "If the gold standard is a good thing, then we ought to keep it, whether other nations want us to keep it or not; if it is a bad thing, we ought to get rid of it, no matter how much other nations may want us to keep it." There is not an intelligent free silver man who does not know that free coinage at the dishonest 16 to 1 ratio means silver monometallism and a cheaper monetary standard. On the other hand, international bimetalism, at the commercial ratio, would not be an alteration in the standard, since all the coins would be worth their face value.

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A RISE IN THE PRICES of farm products is the most tempting bait which the free silver advocates offer to the voters in the agricultural districts of the country. They are quoting with evident satisfaction, and all the impressiveness to be gained from the use of large capitals, an expression from an editorial in the August MAGAZINE, admitting that under free coinage the prices of all farm products would rise. But the free silver organs carefully refrain from printing the whole of the MAGAZINE editorial, which explained that the rise in prices would be simply the measure of the depreciation of the currency, and not a legitimate rise due to increased demand.

Of course nobody believes that the price of farm products could rise without a corresponding increase in the price of other commodities. Thus the rise in prices would not benefit the farmer, since he would have to pay more for the things which he has to buy.

Besides, there is a great deal of humbug in the notion that high prices are a universal blessing. In 1865 an officer in the Confederate army received his month's salary, \$162 in Confederate money, and went into a store intending to buy a pocket handkerchief. The price asked was \$360, and the officer, wishing to buy something, finally selected a paper collar, for which he paid \$125.

Did the high prices of the above simple articles indicate prosperity? No, on the contrary they were a proof of the evils of a debased currency. While the debasement under free coinage would probably not exceed fifty per cent., it would be a debasement nevertheless. If it would not the whole sum of the free coinage contention—that

money is too valuable—falls to the ground, and if the currency depreciates it would make the farmer none the richer, for what he buys would as surely increase in price as what he sells.

A debased and fluctuating currency might enrich a few money brokers, who would gamble on its rise and fall. It would certainly not benefit the farmer or any one else engaged in legitimate business—a fact fully proven by the experience of the United States and other leading commercial nations.

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THE AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION, which held its Twenty-second Annual Convention at St. Louis, September 22, 23 and 24, is to be congratulated on the gratifying progress made during the past year, despite the depression which has been felt in banking and most other lines of business. A net increase of 485 in the membership and a satisfactory gain in the receipts must be taken as an endorsement of the practical work of the organization, particularly in the vigorous prosecution of bank criminals by the protective committee. During the year some notorious bank forgers and burglars have had their careers cut short through the efforts of this committee. This has already resulted in an actual saving to the banks of the country of many thousands of dollars, and if the energetic and relentless pursuit of bank criminals is kept up in the way that it has been carried on by Mr. HENDRIX and his associates, as no doubt it will be, the influence of the association in restraining crimes against banks must be of incalculable benefit.

President PULLEN's administration has been characterized by an advancement in every direction, and by the enlarged effectiveness of the machinery of the association the work has been increased in several important particulars without a proportionate increase in the expenses; indeed some items show a considerable reduction.

The American Bankers' Association is becoming more democratic and is gaining in popularity. In substituting open discussion of banking and financial topics in place of long and carefully-prepared essays, a welcome innovation was made that greatly added to the spontaneity of the proceedings.

St. Louis entertained the convention in a way that left nothing to be desired, combining the warmth of a Southern welcome with the generous hospitality of the West.

At the conclusion of the deliberations of the convention, the bankers from all parts of the country made a pilgrimage to the tomb of LINCOLN, at Springfield, Illinois, thus testifying their admiration for his character and their devotion to the principles which were embodied in his career.

## FINANCIAL AND OTHER DELUSIONS.

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The history of the last two or three centuries affords many instances of popular delusions in regard to enriching the nation by some novel financial operation. The schemes have varied in character from some that were in the nature of investments to others that involved some hocus pocus with the currency. The lesson of all these experiences however is that it is not a difficult or surprising thing to stir up the minds of large numbers of men and induce them by the promise of prospective wealth to support with their means and even with their lives projects that are radically unsound.

There is not the least reason to doubt, when the financial history of the United States since the Civil War comes to be written, with cool judgment after another century has passed away, that the silver legislation of 1878 and 1890, and the Chicago platform of 1896, together with the state of popular opinion that made them possible, will be referred to in the category of those delusions or hallucinations by which large numbers of people may be contemporaneously affected.

These instances of monomania taking possession of masses of men otherwise sane, as the devils took possession of the Gaderene swine, are psychological phenomena. They usually centre around some subject upon which the minds of mankind are seriously interested at all times, religion, or more broadly supernaturalism, and the pursuit of wealth. When either of these two subjects is broached every one is unavoidably interested.

In periods when superstition prevailed more extensively than it does to day, some supernatural claim or event formed the basis of the popular craze, but as the ages passed and the spell of the spiritual was more and more broken, the worship of materialism in the form of wealth has gradually taken the more prominent place in men's minds. It will be found that the delusions of ancient times centred around religion, while those of modern eras centre around wealth.

It is only in the very latest period of the world's existence that a craze about the money standard has become possible, because before the spread of democracy the question of the standard of value was entirely in the hands of the princes of the earth. But all of these popular hallucinations, whatever their subject, in their real nature are entirely of the same character.

Much of what is known as occult learning, by the exercise of which in ancient and modern times both legitimate rulers and leaders, and charlatans, demagogues, thaumaturgists and theosophists, obtain control of numbers of followers, consists simply in the knowledge of how to attract the thoughts of a large number of persons simultaneously to the same object, to fix them there, and then by the known psychological fact that this similar and simultaneous thought, through the mutual action and reaction of one mind on another, induces belief, which soon results in action, almost any object requiring concerted effort can be accomplished.

This occult knowledge is used for good as well as for bad purposes. It



may control public opinion for good objects or bad. It may be used in the revival meeting or in the propagation of the belief that the silver mine owners should be protected at the expense of the remainder of the nation. It may be used to obtain small results or large. The successful salesman employs it, although perhaps unconscious of the nature of his power. In the politician and orator it is often called personal magnetism. It may be used consciously or unconsciously, with deliberate purpose, or simply by an intuition hardly amounting to instinct. It lies at the basis of the belief in agitation. It is the secret of the success of advertising. When any object is to be attained, the abolition of slavery, the success of prohibition, the rule is to keep up an agitation. When a patent medicine is to be sold, or a quack advanced to public favor, or a circus to be made successful, advertise widely and in a startling manner. It is obvious that both agitation and advertising are indispensable when legitimately used, but equally obvious that they may be used both for a good and a bad purpose.

The leader of men whose high and lofty purpose is to benefit his race could gain no hold on his followers, if it were not for the psychological fact that has been mentioned, but it is an equally keen weapon in the hands of the sophist and the charlatan. The difference is that the real leader attracts by truth, while the false prophet attracts by lies. In the end men always discover the difference, but sometimes after great harm has been worked. Earnestness is no criterion. Even the knave can simulate it. Ignorant men who deceive themselves, have it. Robespierre had earnestness and as Mirabeau prophesied, it carried him far.

It is the object of this article to give some instances of popular delusions, both in ancient and modern times, and to show that in their inception and course they show a similarity, although the means taken to arouse them and the objects in view may differ greatly. The delusions of the distant past generally centred around religion, while those of modern times, of the same magnitude, seem to have the pursuit of wealth as their object. They arise by the ignorance or knavery of leaders, single or combined, or spontaneously by some unknown cause attracting people's minds.

#### THE NEW RELIGION OF ALEXANDER OF ABONOTICHUS.

This noted character lived during the second century, A. D. He was born of humble parents. He was engaged as the servant of a doctor who had been a disciple of that arch fraud Apollonius of Tyana. This old villain had learned his master's arts. He could cure stomach-aches and head-aches, and also dealt in spells and love charms. He could find treasures, discover lost deeds and wills and if well paid could fix up a dose of poison.

The young Alexander was an apt pupil, and when his master died was ready to practice on his own account. His confidence in himself was without limit; as long as there were fools with money in their pockets he entertained a well-founded hope of transferring some of it to his own.

Byzantium was then the metropolis of the Eastern Empire. Here he made the acquaintance of another vagabond who lived by giving tips on the races. In some of their travels they went through a part of the country where large harmless snakes were used as household pets to keep down rats and mice. The two scamps bought a handsome specimen for future use. They used the reptile in telling fortunes. This they found a very good busi-

ness. Fools they observed always wanted to know the future and paid well for an alleged revelation of it. Extending their business, they resolved to set up an oracle of their own. Delphi and Delos were not in good working order and a new oracle would supply a long-felt want. They decided to produce a god that would speak and give out responses. As they thought, the merchants and commercial population of Byzantium were too knowing by half. Christianity might thrive in the busy haunts of men, but a heathen god needed a more retired spot to make his debut. Success depended upon a favorable beginning.

To start the thing they buried some brass plates in the Temple of Apollo at Chalcedon, inscribed with the information that Apollo and Æsculapius were about to visit that part of the country and that Æsculapius would take up his residence at Abonotichus in bodily form. The plates were found and the story spread. The whole country became excited. The people of Abonotichus felt as if they had secured the World's Fair. At this stage Alexander is said to have poisoned his companion. The foundations of a temple were laid at Abonotichus. Alexander appeared there in the character of the forerunner of the coming god. He was received with an ovation. He had in the meantime carefully trained his tame serpent and accustomed it to wear a horse-hair mask painted to resemble a human face. The serpent he concealed for the present. Having previously hidden a goose egg in which he had placed a young snake just born, the next morning he rushed into the market place in a state of frenzy shouting that the day had arrived in which the god would take his place in the temple. Followed by the excited crowd he rushed to the site of the temple, offered a prayer, and dug up the egg. He broke the egg. The tiny snake twisted about his fingers. The people shouted in ecstasy and blessed the gods. No one dared express a doubt. The news spread. The roads to Abonotichus were choked with people hastening to see the wonder. Alexander had prepared a tabernacle with a railed passage from door to door. Behind the rail the prophet sat with the snake coiled around him. Occasionally the head, with its human mask, appeared from under Alexander's arm. It was, so he told the people, the little snake from the egg grown to enormous size in three days. A miracle! the crowd exclaimed, and belief continued to spread.

Soon afterwards the snake spoke with a human voice. The mechanism was simple. A flexible tube ran from behind the mask to a confederate in the rear. The temple was finished and the god accommodated with splendid quarters. Revenues began to pour in. A priesthood was founded. Attempts to expose the fraud failed and new believers still gathered. From such beginning was established a cult that lasted nearly four hundred years.

#### THE CRUSADES.

The famous Crusades are another instance of a popular hallucination centering around religious belief. Notwithstanding the teachings of the great fathers of the church, the bulk of the Christian population of Western and Central Europe had come to believe that the gates of heaven were in the Holy Land. A pilgrim to the Holy Sepulchre was thought to secure immediate salvation, whether he died on the journey or returned in safety home.

After Palestine fell into the hands of the followers of Mahomet, access to the shrine of christendom became almost impossible. The idea of regaining

Jerusalem from the hands of the infidel spread, and Pope Urban and Peter the Hermit preached the crusade. The flood tide of popular feeling gave weight to the sanctions of the church. Peter the Hermit and Walter the Penniless led a motley host of 200,000 men, women and children, who all starved or were slaughtered before they reached the Holy Sepulchre. More disciplined hosts followed. At times they revelled in the spoils of temporary success, and again they were in the extremes of desperation. In their depths of misery at Antioch a priest had a revelation from St. Andrew, who informed him of the hiding place of the steel lance-head which pierced the Savior's side as He hung on the cross. After three days unavailing search the lance-head was found by the priest himself. This miracle encouraged the host. They marched on and defeated the infidels, and at length attacked Jerusalem, where on the second day of the assault a horseman was seen waving his shield on Mt. Olivet. The cry arose, "St. George, the Martyr, has come to help us!" and in the enthusiastic rush that followed Jerusalem was taken.

The results of the religious frenzy which turned the populations of the West on the East were not what their promoters anticipated. They did not fulfill the expectation of the popes that the permanent dominion of Latin Christianity would be established throughout the Christian world. They caused the outpour of oceans of blood and countless treasure, but they stemmed the tide of Mahometan conquest and brought the beneficent light of learning to the nations of Europe.

#### THE TULIP MANIA.

One of the most curious of crazes that ever affected a population was that known as the tulip mania, which had its beginning in Holland about the year 1635. The difficulties in the way of raising the choice varieties of tulips, and a sudden rage that seemed to possess horticulturists to possess them, at first caused a rise in the price put upon them. Bulbs of rare varieties were sold at greater and greater prices until they became the favorite stock of speculators. The speculation in the products of horticulture became so intense that at last six thousand francs were paid for the choicer specimens. At last the government issued a decree that no bulbs should be sold for more than two hundred francs. This put an end to the speculation, but while it lasted many people became rich and many were ruined.

#### JOHN LAW'S PAPER MONEY.

This adventurer, in 1716, with the approval of the Regent of France, established a bank for the issue of paper money, which was very successful. In 1718 the Regent transformed this institution into a government bank. Law was given power to organize trading companies which promised great returns, and by degrees through his influence with the Regent absorbed all other private companies in France and also engaged to redeem the national debt in shares of his companies. The result was that his shares afforded the only means of investment in France. By 1719 these shares, through the artificial monopoly created, had risen to forty times their par value. Madness seemed to possess the nation. Trade received a vast though unnatural impulse, and the enormous influx of foreigners and provincials was noticed at Paris. Everybody seemed to be getting richer. But there were a few who retained the bad habit of reflection. They soon calculated that the government reve-

nues and the profits of the company could not pay the interest promised on the shares issued. The latter began to sink in value. The bank was ordered to buy them at a fixed price. In order to do this it had to increase its issues of notes. The depreciation of the nominal value of the shares was stopped but that of the notes commenced, ending in complete collapse of the whole system.

#### SPECULATION IN ENGLAND IN 1692 AND 1693.

The increase of capital in England during the early part of the reign of William and Mary was greater than the means of investment. A crowd of promoters began to devise all sorts of schemes for the investment of this redundant capital. They held out the hope of immense gains. All sorts of companies were started, and the public went wild. Similar manias of speculation occurred in England in 1720, in 1825, and in 1845.

#### SPECULATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

There is hardly any other country in the civilized world that has not witnessed similar scenes of speculation. In the United States the land and cotton speculation of 1836-37 will be called to mind, also the speculative period preceding 1857, the gold speculation of the war period, and the terrible scenes of Black Friday in 1869. It is hardly necessary to more than refer to the paper money of the Continental Congress, to the assignats of the French Revolution, to the issues of the Confederate Government.

Enough has been said to indicate the ease with which the popular mind may be excited to act in accordance with some fixed idea, either of a religious or financial nature. No one of the popular crazes of which mention has been made was ever produced more designedly and with a stronger desire of personal profit than the hallucination now existing in the minds of a large number of persons in the United States in favor of the free coinage of silver as a means of bringing prosperity to all.

The large owners of silver mines are as responsible for the deception they have, for purposes of private gain, practiced on the minds of the American people, as was the impostor Alexander for the fraud he perpetrated upon the ignorant inhabitants of Asia Minor when for his own aggrandizement he presented them a snake for a god.

When in the year 1873 Senator John P. Jones of Nevada first came to Congress, he was in favor of the gold standard, so was Senator Stewart, so were all the representatives of the mining interests of the West. Silver then was worth more per ounce in gold than its coinage value. All of these men were sagacious business men. When silver began to fall in value from new discoveries of mines and improved methods of extracting the metals from the ore, they saw something had to be done or their gains from their mining properties would diminish in altogether too rapid a ratio. Like the charlatans and impostors of ancient and modern times, they knew they could deceive the people. They inaugurated an agitation in and out of Congress. They used the important position of their States, holding the balance of power between the two great parties, to obtain constant concessions. They aroused by their agents every unsettled and dissatisfied feeling throughout the whole country. Like David in the cave of Adullam they gathered to themselves all who had grievances real or fancied, or who were poor or in

debt. Every appliance of agitation has been exploited by them during the last twenty years. They have purchased in various ways men of ability to plead their cause. Others have come to them voluntarily either in hope of payment or because they were not rated at the value they esteemed themselves on the other side. Cranks came to them, because they naturally delight in paradoxes.

The first effect of their agitation and partial successes was to cause a depression of business throughout the country. This depression threw men out of employment and rendered them dissatisfied. Prices of products have fallen. With great adroitness they seek to impute the consequence of their own manœuvres to their opponents and to strengthen their position. In fact, they have tried to treat the American people like a fakir treats his dupes at a country fair.

There is no doubt that they have been wise and cunning in their day and generation. But unfortunately for them there are too many in the country who have the habit of reflection. As Lincoln said, it is impossible to deceive all the people all the time.

The engineers of the silver craze have been too long about their work of deception. The mask is beginning by sheer age to wear too thin. Even the most unwary are beginning to see the danger and disaster it tries vainly to conceal.

When the history of this period comes to be written hereafter it will sum up this long effort of the silver miners to sustain their product as one of the most gigantic attempts to cheat and deceive the people ever known or heard of.

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**BANK CO-OPERATION.**—Out of the hard experiences of the past few years some valuable lessons and ideas are being extracted. A topic that is now engaging considerable attention in banking circles is the possibility of devising some method of staying the foolish runs on bank deposits which are the cause of such general distress in every panic.

At the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association the editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* adverted to the development of the mutual support of banks in times of financial crises. He offered no formal plan but cited the progress that by natural law had already been noticed in bank co-operation in such times. The banks of New York city have since 1861 taken the lead in resisting the influence of monetary panic, and it was therefore an appropriate subject for the spokesman of those banks. The progress already made on the lines of co-operation makes it pertinent to ask why in the near future there should not be a more complete development of the principle. Honesty of purpose and dealing on the part of all banks and financial institutions is the prime factor of final success in such an undertaking. The signs of the times tend to a favorable answer. Why should not the strengthening of the weak points where the panic has its beginning, arrest its progress. Success depends upon the knowledge that the banks first attacked are worthy of support. This can only be depended upon when the majority of banking institutions frown down and aid in the eradication of tricky and dishonest banking. To set up correct ideals and enlist the forces of the banking interests in support of them is a noble work for the American Bankers' Association, and the auxiliary State bankers' associations.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the *MAGAZINE'S* Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### *NATIONAL BANK—AGENT OF SHAREHOLDERS.*

Supreme Court of California, August 7, 1896.

*CHETWOOD vs. CALIFORNIA NATIONAL BANK.*

An agent of the stockholders of an insolvent National bank is an officer of the United States. The validity of his appointment cannot be attacked collaterally.

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**HENSHAW, J.:** This is an appeal from an order made in the above-entitled case after the entry of final judgment therein. The following facts are necessary to an understanding of the contention: The California National Bank of San Francisco was insolvent, and its affairs were in the hands of a Receiver appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency at the time when Chetwood, as a stockholder of the bank, instituted this action on its behalf against certain directors to recover damages for moneys alleged to have been lost to the bank by reason of their mismanagement of its affairs. The Receiver continued in charge of the affairs of the bank and was made a party defendant in the action. Thereafter, at a stockholders' meeting, it was determined that the Receiver should not be continued in office to wind up the affairs of the association, and that an agent should be elected for that purpose, and the appellant, Stateler, was elected such agent. The authority for these proceedings is found in the Act of Congress which provides as follows (27 Stat. 345, c. 360, § 3):

"Whenever any association shall have been placed in the hands of a Receiver, and when the Comptroller of the Currency shall have paid to each and every creditor of such association, not including shareholders who are creditors of such association, whose claim or claims as such creditor shall have been proved and allowed as therein prescribed, the full amount of such claim and all expenses of the receivership, and the redemption of the circulating notes of such association shall have been provided for by depositing lawful moneys of the United States with the Treasurer of the United States, the Comptroller of the Currency shall call a meeting of the shareholders of such association by giving notice thereof," etc. "At such meeting the shareholders shall determine whether the Receiver shall be continued and shall wind up the affairs of such association, or whether an agent shall be elected for that purpose. After the election of the agent, and after the execution by the shareholders of a bond to the satisfaction of the Comptroller of the Currency, and filed with him, conditioned for the payment and discharge in full of each and every claim that may thereafter be proved and allowed, and for the faithful performance of all the duties of the agent's trust, the Comptroller and the Receiver shall thereupon transfer and deliver to such agent all the undivided or uncollected or other assets of such association then remaining in the hands or subject to the order or control of said Comptroller and the said Receiver,

or either of them, and for this purpose the said Comptroller and said Receiver are hereby severally empowered and directed to execute any deed, assignment, transfer or other instrument in writing that may be necessary and proper, and upon the execution and delivery of such instrument to the said agent the said Comptroller and the said Receiver shall by virtue of this Act be discharged from any and all liabilities to such association. Upon receiving such deed, assignment, transfer or other instrument, the person elected such agent shall hold, control and dispose of the assets and property of such association which he may receive under the terms thereof for the benefit of the shareholders of such association, and he may in his own name, or in the name of such association, sue and be sued, and do all other lawful acts and things necessary to finally settle and distribute the assets and property in his hands, and may sell, compromise or compound the debts due to such association, with the consent and approval of the circuit or district court of the United States for the district where the business of such association was carried on, and shall at the conclusion of his trust render to such district or circuit court a full account of all his proceedings, receipts and expenditures as such agent, which court shall upon due notice settle and adjust such accounts and discharge said agent and the sureties upon said bond."

The appellant, Stateler, received from the Comptroller of the Currency, and from Young, the Receiver of the California National Bank, the certificate, deed, assignment and transfer contemplated by the Act, which recited that the shareholders of the bank, called to meeting by the Comptroller, after due notice given as required by law, had elected an agent for the bank as provided by the Act, and that Stateler was duly elected such agent, and the required bonds had been executed and filed by the shareholders to the satisfaction of the Comptroller, as required by law. Stateler thereupon entered upon the discharge of the duties of his trust, and, after the entry of judgment in the case of *Chetwood vs. The California National Bank of San Francisco*, petitioned the court for an order requiring Chetwood to turn over to him, as agent of the bank, \$27,500 received by Chetwood in that action. The court refusing to make the order, this appeal is taken.

Considerable attention is devoted in the briefs to a discussion of the regularity and validity of the proceedings of the shareholders which terminated in the election of Stateler as agent, and the assignment to him by the Comptroller and the Receiver of the assets of the corporation. Into these questions we do not deem it necessary to enter. By the provisions of the Act itself, Stateler succeeded the Receiver in the performance of the duties which otherwise would have pertained to the Receiver. Though chosen by the stockholders, he received his commission as agent from the Comptroller, with whom a bond was filed for the faithful performance of his trust. In the conduct of that trust he is placed under the direction and control of the circuit court, to which he must apply before he can compromise debts or claims of the corporation, and before which he must go to make his report and receive his discharge. The agent therefore stands *in loco* the Receiver, and is in fact the Receiver, under a varied form of appointment, and under a different name. It is held that the Receiver is an officer of the United States. (*Platt vs. Beach*, 1 Thomp. Nat. Bank Cas. 182, Fed. Cas. No. 11,215; *Stanton vs. Wilkeson*, 1 Browne, Nat. Bank Cas. 162, Fed. Cas. No. 13,299; *Frelinghuysen vs. Baldwin*, 12 Fed. 395; *Price vs. Abbott*, 17 Fed. 506.)

If the agent be not also in strictness a public officer of the United States, he is at least a *quasi* public officer.

In *McConville vs. Gilmour* (36 Fed. 277), the circuit court enters into a long and elaborate discussion of the functions and status of this officer, and reaches the conclusion that "the agent is an officer of the United States in every sense that the Receiver is." Such being the case, and Stateler being *de facto* the agent, and presenting his commission from the Comptroller, reciting his appointment, and the regularity of the proceedings attending it, the question of the regularity of his appointment is not one to be raised upon collateral attack in this action.

Under this condition of affairs, it still remains to be considered whether he is entitled to have paid over to him the moneys that had been collected. The circumstances under which the \$27,500 were paid have been fully set forth in the opinion filed in another appeal in this action. (*Chetwood vs. Bank*, S. F. 177; filed July 22, 1896, 45 Pac. 704.)

The shareholder who sues on behalf of the corporation is unquestionably entitled to conduct, manage and control the litigation until a final determination thereof. Thereafter, in the case of a corporation not under disability, and where no good reason appears to the court why it should not be allowed to take into possession and dispose of the judgment recovered (*For vs. Mining Co.* 108 Cal. 475, 41 Pac. 328), it becomes the duty of the shareholder, after reasonable allowance made for costs and expenses of litigation, to restore to the corporation the funds in his possession. In this case, while the corporation, as a corporation, was still in existence, it was not conducting or operating its business, and its assets, under the laws of the United States, had passed into the hands of the Receiver, and from his hands to those of his successor—the agent. The latter was charged with the explicit duty of collecting the assets, and distributing them ratably. If necessary, he could sue or be sued. There can be no doubt but that the Receiver or agent would be entitled, where litigation had come to an end with moneys in the hands of the plaintiff stockholder under a judgment rendered in his favor on behalf of the corporation, to invoke the aid of the court, and to receive at its hands an order directing the payment of those moneys to him for the purposes of his trust; and in this case we entertain no doubt but that the appellant would be entitled so to do if it be found that the litigation in question is at an end.

If we were to accept the statement of respondent's brief in this regard, no difficulty would here be presented. Respondent states "that Chetwood prosecuted this present action, which resulted in judgments severally against Thompson for \$20,000, Wilson for \$7,500 and Thomas for \$139,738;" but in fact there was no judgment, severally or collectively, entered against Thompson and Wilson, or either of them, for \$20,000, or \$7,500, or for any other sum whatsoever. As set forth in the opinion upon the former appeal, above referred to, after the court had ordered judgment against the three, and appointed a referee to take an accounting to fix the amount thereof, Thompson and Wilson procured from plaintiff a *retraxit*, and a judgment of dismissal, by the payment to him of \$27,500. The only judgments which were entered in that case were the judgments of dismissal in favor of Thompson and Wilson, and the judgment against Thomas for \$139,000; but, as in the former opinion discussed and decided, the payment of \$27,500 was a satisfaction of plaintiff's claim against the three defendants, and the defendant



Thomas became entitled to a judgment in his favor thereby. That litigation then and there came to an end, as to the defendants Thompson and Wilson, because they had paid \$27,500 for a *retractit* of the cause of action in tort against them; as to Thomas, because the release and discharge of his alleged joint tort feorsors operated in law to release him. An end to that litigation having been thus reached, the agent was entitled to have the proceeds of it, after reasonable deductions, paid over to him. Such was his demand, and it should have been granted. The order is reversed, with directions to the trial court to enter the order prayed for, after making reasonable allowance to plaintiff, Chetwood, for his costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees in the said action as contemplated by law.

We concur: TEMPLE, J.; MCFARLAND, J.

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NOTICE TO BANK—NEWSPAPER READ BY OFFICERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, February 18, 1896.

CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO *vs.* MCGEOCH, *et al.*

To prove a bank's knowledge of a preference, a certain issue of a newspaper of general circulation, which the bank's President and Cashier were accustomed to take and read, and which contained on that date an article concerning such creditor's security in full, is admissible in evidence.

The fact that a majority of the directors of the bank were members of the Board of Trade, that the Cashier was frequently there, and that the security in full of such creditor became publicly and generally known to the Board of Trade and in the city, are circumstances admissible to show knowledge on the part of the bank.

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This was an action by the Continental National Bank of Chicago against Arthur N. McGeoch, Clara McGeoch and John W. Flint, executors of the estate of Peter McGeoch, deceased, and Daniel Wells, to recover an alleged balance on promissory notes.

One of the questions involved was whether the plaintiff bank knew at the time of accepting composition agreement that the Union National Bank of Chicago had been paid, or had secured its claim in full by the committee of creditors who circulated the composition agreement.

CASSADY, C. J. (omitting other parts of the opinion): Error is assigned because the court admitted in evidence a copy of the "Chicago Tribune" of Sunday, July 27, 1883, giving an account of the payment of the Union National Bank's claim having been secured in full by the committee mentioned giving their personal bond for the same. It is admitted that both the President and Cashier of the plaintiff bank were accustomed to take and read the "Chicago Tribune" at that time, and there is no evidence that either of them read or received that particular Sunday issue. Under the repeated rulings of this court, we must hold that the article was admissible. (*Young vs. Tibbitts*, 32 Wis. 79; *Gilchrist vs. Brande*, 58 Wis. 200.)

The fact that a majority of the plaintiff's directors were members of the Board of Trade, that its Cashier was frequently there, and the fact that such security in full of the Union National Bank became publicly and generally known on the Board of Trade and in the city, were circumstances admissible in evidence. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 138; *Lovejoy vs. Spafford*, 93 U. S. 430.)

Thus it is established as a verity in the case that the plaintiff, with full knowledge that payment to the Union National Bank had been secured in

full by the committee, accepted the \$25,916.97 as a settlement, and executed and delivered the discharge in question, notwithstanding the condition it had exacted when it signed the consent to settle, as indicated.

Nor do we think there was any error in charging the jury on the subject of notice, as to such preference, or as to the corner on lard. They were expressly told that the plaintiff was not chargeable with the knowledge of its directors, acting as individuals, nor with the knowledge of the plaintiff's officers having nothing to do with the compromise and settlement. The court merely allowed the jury to take into consideration the circumstances tending to prove knowledge on the part of the plaintiff, including the matters mentioned.

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DISCOUNT OF DRAFT BEFORE ACCEPTANCE—WHAT NECESSARY TO  
CONSTITUTE BANK A BONA FIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE.

Supreme Court of Michigan, July 28, 1896.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MONROE vs. WILLS CREEK COAL COMPANY.

Where a bank has discounted a draft in advance of its acceptance, it will not be deemed a *bona fide* holder for value, so as to exclude the equities of the acceptor, unless at the time of or after, the acceptance, it had funds in its possession which it released or failed to withhold because of such acceptance.

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MONTGOMERY, J.: Action on an accepted draft drawn by the Monroe Manufacturing Company on defendant, and discounted at the bank of the plaintiff before acceptance. There was testimony tending to show that the acceptance was for the accommodation of the drawer; that the acceptance was made by the bookkeeper, who had no authority to accept drafts for the company, and without any consideration passing to the company.

Plaintiff, however, claimed that it was a *bona fide* holder, and that the action of the bookkeeper in accepting the draft was fully ratified by the defendant's vice-president, who had general authority to accept drafts. The question of ratification was submitted to the jury, under instructions which appear unobjectionable, and was found in the affirmative. Even if the acceptance of the draft was ratified, if it was for the accommodation of the drawer, a recovery could be justified only upon a finding that the plaintiff was a *bona fide* holder; and it is contended by the defendant that the evidence failed to show that the bank parted with value on the strength of the acceptance. The testimony given upon this point was by Gen. Spaulding, the President of the bank. He testified, in substance, that the draft was discounted before acceptance, and sent forward to the bank's correspondent in Detroit, for acceptance and return; that it was returned, bearing the indorsement, "Accepted by the Wills Creek Coal Co. B. F. Berry, Vice-President.."

On cross-examination he testified that he was not able to state whether the money was paid on the draft, or whether it was credited to the account of the Monroe Manufacturing Company, and that he discounted it relying upon the Wills Creek Coal Company, because he did not presume that the Monroe Manufacturing Company would draw against the Wills Creek Coal Company unless they were indebted.

On redirect examination, he was asked to state what the arrangement was with the Monroe Manufacturing Company in regard to what should be done with the proceeds of this draft if it was not accepted by the Wills Creek Coal

Company. The answer was as follows: "The instructions to those in the bank under me were that if paper was sent for acceptance, and acceptance refused, the amount would be charged right back to the account of the drawer." The Court: "So that it was a conditional credit?" Answer: "Yes, sir." Question: "Depending upon the indorsement?" Answer: "Yes, sir; entirely." There was no testimony as to whether the Monroe Manufacturing Company had funds in the bank against which this draft could have been charged, after the discount of the same.

The Court charged: "If you believe the testimony of General Spaulding that the First National Bank of Monroe discounted the draft in suit upon the condition that the acceptance of the Wills Creek Coal Company should be obtained, and reserving the right to charge the proceeds back against the Monroe Manufacturing Company in case the acceptance of the Wills Creek Coal Company should not be obtained, then I charge you that the bank would be a *bona fide* holder of the paper, and would be entitled to recover; that is, if they relied upon that, other things being duly authorized, and if they relied upon that, they would be entitled to recover, if the paper appeared regular upon its face, was taken in the ordinary course of business, was taken [accepted] by some one authorized by the Wills Creek Company, either expressly or by ratification, growing out of the acts of the vice-president and general manager of the company, or arising from a course of conduct pursued by the vice-president and general manager of the defendant company, having knowledge that the paper had been accepted by the bookkeeper of the corporation."

It will be noted that the testimony of Mr. Spaulding does not show that there was any agreement between the parties to charge back the amount of the draft, nor do we think that this would be essential if, in fact, there was a credit on the books of the bank which would enable the bank to have done so. But there was no such evidence, nor does the instruction make the right to recover depend upon any such fact.

Under these circumstances, the instruction was erroneous. Unless, when the acceptance came to the bank, it had funds in its hands which it released or failed to withhold from the drawer, the Monroe Manufacturing Company, because of the acceptance, the bank did not part with value in reliance on the acceptance in such sense as to constitute it a *bona fide* holder. (*Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank vs. Empire Stone Dressing Co.* 5 Bosw. 275.)

The judgment will be reversed, and a new trial ordered. The other justices concurred.

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#### USURY—PRIVATE BANKERS—NEW YORK STATUTE.

New York Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County, March, 1896.

HAWLEY vs. KOUNTZE.

Where the lender exacts, in addition to legal interest, as a consideration for making the loan, an option to purchase of the borrower shares of stock at a price fixed, such additional exaction constitutes usury.

The immunity against forfeiture of the principal granted to banks by the Banking Law of New York applies to private bankers.

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This was an action to declare void a certain contract for a loan, and to enjoin the sale of certain shares of stock pledged by plaintiff to defendants as security for such loan.

GAYNOR, J.: No doubt the defendants exacted of the plaintiff, in addition to lawful interest, that he give them the option to purchase of him the shares of stock at the price fixed, for the making of the loan; otherwise there was no reason or consideration for the option. The exacting and receiving of this option in addition to lawful interest was a violation of the usury statute. (*Cleveland vs. Loder*, 7 Paige, 557.)

The shares of stock covered by the option are included with shares deposited as collateral to the loan, and the defendants are about to sell all of the shares, the loan being in default. This action is brought to have the contract of loan adjudged void, and to enjoin the sale of the shares of stock, and have them surrendered. The defendants are "private bankers." The banking laws revised and combined into one Act in 1882, applied generally to "banking associations" and "individual bankers" (Laws 1882, c. 409), who were thereby allowed to enjoy the privileges of and do business under the banking laws, subject to the supervision of the State Banking Department. The said Act relieved them from the forfeiture of the principal for usury under the general usury laws, and subjected them instead only to a forfeiture of the entire interest, or, if the usury should be paid, to a penal action to be brought within two years for the recovery of twice the amount thereof; the declared purpose of the Act being to put State bank associations and bankers in this respect upon the same footing as National banks. (Sections 68, 69.) But these sections also expressly included and gave the same relief to "private bankers," although the Act did not subject them to it or to public control, viz., to the jurisdiction of the banking department. It was doubted if these provisions applied to any but "banking associations" and "individual bankers," who, as has been seen, conducted business under the regulations of the banking laws, and the supervision of the State, and thereby became in a sense public bankers; but they were held to apply to private bankers also. (*Perkins vs. Smith*, 116 N. Y. 441.)

This construction made the Act incongruous, in extending this privilege to persons not answerable to its provisions, or embraced within its general scope and policy. In the new revision of the banking laws in 1892 (chapter 689) the designation of private bankers was dropped in the rendering of the said sections 68 and 69 of the Act of 1882 (section 55), but in the schedule of repealed Acts at the end, while the said Act of 1882 is included, the said sections are expressly exempted from repeal.

The Act of 1892 being restricted to banking associations and individual bankers authorized and controlled thereby, I can see no object in thus keeping alive the said two sections of the Act of 1882, unless to continue to "private bankers" the immunity against forfeiture of the principal under the general usury laws, for in all else the said sections are fully incorporated in the new Act. To give such immunity to money lenders who choose to call themselves private bankers, and refuse to subject themselves to public regulation and supervision, while subjecting to such forfeiture all individuals who do not thus dub themselves, seems strange; but it has to suffice with the court that the Legislature has so enacted.

As forfeiture of the principal may not be decreed against the defendants, it follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction pending the action to prevent the defendants from selling the shares as collaterals to pay the debt. They have the right to sell them to pay the debt. They may not, however,

lawfully retain the proceeds to pay the interest; nor may they hold or sell them under the option.

Chapter 237 of the laws of 1882 has no application to this case, as it only makes lawful the payment of "any sum of money to be agreed upon in writing" for advances of money upon warehouse receipts, bills of lading, certificates of stock, and certain other specified collateral securities. The exaction in excess of interest in this case was not of a sum of money, nor was it provided for by a written agreement.

I think this action is maintainable. The said shares of stock are of no fixed or market value, as the company in which they are has not got into full operation, and in an action for their conversion, or for replevin, or for the statutory penalty of twice the amount of the usurious exaction, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove a sum certain. Such an action is therefore not an adequate remedy. The jurisdiction of equity in cases of usury is ancient, and has been aided by our usury statute. (1 Rev. St. p. 771, pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3; Laws 1837, c. 430; *Allerton vs. Belden*, 49 N. Y. 373.)

The injunction is continued pending the action, unless the defendants offer to receive the principal of the indebtedness in full, and surrender up the notes and the collateral and the option, in which case the injunction will be modified upon an application upon five days' notice, so as to allow the said shares of stock to be sold as collateral to pay the principal.

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#### PROMISSORY NOTE—EFFECT OF PROVISIONS IN MORTGAGE.

Supreme Court of Michigan, July 31, 1896.

WILSON vs. CAMPBELL.

A note otherwise negotiable is not rendered non-negotiable by a provision that upon default being made in the payment of any installment of interest the entire principal sum shall become due; nor by a provision in a mortgage collateral thereto that the entire principal shall become due upon default being made in the payment of taxes.

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This was a bill to compel the discharge of a mortgage, executed by one Potter and wife and a cross-bill to foreclose the mortgage. Potter had made his promissory note payable to E. E. White, or bearer for \$550, due April 1, 1892, with coupons attached, representing the installments of interest.

The note contained a provision that in case of default in the payment of interest continuing for thirty days the whole principal and interest unpaid should, at the option of the holder of the note, become due. This note was secured by a mortgage with a condition for the payment of the principal and interest of the note and all taxes and assessments of whatever nature which may be levied upon the described premises as soon and as often as the same may become due and payable. The mortgage contained the following agreement:

"Should any default be made in the payment of said taxes, assessments, interest, or any part thereof, on any day whereof the same is made payable, as above expressed, and should the same remain unpaid and in arrears for the space of thirty days, then and from thenceforth—that is to say, from the lapse of thirty days—the aforesaid principal sum of five hundred and fifty dollars, with all arrearages of interest thereupon, and all taxes, assessments, due and unpaid shall at the option of said obligee, his executors, administrators, or assigns, become and be due and payable immediately thereafter,

although the time above limited for the payment thereof may not then have expired, anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding."

The note and mortgage were assigned to the defendant June 14, 1887, and possession of the same delivered to her.

The complainant claimed to have made payment of the mortgage to the company which had negotiated the loan.

MONTGOMERY, J. (omitting part of the opinion): If the note and mortgage were negotiable, it follows that the complainant has not made a payment to one either in fact or apparently clothed with authority to receive it. But it is contended that the note is not negotiable, the ground being that the note gives an option to declare the whole amount due in case of default in payment of an installment of interest, and, while the point is not made, the question suggests itself whether the similar provision contained in the mortgage, giving a like option in case of default in payment of taxes, renders the security non-negotiable, and as this question is discussed in *Brooke vs. Struthers* (now pending before us), we consider both questions.

In *Littlefield vs. Hodge* (6 Mich. 327), it was held that a note in form negotiable is none the less negotiable when secured by a mortgage containing provisions not repugnant to it. We apprehend the test in such cases is, are the provisions of the mortgage such as to introduce uncertainty as to time or amount? What elements of uncertainty inconsistent with negotiability here exist, if any? Is there such uncertainty as to time as renders the note non-negotiable? It seems to me very clear that the answer must be in the negative.

(*Carlton vs. Kenealy*, 12 Mees. & W. 139; *German Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Franck*, 22 Ind. 364; *Walker vs. Woollen*, 54 Ind. 164; *Cota vs. Buck*, 7 Metc. [Mass.] 588; *Kiskadden vs. Allen*, 7 Colo. 206, 3 Pac. 221; *Dobbins vs. Oberman*, 17 Neb. 163; *Ernst vs. Steckman*, 74 Pa. St. 13; *Charlton vs. Reed*, 61 Iowa, 166; *Chicago Railway Equipment Co. vs. Merchants' Bank*, 136 U. S. 268; *Cisne vs. Chidester*, 85 Ill. 525.)

In *Carlton vs. Kenealy* it was determined that a note payable in installments, subject to a condition that, on default being made in payment of the first installment, the whole amount shall become due, is assignable within the statute 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9. Parke, B., in deciding the point, said:

"Almost every note payable by installments has such a condition. It is not a contingency; it depends upon the act of the maker himself, and on his default it becomes a promissory note for the whole amount."

In *Ernst vs. Steckman* a note payable twelve months after date, or before, if made out of the sale of Coffman's Compound Broadcast Seeding Machine, was held negotiable. The case of *Walker vs. Woollen* is to precisely the same effect, as is also the case of *Charlton vs. Reed*.

In *Dobbins vs. Oberman* the note read: "On March 1, 1893, for value received, I promise to pay to Anna M. Wilson, or order, four hundred dollars, with interest. This note shall become due immediately after Anna M. Wilson delivers possession to me of the northeast quarter of section 12," etc. This instrument was held negotiable, the court finding that it contained a promise to pay to Anna M. Wilson, or order, a sum certain absolutely and at all events; and adding: "It matters not, then, that it also contained a promise to pay sooner than the general date of payment upon the happening of an uncertain event." In *Chicago Railway Equipment Co. vs. Merchants' Bank* (136 U. S. 269), it was held that a recital that the note in suit was one of a series, and

that in default of payment on any one of the series the note in suit should become due, did not render the note non-negotiable, the same containing a promise to pay at a certain definite date at which it became due at all events. The case contains a review of the authorities and an interesting discussion by Mr. Justice Harlan. The present case is unlike *Brooks vs. Hargreaves* (21 Mich. 254), as in that case the maturity of the note depended upon the volition of a third person not a party to the note. In *Story vs. Lamb* (52 Mich. 525), an option was given to the payee to take possession of the property which was the consideration of the note in case of default or demand payment of the note, the title to the property being retained in the payee. In this respect the case is like *Harkness vs. Russell* (118 U. S. 663), which case is distinguished in *Chicago Railway Equipment Co. vs. Merchants' Bank* (136 U. S. 282). In *Bank vs. Wheeler* (75 Mich. 546), the payee was given the right to extend the time or renew. *Brewing Co. vs. McKittrick* (86 Mich. 191) follows *Bank vs. Purdy* (56 Mich. 7), and must rest upon the view that the introduction into a promissory note of extraneous provisions must render the note non-negotiable, as in that case there was an absolute promise to pay. Whether this be viewed as a departure or not, such a rule cannot be applied to provisions in a mortgage collateral to a negotiable note. As to the certainty of time required, I think it sufficient if a time be fixed which must inevitably happen. (*Mattison vs. Marks*, 31 Mich. 421; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 47, 48, 852) *Corey vs. Markey* [Mich.] 66 N. W. 493.) There is no uncertainty as to the amount stipulated to be paid. The engagement to pay all taxes and assessments adds nothing to the obligation of the mortgagor. The obligation rests upon him independently of any stipulation on the subject, and his failure to meet the obligation gives the mortgagee the right to discharge the lien for the purpose of preserving his security, and add the amount to the mortgage debt. (2 Jones, Mortg. §§ 1137, 1683; *Insurance Co. vs. Bulte*, 45 Mich. 122.) It is a radical mistake, therefore, to consider this an obligation to pay the mortgagee so much in addition as the taxes and assessments amount to. The obligation is, in the first instance, to pay to the public authorities authorized to receive the amount, and it is only by implication, if at all, that the indebtedness is ever to be added to the mortgage.

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#### CHECK—TIME OF PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, June 19, 1896.

GRANGE vs. REIGH, et al.

The payee of a check must present the same for payment within a reasonable time, in order to preserve his right of recourse on the drawer in case of non-payment by the drawee. Where the payee of a check resides and receives the check at the place where the bank is located, a reasonable time for presentation to the drawee reaches, at the latest, only to the close of banking hours on the succeeding day, excluding Sundays and holidays.

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On July 20, 1893, defendants were indebted to plaintiff in the sum of \$1,211. After banking hours on that day, in the city of Milwaukee, where plaintiff resided, defendants gave him a check for the amount of such indebtedness on the South Side Savings Bank, located in said city. Such check was not presented for payment either on that or the succeeding day, July 21. The bank was open for business all of such succeeding day, and would have paid the check had it been presented during that time. The bank did not

open for business after the 21st, by reason of which the check was not paid. This action is to recover the amount of the check from the drawers. The circuit court decided that, because of the failure to present the check for payment to the bank within a reasonable time, recourse upon the drawers was lost; and accordingly judgment was rendered for the defendants, and plaintiff appealed.

**MARSHALL, J.** (after stating the facts): The settled law applicable to the facts of this case is that, if a person receives a check on a bank, he must present it for payment within a reasonable time, in order to preserve his right of recourse on the drawer in case of non-payment by the drawee; and that, when such person resides and receives the check at the same place where such bank is located, a reasonable time for such presentation reaches, at the latest, only to the close of banking hours on the succeeding day, excluding Sundays and holidays. (Tied. Com. Paper, § 443; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1590, 1591, and cases cited; *Lloyd vs. Osborne*, 92 Wis. —, 65 N. W. 859.) Plaintiff failed to comply with the law in this respect; hence defendants were discharged from all liability to answer for the default of the bank. Such was the decision of the trial court, and it must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

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**BOND OF OFFICER—CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT—KNOWLEDGE OF BANK.**

Supreme Court of Georgia, January 13, 1896.

**FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY vs. GATE CITY NATIONAL BANK.**

Under a contract by which a fidelity and casualty company binds itself to make good to a bank, to a specified extent, such pecuniary loss as the latter may sustain by reason of the fraud or dishonesty of a named employee in connection with his duties as receiving teller, "or the duties to which, in the employer's service, he may be subsequently appointed or assigned by the employer," it is the right of the bank, without notifying the company, to confer upon this employee the office of Assistant Cashier, in addition to that of receiving teller; and, upon this being done, the company is as much bound to make good to the bank losses occasioned, during the period covered by the contract, by reason of the employee's fraud or dishonesty while acting in the capacity of Assistant Cashier, as in that of receiving teller.

Although the contract may have required the bank, upon the discovery of any fraud or dishonesty on the part of such employee, to give notice thereof to the company, and also, immediately after knowledge by the bank of the occurrence of any act on his part involving a loss to the company of more than \$100, to notify the company of the same, yet where such contract contained no stipulation making it in the least degree incumbent upon the bank to exercise any diligence or care in inquiring into or supervising the conduct of this particular employee, or of any of his co-employees in its service, and imposed upon it no duty of vouching for the fidelity or efficiency of the latter, or of requiring them to watch and report upon his actings and doings, information or knowledge on the part of the bank's Cashier—he being only such a co-employee—as to the matters concerning which the company had stipulated for notice would not, relatively to it, be, under these circumstances, imputable to the bank itself.

Where, to an action by the bank upon such a contract, the defendant filed an amendment to his plea, which amendment alleged that the employee had, within the knowledge of the bank, been guilty of a specified default, such amendment, not being legally complete without further alleging that the plaintiff had failed to duly notify the defendant of the default in question, was properly stricken on demurrer.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

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**LUMPKIN, J.:** In view of what we consider the controlling questions in this case, it is not essential to deal specially with the numerous assignments



of error contained in the record, and we shall therefore confine our remarks to the points upon which we have found it necessary to rule.

1. The Fidelity and Casualty Company (to which we shall hereinafter refer as the "Company") undertook, by its bond, to make good to the Gate City National Bank of Atlanta (which will hereinafter be called the "Bank") such pecuniary loss not exceeding \$10,000, as it might sustain by reason of the fraud or dishonesty of Lewis Redwine in connection with his duties as receiving teller, "or the duties to which, in the employer's service, he may be subsequently appointed or assigned by the employer." He was afterwards appointed Assistant Cashier, and as such was guilty of conduct which caused loss to the bank in an amount far exceeding the face of the company's bond.

One of the questions for decision is whether or not the company was surety for him in the latter capacity. In view of the comprehensiveness of the above-quoted language, it would be difficult to hold it was not. He was certainly appointed, subsequently to the execution of the bond, to the office of Assistant Cashier; as such, had duties to perform in his employer's service, and by a violation of those duties brought loss to his master. We think the plain language of the contract covers the precise state of facts which arose, and that the company is as much bound to answer to the bank for the consequences of Redwine's dishonesty in the latter capacity as in the former.

2. The main question in the case is whether or not, under the stipulations expressed in the contract, the knowledge of the bank's Cashier of fraud or dishonesty on the part of Redwine, or of any act done by him involving a loss to the company of more than \$100, was imputable to the bank itself.

This case does not fall within the general rule applicable to banks in their dealings with the general public. Much of a bank's business is necessarily intrusted to its subordinate officials or servants, and in a large number of instances it will, upon the doctrine of constructive notice, be held to know what comes to their knowledge. This rule is founded upon necessity, and has for its object the protection of those who deal with and trust the bank.

The transaction out of which this bond grew was of an altogether different kind from those usually occurring between a bank and its customers. The contract was not made for the purpose of protecting the company in any dealings it might have with the bank; but, on the contrary, the company undertook to protect the bank in the matter of delegating some of the duties it owed to others to Redwine for performance in its behalf. In other words, the company agreed to save the bank from loss, to a limited extent, by reason of its thus trusting Redwine. As naturally incident to a contract of this nature, the company stipulated that the bank should gain no benefit thereunder if it continued in its service an employee known to be unworthy of trust, without prompt notice to the company after he had been discovered by the bank to be untrustworthy.

There is not a syllable in the contract, however, bearing the construction that the bank should exercise any degree of diligence in inquiring into or supervising the conduct of Redwine, in order that the company might be saved from loss through his misconduct. The bank did not undertake to exercise reasonable care and diligence to find out if Redwine had become untrustworthy, but as to this matter the company, in effect, invited the bank to repose in peace, for it guaranteed that Redwine would remain honest and faithful. Only after knowledge had actually come to the bank that he was,

or had become, otherwise, was it under any duty to the company; and then it was only required to immediately notify the company of what it had ascertained.

This bank, it seems, was conducting its business in the manner usual with such institutions; having a Cashier, Assistant Cashier, receiving and paying tellers, bookkeepers, etc. It was not, so far as the company was concerned, under any duty of keeping itself informed as to the conduct of Redwine. The company must have known and contemplated that the bank's business was to be carried on through its employees, including Redwine; and yet it entered into a contract which does not even suggest that it should be protected if any of these employees other than Redwine should fail in the duty they undoubtedly owed the bank, of informing it of any misconduct on his part.

Evidently the company chose to rely solely upon the care which the bank would most probably exercise in protecting itself, and consequently did not require any fixed supervision over Redwine; being willing to content itself with the assurance that the interests of the bank would necessarily require such a supervision of him as would in all probability enable the bank to obtain actual knowledge of any fraud, dishonesty, or negligence of which he might be guilty.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we cannot think that the parties to this contract contemplated that the bank would be bound to act upon mere constructive notice of Redwine's shortcomings. The "knowledge" referred to meant actual knowledge. Constructively, whenever Redwine—he being an employee of the bank, handling its money—misapplied the same, the bank itself would have immediate notice of the fact; for his knowledge, as a servant of the bank, would, if the doctrine of constructive notice were applicable, be its knowledge. Surely the contract cannot be construed as contemplating any such result as this.

Again, suppose another employee was colluding with Redwine in concealing his shortage; the knowledge of such other employee would be, constructively, the knowledge of the bank. Or suppose Redwine and another employee, also under bond, were both misappropriating the bank's funds, and each found the other out; could it be said, in defense to a suit on Redwine's bond, that the other employee's knowledge was the knowledge of the bank? or, when suit on the other employee's bond was entered, that Redwine's knowledge was constructive notice to the bank, and the legal equivalent of the "knowledge" referred to in the company's bond?

In the absence of any guaranty on the part of the bank that its other employees would be honest and faithful, and in view of the purpose of the condition inserted in the bond, it would seem that the better construction of it would be that the bank only obligated itself to act in good faith, and impart only actual knowledge on its part. The bond, would, indeed, be of no practical protection, if, in order to realize its benefits, the bank had to insure, not only the honesty and fidelity, but the faithful and conscientious attention to duty, of a dozen others of its employees.

Stupidity of an employee, in not comprehending ordinary facts and circumstances, which would be equivalent to actual knowledge if within the knowledge of the bank itself, might lead to a forfeiture of the bond, while forgetfulness or mere negligent inattention to duty on the part of such employee would bring about the same result. The Cashier, according to the

undisputed testimony in this case, was a mere employee. Unless the bank obligated itself to use his eyes and ears, it had no knowledge of Redwine's misconduct.

The following cases throw much light upon the subject under consideration: In *Railway Co. vs. Shaeffer* (59 Pa. St. 350), it was held that, where an officer of a corporation violates his duty, knowledge on the part of other officers of the corporation of the default, or even connivance in it, does not discharge the sureties. In that case the defaulting employee had given a bond, with sureties, for the faithful discharge of his duties. In delivering the opinion of the court, Sharswood, J., says:

"Corporations can only act by officers and agents. They do not guaranty to the sureties of one officer the fidelity of the others. The rules and regulations which they may establish in regard to periodical returns and payments are for their own security, and not for the benefit of the sureties. The sureties, by executing the bond, become responsible for the fidelity of their principal. It is no collateral engagement into which they enter, dependent on some contingency or condition different from the engagement of their principal. They become joint obligors with him in the same bond, and with the same condition underwritten. The fact that there were other unfaithful officers and agents of the corporation, who knew and connived at his infidelity, ought not in reason, and does not in law or equity, relieve them from the responsibility for him. They undertake that he shall be honest, though all around him are rogues. Were the rule different, by the conspiracy of the officers of a bank, or other moneyed institution, all their sureties might be discharged. It is impossible that a doctrine leading to such consequences should be sound. In a suit by a bank against a surety on the Cashier's bond, a plea that the Cashier's defalcation was known to and connived at by the officers of the bank was held to be no defense. (*Taylor vs. Bank*, 2 J. J. Marsh, 564.")

In the latter case it would seem that a mother bank established a branch, putting it into the hands of a directory for management, and itself appointing a Cashier, requiring of him a bond. In speaking of a plea filed in defense to a suit upon the bond, Judge Robertson said (pages 569, 570):

"It imputes to the directory of the branch bank only a knowledge of the delinquencies of the Cashier, and a connivance at them. It was their duty, if they had any such knowledge, to communicate it to the mother bank. And if they failed to do it there would be more reason for charging them with fraud on the mother bank than for imputing to it any fraud on the sureties of the Cashier. It is not the presumption of either law or fact that everything known to the branches is communicated to the principal bank. The Cashier of a branch is an agent of the mother bank. The directors of the same branch are other agents of the same parent institution. Suppose these several agents combine to defraud their principal; is the one excused by the fact that the other is particeps? Is the surety of one exonerated because the other has co-operated in the malfeasance? Or suppose one connive at a fraud or improper conduct of the other; is the employer responsible because one of its agents knew of the delinquency, and might have prevented its recurrence? The legal maxim, '*Qui facit per alium facit per se*,' does not apply to such a case. The connivance of the branch is not that of the mother bank. The fraud of the branch is not that of the mother institution, because, if the plea be true, there was a tacit combination of the agents to

injure the principal. If A employ a principal to transact particular business, and exact from him security for his fidelity, and constitute another agent to perform other associate and supervisory functions, surely, if they both conspire to defraud their constituent, the security shall not be permitted to say that the act of the agent is that of the principal."

Brandt, in his work on Suretyship and Guaranty (section 369), recognizes and approves the doctrine laid down in the cases above referred to, and says:

"If the sureties of one officer of a corporation could be relieved from liability by the neglect of duty of other officers of the corporation, the corporation would be deprived of all remedy."

The above authorities will suffice to show that the doctrine of constructive notice has no application to transactions such as that in the present case. Not having required the bank to insure the fidelity of all its other employees, as a condition precedent to recovery on Redwine's bond, the company cannot take advantage of the failure of duty on the part of one of the bank's employees. Undoubtedly it was the duty of McCandless, the Cashier, to inform the bank as to any misdoings of Redwine of which he knew. This was, however a duty he owed the bank, and not the company, which could only derive a benefit therefrom by express stipulation in its contract to the effect that it should be entitled to have such duty of McCandless to the bank faithfully performed. The bank suffered from such neglect to a far greater extent than did the company, whose liability under its bond was limited in amount, and surely the bank is not equitably estopped from claiming a benefit under the bond which it expressly stipulated for.

[The remainder of the opinion is devoted to questions of pleading.]

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

Editor *Bankers' Magazine*:

CHARLESTOWN, W. Va., Sept. 21, 1896.

SIR:—On the 12th inst. we sent two checks on Martinsburg, Pa. to our Baltimore correspondent; on the 14th the Baltimore bank forwarded them to the Corn Exchange National Bank, Philadelphia, which forwarded them to Gardner, Morrow & Co., Hollidaysburg, Pa. Gardner, Morrow & Co. closed their doors on the 18th without remitting. Is not the Philadelphia bank responsible to our Baltimore correspondent, and they to us?

G. A. PORTERFIELD, Cashier.

*Answer.*—There does not appear to have been any negligence on the part of the Baltimore and Philadelphia banks, and hence their liability depends upon the question whether they can be held liable for the default of Gardner, Morrow & Company. On this point the authorities are directly in conflict. On the one hand it is held that, in the absence of an express or implied contract varying such liability, the collecting bank is liable for the neglect or default of its correspondent or other agent. (*Exchange Nat. Bank vs. Third Nat. Bank*, 112 U. S. 276; *Van Wart vs. Woolley*, 3 B. & C. 439; *Mackers vs. Ramsays*, 9 Cl. & F. 818; *Allen vs. Merchants' Bank*, 22 Wend. 215; *Montgomery County Bank vs. Albany City Bank*, 7 N. Y. 459; *Commercial Bank vs. Union Bank*, 11 N. Y. 203; *St. Nicholas Nat. Bank vs. State Bank*, 128 N. Y. 126; *Reeves vs. State Bank*, 8 Ohio St. 465; *Simpson vs. Walby*, 63

Mich. 479; *Steetssguth vs. Nat. American Bank*, 43 Minn. 50; *Power vs. First Nat. Bank*, 6 Mont. 251.)

On the other hand it is held that the duty of the collecting bank is fully discharged if it exercises reasonable care in the selection of such correspondent or other agent, and that when the paper has been duly transmitted with the necessary instructions to a suitable agent at the place where it is payable, the transmitting bank will not be liable for any neglect or default of such agent. (*East Haddam Bank vs. Scovill*, 12 Conn. 303; *Aetna Ins. Co. vs. Alton City Bank*, 25 Ill. 243; *Guelich vs. Nat. City Bank*, 56 Iowa, 434; *Stacy vs. Dane County Bank*, 12 Wis. 629; *Daly vs. Butchers and Drovers' Bank*, 56 Mo. 94; *Bank of Louisville vs. First Nat. Bank*, 8 Baxter, 101.)

The precise question does not appear to have been decided in Maryland, West Virginia, or Pennsylvania. The first mentioned rule prevails, however, in the Federal courts; and as the Charlestown, Baltimore and Philadelphia banks are, for jurisdictional purposes, citizens of different States (Act Congress, August 13, 1888), the suits could be brought in those courts, provided the amount of the checks exceeded two thousand dollars.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

Mo., Sept. 25, 1886.

SIR:—It is customary for banks to take notes here made payable to their own order and have the endorser write his name on the back. Is it necessary in this case to have it protested to hold the endorsers? It is claimed that on a note made this way the endorser becomes a maker.

I. A. J.

*Answer.*—On this point there is much conflict in the decisions. In some jurisdictions a person so placing his signature on the back of a note is deemed a joint maker; in other jurisdictions he is regarded as a guarantor; and in still others as an indorser; and those courts who hold him to be an indorser differ as to whether he is a first or second indorser. The rule mentioned by our correspondent prevails in the Supreme Court of the United States (*Good vs. Martin*, 95 U. S. 95); Michigan (*Rotschild vs. Griz*, 31 Mich. 150); Maine (*Stevens vs. Parsons*, 80 Me. 353); Arkansas (*Nathan vs. Sloan*, 34 Ark. 524); Missouri (*Schmidt Matting Co. vs. Miller*, 38 Mo. App. 251), and several other States. Where this rule prevails notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the person so writing his name on the instrument.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

HOT SPRINGS, Ark., Sept. 17, 1886.

SIR:—A wishes to obtain a loan from B, a banker, and gives C and D as endorsers. The note is drawn as follows: Ninety days after date we promise to pay to the order of B the sum of one thousand dollars with interest from maturity until paid, etc.

(Signed) C and D.

You will notice that A, the beneficiary, has not signed the note, nor is there anything in or about the note to indicate that he is in any way concerned in it. All parties to the transaction understand the nature of it, the intent being that the beneficiary wishes to hide his identity in the transaction from the general public or the bank examiner. It is in point of fact a note without the maker's name attached. After three or four renewals the maker or beneficiary falls. The question is, are the indorsers liable or not? or can a valid note be made without attaching the maker's signature?

ED. H. JOHNSON, *Cashier*.

*Answer.*—The note mentioned is a valid obligation, and C and D are liable thereon as makers. It is true that they are merely accommodation makers; but this fact does not relieve them from liability, though B knew at the time of discounting the note that it was made for the benefit of A. (*Stephens vs. Monongahela Nat. Bank*, 87 Pa. St. 163; *Thatcher vs. West River Nat. Bank*, 19 Mich. 202; *First Nat. Bank vs. Dawson*, 78 Ala. 71; *Jones vs. Benyhill*, 35 Iowa, 289.) There is no rule which requires that a person disposing of a note, whether made for his accommodation, or otherwise, shall appear as a party thereon.



*Eads Bridge—View from East St. Louis.*

## AMERICAN BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

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*PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION, HELD AT  
ST. LOUIS, MO., SEPTEMBER 22, 23 AND 24.*

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**S**T. LOUIS welcomed the Twenty-second Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association in a style according with the high character of the organization and the dignity of the commercial capital of the Southwest—the heart of the great Mississippi Valley, the most fertile region of the American continent.

There have been few, if any, conventions of the association where the social features have been more varied and brilliant or where the arrangements so nearly approached perfection in all respects. This was largely due to the careful preparation made by the reception committee, of which Mr. Charles Parsons was chairman, and the committee of arrangements headed by Mr. Wm. H. Thomson. While there were many notable features, the reception by Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Van Blarcom, on Wednesday evening, and the banquet on Thursday evening, were of especial distinction.

The delegates were afforded every opportunity of inspecting the material resources of St. Louis, her great system of transportation, parks, etc. All the bankers united in making the most thoughtful provision for the entertainment of the visitors.

By invitation of the bankers of Springfield, Ill., the delegates to the convention, and the ladies in attendance, visited the tomb of Lincoln, at Springfield, the trip being made in a special train provided by the Springfield bankers. At the tomb appropriate addresses were made by Messrs. Pullen, Hendrix, Cornwell, Justi, Leathers and others.

As a banking centre St. Louis is noted for its solidity; even the panic of 1893 was weathered without clearing-house certificates or bank failures. Its commercial prosperity is on a sure foundation, and its growth has been continuous and healthful.

On account of the close of the convention having come so near the date of publication, the *MAGAZINE* is unable to give the attention to the social events that their importance merits. In the November number some additional illustrations will be

given, also a more extended recognition of the untiring labors of the St. Louisans who made the convention such an eminent success.

#### FIRST DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

The Twenty-second Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association met in St. Louis, Mo., on Tuesday morning, September 22, 1896.

President Eugene H. Pullen, of New York, called the convention to order, in the Olympic Theatre, promptly at 10 o'clock and introduced the Right Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, Bishop of Missouri, who offered prayer.

On motion, the call of the roll was dispensed with. An address of welcome was then delivered by Hon. C. P. Walbridge, Mayor of St. Louis. He said :

#### ADDRESS OF WELCOME BY MAYOR WALBRIDGE.

Mr. President, it is doubtless true that this convention could not be held in any other country. There may be nations whose aggregation of bankers would represent the same, or possibly more of wealth, but not the same *personnel*. I do not say this to flatter your association, but to emphasize the institutions of government under which your association has grown up. A bankers' convention in England or Germany or Russia, or in any foreign country, would be composed of nobles and earls and dukes, and heirs to great estates, whose perpetuity is fostered and encouraged by the laws and customs of the land. There is no insignia of rank in this convention except that which nature has stamped upon each individual. Your estates are represented in this convention, with rare exceptions, by their founders. In foreign countries the social structure is built in layers, as we build streets.

In this country the social fabric is not built in layers, but of uprights. It grows naturally as wheat and corn grow in the fields, from the bottom up, and as each stalk in the field is valued because of its yield in grain, so each stalk in our social field is valued because of its yield of intelligence and virtue and industry and energy. In foreign countries the social circle is horizontal. In this country it is perpendicular up and down, and whether a man be in the up stratum or the down stratum depends not upon the accident of his birth, but upon the quality and extent of his own effort, and the circle goes on all the time, carrying virtue, industry, strength and courage from the bottom up, bringing depravity, intemperance and imbecility from the top down.

If these things be true, Mr. President, is it not impossible in this country to have a genuine conflict between the masses and the classes? If these things be true, is it not the solemn duty of every true American to resist with all his might every effort on the part of demagogues to foment an imaginary conflict of the sort?

And so I welcome you to St. Louis as good exponents of what may be done by individuals under our institutions; and I would express the hope that your deliberations here may not only establish mutual confidence among yourselves, but that you may so operate as to extend that confidence into all the avenues of industry and trade, and thus restore prosperity throughout the length and breadth of our land.

THE PRESIDENT: I next introduce Mr. W. H. Thompson, the President of the St. Louis Clearing-House.

#### ADDRESS OF W. H. THOMPSON.

To the President and members of the American Bankers' Association:—The members of the St. Louis Clearing-House, whose invitation you have accepted to hold your annual convention in this city, have assigned to me the pleasant task of greeting you on their behalf.

I regret very much not being able to congratulate you on the prosperity promised at your meeting one year ago, and that we have not yet had the opportunity of participating in the "great revival."

If you will however grant us an extension of sixty days, we can promise that the clouds that now overshadow the political horizon will be dispelled; confidence will be restored; the wheels of commerce will again revolve; labor will be fully employed and receive proper reward. This we can promise on the guaranty of the party that will be successful at the election in November, for each and all of them, whose platforms and candidates are now before the people, claim that their election will at once remedy all existing evils, and is the one thing needed to restore our wanted prosperity; besides we have faith in the American people, and that whatever party may succeed, they will in good faith accept the verdict. In this prosperity we hope the bankers may be allowed to participate.

One of the difficulties you will meet with at this convention is that you ought not to discuss questions of finance, for what have formerly been considered purely questions of finance are now politics, and the discussion of political questions should be avoided.

Our committee of arrangements have, so far as they possibly could, provided against this difficulty, and have prepared a programme which, with the assistance of the reception committee, will give you very little time for the transaction of any other business.

No doubt some of the older members of the convention remember a time when bankers were treated with some consideration, and next to the captain of the militia, and the village schoolmaster, the village banker was a person of considerable importance in the community in which he lived. He was looked to by the politician, the farmer and the merchant for financial advice and assistance when needed. This condition of affairs is now changed. They still look to the banker for assistance, but they look to the politician for financial information and advice.

We propose this week to show some of the old time faith in the bankers' advice on financial questions, and anticipate much benefit from your meeting with us at this time, notwithstanding the fact that on the political arena, the public attention is now chiefly centered, and financiers are numerous. They are holding forth on the street corners, in hotel corridors; everywhere you go they are to be found, and even in the daily newspapers the financial question is occasionally alluded to, so that no one (except a banker) needs any information on the subject. The time may come, however, when the aid of the banker will be required, and judging from your past action that aid will be freely rendered, and whatever will tend to benefit the people and aid them in restoring prosperity to the country, will have the hearty co-operation of the American bankers. They have always been prompt in rendering their aid to the Government when needed, and have done their part in every emergency.

All parties join in rendering honor to our soldiers and sailors who in time of our country's peril fought our battles and won our victories; also to our legislators who sustained them during the conflict, and acknowledge freely their services, but some of these same parties seem to forget the men without whose aid success would have been impossible.

We think that while our soldiers and sailors are justly entitled to, and do receive from a grateful people medals and diplomas in commemoration of their services, the men who rendered their aid in sustaining the Government financially ought to be at least entitled to honorable mention.

We are glad to welcome these men to our city, and are proud to have them with us, and express the hope that although it is the first time we have had this privilege, it may not be the last, and at some future time, we may have the pleasure of greeting you in increased numbers, and under more favorable circumstances.

Mr. E. H. Pullen, President of the American Bankers' Association, then addressed the convention as follows:

#### ANNUAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT E. H. PULLEN.

Gentlemen—On behalf of the American Bankers' Association, it gives me pleasure to acknowledge your generous welcome to this imperial city of the West.

Twenty years ago it was my privilege to address in this city the Bank Clerks' Association of the State of Missouri, on which occasion I find on reference to the published proceedings, I used the following language:

"In this centennial year of our national existence we naturally draw contrasts between the past and the present, and none are more marked and astonishing than those presented in the history of St. Louis."

Note her marvellous progress through the years, until to-day she is the central jewel in the galaxy of stars that glitter in the diadem of our Republic.

Verily, the wilderness and the solitary place have been gladdened, the desert has rejoiced, and now blossoms as the rose.

Standing in this matchless western city, overwhelmed with admiration and surprise, I exclaim in realization what was uttered in prophecy, "Westward the star of empire takes its way," and now comprehend the wisdom of the prescient advice of the late sage, Horace Greeley, when he urged the young man to "go West."

This was said in 1876. Twenty years have since passed away, buried in the mausoleum of the past, but have indelibly left their impress on the history of your city. The great calamity you suffered during this year, involving loss of life and property, you endured with fortitude that excited the sympathy of all your countrymen, and your self-reliance and speedy recuperation from disaster command their admiration.

In accepting your invitation, we felt well assured that your far-famed hospitality would be extended to us in such liberal measure that, though far from our homes, we would feel thoroughly at home with you. That was our happy anticipation—to-day we enjoy the full





*Planters' Hotel—Convention Headquarters.*

realization. Our lines have transiently fallen in pleasant places among friends and associates.

The recollection of our visit and your generous welcome will be treasured by each of your guests as one of the most delightful memories of past enjoyments.

Fellow Members—I cordially welcome you to the Twenty-second Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association, and congratulate you on the large attendance, evidencing increasing interest in the objects of our union.

In consequence of the declination of Douglas H. Thomas, of Baltimore, who was elected first vice-president of this association in that city in 1894, to allow his name to be used as candidate for the presidency at the convention at Atlanta, in 1895, I was unanimously elected to that high and honorable position.

The declination of Mr. Thomas was regretted by all, and especially by those who enjoyed his personal acquaintance and were conversant with his character and abilities.

I served as chairman of your executive council for three years, and am closing, with this convention, four consecutive years of service. During that period I have striven to do the very best I could to promote the interests and contribute to the usefulness, popularity and perpetuity of our association.

It has been the custom heretofore to elect retiring presidents as members of the executive council. An amendment was offered at our last convention prohibiting this, but it was not adopted. I am in sympathy with the view of members adverse to this custom, and in my case, considering it will be more honored in the breach than in the observance, I beg respectfully to decline election as one of the executive council.

The past year has been an eventful one in our history. Our membership has largely increased during that period, the accessions being about five hundred.

Interest in our association and its work has been aroused, and we confidently expect a continuance of growth with greater rapidity in the future than in the past.

#### PROTECTIVE WORK.

The labors of the standing protective committee have been exceedingly onerous, unintermitting and phenomenally successful since the adjournment of our convention held at Atlanta.

The success accomplished has far exceeded our most sanguine expectations, and the report of the committee, which will be presented, will doubtless afford you much gratification.

The labor involved in the diligent prosecution of the protective work of our association, the time and care constantly needed, the responsibility of quick exercise of discretion, the voluminous correspondence, personal conferences sought at all hours, the pressing necessity of economy, linked with unstinted expenditure when apparently justified, cannot be estimated except by the gentlemen constituting the committee, who have unselfishly devoted themselves to the task assigned to them, and have found it and the responsibilities exceedingly burdensome and materially interfering with their attention to their own legitimate professional duties.

The protective feature of our work has been this year the greatest factor in attracting new members, and the extraordinary success that has crowned our efforts not only stimulates to increased, energetic exertion, but guarantees that such redoubled effort will in due time exterminate the professional forgers, burglars and check-raisers who have for years preyed on our banks and bankers.

It is our determination to wage an unrelenting war against these criminals, who already understand that the American Bankers' Association is on their track, and they are rapidly appreciating and avoiding the great risk they incur in attempting to defraud our members.

The cost of the work during this year, managed as economically as consistent with efficiency, has been considerable, but the results are worth infinitely more than the thousands of dollars expended.

Experience of similar organizations is that each year of such work faithfully and zealously performed costs less than the preceding years, and that after four or five years the expense will be nominal in comparison.

The skillful professional bank criminals appear to have ample means with which to employ able counsel.

When we secure their arrest and incarceration, our work is far from completed; we must watch their trial until closed by their conviction, and only relax our efforts when they are sentenced and securely put behind the bars.

It is estimated that the increased schedule of dues for the present year will yield from thirty to thirty-two thousand dollars, and that this sum will be sufficient for the protective work and other expenses of the association.

The secretary of the association informs me that the membership of the American Bankers' Association represents, in round figures, eight hundred and sixty million dollars of capital and surplus.

Thirty-two thousand dollars is a small percentage of that amount, say, about four-elevenths of one one-hundredth of one per cent.

All the banks and bankers of the United States should identify themselves with this association and cheerfully contribute to its efforts to protect its members from the depredations of professional criminals.

The schedule of dues was fixed by amendments adopted at our last convention. Attention has been called to the fact that a bank having capital and surplus of five or six millions of dollars pays thirty dollars annual dues—only three times as much as a bank with less than one hundred thousand dollars capital and surplus.

The dues were fixed so as to yield a certain sum in the aggregate—if membership of this association is not worth ten dollars to the smallest bank in the smallest place in our country, it is not worth anything.

While we believe we afford excellent protection to our members against professional criminals, we should be sorry if each member in joining thought only of what his bank might gain, instead of joining from professional pride, *esprit de corps*, actuated by a desire to contribute to the common interest and welfare of the banking fraternity.

When those prominent professional criminals, Becker and Cregan, were arrested, and when, a few weeks ago, their conviction and sentence to life imprisonment was flashed over the wires, each member of our association rejoiced, and felt a sense of pride that he had performed his share in achieving that result.

#### DAYS OF GRACE.

Many States have abolished days of grace, and the subject is being considered by the remainder.

We hope, with the co-operation of the bankers' associations in these States, during the present year, to have the pleasure at our next convention to announce that days of grace have been abolished in every State of our Union.

Uniformity in commercial laws and usages in the different States is very desirable.

We have given much thought to the subject, and made some effort in the desired direction.

Forty-five States with more or less difference in their commercial and banking laws, home-stead exemptions and limitations, naturally attract attention and thought.

For example, in one State, at least, in cases of the failure of a bank organized under its laws, the home depositors receiving no interest are preferred creditors—in others, possession as collateral of a certificate of stock of a corporation organized under their laws, standing in the name of the borrower, is valueless as security unless transferred to the lender or noted on its stock ledger.

In another, if payment of a demand note, indorsed, is not demanded within four months from its date and protested if not paid, the indorsers are released.

In another, notes that are not payable at a bank within the State, protest is not necessary to hold the indorsers, but the maker must be sued at the first court after maturity of note, unless it can be shown that he was insolvent at that time.

I cite these few examples to illustrate the differences that exist, and earnestly urge that this association should take up this work of harmonizing the commercial and banking laws of the different States. A well-arranged plan in co-operation with the State bankers' associations and our various vice-presidents would, in my judgment, be crowned with success.

#### EXPRESS COMPANIES.

We have taken a deep interest in the pending controversy between express companies and banks in various parts of our country in regard to what are known as express money orders, and also their increased rates for transportation of money.

A committee was appointed to look into the merits of the controversy and suggest such action as they might consider essential for the protection of our interests, and the results of their investigations will be submitted to your consideration.

There has been considerable bitterness of feeling injected in the controversy that is needless and irrelevant. It does not tend to an equitable solution of the difficulty to be intemperate in speech or action.

If the express companies do not pay their fair share of taxation, if their issue of money orders should be liable as circulation to ten per cent. tax, if they should be subjected to the restrictions of the Inter-State Commerce law, are matters that can be discussed in a dispassionate manner, and the legislatures of the different States or the Congress can be invoked to make such legislation as is needed.

To say that in New York, Chicago and other cities, banks should decline to keep the accounts of express companies and redeem their money orders, is simply ridiculous.

To say that those banks should issue small drafts in order to supplant express money orders, is equally ridiculous.

The advice to the country bankers to withdraw their accounts from banks in those cities who will not close accounts of express companies or substitute their own drafts in lieu of express orders, is superlative nonsense.

The whole question is one of competition, and our sole effort should be to restrain that competition within legal limitations.

#### ENDORSEMENTS.

The subject of "Restrictive Endorsements" has attracted considerable attention lately, and the clearing-houses of our country have taken action in regard to the matter.

It is understood now by the banks and bankers in our country that absolutely plain endorsements are required, and that no other endorsement should be made or accepted.

There is one matter that should receive the earnest attention of our members, and that is in regard to items on distant points sent as cash to their correspondents.

A New York bank, for example, receives a check from its St. Louis correspondent, drawn by Jones & Company, for one thousand dollars on the None-such National Bank, of None-such, Connecticut, and sends that item to its correspondent at Hartford (contiguous to None-such) as cash. The bank at Hartford remits once in ten days for such items—in other words, the New York bank extends to the bank at Hartford a credit of a certain number of days, and the bank at Hartford sends it to its correspondent at None-such, who remits once in seven days—in other words, the bank at Hartford extends a credit to the bank at None-such of a certain number of days. The check of Jones & Company is paid by the bank at None-such and the amount credited to the bank at Hartford, but before remittance day the bank at None-such fails, and the bank at Hartford immediately notifies the New York bank



*St. Louis—Views from Court-House Dome.*

of the fact, and demands that the item be credited back to their account, and the New York bank makes the same claim on the correspondent at St. Louis, from whom it received the item for similar credit. The St. Louis correspondent demands repayment from the depositor of the check, and he claims that the check was paid, and he declines to refund the money, disclaiming any responsibility for the results of the credits extended by parties through whom the check passed—he declines to pay unless the item is returned to him duly protested.

Query—Who should lose the money? Who should be the creditor of the insolvent bank at None-such? The bank at Hartford, the New York bank, the St. Louis bank, or the original depositor?

The subject of collections is one that appeals to our best consideration, and it is hoped that the discussion of Question No. 1 on the programme will evolve a solution of this difficult problem.

#### STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

Our relations with the bankers' associations of the various States having such organizations are close and satisfactory, and the representation they will have by virtue of the amend-

ments to our constitution, at our last convention, will give them a potential voice in our management and secure their co-operation in obtaining needed legislation and other measures to conserve our common interest.

The American Bankers' Association should and will preserve its popular, democratic and representative character, and at the same time can have within itself, in its executive council and its State vice-presidents, a compact, delegated body, in which the State associations will be largely represented, and which can be clothed with discretionary power, which they could exercise through each year for the benefit of all the members.

#### THE HISTORY OF OUR ASSOCIATION.

The history of the American Bankers' Association for the twenty-two years which have elapsed since its organization is closely interwoven with our national history.

This record has been published, forming an encyclopedia of finance for that period, and members will find it profitable and interesting to add these volumes to their libraries.

#### COMPETITION.

Competition in business is its life within well-defined limits, but beyond those limits it is far from profitable or wise.

If it were not for unwise competition, no interest would be paid on deposits by banks of discount, and no collections would be made at a loss in exchange and time.

If we become members of this association exclusively "for all there is in it" (I quote this expression) for ourselves or the banks with which we are connected, that motive is far from commendable, and intensely selfish.

We associate ourselves in this association to advance the interests of our profession—not for personal honors or gains; not to increase the business of the banks which we represent, by solicitation of accounts already established, for this can only be done by offensive interference with the business of our fellow members.

We have been sarcastically called a "mutual admiration society." I accept it literally, and rejoice in the title, but let us avoid being stigmatized as a "society for mutual piracy."

Instead of making our sole effort to get out of this association all that we can for individual profit, rather let us put into it, its affairs, its management and its fields of labor, all that is in us, to contribute all we can to the best and highest interests of our fraternity.

We have assembled here on this occasion, coming from the North and the South, from the East and the West, but we are not divided geographically or by sectional differences.

We are proud, even in these troublous times, to call ourselves "American citizens."

I assume that it is the purpose of each and every member of this association to be honest in all the relations of life, even political. A man who is politically dishonest is unworthy of confidence in business.

Nations are made up of individuals, and national honesty should be as precious to each individual as his personal honesty.

Honesty is the corner stone of good character in the individual and the nation alike.

The American Bankers' Association, during its twenty-two years' history, has stood for honesty—individual honesty, official honesty, national honesty.

It has always stood for honest money—for an honest dollar, worth one hundred cents and accepted as such in all the markets of the world.

In the past it has boldly, unhesitatingly and repeatedly given utterance to these views—it has issued its declarations in print and scattered them broadcast all over our land.

We should occupy the same position to-day, and, far from desiring to modify our past record, we should confirm and reiterate it with emphasis.

In times of prevailing business depression, widespread discontent and general unrest, the various elements among the people that in prosperity cannot combine their forces, readily coalesce.

Dishonest money, because it is dishonest, attracts the disorderly, lawless and revolutionary elements—the socialist, the populist and the anarchist.

The issue to-day is not exclusively honest money, but the very existence of Government and the preservation of law, life and liberty are at stake.

Banks, especially National banks, have been assailed by the vituperations of ignorance and passion.

The banks rallied to the support of the Government in the darkest hour of its history, and supplied the money necessary to defend its honor and life.

Through the National bank system, subsequently established, a market was opened for United States bonds, yielding the money necessary for the prosecution of the war for the preservation of our Union, and a currency provided that has never been excelled for safety, universal acceptance at par, and immediate redemption.

Ninety-three per cent. of the business of this country is transacted by checks and other negotiable instruments.

Eliminate banking facilities, National banks and their circulation, and substitute dishonest money as the vehicle of trade, financial chaos would speedily result.

Cotton and cereals could not be produced—if produced, could not be marketed—transportation would be paralyzed, the wheels of industry would cease to revolve, enterprise and development be checked, and the whole land plunged into ruin and misery.

Many sincerely believe, it is true, and pity it is true, that the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 and the payment of existing obligations, public and personal, in that metal would be for the highest good of the country. We respect their sincerity in honestly advocating dishonesty, but regret their hallucination on the subject, and are sorry to see them in such disreputable company.

The question has finally been referred to the ballot box for settlement.

We live in a land that has been and is the recipient of the Divine blessing. We live in a land of civil and religious liberty—full of churches, free schools and open Bibles—and we cherish implicit faith in the honesty of the American people, in their common sense, their ready discrimination between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, in their faithful performance of existing contracts, in their respect for the law, in their unselfish devotion to their country, their loyalty to her highest interests, and their willingness to sacrifice their lives rather than suffer her honor to be tarnished by dishonesty.

There is a God who presides over the destinies of nations. Let us do our duty and then trust Him in the present crisis of our beloved country, for the preservation of its honor and liberty inseparable, for, as Burke said: "What is liberty without wisdom and without virtue? Such liberty is the greatest of all possible evils, for it is vice and folly, and madness, without tuition and without restraint."

From liberty without honor or virtue, from dishonesty, from lawlessness, from anarchy and ruin, good Lord deliver us!

THE PRESIDENT: The report of the executive council will now be read by the chairman, Mr. Joseph C. Hendrix, of New York.

MR. HENDRIX: The report of the executive council for 1895 and 1896 is as follows:

#### REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL—SEASON OF 1895-1896.

##### *To the American Bankers' Association:*

The Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association, in submitting this report for the year ending September 1, 1896, begs to state as follows:

On September 1, 1896, the association comprised 1,711 members. On September 1, 1896, the enlarged list stands at 2,196 members. Deducting from this eight banks which have failed, we have a paying membership of 2,188. Increase of membership has been the aim of your officers, and we are pleased to report a net increase of 477 members. Under the new schedule which went into effect September 1, 1896, the amount to be realized from membership dues is \$32,845. Drafts for this amount were deposited by the secretary with the treasurer of the association, August 31, 1896, and the full amount thereof credited to the association with the understanding that an adjustment of the unpaid drafts will be made later on.

#### EXPRESS MONEY ORDERS.

At the beginning of the year the association received many letters from bankers throughout the country inviting attention to the competition of express companies in the issuance of money orders, which the banks were called upon to cash, and also to the increase of rates upon money packages. These letters may be summarized in the complaints reported as follows:

- (1) That the express companies were encroaching upon the business of banks in issuing what in fact were drafts or bills of exchange, and were thus doing a business not contemplated in their organization.
- (2) This competition for exchange business was severely felt by banks in the interior.
- (3) That the companies did not provide for the payment of these orders at their places of presentation but depended upon the banks to float them.
- (4) That the companies had advanced rates for carrying currency which the banks had to provide to cash these express money orders.
- (5) That the express companies were free from the restraints to which banking in its various forms is subject, as they should be if they assumed any of the functions of banking.
- (6) That the express companies shipped the money they received for money orders without any cost for transportation.

It was also stated that there were thirteen express companies engaged in the business of

issuing money orders, and that the practice of the banks in cashing these orders had accelerated the growth of this competitive business until it was much larger than was generally supposed. The Detroit Clearing-House made an investigation of the subject in consequence of which the associated banks of Detroit protested against the increase of rates, but, so far as we know, without result. The officers of the association most carefully considered the whole question, and the president and chairman had an interview with the president of some of the leading express companies, where there was a full interchange of the views of both sides. A general statement of the whole matter was made to the executive council at its meeting in New York city, on March 11, 1893, and by vote of the council the whole subject was referred to a special committee for further consideration and report. The report of this committee with letters pertinent to the question will be presented to the convention.

#### CURRENCY CONTRACTION—THE FORGED CIRCULAR.

The spurious circular alleged to have been issued on March 12, 1893, by the American Bankers' Association to all the officers of the association, has continued its rounds, and in correspondence the officers of the association have repeatedly denounced it as a fraud and a forgery, and have sent to all persons making inquiry the following circular, signed by the chairman of the executive council, now president of this association, and by the former secretary of the association, and circulated through the associated press on April 10, 1894:

"DEAR SIR:—The following circular has appeared during the last year in a number of newspapers:

[Issued March 12, 1893, by American Bankers' Association to all National Banks.]

'DEAR SIR:—The interests of national bankers require immediate financial legislation by Congress. Silver, silver certificates and Treasury notes must be retired, and National bank notes upon a gold basis made the only money. This will require the authorization of from \$500,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000 of new bonds as a basis of circulation. You will at once retire one-third of your circulation and call in one-half of your loans. Be careful to make a money stringency felt among your patrons, especially among influential business men. Advocate an extra session of Congress for the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman law, and act with the other banks of your city in securing a large petition to Congress for its unconditional repeal, as per accompanying form. Use personal influence with Congressmen, and particularly let your wishes be known to your Senators. The future life of National banks as fixed and safe investments depends upon immediate action, as there is an increasing sentiment in favor of Government legal-tender notes and silver coinage.'

You will observe that the circular is unsigned and dated on the Sabbath. The association never issued the said circular, and is not responsible for it.

Its language is the very best evidence of its falsehood as purporting to have been issued by the American Bankers' Association.

HENRY W. FORD, *Secretary.*"

E. H. PULLEN, *Chairman Executive Council.*

Under date of January 11, 1896, we received from W. J. Bryan, Lincoln, Neb., the following communication:

"My attention has been called to the following circular, which it is alleged was sent out by your association on or about the 12th day of March, 1893. I do not, of course, desire to ask for any papers which were confidential, or which you are not willing to publish, but since the enclosed letter has been published as coming from your association, I would be glad to have an admission or denial sufficiently broad to cover any letter of similar import.

Yours, very truly,

W. J. BRYAN."

Under date of January 15, 1896, the following reply was made:

"Hon. W. J. Bryan, Lincoln, Neb.

DEAR SIR:—In response to your letter of January 11th enclosing type-written copy of a circular purporting to emanate from the American Bankers' Association, under date of March 12, 1893, I beg to enclose you an official denial of its authenticity.

Very respectfully,

JOS. C. HENDRIX, *Chairman Executive Council.*"

Mr. Bryan apparently accepted the official denial as conclusive, and so far as we know has made no use of the fraudulent circular.

#### SOUND MONEY RESOLUTIONS.

At a meeting of the executive council held March 11, 1896, in New York city, the following declaration was made by unanimous vote:

"The Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association declare unequivocally in

favor of the maintenance of the existing gold standard of value and recommend to all bankers and to the customers of all banks the exercise of all their influence as citizens in their various States to select delegates to the political conventions of both of the great parties who will declare unequivocally in favor of the maintenance of the existing gold standard of value."

A copy was sent in circular form to the bankers of the United States, requesting them to use their influence to give practical effect to the action of the council.

#### THE PROTECTIVE WORK.

A separate report will be made by the protective committee to which report the careful attention of the association is invited. The council begs to express its appreciation of the development of this important work. It is believed that under the new schedule of dues a sufficient appropriation can be made to carry on the work for the next year without levying an assessment. We recognize the economy with which the work has been conducted the past year, and believe that it sets a good example for the future. Unless carefully supervised, the expense item upon this account is apt to grow burdensome. Up to this date the work of directing and managing this important branch of our business has devolved upon the chairman of the protective committee. The work has grown so much that it is impracticable to request any bank officer to undertake to continue it as in the past. At the meeting of the executive council held in March, 1896, it was referred to the standing protective committee of 1894-5 and of 1895-6, to report to the council a plan for putting the protective feature upon a permanent business basis, and this report will be considered by the council during this convention.

When it is recalled that the association in its protective branch has in two years successfully prosecuted to sentence two of the greatest bank criminals, the importance of the service to banks cannot be disregarded. Charles Becker, who, with James Cregan, was sentenced for his natural life in San Francisco for the Nevada Bank forgery, has, as we learn from the detective and police authorities, been concerned in forgeries upon financial institutions, in this country and Europe, which have yielded \$2,365,200. Maximilian Schoenbein, who was prosecuted by this association, and is now serving a term of four years and eight months, has, through burglaries upon banks in his career, obtained, we are informed, at a low estimate, over a million dollars.

It is the aim of the council to organize this protective work, so that it will continue year after year, with unbroken efficiency and be a source of strength to the association, and to its members.

Mr. Hendrix presented the following :

#### REPORT OF THE STANDING PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE.

Total receipts.....	\$25,222
Total expenditures.....	17,776
Balance, September 1, 1896.....	\$7,446

The results of the work of the committee for the year are well-known to members, and details are given in the report of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, hereto attached, and in the guide to the convention, which has been privately published, but which contains full accounts of the chief cases coming under our attention.

The labor of the committee has outgrown the form of organization hitherto adopted and a recommendation has been made to the executive council for the future conduct of the work, which recommendation has been concurred in by the bankers who composed the committee last year.

Starting in the year with a sense of distrust of the power of the association to efficiently contend with numerous and widely scattered bank swindlers, forgers and burglars, the committee beg now to frankly state that experience has satisfied them that this work can be done, and has, under its own observation been done effectually. The moral effect upon criminals of the existence of a compact body in command of large funds and skilled men, to defend the members of the association, has proven of great value. The criminals who study how to defraud or rob banks spend much time in their plans. They study the whole situation with great care. They are more afraid of the unseen than what they can see. They have learned that there is a vigilant committee in charge of the interests of the members of the American Bankers' Association, which takes up their pursuit, prosecution and punishment, and follows them without regard to labor or expense, until they are safely behind the bars. Moreover, that this committee files with prosecuting officers and Governors, protests against any leniency or pardon, and arranges to have warrants for other crimes in the hands of the authorities to be served at the doors of the prisons when the offenders are released.



The result of the assessment for the protective fund was—gross receipts from members, \$14,766.

The prominent bankers' directories will next year distinguish members of the association by a special mark which will be a warning to those contemplating bank swindles and robberies, that the banks so designated are under the watchful eye of the organized protective system of the association.

During the year thirty-one attacks have been made by burglars upon banks not members of the association, with a resultant loss of \$64,233, while during the same period but one attempt was made to break into a bank which was a member of the association, and this attempt proved unsuccessful.

The committee recommend the appointment by the American Bankers' Association of a commission to be composed of five members to carefully study the whole question of safeguards which may be used to protect the drafts of bankers from being raised, and that the secretary of the association be made the secretary of this commission for the purpose of having a central point for the conduct of correspondence and for kindred business. We believe that the mere existence of this commission will stimulate manufacturing stationers, lithographers, and check-book makers, to give to the bankers of this country their best talent. While we cannot encourage the expectation that any device which is presented may not be overcome by the skill of forgers, we believe that it will prove useful to stimulate inventive faculty in the direction of securing greater safeguards, and that, if there is a central body which will give attention to the subject, bank officers and employees, as well as a large number of other persons in the country, will show an interest in the matter.

We repeat the recommendation made at the last convention that members should use the greatest caution in the employment of printers and lithographers, and that they should insist upon the greatest care on the part of those they employ, in disposing of surplus sheets of drafts and checks.

G. A. VAN ALLEN, Albany, New York: Mr. President, I desire to offer the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the hearty thanks of this association be, and they are hereby, cordially extended to the standing protective committee for the commendable and energetic manner with which its members have performed their arduous duties.

H. W. Yates, of Omaha, Neb., seconded the resolution, which was carried.

THE PRESIDENT: We will now listen to the treasurer's report. Mr. William H. Porter, of New York, Vice-President of the Chase National Bank, is unavoidably detained at home, and Mr. Hendrix will read that report.

#### TREASURER'S ANNUAL REPORT.

NEW YORK, August 31, 1896.

To the American Bankers' Association.

GENTLEMEN:—I have the honor to submit the following report of the receipts and disbursements during the past year:

##### *General or Membership Account.*

Balance on hand September 1, 1895, as reported by George F. Baker, former treasurer.....	\$3,025.80
Received by George F. Baker, former treasurer, from September 1, 1895, to October 24, 1895, when transfer of account was made to present treasurer—	
From dues 523 members at \$5.....	2,615.00
"    "    1,004    "    "    \$10.....	10,040.00
Total.....	\$12,655.00
Received by present treasurer, from October 24, 1895, to August 31, 1896—	
For membership dues: 404 members at \$5.00.....	\$2,020.00
"    "    253    "    "    \$10.00.....	2,530.00
"    "    1    "    "    \$15.00.....	15.00
"    "    1    "    "    \$9.90.....	9.90
"    "    1    "    "    \$8.33.....	8.33
"    "    1    "    "    \$2.50.....	2.50
Total.....	\$4,585.73

*Standing Protective Account.*

Reimbursements for advances.....	\$39.50
January, 1893, coupons from \$5,000 Lake Erie and Western second mortgage five per cent. bonds.....	126.00
July, 1893, coupons from \$5,000 Lake Erie and Western second mortgage five per cent. bonds.....	125.00
Amount received on account of note of "Banking Law Journal".....	13.30
Amount received from sale of old office furniture and metal signs.....	6.00
Amount received from sales of Volumes 1, 2 and 3, A. B. A. proceedings.	3.00

Total.....	\$20,008.33
Disbursements as per accompanying vouchers.....	16,999.58

Balance on hand September 1, 1893.....	\$3,618.75
Balance on hand September 1, 1895, as reported by George F. Baker, former treasurer.....	\$4,438.33
Subscription received by George F. Baker, former treasurer, from September 1, 1895, to October 24, 1895.....	10.00
Received by present treasurer, from October 24, 1895, to August 31, 1896, for assessments paid by members.....	14,775.00
Transferred to this account from the membership account, as directed by resolution of executive council, October 14, 1895.....	5,500.00
Received from J. J. P. Odell, former chairman of standing protective committee, balance his petty cash account.....	117.20

Total.....	\$26,840.53
Disbursements as per accompanying vouchers.....	19,393.89

Balance on hand.....	\$7,446.64
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The treasurer holds for the association \$5,000 par value second mortgage five per cent. gold bonds of the Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, due in 1941.

(Signed)

W. H. PORTER, *Treasurer.*

F. W. Hayes, of Detroit, Mich., read the report of the auditing committee which was, in part, as follows :

The report of the treasurer of the association, and the financial report of the standing protective committee, have been examined by us, and we find the reports of the treasurer to agree with the cash book.

The total receipts as shown by the cash-book being \$20,008.33; and the vouchers exhibited of the disbursements amount to \$16,999.58; leaving a balance, as submitted, of \$3,618.75.

THE PRESIDENT: The report of the secretary, James R. Branch, of New York. will now be presented.

## SECRETARY'S ANNUAL REPORT.

NEW YORK, September 19, 1896.

To the American Bankers' Association.

GENTLEMEN:—I have the honor to submit the following report:

The close of the year 1896 shows the largest membership in the history of the association. In 1899 there were 1,870 members. This was the maximum until the present time. Since then the membership has sunk as low as 1,638, and by the secretary's reports there has been a net loss of members since 1890, as follows:

	<i>Net loss.</i>		<i>Net loss.</i>
1890.....	42 members.	1893.....	262 members.
1891.....	67 "	1894.....	2 "
1892.....	8 "	1895.....	31 "

These reports also show that during the last eight years this association has a gross average annual loss of 200 members.

October 17, 1895, there were 1,711 members on our books; of these, however, only 1,527 had paid their dues, although the call for the same was issued September 1, 1895.

In the past year, however, we have only lost 47 members, having regained 58 of the 105 who were dropped from the roll December 1, 1895, according to article 8 of the constitution. A large proportion of the 47 lost members either assigned or liquidated.

The following number have been added to our list from September, 1895, to September, 1896, including the 58 members who were regained, as follows:

From personal interviews.....	53
From annual proceedings.....	42
From convention.....	58
From correspondence.....	137
From circulars.....	285
	<hr/> 590
Loss from failure and liquidation.....	19
By official notice of withdrawal.....	14
Dropped from the list for non-payment of dues.....	72
	<hr/> 105
Net gain.....	485

The following difference of 13 in number of drafts drawn on members as shown in report of chairman of executive council and number of paid members September 1, 1896, is caused by 5 complimentary members who joined the last of the fiscal year and 8 banks who suspended after paying their dues

Total paid membership for the year ending August 31, 1895.....	1,711
Total paid membership for the year ending August 31, 1896.....	2,196
	<hr/> 485
Showing a net gain over 1895 to September 1, 1896.....	485
Members joined and rejoined since September 1, 1895, to September, 1, 1896....	590
New members joined since September 1, 1896.....	70
	<hr/> 660
Total members joined since September 1, 1895.....	660

I am glad to report that this is the largest increase in the history of the association, and the smallest percentage of loss of old members, and judging from the daily additions to our ranks we should have 700 new members by the middle of October, or twelve months from our last convention.

This office has without additional help sent out over 100,000 pamphlets and circulars during the past year. Fifty thousand circulars were issued from different parts of the country by our officers and members, and reaped good results. These circulars, being endorsed by the banks who sent them to their correspondents, carried additional weight and saved the expense of postage, the total cost being \$115, while the 13,500 circulars and letters issued November 19, 1894, by the old process, cost \$617.55.

I am pleased to add that by getting bids for printing our proceedings, we obtained a deduction of \$428 from the price paid last year to the same printing house; and even these figures could have been reduced, but for the fact that a large amount of the work was already done when this reduction was requested. The bids for this year's proceedings are several hundred dollars below this.

The treasurer's books have been kept in the secretary's office for the past year with the usual complement of clerks, saving an additional \$500 a year.

The dues of the members who have joined and have been regained since September 1, 1895, amount to \$8,900 annually. This increase is largely due to the united efforts of officers and members and the publicity given to the good work of the protective committee by the financial press.

If this organization continues its practical work and impresses on bankers who are not members that good genuine benefits are being reaped daily by those who belong, it is not far distant when the membership will number 5,000.

Very respectfully,

JAS. R. BRANCH, *Secretary.*

**THE PRESIDENT:** At a meeting of the executive council held last evening a declaration was adopted, with instructions to submit the same to this convention for its action, and it will now be read.

JOSEPH C. HENDRIX, of New York: The declaration is as follows:

#### DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

The American Bankers' Association, in its twenty-second annual convention assembled, and representing every section of our republic, hereby declares that, in its opinion, the existing commercial depression is immediately due to the attacks which threaten to overthrow the present gold standard of value, and that we further believe that our full measure of national prosperity will not be gained until the whole world understands that the dollar of

the United States is one hundred cents' worth of gold, and that the nation intends to keep it at that value.

We believe that an opportunity is presented by the issue of this political campaign to give a lasting definition of the dollar as a money unit, to permanently settle the foundation of our monetary system, and to remove the menace of an overturn of values and far-reaching ruin and distress which a descent to a silver basis would involve.

We warn our countrymen against the rash proposition that this nation should single-handed attempt to legislate silver to a parity with gold at a fictitious ratio.

We declare that the free coinage of silver means monometallism, with gold at a premium, all other forms of our currency at a discount, and the value of the dollar an uncertain quantity depending each day upon the gold price of silver bullion, with corresponding fluctuations in the value of all kinds of property.

We believe that before the mints could begin to coin silver every dollar of gold would disappear from circulation, thus violently contracting our currency, and that the value of the remaining dollars would be the bullion value of the silver in them, measured by the gold standard of the chief money markets of the world.

We denounce as utterly false the claim that the gold standard is a device of bankers, creditors and financiers. They have no such power in human affairs, and never had. The gold standard is an edict of commerce translated into law. It was dictated by those who conduct the commerce of the world rather than those who handle the money of the world. It is rooted in a preference lodged in the human breast. A test of the weight of the two metals in quantities of equal value shows how and why traders decided in favor of the money which they could carry with the least burden and use wherever they might go to the best advantage. Gold commands all values because it is the most stable in value. It was not legislated into the world's finance until commerce selected it as a gauge, and it will not be legislated out of use if laws are changed.

We assert that mere "money changers" have always found more profit in a fluctuating than in a fixed currency, and that one source of revenue which those who thus handle money always had when the currency was not stable has been closed up in this country by the influence of the gold standard, and that what they have lost from such revenue has been gained by producers and merchants. But bankers are not mere money changers; they are the trusted custodians of the money of the world.

As bankers, we are debtors to the extent of our deposits. We have received these deposits in money as good as gold. We desire to return them in money of equal value. It will be impossible for banks, life insurance companies, mutual benefit orders, building and loan associations and kindred institutions, to return to their creditors money equal in value to that which they have received if our currency is depreciated to the bullion value of the silver dollar. We have no interest in the metal composing our national standard of value which is not shared by every man who owes a dollar, or has a dollar due to him. We desire to have debts due us paid in as good money as we have loaned. We desire to pay our debts in the same way. The banking business is not vitally dependent upon any specific standard or upon any particular kind of currency. It adapts itself to all conditions; but, conscious of the needs of our customers, we earnestly desire to see our country purged of the monetary delusions which drive money out of the channels of business. A dollar of fixed value in the world's commerce has the power to make markets, sharpen trade, invite capital, develop resources and extend our national power and influence. A doubtful or depreciated dollar will blight every man's effort, and prove a national curse. As bankers we want the dollar which will do our country the most good, and we commend to all of our fellow citizens the opportunity which they now have to decide upon the future value of their dollar, and to remove from our land the menace which has destroyed more values and caused more suffering than war or pestilence.

On motion of William H. Rhawn, of Philadelphia, seconded by Mr. Tracy, of Springfield, Ill., the declaration was adopted by a rising vote.

**THE PRESIDENT:** We will now listen to the report of the committee on express money orders.

F. W. Hayes, of Detroit, Mich., presented the report as follows:

#### REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EXPRESS MONEY ORDERS.

*To the Executive Council of the American Bankers' Association.*

**GENTLEMEN:**—The undersigned committee, to which was referred the discussion of the subject of "Express Money Orders," beg to report that after considerable correspondence between the members of the committee, a meeting was held in Chicago on May 13th and 14th.

Complaints of bankers and banks against these orders were submitted from several different States, together with vigorous protests against the largely increased rates of the

express companies for transportation of money packages, and it seemed quite difficult to consider the question of "Express Money Orders" without also taking into account "Express Rates on Money Packages."

In the manner in which the money order express business is being prosecuted and expanded by the express companies, it undoubtedly comes into competition with the banks, but in many respects these orders are made to perform a public service which individual banks cannot supply without violating the rules maintained by them for the safe prosecution of their business. These orders are issued by the express companies to strangers and irresponsible persons with no limit as to the smallness of the amount of the order, and doubtless a more liberal rule prevails for identification than banks generally would feel justified in permitting. It is true that the class of persons thus served might be accommodated through the money orders issued by the United States post offices, but such orders are practically non-negotiable, as they cannot be passed beyond two or three persons, and then with risk, as the payee's name is not disclosed in the order.

It must be conceded in all fairness that if the express companies are authorized and legitimately doing the business of banking, they should submit to the same terms, conditions and penalties of banks, and should be required to make statements of their affairs and pay proper taxes on the amount of business done by them, and local taxes on their personal property where same is located, thus, to some extent, reducing the burden now imposed upon banks, for it is well known that no class of business pays so large and full a proportion of the taxes as organized banks. They do not, in any way, escape taxation, but are assessed (certainly in the larger cities and in many of the smaller places) to the full cash value of stock as shown by their published statements.

Your committee is of the opinion that the American Bankers' Association, while it may take notice of and make recommendations in the matter, is not in a position to directly accomplish the desired changes. We therefore recommend:

(1) The adoption of a resolution advising all banks and bankers to discontinue the cashing of express money orders at par.

(2) Recommending banks and bankers to use their influence with members of Congress to secure such changes in the postal laws as will enable the postmasters throughout the United States to issue United States money orders, in as simple a form as possible, and that they may be negotiated without difficulty, withdrawing the restrictions in regard to endorsement or transfer from one person to another, and make them payable, if desired by the holder, in the principal money centers of the country, instead of requiring each order to be sent to the small post office on which it may be drawn.

(3) Recommending the bankers' associations of the several States to take such action as will bring the question properly before the legislatures of the several States, and to obtain therefrom such legislation as will either prohibit the issue of money orders by express companies, they being distinctly one form of domestic exchange, the selling of which properly pertains to the business of banking, or, in case the right of issuing orders is given that these companies then be made subject to the same laws which govern and control banks in the matter of capital stock required, examinations and public reports, together with the imposition of taxes in the same manner, form and rates required to be paid by banks.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

(Signed) F. W. HAYES, GEO. H. RUSSEL,  
H. W. YATES, JOHN N. SIMPSON,  
G. P. GRIFFITH.

On motion the report was adopted.

Adjourned to Wednesday, September 28, 1896, at 10. A. M.

#### SECOND DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

President Pullen called the convention to order for the second day's session, Wednesday, Sept. 28, and prayer was offered by Reverend John J. Kain, Archbishop of the Diocese of St. Louis.

The following letter was read:

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN.  
NEW YORK, September 21, 1896.

Col. James R. Branch, Secretary American Bankers' Association.

MY DEAR SIR:—In behalf of the National Association of Credit Men, permit me to express to your splendid organization the most cordial and fraternal greeting.

The purpose prompting the endeavors of both our associations are not dissimilar; you seeking to improve all systems pertaining to banking, we aspiring to reform and correct

abuses, improve and elevate statutory provisions and educate and purify the methods of merchants generally, with which in our special calling we come so closely in contact. Our interests are largely mutual, and there should exist between us the closest relations of co-operation.

In our labors to make uniform the laws of our various States, and to secure better measures for the protection of the entire mercantile community, we know we shall have the support of the bankers of this country, while in our educational efforts to improve methods of business, and by our agitation and action to declare that in this land there is no room for the dishonest merchant and no toleration for fraudulent devices and schemes, we are confident that we shall have your grand influence and support.

Again expressing to the American Bankers' Association our desire for their co-operation in all our worthy undertakings in behalf of trade and commerce, I remain,

Most respectfully yours,

F. R. BOOCOCK, *Secretary.*

THE PRESIDENT: The roll of States will now be called.

#### RESPONSES TO THE CALL OF STATES.

**Arkansas.**—S. H. HORNOR, Helena: Arkansas banks are in a prosperous condition. We are not doing a very large business, but it is a safe, conservative one, and we hope to be able to maintain that reputation.

**California.**—H. M. LUTZ, Los Angeles: I have very little to say as to California banking. We experience some difficulty there in securing satisfactory collateral for loans. If we accept irrigation bonds, it is based chiefly upon real estate, and that, as you gentlemen of National banks will understand, is rather a difficult situation in which to place a national institution, and probably it accounts for the fact that we have only thirty-one National banks in the State of California.

Another peculiarity that belongs to California banking—and it is particularly so to you who are Eastern bankers—is the fact that we are absolutely, I might say, on a gold basis. Our transactions are almost altogether based upon gold. Our clearing-house settlements are made in gold. And this will account to some of our New York friends, perhaps, who may have been called upon to furnish gold to their California correspondents. The bank I represent a short time ago wired its correspondent in New York that it would like to have \$25,000.00 in gold coin. We got \$5,000.00 in \$5.00 gold pieces and an apology for the balance.

I am sorry to say though that the Californians are an inconsistent sort of people. Doing business as they are, and as they always have been, almost exclusively in gold, yet they sent delegates to the conventions of both political parties instructed for silver. I am ashamed of it, and it is the only thing, gentlemen, that I am ashamed of in connection with California.

**Georgia.**—JOHN K. OTTLEY, Atlanta: I will say for Georgia that our banks are in a healthy and prosperous condition. The money market has been made easy for the present by the movement of cotton, which is moving freely and is bringing a good fair price.

I am somewhat like the gentleman from California in that I am sorry to see that many of our people, especially in the smaller towns, are in favor of free silver. All the bankers, without any exception that I am aware of, however, are in favor of sound money and we are at work in that State trying to convert the people, and hope to be able to meet with considerable success between now and election day.

**Illinois.**—F. W. TRACY, Springfield: Mr. President and Gentlemen—The banks in Illinois have not been exactly prosperous, but I think I can freely say that they are holding their own. In these depressed times you know it is pretty hard to make any money. Our little institution has been paying a dividend for the last twenty years, and we have not stopped yet, and don't propose to even if times are hard. I believe all the Chicago banks are earning dividends. Some of them have to charge large amounts to their undivided profits, but they have got them, so it don't make any difference. They wipe out the losses and they keep paying dividends. Down our way we do such a small business that the losses do not accumulate, and we can get along without them.

We have an association of bankers in the State of Illinois that is a very large one. Some of you gentlemen that attended the meeting of the delegates last night wondered how it was that Illinois cast eight votes in this convention. That is because she has the largest State association of bankers in the Union, although I believe New York did cast nine votes; but that was because they had one delegate from each group in their State association, of which there are nine groups, while our votes were cast because of the number of our members. That state of things shows you that the bankers of Illinois are up and about their business. They are aggressive, and they stand up at the front all the time, and I am sure that the American Bankers' Association ought to be proud of Illinois, as we in Illinois are proud of the American Bankers' Association.

**Indiana.**—JAMES H. DEHORITY, Elwood: The times in Indiana are a little close, though we have been able to get along all right so far. The institution I represent is a small one, but I am glad to say that it has always been able to pay a dividend of eight per cent. per annum, and put five per cent. to the surplus account.

**Iowa.**—FRED HEINZ, Davenport: Mr. President and Gentlemen—Iowa reports as to the banks that their general condition is good. While there is a slight decrease of deposits since last year, the same is not sufficient to cause any great distress. They are suffering, in common with their fellow bankers in other States, by the uncertainty of the coming events that are to culminate on November 3.

As to the Iowa State Bankers' Association, there has been an increase of membership, and the last convention held was the best attended one that we have had.

The last session of the Iowa Legislature passed an Act to have express companies pay a per cent. of their earnings as taxes; also another Act putting express companies on the list of common carriers, and under the supervision of the State railway commissioner, so as to put some legal restraint on them as to their charges for carrying currency. An Act has also been passed affording protection to banks holding corporate stock as collateral, by making their title to the collateral absolute, on their giving notice to the secretary of the corporation, whose stock is held as collateral, thereby saving the transfer on the books of the corporation whose stock is held as collateral. This Act also provides that the bank holding collateral security shall not be liable for assessments on such stock held as collateral security. There will be a special session of the Legislature, at which time—among other things—it is expected that the law of three days of grace in negotiable instruments will be repealed.

**Kansas.**—J. R. MULVANE, Topeka: I am not going to afflict you with a long speech. I have been a member of this association for twenty years, and I think this is about the first time that I have had anything to say on the floor of the convention.

Sunny, breezy, Kansas has been justly charged with a good many misdoings—much has been unjustly charged up to her account. We are proud of the fact that many of the good things have originated in Kansas as well as some of the crankisms. Just now we are getting over our crankisms—we are convalescent. But we notice that Populism, with all its heresies, has struck Connecticut and Pennsylvania. We hope not seriously. It has run out on Kansas soil; peace to its ashes!

Kansas has had a large population of restless people who have come from all the States of the Union—generally left homes for the purpose of bettering their fortunes: men of ability and brains, in the full prime of manhood. Each came with his own particular ideas of government, and right; each had been somebody in his own home. It has taken some time to round off the sharp corners and assimilate these many diverse elements; but we think we have gone through the general ferment and have now arrived at stability.

We have also had our proportion of the demagogues. The older States may have had a surplus. Perhaps we did not get more than the usual dose for a new country. These demagogues parade as the country's saviors, willing to ride into office on any hobby that would promote their interest, willing to defame their State and neighbors if that but magnified their own importance and led them to political preferment.

The great mass of the people of Kansas are law-abiding, honest, patriotic, self-sacrificing citizens; nothing too good to lay on the altar of their country—no sacrifice too great for them to make for their country's flag and honor. Such a people must be self-reliant, and with the courage of their convictions. These people have gone through the financial sweats of the last ten years—had the measles, and populism, and a boom, and still the State has grown in wealth, and we are proud to be called Kansans. No people have a better claim to the good opinion of the country at large than have the debt-payers of Kansas. I have seen more personal sacrifices made for the purpose of paying a just debt than I ever supposed men would make.

In all of our misfortunes, in common with the rest of the country, crop failures, droughts, grasshoppers, and the effects of the general panic, we think the political demagogue and his unseemly calamity howl have hurt us, by far, the most.

We think the stability of a country is evidenced by the stability of its banks. In the State banks of Kansas, the loss of 1893, the panic year, to depositors, was less than sixty thousand dollars. This will compare favorably with the very best. For the year 1894, the affairs of all the suspended banks of the State were settled during the year without the intervention of Receivers, or the great expense of the courts, and by the depositors getting their money in full. For the year 1895 there were eleven suspensions. Four were adjusted and depositors paid in full during the year; and of the remaining seven, forty per cent. had been liquidated during the year, and forty per cent. more paid during 1896, with the assurance that every cent will be paid to the depositors. Some of these banks failed in the last months of the year; hence increased the unadjusted liabilities which were originally in gross only \$236,500. This record for three years, I think, will challenge comparison with the best.

The loss by failure of banks in Kansas in the last ten years has been a half less than any other State of like population. You may say that much of this arises from the fact that we had little credit. Unfortunately, too true! But we are entitled to claim the good results—the benefits are ours.

The agricultural community of Eastern Kansas, I think, is in better financial condition than any other like population of agriculturists in the Union. With a school-house or church on every hill, we ever attest our loyalty to our country and to our God.

**Kentucky.**—JOHN H. LEATHERS, Louisville: With all due respect to other States, Mr. President, we claim to have the finest soil and the finest climate in America. We raise more things and better things than in Kansas or anywhere else. We are the largest tobacco producing State in the Union, and we are the largest fine whiskey producing State in the Union. We raise more hemp than any other State. We don't put it to use ourselves; we send it out to Kansas. We raise the finest stock in the world—Kentucky horses, like Kentucky women, have a world-wide reputation for gentleness, for beauty, and for speed. In 1866 we had our struggles, as did the people in other States in the Union, but since then there have been no disasters among the banking institutions of the State. We feel apprehensive of the future, as doubtless many of you here do; but let me say, as a matter of pride and gratification, that Kentucky, which has been the battle-field of many a hard fought fight, stands to-day for one country, one flag, and honest money.

**Maryland.**—ROBERT SHRIVER, Cumberland: I am sorry that there is not some one here from Baltimore to speak for Maryland. My city is in the western part of the State. We have three banks, and each of them ranks very high, and they are all prosperous. I am sorry to say that at present the situation of business is not such as we could wish it were, owing to the political situation. The banks in the State are making less money than they would were the difficulties which surround us absent. We are proud of the fact that we are one of the States that has abolished days of grace. We think every State in the Union should do the same.

**Massachusetts.**—H. L. BURRAGE, Boston: The banking business in our State is sound as Plymouth Rock, and it is all right, and will be for many years to come, I hope.

**Michigan.**—F. W. HAYES, Detroit: The Michigan delegation have selected Mr. Sherwood, the Commissioner of the Banking Department of Michigan, to respond for the State.

T. C. SHERWOOD: Whenever the name of Michigan is mentioned in a convention of bankers the thoughts of the delegates immediately revert to her copper, her iron, her soil, and her furniture industries, because you have been benefited by these industries, and as bankers you have handled the paper which represents the wealth invested in them.

I think I can say at this time that the bankers of Michigan, notwithstanding the depression of the last three years, are laboring earnestly, loyally and honestly for the interest of banking in Michigan. And I wish to say to-day, that not only are we laboring for the interest of the banks, but we are working for sound money, and in November we will speak in no uncertain terms in respect to what we think constitutes honest money in the United States.

**Minnesota.**—A. C. ANDERSON, St. Paul: Minnesota is famed for its pure air, pure water, and when we get a chance to speak, we will speak for pure politics and honest money. The banks in our State are in a waiting condition at the present time. We are furnishing money to move the crops, and everything is going easily. At the present time the deposits in the Minnesota banks are about sixty millions. Aside from the deposits in the city banks, the deposits of the country banks are quite largely those of farmers, and when I state that, you will know where the farmer is going to vote in Minnesota. Labor is waking up to the fact that it is getting a dollar that is good in this country, and a dollar that will buy a draft for a dollar, payable in gold in any other country, and it does not propose to take any poorer dollar.

**Mississippi.**—R. W. MILLAPS, Jackson: Mississippi is an agricultural State. It has, you might say, but one industry, and that is the raising of cotton. It is without large cities, and the banker's dealings are directly with the merchants, who either loan to the planters on their crops, or in many instances the banks loan to the planters direct. So we have a close connection with the producer. The seasons for farming are regular in our latitude. There never was a failure of crops known, and as cotton is the article most largely produced it is always convertible into ready money. Twenty years ago there were only five or six banks in Mississippi—to-day there are ninety. Several years ago there was a failure of one bank, and the President was sent to the penitentiary, and since then there has only been one failure and that of a very small bank.

**Missouri.**—W. S. WOODS, Kansas City: Missouri is a great mining and agricultural State. We not only have fine farming country, producing great quantities of cereal and fruit products, but we have the greatest coal belt in the Nation, and in the Southwestern part of the State we produce as much lead and zinc as is produced in any other section of equal size in



the world. The banking business of Missouri is in a healthy condition. I have been banking in the State exceeding thirty years, and I think times at present are as good as they ever have been. Missouri State banks have twenty-one millions of deposits; National banks in the State, seventeen millions. We have a total of 670 banks. Notwithstanding many of us are in favor of National banks, yet they have not been as popular in this State as they are in some of the Eastern States. We only have seventy-five National banks in the State, but notwithstanding that the people of Missouri have not taken to the National bank system, they are not opposed to it, nor do they believe that the national bankers are the enemies of the people. Two years ago we inaugurated a system of bank examination which has been productive of much good.

**Nebraska.**—H. W. YATES, Omaha: I regret that our State has a small representation here. This meeting this morning seems to me to be very much in the nature of an experience meeting, where the bankers are getting up and telling the story of their own sections in a good old-fashioned way. Therefore, I do not hesitate to say something, especially when I consider that the name of Nebraska is seldom called without some one being able to respond for it. Nebraska has done fairly well in politics in the present year. We have been able to supply the nominees for two of the presidential parties—one of whom is making considerable noise just now. We were also able to furnish the presiding officers of two of the great conventions, and I have not the slightest doubt that we could have supplied all your officers if it had been necessary. I am sure that Nebraska, at this time, has more political agitators than any other section of the United States. While we have done so well in politics, gentlemen, I regret to say that I am not able to make a better report in respect to banking. From July 18, 1892, to July 18, 1896, Omaha banks lost \$7,500,000 of deposits, and the banks in the State outside of that city lost \$11,500,000 in deposits. To this might be added six million dollars for the State banks. This is a per capita of nearly thirty dollars. Now, we know that real estate values are very much depressed in Nebraska; we know that the prices of farm products are tremendously depressed, and our people are striving to find a reason for it. We hear a good deal nowadays about the amount of money in circulation. If there is any basis of truth whatever in that it would be when it is applied to the currency actually in circulation. How do we know that this depression in the Western States may not only have come from the depression in real estate values but that it may also account for the low price our Western products are bringing. It seems to me that if these gentlemen were to look into it they would find that Nebraska, Kansas and South Dakota have raised enormous crops of corn this year; and I know that our farmers are unable to get money with which to buy cattle to feed the corn to. In consequence of their failure to get money to do that, these crops are thrown upon the market at depressed values. Now, instead of finding some way to increase the volume of currency, it would seem a great deal better to investigate the causes which have been responsible for the disappearance of all this money. When people investigate that we may be sure that then daylight will be in sight, and that the cloud of repudiation and dishonor which now hangs over this Western country will be dissipated and will roll away.

**New York.**—J. R. VAN WAGENEN, Oxford: In the face of the considerable amount of skilled talent upon the platform from New York State it will be very difficult and embarrassing for any one to speak for New York, but we have a gentleman whom we are willing to turn out and who we think is abundantly able to fill the bill—Mr. Bradford Rhodes.

**BRADFORD RHODES, Mamaroneck:** The pleasant duty devolves upon me to respond for the institutions carrying on the banking business within the limits of the Empire State. New York, containing within her borders the great financial center of the country, not only leads in the extent of her banking business, but in the variety and completeness of her banking history. Her banking experience has covered the development of the business and of public opinion in regard to it from the very beginning of the Government. From a privilege granted by charter to a limited number of favored citizens, the laws have by degrees thrown open the business of banking to all who have the capital to invest in it.

In point of date, the first bank established in New York was the third in the United States. The first was organized in Philadelphia in 1782, the second in Boston two months later in the same year, and the third in New York in 1784. In the organization of the latter Alexander Hamilton was the prime mover. The same man who, more than any other, introduced and caused to predominate in our Constitution its distinguishing elements of order, force and duration; the man whose intellect pierced through the most subtle and profound problems, of whom Talleyrand said "he possessed the power of divination;" the man from whom emanated the principles that give the greatest strength and security to our republican institutions, to whose writings we may always turn for aid against financial and economic heresies, exhibiting as they do an extent and precision of information, a profundity of research, an accuracy of understanding, which would do credit to the most illustrious statesmen of either ancient or modern times.

It is to the strength, clearness and comprehensiveness of design, of the teachings of such men as Alexander Hamilton, who founded the banking business in the State of New York,

we may ascribe the fact that the majority of the people of the United States to-day reject the errors of populism and cannot be induced to depart from principles of honesty and a sound money standard.

The bank which Hamilton founded and which, like the principles he enunciated, has stood the test of time, to-day heads the list of the banks which compose the clearing-house of the New York associated banks—that body of which we are so proud, which always stands in the breach when the credit of the nation is threatened; whose strength as a bulwark against the insidious force of commercial depression, already proved, is marching on to still higher development. Gentlemen, I expect to see the day when the associated banks of New York city, strong in the confidence of the other banks of the country, and assisted by the associated banks of the other great financial centers, will, as their experience advances, be able to maintain such a continuous attitude of confidence as will control and allay the beginnings of commercial apprehension, so that the recurrence of serious financial panics will forever be prevented.

A study of the development of banking in New York from its foundation by Alexander Hamilton proves this conclusion almost to a certainty. The State has passed through banking under charter privileges, bolstered by restraining laws and strengthened by the safety fund system, to the present system of banking under general laws which place all holders of the necessary capital upon the same footing. To-day the laws of the State throw open the doors to the freest use of capital in banking consistent with the insurance of honest management.

As an excuse for the restrictive laws which prevailed for a long time in New York as well as elsewhere, it was argued that the wisdom, experience and honesty necessary for the proper management of a bank could only be obtained by the inducement of the monopolistic profit which such laws offered to the privileged few. This argument has no longer any foundation. Where can there be found a more conservative, intelligent, honest and experienced body of men than those who now under free banking laws manage and conduct the financial institutions doing business within the borders of the State? This is proved by the discussions in the conventions of the New York State Bankers' Association, and in the meetings of its various groups. It is proved by the action of the New York Clearing-House Association in times of emergency, and the confidence with which this action is regarded by the other bankers of the State and country. I ask with confidence, are the acts and decrees of the directorates of either the Bank of England or the Bank of France made with greater promptness or effect when circumstances require, or with more wisdom and discretion, than are those of the committees of the New York associated banks?

Banking in the United States is not bounded by State lines. I cannot speak for the banks of New York, within whose borders is New York city, the great financial center of a country containing over seventy millions of people, of unequalled wealth actually developed, and with possibilities of an increase of wealth practically unlimited, without referring to the banks of the whole country to which the banks of New York State are as firmly united as they are to each other.

The point to which I wish to direct the minds of this convention is a consideration of the logical result of the tendency to united business action among banks which has been so marked a feature both among banks in Europe and the United States during the last twenty-five years. In 1861, in 1873, in 1884, in 1890, and in 1893, the associated banks of New York, each time with greater success, sustained the credit of the business community and their own by the issue of loan certificates and by the force of their determined mutual support of each other. In England at the time of the Baring failure and the Argentine collapse the united action of the Bank of England and the joint-stock banks warded off what might have proved the bankruptcy of many of them. In France the terrible breakdown of the Panama Canal scheme and of the copper syndicate was discounted by the determined union of the French financial institutions and private banking firms. Again very recently we have witnessed the combination of American and foreign banking firms to sustain the credit of the United States Treasury, and their willingness with the co-operation of other banks to take measures to prevent the undue hoarding and exportation of gold. All of these actions successfully accomplished show the efficiency of united business action, undertaken within the scope of legitimate, private enterprise. How probable it seems that this unity of action may by degrees be extended until all the banks of the country will stand together to prevent the beginnings of financial crises.

I do not think that the organization of this association or the several State associations which have followed in its footsteps is calculated of itself alone to accomplish this result. These organizations are, however, doing preliminary work by breaking down the barriers of that spurious conservatism which cultivated a reticence of communication among banks. They are clearing the ground by encouraging acquaintance and exchange of opinion. From the nature of their organization, however, they are not executive. They

are the newspapers and records of banking action, rather than its initiators. They thus encourage and stimulate the action of the proper banking powers. United business action must arise from a different source—from the clearing-house associations and the intelligent bankers of the country. If the New York Clearing-House Association, aided by the similar associations of other centers, can alleviate the worst bitterness of a financial crisis as they did in 1893 and on previous occasions; if a syndicate of independent private bankers can sustain national credit and modify the course of exchange, why cannot a greater evolution of this principle throw on the united shoulders of the bankers of the whole country the burden now borne by a part of them. A commercial crisis commences by the withdrawal of confidence at a few points. If by united action these points could be strengthened, the panic would not spread. As it is now alarm spreads first among the disunited country banks sporadically, and from them the call is made on the centers. Though not actually attacked each disunited bank seeks to make provision for itself. There is immense and useless waste of force. The centers begin to weaken and reflex action increases the alarm. The reduction of reserves at the centers causes greater demand from the extremities. The panic progresses and does its evil work until it is brought up with a round turn by the action of the clearing-house associations at the great centers.

This remedy, though it has proved effectual, is a violent and dangerous one. With great unity among all the banks of the country, the beginnings of the crisis might be stopped with less waste of power. Would not a greater unity of feeling prevent the spread of alarm? Could not a comparatively small degree of assistance stop the trouble at the points where it first becomes manifest? But to apply such a remedy practically needs great confidence of the banks in each other. The banks in the centers must know that the weak banks are worthy of being sustained, and the latter that the stronger banks will sustain them. But the tendency of modern banking makes it not improbable that this necessary degree of confidence will shortly be reached. The prevention of the beginnings of panic would forever render unnecessary the issue of loan certificates.

However impossible a general union for counteracting sudden lapses of credit at weak points of the general circle of banking may seem at present, I have no doubt that the whole trend of banking experience is toward that point.

It is dependent on the honesty of bank management, which is now the rule rather than the exception. To-day we seldom hear of banks started for fraudulent purposes. The laws in most States prevent this. Inspections and examinations insure that those who organize banks do so with no other view than the wish to obtain legitimate banking profits.

I therefore anticipate the day when every bank, not only in New York State but in the Union, will be as fully protected from sudden and unreasonable runs upon it as each member of the New York Clearing House Association is protected under similar circumstances.

It is said "happy is the nation that has no history." Great events are apt to partake of the nature of calamities. During the last decade there has been little to tell about the banks of New York State. They have been doing business with the success and silence of well-oiled machinery. They are philosophically working through this period of depression. They stand united in favor of a gold standard, the maintenance of which is the only path to the prosperity of the country.

The prosperity of the country is their prosperity, and its loss is their loss.

**North Carolina.**—J. W. NORWOOD, Wilmington: I simply want to say that I do not belong to the speaking members of our banking fraternity, but I will have to do the best I can, because most of our speakers are engaged at this time in trying to convince the people that fifty-three is only fifty-three, and not one hundred. The old party lines are very much broken up in North Carolina, and many people who have been voting one way for generations past, have come to the conclusion that it is time to vote according to their convictions, and I think in November we will show you that North Carolina is not one of those States that is ready to assist in driving this country to financial suicide.

**Ohio.**—WILLIAM A. GRAHAM, Sidney: During the thirty years prior to 1895 there were one hundred and five bank failures in Ohio. Of these, ten were National banks, two were State banks, five were Savings banks, five were Savings banks and loan association, and eighty-five were private bankers. Of the National banks, one resumed and three paid one hundred per cent.; so that in but six cases have depositors lost through the management of National banks. Of the State banks, one resumed, and the other paid one hundred per cent. Of the Savings banks, five resumed. Of the Savings and loan associations, one resumed. Of the private banks, quite a number resumed. To-day the banking interest of Ohio comes to this convention with greetings. Ohio, gentlemen, has contributed something in the past to the history of this country; it contributed Salmon P. Chase, the author of the national banking system. It gave to the country John Sherman. It has been represented in the Nation in its great soldiers, in its literature and in the arts. Ohio to-day contributes its share to the greatness of the country, in its financiers, and in its politicians. I need but cite that magnifi-

cent pioneer Marc Hanna to prove this. Ohio has contributed something in her brilliant Senator Foraker. And, gentlemen, it has pleased the people of this country, because its representatives selected and the delegates in the national convention nominated as the standard bearer of one of the great political parties the chosen son of Ohio; the purity of whose character and the honesty of whose manhood is well known to the nation—William McKinley.

**Pennsylvania.**—WILLIAM H. RHAWN, Philadelphia: As our Vice-President is not here I would call upon Mr. Baker, of the Merchants' National Bank of Philadelphia, to say a few words for Pennsylvania.

**HARTMAN BAKER**, Philadelphia: I come from a city which is sometimes called the City of Brotherly Love. When I got to St. Louis last night I felt a long ways from home, but on Tuesday about noon I found that I had discovered another city of brotherly love. In regard to the banking interests of Pennsylvania I can say that we are not only conservative, but we are full of faith; conservatism and faith I think mean in some respects the same thing. We are discounting paper, we are taking deposits, we are fighting on the question of exchange in our country banks, just as though there were no cloud on the horizon, because Pennsylvania has so much faith in the common sense of the people of the United States that we don't think it possible that we can become dishonest, and in November we are going to take the privilege of contradicting Mr. Rhodes, who said that New York was going to give three hundred thousand majority for McKinley, and we are going to double that. The voice of Pennsylvania is always sure to be on the right side.

**Tennessee.**—T. J. LATHAM, Memphis: I wish to occupy the time of the convention but a very few moments. I have the advantage of my friend from Illinois and my friend from Maryland, who feel that they were overshadowed in not representing the leading cities of their States, in that I represent Memphis, the Queen City and the commercial capital of the volunteer State of the South—a title which Tennessee is entitled to because she contributed more soldiers in the Mexican war in proportion to her population, and put as many men in the late war also, as any State in the Union. Tennessee, I can say, without any feeling of enmity, is not confined to one or two products. Whether it be cotton, or mining, or lumber, she stands equally prominent throughout the country. Our cotton interests, and our lumber interests, and various other interests, make her a very important State.

During the panic of 1893 Memphis had the honor of not having a single suspension, although having large banking interests; and to-day, though distinguished for its Democracy, I can say there is not a banking man, and very few commercial men in Memphis, that are imbued with the heresy of dishonest money.

**Texas.**—JOHN N. SIMPSON, Dallas: I was looking for some one from Texas with a better voice than myself to speak for the biggest and greatest State in the Union. Texas with its 274,000 square miles is larger than any five States of the Union. It has a climate that is surpassed by no region on earth. It has a soil that rivals the valley of the Nile. And when you come to products, why, Texas produces more than one-quarter of all the cotton raised in the United States. In live stock it is second to no State in the Union. This year, although we have a short crop of cotton, we will ship more than two and a quarter millions of bales, and we will receive for that cotton more than one hundred millions of dollars. Our live stock shipments will amount to more than fifty millions of dollars. We have two hundred and fourteen National banks in our State. We have had as few failures as any Western State. Our banks are in good condition. The people are just harvesting their crops, and they are not in need of money now, as our crop is going to market. Within thirty days we shall have garnered the crops and we will have plenty of money. As to the political situation in the State I will say this. We have four parties in Texas. We have a Republican party, a Free Silver Democratic party, a Sound Money Democratic party, and we have the Populist party. While Texas has rolled up the largest Democratic majority in the Union in other years, there is a strong probability that this year it will be a majority the other way.

**Vermont.**—J. J. ETEY, Brattleboro: I do not know whether I am the only representative here from Vermont or not, but I do not want the State to go unheard from.

**A DELEGATE:** We heard from her three weeks ago.

**MR. ETEY:** Yes; three weeks ago yesterday we let our voice be heard throughout this nation. I am very glad to be able to assure you to-day that the farmers of Vermont—for we are practically all farmers up there—have not been deceived, and believe that honesty is not only the best policy but that it is the only policy. Savings banks predominate in Vermont, and the money in those Savings banks is limited, as no one can deposit over \$2,000, and therefore the money in the banks belongs to small depositors. That was the class of people that spoke to the country three weeks ago; and I assure you that not only the banking interests in Vermont but the rank and file of the people will always be found where they have been found in the past—standing up boldly for honesty and integrity both in their word as well as in their money.

**Virginia.**—**CALDWELL HARDY**, Norfolk: I did not come here prepared to make a speech, but I am not willing that Virginia should drop out of the procession. I believe the harbor of Norfolk is considered the finest on the Atlantic coast south of New York, and her banking facilities are measured, of course, by her commerce. We have in our harbor and centering there a large number of extensive railway systems: the Norfolk & Western Railway, bringing there, among other products, hundreds of thousands of tons of Pocahontas coal, which has become very celebrated of late years and is used on most of the Atlantic liners; the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, the Seaboard Air Line, and the Southern Railway, which has absorbed various lines and now controls some 8,000 miles of track. At Newport News, which is located on our harbor, is situated one of the greatest ship-building yards in the world, and with the largest dry docks in the country.

So far as our banking facilities are concerned they have proved ample for handling the commerce that has come to us. For a number of years we have been one of the largest cotton ports in the Southern States, and our lumber business is scarcely second to our cotton interests, representing in value one of the largest products in our section. The lumber is shipped all through the East and the West as well, competing with the white pine of Michigan. My own bank has a capital of \$400,000 and deposits ranging from \$1,750,000 to \$2,000,000, and I am glad to say we have more deposits to-day than we had a year ago. We have been able to supply every customer who has had any claim upon us, and to supply him with comfort to ourselves; and, although within the last thirty or sixty days, we have sent South in the neighborhood of \$500,000, for the purpose of moving the cotton crop, which is being returned to us now in the shape of drafts drawn against the exports of cotton at New York—we are getting along very comfortably and are waiting for the sound money landslide on November 3. We have more of the silver sentiment in our State than I should like, but I think I can truthfully say that it does not exist at all among our most substantial business men, and I think the same thing may be said generally of the business communities throughout the South, and when the returns from election come in the solid men of our section will speak in no uncertain tones and I think we will see the last of what is so generally termed "the solid South" on that or any other question.

**West Virginia.**—**JOSEPH E. SANDS**, Fairmont: West Virginia is, as you know, a mountainous State, and owing to the great natural advantages we have there we have not suffered any depression in business interests, and everything to-day is going along apparently just as smoothly as it has at any time in the past. I trust that, as mountaineers will always be free, when the time comes West Virginia will be found among those States that wish to maintain the honesty and integrity of the country, and that she will aid to the best of her ability in the fight for sound money, sound currency, and the promotion of the best interests of the nation.

**Wisconsin.**—**A. J. FRAME**, Waukesha: The banking interests of Wisconsin suffered greatly in 1893, but the weakness has all disappeared and to-day we are awaiting the return of prosperity, only prevented by this blight of uncertainty as to the quality of money in existence. The quantity has been greater per capita since 1890 than at any period of our history. Adam Smith, who cannot be charged with having been a politician, once said:

"The attention of Government was never so successfully employed as when directed to watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country. No complaint is more common than that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither the wherewith to buy it nor the credit to borrow it. Those who have either will seldom be in want either of the money or the wine which they have occasion for, and a country that has wherewithal to buy gold and silver will never be in want of those metals. When the quantity of gold and silver in any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their exportation."

Therefore, I draw the conclusion that it is the question of the quality of the money and not the quantity, as the needs of commerce will supply the quantity if we have the quality.

#### DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL BANKING QUESTIONS.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Gentlemen, we have finished with the call of the roll of the States. Now we go to the discussion of practical banking questions, which is open to all delegates under the five-minute rule. The first question is: "Diligent Presentation of Checks Payable at a Distance. The Law and the Practice."

**MR. HENDRIX:** To assist in the discussion of this practical banking question, a little syllabus has been prepared, copies of which have been distributed throughout the hall.

##### *I. Diligent Presentation of Checks Payable at a Distance.*

On this subject the law and the practice do not agree. The law says that a check must be mailed direct to an agent at the place of payment. The practice is to send to a correspondent,

more or less removed, resulting in a circuitry of route and delay. The law says mailing direct to drawee is negligence. The practice is frequently to do this.

What changes in the existing practices of check collection are expedient to the end that greater economy of time, risk and expense may be gained?

Subject of a national clearing-house as a channel for the presentation and collection of the country's paper.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Is there any discussion on this topic? If not, we will pass to the next, which is a discussion of the rule abolishing restrictive endorsements.

**MR. HENDRIX:** We trust that these questions will draw out the thought of the members of the association, and that gentlemen will not hesitate to enter into discussion promptly and give us the benefit of their views ripened by their experience. You are all familiar with the resolution adopted by the New York Clearing-House Association on June 3, 1896:

*Resolved,* That on and after the first day of July, 1896, members of this association shall not send through the exchanges any checks, sight drafts, notes, bills of exchange, or other items having thereon any qualified or restrictive endorsement, such as "for collection" or "for account of" unless all indorsements thereon are guaranteed by the bank member of the association sending such checks, drafts, notes, bills of exchange, or other items. Any such items sent in violation of the above requirements shall be returned directly to the member from whom they were received, and shall in all respects be subject to the regulations contained in section 15 of the constitution of the New York Clearing-House Association.

Since that time similar action has been taken by the Clearing Associations of the following cities:

Albany,	Fall River,	Louisville,	Pittsburg,
Atlanta,	Galveston,	Martinsburg,	Providence,
Boston,	Grand Rapids,	Memphis,	Savannah,
Buffalo,	Hartford,	Milwaukee,	Omaha,
Chicago,	Jacksonville (Fla.),	Newark,	St. Louis,
Cleveland,	Kansas City,	New Haven,	St. Paul,
Cumberland,	Knoxville,	New Orleans,	Syracuse,
Detroit,	Little Rock,	Norfolk,	Tacoma,
Duluth,	Los Angeles,	Philadelphia,	Trenton,

In several cities the clearing-houses decided not to accept an indorsement "for deposit," or "for deposit to credit of," and decline to pay any items with other than a plain indorsement thereon.

The risks taken by banks paying checks containing restricted indorsements. Reasons for the change of practice.

**MR. N. B. VAN SLYKE,** Madison, Wis.: My understanding of this question is, that the simple indorsement of paper, with the additional words "for collection," "for account," "for credit," etc., is a full guarantee of the paper. I believe that the custom of using the additional words of "for collection," etc., is to keep in evidence the ownership and not the transfer to the indorsee, other than for collection and return to the indorser. The party receiving such paper becomes the agent of a principal, who is the responsible party to his prior indorser. If the country banker's indorsement to his central correspondent is responsible, or not, the plain simple indorsement is as strong as any additional wording can make it.

**G. P. GAUFFITH,** Cincinnati, O.: This form of indorsement, "for collection," first came into use at the time of a failure of a bank in New York city, where the Cashier had used collections from the State of Ohio for his own personal benefit. After that we endeavored to get the title of the property in our own name; and the words "for collection," "for account of," etc., arose after that time. If that phrase could be hedged about with law it would be a great deal better than the unrestricted indorsement. Take your bills receivable, for instance, that you have in your pocket-book, payable at various points. You give them to your collection clerk. He puts a number on them, and stamps the indorsement, and very often the officers of the bank do not see the indorsement at all. In some cities, like Cincinnati, for example, I am free to confess that a great deal of this paper I do not see at all. Of course, if your clerk is honest, all right; but, if he is dishonest, he might use that paper. Now, the restrictive indorsement, "for collection," was to prevent that very thing. What right has a banker to throw a burden upon another, or any responsibility whatever, except to return to him as good money as he could get from any other person. Your indorsement should carry all the legal responsibility of the previous indorsement—of a previous forgery, perhaps, of a check being raised, or of the indorsement being irregular. When I have per-

formed my duty of collecting and securing for you your money, you certainly ought to make good to me any irregularity there might be to me in the prior indorsement. The only way under the ruling of the Supreme Court, is, that you shall indorse the paper, "to the First National Bank or order," and then when the money is in the hands of the First National Bank, when anything is found wrong about it, you have a perfect right to charge back what you have lost.

**J. A. CONWAY, Vicksburg, Miss.:** The restrictive endorsement, as we understand it in our part of the country, is simply a warning to bankers in the interior to be careful in their methods of business, and not to give money to any one over their counters, or to receive from any one any item for collection or deposit, unless they are thoroughly satisfied that it comes to them straight and true and that there is no endorsement or anything on the paper that they do not know about. In these days of the skillful raising of checks by expert forgers no ordinary examination can show whether they have been tampered with. Therefore the only safeguard that bankers have is to know who they are doing business with, and to refuse to accept any paper for collection unless they know about the previous endorsement.

**HARVEY J. HOLLISTER, Grand Rapids, Mich.:** When does the liability of the country banker cease, having sent his remittance, we will say, to New York? When does his liability as endorser cease? On the arrival of an acknowledgment, or thirty days hence, or when?

**ROBERT SHRIVER, Cumberland, Md.:** On this question I feel a little interest, from the fact that I began as a boy in the banking business in 1853. I had gone through the experience recited by Mr. Griffith of Cincinnati where the words "for collection" were first applied, and the reasons for it, as stated by him. That paper falling into the hands of a banking institution was hypothecated fraudulently, and thereby the owners were deprived of their property. The words "for collection" were used simply to hold the title of the paper in the person sending it. The use of that stamp from time to time has grown in such a way that is has been put indiscriminately upon almost every piece of paper that passes from one bank to another. I have felt from time to time that the cyclone which struck us when the New York Clearing-House adopted that resolution was perhaps one of the best things that has struck the financial interests of this country in a long while. We have been passing checks—I refer now particularly to checks as distinguished from promissory notes and collections, as we call them—from one to another, with no transfer of any kind upon them. The New York Clearing-House passed a resolution which you are all familiar with, and in sending out from our bank in Cumberland a circular to our correspondents I took the liberty of adding, what seemed to me to be a proper addition, viz., the fact that the New York Clearing-House resolution did not go far enough. When a check is made payable to a person it seems to me that the bank is in no position to pay that check unless the person to whom it is payable shall endorse it; and when I say endorse it I mean endorse it; not that he shall put on it, "for deposit, John Smith," or "to the credit of John Smith." That is a mere memorandum of the destination that the owner of the check desires it to have. It is no endorsement at all. Therefore, in the circular which I issued I stated that no guarantee would suffice to make that kind of an endorsement valid. In the First National Bank of Cumberland we have paid thousands of checks endorsed in just that way, which have come from New York city and other cities with such endorsements upon them. It was no voucher in our hands. I suppose every other bank in the United States is in exactly the same position. Therefore, I say that when the New York Clearing-House passed this resolution they gave us perhaps one of the best things for the banking fraternity because it went to the bottom of an exceedingly important subject. What does this endorsement mean? Simply the passing of a title. The person who has a deposit in a bank is authorized to issue a check which transfers the title of a certain sum of money to another person. That other person cannot get the money on the check unless he endorses the check. Now, he ought to be required to do the same thing if he goes to any other bank's counter—write his name on the check. Hence, I suggest that every bank in the country is in the position of having that duty placed upon it—that every check that comes into its hands, no matter where payable, should be put in exactly the same position that they would require if that check was paid over their own counter. They ought not to expect an interior bank to pay a check with an invalid endorsement. They should start the check right—start it right simply because it is right to start it right.

When you come to the matter of the collection of a note the endorsement "for collection" on it seems the right thing. It is the right thing so far as property goes. But there is another thing. When the man at the other end pays his note the bank who gives it to him must guarantee in some form or other that the endorsements are right. If "for collection" simply means an agency, as the Supreme Court has told us, that the intermediate endorsements are all agencies and no one is responsible for the genuineness of the endorsement.

**G. P. GRIFFITH, Cincinnati, O.:** Suppose a note is made payable to John Jones, and it is endorsed "John Jones" and underneath that is written "Sam Smith." The man that accepts the payment of the note is under a legal obligation that the title he takes from you when he

accepts your money, and you tender him the money, and he accepts the note, he has a right to ask you for a guarantee of John Jones and Sam Smith. There is nothing restrictive about it, and when it comes to you from a bank that bank is a guarantor to you. Therefore, you are perfectly safe when you guarantee him, and you do that when you put your stamp on it.

ROBERT SHRIVER: In that case I should say that the endorsement, carrying with it the guarantee, would make it right. The decision of the Supreme Court settles that question without any doubt. The question arises, I think, entirely from the fact that the intermediate persons, unless they have put themselves in a position by some agreement, which a guarantee does—that the liability remains with them and that they are more than agents—then the transfer by an endorsement “for collection” is not sufficient to hold them. But the main point is, when a note or check is presented for payment, if you have the genuine signature of the payee, you have to complete it; the rest of the endorsements are comparatively immaterial. Hence in order to assure the payer that the original endorsement is right, the endorsements are made without any restrictions, and it seems to me the right thing, and it seems to me also that every bank should see to it that every piece of paper that comes into its possession for collection should be absolutely complete for them to pay it, if it is drawn upon them.

R. L. BENNETT, Yazoo City, Miss.: It seems to me that the discussion of this question is utterly useless unless we can effect some practical result. The gentlemen from Maryland and Ohio have indicated that they believe that restrictive endorsements are sometimes useful. Now, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that if they are used there are certain liabilities that attach to their use. The clearing-houses have decided, therefore, that restrictive endorsements will not be permitted, and for that reason they exclude them, except upon the guarantee of the bank sending them. There are some clearing-houses that have not adopted the rule of the New York Clearing-House but have adopted a rule forbidding the clearing of these items at all. It seems to me that the only practical object that we can attain at this time, therefore, would be to suggest some measure whereby the clearing-houses of this country should all be brought in line upon this one proposition, and I believe that the very best rule that could be adopted under the circumstances would be that of the New York Clearing-House, which has been followed by most of the clearing-houses in the country.

I therefore move that this matter of restrictive endorsements be referred to the executive council with a request that if in their wisdom they see fit to take up the matter with the various clearing-houses of the country they shall do so and endeavor to obtain a uniform rule applicable in all clearing-houses alike, and that this association favors the rule adopted by the New York Clearing-House.

The motion was seconded by S. Prentiss Smith, of San Francisco, and was carried.

THE PRESIDENT: The next question on the programme is “Payment of Depositors’ Notes. Discussion of Practice in Different States.”

MR. HENDRIX: The syllabus, in respect to this question, states:

### III. *Payment of Depositors’ Notes.*

In some States, as in New York and Pennsylvania, the note of a depositor payable at his bank, is equivalent to his check in the eye of the law, and the bank must pay and charge up, the same as a check.

In other States, as in Illinois and Tennessee, the law is that the bank must not pay or charge up without express instruction from its depositor.

In Indiana the rule is that the bank may pay, but is not obliged to do so in the absence of express instructions.

Which is the correct rule from the standpoint of business judgment?

M. M. WHITE, Cincinnati, O.: This question widely differs, perhaps, in every State. I believe it is the consensus of opinion that the payment of a note is strictly subject to the order of your depositor. The fact that a depositor makes his note payable at a bank does not of itself place upon that bank the duty of paying it when presented, in my opinion, without the depositor’s direction. I think it is always the safest plan that where a depositor desires his notes paid and charged to his account there should be a statement made by the depositor to that effect in writing, so that the bank would be authorized to make the charge to his account. Otherwise, I cannot see why the bank has any right to pay the note. The depositor may have some reason why he does not want to pay the note, and that is his business, and in my opinion it is not the business of a bank to undertake to say what its depositor intends to do. He puts his money there subject to his check or order. Very frequently notes are made payable at



banks where there is no account kept whatever. So that the mere fact that a note is made payable at a bank does not give the bank the right to take it for granted that the maker of the note wishes the bank to pay it without his authority.

N. B. VAN SLYKE, Madison, Wis.: I would like to ask Mr. White whether if a depositor had one thousand dollars in his bank and a note of his for \$500 was presented, the bank would feel justified in protesting that note?

MR. WHITE: If the note was presented by some other bank to us we should say that we had no instructions to pay it. Consequently, if it required protest it would go to protest. If we held the note, or a banker held a note where the depositor kept an account, it would be proper to inquire in some way before the note was charged up whether the depositor wished it paid and charged to his account.

MR. VAN SLYKE: If the depositor had that amount of money in your bank, and you protested that note, for instance, when he was absent and you couldn't make the inquiry of him, wouldn't you be liable for damages?

MR. WHITE: No, sir; not at all, because he had never given us authority to pay the note.

MR. VAN SLYKE: I think it would be desirable to have uniform statutes on that question in all the States.

MR. WHITE: A bank is assuming too much, it seems to me, to undertake to do business for its depositors in that way. The depositor must be aware of his own business, and if he doesn't want to attend to it, it is not the business of his bank to do it for him without his instructions. I think the deposits in a bank are too sacred for a bank officer to assume for himself what the depositor ought or intends to do. If a note is discounted and belongs to the bank, the bank has a perfect right to charge that note to the depositor's account; or if you have a call loan you can charge it to the depositor's account.

DANIEL ANNAN, Cumberland, Md.: It seems to me that when a note is made payable at a bank that fact is of itself instruction to the bank to pay it and charge it up to the depositor's account.

S. PRENTISS SMITH, San Francisco, Cal.: That depends upon the State law, whether you have a right to do that or not.

MR. ANNAN: We have no State law on the subject. It seems to me that if a note were protested, under the circumstances cited by Mr. Van Slyke, the bank would be liable.

JOHN B. RAMSAY, Baltimore, Md.: It is the custom in Baltimore to present all notes before twelve o'clock, and always before three. Now, suppose a bank certifies a note, say at twelve o'clock, and before three o'clock the payment of that note is stopped. What would you do in a case like that? Where would you be in regard to the man who stopped payment of it?

I. E. KNISELY, Toledo, O.: There is some misapprehension, and it is due to the fact that there are contradictory decisions upon it. I want to call your attention, however, to a case decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana. I was led to read that case, because I had a case in point. In that case the judge who decided it challenged the finding of any case in any report holding that a bank ought to pay a note made payable at its counter without instructions from the depositor. I examined the cases cited by Mr. Morse in his work on banking, for I did not take it for granted that what he said was correct—that a note made payable at a bank was equivalent to drawing a check upon the depositor's funds in that bank; but I began first by examining a case in 80 New York, and I found that the judge was correct. That case did not decide that point. I took up 9 Cranch, and I found that case did not decide the question. I then hunted up 5 Sanford, and I found that did not decide the question. Then I got 122 Massachusetts, and I found that didn't decide it. So I concluded that those cases that were cited there, holding that a bank ought to pay a depositor's note, did not decide any question of the kind. But the question has been decided in Indiana and in Illinois. It has been held there that if a bank paid its depositor's note it was protected and the depositor could not subject the bank to any loss.

JOHN B. RAMSAY, Baltimore, Md.: That was a decision of the State court, was it not?

MR. KNISELEY: Yes, sir; and I believe the same thing has been held in Pennsylvania. I think the misapprehension arose largely from the use of authorities which are not in point. I agree with Mr. White that it is the best practice to have written authority from the depositor before paying his notes.

CHARLES MCKNIGHT, Pittsburgh, Pa.: I should perhaps say something about the custom in our city in this respect. Where a note is payable, say, at four months, for \$1,000, at the First National Bank, it is the duty of the presenting bank to present the note there for certification or for payment. It is the custom then for the payee to certify the note or lift it by his own check. The law cited by one of the gentlemen is just about as I remember it, although I cannot quote the volume in which it appears, where it was decided in a case brought against a bank for a note which had been presented and charged up that the bank was not responsible. That is, the court held that the bank had a perfect right to charge the note up under

the circumstances; and in the judge's opinion he said that he was not at all sure but what it was the duty of the bank to charge up the note if the customer had money there to meet it. As to the custom in our bank, if we receive a note made by John Smith for \$1,000, we look first to see if he has the money in the bank. If he has, and the note is presented by an outside bank, we either certify the note or pay it. We always notify the customer, by messenger or by telephone, however, that we have done so. If it is a note which we have discounted, why, we charge it up as a matter of course. But we feel at liberty to charge up a note to a customer's account if he has the money there to meet it; or, if he has not the money there we feel at liberty to do it also.

J. A. CONWAY, Vicksburg, Miss.: In our State we have two sorts of notes. One is made payable to order, and the other to bearer. A bank purchasing a note to order, so as to preserve itself from loss, should notify the maker of the note that it has purchased it; otherwise any offset that he could show would be held good against the bank. To protect ourselves, we make all notes payable to bearer, and under those circumstances there is no offset. I would like to know from some of the gentlemen what they would do if they paid a note made payable at their bank without instructions from the maker, and afterwards found that the maker had a receipt for a portion of the amount that the note called for?

ALVAH TROWBRIDGE, New York City: In New York the custom is universal among the banks that notes are presented in the morning before twelve o'clock. Generally the first messengers that go out after the opening take out the notes, and they go the length and breadth of the city. I have never heard of a case where it was objected to that a bank certified the note of a depositor against his account. It is the custom of our bank to do so, and it is done six days in the week. We always consider that the presentation of the note is as much a demand upon the depositor's money as the presentation of his check. Checks and notes go in the same pocket-book and are certified on the same route. There is no question about it; in New York it is universally done.

THE PRESIDENT: The next question is: "Necessity of Uniform Laws Governing Commercial Paper. What Can the American Bankers' Association Do to Bring the Various State Laws into Harmony?"

On motion of John B. Ramsay, of Baltimore, the question was referred to the executive council for action.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we take a recess for lunch I will announce the following gentlemen as the nominating committee: M. M. White, Cincinnati, Ohio; F. W. Hayes, Detroit, Michigan; T. P. Day, Pittsburg, Pa.; J. B. Ramsay, Baltimore, Md.; George H. Prince, St. Paul, Minn.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION.

THE PRESIDENT: Question V. is the next subject of discussion: "Is a Bank Check Revocable Before Presentation for Payment? Discussion of the Practice in Various States." The syllabus says:

##### V. Bank Check Revocable Before Presentation for Payment.

Under the law of Ohio a bank check is revocable by the drawer before its presentation for payment, unless the bank on which it is drawn has accepted or certified it, or otherwise become committed to its payment. An action, therefore, cannot be maintained against a bank by the holder of a check for refusal to pay it, unless the check has been accepted, although there stands to the credit of the drawer on the books of the bank, a sum more than sufficient to meet the check.

In Illinois, on the other hand, it has been held that after a check has been passed into the hands of a *bona-fide* holder, it is not in the power of the drawer to countermand the order of payment. In the State of Illinois, therefore, the check holder has a right of action against the bank which refuses for any cause to pay when in funds.

Is there any reason why the holder of an unaccepted check can sue the bank thereon in Illinois, while he cannot in New York or Ohio?

Are there any remarks on this subject? In the State of New York a man has the right to stop the payment of a check, and when it is presented we do not pay it—unless we have previously certified it, and then it is paid.

There does not seem to be any discussion. The next question is VI., but I will omit it for the present, as we shall return to it later. Question VII. is: "Uniform-

ity of Holiday Laws." It appears to me that by resolution that question might well be referred to the executive council to take such action as it sees fit.

On motion of Wm. H. Rhawn, of Philadelphia, the question was so referred.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The next question on the list is: "Equality in the Taxation of Bank Stock." We are surely all interested in that. The syllabus says the only way in which the American Bankers' Association can work in this direction is through the different State bankers' associations, and I think a resolution to request this association to correspond with the different State associations in regard to this matter would be the best disposition to make of that.

On motion of M. M. White, of Cincinnati, the executive council was authorized to communicate with the various State associations of the country with a view to securing equality in the taxation of bank stock in the different States.

**THE PRESIDENT:** The next is an important question which we meet at almost every stage of business in New York: "The Partial Payment of Checks." The syllabus says:

#### *X. The Partial Payment of Checks.*

Should a bank make a partial payment of a check, when not in funds to pay in full? Has the bank the right to disclose the depositor's balance to the check-holder to enable the latter to deposit sufficient to make the check good? What should a bank do when there are simultaneous checks coming through the clearing-house aggregating more than the depositor's balance, the balance being sufficient for part of the checks?

If a man has \$2,500 to his credit and \$4,000 in checks comes in through the clearing-house, the general practice in New York is to pay to the extent of his balance of \$2,500, picking out enough checks irrespective of where they come from, paying those, and returning the balance of the checks to the bank that sent them through the clearing-house. Suppose that man fails, have we a right to discriminate, and discriminating against the holders of the checks we return? That is one of the points. Another point is, if Mr. John Jones comes into your bank with a check for \$1,000 and you say it is not good, that he has only \$700 on deposit, and Mr. Jones says I want to deposit \$300, and then you certify his check for \$1,000.

**GEORGE A. LEWIS, of Naugatuck, Conn.:** Is it customary to do that?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Well, it is done as a matter of courtesy. If a reputable house in New York has the check of one of its customers on a bank and we tell them it is not good for that amount they are perfectly willing sometimes to deposit sufficient money to make it good so that they can get what is there. Now, the question is: Is that right?

**C. S. TYSON, Germantown, Pa.:** I should like to have that question laid over for a few moments, because it is a very important one, and a good many of the delegates have not returned from lunch.

**THE PRESIDENT:** We will pass it for the present. Question XI. is also another important one: "Recourse of Banks Against Account of an Insolvent Customer."

The syllabus says:

"The subject of a bank's recourse upon the deposits of an insolvent customer, where it holds paper not yet matured. In some States the law allows the set-off, in others it does not."

We have never attempted in New York, so far as my knowledge goes, to charge a note to a customer's account that has not yet matured. If we have a maturing obligation in 60 or 90 days and the bank fails we do not feel at liberty to charge that off against it, but if we have a demand loan then we avail ourselves of the right to do that immediately and before the bank, in case it is a National bank, goes into the hands of a Receiver.

**T. P. DAY, Pittsburg, Pa.:** Wouldn't it be a question of law whether you had a right to do that or not?

**THE PRESIDENT:** The notes sometimes that are taken in the New York banks contain that express provision, with a right to apply any balance of account or any remittance that may be received,

**MR. DAY:** Before maturity?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Yes, sir.

**MR. DAY:** If there was an agreement of that kind of course it would be legal.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Before a Receiver takes charge of a National bank the United States is the owner of all the assets and you cannot apply a balance. Also, if a firm in New York fails and makes an assignment I question very much whether the assignee would allow us,

even upon the basis of a special agreement, to use up a portion of the assets to apply to the payment of our claim to the prejudice of other creditors.

P. W. HUNTINGTON, Columbus, O.: I think in such a case it is plain that the bank makes itself a preferred creditor of the insolvent, and that is clearly illegal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sir; but I referred to where there was a prior agreement.

MR. HUNTINGTON: Prior agreement is another matter; but in the ordinary course of business I do not think the bank would have any right to attach the deposit of its customer to protect a note which has not yet matured. I do not see how it can do it, because it is in effect making of itself a preferred creditor without any license of law whatever.

B. G. BRYAN, Waterbury, Conn.: I understand that in some places there is a law which provides that on the assignment of a party the bank balance shall then be applied to those notes, even if they have not matured.

THE PRESIDENT: To the notes held by the bank?

MR. BRYAN: Yes, sir: not yet matured or become due, by the action of the assignment.

GEO. H. PRINCE, St. Paul, Minn.: I think the law in Minnesota provides that where a firm makes an assignment all of the paper becomes due at that time, and it is the custom to charge any balance against any note held by the bank. At least, our attorneys have advised us that we have a right to do it.

THE PRESIDENT: I know of some cases in New York where we have done so with notes.

MR. PRINCE: In the case I speak of the assignee objected, but his attorney advised him that the bank had that right, and of course he acquiesced in it.

THE PRESIDENT: The next question on the list, XII., we will pass, until Mr. Gookin, of Chicago, comes in. We will pass then to Question XIII.

W. FRANK STREET, St. Louis, Mo.: Before passing to the next question, Mr. President, and referring back to Question XI., I would like to inquire of Mr. Prince if he knows it to be the law that the assignment—the assignment being made by the maker of the note—operates to mature all unmatured paper? I would like to know if that is the law, or whether it is merely a question in practice?

MR. PRINCE: I am not positive, but I understand it is the law; I am quite sure it is.

THE PRESIDENT: Question XIII. is: "Is it Good Banking to Pay Interest on Daily Balances?" That is a pretty serious question. New York banks do not get any interest. I would like to know the opinion of some of our correspondent friends in regard to that matter.

P. W. HUNTINGTON, Columbus, O.: That clearly depends upon the location of the bank who has the practice. Country banks can ill afford to do so, because they have no opportunity in their home markets of using that money promptly on collaterals and call loans. Bankers in large cities, banks of large capital, where such opportunities are afforded them of loaning their money promptly, can better afford to do it, and the history of the business throughout the world shows that the large concerns in large cities can well do their business and pay a small interest on current balances. Therefore, as I said, it depends on the location of the bank and its facilities for handling its business promptly on call or otherwise.

THE PRESIDENT: For instance, New York banks pay two per cent. on balances. When money cannot be loaned better than one per cent. the deposits run up to fabulous figures. The moment money becomes of value on call so that they can loan it at four per cent. our friends want their money. So that paying interest at the rate of two per cent., which, considering the reserve you have to keep, is equivalent to two and a half per cent., and loaning it out at one per cent. for six or eight months, in ordinary years, or one and a half per cent., it nets a loss, and yet notwithstanding that there is a profit that accrues to the banks paying that rate of interest, taking the year in and year out. I am not arguing against it at all, because we should be very glad to receive any good accounts and to pay two per cent. interest on balances.

M. M. WHITE, Cincinnati, O.: I think the business of paying interest by small banks to their depositors on certificates of deposit or otherwise is wrong. It tends to lessen their deposits, which the banks would receive for nothing, by the temptation of a little interest. That money is very uncertain. These certificates are drawn perhaps six months after they know interest is to be paid if presented for payment prior to that time. The contract is altogether against the banker. Whoever undertakes to do a banking business looking solely to one side of the question makes a mistake. I do not think that any account kept in New York, unless it averages a certain amount of money, is entitled to a cent of interest. I have noticed that when money becomes in demand banks outside of the city of New York have requested their bankers to loan out a portion of their balance, thus availing themselves of the money market. If I were a New York banker, I should limit the amount, conditioned as

to the account, of what was paid in interest. I had occasion to limit a bank that had suddenly run up a very large amount—money that could not be used at the time with any degree of certainty of being able to repay it. These large deposits are unprofitable to any bank. It is only the evenness of accounts that is profitable; and, as we depend upon these centers—New York being the heart of the country—I think we should endeavor to keep our accounts in New York equalized; in other words, let the average be about so much. It often occurs in a city like Cincinnati that as soon as our country banks have \$12,000 or \$15,000 they come in and want call loans; they come into competition with us in that way. Now, it is unfair for us to come in competition with New York, for instance. Let us confine ourselves in our own territory. We should give to our New York correspondents, or to any one else where we keep our money, the advantage when money is worth something, and not pile it upon them when it is worth nothing. In other words, gentlemen, we should do our business in such a way that the people we do business with can derive a benefit from it as well as ourselves.

R. L. BENNETT, Yazoo City, Miss.: The question printed on this slip which has been distributed reads: "Is the paying of interest on daily balances legitimate banking, and is it profitable to banks in reserve cities?" As to the latter part of this query I am unable to speak, but as to the first part I should say that it is legitimate business. I know nothing in law against it; but as to whether or not it is good banking I have a different opinion. I think it is questionable whether it is good banking to pay interest on deposits, especially where the bank is engaged in business as a bank of discount and deposit. I think that in the country banks especially it is very improper. In our section of the country it is very unusual for banks to pay interest on deposits. Occasionally we find banks with a small Savings bank attachment, organized under a different name, and issuing time certificates and loaning money on real estate. Sometimes National banks in our State do that. However, I do not believe that the paying of interest on balances is good banking. I will not discuss the question further than to throw out the query, hoping I may be able to get a satisfactory answer, whether or not New York banks, or bankers in central cities, regard with special favor an account kept with them which never exacts any interest; whether an account of that kind would be considered with more favor in times of panic than one that had continually received interest on its balance? That is the only feature that interests me at all, because being in the country our practice is not to pay interest, and the question of receiving interest from our correspondents in New York is a matter that does interest me.

A. C. ANDERSON, St. Paul, Minn.: I know one large New York city bank that does make a distinction between the accounts that they pay interest on and the accounts that they do not pay interest on. The accounts that they do not pay interest on are considered as entitled to special consideration.

MR. BENNETT: We have never received a cent of interest from our bank in New York, and out of consideration for the fact that we thought that some time we might have to use them, we have never asked any interest.

THE PRESIDENT: Question XV.: "Is it Desirable to Have the Ten Per Cent. Tax on State Bank Circulation Repealed?" I think that is the only remaining war tax that we have in the country at this time.

JOHN R. MULVANE, Topeka, Kan.: As a State banker, I should say it was not desirable to have it repealed.

THE PRESIDENT: We are very happy to hear that, because I think there is a general consensus of opinion in that same direction.

H. J. HOLLISTER, Grand Rapids, Mich.: To any one who has lived forty years in this country and has been engaged in this line of work it seems to me this question is a very easy one to settle. It has been my privilege to be in this line of work more than forty years. Consequently, I have been called on to pass through a varied experience, commencing with the panic of '53, with the diversified currency then in circulation, with the currency just prior to 1861 and with all the experiences which prevailed prior to the National Banking Act. It is a fact that under the old State issue of money this country lost in the hands of the people five per cent. of its circulation for every twenty years prior to 1861. According to the best statistics, the people lost two hundred millions of dollars in those twenty years, owing to the failure of banks, on the issues of State banks. Now, while I am and have been for thirty years greatly interested in the national system and connected with it, and while I believe that the currency of this country should be largely the issue of the National banks, or under national supervision, and while I believe this privilege should be extended in the largest degree by giving every opportunity possible in remote districts to establish National banks with small capital, yet I believe we never can afford as a country to go back to any system of paper issue without governmental inspection and guarantee. For these reasons, sir, and many others, I should be decidedly opposed to any repeal of the State bank tax.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Question XVI.: "Should Not the National Banking Law Permit the Organization of Banks of Small Capital in Small Towns?" The National Banking Law does not permit the organization of any bank with less than \$50,000 in places the population of which does not exceed 6,000 inhabitants.

**M. M. WHITE, Cincinnati, O.:** In the address of the president of this association two years ago he strongly advocated the amendment of the national banking law so as to permit national banks to be organized with a capital of \$25,000. The president spent a great deal of time before he set forth this view in study of the question. It was taken up by the association, but it received very little encouragement at Baltimore at that convention. Nevertheless, the president is convinced that he was right upon that subject. In looking over the bank directory when you want to send out a check for collection, for instance, we have a check on Somerset, Ohio. That bank is quoted: Citizens' Bank, no capital and no surplus, and no nothing. You have no correspondent that you can send the item to, unless you make an express agreement with your depositor that he is to take the risk. If you look in Dun's perhaps you may find that there the party does have some responsibility. There is in but very few of the States any adequate supervision over these private banks. They are not called upon to show their hand, or tell what they are doing, or what their capital is, or their surplus, or anything else. Therefore, we are to a certain extent going it blind when we send items to them for collection. Now, it seems to me that there is scarcely a place in the country but what would sustain a bank of \$25,000 capital, which means, of course, under the National Banking Act, a responsibility of \$50,000. Such a bank comes under the supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency, and must show its true condition at all times. If you look through the bankers' directory you will find page after page of blanks as to capital, surplus, undivided profits, etc. It seems to me that it would be much safer to have these small National banks organized, for then they would be all under governmental supervision, and we should know what their responsibility was. It has been claimed by many private banks that the public has no right to know anything about their business, no more than about a merchant's private business. Now, the two things are entirely different. The word "bank" above the door sets out to people that it is a place where money is received on deposit. It is a matter of great pride to this organization that there are so many honest and reputable bankers and banks, and that they have not disgraced the name, and have not abused the confidence reposed in them by the public. I am heartily in favor, as a national banker, of so amending the National Banking Act as to permit of the establishment of banks of \$25,000 capital.

**I. E. KNISLEY, Toledo, O.:** I have been somewhat interested in this question and I have talked with some of the bankers that keep accounts with the bank I am connected with, having in view the same object that my friend Mr. White has. I have always met with this objection. Not that they could not raise \$50,000 capital, but they said that there was one prohibition in the national banking law that would be against them; and that is that they could not loan their money upon real estate. Banks in small towns have to depend largely for their borrowers upon people who will make mortgages. They have not enough manufacturers or merchant customers to borrow their money. I do not understand how they could get around that provision in the national banking law. There is one way by which the object spoken of by Mr. White might be accomplished, and that is this: If a State should put all its private banks under State control and have them examined periodically, as, for instance, the State of Minnesota does, in which the superintendent of banking makes a call for a statement upon every private bank each time the Comptroller of the Currency asks for a statement, then I think the object Mr. White aims at might be attained.

**GEORGE H. PRINCE, St. Paul, Minn.:** The law of Minnesota only refers to State banks—not private banks.

**MR. KNISLEY:** I do not believe if that provision were incorporated in the national banking law that it would result in the creation of small banks in small towns. It is not a very profitable system, anyway, where they are subjected to so much larger taxes than they ought to pay, and as the National banks are organized there is no possible escape for tax paying. Private bankers, of course, have a way of getting around the question of taxes, sometimes, to some extent, which National banks could not adopt.

**LAWRENCE B. KEMP, Baltimore, Md.:** During 1893 it was my privilege and pleasure to be bank examiner of the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia. Among our banks we had a few that had a capital of only \$50,000. During that trying time those banks gave me more anxiety than all of the rest of the banks put together. Usually banks of small capital are situated in outlying districts. Consequently, at a time of depression, when we wanted to stand close together, they were too far away from us to catch that idea of helpfulness that comes from being close to your neighbor; and in consequence, oftentimes, fear of what was coming more than the realization of it would so paralyze them that they would

be ready to throw up their hands before there was any necessity for it. Now, if you cut that in halves, and say \$25,000, and take into consideration how little comparatively can be earned on \$25,000, how few competent people you can employ on capital of that sum with which to carry on a banking business, and see the amount of deposits that a \$25,000 bank can bring in, and you can get in your mind's eye in a time of depression what condition that bank is going to be in and how it is going to stand. I recall that during 1893 the banks of Baltimore had a tacit understanding with the bank examiners that we should see no bank that was in good condition go to the wall. If we had \$25,000 banks scattered all over our State it would have been almost impossible for us to have responded as quickly as they would have needed the help. And then just take into consideration, too, the character of people that surround and support a \$25,000 bank. The calibre of those men is small, and when a time comes like that they get paralyzed beyond description. I know of nothing, even in as good a State as ours, where we have not had a bank failure for sixty years, that would make good bankers as fearful as the fact of the establishment of \$25,000 banks. I recollect that while I was in Washington I went to the department to see what character of bank it was that was giving the most trouble, and it was always the little fellows—those were the ones that needed the most care and the most encouragement.

WILLIAM S. WITHAM, Atlanta, Ga.: I have the pleasure, gentlemen, to represent a few small banks myself. I don't know just what railroad facilities, or means of communication, the State of Maryland is blessed with, but I do know that the State of Georgia has a first-class bank examiner, and any bank in the State can be reached in as little time as I can reach Atlanta from St. Louis. As to the record of banks with small capital, I want to say that since the day General Lee and General Grant stood under the apple-tree at Appomattox there has not been a failure of a country bank in the State of Georgia. Now and then a young man writes his name up over a grocery store and calls it a bank and starts with a few dollars made by the sweat of some other man's brow, and it is the private banking institution that soon goes under. But you take a chartered bank, a country bank, with a board of directors, and with a modest capital of \$25,000, and it is not only the safest bank we have in the country but it is the most prosperous, because being in an isolated community it can control all of its depositors, and if a man comes in and wants his money you can say: "Now, you go right home, it's all right, we will attend to that for you," and he goes. There is no excuse on the part of the small bank for becoming a National bank, except for the safety and popularity of the system, and I have no hesitancy in saying that although out of the twenty banks that I am connected with there is not one National bank, I wish I had as good a system as the National banks, which is the best we have ever known. As to loaning on real estate, the country banker doesn't loan on real estate, if the young man who runs the concern has been trained to know his business. Besides, if we had \$25,000 National banks and wanted to loan money on real estate we could easily ascertain a way to do it from those who have been in the business before.

THE PRESIDENT: We will now refer to question XII, which was passed a while ago: "Should not Exchange Be Charged on all Items That Cost to Collect?" I believe Mr. F. W. Gookin, Cashier of the Northwestern National Bank, of Chicago, is prepared to say something on this question.

F. W. GOOKIN, Chicago: There are few questions which the bankers of the United States have to meet in the daily conduct of their business which are more perplexing than those arising from the extensive use of local checks in making payments at a distance, and the growing practice on the part of the banks of handling them without remuneration and often without charge. We are all of us familiar with the evil and the burden which it entails. Yet I doubt whether we all realize how seriously it is cutting into the legitimate profits of our business. Strange as it may seem, and notwithstanding the inability of any one to discover how unanimity of action can be brought about, many able bankers still hold to the view that all we need to do is for each one of us to make a proper charge upon all foreign items handled. Such a beautifully simple solution of the difficulty has about as much practical value as the stock receipt for holding professional politicians in check, that all the good and true men in the country should attend the primaries and act in concert; and is like it in that the plainest teachings of experience are ignored. How happy we should all be if competition could be gotten rid of so easily. But even if it were desirable that we should get rid of it—which I doubt—it is idle to waste even a moment's thought upon the possibility, since competition is as inevitable a concomitant of banking as of any other line of business.

In considering the question of a remedy there are three things which should be kept clearly in mind. These are, first, that the problem is not everywhere throughout the land an identical one in all respects, but varies in each town according to its geographical position and commercial importance. For country banks it has a somewhat different aspect from that which it presents to banks located in our leading cities. Second, that it is intimately

connected with the custom which prevails quite generally in the interior cities, of taking domestic exchange from and furnishing it to customers at par, irrespective of the market rate. Third, that in nearly every one of our cities the banks have to meet not merely local competition, but to some extent the competition of banks in other cities also. No remedy which fails to take all three of these factors into account can possibly achieve the desired result.

About a month ago I sent out a circular letter to the banks in the larger cities of the country, inviting an interchange of views, and advocating as a remedy that all domestic exchange transactions of whatever kind and with all classes of customers without exception be made at the current market rate, plus or minus, according to the nature of the transaction, a small commission for the bank performing the service. This I believe to be the only equitable and scientific basis for such transactions, and so far as I have been able to learn it is the one followed in every country in the world except the United States.

To the idea so often advanced that the solution of the problem lies in the formation of some sort of a clearing-house for country checks, in each of the reserve cities, I may say that aside from the fact that any such plan presents what seems to me the practically insuperable difficulty that it does not and cannot get rid of the cost of exchange—the actual expense incident to the transmission of funds—there is the further objection that it would be manifestly against the interest of the country banks to join in making it operative. Some of them, it is true, are pursuing the cut-throat policy of trying to beat their neighbors by taking all foreign items at par and collecting them as best they can; but with these exceptions country banks joining such a clearing-house would lose more than they could possibly gain by so doing.

Hitherto all practical measures of relief have taken the form of agreements between banks in various cities, establishing a fixed scale of charges to be collected in advance. In spite of the fact that many agreements are now in apparently successful operation—notably in St. Louis, Kansas City and Omaha—I am not satisfied that they afford a complete or a permanent solution of the problem. It is indeed too much to say that they tend to put a premium on dishonesty. No matter what penalty be prescribed, secret concessions can always be made with but little danger of detection, and sooner or later some of the parties to the compact are sure to use it as a means by which they can cut into the business of those who conscientiously stand on their pledge, whilst few of them can be depended upon not to yield to the demands of large depositors who feel their accounts entitled them to special favors. As I stated in the circular letter previously referred to, any agreement to maintain an arbitrary scale of charges is naturally looked upon by the business community as a high-handed proceeding, and in these days of cut rates and secret concessions few merchants who are compelled to pay what is demanded can be made to believe that all their competitors are accorded similar treatment. In fact one of the chief obstacles in the way of reformation arises from the ability of large wholesale houses to arrange with their banks to have all country checks received by them credited at par, in consideration of the size of the balances they carry, although I am convinced that the accounts are often made unprofitable in consequence and that the banks could, as a rule, better afford to pay a reasonable rate of interest instead. There is then no incentive for the wholesale houses to oppose the extension of the practice of sending out country checks, and if they take checks on small interior points without objection, all of their competitors are compelled to do likewise. In this connection I desire to say that most of the existing clearing-house agreements seem to me to be inadequate and inequitable, in that they provide the city depositors shall be charged on all out-of-town items, whilst from banks and bankers whose accounts are much less desirable, being on an interest basis and subject to greater fluctuations, many such items are taken at par, thus indirectly discriminating against the city depositors in favor of the customers of banks in other towns.

To the extent to which agreements to charge definite rates can be made to work, I regard them as marking an improvement over the condition of open competition which prevails in most of our cities; but conceding for the sake of argument that such agreements furnish the best and most practical solution of the difficulty, I do not think it would be possible to get the banks in some of the larger cities, such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Chicago, to form them; for they recognize that while such agreements may work well in towns where the parties to them are few in number and can be easily watched, there is no likelihood that would prove true in the wider field. Experience has shown over and over again that whatever be its form a voluntary agreement is sure to break down in the course of time, if any of the parties to it gain an advantage over their fellows by violating its provisions. I believe, gentlemen, that I echo the views of every one here when I say that I would not hesitate to trust any of you with large sums of money without taking receipts therefor, feeling perfectly sure that they would be properly credited and honestly and faithfully accounted for; yet, nevertheless, there are very few among you whom I would trust out of my sight to maintain the inflexibility of an agreement to charge uniform rates. In my



opinion the problem under consideration cannot be solved by any transient expedient. We can only hope to solve it by putting in practice some plan from which it will be manifestly against the interest of any bank to depart. That it may be depended upon to endure under any and all circumstances, and have no tendency to break down of its own weight, seems to me to constitute the strength of the plan which I have ventured to propose. It is simply working with and not against the natural law of exchange. And here let me say, for the information of those who may not be familiar with the way this operates in the large cities, that in Chicago all exchange transactions between banks are negotiated by a broker, who makes the rounds of all the leading institutions at least twice daily; and that the most delicate thermometer does not respond more quickly to changes in temperature than does the price of exchange reflect the slightest difference in the relation of the supply to the demand.

Should the banks in all the larger cities adopt the principle of making all domestic exchange transactions at the current market rate, the effects would, I think, be more far-reaching than is apparent at first glance. The replies which I have as yet received to my circular are not sufficiently numerous to afford a basis for any general conclusions; but while nearly all of them are favorable to my main contention, some of the writers seem to think that the stress of competition would cause banks to depart from the rule and offer to deal with their customers at par. Let us consider how it would work out in practice, should any bank fancy it could gain an advantage by so doing. I ask you to bear in mind, however, that the plan provides that the buying and selling rates for exchange on the leading cities shall be kept conspicuously posted during business hours in all banking offices. Is it reasonable to suppose that the customers of a bank should attempt to run counter to the current, would buy exchange from it at par when they could obtain it at a discount elsewhere, or that they would deposit at par when they could easily obtain a premium for it elsewhere? On the other hand, is it likely that they would hesitate to deposit exchange at par when quoted at a discount or to buy freely when quoted at a premium? I believe that if you will take the trouble to consider the matter carefully you will find that if the principle advocated were once adopted it would impose its own penalty upon its violators, and I believe that this penalty would prove to be of efficacious severity. To the objection made by bankers in some of our cities that market rates for exchange are unknown, I answer that they would come into existence with the adoption of the proposed plan. This of course would apply only to exchange upon leading cities, for it is obvious that there can be no market rate for exchange on towns to which checks have to be forwarded for collection and returns. Par *lista*, however, would necessarily be abolished and with them the chief incentive to the unbusinesslike practice of collecting country checks without charge disappear. There can be no doubt that one of the chief features in bringing about their extensive circulation has been the erroneous notion that the interchange of favors upon a reciprocal basis is a mutual benefit to both parties. It would be nearer the truth to say that it is in fact a mutual detriment.

How far the establishment of the proposed custom would operate to discourage the use of country checks, it is impossible to foresee. That it would have that effect to a large extent I have little doubt, and I am quite certain of it if the country banks should also adopt the plan of a sliding scale of rates depending upon the cost of exchange to them as determined by the currency movement. Independent of their action, however, the consistent course for the city banks to adopt in dealing with out-of-town items would be the one which I suggested in my circular letter, viz.: credit them to their customers at par and then keep an account with each of the cost of collecting, including interest and incidental, and charge them on the first of each month, or other stated period, with the total expense incurred on items lodged during the preceding month. Although this plan would involve more bookkeeping than to collect an arbitrary fixed charge in advance on all items deposited, it would be much fairer to the customers and much less likely to incur their opposition. This, however, is a matter of detail and may safely be left for each bank to work out in its own way. For I trust it will be perceived that what I advocate is not the formation of an agreement which must be maintained by force, but the establishment of a custom which when once put into practice will maintain itself under any and all circumstances. To work perfectly, however, the plan would have to be adopted in all the large reserve cities, and certainly in those which come into direct competition with each other in bidding for country bank accounts. It will not work satisfactorily if tried in a partial way only, or if exceptions be made between city depositors and banks and bankers. Unless something is done to counteract the present tendencies the entire cost of furnishing exchange will ultimately be saddled upon the banks, instead of being borne by those who require the service. I do not underrate the difficulty of securing united action on any issue by the banks in the different cities or the country at large, but so far as this question is concerned I may quote the words of Benjamin Franklin when he said to his compatriots during the Revolutionary War: "If we do not hang together, we shall all hang separately."

I. E. KNISLEY, Toledo, O.: In the bank with which I am connected during the last year

we have made quite an investigation into this subject. We took five of the largest accounts in the bank. I will give you the case of a wholesale clothing house first. We took in from them during the month 63 checks direct, 112 checks sent through Fort Wayne, Detroit and Pittsburg, making 177 checks altogether. The average amount of those checks was \$108; making a total of \$19,116 of our money that we set afloat for their benefit. These were cash items. The least time we could allow for that money was three days. We could not succeed in getting this money returned to us in less than that time. We deducted that balance from their total balance for the month, leaving \$65,052. We divided that by 30, giving an average daily balance of \$2,170. The best we thought we could make out of that money was three per cent.—and of course that was subject to check—which gave us \$5.42. The actual cost of collecting 65 checks was \$11.05. The net loss on the account for the month was \$5.63. Now that was the value of that account saying nothing about the cost for clerk hire, etc.

WILLIAM S. WITHAM, Atlanta, Georgia: Atlanta has found a remedy for this exchange business. When a city banker chases a little two dollar check all over the United States hunting a bare point to save a modest charge of ten cents which the country banker wants to put on it, why, he ought to have trouble and he will have trouble. Touching the law on a circuitous check the man that starts it on that endless route loses in case the bank on which it is drawn is a failure. The country banker is, as someone here has said, here to stay. Yes, there is no doubt about that, and the country bank ought to be blessed for charging an exchange. I want to say that the country bank that charges a city bank exchange on its checks and does not keep a balance with that city bank is a robber. Atlanta charges everybody. The biggest customer will pay it. That is the remedy.

M. M. WHITE: Very few of us know really what our business costs us. Often a man says to me: "I want to open an account with you. Do you charge anything on collections outside of the city?" I do not know what your answer might be, gentlemen, but so far as I am concerned we have no accounts which we propose to credit with \$100 when we take in a check for that amount and only get back \$99.75. A bank is too often supposed to be a kind of an accommodation affair by many people; but I want every one to understand that the Fourth National Bank of Cincinnati is not in business for pleasure, nor are we there for our health. We are trying to make a little money in a legitimate way, and we do not propose to credit anybody with more money than we think we will get back. We are willing to do the work of our depositors, but we are not willing to pay for the privilege of doing it.

JOHN K. OTTLEY, Atlanta, Ga.: In regard to exchange on country checks, Atlanta being the principal city in Georgia and being quite a wholesale center, the checks deposited with the Atlanta banks extend to a certain extent over most of the Southern States, and after deliberation in the clearing-house, we agreed to charge every depositor a uniform rate, and our rates on each check up to \$75 is ten cents, and, on a rising scale up to \$100, it is twenty-five cents, and on all items that run over \$500 we take them at one-eighth. We have had this agreement in effect now for something over three years, and it has worked very well indeed. We have a grievance committee, and if there is any violation of this agreement it is reported to that committee, and in every case that they have investigated they have found that the omission to live up to the agreement arose through the negligence of tellers. It has made a difference of several thousand dollars a year to the large banks.

W. S. WOODS, Kansas City, Mo.: Kansas City has had an experience somewhat like Atlanta. One way to cure this evil is, if a man deposits a check with you for \$100 which will only net you \$99.75, and if he wants credit for cash, reduce it to cash and give him credit for that amount. If he wants it on collection account, credit it that way. We adopted this plan some three years ago, and entered into a compact, and the bank that breaks the compact is under a penalty of \$1,000.

THE PRESIDENT: We will return to Question X.: "The Partial Payment of Checks."

FRED HEINZ, Davenport, Iowa: The syllabus says, "Should a bank make a partial payment of a check when not in funds to pay in full? Has the bank the right to disclose the depositor's balance to the check holder to enable the latter to deposit funds sufficient to make the check good? What should a bank do when there are simultaneous checks coming through the clearing-house aggregating more than the depositor's balance, the balance being sufficient for part of the checks?"

I think the true way would be not to pay either of them. Hold on to the funds. That is the first principle of good banking. Then I would invite the gentlemen to a conference and I would get them to agree about the division of funds. If not, I would get my lawyer to file a bill in court and let them fight for it.

The question of legislation to prevent check kiting was, on motion of T. P. Day, of Pittsburg, referred to the executive council.

"What is the Best Method to Safeguard Bankers' Drafts from Forgery and Alterations," was also similarly referred.

Frank W. Tracy, of Springfield, Ill., extended an invitation to all the delegates, guests and the ladies to visit the tomb of Lincoln, at Springfield.

Adjourned to Thursday, September 24.

### THIRD DAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

The convention came to order and was opened with prayer by Reverend Dr. Samuel J. Nicholls.

The President announced that the chairman of the executive council would submit to the convention a proposed amendment to the by-laws.

**CHAIRMAN HENDRIX:** I am instructed by the executive council to submit to the convention for its consideration the following proposed amendment to the by-laws:

*Resolved,* That the by-laws of this association be amended by the addition of the following: A section of the association, to be known as the Section of Trust Companies, is hereby established, which shall meet annually in connection with the meeting of this association. The scope of the section shall embrace matters of interest to trust companies in so far as such matters are distinct from banking. It may report to the association, and all affairs relating to trust companies may be referred to it. Its programme and proceedings may be published from time to time, together with the programme and proceedings of the association. All trust companies, members of this association, who desire, may enroll themselves as members of the section. The section may adopt such by-laws as it may see fit, not in conflict with the constitution and by-laws of this association. The executive council of this association shall have supervision over the section, and may make such provision for it as to said council may seem wise.

The resolution was adopted.

Mr. Rhawn, of Philadelphia, presented the following resolution, which was referred to the executive council:

*Whereas,* The American Bankers' Association, at its first convention in 1875, "resolved, that in the opinion of this convention it should be the effort of every good citizen to hasten the day when every promise of our Government to pay a dollar shall be honestly redeemed in coin," and at its convention of 1877, "resolved that it is essential to the highest welfare of the American people that their trade and commerce at home and abroad should all be conducted upon the standard of value which the most advanced commercial nations in the world have adopted."

The association has at all of its twenty-two annual conventions, including the present one, consistently and persistently advocated and declared the principles of sound money, and endeavored to educate the people of the country in them; and,

*Whereas,* There never was a time in the history of our nation when its citizens were more in need of education and information upon the principles of sound money to guide them to a right decision of the question of free silver coinage now before them, than at present; therefore be it

*Resolved,* That this association earnestly urges upon its members and upon bankers everywhere throughout the land the free dissemination by them of the best sound money pamphlets exhibiting the fallacy of free silver coinage, and the necessity for the gold standard.

*Resolved,* That the executive council inquire into the merits of the two pamphlets, entitled "Wages, Fixed Income and the Free Coinage of Silver" and "Greenbacks, the Silver Trouble and Its Causes," written by members of this association, with the view to their recommendation for immediate distribution among the people by members if deemed advisable.

Bradford Rhodes, of New York, presented the following resolution:

*Resolved,* That it is the sense of this convention that hereafter in the election of president and first vice-president, the following rule be observed, viz., that the roll of States be called and the chairman of each State delegation, if he so desires, be allowed to place in nomination candidates for those offices.

Mr. Griffith, of Cincinnati, thought the plan a good one.

Mr. Farson, of Chicago, seconded the adoption of the resolution.

The chair ruled that the resolution would have to go to the executive council.

Mr. Russel, of Detroit, Mich., invited the association to meet next year in Detroit.

Mr. Conway, of Vicksburg, Miss., suggested the desirability of holding the convention in the future a little earlier in the year.

M. M. White, from the committee on nominations, reported for president, Robert J. Lowry, of Atlanta, Ga. Capt. Lowry was elected by acclamation.

For first vice-president, Joseph C. Hendrix, of New York, and Frank W. Tracy, of Springfield, Ill., were proposed.

MR. RIDGELY, of Springfield, Ill.: Frank W. Tracy is one of the charter members of this association. He is President of one of the largest National banks in the State outside of Chicago. He is a hustler. I have known him for a quarter of a century, and we want him for the first vice-president of this association for the next twelve months. I have no objection to my friend Hendrix from New York, but I think he ought to be continued as chairman of the executive council where he has done so much good during the past year.

J. R. Mulvane, of Topeka, Kans., and Fred Heinz, of Davenport, Iowa, seconded the nomination of Mr. Tracy.

J. P. HUSTON, Marshall, Mo.: On behalf of the bankers of Missouri, who claim a personal interest in Mr. Hendrix, he being a former Missourian, I beg to second his nomination. I sat in the Baltimore convention as a delegate, on the occasion when the name of that gentleman was presented for president, and a determined effort was made on the part of some delegate to turn down the nomination presented by the nominating committee and to put in another man who was comparatively new in the work of the association. On that occasion I was very glad to be one of the few Western men there to help sustain the report of the nominating committee. Now, sir, we think a good deal of Mr. Tracy. He comes from a sister State, and we recognize in him a gentleman whose name is a tower of strength in the West; but on the other hand, we yield nothing, when honors are spoken of, to the name of Joseph C. Hendrix. Mr. Hendrix was born in this State. His father was the head of the old Hendrix Bank in Fayette, and the successor of that bank is an honored institution in this State. There is no man in this convention who has done more for the cause of good banking and honest money than Joseph C. Hendrix of Brooklyn and New York. He has filled the position of chairman of the executive council during the past year with exceptional ability and the result is that this has been the most prosperous year in the history of the association. I come from a State in which very few of the bankers have taken much interest in the proceedings of this association, partly because in former years the association was composed very largely of bankers from metropolitan centers alone, who met and discussed questions which were peculiarly their own; and the association only began to take on a national character with the development of the State associations, and by the infusion of some new blood into it. I most heartily second Mr. Hendrix's nomination.

Bradford Rhodes, of New York, and C. A. Pugsley, Peekskill, N. Y., also seconded the nomination of Mr. Hendrix.

The vote resulted in 115 for Mr. Hendrix and 78 for Mr. Tracy.

On motion of Mr. Ridgely the election of Mr. Hendrix was made unanimous.

M. M. WHITE: Mr. Pullen declined to serve longer on the executive council.

[A complete list of the new council and other executive officers of this association will be found at the end of this report.]

JOHN B. RAMSAY, of Baltimore, Md.: Mr. President and gentlemen of the association, I desire to offer the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That this convention hereby place on record its admiration of the pure life and character of Enoch Pratt, the splendid philanthropist, and late President of the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, of Baltimore, Md., who died at the advanced age of eighty-eight years only a few days ago, and laying down his armor as a tired soldier, his race well run, his work well done, the victory won, entered into rest.

The resolution was adopted by a rising vote.

Jos. C. Hendrix moved that the executive council be directed to prepare a suitable minute and print it with the records of the association in respect to the death of the late George S. Coe, of New York. The motion was seconded and carried.

WILLIAM H. RHAWN, of Philadelphia: It has been the custom of this association to present to its retiring presidents some little souvenir that they may take with them to their homes as a testimonial of the appreciation of this association for their services. The memento which has been selected on this occasion to be presented to the retiring president is emblematical of the declaration that this convention made on the first day of our assembling in this city. It is of gold, the standard money of the nation, as you see (exhibiting). It is inscribed "American Bankers' Association to Eugene Pullen, President, 1895-6, St. Louis, Mo." On the reverse side is the monogram of the association "A. B. A." And now, Mr. President, it is with unfeigned pleasure that I present to you this testimonial on behalf of the American Bankers' Association, and I trust that you may be able to hand it down to future generations as a mark of the appreciation and esteem in which you were held by this body.

THE PRESIDENT: I assure you, Mr. Rhawn, and gentlemen of the association, that I appreciate this gift very much. I shall always carefully treasure it; but after my wife and I shall have passed away some other generation and some other people will have to take it.

It now becomes my pleasant duty to install the officers elect. It is hardly necessary to introduce Robert J. Lowry, of Atlanta. I have known him from boyhood. I am delighted to be the one to introduce him to you as the President of this association.

#### ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT-ELECT ROBERT J. LOWRY.

Gentlemen of the American Bankers' Association—The honor you have conferred by electing me to the position of president of your association for the ensuing year is highly appreciated, and, I assure you, gentlemen, that when I recall the names of those able and eminent financiers who have filled the position during the twenty-one years of the existence of the association, my appreciation of your kind partiality in selecting me as their successor is equaled only by my desire to prove worthy of your confidence.

Fortunately, I shall have for my guidance in performing the duties of the office the examples and precepts of those who have gone before, examples and precepts which, if followed, and applied to present conditions, will, I am certain, crown my efforts as your presiding officer with success, and redound to the good of our association.

Gentlemen, just here let me ask of each member of the association your hearty support and generous sympathy; let us discard all bickerings; let us sink all personal feeling, and even cherished opinions if necessary, in the one great object, the good of the whole, knowing that in the prosperity of the association is embraced that of each individual member.

Without your hearty support my individual efforts, be they ever so devoted, must fail, and failure to uphold the high standing now enjoyed by the association will not only reflect on your presiding officer, but involve each and every member of our body.

I again assure you that as your president during the ensuing year (which none can doubt will be one of most serious financial and commercial import to both our common interest and country) I shall endeavor to perform the duties of the high and honorable position to which your partiality has assigned me, so as to at least hope for the commendation at the expiration of my term of office of "Well done, good and faithful servant."

My ambition will be fully satisfied if I can but follow in the footsteps of our retiring president, whose financial wisdom, gained through the experience of a lifetime of active business relations, has added so much to the efficiency of our association, one whom we delight to honor, and I feel that I but voice the unexpressed though heartfelt wish of every member of our body when I say, may he be long spared to encourage us by his example and enlighten us with his wisdom.

The reports presented by the retiring administration of the association show that the work done by the detective department of your association deserves your hearty commendation, and also that the increase of membership during the past year has been greater than that of any previous year in the life of the association. Though this increase in membership is encouraging there is yet room for many more of the thousands of banks and bankers in the United States, who are not yet members of our organization, who should know the advantages of membership. There are none so dull who cannot appreciate the truths that "in union there is strength," in organization there is power.

Gentlemen, in conclusion let me say that the members of our association are patriotic citizens, who take pride in everything which tends to add to the prosperity and greatness of the republic, and who appreciate the fact that the producing, industrial and commercial interests of the whole country are so Siamesed together that the life of each is dependent upon the other, and we know that partial prosperity paralyzes, while general prosperity invigorates.

I again thank you, gentlemen, for the honor you have seen fit to confer upon me, and assure you that it is appreciated.

**THE PRESIDENT:** It is not necessary for me to mention the name of Joseph C. Hendrix. Some one claimed here that he was a Missourian, but I can assure you that he belongs to New York State, and that he lives in the same town I do, Brooklyn. He represented our district in Congress, where he distinguished himself on behalf of sound money. He has always been a success. He was postmaster of Brooklyn; then he was President of the Kings County Trust Company, and he is now President of the National Union Bank in New York. I am proud, Mr. Hendrix, to assure you that as a member of this association and as a citizen of your own town, I can welcome you to this position.

**FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT HENDRIX:** Gentlemen, this is indeed a grateful moment. The honor you have conferred touches me more especially because of our gathering here in my native State. I have taken a great interest in this association and its work. These annual conventions are something more than a love feast or an excursion. It is the only organization in the country where we can corral the influences which properly pertain to dignify our noble calling. The legislation of our country is an open page which shows how little the pen of the banker has been used to write the statutes. In the future we hope to make a change in this respect. I hope to see this association a center of great influence. I will not detain you by any further remarks, simply expressing my sincere thanks for the honor conferred upon me.

On motion of M. M. White, of Cincinnati, the thanks of the association were tendered to the citizens of St. Louis, and to the bankers of the city, and to the newspaper press, for the cordial hospitality extended to the convention.

The convention then adjourned *sine die*.

#### OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION AND MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

##### PRESIDENT.

ROBERT J. LOWRY, President Lowry Banking Company, Atlanta, Ga.

##### FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT.

JOSEPH C. HENDRIX, President National Union Bank, New York.

##### CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

ALVAH TROWBRIDGE, Cashier National Bank of North America, New York.

##### TREASURER.

WILLIAM H. PORTER, Vice-President Chase National Bank, New York.

##### SECRETARY.

JAMES R. BRANCH, 2 Wall street, New York.

##### EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

##### MEMBERS EX-OFFICIO.

ROBERT J. LOWRY, President Lowry Banking Company, Atlanta, Ga.

JOSEPH C. HENDRIX, President National Union Bank, New York.

##### MEMBERS FOR ONE YEAR.

MYRON T. HERRICK, President Society for Savings, Cleveland, Ohio.

G. P. GRIFFITH, Vice-President and Cashier Citizens' National Bank, Cincinnati, Ohio.

THOMAS P. BEAL, President Second National Bank, Boston, Mass.

HENRY W. YATES, President Nebraska National Bank, Omaha, Neb.

H. W. WHEELER, President Commercial National Bank, Seattle, Wash.

J. EDWARD SIMMONS, President Fourth National Bank, New York.

DOUGLAS H. THOMAS, President Merchants' National Bank, Baltimore, Md.

JOHN N. SIMPSON, President National Exchange Bank, Dallas, Texas.

JESSE B. WILSON, President Lincoln National Bank, Washington, D. C.

WM. C. CORNWELL, President City Bank, Buffalo, N. Y.

## MEMBERS FOR TWO YEARS.

JNO. J. P. ODELL, President Union National Bank, Chicago, Ill.	HARVEY J. HOLLISTER, Cashier Old National Bank, Grand Rapids, Mich.
JAMES H. WILLOCK, President Second National Bank, Pittsburg, Pa.	FRANK W. TRACY, President First National Bank, Springfield, Ill.
JAMES T. HAYDEN, President Whitney National Bank, New Orleans, La.	GEORGE H. RUSSEL, President State Savings Bank, Detroit, Mich.
CALDWELL HARDY, Cashier Norfolk National Bank, Norfolk, Va.	THOMAS S. RIDGWAY, President First National Bank, Shawneetown, Ill.
BENNET V. LEIGH, Cashier Clinton National Bank, Clinton, N. J.	WALKER HILL, President American Exchange Bank, St. Louis, Mo.

## MEMBERS FOR THREE YEARS.

JOHN C. NEELY, Cashier Merchants' National Bank, Chicago, Ill.	T. J. LATHAM, Cashier Memphis National Bank, Memphis, Tenn.
R. H. RUSHTON, Cashier and Vice-President Fourth Street National Bank, Philadelphia.	W. J. COCKER, President Commercial Savings Bank, Adrian, Mich.
WM. H. THOMSON, Cashier Boatmen's Bank, St. Louis, Mo.	GEORGE M. REYNOLDS, President Des Moines National Bank, Des Moines, Iowa.
ALVAH TROWBRIDGE, Cashier National Bank of North America, New York.	C. A. PUGBLEY, Cashier Westchester County National Bank, Peekskill, N. Y.
A. C. ANDERSON, Cashier St. Paul National Bank, St. Paul, Minn.	JOHN H. LEATHERS, Cashier Louisville Banking Company, Louisville, Ky.

## VICE-PRESIDENTS.

ALABAMA—J. B. Cobbs, President Berney National Bank, Birmingham.  
 ARIZONA—M. B. Hazeltine, Assistant Cashier Bank of Arizona, Prescott.  
 ARKANSAS—Jno. G. Fletcher, President German National Bank, Little Rock.  
 CALIFORNIA—S. Prentiss Smith, Assistant Cashier Bank of California, San Francisco.  
 COLORADO—D. H. Moffat, President First National Bank, Denver.  
 CONNECTICUT—B. G. Bryan, Cashier Fourth National Bank, Waterbury.  
 DELAWARE—Jas. P. Winchester, President First National Bank, Wilmington.  
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—Chas. C. Glover, President Riggs National Bank, Washington.  
 FLORIDA—H. T. Bays, Cashier Merchants' National Bank, Jacksonville.  
 GEORGIA—C. C. Sanders, President State Banking Company, Gainesville.  
 IDAHO—C. W. Moore, President First National Bank, Boise City.  
 ILLINOIS—W. A. Hammond, Vice-President National Bank of Illinois, Chicago.  
 INDIANA—C. T. Lindsey, Cashier Citizens' National Bank, South Bend.  
 INDIAN TERRITORY—Don Lacy, Cashier City National Bank, Ardmore.  
 IOWA—Fred Heinz, President Farmers and Mechanics' Savings Bank, Davenport.  
 KANSAS—P. I. Bonebrake, President Central National Bank, Topeka.  
 KENTUCKY—Frank P. Helm, President First National Bank, Covington.  
 LOUISIANA—Wm. Garig, President First National Bank, Baton Rouge.  
 MAINE—Edward Stetson, President First National Bank, Bangor.  
 MARYLAND—Lawrence B. Kemp, President Commercial and Farmers' Nat. Bank, Baltimore.  
 MASSACHUSETTS—Jas. P. Stearns, Vice-President Shawmut National Bank, Boston.  
 MICHIGAN—Peter White, President First National Bank, Marquette.  
 MINNESOTA—R. S. Davis, Cashier Lumbermen's National Bank, Stillwater.  
 MISSISSIPPI—A. G. Campbell, President First Natchez Bank, Natchez.  
 MISSOURI—Breckinridge Jones, Vice-President Mississippi Valley Trust Company, St. Louis.  
 MONTANA—L. H. Hershfield, President Merchants' National Bank, Helena.  
 NEBRASKA—F. H. Davis, Cashier First National Bank, Omaha.  
 NEW HAMPSHIRE—Geo. S. Bond, President Connecticut River National Bank, Charlestown.  
 NEW JERSEY—Nathan Haines, Cashier Mechanics' National Bank, Burlington.  
 NEW MEXICO—J. S. Raynolds, President First National Bank, Albuquerque.  
 NEW YORK—Jas. H. Tripp, President First National Bank, Marathon.  
 NORTH CAROLINA—J. E. Rankin, Cashier Battery Park Bank, Asheville.  
 NORTH DAKOTA—C. B. Little, President First National Bank, Bismarck.  
 OHIO—P. W. Huntington, President Hayden National Bank, Columbus.  
 OKLAHOMA—J. A. Stine, President Exchange Bank, Alva.  
 OREGON—Jno. A. Devlin, President First National Bank, Astoria.  
 PENNSYLVANIA—Robt. Wardrop, Cashier Tradesmen's National Bank, Pittsburg.  
 RHODE ISLAND—C. H. Merriman, President National Bank of North America, Providence.  
 SOUTH CAROLINA—E. H. Pringle, President Bank of Charleston National Banking Association, Charleston.  
 SOUTH DAKOTA—Jno. Clay, Jr., President Butte County Bank, Belle Fourche.  
 TENNESSEE—Jno. W. Faxon, Assistant Cashier First National Bank, Chattanooga.  
 TEXAS—C. C. Hemming, President Gainesville National Bank, Gainesville.  
 UTAH—H. S. Young, Cashier Deseret National Bank, Salt Lake City.  
 VERMONT—C. W. Woodhouse, President Merchants' National Bank, Burlington.  
 VIRGINIA—Jno. P. Branch, President Merchants' National Bank, Richmond.  
 WASHINGTON—Jacob Furth, President Puget's Sound National Bank, Seattle.  
 WEST VIRGINIA—J. E. Sands, Cashier First National Bank, Fairmont.  
 WISCONSIN—A. J. Frame, President Waukesha National Bank, Waukesha.  
 WYOMING—Henry G. Hay, President Stock Growers' National Bank, Cheyenne.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

### THE BANK OF ENGLAND DISCOUNT RATE.

The change in the official rate of discount at the Bank of England, on September 10, from two to two and-a-half per cent., is the first change made since February 23, 1864. This long interval of uniform discount is without parallel in the history of the bank since the means of controlling the flow of bullion by the discount rate was first adopted about thirty years ago. The large accumulation of gold coin and bullion, as the result of the opening of the new mines in South Africa and the expulsion of gold from the United States by the silver agitation, has had something to do with the uniformity of the discount rate. The changes from 1845 to 1891, when the bullion was lower, were 354, which was more than twice as many as in any other country during the same period. The bank has not found it necessary during the past three years to protect the bullion by increasing the discount rate. Even at the present time, it appears to be as much the banking reserve as the bullion held against notes which demands protection. The gold coin and bullion in the issue department of the bank on September 23 was £29,815,050 (\$195,000,000). This is far above the average reserve four or five years ago, but is several million pounds less than the reserve has recently been. The discount rate was again advanced, on September 24, from 2¼ to 3 per cent.

This change in the official rate of the Bank of England, after so long an interval of uniformity, is likely to renew the discussion whether changes in the discount rate are the most efficient means of maintaining business security. There is little question that such changes arrest the export of gold, and their success in this respect has given the system high credit among bankers and political economists. The question has begun to be raised of late, however, whether business would not be conducted to greater advantage without frequent changes in the discount rate and whether the gold reserve could not be protected by the purchase of gold at the expense of the bank. The Bank of France kept its discount rate nearly uniform at four per cent. all through the acute crisis of 1866 in England, but was obliged to purchase gold in 1864 to the amount of 221,000,000 francs. This was less than a fifth of the purchases made in 1855, 1856 and 1857, when the French discount rate was two per cent. below the London rate and 14,000,000 francs was expended in premiums on 1,274,508,519 francs (\$250,000,000) in gold. The French system, which includes the charge of a premium for gold for export, has been severely attacked by French economists and is hardly defended by any of them in its entirety. The recent experience of the American banks, however, in importing gold in order to avoid the contraction of the currency, gives renewed interest to the question whether the policy of raising the discount rate has not been carried to extremes in London and could not well be combined, with advantage to business, with the occasional purchase of gold.

### THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Negotiations for the renewal of the charter of the Bank of Austria-Hungary have lately been active between the representatives of the bank and of the two cabinets. The charter of the bank expires on December 31, 1897, and there is little doubt of its renewal. The question is somewhat complicated by political considerations, growing out of the desire of Hungary to establish her financial and political independence of Austria, but the Hungarian capitalists are not disposed to favor a new independent bank, because it would tend to deprive them of the use of Austrian capital and raise the rates for money. The proposition for the continuance of the bank which has been made by the two governments involves separate boards of directors at Vienna and Buda-Pesth with wider powers than belong to the existing boards. The bank desires to increase its capital from 90,000,000 florins (\$44,000,000) to 105,000,000 florins (\$52,000,000). The two governments have thus far been rather averse to this increase, but have been willing to postpone the division of the profits between themselves and the bank until four and a half per cent. should have been paid to the shareholders, instead of making the division after the dividend of four per cent. had been paid. The bank proposed to give the State half the profits between four and six per cent. and one-third of the profits in excess of six per cent. The Government has demanded that the public debt to the bank, which was originally 80,000,000 florins, be reduced by about 13,000,000 florins (\$8,000,000). The bank is willing to concede this if the Government will agree to reimburse the holders of shares of the nominal value of 600 florins to the amount of 800 florins in case of the expiration of the bank privilege. The Government have intimated that they would make the reimbursement at the



rate of 760 florins, which brings the parties pretty close together upon this point. The bank has asked on its side that it be made the depository of public funds and that the administrative council have authority to fix the discount rate at its discretion. The shareholders of the bank took the propositions of the Government under consideration late in August and they will probably be adopted with some concessions on both sides.

#### THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.

The question is causing some discussion in Paris, whether the renewal of the charter of the Bank of France will justify a bull movement in the shares or will detract from their value. The "*Moniteur des Interests Matériels*," in discussing the subject, says:

"Those who are regarded as well informed convey the impression that the project for the renewal of the privilege prepared by M. Cochery differs little, in its outlines, from that which was presented by M. Burdeau in 1891. Let us consider the principal conditions of that project. The bank was to abandon to the state the value of six and a half millions of notes issued before 1864 and considered as lost; to carry from 140,000,000 to 180,000,000 francs the limit of advances to the Treasury; and also to pay an annual return of 1,700,000 francs from 1891 to the end of 1897 and of 2,500,000 francs from 1898 to the end of 1920. Ignoring the other concessions to deal only with the last, what does it represent? A reduction of dividend of nearly 13.70 francs per year for each of the 132,500 shares constituting the corporate capital. In 1898 the bank distributed 103 francs net. Under the new regime, other things being equal, the dividend would be only 90 francs, and at present prices the shares would be capitalized at about two and a half per cent. This is not any too brilliant, especially when one considers that the competition of the other great discount establishments is constantly increasing."

#### THE BANK OF SCOTLAND IN LONDON.

The Bank of Scotland, the oldest institution of its kind in Great Britain except the Bank of England, has recently occupied a handsome new building, built exclusively for its London branch. It is one of the indications of the great economic development of the present generation that a branch office, which was not established in London until 1868, now requires a large building and a complete equipment of officers. The London banks felt the competition of their northern neighbors so keenly only twenty years ago that a determined effort was made to shut the Scotch banks out of London. The plan nearly succeeded when the limited liability law was modified in 1879. The Scotch banks have gone on developing their business, however, and have easily made a place beside their English competitors. The Bank of Scotland has been specially successful under the continuous management since 1873 of Mr. Robert Davidson, and has twice within that time moved to larger quarters. The new building is in Bishopsgate Street, on the extreme east of the circuit of financial houses, but there has been a tendency of late years in that direction, which will probably be encouraged by the action of the Bank of Scotland.

#### A SPANISH BANK IN LONDON.

Spanish merchants and exporters are agitating with a good deal of earnestness the establishment of a bank in London, which shall not only do a strictly banking business but act to some extent as a commission house for the sale of Spanish goods. A Spanish journal quoted in the British Board of Trade Journal for August, says upon the latter point:

"Anyone who has observed the way in which Spanish produce is turned into money in London knows that the persons commissioned to carry on sales, whether brokers, agents, or bankers, either merely dispose of the merchandise under the hammer or, as it frequently happens, form themselves into rings or syndicates for the purpose of acquiring the goods at 50 per cent. of their value. It is evident that a house of business, genuinely Spanish, would very quickly put an end to the ruinous abuses referred to, viz., by forming a special section for the placing of products received on commission; by effecting sales in a very different way from that in which they are now arranged, and by providing accommodation for warehousing the exhibitions of samples, and for sales."

#### GOLD RESUMPTION IN AUSTRIA.

The fact that the premium on gold has finally disappeared in Austria is of capital importance to that country, if this condition can be permanently maintained. The Austro-Hungarian Bank has already gained more than \$2,500,000 in gold within two weeks and holds \$30,000,000 more than a year ago. The bank has now accomplished the work for which it was created, under the form of the National Bank of Austria, in 1817. The country was then wallowing in the mire of depreciated government paper and the bank was established for the purpose of issuing a scientific banking currency and withdrawing the government notes. The restoration of specie payments was almost accomplished in 1847, when the uprising in Hungary, followed by the Crimean war and afterwards the wars with Italy and France, again projected

far into the future the day of resumption. The gold standard was established in Austria-Hungary, with a complete new system of coinage, on August 11, 1892. Gold was imported largely into the Empire and resumption again seemed on the eve of accomplishment when the crisis of 1893 in Germany, the United States, and other countries created an unfavorable rate of exchange and prevented the restoration of parity between gold and paper at the rate fixed by law. The premium on gold has been gradually growing less during the present year and early in August entirely disappeared. The small volume of Government paper money outstanding and the notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank have remained steady while other paper has fluctuated during the past few weeks. The gold reserve of the bank on August 23, was \$120,000,000, while the stock of silver has been reduced to less than one-half this amount. The outstanding circulation was about \$240,000,000, indicating a gold reserve of 50 per cent. and a combined coin reserve of 72 per cent. against circulation.

#### THE BANKING SITUATION IN ITALY.

The banking laws of Italy have been modified about half a dozen times in the past three years, but Signor Luzzati, the Minister of Finance, has given notice that he is preparing a new project regarding the circulation. The securities upon which the bank note circulation of Italy rests were found in 1893 to consist in large proportion of bad debts or property which could not be quickly converted into cash. The bank paper has since been continuously below par in gold and so far below par that even the subsidiary silver coins have been driven out of circulation. There has been some improvement in the rate of exchange of late and the scheme of Signor Luzzati seems to look toward a reduction of the paper circulation. It is feared, however, that too great a reduction may cause acute contraction of the supply of monetary signs. Some of the banks do not seem to have been taught wisdom by the experience of 1893 nor to have been restrained by the laws then enacted. The Bank of Naples, one of the three institutions which survived the exposures of 1893, exceeded the legal limit of its circulation during June by 9,472,000 lire (\$1,800,000). The bank has made amends to the Treasury, but the discussion aroused on the subject has caused a degree of injury to its credit which has extended to its land mortgage bonds.

#### THE NEW BANKING LAW IN SWITZERLAND.

The proposed Bank of State in Switzerland has received a severe blow by the action of the Swiss Union of Commerce and Industry. The union is in favor of a central bank, for the declared purpose of regulating the money market and facilitating exchanges, but it is strongly opposed to government ownership and control. The proposition to create the State bank passed the National Council early in the summer by a vote of 39 to 43 and the Council of the States by a vote of 27 to 17. The Union of Commerce and Industry, however, met at Zurich on August 15 and voted 20 against 2, after three hours of discussion, against the proposition of the Government. The resolutions adopted declare that the union regards it as its duty, in the public interest, to renew its express opposition to this legislative plan and to act accordingly. The resolutions declare, however, that in case the law is rejected by the people, the Government should take the necessary steps immediately thereafter to submit new propositions to the federal authorities for the proper settlement of the question.

C. A. C.

#### Gold, Silver and Paper.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DULUTH, Minn., Sept. 30, 1896

SIR:—Will you please give me the exact relative value of our gold, silver and paper currency one year before and after the so-called "crime of 1873." A. R. M.

*Answer.*—The relative values of gold, silver and paper currency for the above period were as follows:

GOLD.		
	Highest.	Lowest.
1872.....	115½	106½
1873.....	119½	106½
1874.....	114½	100
PAPER.		
1872.....	91½	84½
1873.....	93½	80½
1874.....	91	85½

SILVER. (Bullion value of 371.25 grains).

1872, \$1.022; 1873, \$1.004; 1874, \$0.968.

The value of gold as above given is in comparison with the paper currency, which was then depreciated, the premium on gold being the measure of the depreciation.

SAVINGS BANKS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.—Statement of their condition by counties July 1, 1896, and, for comparison, the totals for January 1, 1896. Compiled from the official reports.

County.	No. of Banks.	Total Resources.	Due Depositors.	Other Liabilities.	Surplus.	Open Accounts.	Ag'ts opened during year ending June 30, 1896.	Accounts closed during year ending June 30, 1896.	Deposits during year ending June 30, 1896, not including interest.	Amount withdrawn during year ending June 30, 1896.	Amount of interest credited and paid for year ending June 30, 1896.	Salaries and expenses for year ending June 30, 1896.
Albany.....	6	\$44,512,730	\$40,181,446	\$65,630	\$4,285,353	68,633	14,115	10,670	\$11,631,961	\$10,365,996	\$1,468,932	\$108,326
Broome.....	1	2,460,284	2,230,261	9,330	277,192	13,037	4,465	1,234	1,358,368	1,378,765	57,576	23,084
Cayuga.....	1	3,476,753	3,447,663	.....	457,661	13,561	2,627	1,668	1,676,851	1,579,328	110,444	20,961
Chemung.....	1	2,520,148	2,514,141	.....	224	718	1,047	61	10,872	14,966	362	2,153
Columbia.....	1	1,230,741	1,217,622	.....	308,026	5,765	1,047	1,014	440,816	504,173	74,059	9,364
Cortland.....	1	1,230,741	1,217,622	.....	183,109	28,370	3,344	1,183	177,290	630,184	38,181	5,849
Dutchess.....	1	11,230,927	10,150,639	14,076	1,056,212	28,343	3,277	2,636	2,324,728	2,222,914	88,478	31,431
Erie.....	4	30,384,262	34,274,287	.....	6,123,600	86,666	20,378	14,724	14,162,035	13,406,734	1,262,024	161,838
Fulton.....	1	98,764	62,472	462	3,886	794	223	86	82,234	40,864	2,277	465
Greene.....	1	1,267,631	1,062,475	.....	175,149	3,446	710	434	935,666	279,025	34,233	4,219
Jefferson.....	1	2,749,254	2,488,198	.....	265,066	12,420	9,341	1,649	1,014,262	867,060	83,910	14,228
Kings.....	15	131,830,449	115,584,825	36,317	16,225,206	29,576	62,065	42,274	84,241,146	81,367,362	8,968,163	371,729
Madison.....	1	980,031	872,575	2,248	105,206	62,685	14,944	736	942,323	337,456	28,548	4,007
Monroe.....	1	33,008,119	29,478,838	130,376	3,539,693	62,685	14,238	11,385	10,672,034	10,078,115	1,000,162	122,746
Montgomery.....	1	981,607	835,949	.....	35,747	5,092	1,762	824	865,465	877,162	23,021	2,596
New York.....	25	441,975,394	382,622,547	5,390	49,347,496	898,362	179,672	139,076	108,225,610	95,670,278	13,046,430	1,163,240
Niagara.....	2	1,543,474	1,411,913	290	131,271	5,284	1,571	1,207	1,438,622	1,048,163	49,889	7,668
Onondaga.....	3	9,520,915	7,993,104	23,160	1,526,449	28,240	1,972	4,465	2,318,969	256,972	256,972	30,641
Orangetown.....	3	22,310,451	19,977,571	2,988,238	52,309	52,309	11,874	2,896	6,886,701	7,668,765	723,669	88,779
Oswego.....	8	10,383,948	8,983,977	64,551	1,399,077	29,434	5,560	2,896	2,697,073	2,064,351	822,974	30,166
Oswego.....	8	2,995,646	2,744,650	222	1,260,772	9,411	2,633	2,896	1,941,694	1,654,169	98,863	16,312
Putnam.....	1	312,224	280,134	.....	32,090	1,230	993	171	1,308,631	1,267,068	8,237	1,866
Queens.....	9	3,990,378	3,402,584	.....	457,794	15,435	8,743	3,035	1,360,495	1,260,495	116,969	20,519
Rensselaer.....	2	7,668,101	6,421,796	53,808	1,193,505	17,108	9,290	2,941	1,463,671	210,888	31,586	31,586
Richmond.....	2	1,325,356	1,187,347	.....	138,004	5,497	1,211	665	675,636	683,474	36,978	12,666
Schenectady.....	1	1,981,661	1,808,804	1,706	122,856	7,010	1,631	1,246	1,717,636	683,474	57,918	6,666
Seneca.....	1	205,243	198,122	.....	10,121	1,315	988	493	117,800	68,114	6,267	1,802
Suffolk.....	3	5,171,388	4,547,483	.....	623,515	11,425	1,171	693	608,635	1,011,239	170,723	13,728
Tompkins.....	1	1,381,791	1,140,481	.....	239,310	5,597	1,660	1,816	600,644	1,023,063	91,610	9,908
Ulster.....	6	7,068,250	6,442,872	70	614,777	19,181	8,298	2,660	1,848,667	1,764,967	315,604	21,268
Westchester.....	10	12,395,035	11,340,750	.....	1,054,284	37,888	7,807	5,036	2,400,630	2,633,063	866,906	66,012
Totals, July 1, 1896.....	127	\$304,751,426	\$274,082,989	\$411,157	\$91,807,370	1,732,882	344,141	293,189	\$274,460,659	\$194,633,393	\$24,988,777	\$2,897,063
Totals, January 1, 1896.....	126	\$783,078,680	\$691,764,508	\$358,765	\$90,665,321	1,603,797	368,129	292,316	\$167,628,190	\$24,298,416	\$24,561,386	\$2,561,386
Increase.....	1	\$23,672,846	\$23,298,996	\$62,408	\$952,049	28,595	8,018	5,673	\$4,283,440	\$7,324,143	\$730,311	\$54,361

## NEW YORK TRUST COMPANIES—Condensed statement of condition July 1, 1890.

NAMES.	Total resources.	Capital stock paid in, in cash.	Surplus and undivided profits.	Interest, commissions and profits received during year.	Interest paid and credited to depositors during the year.	Expenses for year.	Dividends on capital declared for year.	Deposits made by order of court for year.	Total deposits on which interest is allowed at this date.	Amount of bonds and mortgages purchased.
Atlantic Trust Co., New York.....	\$6,308,282	\$1,000,000	\$944,080	\$280,655	\$107,873	\$47,321	\$80,000	\$578	\$4,340,876	\$46,000
Binghamton Trust Co., Binghamton.....	2,194,534	400,000	73,150	108,132	43,782	21,643	100,000	84,918	1,498,681	62,135
Brooklyn Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	12,125,587	1,000,000	1,410,960	590,898	237,305	83,619	160,000	2,748	9,470,730	70,981
Buffalo Loan, Tr. and Safe Dep. Co., Buffalo	1,670,560	200,000	54,000	78,574	46,923	25,400	12,000	101,747	1,248,265	400,978
Central Trust Co., New York.....	30,800,257	1,000,000	6,342,905	1,950,937	940,580	104,575	500,000	153,250	19,982,805	31,638
Chautauque Co. Trust Co., Jamestown.....	1,421,582	300,000	82,907	84,168	5,301	321	6,000	13,067	30,118	17,703
Columbia Trust Co., Newburgh.....	408,682	100,000	30,118	22,032	5,301	4,263	6,000	116,624	42,53,062	12,860
Continental Trust Co., New York.....	5,573,618	500,000	355,349	199,874	80,584	62,900	30,000	195,624	4,283,062	11,708
Delaware Loan and Trust Co., Walton.....	490,580	100,000	15,177	17,876	8,815	5,665	6,000	113,015	28,805,047	291,305
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., New York.....	35,934,969	1,000,000	4,340,175	1,230,015	575,951	177,375	300,000	68,307	3,198,706	3,000
Fidelity Trust Co., New York.....	4,690,214	500,000	103,227	182,603	105,106	63,188	80,000	251	4,222,469	11,294
Franklin Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	7,113,400	1,000,000	894,235	343,800	181,080	93,742	180,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Guaranty Trust Co., New York.....	14,715,022	2,000,000	2,376,727	1,037,514	259,774	127,529	40,000	101,101	10,100	11,294
Hamilton Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	5,737,581	500,000	474,391	191,085	105,115	98,749	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Holland Trust Co., New York.....	1,182,690	500,000	119,756	4,086	3,475	16,101	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Ithaca Trust Co., Ithaca.....	565,801	100,000	32,017	26,698	11,502	6,622	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Kings County Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	7,044,321	1,000,000	677,382	241,432	88,489	43,609	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Knickbocker Trust Co., New York.....	11,870,250	1,000,000	511,094	425,116	184,540	118,829	60,000	325,772	8,012,367	12,000
Long Island Loan and Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	4,212,402	1,000,000	381,577	181,080	61,847	25,394	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Manhattan Trust Co., New York.....	5,446,062	1,000,000	390,224	384,946	74,724	86,107	40,000	29,684	4,708,703	34,425
Manufacturers' Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	2,780,339	500,000	53,914	34,001	1,991	14,069	280,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
Merchants' Trust Co., New York.....	30,010,528	2,000,000	2,313,913	1,069,649	475,243	138,585	10,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
Metropolitan Trust Co., New York.....	10,763,138	1,000,000	1,069,649	412,485	193,786	68,461	40,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
Nassau Trust Co., of the City of Brooklyn.....	3,600,751	1,000,000	242,927	33,352	32,690	11,367	40,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
N. Y. Life Insurance and Trust Co., N. Y.....	29,682,438	1,000,000	2,672,019	1,357,346	657,044	100,359	40,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
N. Y. Security and Trust Co., N. Y.....	9,647,392	1,000,000	1,278,116	489,077	11,625	78,476	40,000	101,236	2,19,012,47	35,800
Orange Co. Tr. and S. Dep. Co., Middletn.....	903,235	100,000	57,775	11,875	12,385	6,427	80,000	3,504	6,292,056	20,800
People's Trust Co., Brooklyn.....	8,852,560	1,000,000	1,133,270	352,358	132,385	62,490	80,000	110,106	6,292,056	20,800
Real Estate Trust Co., New York.....	5,150,279	500,000	393,250	200,000	101,389	94,060	20,000	54,490	4,678,500	34,550
Rochester Tr. and Safe Dep. Co., Rochester.....	5,423,566	200,000	542,907	297,813	159,348	11,222	12,000	19,333	4,678,500	34,550
Security Trust Co., of Rochester.....	1,907,810	1,000,000	153,408	88,812	34,013	15,204	40,000	29,684	974,807	60,000
The State Trust Co., New York.....	1,373,715	1,000,000	207,386	88,812	34,013	15,204	40,000	29,684	974,807	60,000
Title Guarantee and Trust Co., New York.....	2,357,143	2,000,000	2,077,836	863,492	32,251	560,347	160,000	3,177	8,858,312	70,262
Trust and Dep. Co. of Onondaga, Syracuse.....	2,357,143	100,000	11,388	18,752	62,340	18,353	8,000	6,177	974,070	70,262
Union Trust Co., of Jamestown.....	90,653,937	1,000,000	5,084,131	1,321,477	631,074	87,455	6,000	2,904	30,520,500	40,880
U. S. Trust Co., New York.....	13,067,315	2,000,000	1,110,921	1,321,477	631,074	214,863	100,000	106,900	6,156,142	1,232,387
U. S. Mortgage and Trust Co., New York.....	50,000,010	2,000,000	9,043,384	1,057,470	408,698	101,623	400,000	251,233	37,734,000	1,232,387
United States Trust Co., New York.....	5,150,555	500,000	484,223	172,015	71,531	32,453	30,000	177,180	4,128,614	.....
Totals, July 1, 1890.....	\$90,917,228	\$30,400,000	\$48,063,783	\$16,706,776	\$6,068,479	\$2,715,646	\$3,671,000	\$3,457,871	\$282,646,678	\$3,802,884

Deficit in Profits, \$4,656.71.

# BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS**, **CHANGES IN OFFICERS**, **DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

## NEW YORK CITY.

—If surface indications count for anything, the commercial and financial centre of the country is deeply stirred by the issues of the pending political campaign, involving a proposed change to the single silver standard in place of the use of both gold and silver as full legal tender money which now prevails under our actual bimetallic money system. In the section of the city below Twenty-third street, the display of McKinley and Hobart flags gives the city a holiday aspect. There are about 400 of these banners and less than a dozen for the free silver candidate. The number of sound-money flags is greatest in the dry-goods district, and not in the banking centre. For a city with a normal Democratic majority of upwards of 50,000, the apparent unanimity with which the Republican candidates are being supported is a remarkable demonstration of the soundness of local public opinion, irrespective of party ties, in regard to maintaining a stable standard of value.

—The annual meeting of the New York Clearing-House Association was held Oct. 6, and the following officers and committees were elected:

*President*—J. Edward Simmons, President Fourth National Bank.

*Secretary*—Stuart G. Nelson, Vice-President Seaboard National Bank.

*Clearing-House Committee*—Henry W. Cannon, President Chase National Bank; James T. Woodward, President Hanover National Bank; A. B. Heppburn, President Third National Bank; Frederick D. Tappen, President Gallatin National Bank; Robert M. Gallaway, President Merchants' National Bank.

*Conference Committee*—Dumont Clarke, President American Exchange National Bank; Thomas L. James, President Lincoln National Bank; George M. Hard, President Chatham National Bank; Clinton W. Starkey, President Oriental Bank; Edward E. Poor, President National Park Bank.

*Nominating Committee*—A. S. Frisell, President Fifth Avenue Bank; Richard Kelly, President Fifth National Bank; F. M. Harris, President Nassau Bank; Richard Hamilton, President Bowery Bank; Scott Foster, President People's Bank.

*Committee on Admissions*—William H. Perkins, President Bank of America; A. Trowbridge, Cashier Bank of North America; E. S. Mason, President Bank of New York, N. B. A.; Joseph C. Hendrix, President National Union Bank; H. Rocholl, President German-American Bank.

*Arbitration Committee*—Stephen Baker, President Bank of the Manhattan Company; Charles H. Fancher, President Irving National Bank; Edward C. Schaefer, President Germania Bank; G. G. Brinckerhoff, President National Butchers and Drovers' Bank; H. B. Brundrett, President Pacific Bank.

*Manager*—William Sherer.

*Assistant Manager*—William J. Gilpin.

Mr. Simmons, the new President of the Clearing-House, is one of the best known and most popular bank presidents in the city. He has been at the head of the Fourth National Bank for some years, was President of the New York Stock Exchange and President of the Board of Education and Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce, and has held many other positions of trust.

To the banking community Mr. Simmons' services have been of the first importance. This is particularly exemplified by his work as a member of the Loan Committee of the Clearing-House in the panics of 1890 and 1893, and during the Venezuelan flurry.

Following are extracts from the Manager's annual report for year ending October 1, 1896:

The clearing-house transactions for the year have been as follows:

Exchanges.....	\$29,350,804,893.87
Balances.....	1,843,289,238.66
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$31,194,184,132.53</b>

The average daily transactions;

Exchanges.....	\$80,232,443.24
Balances.....	6,043,571.57
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$102,276,014.81</b>

Total transactions since organization of clearing-house (43 years):

Exchanges.....	\$1,102,864,012,832.18
Balances.....	51,806,942,621.49
Total.....	\$1,154,170,955,653.67

Largest daily transaction on record, February 28, 1881:

Exchanges.....	\$388,555,961.58
Balances.....	7,365,440.20
Total.....	\$395,822,422.37

The debit balances were paid in as follows:

United States gold coin.....	\$20,000.00
United States bearer gold certificates.....	20,000.00
Clearing-House gold certificates.....	870,000.00
United States Treasury notes.....	852,000.00
United States legal-tender certificates.....	1,185,750,000.00
United States legal tenders and change.....	706,177,238.66
Total.....	\$1,843,289,238.66

The association is now composed of 47 National banks and 18 State banks. The United States Assistant Treasurer at New York also makes his exchanges at the clearing-house.

There are 77 banks, trust companies, etc., in the city and vicinity, not members of the association, which make their exchanges through banks that are members, in accordance with the resolution adopted October 14, 1880.

The new President, Mr. J. Edward Simmons, who was warmly greeted by the members as he took his seat, spoke briefly as follows: "I thank you, gentlemen, for the honor you have conferred upon me by unanimously electing me to preside over the deliberations of this body for the ensuing year, and I am exceedingly grateful for the kind and commendatory words you have spoken. Permit me to assure you, gentlemen, that it will be my earnest endeavor to discharge the duties of this important office in a way that will be creditable to myself and satisfactory to you, and if, at the expiration of the year, I shall have approximated the success achieved by my worthy predecessors, I shall feel that my labors have not been in vain."

Frederick D. Tappen, chairman of the building committee, presented the committee's final report, in which the total cost of the building was stated and other particulars given in connection therewith. The report was referred to a special committee for examination and audit. The total cost of the building and site was \$1,100,000.

Under the head of unfinished business, the association took up and passed the resolution offered some time ago by Henry W. Cannon, to amend the constitution so as to make it compulsory upon all members to stamp their endorsement upon all checks presented through the clearing-house, holding them responsible therefor in case such checks are, subsequent to payment, discovered to be fraudulent.

—The local branch of the Credit Men's Association will endeavor to secure reforms in the State laws concerning the giving of preferences by insolvent debtors, bills of sale, confession of judgments, and other statutes which it is claimed now operate to aid those who wish to defraud their creditors. The national organization has already done good work in this line in other States.

—Clermont H. Wilcox, senior member of the firm of Wilcox & Co., has retired and John S. Baird has been admitted to partnership.

—The Gallatin National Bank has declared its one hundred and twenty-eighth consecutive dividend of five per cent. and an extra dividend of one per cent. out of the earnings of the past six months.

—A meeting of the Council of Administration of the New York State Bankers' Association was held in the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce, September 30. Judge Seymour Dexter, of Elmira, President of the association, presided.

—Moreton Frewen, a persistent British advocate of alleged bimetalism, arrived in New York recently. He is said to have admitted that the election of a free silver President would cause a money panic, but that the United States was strong enough to stand it!

—William A. Nash, President of the Corn Exchange Bank and former chairman of the clearing-house committee, returned from a European trip recently.

—The new Colonial Trust Co., of which Theodore W. Myers, ex-City Comptroller, is to be President, will have its quarters on the ground floor of the twenty-five story St. Paul building, now being erected at Broadway and Ann street.

—The largest single mass of gold ever taken to the Assay Office was deposited there recently for the account of the Caribou Hydraulic Mining Company, of British Columbia. It weighed 4,747 ounces, and was in the shape of a cone, nine and a half inches at the base and twelve and a half inches high. The experts at the Assay Office estimated the value of the metal at \$35,446.

—J. R. Williston and W. H. Barnes, formerly of Barnes & Cunningham, Boston, have formed a partnership under the style of Williston, Barnes & Co., and will do a brokerage business at 30 Broad street. The firm will be distinct from the Boston house of J. R. Williston & Co.

## NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—The Hamilton Bank increased its October dividend from 2 to  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. and the Suffolk from 2 to 3 per cent.

—At the annual election of officers of the Boston Stock Exchange, Sept. 23, the following ticket was elected: President, Linman B. Greenleaf, succeeding Charles Head; Vice-President, Elisha D. Bangs, succeeding Philip V. R. Ely; Chairman, Murray R. Ballou; Treasurer, Sidney Chase; Secretary, Murray R. Ballou; Governing Committee (to serve two years), John W. Belcher, Joseph W. Davis, G. Frederick Gridley, Arthur W. Hale, Charles Head and John Parkinson.

—The firm of Cox, Bickford & Co. has dissolved by mutual consent. J. M. Cox withdrawing from active business. The business will be carried on by Scott & Bickford and Guy M. Spear, under the firm name of Bickford, Spear & Co.

**Providence, R. I.**—The Providence Banking Co., capital, \$100,000, has absorbed the business of Wilbour, Jackson & Co.

**New Hampshire Bankers' Association.**—The regular meeting of the New Hampshire Bankers' Association was held at Young's Hotel, Boston, Sept. 23. President Hatch in the chair. The following resolutions were adopted:

"The New Hampshire Bankers' Association gives its hearty approval of the efforts being made to maintain gold as the standard money of this country. The prosperity of labor, the well-being of the people, the good name and credit of the country, all depend upon preserving the best dollar of the world as a monetary basis."

The next meeting will take place on the third Wednesday in December.

**Suicide of a Bank Officer.**—George J. Marsh, Treasurer of the Cape Ann Savings Bank, Gloucester, Mass., shot himself fatally on Oct. 8. It is stated that he had lost his private fortune and some trust funds in stock speculation, but that the bank's funds are untouched. Deposits in the bank exceed \$3,000,000.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—Two of the officers of the National Bank of the Republic—Wm. H. Rhawn, President, and Joseph P. Mumford, Cashier—recently entered upon the thirty-first consecutive year of service with the bank. Both have been continuously in the bank since 1866, and have most worthily sustained the important trust committed to their care.

**Pittsburg.**—The National Bank of Western Pennsylvania has bought ground for the erection of a modern and substantial banking house.

—The Columbia National Bank has removed into new quarters at Fourth avenue and Smithfield street, the building being remodeled and especially fitted up for the banking business.

Pittsburg has lately made several handsome and solid additions to the number of bank buildings in the city—a gratifying evidence of banking progress and prosperity in that great industrial metropolis.

**Rochester, N. Y.**—Local banks now refuse to receive Canadian silver on deposit, having posted notices to that effect on Sept. 21.

**New York Banks.**—The 213 banks in the State of New York, according to the returns just tabulated by the Superintendent of Banks, have total resources of \$273,795,005. Deposits amount to \$181,823,096, exclusive of bank deposits.

**A Cashier Acquitted.**—John J. Bush, Cashier of the defunct Elmira (N. Y.) National Bank, who has been on trial before the United States District Court on a charge of having wrecked the bank, has been found not guilty.

**A Banker Honored.**—Charles E. Hart, President of the Orleans County National Bank at Albion, has been nominated for the Assembly by the Democrats of Orleans county, N. Y.

**Depositors Being Paid.**—The Comptroller of the Currency has declared a fifth dividend of 5 per cent. to depositors of the Central National Bank of Rome, N. Y., making in all 80 per cent. on claims proved, amounting to \$469,838.

**New York Tax Decision.**—The Court of Appeals (New York) has decided that United States bonds belonging to foreign decedents, but kept in this State, are not taxable under the collateral inheritance law.

**Baltimore, Md.**—David L. Bartlett has been elected President of the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, succeeding the late Enoch Pratt.

—The United States Trust Co. has been incorporated with \$100,000 capital. The company will execute trusts, act as financial agent and receive deposits.

### SOUTHERN STATES.

**Nashville, Tenn.**—Herman Justi, a well-known banker, has been elected Chief of the Bureau of Promotion and Publicity of the Tennessee Centennial Exposition, to be held in this city in 1897. It is proposed to have a bankers' exhibit at the exposition.

**Judgment Against a Banker.**—Judgments aggregating \$89,780 were rendered recently against Ed. Hogaboom, as President of the defunct City Savings Bank and Trust Company, of Hot Springs, Ark. The attachments in all of the judgments against the property of Hogaboom were sustained. Fifty thousand dollars of the above amount constitute a loan, secured by Hogaboom from Isaac Staples, a wealthy lumber manufacturer of Stillwater, Minn.

### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The tabulation made by the Auditor of Public Accounts of the reports of the State banks of Chicago, has been filed in response to the recent call, showing their condition at the commencement of business on Sept. 1. As compared with the last previous reports, submitted on June 8, loans show a decrease of \$3,680,967, and total deposits of \$5,255,116. Other changes are as follows: Cash means, decrease, \$1,771,713; cash on hand, increase, \$1,742,859; due from banks, decrease, \$2,208,285; surplus and profits, increase, \$2,655,804; savings deposits, decrease, \$1,969,796; individual deposits, decrease, \$3,339,663; amount due to other banks, decrease, \$1,006,546.

—The suit of the Fort Dearborn National Bank, for \$45,000, against Jameson & Co., stock brokers, which was begun about a month ago, was tried recently and resulted in a verdict for \$41,208 in favor of the bank. An appeal was taken.

**Nebraska Bank Resumes.**—The Bank of Filley, Neb., which was reported closed on Sept. 5, has effected a reorganization and resumed business on Sept. 17.

**New Bank Wanted.**—There is said to be an opening for a new bank at Anaconda, Colo.

**Minnesota Bank Robbed.**—The Bank of Sherburne, Minn., was attacked by robbers on Oct. 7. They secured \$1,000, and killed the Assistant Cashier.

**Detroit, Mich.**—Vacancies caused by the resignation of Frank H. Walker as Vice-President and director of the Commercial National Bank have been filled by the election of Cashier Morris L. Williams as Vice-President and Chas. F. Hammond as a director. Mr. Williams will continue to act as Cashier.

**Ex-Banker Set Free.**—S. T. Barlow, charged with embezzling \$1,125, while Cashier of the State Bank of Goodland, Kans., was discharged on September 23 because the evidence introduced by the State was not sufficient to warrant the court giving the case into the hands of the jury.

**Eight Years for Bank-Wrecking.**—Francis A. Coffin, found guilty of complicity in the wrecking of the Indianapolis (Ind.) National Bank and refused a new trial by the United States Supreme Court, was taken to the penitentiary at Michigan City on Sept. 21, to serve out his sentence of eight years.

**Kansas City, Mo.**—On Sept. 26 the International Loan and Trust Co. filed a deed of trust for \$96,292. Provision is made in the deed of trust that the company shall have until December 1, 1896, to meet its obligations.

**Bank Dividend Declared.**—The Comptroller of the Currency has declared a second dividend of 10 per cent. in favor of the creditors of the Wichita (Kans.) National Bank, making in all 40 per cent. on claims proved, amounting to \$155,859.93.

### CANADA.

**Canadian Bankers' Association.**—The Fifth Annual Convention of the Canadian Bankers' Association was held at Ottawa, Sept. 9. Thos. Fyshe, Cashier of the Bank of Nova Scotia, and president of the association, read the annual address. He denounced the free coinage of silver as a scheme for "the wholesale robbery of labor."

**Bank of Manitoba.**—The final dividend which pays the full amount of principal due to depositors has been issued by the liquidators of the Commercial Bank of Manitoba.

**Gold Payments Demanded.**—Several of the Canadian banks that discount notes payable in the United States are requiring a guarantee of payment in gold coin or its equivalent.



## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

**California.**—The Bank of National City is not solvent, as was reported when it closed, August 12. The State Bank Commissioners have declared it insolvent after an examination. An assessment of 10 per cent. on the capital stock of \$30,000 has been ordered. Cashier C. B. Whittelsey has been appointed custodian of the bank pending liquidation.

**Connecticut.**—Geo. P. Bissell & Co., Hartford, went into the hands of Henry E. Taintor, Receiver, on September 23. Deposit liabilities are in excess of \$200,000.

**Florida.**—Bishop Bros., proprietors of the Bank of Eustis, made an assignment October 4. The business was started in 1885.

**Illinois.**—Clark, Hawley & Co., bankers at Warren, suspended on September 7. They claim assets of \$30,000 in excess of liabilities, and that the suspension is only temporary.

—Lochridge Bros., bankers at Pawnee, assigned to Gilbert C. Drennan, September 22. Liabilities, \$51,000; assets, \$37,000; deposits, \$34,000. Assets include \$30,000 real estate and \$37,000 personal property, notes, accounts, etc.

**Iowa.**—A. A. Ball, bankers at West Liberty, were reported suspended, September 25. Deposits amounted to about \$230,000; loans, \$275,000; surplus, \$45,000.

—S. H. Watson & Sons, Vinton, made an assignment September 19. Liabilities, \$250,000; assets, \$250,000. They had been doing business for forty years.

—F. H. Whitney, proprietor of the Bank of Atlantic, made an assignment to J. B. Bruff on September 30. Assets consist of real estate, valued in the assignment at \$420,000. Liabilities to the Bank of Atlantic, consisting of notes and overdrafts, are \$94,000. Mortgages given to a life insurance company aggregate \$180,000.

**Kansas.**—The Logan County Bank, Russell Springs, is reported to have gone into voluntary liquidation on October 5.

—The J. B. Watkins Land and Mortgage Co., Lawrence, has gone into the hands of Receivers. Liabilities are \$4,500,000. The company has been embarrassed for some time.

—The Argonia State Bank suspended September 25. Deposit liabilities are small. Some time ago the bank closed, but resumed and gave its depositors time certificates, which it was unable to meet.

—The Bank of Tribune closed September 25. Deposits will probably not exceed \$4,000.

**Louisiana.**—NEW ORLEANS.—In addition to the failure of the American National Bank, which suspended on August 6, and was placed in the hands of a Receiver on September 10, there have been three other recent bank failures here.

The Union National Bank closed on September 9. By means of false entries and dummy depositors, a bookkeeper, Louis Colomb, and his accomplices, stole \$602,600 of the bank's money. Colomb committed suicide on September 12. An attempt is being made to reorganize the bank with \$250,000 capital.

The Mutual National Bank also closed on September 10. It was established in 1871, and had reduced its capital from \$500,000 to \$300,000 and later to \$200,000.

The Bank of Commerce closed on September 11, and the President and Cashier have been placed under arrest on the charge of receiving deposits knowing the bank to be insolvent. Assets are estimated at \$472,212; deposit liabilities are \$399,808. Overdrafts amount to \$300,000.

In order to prevent runs on the other banks payments in one day to any depositor were limited to \$100, and the Savings banks were compelled to enforce the by-law requiring previous notice of withdrawals.

**Michigan.**—The First National Bank of Ithaca closed October 7. Robert M. Steele is President of this bank as well as of the failed bank at Mount Pleasant. Steele failed at St. Johns recently for a large sum. The capital of the bank is \$25,000.

—The First National Bank, Mount Pleasant, closed October 5. At the last report the deposits were \$37,000. Incompetent management is alleged.

**Nebraska.**—OMAHA.—The Midland State Bank, with deposits of about \$65,000, closed on September 16, owing to steady withdrawals.

—The Bank of Lamar, private, capital, \$5,000, has gone into liquidation.

**Minnesota.**—J. E. and C. H. Brown, proprietors of the Mapleton Bank, assigned to S. H. Whitney, September 23. The liabilities are \$34,771 and the assets \$124,447, largely in real estate. The bills receivable amount to \$34,277, and can be readily converted into cash.

**New York.**—A run forced the suspension of the National Bank of Troy, on September 19. Its failure was due to an accident, a man having fallen dead near the bank and the crowd which collected was supposed to have been attracted by a run on the bank. This rumor led to an actual run, which caused the suspension. Liabilities include deposits, \$449,000; money borrowed, \$45,000. The capital is \$200,000 and the last statement showed surplus and profits of \$25,000.

—Owing to a run the First National Bank, Springville, suspended September 26. The bank's individual deposits amounted to \$180,300, and loans, \$253,400.

**Pennsylvania.**—Gardner, Morrow & Co., Hollidaysburg, assigned to John Cree, September 18. The firm had done business since 1850, and had an extensive deposit line.

**Indiana.**—On September 19, Receiver Krisber, of the bankrupt First National Bank of North Manchester, sold the remnant of the assets of the institution, which closed in 1893. Twenty-five thousand dollars in notes brought \$250, and the realty taken and held by the bank for debt and the bank building realized \$8,000. The Receiver thinks the depositors, who have received seventy-five cents on the dollar, will get the other twenty-five, but stockholders will have nothing.

**Washington.**—The Bennett National Bank, New Whatcom, suspended on September 14. Owing to the financial agitation the bank has lately lost more than half its deposits. It suspended some time ago, but again resumed business.

**Wisconsin.**—On September 5 the Jackson County Bank, Black River Falls, was placed in the hands of Samuel Jones, Receiver.

John Lienlokken, doing a private banking business at La Crosse, assigned to J. L. Pettin-gill, September 29.

—The Shullsburg Bank made an assignment September 19. Its resources were about \$114,900, and deposits, \$58,400.

### Farmers and the Silver Movement.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—In your issue of September, page 333, in a tabulated statement furnished by Mr. Powers, and in the lower line of the same I find the statement of the 1895 crop of wheat with an estimated value per bushel in gold of 28 cents. Is this not a misprint, as I believe that wheat sells primarily in this vicinity as low as in any point in the United States, and no farmer realized less than about 40 cents at his home market for any part of the 1895 crop. Your explanation of the apparent discrepancy will oblige me. E. P. WELLS.

JAMESTOWN, No. Dak., Oct. 2.

*Answer.*—Under date of October 7 the author of the article mentioned above writes as follows:

In reply to your letter of October 6 with reference to the criticism upon my article which you have received from Jamestown, No. Dak., I have no explanation to make beyond what the article itself furnishes. The figures that I quote are those of Mr. Powers, the State Statistician of Minnesota, one of the most accomplished and accurate statisticians in the country. H. L. NELSON.

P. S.—On looking over the article I find that there is some confusion of statement. The table of prices refers to all grains, not to wheat alone. H. L. N.

**Boy Orator on Bankers.**—At Huntington, W. Va., on October 2, Mr. Wm. J. Bryan, the popocratic candidate for President, paid his respects to the bankers as follows:

"And yet these men who act in the capacity of trustees are so insolent that they are now contributing to Republican funds the money that the people have deposited with them for security.

My friends, if the banks want to go into politics, let them beware of the result that may follow political banking. If they train to be business men and run their business on business principles, they must not come into the field of politics and attempt to run politics."

By what license has the field of American politics been pre-empted by boy orators and silver mine owners? Have not the bankers as much right to "run" politics, if they can, as the orators, the farmers or anybody else? As Mr. Bryan declaims so loudly against monopolies, he ought not to try to form a political trust.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

First National Bank, Thompson, Iowa; by C. S. Gilbertson, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ARKANSAS.

LITTLE ROCK—Pulaski Trust Co. (successor to Coffin & Ragland); capital, \$25,000; Pres., Maxwell Coffin; Secretary, J. F. Lenon.

#### ILLINOIS.

BEECHER—Bank of Beecher.

#### IOWA.

BARNES—Farmers' Bank (successor to Farmers' Savings Bank); capital, \$4,000; Pres., E. B. Skinner; Cashier, W. N. Skinner.

HANCOCK—Bank of Hancock; Cashier, Frank Diederich.

MAPLETON—First State Bank (successor to Monona Co. State Bank).

#### KANSAS.

ALMENA—State Bank (successor to Bank of Almena); capital, \$2,500; Pres., Albert Fisher; Cashier, B. R. Fisher.

PARSONS—Parsons Loan and Trust Co.; capital stock, \$100,000.

#### LOUISIANA.

HOUMA—Peoples' Bank; capital (paid in), \$10,000; Pres., Leon H. Jastremski; Cashier, Gabriel Montegut; Asst. Cashier, J. A. Robichaux.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

FITCHBURG—Fitchburg Loan, Safety Deposit and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000; Pres., F. S. Coolidge; Cashier, A. A. Howe.

#### MICHIGAN.

CENTRAL LAKE—Antrim County Bank; capital, \$15,000.

#### MINNESOTA.

ULEM—Julius Siemens.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

WEST POINT—Bank of West Point; capital, \$50,000.

#### NEBRASKA.

MAYWOOD—Burson & Edghill.

#### NEW YORK.

BERGEN—W. H. & C. E. Housel.

NEW YORK CITY—Williston, Barnes & Co. —Colonial Trust Co.

#### NORTH CAROLINA.

AURORA—Whitehurst & Hudnell.

SANFORD—W. J. Edwards; capital, \$10,000.

#### NORTH DAKOTA.

CARRINGTON—Foster Co. State Bank; capital, \$5,000; Pres., E. Delafield Smith; Cashier, A. M. Smith.

#### OHIO.

AKRON—Dime Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000.

GLENVILLE—Garfield Sav. Bank Co. (branch of Cleveland, O.); Pres., H. Clark Ford; Treas., J. V. Davis.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

BRISTOL—Torjus Strandness.

COLUMBIA—C. E. Cory.

WHITE ROCK—White Rock State Bank; capital, \$5,500; Pres., S. E. Oscarson; Cashier, H. O. Powell.

#### TEXAS.

DENISON—Brooks & Johnston.

SAN ANTONIO—John Woods & Sons (removed from Del Rio, Texas).

#### RHODE ISLAND.

PROVIDENCE—Providence Banking Co. (successor to Wilbour, Jackson & Co.); capital, \$100,000; Pres., C. S. Sweetland; Vice-Pres., Joshua Wilbour; Treas., B. A. Jackson; Secretary, Arthur Knight.

#### VIRGINIA.

ROCKY MOUNT—Exchange Banking Co.; Pres., I. T. Fishburne; Vice-Pres., J. J. Montgomery; Cashier, J. J. Scott.

### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

EUFULA—East Alabama National Bank; no Asst. Cashier in place of C. P. Roberts.

#### ARKANSAS.

HARDY—Spring River Bank; reported resumed; J. C. Hersper, Pres.

HOT SPRINGS—Arkansas National Bank;

Henry W. Myar, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. J. Little.

LITTLE ROCK—Bank of Commerce; Frederick Kramer, Pres., deceased.

#### COLORADO.

COLORADO SPRINGS—Exchange National

Bank; A. S. Holbrook, Pres. in place of D. M. Holden; W. H. Reed, Vice-Pres. in place of A. S. Holbrook.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**HARTFORD**—Mercantile National Bank; Frank D. Glazier elected director in place of Jno. W. Stedman, deceased.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**GEORGETOWN**—Farmers and Mechanics' National Bank; S. Thomas Brown, Pres. in place of H. M. Sweeney, deceased; M. I. Adler, Vice-Pres. in place of S. Thomas Brown.

#### GEORGIA.

**AMERICUS**—Bank of Commerce; Chas. A. Huntington, Vice-Pres. and director deceased.

**FITZGERALD**—Colony Bank; reorganized as a private bank under title of Bauder & Bowen.

#### ILLINOIS.

**CHICAGO**—Metropolitan National Bank; Edison Keith, director, deceased.

**VANDALIA**—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of Geo. W. Brown.

#### IOWA.

**BURLINGTON**—Merchants' National Bank; W. E. Blake, Vice-Pres. in place of John Patterson; R. S. Hosford, 2d Vice-Pres. in place of W. E. Blake.

**KEOKUK**—State Central Savings Bank; Geo. E. Rix, Cashier.

**POPEJOY**—Bank of Popejoy; Flora A. Popejoy, Vice-Pres.; J. H. Popejoy, Asst. Cas.

#### KANSAS.

**ARKANSAS CITY**—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of L. P. Davis.

**GARFIELD**—Garfield Banking Co.; removed to Larned, Kans.

**GARNETT**—First National Bank; Jesse F. Foster, Cashier in place of Ed. L. Foster.

**HARTFORD**—I. A. Taylor Banking Co.; C. R. Baysinger, Asst. Cashier in place of Wm. D. Taylor.

**LA CROSSE**—First National Bank; no Pres. in place of B. F. Coughenour.

**SALINA**—Farmers' National Bank; W. T. Welch, Cashier in place of Thomas H. Davis; F. R. Spier, Asst. Cashier in place of W. T. Welch.

**SOUTH HAVEN**—South Haven Bank; T. C. Ellis, Cashier, deceased.

#### KENTUCKY.

**ASHLAND**—Second National Bank; no Vice-Presidents in places of J. M. Ferguson and Charles Kitchen.

**FRANKLIN**—J. A. McGoodwin Banking Co.; capital reduced from \$17,500 to \$15,000.

**HENDERSON**—Farmers' Bank; Edward Atkinson, Asst. Cashier, resigned.

**LOUISVILLE**—German National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Adolph Reutlinger.

**MAYSVILLE**—Bank of Maysville; J. F. Barbour, President in place of James Barbour,

deceased; R. K. Hoefflich, Cashier in place of J. F. Barbour.

**NICHOLASVILLE**—First National Bank; Ben. P. Campbell, Pres. in place of Jno. A. Willis.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—National Farmers and Planters' Bank; D. L. Bartlett, Pres. in place of Enoch Pratt, deceased; Jno. A. Whitridge, Vice-Pres. in place of D. L. Bartlett.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Cox, Bickford & Co.; succeeded by Bickford, Spear & Co.

**WOBURN**—Five Cents Savings Bank; Benjamin Hinckley, Pres. in place of John Cummings.

#### MICHIGAN.

**DETROIT**—Commercial National Bank; M. L. Williams, Vice-Pres. in place of Frank H. Walker, resigned; Chas. F. Hammond, elected director in place of Frank H. Walker; Geo. B. Caldwell, Asst. Cashier, resigned.—Detroit National Bank; James F. Joy, director, deceased.

**FLINT**—Genesee County Savings Bank, W. A. Atwood, Pres. in place of Russell Bishop, deceased.

#### MINNESOTA.

**ADRIAN**—Adrian State Bank; C. Mylius, Pres. in place of A. Schaefer; Geo. C. Eyland, Jr., Asst. Cashier.

**BELLINGHAM**—Bellingham State Bank; Lucius F. Clark, Pres., retired.

**DULUTH**—First National Bank; A. L. Ordean, Pres. in place of Luther Mendenhall; no Vice Pres. in place of A. L. Ordean.

**LUVERNE**—Rock County Bank; B. H. Hinkley, Pres., deceased.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Union National Bank; A. F. Kelley, Vice-Pres. and director, resigned.

#### MISSOURI.

**BUTLER**—Walton Trust Co.; capital, \$55,000; W. E. Walton, Pres.; Frank Allen, Sec.

**DEKALB**—Derge-Campbell Banking Co.; C. K. Leslie, Cash. in place of A. P. Campbell.

**IRONTON**—Iron County Bank; I. G. Whitworth, Pres.; J. W. Craven, Cashier.

**LAMAR**—First National Bank; J. B. Fant, Pres. in place of J. H. Wilson; no Vice-Pres. in place of J. R. Fant.

**PATTONSBURG**—Pattonsbury Savings Bank; Rosa Barlow, Cash.; W. Smith, Asst. Cash.

**SPRINGFIELD**—Holland's Bank; incorporated and title changed to Holland Banking Co.

**ST. LOUIS**—St. Louis National Bank; Jno. Nickerson, Pres. in place of L. C. Nelson;

L. C. Nelson, Vice-Pres. in place of H. M. Noel; C. G. Warner, 2d Vice-Pres.—Mer-

chants'-Laclede National Bank; Geo. E. Hoffman, Cashier in place of Jno. Nickerson;

H. Fullerton, Asst. Cashier in place of Geo. E. Hoffman; D. R. Francis, no longer

Vice-Pres.—Mississippi Valley Trust Co.; D. R. Francis, no longer Vice-Pres.—Con-

tinental National Bank; Joseph Hill, director, deceased.

### NEBRASKA.

FILLEY—Bank of Filley; resumed.

ST. PAUL—Citizens' National Bank; no Cashier in place of M. H. Nugent.

### NEW MEXICO.

EDDY—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of C. E. Conway; K. August Gagg, Asst. Cashier.

### NEW JERSEY.

BORDENTOWN—Bordentown Banking Co.; Mallon Hutchinson, Pres., deceased.

HACKETTSTOWN—M. T. Welsh, Vice-Pres. in place of Wm. Dellicker, deceased.

MOUNT HOLLY—Union National Bank; corporate existence extended until September 9, 1916.

PLAINFIELD—First National Bank; J. W. Johnson, Pres. in place of E. R. Pope; H. M. Estil, Vice-Pres. in place of D. F. Randolph.

### NEW YORK.

AUBURN—Cayuga Co. Nat. Bank; Chas. Hoskins, Cashier in place of F. G. Jones, deceased.

CAZENOVIA—J. H. Ten Eyck Burr; C. B. Cannon no longer Cashier.

CUBA—Cuba National Bank; E. D. Lovelidge, Pres., deceased.

FREEPORT—Freeport Bank; Wm. Foreman, Vice-Pres., deceased.

KINGSTON—State of New York Nat. Bank; J. M. Schaeffer, Cashier in place of Chas. W. Deyo, deceased.—Ulster County Savings Instn.; Alton B. Parker, Pres. in place of Chas. W. Deyo, deceased.

NEW YORK CITY—National Broadway Bank; John Lawrence, director, deceased.

TROY—Union Nat. Bank; Joseph M. Warren, director, deceased; also Vice-Pres. Troy Savings Bank.

### OHIO.

CLEVELAND—Nat. Bank of Commerce and Citizens' Sav. and Loan Assn.; Henry B. Payne, director, deceased.—Woodland Avenue Savings and Loan Co.; Edward G. Caskey, Asst. Cashier, deceased.—Union National Bank; James D. Waterson, Asst. Cashier, deceased.

COLUMBUS—Market Exchange Bank Co.; capital, \$25,000; S. B. Hartman, Pres.; Wm. Gault, Vice-Pres.; O. A. Schenck, Cashier.

LIMA—Commercial Investment Bank; title changed to Commercial Bank.

### OREGON.

DALLAS—Dallas City Bank; Wm. Savage, Vice-Pres., deceased.

FOREST GROVE—Bank of Forest Grove; A.

Pfanner, Pres. and sole owner in place of C. M. Keep.

THE DALLES—First National Bank; H. M. Beall, Cashier in place of J. M. Patterson.

### PENNSYLVANIA.

ATHENS—First National Bank; F. K. Harris, Cashier in place of Chas. T. Hull.

DOYLESTOWN—Bucks County Trust Co.; Jas. B. Doyle, director, deceased.

PHILADELPHIA—National Security Bank; J. H. Dripps, Cashier in place of Geo. W. Cox, deceased.—Northwestern National Bank; Geo. W. Roydhouse, Pres. in place of James B. Doyle, deceased.—Market Street Nat. Bank; W. P. Sinnett, Asst. Cashier.—Fourth Street Nat. Bank; Geo. F. Tyler, director, deceased.

ROYERSFORD—National Bank of Royersford; Henry A. Cole, Pres. in place of Ephraim P. Keely; P. Williard, Vice-Pres. in place of Henry A. Cole.

### SOUTH CAROLINA.

EASLEY—Easley Banking Co.; title changed to Easley Bank.

### TENNESSEE.

GREENVILLE—First National Bank; J. W. Willis, Pres. in place of J. M. Brabson.

NASHVILLE—Nashville Trust Co.; T. J. Turley, Secretary, deceased.

WARTRACE—Bedford County Bank; capital, \$15,000; J. G. Wilkinson, Pres.; Cashier, A. M. Young.

### TEXAS.

BROWNWOOD—Brownwood National Bank; Millard Romines, Asst. Cashier in place of Marion Ford.

DEL RIO—John Woods & Sons; removed to San Antonio.

### UTAH.

LOGAN—First National Bank; Allan M. Fleming, no longer Acting Cashier.

SALT LAKE CITY—Commercial Nat'l Bank; Frederick H. Auerbach, director, deceased.

### VIRGINIA.

ABINGDON—Carpenter & Bell; succeeded by J. W. Bell.

LYNCHBURG—Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank; D. A. Payne, Acting Sec. and Treas.

### WASHINGTON.

TACOMA—London and San Francisco Bank; T. V. Walter, Manager, deceased.

### WEST VIRGINIA.

ROMNEY—Bank of Romney; Jno. T. Vance, Cashier, deceased.

### WISCONSIN.

COLUMBUS—Farmers and Merchants' Union Bank; J. E. Wheeler & Son, Proprietors in place of R. S. Rockwell & Co.

MAHSHFIELD—German-American Bank; W. D. Connor, Pres.; A. C. Galloway, Asst. Cas.

**BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.****ALABAMA.**

CALERA—Gordon Du Bose.

**CONNECTICUT.**

HARTFORD—Geo. P. Bissel &amp; Co.; in hands of Henry E. Taintor, Receiver, Sept. 23.

**FLORIDA.**

ECTIS—Bishop Bros.

**ILLINOIS.**PAWNEE—Lochridge Bros.; assigned Sept. 22.  
WARREN—Clark, Hawley & Co.; suspended Sept. 7.**IOWA.**

ATLANTIC—Bank of Atlantic; assigned to J. B. Bruff.

MALVERN—Farmers' National Bank; in voluntary liquidation by resolution of Aug. 6.

SIOUX CITY—Sioux National Bank; in hands of Jonathan W. Brown, Receiver, Sept. 9.

VINTON—S. H. Watson &amp; Sons.

WEST LIBERTY—A. A. Ball &amp; Co.

**KANSAS.**

AGRA—Agra State Bank.

ARGONIA—Argonia State Bank.

LAWRENCE—J. B. Watkins Land Mortgage Co.

RUSSELL SPRINGS—Logan County Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

TRIBUNE—Bank of Tribune.

**LOUISIANA.**

NEW ORLEANS—American National Bank; in hands of Frank L. Richardson, Receiver, Sept. 10.—Union National Bank; closed Sept. 9.—Mutual National Bank; suspended Sept. 10.—Bank of Commerce; closed Sept. 11.

**MICHIGAN.**

MOUNT PLEASANT—First National Bank; closed Oct. 5.

**MINNESOTA.**

MAPLETON—Mapleton Bank; assigned to Sewell H. Whitney.

**MONTANA.**

HELENA—First National Bank; in hands of Erastus D. Edgerton, Receiver, Sept. 11.

**NEBRASKA.**

LAMAR—Bank of Lamar; in voluntary liquidation.

OMAHA—Midland State Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

CANISTEO—Porter &amp; Davis.

SPRINGVILLE—First National Bank; in hands of Wm. A. Douglas, Receiver, Oct. 8.  
TROY—National Bank of Troy.**OKLAHOMA.**

SHAWNEE—Farmers and Merchants' Bank.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

HOLLIDAYSBURG—Gardner, Morrow &amp; Co.; assigned to John Cree.

**TEXAS.**

SAN ANGELO—Citizens' National Bank; in hands of Chas. A. Dalley, Receiver, Sept. 9.

**WASHINGTON.**

NEW WHATCOM—Bennett National Bank; in hands of Chas. Clary, Receiver, Sept. 19.

**WISCONSIN.**

LACROSSE—John Lienlokken; assigned to J. L. Pettingill.

PORTAGE—German-American Bank.

SHULLSBURG—Shullsburg Bank.

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**Use of Clearing-House Numbers.****Editor Bankers' Magazine:**

SIR:—Mr. Kent's suggestion in your September number, that banks use the New York Clearing-House numbers instead of the banks' names in listing checks, is a good one. As an additional way to attain that end, let me suggest that the New York banks issue to their correspondents a circular letter asking them to list them by number instead of by name, and sending with the letter a numerical list of the banks and an alphabetical list with the numbers given.

I know some country banks which have already adopted the numerical listing, and like it themselves and find it is appreciated by their correspondents.

E. S. CAMPBELL,

Vice-President National Newark Banking Co.

NEWARK, N. J., Oct. 2.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

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[All books mentioned in the following notices will be supplied at the publishers' lowest rates on application to BRADFORD RHODES & Co., 78 William Street, New York.]

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**WAGES, FIXED INCOMES AND THE FREE COINAGE OF SILVER.** By ISAAC ROBERTS. Philadelphia: John Highlands. Price: cloth, 50 cents; paper, 25 cents.

This book is written in a familiar conversational style, easily understood by those who are not acquainted with the technical points of finance. It is an especially convincing argument against the evil effects of the free coinage of silver on all who work for wages, and if placed in the hands of wage-earners it will prove a most powerful and convincing statement of the principles of sound money and the baneful results of free coinage. All large employers of labor who favor sound money could do no better educational work than to circulate Mr. Roberts' book.

Referring to the circumstances which led to the writing of his book, which has been widely distributed by many banks, the author says:

"In the early spring of 1895, while riding on a train of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, a brakeman on that road whom I have known for years came to me and asked me the question with which the book opens: 'Can you give me some points on the silver question?' We had several talks on the subject, subsequently, and my eyes were opened to the fact that the workingmen of the country were greatly interested in it and would be glad to have information about it. Believing as I did, and still do, that every workingman and wage-earner in our country would be most disastrously affected by the free coinage of silver, I decided to tell them what I knew about it, and in such a way that all could readily understand it. I had the book about half written when Mr. Carlisle's great speeches at Memphis and Covington were published. I noticed their remarkable effect in Kentucky and came to the conclusion that free coinage had received its quietus. When the issue began looming up again this spring (1896) I decided to finish my book. It appeared about June 5 of this year, and its generous reception by the public, and especially by men engaged in my own business, far exceeded my expectations, and for it I desire to extend my grateful acknowledgments. Two things about this reception have been especially pleasant: First, that workingmen and workingwomen here and there have expressed their appreciation of the book; and second, that many bank officers, whom I consider peculiarly well qualified to judge the book, have also expressed their cordial approval of it."

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**POOR'S MANUAL for 1896.** New York: H. V. & H. W. Poor.

The issue of this standard authority on railways for the current year is now at hand, containing its usual full and accurate information in regard to the railways of the country. For the fiscal year 1895 the railways carried 548,974,263 passengers and moved 768,799,883 tons of freight. Total available revenues were \$436,964,529; payments, \$481,801,811, leaving a surplus over fixed charges and miscellaneous payments of \$5,162,718.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## *A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.*

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NEW YORK, October 3, 1896.

GOLD, COMMERCIALLY AND POLITICALLY, has commanded universal attention during the month just ended. As the cause of the gold standard has apparently improved in the political field, gold itself has come to the relief of the financial situation. The arrivals of gold began on August 28, and since that time nearly \$41,000,000 has reached the ports of the United States. The large influx of gold has resulted in an advance in rates for sterling exchange, but this is probably only temporary, the merchandise movement still justifying a continuance of gold imports.

The imports of merchandise continue small in volume, while the exports are being swollen by very large shipments of grain, which promise to show no cessation for some time.

The August returns show an excess of exports over imports of more than \$19,000,000, while a year ago the imports were \$15,000,000 larger than the exports. Last month the merchandise exports also exceeded the imports. In the eight months ended August 31 there were net exports of nearly \$100,000,000.

With grain and cotton going forward freely there is little reason to look for an adverse gold movement during the remainder of the year provided there is no unfavorable influence to affect credit.

As the monthly production of our gold mines is about \$4,000,000 any gain in the supply from imports of gold will cause a rapid expansion of the circulating medium. The large gold imports last month have had a double influence. They have put the United States Treasury in a very much better position than it has held for a long time past. It now has \$124,000,000 of gold in excess of gold certificates outstanding, as compared with less than \$102,000,000 a month ago. The gold in circulation, including certificates, has also increased from about \$503,000,000 to more than \$517,000,000 during the month.

For the gold that went into the Treasury there were put into circulation other kinds of money, principally "greenbacks" and silver certificates. The money in circulation increased nearly \$50,000,000 since September 1, and the per capita was raised from \$21.48 to \$22.05, the highest since February 1 last. More than \$4,000,000 of the increased circulation consists of National bank notes, a number of the banks still taking out new circulation.

The past month has witnessed a very marked advance in the price of wheat—18 cents per bushel. This with higher prices prevailing for other grains and for cotton has brought about a more hopeful feeling among farm producers than has prevailed for some time. With or without silver, the prospect for the farmer has improved. The official estimates of the Department of Agriculture, based upon the condition of the crops on September 1, are in the main favorable. Cotton is the notable exception, its condition on September 1 being only 64.2 per cent., the lowest in 27 years. The condition a year ago was 70.8 per cent. and in 1894, 85.9 per cent. The increased acreage this year may produce a crop larger than that of 1895, which was estimated at 7,162,000 bales, but there is no means yet of ascertaining the actual figures.



The condition of wheat on September 1 was almost exactly the same as a year ago, 74.6 per cent. against 75.4 per cent. Corn was about the same as in 1891, 91 per cent., which compares with 96.4 per cent. in 1895. As to the yield of these two crops there is great variance of opinion. About 400,000,000 bushels is figured for wheat, but the "Cincinnati Price Current" very properly raises the question why a larger acreage with only a slight decrease in condition should point to a less production than in 1895, which was estimated by the Government at 467,000,000 bushels, although the reported distribution indicates that the crop was not less than 500,000,000 bushels.

As to corn, the yield is estimated at about 2,200,000,000 bushels, or about the same as last year's, which was estimated by the Government at 2,151,139,000 bushels. The yield of oats it is thought will amount to 680,000,000 bushels, as compared with 824,444,000 bushels in 1895. The annual production of wheat, corn, oats and cotton during the past seven years is estimated as follows, the figures for wheat being revised estimates based upon the known distribution of that crop :

YEAR.	Wheat.	Corn.	Oats.	Cotton.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bales.
1890.....	430,000,000	1,498,970,000	523,621,000	8,655,518
1891.....	675,000,000	2,080,154,000	728,394,000	9,098,707
1892.....	550,000,000	1,628,464,000	661,036,000	6,717,142
1893.....	475,000,000	1,619,498,000	638,855,000	7,327,211
1894.....	515,000,000	1,212,770,000	662,067,000	9,802,766
1895.....	500,000,000	2,151,139,000	824,444,000	7,162,473
1896.....	460,000,000	2,200,000,000	680,000,000	.....

During the period included in the above table each crop reached its maximum yield, wheat in 1891, corn and oats in 1895 and cotton in 1894. In no year prior to 1890 was there such a large yield for either of the crops mentioned.

Bearing upon the future price of wheat and the probable export demand for that cereal estimates of the world's supply are of considerable interest at this time. Shortage is reported in Argentina, Russia and India. The estimated yield for Europe, India and the world in each of the past six years is as follows :

YEAR.	Europe.	India.	World.
	Bushels.	Bushels.	Bushels.
1891.....	1,150,368,000	275,040,000	2,225,008,000
1891.....	1,383,960,000	206,640,000	2,396,848,000
1893.....	1,516,186,000	264,000,000	3,490,608,000
1894.....	1,532,648,000	246,430,000	2,528,152,000
1895.....	1,485,696,000	228,704,000	2,476,072,000
1896.....	1,452,400,000	177,600,000	2,322,800,000

The total yield of the world this year as indicated will be less than in any previous year since 1890.

While recently there have been evidences of some improvement in business, notwithstanding an uneasy feeling regarding the money situation, business is far from active. A decrease of 13 per cent. in the bank clearings in New York last month as compared with a year ago, and of 9 per cent. outside of New York, is indicative of the situation. The disposition is to wait until after election before attempting to extend operations, although in various lines of industry the reduction of stocks has compelled an enlargement of production.

Failures have been on the increase and there has been some apprehension that the narrowing of the lines of credit as a consequence of the money agitation might cause many weak concerns to suspend. Except the failures of the three banks in New Orleans last month there has been no doubt cast upon the stability of our

banking institutions, and it may safely be said that the banks of this country never stood higher in public confidence than at the present time.

The iron trade has reflected the unfavorable condition of general business as it usually does, although there are some favorable developments in that quarter. Since November 1, 1895, there has been almost an uninterrupted decrease in the production of pig iron. On that date there were 239 furnaces in blast with a weekly capacity of 217,306 tons. On September 1 there were only 145 furnaces in blast with a weekly capacity of 180,500 tons, a decrease in the average output of 40 per cent. The production is now less than at any time since August 1, 1894.

**GOLD IMPORTS AND THE BANK OF ENGLAND.**—On September 10 the Bank of England raised its rate of discount from 2 to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and two weeks later to 3 per cent. The nominal rate had been 2 per cent. since February 22, 1894, and that is the minimum rate which the bank names, although for a good part of the time in the past two years the actual rate for money has been below 2 per cent. The advances made last month were not solely on account of the heavy gold movement to this country, although unquestionably the movement has been a surprise on the other side by reason of its great magnitude. But London has been drawn upon by the Continent and the Bank of England also holds a large amount of specie subject to the call of Japan.

On February 22, 1894, when the Bank of England lowered its rate of discount to 2 per cent., not to change it again for more than two and a half years, the bank held about \$148,500,000 of gold and the percentage of its reserve to liabilities was 60.21. On September 10, 1896, when the rate was raised to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the gold holdings were \$218,500,000 and the ratio of reserve was 56.80 per cent; on September 24, when the advance to 3 per cent. was made, the gold held aggregated \$205,500,000 and the ratio of reserve was 55.45 per cent. While the supply of specie is considerably in excess of the amount held in 1884 the percentage of reserve is nearly 5 per cent. lower than it was then, while the deposits now aggregate £57,000,000, as compared with £31,700,000 in 1894, and circulation is £26,800,000 as compared with less than £24,500,000.

Since the latter part of June the reserves of the Bank of England have been decreasing and since the middle of August at a rapid rate. The gold holdings and reserve ratios on the dates mentioned have been as follows:

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>Gold in Bank of England.</i>	<i>Ratio of Reserve.</i>
June 25.....	\$48,156,277	59.37 per cent.
August 20.....	47,474,961	58.94 "
" 27.....	46,372,048	58.64 "
September 3.....	44,044,283	56.95 "
" 10.....	42,721,027	56.30 "
" 17.....	42,146,413	56.14 "
" 14.....	41,155,469	55.45 "
October 1.....	40,386,442	52.14 "

Nearly \$45,000,000 of gold has been withdrawn from the Bank of England since June 25, \$35,000,000 of it since August 20. The reserve ratio has declined nearly  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. since June 25, and in view of these results the recent advances in the rate of discount are not at all mysterious.

Naturally enough the effect of this action of the Bank of England upon the movement of gold to the United States has been the subject of discussion. There is no likelihood of its retarding gold imports while present conditions continue to exist. Even further advances in the rate, which are quite probable, will not produce this effect, although they may serve to attract gold to London from other financial centers. In the last half of 1880 we imported \$70,000,000 of gold with the Bank of England rate of discount at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 per cent. In August, 1881, the Bank advanced its rate from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 and then to 4 per cent., and in October following to 5 per cent., maintaining the latter rate until the close of the year, but between

August 1 and December 31, 1881, we imported \$25,000,000 of gold. In the last three months of 1884 we imported \$18,000,000 gold while the Bank of England rate during most of the time was 4@5 per cent. Two years later in the corresponding period our imports of gold were \$26,000,000 and the bank rate 4@5 per cent. Nearly \$27,000,000 gold was imported in September and October, 1887, with a bank rate continuously at 4 per cent. In 1890 and 1891 also we imported considerable gold while the Bank of England maintained a rate of discount ranging from 3 to 5 per cent.

Two per cent. is an abnormal rate and for six years prior to 1894 no rate lower than 2½ per cent. was made, except for about six months in 1892, from April to October. The range and average of the rates charged by the Bank of England yearly since 1880 have been as follows :

Year.	High.	Low.	Average.	Year.	High.	Low.	Average.
1880.....	3	2½	2¾	1888.....	6	2½	2¾
1881.....	5	2½	3¼	1889.....	6	3	4¼
1882.....	6	3	4¼	1890.....	5	2½	3¾
1883.....	5	3	3¼	1891.....	5	2	2½
1884.....	5	2	3	1892.....	3½	2	2½
1885.....	5	2	3	1893.....	5	2½	3
1886.....	5	2	3	1894.....	3	2	2½
1887.....	5	2	3¾	1895.....	2	2	2
1888.....	5	2	3¼	1896.....	3	2	...

One thing is implied in the recent action of the Bank of England, that the stagnation that has so long affected the money market abroad is coming to an end. It began in 1890 and there has been but little indication of relief until now.

**THE ADVANCE IN SECURITIES.**—The decline that for months caused investors in stocks and bonds much apprehension, was checked in August, and last month there was a recovery such as is not often witnessed in the short space of a few weeks. The security market in September was unquestionably affected by the change in sentiment in investing circles regarding the political situation. The large anti-silver majorities in Maine and Vermont and the very large and representative gathering of gold-standard Democrats at Indianapolis were considered very significant straws showing the trend of political events. A bullish sentiment sprang up very suddenly and with scarcely any set-back an advance movement in the stock and bond markets has continued to the close of the month.

In the stock markets the advances have extended throughout the list and a very large proportion of stocks have made a net gain in prices since the latter part of August from 5 to 10 per cent., and in some cases even more. Among the stocks which have advanced 5 per cent. in a month are Atchison, New York Central and Pacific Mail; 6 per cent., Atchison preferred, Canada Southern, Denver & Rio Grande preferred, Missouri Pacific and National Lead; 7 per cent., Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis preferred, Illinois Central, Louisville & Nashville, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba, United States Cordage guaranteed and Wheeling and Lake Erie preferred. Among the stocks which have advanced more than 8 per cent. are the following :

	Per cent.		Per cent.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.....	8	Lake Erie and Western, preferred.....	12½
Cleveland, Cinn., Chicago and St. Louis.	8	Minneapolis and St. Louis, 2d preferred.....	13
Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. and Omaha....	8¼	American Cotton Oil, preferred.....	13
Missouri, Kansas and Texas, preferred.	8¾	Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul.....	14
Iowa Central, preferred.....	9	Chicago and Northwestern.....	14½
New York, Chic. and St. Louis, 2d pref.	9	Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.....	14½
Southern, preferred.....	9½	Minneapolis and St. Louis, 1st preferred.	15½
American Sugar Refinery, preferred....	9¾	American Tobacco.....	16¼
Delaware and Hudson.....	10¾	Consolidated Gas.....	16½
New England.....	10	Central of New Jersey.....	16½
National Lead, preferred.....	10	Manhattan, Consolidated.....	16½
Tennessee Coal and Iron.....	10¾	Chicago Gas.....	16½
Pullman Palace Car Company.....	11	United States Leather, preferred.....	18¼
New York, Susquehanna & West., pref.	11½	Delaware, Lackawanna and Western....	20
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul, pref.	12	Metropolitan Traction.....	20¼
Lake Shore.....	12¼	American Sugar Refinery.....	20½
Western Union.....	12½		

The bond market has advanced as rapidly as stocks and with few exceptions substantial gains have been made in the past month. The Government bond issues have all advanced, the gains reflecting the increased confidence in the financial strength of the Treasury. The 4 per cents of 1907 have advanced since August  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. for the registered and  $1\frac{1}{8}$  for the coupon bonds; the 4 per cents of 1925, registered  $4\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., coupon  $6\frac{1}{8}$  per cent.; the 5 per cent. bonds of 1904, registered  $1\frac{1}{4}$  per cent., coupon 8 per cent.

In the railroad and miscellaneous bond market the gains generally ranged from 2 to 10 per cent. Some of the largest advances for the month were:

	Per cent.		Per cent.
Ches. and Ohio R. & A., 2d con. 4's.....	8	Wisconsin Central 1st 5's.....	10
Morris and Essex, 1st 7's.....	8	Southern 1st con. 5's.....	10 $\frac{1}{4}$
Northern Pacific gen. 3d l. g. 6's, 1937....	8	Virginia and Midland gen. 5's.....	10 $\frac{3}{4}$
Texas and Pacific 1st gold 5's.....	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	Reading gen. 4's.....	10
Union Pacific 1st 6's, 1908.....	8	Missouri, Kansas and Eastern 1st 5's....	10
Atchison gen. 4's.....	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	Morris and Essex 1st con. 7's.....	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
Atchison adjustment 4's.....	9	Missouri, Kansas and Texas 2d gold 4's....	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
New York, Lack. and Western, 1st 6's....	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	Chic., Burlington and Quincy deb. 5's....	12 $\frac{1}{4}$
Mobile and Ohio gen. 4's.....	9	Milwaukee and St. Paul l. & M. 7's.....	12 $\frac{1}{4}$
New York, Susque. & Western gen. 5's....	9	Clev., Cinn., Chicago and In. consol. 7's....	13
San Antonio and Aransas Pass 1st 4's....	9	Peoria and Eastern 1st con. 4's.....	15
Tenn. C. and I. Tenn. Division 1st 6's....	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	Ohio, St. Louis and U. N. gen. 5's.....	15
United States Cordage 1st 6's.....	10	Ohio Southern 1st 6's.....	16 $\frac{1}{4}$
Kansas Pacific 1st consol. 6's.....	10		

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The tendency of the money market is again downward, and easier rates after the ending of the political campaign may be looked for. The supply of money is increasing and borrowers are getting more favorable terms. There was a little stiffening in rates at the end of the month in anticipation of October 1st payments, but the market became easier immediately after. At the close of the month call money ruled at 8 @ 6 per cent. with the average rate about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 6 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 6 per cent. for all periods. For commercial paper the rates are  $6\frac{1}{2}$  @ 7 per cent. for 60 to 90 days bills receivable, 7 @  $7\frac{1}{2}$  for 4 months commission house names and prime 4 to 6 months single names, and 8 @ 9 per cent. for good 4 to 6 months single names. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the following table:

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	May 1.	June 1.	July 1.	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2 — 3	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 2	2 — 3	2 — 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 8	8 — 6
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 3	2 — 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 — 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 — 3	6	6
Brokers' loans on collateral, 30 to 60 days.....	3	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	4 — 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 8	6
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	3	3	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	9 — 11	6
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4	4 — 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 — 11	6
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 4 $\frac{3}{4}$	4 — 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	9	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 7
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 — 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 5	5 — 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 7	.....	7 — 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	6 — 6 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	7 — 8	.....	8 — 9

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—There was a heavy drain of gold from the leading European banks in September. The Bank of England lost \$80,000,000, the Bank of France \$18,000,000, and the Bank of Germany \$6,000,000. The three banks together hold \$25,000,000 less gold than they did a year ago.

## GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 1, 1896.		September 1, 1896.		October 1, 1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£44,980,056	.....	£46,872,048	.....	£40,386,442	.....
France.....	78,010,739	£49,885,208	82,728,549	£50,215,122	79,080,790	£49,758,208
Germany.....	81,085,775	12,812,475	80,849,884	15,424,686	29,646,887	14,838,183
Austro-Hungary...	24,402,600	12,775,000	28,562,000	12,884,000	29,054,000	12,796,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,456,000	10,710,000	8,528,000	10,510,000
Netherlands.....	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,694,000	6,888,000	2,636,000	6,842,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,663,338	1,381,667	2,684,667	1,342,338	2,660,338	1,329,667
Totals.....	£192,708,908	£93,901,344	£202,276,598	£97,444,121	£191,939,982	£96,053,053

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—Rates for money in Europe have been advancing. The Bank of England advanced its rate from 2 to 2½ per cent. and again to 3 per cent. The Bank of Berlin and the Swiss banks advanced their rate to 4 per cent. The open market rates on the Continent have generally advanced from ½ to 1¼ per cent.

## MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	Apr. 17.	May 15.	June 19.	July 17.	Aug. 14.	Sept. 13.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2	2	2	2	2	2½
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Loans—Day to day.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½
Berlin, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Hamburg, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Frankfort, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Amsterdam, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½
Vienna, ".....	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½	3½
St. Petersburg, ".....	6½	6½	6½	6½	6½	6½
Madrid, ".....	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½	4½
Copenhagen, ".....	8	8	8	8	8	8

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—Rates for sterling exchange fluctuated widely during the month, the market being affected by a number of influences—the heavy imports of gold, the maturing of sterling loans and arbitrage dealings in stocks. The very large movement of gold caused an advance late in the month, but the grain and cotton shipments may be expected shortly to bring bills on the market in sufficient supply to prevent any great advance in rates. The following tables show the condition of foreign exchange markets.

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	June 1.	July 1.	August 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.87½ — ¾	4.87 — ¼	4.88 —	4.82 — 3¼	4.83½ — 3
" " Sight.....	4.88½ — ¾	4.88 — ¼	4.89 —	4.84 — 4¼	4.85½ — 1½
" " Cables.....	4.88½ — 9	4.88½ — 12	4.89½ —	4.84½ — 4¾	4.85½ — 6
" " Commercial long.....	4.87 — ¼	4.89½ — ¾	4.87½ — ¾	4.81½ — ¾	4.82½ — ¾
" " Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.88½ — ¾	4.89 — ¼	4.87 — ¼	4.81 — 1½	4.81½ — 2½
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.14½	5.15½ — 15	5.14½ — 3¾	5.30 — 19½	5.18½ — 7½
" Bankers' 60 days.....	5.16½ — ¼	5.17½ — 6¾	5.16½ —	5.22½ — 1¾	5.20½ —
" Bankers' sight.....	5.15 — 4¾	5.15½ —	5.15 — 4¾	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — 1½
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days.....	5.18½ — 18	5.19½ — 8½	5.18½ — 12	5.25½ — 4¾	5.20½ — 1½
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.16½ — 5¾	5.16½ —	5.16½ — 5¾	5.21½ — 6	5.18½ — 1½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½
" Bankers' sight.....	95½ — ¾	95½ — ¾	95½ — 1½	94½ — 5	95½ — ¾
Brussels—Bankers' sight.....	5.15 —	5.15½ —	5.15½ — 15	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — 1½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40 —	40 — 1½
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	27 — 1½	27 — 1½	27 — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.47½ — 45	5.50 — 45	5.50 — 40	5.60 — 60	5.60 — 60

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Sept. 5.....	4.82½ @ 4.82¾	4.84 @ 4.84½	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.82 @ 4.82½	4.81½ @ 4.81¾
" 12.....	4.81½ @ 4.82	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.80¾
" 19.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.80¾
" 26.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80½ @ 4.80¾
Oct. 3.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.85½ @ 4.86	4.83½ @ 4.83	4.81½ @ 4.82½

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	June 17, 1896.	July 15, 1896.	Aug. 12, 1896.	Sept. 16, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£26,590,515	£27,387,770	£27,476,410	£26,835,985
Public deposits.....	18,150,787	6,951,901	6,215,330	6,514,798
Other deposits.....	52,325,365	58,448,143	55,094,111	50,263,086
Government securities.....	15,205,022	14,980,281	14,956,995	14,944,006
Other securities.....	28,734,469	28,880,421	28,596,618	28,347,085
Reserve of notes and coin.....	39,339,878	37,599,898	38,462,190	32,110,428
Coin and bullion.....	49,079,193	48,187,668	47,138,600	42,146,413
Reserve to liabilities.....	50½s	50s	50½s	50½s
Bank rate of discount.....	2s	2s	2s	2s
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	1½s	1½s	1½s	1½s
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	112½	118½	112½	109½
Price of silver per ounce.....	31½d.	31½d.	31½d.	30½d.
Average price of wheat.....	25s. 1d.	24s. 7d.	23s. 6d.	23s. 6d.

**SILVER**—The silver market in London was very quiet during the month and the price was weak. Opening at 80 11-16d per ounce the price touched 80d on September 14, subsequently reached 80 7-16 and closed at 80 5-16d, a net decline for the month of ¾d per ounce. The lowest price for silver since April, 1895, was 80d recorded in December and again touched last month.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894, 1895, 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	31½	30½	27½	27½	30½	30½	July.....	28½	28½	30½	30½	31½	31½
February	30½	27½	27½	27½	31½	30½	August..	30½	28½	30½	30½	31½	30½
March....	27½	27	30½	27½	31½	31½	Septemb'r	30½	29½	30½	30½	30½	30
April.....	29½	29½	30½	29½	31½	30½	October..	29½	28½	31½	30½	30½	30
May.....	29½	28½	30½	30½	31½	30½	Novemb'r	29½	28½	31	30½	30½	30
June.....	28½	28½	30½	30½	31½	31½	Decemb'r	28½	27½	30½	30	30½	30

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—Government expenditures were small last month—less than \$26,500,000—a decrease as compared with August of nearly \$10,000,000, but notwithstanding this fact there was a deficit of \$1,846,000. The receipts were the smallest since April, 1895, excepting only in April last and aggregated only \$24,584,000. Customs revenues were nearly \$1,000,000 less than in

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	September, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.	Source.	September, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.
Customs.....	\$11,374,117	\$35,890,942	Civil and mis.....	\$6,120,000	\$30,371,032
Internal revenue.....	11,679,136	87,943,007	War.....	4,830,000	14,567,947
Miscellaneous.....	1,530,991	6,371,600	Navy.....	2,990,000	8,992,971
			Indians.....	710,000	3,392,737
Total.....	\$24,584,244	\$79,175,550	Pensions.....	11,454,000	36,981,115
Excess of expendi- tures.....	\$1,846,755	\$25,045,594	Interest.....	297,000	9,945,320
			Total.....	\$26,431,000	\$104,221,144

August, and \$8,000,000 less than in September last year. For the three months of the present fiscal year a deficit of more than \$25,000,000 is shown, comparing with about \$10,000,000 last year, \$700,000 in 1894, and \$19,000,000 in 1893.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	June 30.	July 31.	August 31.	Sept. 30.
Net gold.....	\$102,418,008	\$110,567,322	\$101,708,672	\$124,124,222
Net silver.....	86,331,904	88,830,116	26,773,680	16,643,222
U. S. notes.....	88,980,861	67,704,664	75,189,381	62,632,216
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).....	22,432,899	28,700,225	27,599,106	21,316,293
Deposits in National banks.....	16,778,461	16,284,421	16,624,322	16,443,281
Available cash balance.....	\$266,942,129	\$262,147,249	\$246,786,161	\$241,039,305

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$27,804,400	\$34,523,447	\$44,705,957	\$29,237,670	\$32,529,340	\$49,845,507
February.....	22,888,057	25,606,085	87,085,511	26,059,228	26,749,936	123,962,979
March.....	25,470,576	25,716,957	90,463,807	26,041,149	27,274,994	125,646,461
April.....	24,247,836	32,900,876	91,247,144	24,282,896	28,967,381	125,393,900
May.....	25,272,078	28,558,214	99,151,409	24,643,718	28,426,562	108,345,234
June.....	25,615,474	21,688,029	107,512,262	27,794,219	25,444,789	101,609,606
July.....	29,069,698	38,548,064	107,236,487	29,029,200	42,068,468	110,718,746
August.....	28,962,696	32,588,185	100,329,837	23,562,097	35,701,676	100,957,561
September.....	27,549,678	24,320,482	92,911,974	24,564,244	26,431,000	*124,124,222
October.....	27,901,748	34,503,425	92,943,180			
November.....	25,966,508	27,199,288	79,838,966			
December.....	26,288,938	25,814,317	68,262,268			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—There were \$3,700,000 of Government bonds deposited to secure National bank circulation last month, and a net increase in circulation of more than \$4,000,000; a total increase in the past year of nearly \$21,000,000. The lawful money deposited to retire bank notes was reduced \$348,000 last month, and \$5,281,000 since September 30, 1895.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	June 30, 1895.	July 31, 1895.	Aug. 31, 1895.	Sept. 30, 1895.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$225,912,980	\$225,942,455	\$229,526,449	\$233,552,080
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	205,538,329	206,103,504	210,293,574	214,667,694
Circulation secured by lawful money....	20,374,651	19,838,951	19,232,875	18,884,386
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Four per cents. of 1895.....	31,783,550	32,630,050	34,954,580	35,804,550
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	10,046,000	9,531,000	9,633,000	9,949,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,078,106	22,241,100	22,938,850	22,574,350
"    1907, 4 per cent.....	151,950,450	151,774,450	152,984,450	154,515,950
Five per cents. of 1894.....	13,057,850	13,067,850	15,192,850	15,828,850
Total.....	\$226,915,950	\$229,544,450	\$235,078,700	\$238,773,300

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1895, \$1,360,000; Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$735,000; 2 per cents. of 1891, \$883,000; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$12,265,000; 6 per cents. of 1894, \$385,000, a total of \$15,578,000.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$87,327.

NEW YORK CITY BANKS.—The movement of money to interior points was an important factor in the local banking situation last month and not until late in the month did the very large imports of gold show any particular effect in the statements issued by the clearing-house banks. Deposits declined \$6,000,000 up to

September 12, making \$30,000,000 withdrawn in about two months. Since that date deposits have increased \$9,000,000. Loans were reduced until the last week of the month, the contraction aggregating \$5,000,000, but in the week ended October 3 there was an increase of \$2,600,000. The banks gained \$8,500,000 in specie during the month but hold about the same amount of legal tenders as they did a month ago, after losing \$6,000,000 in the first two weeks. The surplus reserve has been nearly doubled, now being \$16,500,000 against \$8,800,000 a month ago.

## NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Sept. 5...	\$453,070,100	\$49,196,900	\$70,799,600	\$447,071,800	\$8,228,550	\$17,979,500	\$477,535,800
" 12...	452,696,800	51,981,800	68,219,600	445,654,300	8,767,825	18,711,700	430,258,400
" 19...	451,686,800	53,435,300	68,512,100	445,976,100	10,454,875	19,221,100	491,071,800
" 26...	450,541,100	54,330,900	71,977,300	448,368,700	14,216,025	19,709,100	478,781,400
Oct. 3...	453,166,000	55,801,100	74,406,200	454,733,100	16,526,025	19,960,400	575,764,800

## DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$506,437,800	\$30,815,150	\$549,201,400	\$35,268,850	\$501,069,300	\$15,939,875
February.....	551,908,400	111,623,000	546,965,200	36,751,500	490,447,200	30,623,400
March.....	531,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,064,500	490,612,200	24,442,150
April.....	547,744,200	83,600,150	504,240,200	18,413,450	481,795,700	17,005,975
May.....	573,853,800	83,417,950	536,966,100	27,233,575	496,004,100	22,944,275
June.....	572,138,400	77,985,100	566,229,400	41,221,250	496,874,100	22,250,675
July.....	573,337,800	74,803,350	570,496,300	34,225,925	496,046,900	20,323,275
August.....	581,556,000	69,053,700	574,304,500	40,917,175	486,014,000	17,723,600
September.....	585,973,900	65,820,825	574,929,900	39,149,925	451,934,800	8,836,200
October.....	586,633,500	60,791,825	549,136,500	22,296,175	454,733,100	16,536,025
November.....	595,104,900	63,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400		
December.....	579,835,600	52,220,800	530,788,000	18,613,300		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$595,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table:

## BOSTON BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Specie.	Legal Tenders.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Sept. 5.....	\$160,479,000	\$122,602,000	\$7,259,000	\$6,061,000	\$10,065,000	\$72,177,100
" 12.....	159,732,000	132,008,000	7,278,000	6,398,000	10,061,000	64,852,900
" 19.....	159,103,000	134,082,000	7,863,000	7,135,000	10,134,000	78,470,800
" 26.....	159,619,000	135,377,000	8,505,000	6,901,000	10,174,000	76,679,000
Oct. 3.....	160,711,000	136,856,000	8,566,000	6,965,000	10,239,000	94,763,000

## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
September 5.....	\$102,518,000	\$94,519,000	\$25,526,000	\$6,634,000	\$49,868,900
" 12.....	102,263,000	94,116,000	24,924,000	6,678,000	52,347,900
" 19.....	102,219,000	94,307,000	25,348,000	6,520,000	55,890,700
" 26.....	101,965,000	94,456,000	25,551,000	6,798,000	55,657,500
October 3.....	101,778,000	96,926,000	27,153,000	6,805,000	62,230,000

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion:



## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ 60		Twenty marks.....	\$4.75	\$4.80
Mexican dollars.....	50 $\frac{1}{2}$	\$ 52	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilean pesos..	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.79	4.88
English silver.....	4.86	4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$	Mexican doubloons.....	15.55	15.75
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.88	4.90	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.60
Five francs.....	94	97	Ten guilders.....	3.95	3.99
Twenty francs.....	8.86	8.91			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 80 $\frac{1}{2}$ d per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 66 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 66 $\frac{1}{2}$ c. Fine silver (Government assay), 66 $\frac{1}{2}$  @ 67c.

**FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.**—There was an extraordinary increase in the exports of merchandise in August as compared with either 1894 or 1895, although the movement was smaller than in 1891 or 1898. Imports on the other hand were the smallest in a number of years past. The exports were \$19,194,842 in excess of the imports, a showing not paralleled in many years. The total exports for the eight months ending August 31 were nearly \$571,000,000, the largest in six years excepting 1892. The imports were only \$471,000,000, the smallest in six years except 1894. The net exports were nearly \$100,000,000 for which there is no corresponding record in recent years. There were net imports of gold of \$2,073,841 in August, and net exports of silver of \$4,872,012. For the eight months there were net exports of gold \$24,793,801 and of silver \$38,219,459. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and seven months ended July 31, for the past six years:

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF AUGUST.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$72,685,541	\$85,953,360	Exp., \$6,732,181	Imp., \$1,222,587	Exp., \$1,488,715
1892.....	64,846,905	71,242,385	Imp., 6,395,480	Exp., 5,716,069	" 1,701,118
1893.....	73,689,731	58,641,186	Exp., 15,042,546	Imp., 40,622,529	" 1,366,891
1894.....	80,776,147	51,697,072	Exp., 9,079,075	Exp., 1,935,308	" 3,500,467
1895.....	55,980,601	71,111,943	Imp., 15,131,324	Imp., 15,133,175	" 3,490,021
1896.....	68,652,667	49,458,325	Exp., 19,194,842	Imp., 2,073,841	" 4,872,012
EIGHT MONTHS.					
1891.....	554,738,885	595,641,417	Imp., 10,902,532	Exp., 71,585,079	Exp., 4,573,678
1892.....	602,401,616	598,639,947	Exp., 33,761,669	Exp., 49,490,439	" 8,961,841
1893.....	531,195,075	579,024,760	Imp., 47,829,685	" 15,569,965	" 15,569,167
1894.....	517,819,601	452,942,344	Exp., 64,877,257	" 74,233,231	" 24,869,636
1895.....	499,387,403	535,737,819	Imp., 36,350,416	" 27,675,734	" 27,063,745
1896.....	570,982,453	471,222,434	Exp., 99,760,019	" 24,793,801	" 38,219,459

## GOLD MOVEMENT FOR FOUR YEARS.

	1893-1894.	1894-1895.	1895-1896.	1896-1897.
July.....	Imp., \$5,776,401	Exp., \$12,823,572	Exp., \$3,296,067	Exp., \$9,097,738
August.....	" 40,622,529	" 1,935,303	" 15,133,175	Imp., 2,073,841
September.....	" 5,242,083	Imp., 418,118	" 16,674,609	
October.....	" 1,072,919	" 519,851	" 76,857	
November.....	" 4,139,832	" 1,507,388	" 13,468,188	
December.....	Exp., 1,908,300	Exp., 9,424,439	" 14,170,896	
January.....	" 573,790	" 24,068,459	" 198,586	
February.....	" 1,068,335	Imp., 4,067,003	Imp., 9,375,389	
March.....	" 2,929,241	" 4,120,290	" 293,653	
April.....	" 9,402,110	" 2,629,761	Exp., 2,662,498	
May.....	" 23,124,058	" 3,271,193	" 18,499,415	
June.....	" 22,376,872	" 1,963,750	" 6,077,597	
Year.....	Exp., \$4,528,942	Exp., \$30,984,449	Exp., \$80,588,649	

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The mints coined \$8,140,923 gold and \$2,754,185 silver last month. Of the latter \$2,700,100 was in standard silver dollars. The Government resumed the coinage of these dollars in February last and since that time has added nearly \$14,000,000 to the stock of these coins.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES MINTS.

	1895.		1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$3,698,300	\$574,000	\$12,914,600	\$85,000
February.....	6,143,800	491,000	1,240,000	1,500,000
March.....	2,896,102	573,537	1,549,555	1,683,531
April.....	4,639,300	595,000	1,500,000	1,831,000
May.....	4,163,938	440,503	2,857,200	1,826,490
June.....	1,750,000	440,043	2,471,217	1,550,893
July.....	2,910,000	277,000	2,918,200	1,062,000
August.....	3,672,200	748,000	3,315,000	2,686,000
September.....	7,543,573	473,167	3,140,923	2,754,185
October.....	7,215,700	820,000		
November.....	6,916,300	190,169		
December.....	8,097,145	75,592		
Year.....	\$59,616,357	\$5,698,011	\$31,897,196	\$15,388,899

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION.**—The changes in the amount of money in circulation were of extraordinary magnitude last month, the total being \$49,652,000 greater than it was a month ago. There was an increase of \$14,644,521 in gold coin and certificates, an increase of \$3,067,297 in standard silver dollars and \$8,691,580 in silver certificates, a decrease of \$2,298,477 in Treasury notes of 1890, an increase of \$17,582,566 in greenbacks, a decrease of \$4,090,000 in currency certificates, and an increase of \$5,006,837 in National bank notes. The following statement shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on the dates named, the estimated population and the per capita circulation:

## MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$484,728,547	\$445,293,944	\$463,995,939	\$478,771,490
Silver dollars.....	59,205,927	51,999,797	53,445,831	56,513,178
Subsidiary silver.....	64,417,685	59,063,561	69,069,467	60,228,298
Gold certificates.....	42,936,439	39,293,479	38,867,639	38,736,639
Silver certificates.....	396,076,648	331,656,671	345,739,894	354,431,474
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	115,723,769	93,944,532	91,262,524	88,964,047
United States notes.....	230,855,873	237,410,538	231,964,734	249,547,800
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	31,605,000	41,540,000	38,365,000	34,335,000
National bank notes.....	206,653,836	214,066,620	215,793,526	220,804,963
Total.....	\$1,579,206,724	\$1,514,903,142	\$1,539,106,634	\$1,582,302,289
Population of United States.....	70,630,000	71,518,000	71,645,000	71,774,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$22.36	\$21.18	\$21.48	\$22.05

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—While the Treasury gained a considerable amount of gold last month it had to give up other kinds of money for it, and at the close of the month it was about \$800,000 poorer than at the beginning, which fact is explained by the deficiency in the Government revenues. In every kind of currency except gold the Treasury holdings show a decrease, the largest

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$83,378,362	\$119,371,284	\$106,561,114	\$121,772,737
Gold bullion.....	29,820,815	30,640,941	33,264,086	40,998,574
Silver Dollars.....	864,083,702	379,852,244	361,066,160	380,698,963
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	118,763,758	116,681,743	114,829,899
Subsidiary silver.....	12,764,321	16,004,145	15,909,801	15,126,483
United States notes.....	116,826,143	109,270,478	114,718,282	97,133,716
National bank notes.....	7,063,137	11,963,422	13,815,370	12,834,494
Total.....	\$737,547,542	\$785,826,272	\$782,004,553	\$788,384,366
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	533,344,856	506,438,682	514,265,067	516,437,180
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$204,202,686	\$279,387,590	\$267,739,496	\$266,947,206

reduction being in the old legal-tenders of which there were \$17,500,000 released from the Treasury last month.

**THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE COUNTRY.**—The stock of money in the country was increased more than \$42,000,000 last month, making a total gain since August 1 of \$55,000,000. There is now \$641,500,000 of gold in the United States, an increase of \$37,500,000 last month and \$42,500,000 since August 1. There was an increase of \$2,700,000 in silver dollars and a decrease of \$1,800,000 in silver bullion, most of the difference representing profit made by the Government in turning silver bullion into coin. The increase of \$4,000,000 in National bank notes makes up the total gain in the money supply. The following statement shows the amount of each kind of money in the country on the dates mentioned:

**TOTAL SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$568,108,939	\$564,685,228	\$570,557,083	\$600,544,227
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	30,640,941	33,264,086	40,593,574
Silver dollars.....	423,259,689	431,832,041	434,502,041	437,232,141
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	118,753,758	116,681,740	114,829,269
Subsidiary silver.....	77,182,006	75,667,706	75,639,288	75,354,781
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	218,716,973	228,030,042	229,613,896	233,699,367
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,783,409,410</b>	<b>\$1,794,290,732</b>	<b>\$1,806,909,180</b>	<b>\$1,849,249,486</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—There was no important change in the financial position of the Government during the month. The bonded debt is exactly the same as it was a month ago, but the net debt less cash in the Treasury was increased about \$2,000,000, making the total increase since January 1, \$33,000,000. A comparative statement of the debt on the dates named is given below:

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Aug. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
1907, 4.....	559,631,750	559,637,750	559,637,800	559,637,800
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	50,510	46,600	46,580	46,580
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
1925, 4.....	62,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$747,361,960</b>	<b>\$847,364,250</b>	<b>\$847,364,280</b>	<b>\$847,364,280</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,674,510	1,633,640	1,622,960	1,621,790
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863
National bank note redemption acct.....	22,659,734	19,688,546	19,229,828	18,845,768
Fractional currency.....	6,863,394	6,891,184	6,891,184	6,890,504
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$376,288,992</b>	<b>\$373,315,094</b>	<b>\$372,856,876</b>	<b>\$372,471,635</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.....</b>	<b>1,125,325,462</b>	<b>1,222,312,984</b>	<b>1,221,843,596</b>	<b>1,221,457,655</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	50,099,889	40,687,189	40,496,189	40,239,539
Silver.....	345,702,504	344,032,504	337,204,504	364,476,504
Certificates of deposit.....	34,450,000	42,160,000	39,225,000	34,715,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	137,771,230	123,843,230	126,741,230	125,004,230
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$568,023,673</b>	<b>\$555,212,973</b>	<b>\$563,656,973</b>	<b>\$564,524,233</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,693,349,135</b>	<b>1,777,525,957</b>	<b>1,785,500,569</b>	<b>1,785,981,888</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	787,573,447	851,863,747	849,398,746	849,642,773
Demand liabilities.....	609,551,247	595,705,275	606,042,346	606,498,317
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$178,022,200</b>	<b>\$256,158,472</b>	<b>\$243,346,400</b>	<b>\$241,154,455</b>
Gold reserve.....	63,262,268	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	114,764,932	156,158,472	143,346,400	141,154,455
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$178,022,200</b>	<b>\$256,158,472</b>	<b>\$243,346,400</b>	<b>\$241,154,455</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.....</b>	<b>947,296,262</b>	<b>966,164,512</b>	<b>978,497,196</b>	<b>960,308,230</b>

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of September, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1896.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				SEPTEMBER, 1896.				
	High.	Low.	Highest.			Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.	
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	23½	3½	17¾	Feb.	24	8¼	Aug.	7	13¾	10½	13¼
" preferred	36½	16	28¾	Feb.	24	14¾	Aug.	7	20¾	16½	20¾
Atlantic & Pacific	2	½	¾	Feb.	6	¾	Jan.	7	.....	.....	.....
Baltimore & Ohio	66¾	32½	44	Jan.	27	10½	Sept.	2	14¾	10½	14
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts.	24	19	25	May	16	15	Feb.	11	.....	.....	.....
Canadian Pacific	62¾	33	62¾	May	27	52	Jan.	4	58	57	57¾
Canada Southern	57¾	42	51¾	Feb.	10	40¾	Aug.	7	46¾	43¾	46¾
Central of New Jersey	116¾	51½	109¾	Apr.	23	87¾	Aug.	10	104¾	94¾	108¾
Central Pacific	21¾	12	15¾	Feb.	15	13¾	Aug.	22	14¾	13¾	14¾
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cts.	20¾	12½	18¾	Apr.	23	11	Aug.	8	15¾	13¾	15¾
Chicago & Alton	160	147	160	Jan.	18	148	Aug.	11	157	150¾	157
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	62¾	60	82¾	Apr.	24	53	Aug.	7	71	60¾	70¾
Chicago & E. Illinois	57	43¾	42	Feb.	13	37¾	Aug.	10	.....	.....	.....
" preferred	108	90	100¾	Mar.	5	90	Aug.	11	.....	.....	.....
Chicago Gas	78¾	49¾	70¾	May	4	44¾	Aug.	8	63¾	53¾	61¾
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	78¾	53¾	79¾	June	17	59¾	Aug.	10	73¾	65¾	71¾
" preferred	130	114¾	130¾	Mar.	2	117¾	Aug.	7	129¾	125	126
Chicago & Northwestern	107¾	87¾	106¾	Apr.	23	85¾	Aug.	10	100	95	99¾
" preferred	151	137	150	June	30	140¾	Aug.	23	145	145	145
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	84¾	59	74¾	Feb.	24	49¾	Aug.	7	68¾	55¾	62¾
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	46	28¾	45¾	Apr.	27	30¾	Aug.	8	39	36	38¾
" preferred	123¾	104	125¾	July	3	117	Jan.	7	120	118	120
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	50	28	36¾	Feb.	10	19¾	Aug.	8	27¾	23	27
" preferred	97	63¾	90¾	Feb.	20	73	Aug.	7	80	75	75
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	11¾	3	4¾	Jan.	16	¼	July	18	¾	¾	¾
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41¾	20¾	34¾	Feb.	24	14¾	Aug.	7	21¾	17	21
Columbus & Hock. Val. Coal	27¾	9	4¾	Mar.	7	¾	July	9	.....	.....	.....
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	97¾	14¾	18¾	Jan.	27	12¾	Aug.	10	16	13	16
" preferred	69¾	55	60	July	22	50	June	22	55	53	55
Consolidated Gas Co.	161¾	126	164¾	Apr.	23	133	Aug.	10	149¾	141	149¾
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	134¾	118	129¾	Feb.	11	114¾	Aug.	10	124¾	119¾	124¾
Delaware, Lack. & Western	174	154	166	June	5	138	Aug.	10	153	150	153¾
Denver & Rio Grande	17¾	10	14	Feb.	4	10	Aug.	25	.....	.....	.....
" preferred	55¾	32¾	51	Feb.	24	37	Aug.	7	43¾	40¾	43¾
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102¾	94	100¾	May	6	89	Jan.	2	111¾	12	14¾
Eric	.....	.....	15¾	Mar.	12	10¾	Aug.	7	14¾	12	14¾
" 1st pref.	.....	.....	41¾	Mar.	17	27	July	29	31¾	27¾	31¾
" 2d pref.	.....	.....	25	Mar.	16	13	Aug.	6	18¾	17	18¾
Evansville & Terre Haute	51	28	34¾	Feb.	24	24	Aug.	15	27	27	27
Express Adams	153	140	150¾	Apr.	23	135	Aug.	25	145	143	143¾
" American	119½	100	116	May	25	105	Aug.	18	111	108	111
" United States	50	36	49	Apr.	24	35	Aug.	25	37¾	35	35
" Wells, Fargo	115	95	101	Feb.	15	80	Aug.	14	95	85	85
Great Northern, preferred	134	100	121	May	7	108¾	Mar.	13	120	120	120
Illinois Central	106	81¾	98	Jan.	31	84¾	Aug.	11	91¾	88	91¼
Iowa Central	11½	5½	10¼	Feb.	8	5¼	Aug.	13	7¾	6¾	7¾
" preferred	38	19	38	Apr.	23	19	Aug.	7	23	22¾	27
Laclede Gas	33¾	14¾	30	Apr.	27	17	July	20	25¼	18¾	25
Lake Erie & Western	23	12¾	22¾	Feb.	5	12¾	Aug.	10	16¾	14¾	16
" preferred	85	61	75	Feb.	7	55¾	Aug.	8	68¾	63	68¾
Lake Shore	153¾	134¾	154¾	June	17	134¾	Jan.	7	147	141	147
Long Island	22¾	8	22	Jan.	7	68	July	29	70	68	68
Long Island Traction	22	5	22	Feb.	19	16	Jan.	10	.....	.....	.....
Louisville & Nashville	66¾	30	55¾	Feb.	24	37¾	Aug.	26	44¾	36¾	43¾
Louis., N. A. & Chic. Tr. cts.	10¾	6	10¼	Feb.	18	1	Aug.	26	2¾	1¾	2¾
" preferred	20¾	15¾	24¾	Feb.	13	4	Aug.	26	7	5	5¾
Manhattan consol.	119¾	96	113¼	Feb.	11	73¾	Aug.	13	85¾	79¾	85¾
Michigan Central	108	91¾	97¾	Feb.	11	80	Aug.	26	92	90	92
Minneapolis & St. Louis	26¾	14	21¾	Feb.	21	12	Aug.	21	16	12	14
" 1st pref.	88	73	83	Feb.	21	54	Aug.	8	68¾	65	65
" 2d pref.	62	30¼	53¾	Apr.	22	30	Aug.	10	43	38	43
Mobile & Ohio	27	13¾	25	Jan.	11	14	Aug.	10	18¾	17	18¾
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9¾	13¾	Feb.	21	9¼	Aug.	6	11	10	10¾
" preferred	41	18¾	31¾	Feb.	25	16	July	20	24¾	20¾	24¾

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1895.		SEPTEMBER, 1895.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42½	18½	20½—Apr. 24	15—Aug. 7	21½	17	21
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis.....	81½	64					
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104½	90	90½—Feb. 25	88—Aug. 6	93½	91½	92½
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18½	10	15—Jan. 22	9—Aug. 11	12	10	11½
1st preferred.....	75	65	80—Jan. 22	67½—July 28			
2d preferred.....	34½	20	35½—Apr. 13	20—Aug. 10	29	27	28
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	15½	7½	17½—Feb. 20	13½—Jan. 7			
preferred.....	30	16	29—Feb. 20	25—Jan. 22			
N. Y. & New England.....	65½	29	51½—Jan. 23	35—July 21	45	45	45
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.....	218	174	186—Feb. 10	160—July 23	165½	164½	165½
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	19½	11½	15½—Jan. 31	11½—Aug. 10	14½	12½	14
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	14½	6½	11½—Jan. 31	6—Aug. 11	9½	7½	8½
preferred.....	43½	19½	31½—Feb. 6	12—Aug. 8	23½	19	23
Norfolk & Western.....	6¼	1¼	9½—Sept. 29	1½—Apr. 29	9½	8½	9½
preferred.....	19½	8	14½—Sept. 30	4½—May 8	14½	12½	14½
North American Co.....	7	2½	6½—Feb. 24	5½—Aug. 7	5½	4½	5
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8½	2½	14½—Sept. 30	1½—May 23	14½	9½	14½
preferred.....	27	10½	22—Sept. 30	10—Apr. 16	22	17½	21½
Ohio & Mississippi.....							
Ohio Southern.....	19½	4					
Oregon Improvement.....	14½	8	4½—Jan. 4	¼—June 12	14	¼	¼
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	32	17	22—Apr. 14	10—Feb. 18	18	18	18
Oregon Short Line.....	11½	3½	16—Sept. 25	3½—Apr. 14	16	12½	15
Pacific Mail.....	84½	20	31—Feb. 10	15½—Aug. 7	21	18	20½
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	7½	2	3½—Feb. 10	1½—June 23	2½	1½	2
Phila. & Reading 3d ins. pd.....	22½	4½	20—Sept. 30	2½—Jan. 7	20	13½	19½
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	22½	12	18½—Feb. 7	11—Aug. 7	13½	11½	13
preferred.....	80½	43½	56—Feb. 27	40½—Aug. 12	47	44	44
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34½	18	20½—Jan. 31	17—Jan. 15			
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178½	146	164—Feb. 11	138—Aug. 7	149	140	149½
Rio Grande Western.....	19½	15	18½—Feb. 10	16—Feb. 8			
preferred.....	46½	30	46½—Feb. 10	39—Jan. 27			
Rome, Wat. Ogden's g.....	120	112½	116½—Apr. 27	108—Sept. 15	111	108	110½
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	36½	60½—Jan. 3	53—Aug. 14	57½	57½	57½
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	94	4½	5½—Feb. 7	2½—Aug. 10	3½	3½	3½
preferred.....	19½	8	13—Feb. 26	6½—Aug. 7	9½	7½	9
St. Paul & Duluth.....	35½	18	27½—Feb. 24	15—Sept. 16	19½	15	19½
preferred.....	95	80	91—Feb. 10	84—Sept. 10	84	84	84
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116½	104	115—Jan. 11	105—Aug. 11	112	110½	111½
Southern Pacific Co.....	20½	16½	22½—Jan. 14	15—Sept. 29	17	15	15½
Southern Railway.....	14½	7	11—Feb. 6	6½—Aug. 7	9	7	8½
preferred.....	44½	22	38½—Feb. 25	15½—Aug. 8	24½	19½	24½
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co....	46½	18½	34½—Feb. 10	18—July 20	23½	17½	22½
Texas & Pacific.....	14½	6½	9½—Feb. 25	5—Aug. 7	7½	6½	7½
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	4½	½					
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17½	4	10—Apr. 21	3½—Jan. 25	7½	5	6½
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	6½	2½	5½—Feb. 13	1½—July 29	1½	1½	1½
Wabash R. R.....	10½	5	7½—Feb. 24	4½—Aug. 7	6½	5½	6½
preferred.....	26½	12½	19½—Feb. 24	11—Aug. 7	15½	12½	15½
Western Union.....	96½	82½	87½—Apr. 22	72½—Aug. 10	84½	77	83½
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	18½	6½	13½—Feb. 14	5½—Aug. 27	6½	5½	6
preferred.....	54½	29	40½—Feb. 13	20½—Aug. 8	27½	24	27½
Wisconsin Central.....	7½	2½	4½—Feb. 24	1½—Aug. 21	2	2	2
"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:							
American Co. Oil Co.....	30½	14	19—Jan. 27	8—July 20	14	9	12
preferred.....	79½	59	68½—Feb. 14	37—Aug. 10	50	44	49½
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121½	86½	120½—Apr. 21	95—Aug. 10	117½	107½	111½
preferred.....	107	90½	104—May 27	92½—Aug. 8	102	96½	100
American Tobacco Co.....	117	68	95—Apr. 2	51—Aug. 10	67½	55½	61½
preferred.....	116	90	108—Feb. 18	95—Aug. 4	96	96½	96
Dts. & Cattle Feed Co.....	25½	7½	20½—Apr. 23	9½—Aug. 7			
General Electric Co.....	41	20	30½—Mar. 13	20—July 16	20½	23½	28½
National Lead Co.....	88	17½	28½—Apr. 21	16—Aug. 10	22½	19	22½
preferred.....	94½	73	91½—Apr. 17	75—Aug. 27	85	80½	85
National Lined Oil Co.....	31½	15	21½—June 23	13—Aug. 21	17	14	16
National Starch Manfg. Co.....	12	5	6½—Feb. 21	4½—Jan. 14			
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	¾	6½—Feb. 7	3½—Aug. 31	5	3½	4½
preferred.....	17	1½	12½—Feb. 7	6½—Aug. 31	9½	6½	9½
U. S. Leather Co.....	24½	7	11½—Feb. 8	5½—July 16	9½	7	8½
preferred.....	97½	58	89½—Feb. 14	41½—Aug. 10	60	45½	56½
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	29—Jan. 13	14½—Aug. 8	18½	16½	17
preferred.....	96½	75	89—Jan. 15	69½—Aug. 18	73	71	71

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 13, '95	....	....	....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1935	7,000,000	Q J	69½	Sept. 29, '96	69½	65	98,000
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1965	95,863,000	A & O	77¼	Sept. 30, '96	77¼	73¼	866,000
{ " adjustment, g. 4's.....	1965	51,728,000	NOV	30¾	Sept. 30, '96	37¼	30½	2,091,000
{ " Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Colorado Midland 1st g. 6's.....	1936	429,000	J & D	77½	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " eng Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	5,821,000	.....	67	Sept. 28, '96	68	67	23,000
{ " cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	973,000	F & A	21	June 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " eng. Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	3,863,000	.....	18	Sept. 30, '96	19½	16	40,000
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1937	18,790,000	J & J	50	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " 2d W. d. g. g. s. f. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	92	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
{ " Western div. inc.....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	¾	Sept. 30, '96	1	¾	58,000
{ " div. small.....	1910	.....	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '93	.....	.....	.....
{ " Central div. inc.....	1922	1,811,000	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).....	1919	3,000,000	A & O	105	July 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ " 5's, gold.....	1885-1925	10,000,000	{ F & A	92	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1988	11,988,000	{ F & A	103	July 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd.....	1900	6,000,000	M & N	83½	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1900	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ B. & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s.....	1900	10,667,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1903	10,483,000	J & J	79	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " 1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
{ " "B".....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
{ Monongahela River 1st g. g. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
{ Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1930	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ A. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. s. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ " coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's.....	1943	7,650,000	{ J & D	115	Sept. 24, '96	115	112	50,000
{ " registered.....	.....	.....	{ J & D	112½	May 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	110½	Sept. 10, '96	110½	110½	5,000
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s.....	1924	3,500,000	A & O	74½	Sept. 30, '96	75	71	40,000
{ " 2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	52	June 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Union Elevated 1st g. g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	72	Sept. 30, '96	73	70	132,000
{ Seaside & Bkin Bdge 1st g. g. 5's.....	1942	1,305,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	76	Sept. 30, '96	76	73	4,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '96	74	74	5,000
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	96	Sept. 17, '96	96	96	1,000
{ Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	119	Sept. 5, '96	119	119	5,000
{ " cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	112	Aug. 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121½	May 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.....	1913	1,349,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ " registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.....	1906	6,500,000	J & D	105	Sept. 30, '96	105	100½	14,000
{ " con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	{ A & O	102½	Sept. 29, '96	102½	102½	3,000
{ " registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	97	Feb. 9, '93	.....	.....	.....
{ Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's.....	1927	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ced. Rap. Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's. 1920		825,000	A & O	105½	May 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's. .... 1921		1,905,000	A & O	102	July 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1908		13,920,000	J & J	107½	Sept. 30, '98	107½	108	38,000
2d mortg. 5's. .... 1913		5,100,000	M & S	101½	Sept. 21, '98	101½	98	15,000
registered. ....			M & S	103½	Apr. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Cin. Mid'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s. 1909		2,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1937		4,880,000	M & N	95	July 3, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chat., Rom. & Colu's g'tg. g. 5's. 1937		2,080,000	M & S	70	July 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
1st consolidated 7's. .... 1890		3,836,000	Q J	103½	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
convertible 7's. .... 1902		1,167,000	M & N	116	June 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6's. .... 1908		486,000	M & N	114	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
gen. mtg. 5's. .... 1897		41,604,000	J & J	115	Sept. 30, '98	115	112	80,000
registered. ....			Q J	111	Sept. 28, '98	113½	111	77,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ascd. 7's. 1900		5,500,000	Q M	102½	Sept. 30, '98	102½	102½	1,000
mortgage 5's. .... 1912		2,887,000	M & N	90	May 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
Am. Dock & Improv'm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	109	Sept. 17, '98	110	109	7,000
N. J. Southern int. gtd 6's. .... 1890		411,000	J & J	109½	July 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Pacific g'd bonds. .... 1897		19,463,000	J & J	100	Sept. 22, '98	100	99½	3,000
San Joaquin br. 6's. .... 1900		6,080,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 29, '98	100	99½	32,000
Mtge. gold gtd. 5's. .... 1939		11,000,000	A & O	104	Aug. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central Pacific land grant 5's. 1900		2,526,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16, '98	84½	84½	2,000
ext g's series A B C D. 1898		5,598,000	J & J	98	May 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's. 1918		4,368,000	J & J	98	Aug. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
Western Pacific bonds 6's. .... 1898		2,735,000	J & J	107½	Nov. 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		3,964,000	J & J	101	Sept. 24, '98	100	100	1,000
50 year m. gg. 5's. .... 1938		4,800,000	A & O	94	Aug. 5, '98	94½	92½	123,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. .... 1936		1,500,000	J & J	108½	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd. .... 1898		2,287,000	J & J	106½	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
6's. g., Series A. .... 1908		2,000,000	A & O	111	Aug. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mortgage gold 6's. .... 1911		2,000,000	A & O	117	Sept. 18, '98	117	115	9,000
1st con. g. 5's. .... 1909		23,553,000	M & N	106½	Sept. 30, '98	107	102½	84,000
registered. ....			M & N	100½	Sept. 21, '98	100½	99	3,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. .... 1902		21,796,000	M & S	71½	Sept. 30, '98	71½	65	210,000
registered. ....			M & S	85	Dec. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
(R. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1899		6,000,000	J & J	93½	Sept. 30, '98	94	93½	28,000
2d con. g. 4's. .... 1899		1,000,000	J & J	83	Sept. 23, '98	83	80	8,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. .... 1940		650,000	J & J	92½	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	98	Dec. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	98	Sept. 24, '98	98	95	8,000
Ches. Ohio & S'hwestern m. 6's. 1911		6,176,800	F & A	105½	Feb. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d mtge. 6's. .... 1911		2,865,000	F & A	48½	Sept. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's. .... 1938		1,984,000	J & J	110½	Aug. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's. 1903		1,832,000	J & J	111½	July 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. .... 1900		1,745,000	F & A	111	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 7's. .... 1900		300,000	M & N	111	July 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's. .... 1898		188,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. f'd g. 6's. 1912		547,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's. .... 1928		8,241,000	A & O	99	Aug. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
deb. 6's. .... 1896		935,000	J & D	97	Jan. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		28,924,000	J & J	115	Sept. 29, '98	115	111½	50,000
5's. sinking fund. .... 1901		2,315,000	A & O	101	Aug. 5, '98	.....	.....	.....
5's. debentures. .... 1913		9,000,000	M & N	95	Sept. 29, '98	97½	92½	30,000
convertible 5's. .... 1903		15,263,900	M & S	96½	Sept. 30, '98	99½	95	20,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's. 1919		2,880,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 21, '98	101½	101½	1,000
4's. .... 1919		7,753,000	A & O	95	Sept. 22, '98	103	95	2,000
Denver div. 4's. .... 1922		6,240,000	F & A	89	Sept. 5, '98	89	89	12,000
4's. .... 1921		3,400,000	M & S	88½	Nov. 6, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. .... 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Nebraska extens'n 4's. 1927		26,730,000	M & N	85½	Sept. 28, '98	85½	84	23,000
registered. ....			M & N	90½	July 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	112½	Sept. 30, '98	112½	109½	22,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	110	Aug. 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
small bonds. ....			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & E. Ill. 1st con. 6's, gold...1904		2,653,000	A & O	125	Sept. 8, '96	125	123 1/4	5,000
"  gen. con. 1st 5's.....1907		7,487,000	M & N	96 1/2	Sept. 30, '96	97 1/4	96 1/4	32,000
"  registered.....1907			M & N	108	Oct. 8, '96			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's.....1906		4,626,000	J & J	98	July 9, '96			
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st m. 8's P. D....1896		3,674,000	F & A	105	Sept. 30, '96	105	103 1/4	31,000
"  2d 7 1/2-10 P. D.....1896		1,124,000	F & A	127	July 11, '96			
"  1st 7's \$ gold, R. div.....1902		3,796,500	J & J	123	Sept. 17, '96	123	123	4,000
"  1st 7's \$.....1902			(J & J)	120	Feb. 8, '94			
"  1st m. Iowa & M. 7's.....1897		2,097,000	J & J	125	Sept. 28, '96	125	125	2,000
"  1st m. Iowa & D. 7's.....1899		444,000	J & J	127 1/2	June 5, '96			
"  1st m. C. & M. 7's.....1903		2,398,000	J & J	125	Sept. 29, '96	125	125	1,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's.....1905		11,299,000	J & J	125	Sept. 28, '96	125	122	3,000
"  1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		3,505,000	J & J	125	Sept. 15, '96	125	125	2,000
"  1st 6's, Southw'n div.....1909		4,000,000	J & J	111	Sept. 25, '96	111	109 1/4	8,000
"  1st 5's, La. C. & Dav.....1919		2,500,000	J & J	106 3/4	Sept. 14, '96	108 3/4	103 3/4	3,000
"  1st So. Min. div. 6's.....1910		7,432,000	J & J	113 1/2	Sept. 28, '96	113 1/2	112 1/2	7,000
"  1st H't & Dk. div. 7's.....1910		5,630,000	J & J	121 1/4	Sept. 19, '96	121 1/4	121 1/4	3,000
"  5's.....1910		990,000	J & J	104 1/2	Sept. 30, '96	104 1/2	101 1/2	18,000
"  Chic. & Pac. div. 6's.....1910		3,000,000	J & J	119	June 17, '96			
"  1st Chic. & P. W. 5's.....1921		25,340,000	J & J	111	Sept. 30, '96	112	108 1/4	94,000
"  Chic. & M. R. div. 5's.....1923		3,063,000	J & J	106	Sept. 28, '96	108	108	20,000
"  Mineral Point div. 5's.....1910		2,840,000	J & J	105	Sept. 29, '96	105	100	25,000
"  Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's.....1921		1,360,000	J & J	106 1/4	July 18, '96			
"  Wis. & Min. div. 5's.....1921		4,755,000	J & J	100 3/4	Sept. 19, '96	107 1/2	100 3/4	7,000
"  terminal 5's.....1914		4,748,000	J & J	108 1/4	Sept. 15, '96	108 1/4	108	3,000
"  Far. & So. 6's assu.....1924		1,250,000	J & J	118	Sept. 20, '94			
"  mtg. con. st'k. f'd 5's.....1916		1,680,000	J & J	96	Jan. 7, '96			
"  Dakota & Gt. S. 5's.....1916		2,856,000	J & J	106	Aug. 25, '96			
"  g. m. g. 4's, series A.....1909		19,010,000	J & J	94 1/2	Sept. 15, '96	94 1/2	92	20,000
"  registered.....			Q J	94 1/2	Dec. 11, '95			
"  Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's.....1910		2,155,000	J & D	116	July 11, '96			
"  1st convt. 6's.....1913		5,082,000	J & D	115	Sept. 28, '96	115	115	2,000
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's.....1915		12,771,000	Q F	134	Sept. 30, '96	135	131	30,000
"  coupon gold 7's.....1902		12,336,000	J & D	117	Sept. 11, '96	117	115 1/4	18,000
"  registered d. gold 7's.....1902			J & D	116	Sept. 24, '96	116	116	4,000
"  sinking fund 6's.....1879-1929		6,011,000	A & O	115	Apr. 10, '96			
"  registered.....			A & O	114	May 27, '96			
"  5's.....1879-1929		7,301,000	A & O	106 3/4	Sept. 30, '96	109 1/2	106	20,000
"  registered.....			A & O	108 1/2	Sept. 29, '96	108 1/2	108 1/2	5,000
"  debenture 5's.....1903		9,800,000	M & N	108	Sept. 18, '96	108	104 1/4	36,000
"  registered.....			M & N	106	Jan. 16, '96			
"  25 year debent. 5's.....1909		6,000,000	M & N	105	Sept. 29, '96	105	105	25,000
"  registered.....			M & N	104	May 15, '96			
"  30 year debent. 5's.....1921		9,800,000	A & O	109 1/2	July 24, '96			
"  registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '95			
"  extension 4's.....1896-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	102	Sept. 4, '96	102	98	2,000
"  registered.....			F A 15	99 1/2	May 11, '96			
"  Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's.....1901		720,000	J & J	107	Sept. 28, '96	107	107	8,000
"  Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
"  Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's.....1900		1,350,000	A & O	116	July 9, '96			
"  Chic. & Milwaukee 1st mtg. 7's.....1898		1,700,000	J & J	104 1/2	July 1, '96			
"  Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,592,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '96			
"  Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	108	Jan. 7, '96			
"  Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1909		1,600,000	M & S	105	July 21, '96			
"  Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	106 1/4	Mar. 31, '96			
"  Mil., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's.....1921		5,000,000	M & N	128	Sept. 23, '96	128	125	29,000
"  con. deb. 5's.....1907		436,000	F & A	104	May 13, '96			
"  ext. & impt. s.f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	109	Sept. 29, '96	109	107	15,000
"  Michigan div. 1st 6's.....1924		1,281,000	J & J	130	July 9, '96			
"  Ashland div. 1st 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	123	Sept. 22, '96	123	123	20,000
"  income.....1923		500,000	M & N	105	July 28, '96			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.....1917		12,100,000	J & J	120 1/2	Aug. 24, '96			
"  6's registered.....1917			J & J	122	July 18, '96			
"  exten. and collat. 5's.....1924		40,417,000	J & J	100	Sept. 30, '96	100 1/2	97 1/2	250,000
"  registered.....			J & J	99 1/2	July 17, '96			
"  debenture 5's.....1921		4,500,000	M & S	91	Sept. 30, '96	91	87 1/4	31,000
"  registered.....			M & S					
"  Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	88 1/2	June 12, '96			
"  1st 2 1/2's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	65	Aug. 7, '99			
"  extension 4's.....		672,600	J & J	84	Oct. 14, '95			
"  Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	A & O	104	Sept. 18, '96	104	103 1/4	4,000
"  small bond.....1923			A & O	103	Apr. 28, '96			



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,413,000	J & D	123½	Sept. 30, '96	124½	118	68,000
{ Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	126¼	Sept. 30, '96	126¼	123¼	3,000
{ North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	125	May 4, '88			
{ St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	126¼	Sept. 24, '96	128	125¼	8,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		1,284,000	M & N	106¼	May 15, '95			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,652,666	Q M	115	Sept. 15, '96	115	113	8,000
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	96¼	Mar. 13, '93			
coupons ca		5,753,000						
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's. 1906		996,000	A & O	120	July 15, '96			
2d g. 4½'s. 1937		2,000,000	J & J	107¼	Dec. 7, '95			
{ Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	106¼	Sept. 24, '96	106¼	100¼	13,000
{ City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	106¼	Apr. 17, '95			
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. cts. 1st 5's for. 1917		2,000,000		70	Aug. 4, '96			
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1906		5,000,000	J & D	86	May 25, '95			
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	98	Oct. 2, '95			
{ St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1900		9,750,000	M & N	90	Sept. 23, '96	90	86¼	31,000
{ registered				80	June 10, '96			
{ Springfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,085,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22, '95			
{ White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16, '95			
{ Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1901		4,000,000	J & J	90	July 20, '96			
{ Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,790,000	Q F	96¼	July 8, '96			
registered				95	Nov. 15, '94			
con. 6's. 1920		738,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29, '93			
{ Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1928		2,571,000	J & J	105	Sept. 28, '96	105	105	1,000
{ Ind. Bloom. & W., 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	109	June 9, '96			
{ Ohio, Ind. & W., 1st pfd. 5's. 1938		500,000	Q J					
{ Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	75	Sept. 25, '96	75	68	30,000
income 4's. 1930		4,000,000		17	Sept. 23, '96	17	17	1,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	106	Sept. 21, '96	106	106	1,000
{ consol mortg. 7's. 1914		3,991,000	J & D	132	Sept. 16, '96	132	132	2,000
{ sink fund 7's. 1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19, '96			
{ gen. consol 6's. 1934		3,206,000	J & J	124	Sept. 10, '96	124	124	3,000
{ registered			J & J					
{ Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	106	Aug. 18, '96			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1933		4,300,000	A & O	105¼	Sept. 29, '96	105¼	103	12,000
{ Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,481,000	J & J	120¼	July 21, '96			
{ registered			Q J					
{ Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1903		8,000,000	M & S	112¼	Sept. 28, '96	112¼	109¼	50,000
{ registered			M & S					
{ Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. 1931		8,000,000	M & S	83	Sept. 30, '96	84	81	66,000
{ gen. mortg. g. 6's. 1904		2,000,000	J & D	83	Sept. 30, '96	83½	80	56,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27, '93			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	125	Sept. 2, '96	125	125	7,000
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4, '95			
{ Morris & Essex 1st m. 7's. 1914		5,000,000	M & N	139	Sept. 30, '96	139	133	65,000
bonds, 7's. 1900		281,000	J & J	106¼	July 25, '96			
7's. 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	184	Sept. 3, '96	184	184	1,000
1st c. gtd 7's. 1915		12,151,000	J & D	139¼	Sept. 30, '96	139¼	138	15,000
registered			J & D	136	June 4, '93			
{ N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	128	Sept. 10, '96	129¼	128	16,000
const. 5's. 1923		5,000,000	F & A	112¼	Aug. 29, '96			
{ Warren 2d 7's. 1900		750,000	A & O	112¼	Nov. 6, '96			
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. 1917		5,000,000	M & S	137¼	Sept. 29, '96	137¼	137¼	1,000
reg. 1917			M & S	140	Sept. 13, '95			
{ Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. 1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Aug. 18, '96			
registered			A & O	128¼	Feb. 12, '94			
6's. 1906		7,000,000	A & O	115	May 8, '96			
registered			A & O	115	July 29, '96			
{ Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	May 21, '96			
1st r 7's. 1921			M & N	141¼	Apr. 20, '96			
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97¼	Feb. 24, '93			
{ Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O					
{ Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J	120¼				
{ Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
{ Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,465,000	J & J	87	Sept. 30, '96	87¼	86	63,000
1st mortg. g. 7's. 1900		6,382,500	M & N	112¼	Sept. 10, '96	112¼	112	22,000
impt. m. g. 5's. 1928		8,103,500	J & D	83	Sept. 14, '96	83	83	10,000
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. Id gtd. 3½ S A. 1911		3,040,000	A & O	19	Sept. 21, '96	19	17	25,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.....1906		900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
g. 4s.....1906		1,250,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....1907		6,322,000	A & O	100%	Sept. 28, '96	100%	100%	10,000
registered.....		.....	A & O	101½	July 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d l m 6s.....1916		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.....1928		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's.....1907		4,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....1907		2,482,000	M & S	104	Sept. 23, '96	104½	108	26,000
2d extended 5's.....1919		2,149,000	M & N	114	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
3d extended 4½'s.....1928		4,618,000	M & S	106	Sept. 23, '96	109	106	18,000
4th extended 5's.....1920		2,928,000	A & O	114	Sept. 23, '96	114	114	2,000
5th extended 4's.....1928		709,500	J & D	104½	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.....1920		16,890,000	M & S	131	Aug. 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....1920		3,705,977	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.....1923		7,500,000	A & O	121½	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....1916		2,380,000	J & D	132½	July 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.....1906		1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.....1909		2,800,000	A & O	102½	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....1902		12,000,000	M & N	109½	Sept. 30, '96	109	104½	94,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....1922		1,100,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....1913		3,396,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.....1906		20,000,000	J & J	89	Sept. 30, '96	89	85½	86,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gen. lien 3-4s.....1906		20,927,000	J & J	60	Sept. 28, '96	60	59½	176,000
registered.....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Eureka Springs R'y 1st 6's.....1903		500,000	F & A	96	Dec. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Evans & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....1921		3,000,000	J & J	106½	Sept. 11, '96	107	106½	3,000
1st General g 5's.....1942		2,098,000	A & O	95	Sept. 14, '94	95	95	5,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....1923		375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....
Sul. Co. Bch. 1st g 5's.....1930		450,000	A & O	96	Sept. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....1926		1,591,000	J & J	90	Dec. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....1920		3,999,000	A & O	113	Sept. 26, '96	113	111	7,000
1st con. gold 5's.....1909		2,100,000	M & N	91	Apr. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....1909		3,068,000	A & O	80	Sept. 25, '96	81½	80	11,000
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....1918		3,000,000	J & J	108	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....1900		423,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....1943		4,370,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....1941		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Worth & D. C. ctf. dep. 1st 6's.....1921		7,899,000	.....	51½	Sept. 28, '96	52	49½	69,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....1928		2,888,000	J & J	50	Sept. 12, '96	50	50	1,000
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's.....1910		4,756,000	F & A	106	Apr. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d mortgage 7's.....1906		1,000,000	J & D	96	Aug. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's.....1901		13,418,000	M & N	90	Sept. 29, '96	91	90	148,000
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's.....1927		5,390,000	J & J	80½	Apr. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
Gd. Rapids & Indiana gen. 5's.....1924		3,746,000	M & S	75	Jan. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's.....1907		2,898,000	M & N	123½	Sept. 30, '96	123½	120	28,000
New Haven & Derby con. 5's.....1918		575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
Houston & Texas Central R. R. 1st Waco & N. 7's.....1908		1,140,000	J & J	126	June 29, '92	.....	.....	.....
1st g 5's (int. gtd.).....1907		7,381,000	J & J	106½	Sept. 25, '96	106½	106	28,000
Con. g 6's (int. gtd.).....1912		3,455,000	A & O	102	Sept. 23, '96	102	102	1,000
Gen. g 4's (int. gtd.).....1921		4,297,000	A & O	68	Sept. 30, '96	69½	67	83,000
Deben. 6's p. & int. gtd. 1907		705,000	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
Deben. 4's p. & int. gtd. 1907		411,000	A & O	88	Mar. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's.....1901		1,500,000	J & J	110	Aug. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
gold 8½'s.....1901		2,469,000	J & J	104	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....		.....	J & J	97	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Illinois Central gold 4's.....	1932	15,000,000	A & O	100	Sept. 9, '98	100	100	3,000
gold 4's regist'd.....	1921		A & O	101	July 27, '95			
gold 4's.....	1953	24,679,000	M & N	100	Sept. 9, '98	100	100	15,000
gold 4's registered.....			M & N					
2-10 g. 4's.....	1904	4,806,000	J & J	99	June 10, '98			
2-10 g. 4's registered.....			J & J					
1st g. 3's sterl. 2500,000.....	1951	2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '98			
registered.....			M & S					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,550,000	F & A	102½	Sept. 8, '98	102½	102½	6,000
registered.....			F & A					
Calro Bridge 4's.....	1950	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '95			
registered.....			J & D					
Springfield div. coupon 5's.....	1908	1,600,000	J & J	100½	Aug. 17, '98			
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1921	600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '95			
Chic., St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....	1907	530,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 21, '94			
1st consol. 7's.....	1907	826,000	M & N	105	Dec. 13, '95			
gold 5's.....	1951	16,528,000	J & D	116	Sept. 28, '98	116	113	73,000
gold 5's registered.....			J & D	115	Oct. 25, '94			
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '95			
registered.....			J & D					
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....	1907	1,384,000	J & J	120	Apr. 25, '95			
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex bonds.....	1906	1,800,000	A & O	28	Apr. 13, '98			
stamped.....								
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1935	1,824,000	J & J	95	Aug. 31, '98			
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....	1939	900,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 20, '98			
1st ext. g. 5's.....	1943	500,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '95			
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold.....	1919	7,954,000	M & N	115	Sept. 4, '98	115	115	4,000
2d mortgage 4½-5's.....	1909	6,568,000	M & S	67	Aug. 24, '98			
3d mortgage 4-4's.....	1921	2,701,000	M & S	14	Aug. 11, '98			
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1938	6,322,000	J & D	94½	Sept. 30, '98	94½	89	94,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,040,000	A & O					
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....	1925	3,177,000	J & J	37½	Sept. 25, '98	37½	37½	5,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....	1929	1,979,000	M & S	60	Mar. 30, '98			
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	113	Aug. 24, '98	114	110	15,000
2d mtge. g. 5's.....	1941	2,000,000	J & J	98	Sept. 18, '98	98	98	2,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	100	Sept. 26, '98	100	100	1,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.								
Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....	1908	2,755,000	F & A	106	July 10, '98			
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....	1906	924,000	A & O	123	July 1, '98			
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....	1909	1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '98			
con. co. 1st 7's.....	1900		J & J	110	Sept. 23, '98	110	109½	9,000
con. 1st registered.....	1901	14,890,000	Q J	108½	Aug. 28, '98			
con. co. 2d 7's.....	1903		J & D	112½	Sept. 3, '98	112½	112½	1,000
con. 2d registered.....	1903	24,682,000	J & D	114	Sept. 19, '98	114	114	5,000
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....	1901	1,000,000	A & O	106	Aug. 12, '98			
Kal. A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1938	840,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '98			
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....	1940	15,000,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 28, '98	99½	97	12,000
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1941	10,000,000	A & O	108	Sept. 17, '98	108	108	11,000
registered.....			A & O	108	Sept. 29, '98	108	107	9,000
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1933	10,280,000	J & J	108	July 27, '95			
registered.....	1933		J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '98			
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's.....	1914	750,000	A & O					
g. 1st gtd 5's.....	1914	1,250,000	A & O					
Lex. Av. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1908	5,000,000	M & S	112	Sept. 30, '98	112½	109	118,000
registered.....			M & S					
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....	1916	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '98			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. cts. for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000		25	Apr. 29, '98			
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....	1906	1,121,000	M & N	104	Sept. 15, '98	104	104	1,000
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1931	3,610,000	Q J	119½	June 29, '98			
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & D	90	Sept. 25, '98	90	90	4,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,500,000	M & S	89	Sept. 29, '98	89	89	11,000
g. 4's.....	1932	325,000	J & D					
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D					
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....	1927	984,000	M & S	102½	Aug. 3, '98			
2d m. inc.....	1927	1,000,000	M & S	40	Mar. 23, '98			
N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....	1907	500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98			
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....	1935	1,228,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '98			
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....	1911	250,000	M & S					
1st 5's.....	1911	750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '98			

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's, 1932		1,075,000	Q & J	103½	June 17, '95	....	....	....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. g'd 5's, 1943		200,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's, 1945		300,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. TrCo. et. gold 5's, 1939		3,406,000	J & J	25½	Sept. 11, '96	25½	25½	1,000
Gen. mtg. g. 4's, 1943		2,432,000	M & S	14	May 8, '95	....	....	....
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's, 1898		7,070,000	A & O	105½	Sept. 30, '96	105½	104½	20,000
Cecilian branch 7's, 1907		600,000	M & S	102	Sept. 3, '96	102	102	1,000
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's, 1896		5,000,000	J & J	113½	Aug. 13, '96	....	....	....
2d 6's, 1930		1,000,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 29, '96	100	99½	12,000
E., Hend. & N. 1st 6's, 1919		2,110,000	J & D	110	Aug. 20, '96	....	....	....
general mort. 6's, 1930		10,486,000	J & D	112	Sept. 21, '96	112	110	2,000
Pensacola div. 6's, 1920		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '96	....	....	....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's, 1921		3,500,000	M & S	118	Aug. 28, '96	....	....	....
2d 3's, 1980		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	....	....	....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's, 1900		1,900,000	J & J	110	Aug. 19, '96	....	....	....
So. N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s, 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '96	92½	92½	5,000
5½ 50 year g. bonds, 1937		1,764,000	M & N	92½	Sept. 29, '96	92½	86	10,000
Unified gold 4's, 1940		14,994,000	J & J	73½	Sept. 30, '96	73½	71	114,000
registered, 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	....	....	....
Pen. & At. 1st 6's, g. 1921		2,870,000	F & A	100	June 23, '96	....	....	....
collateral trust g. 5's, 1931		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '96	....	....	....
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st. g. 4½s, 1945		4,000,000	M & S	105½	Dec. 20, '95	....	....	....
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. g. 5's, 1937		2,066,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '96	....	....	....
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's, 1936		3,673,000	F & A	87½	Aug. 20, '96	....	....	....
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's, 1987		6,742,000	J & J	90	Sept. 18, '96	90	90	2,000
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's, 1945		3,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	102½	Sept. 18, '96	102½	102½	13,000
cons. g. 6's, 1916		4,700,000	A & O	75	Sept. 29, '96	80	75	72,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's, 1940		2,800,000	M & N	40	Sept. 21, '96	45½	40	7,000
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's, 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92	....	....	....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's, 1990		22,973,000	A & O	89½	Sept. 18, '96	90	89½	11,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's, 1934		2,544,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's, 1913		3,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Memphis & Charlestown 6's, g. 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '95	....	....	....
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's, 1908		10,818,000	J & J	118	Sept. 29, '96	118	116	5,000
2d 6's, 1989		4,000,000	M & N	103½	Sept. 23, '96	103½	103	16,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's, 1911		58,963,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '96	....	....	....
1st con. inc. 3's, 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96	....	....	....
2d 3's, 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96	....	....	....
Mexican International 1st g. 4's, 1942		14,000,000	M & S	71¾	Sept. 28, '96	73½	71¾	103,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's, 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	....	....	....
2d inc. 6's "A", 1917		12,265,000	M & S	30	July 16, '96	....	....	....
coup. stamped, 1917						....	....	....
2d inc. 6's "B", 1917		12,265,000	A	5½	July 7, '96	....	....	....
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's, 1910		1,411,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
registered, 1910			J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's, 1902		8,000,000	M & N	116½	Sept. 30, '96	116½	112	39,000
1st con. 5's, 1902		2,000,000	M & N	107	Sept. 23, '96	107	103½	3,000
6's, 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 23, '96	....	....	....
coup. 5's, 1931			M & S	111½	July 24, '96	80	75	....
reg. 5's, 1931		3,576,000	Q & M	115	Apr. 29, '96	....	....	....
mort. 4's, 1931			J & J	195	July 30, '96	....	....	....
mtge. 4's reg., 1940		2,600,000	J & J	102	Jan. 20, '96	....	....	....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's, 1939		476,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's, 1926		5,500,000	F & A	....	....	....	....	....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's, 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 3, '96	....	....	....
1st con. g. 5's, 1934		5,000,000	M & N	99	Sept. 29, '96	99½	97½	17,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's, 1909		1,015,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	....	....	....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's, 1910		636,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96	....	....	....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's, 1921		1,382,000	J & A	115	Aug. 19, '96	....	....	....
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's, 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87	....	....	....
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd.						....	....	....

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1898		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '95	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				89½	June 18, '91	....	....	....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1898		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	....	....	....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,060,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		29,774,000	J & D	81½	Sept. 20, '95	81½	78½	238,000
" 2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	54½	Sept. 20, '95	55½	49½	1,139,000
" 1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30, '95	....	....	....
" of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,898,000	M & S	78	Sept. 20, '95	73	67	22,000
" Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	71	June 30, '95	....	....	....
" Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,940,000	M & N	77	July 15, '95	....	....	....
" Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		598,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	91	Sept. 20, '95	91	85	20,000
Mob. & Birm., prior lien, g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" small. ....		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	80	Sept. 18, '95	80½	79½	24,000
" 3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	90	Sept. 1, '95	90	90	5,000
" trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,876,000	M & S	70	Aug. 14, '95	....	....	....
" registered. ....			M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
" 1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	45	July 28, '95	....	....	....
" registered. ....			F & A	.....	.....	....	....	....
" Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1908		7,000,000	M & S	90½	Sept. 25, '95	100	99½	19,000
" 2d extended g. 5's. .... 1908		2,573,000	F & A	105	May 1, '95	....	....	....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1906		760,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		620,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
St. L. & P'n. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1897		4,000,000	F & A	99½	Sept. 28, '95	99½	98	21,000
St. Louis & P'n. Mount. 2d 7's. 1897		6,000,000	M & N	100½	Sept. 20, '95	100½	100	22,000
" Ark'nass b'nch ext 5's. 1895		2,900,000	J & D	100	Sept. 14, '95	100	100	5,000
" Carlo, Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1897		1,450,000	J & D	100	Sept. 28, '95	100	100	1,000
" g. con. R.R. & l. gr. 5's. 1931		18,845,000	A & O	75	Sept. 29, '95	75	69	60,000
" stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1931		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5, '95	....	....	....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	118½	Sept. 24, '95	114	118½	9,000
" 1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	112	May 1, '95	....	....	....
" gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1908		9,499,500	Q J	85	Sept. 20, '95	85	59	40,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	....	....	....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	111	July 21, '95	....	....	....
" 1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23, '95	....	....	....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1918		6,800,000	J & J	127½	Sept. 20, '95	127½	125	98,000
" 2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27, '95	....	....	....
" 1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		5,084,000	A & O	95	Sept. 28, '95	95	95	16,000
" 1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" 1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '95	....	....	....
" 1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		871,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
N. O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	109½	Aug. 13, '94	....	....	....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		80,000,000	J & J	116	Sept. 29, '95	116	115½	9,000
" 1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	115½	Sept. 20, '95	115½	113½	40,000
" debenture 5's. .... 1904		10,000,000	M & S	102½	Sept. 25, '95	103½	102½	15,000
" debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	102½	Sept. 30, '95	102½	102	9,000
" reg. debent. 5's. .... 1899-1904		1,000,000	M & S	105	Apr. 1, '94	....	....	....
" debenture g. 4's. .... 1906		15,000,000	J & D	99½	Sept. 3, '95	99½	99½	10,000
" registered. ....			J & D	100	Sept. 11, '95	100	100	1,000
" deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		6,450,000	M & N	104	Sept. 14, '95	104	100½	50,000
" registered. ....			M & N	100½	May 12, '95	....	....	....
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	113	Sept. 20, '95	112	110	38,000
" 7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	111½	June 1, '95	....	....	....
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1906		1,660,000	F & A	102	Oct. 3, '94	....	....	....
" reg. certificates. ....			F & A	.....	.....	....	....	....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	104½	Sept. 20, '95	104½	102	281,000
" registered. ....			J & J	104	Sept. 28, '95	104	102	18,000
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's. .... 1906		5,000,000	J & J	107	May 21, '95	....	....	....
" registered. ....			J & J	105½	June 12, '95	....	....	....
" 2d gtd. 5's. .... 1906		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" small bonds series B. ....		38,100	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		800,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's. 1922		9,061,000	A & O	117½	Sept. 20, '96	118	117½	16,000
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		180,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. B. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		875,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	108	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1921		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adirond 1st gtd g. 4's. 1921		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1922		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1927		19,425,000	A & O	103½	Sept. 25, '96	103½	100½	18,000
registered.....			A & O	100½	July 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's. 1905		6,000,000	J & J	116	Aug. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's. 1905		4,000,000	J & J	111½	Sept. 20, '96	111½	110	16,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1908		2,000,000	J & D	106	Dec. 4, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts. \$1,000		15,007,500	A & O	122½	Sept. 28, '96	122½	127	21,000
small certifs. \$100		1,480,000	.....	120½	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's. 1927		1,260,000	A & O	119	Apr. 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1929		5,000,000	J & D	103½	Sept. 19, '96	103½	103½	25,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's. 1922		8,125,000	M & S	84½	Sept. 20, '96	85	82	98,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.			M & S	82½	Aug. 25, '92	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sen. & W. 1st reformed 5's. 1927		3,720,000	J & J	96	Sept. 22, '96	96	94	22,000
2d mortg. 4's. 1927		625,000	F & A	68	Sept. 20, '96	68	64½	14,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's. 1929		2,320,000	F & A	63½	Sept. 29, '96	69	63½	71,000
term. 1st mtg. g. 5's. 1923		2,000,000	M & N	100½	July 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....\$5,000			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1922		3,000,000	J & D	80	Sept. 3, '96	80	80	5,000
Midland R. of N. Jersey 1st 6's. 1910		3,500,000	A & O	114½	Sept. 17, '96	114½	109½	14,000
N. Y., Texas & Mexico g. 1st 4's. 1912		1,442,500	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m. R.R. & L.G.S.F. g.c. 6's. 1921		30,087,000	J & J	112½	Sept. 20, '96	114½	112	47,000
registered.....			J & J	111	Sept. 20, '96	114½	111	106,000
J. P. M. & Co. eng. ctf dep. ....		17,500,000	.....	110	Sept. 29, '96	111	110	11,000
g. 2d lgt. a f g 6's Tr. Co. c. ass.		19,000,000	.....	107	Sept. 29, '96	107	105	27,000
g. 3d lgt. a f g 6's Tr. Co. c. ass.		11,408,000	.....	67	Sept. 29, '96	67	65	46,000
1st gtd coog 6's Tr. Co. c. ass.		44,900,000	.....	46½	Sept. 30, '96	46½	41½	842,000
colts 6's g nts J. P. M. & Co. c.		9,460,000	.....	88½	Sept. 25, '96	88½	85	100,000
reca. ctf. g. 6's July 1, 1897		4,900,000	J	79	Jan. 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
James Riv. Val. 1st g. 6's T. C. cfs. 1926		922,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Spok. & Pal. eng. cfs. 1st sl. f. g. 6's. 1926		1,766,000	M & N	75	Sept. 22, '96	75	75	2,000
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen. 6's. 1923		7,985,000	F & A	119½	Sept. 25, '96	120	119	7,000
registered certificates.....			Q F	122½	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Helena & Red M'tain 1st g. 6's. 1927		400,000	M & S	100	Dec. 30, '91	.....	.....	.....
Dul. & Man. 1st g. 6's. stpd cpts. ....		296,000	J & J	121	July 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. of dep. stmpd. ....		1,364,000	.....	87	July 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
10 p c purchase price paid		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Dak. di. 1st a. f d g. 6's.		1,415,000	.....	79½	Sept. 24, '96	79½	79½	2,000
Tr. Co. ctf. stamped.		4,080,000	J & J	102½	Sept. 28, '96	102½	100	25,000
N. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1923		5,256,000	M & S	84½	Sept. 20, '96	84½	82	7,000
N. P. & Mon. J. P. M. & Co. cf. 1 g. 6's. 1928		360,000	A & O	104	May 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cœur d'Alene 1st gold 6's. 1916		878,000	M & S	102	Jan. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
gen. 1st g. 6's. 1928		1,487,000	.....	54	Apr. 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
Central Wash. Tr. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1928		25,523,000	A & O	42	May 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's. 1921		4,901,000	.....	41½	Sept. 20, '96	41½	38	546,000
U. S. Trust Co. eng. ctf. ....			F & A	40	Sept. 24, '96	40	40	10,000
Seat. L. S. & E. Tr. rec. 1st gtd g. 6's. 1921			F & A	43½	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
assessment paid.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's. 1941		750,000	M & N	106	Aug. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1921		7,288,000	M & N	123½	June 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
New River 1st 6's. 1922		2,000,000	A & O	114	June 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
imptment and ext. 6's. 1924		5,000,000	F & A	97	Feb. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. adjtmnt mtg		1,468,000	Q M	107½	May 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
7's. 1924		4,066,000	.....	82	Apr. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. eqpmnt g. 5's. ....		8,875,000	J & J	66	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. gold 5's. 1920		3,200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Nos. above 10,000		2,475,000	.....	55	Feb. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Clinch V. div. g. 5's			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Md. & W. div.			.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's. 1941		6,809,500	J & J	69½	May 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
Sci'o Val. & N. E. 1st g. 4's. 1929		5,000,000	J & N	81	Sept. 20, '96	81	78	36,000
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's. 1922		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdb'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's. 1920		3,500,000	A & O	94	Apr. 13, '96	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ogdensburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1920		800,000	O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdensburg & L. Chapl. inc. small		200,000	O	82	Feb. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. con. akg. fund 7's... 1898		3,435,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 11, '98	101½	101½	1,000
" consolidated 7's... 1898		3,060,000	J & J	102	Sept. 24, '98	102	101	9,000
" 2d consolidated 7's... 1911		2,952,000	A & O	111	Apr. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st Springf'd d. 7's... 1906		1,984,000	M & N	101	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st general 5's... 1902		405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's... 1898		2,000,000	J & D	85	Sept. 30, '98	85	85	10,000
" gen. mortg. g 6's... 1897		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's... 1921		3,924,000	J & D	87	Sept. 29, '98	87	78	118,000
" gen. mortg. g 4's... 1921		1,548,000	M & N	18	Sept. 30, '98	18	17	14,000
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certa... 1921		1,255,000	.....	45	May 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's 1907		2,717,000	.....	89	July 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oregon & California 1st g 5's... 1927		18,642,000	J & J	71½	Sept. 17, '98	71½	71½	3,000
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's 1910		4,146,000	J & D	74	Sept. 30, '98	75	74	4,000
" con. mortg. g 5's... 1909		1,258,000	A & O	12½	Sept. 30, '98	12½	10	40,000
" Trust Co. certificates... 1909		5,291,000	.....	11½	Sept. 28, '98	11½	10	42,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. 1st 6's... 1909		5,078,000	J & J	108½	Sept. 29, '98	108½	108½	48,000
" consol. m 5's... 1925		496,000	J & D	62	June 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Trust Co. certifis... 1925		12,488,000	61	Sept. 4, '98	61	61	.....	3,000
" Tr. Co. cts for col. trg 5's 1919		5,092,000	.....	92	Aug. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's... 1920		1,815,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1900... 1920		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1902... 1920		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Panama s. f. subsidy g 6's... 1910		1,846,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	108½	Sept. 25, '98	108½	107½	37,000
" reg... 1921		.....	J & J	111	June 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitta., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s								
" Series A... 1940		10,000,000	A & O	107	Sept. 29, '98	107	107	7,000
" Series B... 1942		10,000,000	A & O	108	Sept. 9, '98	108	106	4,000
" Series C... 1942		2,000,000	M & N	110½	July 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series D gtd. 4's... 1945		3,000,000	M & N	101	Sept. 19, '98	101	101	2,000
Pitta., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's... 1940		6,963,000	F & A	111	July 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st reg. 7's... 1900		2,917,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitta., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's... 1912		2,546,000	J & J	140½	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's... 1912		2,546,000	J & J	134½	July 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 3d 7's... 1912		2,000,000	A & O	128	Aug. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis & P. 1st c. 5's... 1932		1,508,000	A & O	115½	July 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1932		.....	A & O	110	May 8, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitta. con. s. fund 7's... 1900		1,508,000	M & N	114	Aug. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series A... 1942		3,000,000	J & J	118½	Apr. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 4½ Series B... 1942		1,581,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's... 1897		1,899,000	J & J	101½	Sept. 30, '98	101½	101½	7,000
" 2d 7's... 1898		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 7's... 1898		1,600,000	M & N	105½	Jan. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½'s 1941		3,840,000	J & J	107	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's... 1942		5,899,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's... 1923		1,675,000	.....	108	June 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds... 1920		22,762,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sterling Gold 6 per cent... 1920		4,718,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Currency 6 per cent... 1906		4,718,000	Q Mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Gold 5 per cent... 1919		4,998,000	Q Mch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Gold 4 per cent... 1943		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g. 4½'s... 1935		5,646,000	M & S	110	Dec. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's... 1944		5,646,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's 1920		1,287,000	J & J	100	Sept. 29, '98	100	100	2,000
" Evansville div. 1st 6's... 1920		1,470,000	M & S	101	Mar. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cts. 2d mort 5's 1928		1,778,000	M & N	28	May 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's... 1921		1,500,000	Q F	109½	June 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 2d m 4½'s... 1921		1,499,000	M & N	69	July 29, '98	.....	.....	.....

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				Price	Date.	Highest.	Low.	Total.
Phil. & Read. gen. g 4's Tr. Co. ctf's.		44,663,000	.....	76½	Sept. 30, '96	77	71½	1,670,000
" 1st pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs.		28,434,000	.....	36½	Sept. 30, '96	37	31	1,763,000
" 2d pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs.		15,442,000	.....	24½	Sept. 30, '96	24½	18½	1,016,000
" 3d pref. inc. .... 1866				13½	Feb. 7, '96			
" 3d pr. in. con. .... 1868		21,634,462	F	3	Sept. 22, '96	8	2½	40,000
" Tr. Co. ctf's 3d instal. pd....				22½	Sept. 30, '96	23	16	972,000
Pine Creek Railway 6's.....1892		8,500,000	J & D	123½	Oct. 26, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1892		2,400,000	A & O	106½	Apr. 5, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. 1892		1,440,000	J & J	124	Mar. 12, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A, 1893		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 25, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1892		2,350,000	J & J	117	May 31, '96	....	....	....
" 2d g. 6's. .... 1894		900,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
" McK'port & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. .... 1918		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	95½	Apr. 2, '96	....	....	....
Pitts., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		8,000,000	A & O	88	Aug. 6, '96	....	....	....
" 1st cons. 5's. .... 1943		786,000	J & J	83½	June 5, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		9,700,000	J & J	70	Sept. 28, '96	70	66½	17,000
" Mort. g. 5's. .... 1891-1941		3,500,000	M & N	79½	Sept. 9, '96	....	....	....
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1827		1,562,000	M & N	.....	.....	....	....	....
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1899		15,200,000	J & J	70	Sept. 30, '96	70	67	127,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1899		1,850,000	J & D	96	Jan. 13, '96	....	....	....
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4, 1940		4,510,000	J & J	67½	Feb. 10, '96	....	....	....
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	....
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st 6's. 1825		553,000	M & N	44	May 11, '96	....	....	....
" Cent. Tst Co. ctf's of deposit		6,447,000	J & J	40	Sept. 23, '96	40½	38	28,000
" St. Joseph & Grand 1st 2d inc. .... 1825		1,680,000	J & J	10	Aug. 2, '96	....	....	....
" Coupons off. ....				3	June 25, '96	....	....	....
" Kansas C'y & Omaha 1st g. 5's. 1827		2,940,000	J & J	37½	Oct. 16, '96	....	....	....
St. Louis, A. & T. H. 1st 2T. g. 5's. 1914		2,200,000	J & D	106	Sept. 4, '96	106	106	5,000
" registered.			J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
" Belleville & Southern I. 1st 8's. 1896		1,041,000	A & O	103	Sept. 5, '96	103	103	1,000
" Belleville & Carott 1st 6's. .... 1823		485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '96	....	....	....
" Chic., St. L. & Pad 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1917		1,000,000	M & S	102	Oct. 2, '96	....	....	....
" St. Louis, South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1831		550,000	M & S	70½	May 28, '96	....	....	....
" 2d inc. 5's. .... 1831		126,000	M & S	72½	Nov. 25, '91	....	....	....
" 1st con. 5's. .... 1839		369,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
" Carbond'e & Shaw't'n 1st g. 4's. 1832		250,000	M & S	.....	.....	....	....	....
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A, 1906		500,000	M & N	115½	June 15, '96	....	....	....
" 2d g. 6's. Class B. .... 1906		2,786,500	M & N	113	Sept. 29, '96	113	111½	12,000
" 2d g. 6's. Class C. .... 1906		2,400,000	M & N	113	Sept. 29, '96	113	109½	6,000
" 1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,042,000	F & A	118	May 23, '92	....	....	....
" gen. g. 6's. .... 1831		7,807,000	J & J	106	Sept. 29, '96	106	108	10,000
" gen. g. 5's. .... 1831		12,293,000	J & J	93	Sept. 30, '96	93	90	7,000
" 1st Trust g. 5's. .... 1867		1,099,000	A & O	87½	Sept. 29, '96	87½	87½	5,000
" Trust Co. ctf's for Cons.				.....	.....	....	....	....
" 4's all installments paid.		14,184,000	A & O	24	June 19, '96	....	....	....
" Kansas City & So. W. 1st 6's. g. 1916		744,000	J & J	85	Feb. 6, '91	....	....	....
" Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		335,000	A & O	100½	May 16, '96	....	....	....
" St. Louis, Kan. & So. W. 1st 6's. 1916		732,000	M & S	100	Jan. 19, '96	....	....	....
" Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1837		1,608,000	J & D	.....	.....	....	....	....
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. .... 1899		20,000,000	M & N	68½	Sept. 28, '96	70½	66	75,000
" 2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. .... 1899		8,000,000	J & J	27	Sept. 26, '96	27½	24½	82,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1837		2,480,000	J & J	90	Aug. 8, '96	....	....	....
" gtd. gold 5's. .... 1837		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '96	....	....	....
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	114	Aug. 24, '94	....	....	....
" 2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	101	Sept. 3, '96	101	101	2,000



**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's, 1909			J & J	103	July 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
" small .....		357,000	J & J	106	July 29, '84	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 6's .....	1909	8,000,000	A & O	118	Sept. 17, '96	120½	118	6,000
" Dakota ext'n 6's .....	1910	5,076,000	M & N	114	Sept. 23, '96	114	113½	4,000
" 1st con. 6's .....	1903	13,344,000	J & J	119½	Sept. 23, '96	119½	117	19,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered .....			J & J	120	Aug. 19, '95	.....	.....	.....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s .....		20,323,000	J & J	100	Aug. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
" 1st cons. 6's register'd .....			J & J	105	Nov. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's, 1937		7,805,000	J & D	88	Sept. 21, '96	90½	88	5,000
" registered .....			J & D	89	Aug. 19, '95	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's .....	1922	2,150,000	J & J	124	July 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		6,000,000	J & J	113	Sept. 14, '96	113	111	13,000
" 1st 6's, registered .....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
" 1st g. g. 5's .....	1937	2,700,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 2, '96	100½	100½	2,000
" registered .....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's, 1908		4,700,000	A & O	103	Sept. 14, '96	105	102½	3,000
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's, 1938		3,625,000	A & O			.....	.....	.....
" registered .....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's, 1943		18,886,000	J & J	54	Sept. 30, '96	54	48½	114,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's, 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100	Mar. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's .....	1934	4,056,000	A & O	114	July 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's .....	1926	2,500,000	J & J	98	Apr. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold, 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '86	.....	.....	.....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's, 1919		5,250,000	M & N	94½	June 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	93½	Sept. 28, '96	93½	93	33,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's .....	1905-12	30,677,500	A & O	108	Sept. 23, '96	108	108	1,000
" g. 5's .....	1888-1938	652,000	A & O	85½	May 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. gtd. g. 5's .....	1937	18,402,000	M & N	86	Sept. 28, '96	87½	86	50,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g. 6's .....	1941	1,920,000	J & J	82½	Sept. 29, '96	83½	82½	113,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's .....	1937	5,500,000	J & J			.....	.....	.....
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's .....	1911	4,180,000	J & J	103½	Sept. 30, '96	103½	102	110,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g. 5's, 1904		25,830,000	J & J	85	Sept. 30, '96	86	82½	457,000
" registered .....			J & J			.....	.....	.....
East Tenn. reorg. lien g. 4's .....	1938	4,500,000	M & S	91	June 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
" registered .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
Alabama Central 1st 6's .....	1918	1,000,000	J & J	107½	June 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's .....	1897	500,000	A & O	121½	May 25, '92	.....	.....	.....
" Income .....	1900	750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's .....	1916	2,000,000	J & J	113	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's .....	1900	3,123,000	J & J	107½	Sept. 23, '96	107½	106½	23,000
" divisional g. 5's .....	1930	3,106,000	J & J	111½	Sept. 25, '96	111½	108	28,000
" con. 1st g. 5's .....	1956	12,770,000	M & N	105	Sept. 21, '96	105	103½	8,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g. 5-6's .....	1922	5,660,000	J & J	104½	Sept. 8, '96	104½	103	4,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g. 6's .....	1925	2,000,000	J & J	111½	Sept. 28, '96	111½	110½	10,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g. 6's .....	1915	5,597,000	J & J	117	Sept. 28, '96	117	114	14,000
" equip. sink. f'd g. 5's, 1909		1,328,000	M & S	98½	Apr. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
" deb. 5's stamped .....	1927	3,368,000	A & O	100	Apr. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's .....	1906	600,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" small .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
" ser. B 6's .....	1911	1,900,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" small .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
" ser. C 6's .....	1916	1,100,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" small .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
" ser. D 4-5's .....	1921	950,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" small .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
" ser. E 5's .....	1926	1,775,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
" small .....			M & S			.....	.....	.....
" ser. F 5's .....	1931	1,310,000	M & S			.....	.....	.....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's .....	1936	2,302,000	M & N	98½	Sept. 30, '96	98½	87½	12,000
" gen. 5's, gtd. stamped .....	1926	2,460,000	M & N	93	Sept. 18, '96	93	93	5,000
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's .....	1924	1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '95	.....	.....	.....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g. 6's .....	1914	2,531,000	J & J	103	Sept. 3, '96	103	103	2,000
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g. 4½'s, 1943		500,000	J & D			.....	.....	.....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1st g. 4½'s, 1939		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 1st con. g. 5's .....	1894-1944	4,500,000	F & A	100	Sept. 14, '96	100½	100	30,000
" St. L. Mers. bldg. Ter. gtd. g. 5's, 1930		3,500,000	A & O	103½	Oct. 9, '95	.....	.....	.....
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g. 6's, 1914		414,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '95	.....	.....	.....
Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's .....	1905	1,620,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '96	.....	.....	.....
" Sabine d. 1st 6's .....	1912	2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '96	.....	.....	.....
" con. m. g. 5's .....	1943	1,620,000	F & A	94½	Sept. 29, '96	95	92	134,000

# BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. { fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth	1906	3,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st gold 5's.....	2000	21,049,000	J & D	81½	Sept. 30, '96	81½	77½	156,000
2d gold income, 5's.....	2000	23,227,000	M & S	104	Sept. 30, '96	104	102	652,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's.....	1987	5,000,000	J & J	119½	Sept. 28, '96	119½	117½	7,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's.....	1985	3,000,000	J & J	105	Sept. 2, '96	105	105	1,000
1st M. g 5's West. div.....	1935	2,500,000	A & O	107½	July 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. g. 5's.....	1985	1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's.....	1930	2,340,000	A & O	78	Sept. 30, '96	78	78	2,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's.....	1917	4,400,000	J & D	69	Sept. 18, '96	69	67	12,000
Tol., St. L. & K. C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 5's.....	1918	3,234,000	M & N	69	Sept. 25, '96	69	64	26,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's.....	1928	1,852,000	J & D	90½	Sept. 28, '96	90½	90	3,000
Union Pacific 1st 6's.....	1896	27,229,000	J & J	105	Sept. 25, '96	105	99½	48,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1897		J & J	97	Sept. 30, '96	97	97	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1898		J & J	105	Sept. 25, '96	105	105	14,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1899		J & J	95	July 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1900		J & J	102	Sept. 28, '96	105	99½	33,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1901		J & J	97	Sept. 30, '96	98	95	39,000
collat. trust 6's.....	1908		J & J	101	Sept. 21, '96	102	100	6,000
5's.....	1907		J & J	98	Sept. 23, '96	98	98	2,000
g 4½'s.....	1918		J & J	93½	Sept. 28, '96	95½	95	9,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....	1894		J & D	95	June 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
gold notes, 6's stampd.....	1894	3,983,000	M & N	50	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ext. sink'g f'd g 5's.....	1899	4,970,000	F & A	50½	Apr. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....	1899	2,070,000	F & A	94	Sept. 23, '96	94½	94	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....	1899	1,991,000	M & S	75	Sept. 25, '96	76	73	14,000
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's.....	1896	1,461,000	F & A	93	Apr. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1896	779,000	106½	Sept. 30, '96	106½	108½	.....	6,000
1st 6's.....	1896	2,169,000	J & D	112½	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1896	1,894,000	J & D	95½	June 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
Denver div. aseed. 6's.....	1899	2,973,000	M & N	111	July 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps	1899	2,914,000	J & J	96½	June 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. 6's.....	1919	1,237,000	M & N	60	July 23, '96	60½	60½	136,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs.....	1899	10,488,000	M & N	66½	Sept. 28, '96	66½	60½	.....
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. f'd cps 7's.....	1895	630,000	M & N	96	June 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atch., Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's.....	1905	4,070,000	Q F	29	Aug. 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
At. Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's.....	1905	542,000	Q F	37½	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
U. P., Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g 5's.....	1918	4,480,000	A & O	24½	Sept. 23, '96	24½	20½	9,000
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g 5's.....	1939	15,801,000	J & D	31½	Sept. 29, '96	31½	28½	219,000
Or. S. L. & U. N. Tr. Co. cts. 1st c. g 5's.....	1919	10,492,000	A & O	68	Sept. 30, '96	68	57	221,000
assented.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's.....	1922	4,171,000	F & A	109½	Sept. 29, '96	109½	105½	61,000
Trust Co. cts. of dep.....	.....	10,780,000	J & J	107½	Sept. 30, '96	109	104	273,000
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's.....	1908	689,000	J & J	115	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's.....	1926	1,877,000	J & J	100	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Utah So'n Tr. Co. cts. gen. mtg 7's.....	1909	858,000	J & J	59	Sept. 18, '96	59½	59	7,000
Tr. Co. cts. ext. 1st 7's.....	1909	1,366,000	J & J	59½	Sept. 18, '96	59½	57	2,000
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g. 6's.....	1921	1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
Coupon off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's.....	1899	31,664,000	M & N	104½	Sept. 30, '96	105	102	290,000
2d mortgage gold 5's.....	1899	14,000,000	F & A	68	Sept. 28, '96	69	66	318,000
deben. mtg series A.....	1899	3,500,000	J & J	21½	Sept. 30, '96	22	20	90,000
series B.....	1899	25,740,000	J & J	97	July 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st g 5's Det. & Chi. ex.....	1940	3,600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. 1st 6's.....	1908	1,000,000	A & O	108	July 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
Western N.Y. & Penn. 1st g. 5's.....	1907	10,000,000	J & J	102½	Sept. 17, '96	102½	102	16,000
gen g. 2-3-4's.....	1943	10,000,000	A & O	40	Sept. 23, '96	40	37½	17,000
inc. 5's.....	1943	10,000,000	Nov.	11½	Sept. 25, '96	11½	10½	40,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's.....	1911	3,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's.....	1926	3,000,000	A & O	100	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's.....	1928	1,540,000	J & J	96	Jan. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
exten. and imp. g. 5's.....	1890	1,608,000	F & A	91	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
consol mortgage 4's.....	1932	1,600,000	J & J	62½	July 20, '96	.....	.....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g 5's.....	1937	2,384,000	J & J	27	Aug. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Trust Co. certificates.....	1937	9,636,000	.....	35	Sept. 30, '96	35	29½	218,000
income mortgage 5's.....	1937	7,775,000	A & O	6	Jan. 9, '96	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,088,000	Q F	106½	Sept. 23, '98	106½	105	15,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	63½	Sept. 30, '98	63½	60	251,000
Am. Water Works Co. 1st 6's. 1907		1,800,000	J & J	106	July 8, '91			
1st con. g. 5's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100½	May 13, '89			
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
Boat. Un. Gas tet ctf's s'k f'd g. 5's. 1939		7,000,000	J & J	81½	Sept. 5, '95			
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		12,386,000	M & M	105	Sept. 31, '96	105	102	98,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		16,000,000	F & A	97	Sept. 29, '96	97	95	7,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1937		10,000,000	J & J	89	Sept. 26, '96	89	77	2,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	105	July 3, '96			
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	95	Sept. 8, '96	95	95	2,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		700,000	J & J	99	Feb. 8, '96			
Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,048,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 10, '92			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '96			
Colo. Hock. Val. C'l & I'n g. 6's. 1917		980,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94			
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1897		1,250,000	J & J	157½	Feb. 29, '96			
Con'ts Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1936		4,846,000	J & D	78	Sept. 30, '96	79	77	7,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	F & A	69½	Sept. 29, '96	71	68½	24,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	107	Sept. 30, '96	108	105½	19,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1905		2,130,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 24, '96	100	99½	12,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96			
registered.			A & O					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's. 1902		2,500,000	M & S	111½	May 7, '95			
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1906		2,000,000	J & J	90	Aug. 24, '96			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		8,750,000	J & D	89	Sept. 29, '96	89	82	50,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 26, '95			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdr Co. 1st s'k f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,755,000	M & N	110	May 31, '94			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	86	May 8, '96			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	82	Oct. 2, '95			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 18, '95			
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	92	Sept. 30, '96	92	87	62,000
small bonds.				97½	Nov. 1, '95			
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N					
Manh. Bch H. & L. lhm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '96			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92			
registered.			M & N					
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S					
Mutual Union Tel. Skg. F. 6's. 1911		1,957,000	M & N	107	Sept. 16, '96	107	107	1,000
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g 6's. 1920		3,897,000	J & J	94½	Sept. 24, '96	94½	94½	2,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g 5's conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g 6's. 1910		448,000	F & A	82½	May 5, '96			
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 13, '89			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	102	Feb. 29, '96			
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	104	Aug. 20, '96			
1st con. g 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	99	Sept. 22, '96	99	96½	20,000
Peoria Water Co. g 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g 6's. 1920		580,000	M & N	106½	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '96			
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102½	June 3, '96			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's. 1917		1,299,000	A & O	81½	Sept. 29, '96	81½	72	16,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,460,000	J & J	82	Sept. 24, '96	82	79½	79,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '95			
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's. 1910		2,484,000	F & A	92	Dec. 3, '95			

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
U.S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. rect's		6,245,100	.....	22½	Sept. 30, '96	24	15½	115,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb. 1915		6,000,000	M & N	110	Sept. 26, '96	110	110	19,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's. 1910		640,000	J & D					
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		8,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '96			
7's registered.....1900			M & N	106	Sept. 30, '96	107	106	7,000
debenture, 7's.....1884-1900		1,000,000	M & N	106	Aug. 25, '96			
registered.....			M & N					
col. trust cur. 5's.....1898		8,405,000	J & J	103	Sept. 30, '96	103	102	14,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's. 1919		866,000	J & J	68	Sept. 23, '96	68	68	1,000
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's. 1908		570,000	J & D					

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1896.		SEPTEMBER SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,100	Q M	95	91	91	91	1,000
4's registered.....1907			J A J & O	110½	104½	107	105½	60,000
4's coupon.....1907		559,634,000	J A J & O	111½	106	107½	107	63,000
4's registered.....1925		162,815,400	Q F	118½	111½	115½	113½	40,000
4's coupon.....19-5			Q F	119	111½	117½	115½	770,000
5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113½	109	110½	110	50,000
5's coupon.....1904			Q F	114½	108½	111½	109½	102,000
6's currency.....1907		9,712,000	J & J	103½	103½			
".....1898		29,904,962	J & J	105	103	106	103	19,000
".....1899		14,004,580	J & J	107½	106			
4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee) 1898		1,680,000	MAR					
".....1897		1,680,000	MAR					
".....1898		1,680,000	MAR					
".....1899		1,680,000	MAR					

## ILLINOIS STATE BANKS.—Statement of condition, Sept. 1, June 3, and Mar. 17, 1896.

RESOURCES.	Sept. 1, 1896.	June 3, 1896.	Mar. 17, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$83,256,291	\$87,659,717	\$85,077,209
Overdrafts, secured and unsecured.....	239,824	315,676	261,808
United States bonds.....	572,796	856,426	479,403
Other bonds and stocks.....	10,248,139	10,162,418	10,193,605
Cash on hand.....	14,782,628	12,911,862	12,414,598
Due from other banks.....	18,816,524	16,269,574	14,448,656
Banking house.....	489,896	433,817	489,744
Other real estate.....	810,948	736,625	702,699
Furniture and fixtures.....	278,175	283,284	287,349
Current expenses.....	185,212	280,490	227,811
Checks and other cash items.....	2,475,455	3,736,558	2,742,247
Collections.....	136,102	170,614	128,293
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$127,291,996</b>	<b>\$133,367,071</b>	<b>\$127,432,923</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock.....	\$18,919,500	\$18,749,500	\$18,739,500
Surplus fund.....	7,547,135	7,476,965	7,463,378
Undivided profits.....	8,467,637	8,485,752	2,909,127
Dividends unpaid.....	6,275	5,109	17,321
Savings deposits subject to notice.....	37,665,012	31,816,405	30,249,738
Individual deposits subject to check.....	39,720,414	51,216,941	46,214,359
Demand certificates of deposit.....	3,748,641	4,693,942	3,843,563
Time certificates of deposit.....	8,507,321	7,284,271	9,207,016
Certified checks.....	691,947	896,407	788,459
Cashiers' checks outstanding.....	532,570	438,902	854,359
Due to other banks.....	6,353,702	7,341,179	6,853,701
Bills payable.....	104,940	184,700	199,531
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	25,300	289,994	92,300
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$127,291,996</b>	<b>\$133,367,071</b>	<b>\$127,432,923</b>

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

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**Barbour.**—Hon. James Barbour, for nearly twenty-five years President of the Bank of Maysville, Ky., died at Clifton Springs, N. Y., Sept. 18, aged seventy-six years.

**Brown.**—Andrew H. Brown, Cashier of the First National Bank, Nicholasville, Ky., died Aug. 19.

**Bushong.**—Jacob Bushong, who was the head of the once famous Bushong banking house, which failed twenty years ago, at Reading, Pa., died September 24, aged seventy-two years. Mr. Bushong was largely instrumental in building the Wilmington and Northern and Schuylkill and Lehigh railroads.

**Doyle.**—James B. Doyle, President of the Northwestern National Bank, Philadelphia, and a director of the Bucks County Trust Co., Doylestown, Pa., died Sept. 15 at the age of sixty years.

**Ebert.**—Fred H. Ebert, Assistant Cashier of the Farmers' Bank, of Loudonville, Ohio, died recently at the age of twenty-four years.

**Emerson.**—Charles Emerson, a member of the banking firm of Emerson and Buckingham, Longmont, Colo., is dead.

**Hutchinson.**—M. Hutchinson, President of the Bordentown (N. J.) Banking Co., died Sept. 10, aged seventy-three years. He had been a member of the Legislature, was a lawyer as well as banker, and left a valuable estate.

**Jordan.**—Francis Jordan died at St. Joseph, Mich., Sept. 22, aged eighty-three years. He was born on the Island of Helligoland, in the North Sea, and came to New York when 14 years old and learned shipbuilding. In 1871 he organized the First National Bank, at St. Joseph, which was later merged into the Union Banking Co. He was President from 1871 to 1893, when he retired from business. He amassed a large fortune.

**Keith.**—Edson Keith, a director of the Metropolitan National Bank, Chicago, died recently.

**Pratt.**—Enoch Pratt, banker, merchant and philanthropist, died at his country residence near Baltimore, Md., Sept. 17.

Mr. Pratt celebrated the eighty-eighth anniversary of his birth on Sept. 10. Notwithstanding his age, he was until a few weeks ago sound physically and mentally, and every day gave evidence of his vigor in the conduct of his business affairs. The extreme heat of early August prostrated him. Since then he has not been at the National Farmers and Planters' Bank, with which institution he had been connected as director and President since 1869. Mr. Pratt was also president of the Baltimore Clearing-House Association. He gave upwards of one million dollars to found a free public library in Baltimore, and at his death made large bequests to charitable institutions. An extended sketch of Mr. Pratt's business career, accompanied by an excellent portrait, appeared in RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING for August, 1896, page 617.

**Strong.**—Cyrus Strong, long identified with the banking business at Binghamton, N. Y., died Sept. 21, aged eighty-two years.

**Turley.**—Theodore J. Turley, Secretary of the Nashville (Tenn.) Trust Co., died Sept. 4.

**Tyner.**—Geo. W. Tyner, President of the Bank of Salem, Iowa, died recently at the age of fifty-five years.

**Vance.**—John T. Vance, Cashier of the Bank of Romney, W. Va., died Sept. 5, aged seventy years.

**Walter.**—Theophilus V. Walter, Manager of the London and San Francisco Bank, Tacoma, Wash., died Sept. 3. Mr. Walter was born in London in 1854, and had been connected with the bank in that city and later in San Francisco and Portland. When the Tacoma branch was established in 1890 Mr. Walter was appointed Manager, in which position he remained until his death.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTIETH YEAR.

NOVEMBER, 1896.

VOLUME LIII., No. 5.

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THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION is an overwhelming victory for the gold standard, for the preservation of the national credit and in favor of a just and honest payment of public and private obligations. The result makes it entirely clear that the American people resent the idea of repudiation in whatever form it may be proposed. In addition it is a stern and emphatic rebuke to the companions of the repudiationists, the inciters of sectionalism and the preachers of class hatred. It means that the unity of the country is to be preserved, and that the threat to debauch the highest judicial tribunal of the land in the interest of rioters is not to succeed. Finally, it is a splendid vindication of the good sense of the American people and the soundness of public opinion upon questions of vital concern.

But it would be a great mistake to assume that the sound money victory is a mere party triumph. The stand taken by the Republican party at St. Louis in favor of the gold standard and the unequivocal declarations of Major MCKINLEY placing himself squarely upon that plank of the platform, were commendable and made the issue clear. But the magnitude of the victory was made possible by the votes of large numbers of Democrats who wanted sound money to win and cast their ballots directly for the Republican candidate as the surest way of helping to bring about that result. It was this vote that swelled the Republican pluralities in States ordinarily voting with that party and turned the tables in a number of States heretofore Democratic.

In view of this the verdict must be construed as an exhibition of the indignation of the people on account of the assaults made on the national honor. The great majority which the people piled up was for a principle, not for a party.

That free silver, or fiat money, should have obtained so deep a hold upon the popular mind as to carry any considerable number of

States is a remarkable circumstance. The scarcity of currency in certain localities at particular seasons of the year, and the strain put upon the banks at the money centres in providing funds to market the crops, are conditions that have probably fostered the cry for "more money." With the primary question of the standards definitely settled, as it was by the election of November 3, it will not be a difficult matter to provide the remedy for these minor ills, particularly as the sound money forces will be in a majority in both branches of the new Congress. This done and the revenues so adjusted as to provide a reasonable surplus, there is no reason why the country should not enter upon a new era of prosperity.

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NOW THAT MCKINLEY IS ELECTED and the gold standard sustained, the first great step toward re-establishing the finances of the country and restoring prosperity to the business community has been taken. Confidence in the future intentions of the citizens and Government of the United States has been restored.

But this is only the first step after all. The situation as to the Treasury and as to the trade of the country will be under the operation of precisely the same currency laws that have been working gradual disaster during the last twenty years, with the sole exception that in the election of MCKINLEY on a sound money platform there is a tacit promise that these laws shall be reformed.

How far will the present Congress be influenced by a sound money victory is an important subject of speculation. In the existing Congress the House is strongly Republican and has also a majority in favor of placing the Treasury upon a sound footing where sufficient revenues will prevent the necessity of borrowing to make up deficits, and where the gold reserve can not be an object of constant solicitude both to the Administration and to the business public. The Senate, however, is not in favor of the gold standard. But with the recent decisive victory at the polls for sound money, some of the Senators who have been pleased to perform the part of obstructionists may possibly see the error of their ways and shrink from the storm of popular indignation that would be almost sure to arise if they still seek to defy the will of the majority. There are a number of the Senators who have hitherto stuck by silver through thick and thin who may be expected to still lead a forlorn hope and go down if need be with their colors flying, but this frantic and insane obstinacy is too much to be believed to exist in the characters of all these men. Some of them will no doubt refuse longer to gnaw the file and kick against the pricks.

Therefore there is a prospect that when Congress meets next December the work of currency reform will be at once taken up.

Although the Congress is Republican it can hardly be conceived that with an administration thoroughly in accord with the financial plank of the Republican platform, the leaders of legislation will hesitate to do what is necessary to relieve the country from the pressure of the laws which may even on a gold standard repress or intimidate the revival of business prosperity. By increasing the revenues, by retiring the note issues of the Treasury either in whole or in part, by providing a sound and elastic bank currency to take the place of the retired notes, Congress can wholly relieve the situation and insure the inauguration of MCKINLEY under the most auspicious circumstances. In no way better than by such action of the present Congress can the promise of the return of prosperity upon MCKINLEY's election be immediately realized.

There would seem to be no reason against this action, except the sentimental one of preventing a Democratic President from signing the necessary reform bills. Even this argument, if argument it be, has less weight after a triumph gained on principles sustained by the better elements in both parties. The triumph of sound money has been gained in reality not by Republicans or by Democrats, but by the efforts of sane and reasonable men in both parties.

Even as a matter of mere politics, it would matter little whether CLEVELAND has the honor of signing bills to rehabilitate the prosperity of the country enacted by a distinctively Republican Congress, or MCKINLEY has the more delayed honor of signing these bills.

The present Congress by proper action can more easily in the first flush of a sound money victory secure the necessary legislation than the new Congress after men's minds have had time to lose some of the beneficent impressions of the campaign.

MCKINLEY has it in his power to exercise a strong influence on the retiring Congress. He can, by exerting himself in favor of the necessary legislation as soon as possible after December 1, save himself from whatever embarrassment there may be in calling an extra session of the new Congress before he is hardly seated in the presidential chair. Upon the general lines to be pursued in regard to currency reform there can not be any great difference of opinion between the retiring and the incoming President. There is no reason why their influence on Congress should not be coincidentally exerted.

What, then, are the lines upon which the Congress when it meets in December should act. The first step is to provide sufficient revenues upon a tariff principle of moderate protection. CLEVELAND can surely make some concessions in this direction. Then a measure for the retirement by funding of the Treasury and legal-tender notes down to a minimum \$150,000,000 either by their being funded into bonds or being paid into the Treasury by the banks in exchange for the



privilege of issuing an equal amount of bank notes to the extent of fifty per cent. of their paid-in capital. Next a bill remedying defects in the national banking laws, making all bank notes redeemable in gold, and reducing the capital requirement in small places to twenty thousand dollars. Finally, to immediately protect the Treasury until the new revenues can become available, there should be a measure authorizing the Secretary to issue interest-bearing notes of the same nature as the English Exchequer notes. Of all these measures the banking measure may cause the most debate, but it is as vitally necessary as any of the others to secure the permanent prosperity of both Government and business interests.

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THE FINANCIAL DISCUSSIONS at the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association at St. Louis were criticized by some of the delegates as being too much of a political complexion.

It is difficult to understand the justice of this criticism, when the main issue of the campaign then pending was the question of the money standard.

As trustees of the people's money the bankers of the country can not be expected to remain silent when the interests of their creditors on one side and their debtors on the other are in danger of serious dislocation. In fact it would be a pusillanimous neglect of duty if the bankers of the country, assembled in their regular annual convention, had failed to record their opinion upon that issue of the campaign which concerned the foundation of their business.

On the first day of the convention the association adopted a statement of principles declaring in favor of the gold standard. This had been preceded by a similar expression of sympathy with that standard in the opening address of the president of the association. Naturally after such an opening on the first day, when the call of States was reached upon the second day, the representatives of the several States expressed their convictions in regard to the probable success in their States of the policy to which the convention had already committed itself as a body.

It is needless to elaborate the proposition that the issue had been forced upon the banking community. In their capacity as citizens bankers may belong to any party, they may hold any political opinions that they desire; but when the business which they have studied and practised for a lifetime, have reduced by experience to an exact science, becomes the bone of contention between political parties, they must necessarily be practically unanimous upon the side which all their experience teaches them is the right side. They are entitled as experts to respect in the expression of their convictions upon the ques-

tion of the money standard, just as a convention of electricians would be entitled to respect when expressing their views as to the nature and proper utility of electricity.

If a political party were to be organized for the purpose of proving by popular vote that electricity was a substance that should be sold to the people by the quart or gallon, and carried around in cans or barrels in the same manner as milk or beer, the opinion of a convention of electrical experts that this method of dealing with electricity was wrong, and not consonant with the real facts of the case, would be entitled to some weight. Yet, no doubt, such is the glamour that the excitement of politics throws over the minds of men, that in such a supposed case the electricians would be told to mind their own business and not interfere with politics. Just so the bankers at St. Louis were advised that they ought not to say anything about the gold standard, and its chances of success, because the great political parties had honored this subject by selecting it as the main point of their contention.

It would truly be a ridiculous state of things if commercial bodies, clearing-house associations, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, bankers' clubs and associations could not use their influence to combat fallacious and advance true ideas of political economy.

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THE RETURN TO PROSPERITY in the United States involves a revival of manufactures, of commerce and of agriculture. The welfare of the citizen engaged in any of these occupations is dependent upon the welfare of those in all the others. The settlement of the standard of value beyond the peradventure of a doubt, is of course of primary importance. There are, however, indications that if the monetary question is correctly settled, a rapid revival of business is almost certain. In fact it is highly probable that such revival would have already occurred, if the future value of money had not been in doubt.

The figures of the Bureau of Statistics show that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1896, the exports of American manufactures have amounted to \$228,489,893, and it is estimated from the returns received during July and August, 1896, that there will be still greater exportations during the present fiscal year, perhaps amounting to \$250,000,000.

It is of course claimed that this increase in the export of manufactures is due to the Wilson Tariff which went into operation late in 1894. Without disputing this altogether, it is still highly probable that the great cut in prices, due to the business depression, has had much to do with the great increase in the export of American manu-

factures. Whatever the reason, the reduction of the stocks on hand must be very great on account of these foreign purchases. These stocks must be renewed, and with the recommencement of active manufacturing operations, commerce and agriculture will experience a new impulse.

The exportation of grain has also been stimulated by foreign demand to such an extent that prices will probably continue to rise. If the presidential election had not been a feature of the year 1896, it is highly probable that the causes adverted to would have brought about a favorable change earlier in the year. The vital question upon which the election turned has damped all enterprise. But perhaps it is better that this question of the standard should be settled now. The revival of business will then be more likely to be permanent.

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THE USE OF LOCAL CHECKS in the daily business of the country seems to be a perplexing question to bankers. Its discussion has been a prominent feature at conventions of the American Bankers' Association and at conventions of the banking associations of the several States. It is what is called a live question.

In all of these discussions it is rather apparent that the true import of the continued use of local checks in the business of the country is not as yet fully recognized. The remarks made show a keen appreciation of the difficulties in making collections, of the length of time banks are obliged to wait for the return of the money advanced when these items are accepted from their depositors, and of the possible addition to profits that might accrue in case all banks could agree to make a uniform charge; but they do not seem to recognize the possibility that the growth of the use of local checks may, taking a broader view of the subject, confer benefits on the business of banking in indirect ways that amply compensate, or will in the long run compensate, for the disadvantages which are so immediately recognized. The general tone of the discussion is one of despair of any effectual remedy. The clearing-house for country checks seems to be regarded as impracticable, and the forms of agreement entered into among banks in various cities, establishing a fixed scale of charges for the collection of such items, do not seem to be regarded as effectual, because of the tendency to secretly evade the established rule in order to retain accounts.

Competition among banks of course lies at the root of the difficulty of making the collection of local checks profitable, but the main reason of the growth in the use of local checks consists in another form of competition. This is the competition among business men generally.

The local check is to all intents and purposes another form of cur-

rency, furnished not by the banks but by the people themselves who use banks. Now, as a tentative proposition it is probable that it will be admitted that the greater the use of banks by the people, the more profitable the business of banking must become. If the money of the people was kept in their own possession, and not deposited in banks, there would be little room in the country for the banking community.

The convenience in business of the use of local checks is one reason no doubt for the establishment of banks in all parts of the country; every little business community finds a bank as necessary to its prosperity as any of the other conveniences of civilization. Just as necessary as a railroad, a trolley line, a post office, a newspaper or a town hall.

Bankers in their discussion of the evils of local checks should not lose sight of the impulse their use gives to the general business of banking. If the use of local checks could by any means be repressed, might it not result in a great falling off of deposits and of loanable funds?

When it is considered that the banks of the United States are as a rule either forbidden the use of the promissory note or are limited to a very restricted use of it, there is little difficulty in perceiving that by means of the local check the people themselves supply a currency which takes the place of these promissory notes. Whether this currency is better or worse than ordinary bank notes depends upon the standpoint from which they are viewed. From the bankers' standpoint they are inferior because it is more difficult for a bank to make a profit on them, but on the other hand the bank assumes less responsibility for them. From the standpoint of the business men of the country, local checks are superior to bank notes in convenience and in cost.

The question at once arises whether it is possible for the bankers of the country to restrict or abolish the use of local checks, and whether if they could do so they would not from the broadest standpoint of banking welfare injure themselves by so doing. It is the use of these checks that reduces the use of actual money in business transactions to the small percentage of total receipts and payments, shown by the statistics on the subject given in the reports of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Business men in competition among themselves find it absolutely necessary to take local checks as they find it necessary to take any form of payment. When State bank notes were in circulation they were freely taken, although they had no legal-tender quality. The business man who should refuse to take local checks in payment of his bills would soon be left in the lurch by his competitors. There is no doubt that their use greatly facilitates payments of all kinds.

Individuals, firms and companies keep bank accounts very often for the great convenience the drawing of checks affords them in making local payments or foreign remittances. There is no great convenience in any line that is not liable to abuse. Bankers seem to dwell more on the abuse than they do on the utility.

But apart from these considerations it is highly probable that the local check has come to stay. Its increasing use has been fostered by the absence of an elastic bank currency and by the advance of means of communication. Even if a satisfactory bank currency were authorized by law it is doubtful whether it could now stop the use of the local check. And perhaps as the different and remote parts of the country become more closely united by improved means of communication, as they will in the future, many of the abuses in the use of local checks now complained of by bankers will be done away with. In the days of canals and stage-coaches the use of this mode of payment was an impossibility. With the invention of the telegraph, the telephone, the railroad and trolley lines, places formerly at a distance are now practically close together. San Francisco is now in a business sense as close to New York city as Albany was formerly. The world is becoming smaller every day. A nation is now almost as compact as a city.

Is it not fair to conclude that the practice of using local checks, growing up with an advancing civilization, is not to be too much deprecated but to be looked upon as an important token of that civilization? The system may be imperfect because comparatively new, but is it not one that is advancing toward greater satisfactoriness both to banks and business men? Its main defect from a business standpoint seems to be the inequality with which it benefits different members of the community. The large dealer whose account is sought for by banks has no difficulty in using his bank to collect the local checks he accepts in payment at par. The holder of the less desirable account is more apt to be charged something. But he presently finds a bank that finds his account desirable.

The local check has as yet by no means reached the limit of its possibilities or its business usefulness. Although it has reduced the demand for actual cash which the banks have to meet, there is a possibility of a still greater reduction. There are still large amounts of payments that might be made with checks that now have to be made with cash. Of these payments daily, weekly and monthly payrolls are the most important. The difficulty of the use of this form of payment instead of cash consists in the difficulties which banks find it necessary to throw in the way of identification. But in time these difficulties may be lightened. This could be hastened by the use of a uniform and distinctive check form to be used by all banks, the print-

ing and issue of the forms being under the same careful supervision now employed in the issue of ordinary paper money. With every increase in the percentage of checks as compared with cash in the total receipts and payments throughout the country, the danger of panics resulting from local scarcity of currency would be lessened, and perhaps in time done away with.

The local check is therefore evidently in course of development. It is an outgrowth of the concentration of the business of the country by the advancing appliances of civilization. That the attention of bankers should be mainly directed to the imperfections that manifest themselves in the course of this development, is natural and beneficial. Out of the discussion of the subject will come greater light. But with the growth of the use of local checks there will in the end undoubtedly evolve both greater security and greater popularity to the banking community. Popularity in no mere political sense, but from the recognition of their convenience, security and utility by the mass of people, poor as well as rich. Above all the country banks should cherish and foster the growth of the use of local checks, as they, more than others, will thereby have the necessity of their existence more completely demonstrated.

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THE IMPORTATION OF GOLD, which has continued during the autumn, is not difficult to account for in the face of the large balance of trade in favor of this country during the last year. The depression which since the financial crisis of 1893 has affected all kinds of business, and the lack of confidence in the future, have depressed prices. These low prices have naturally increased exports of American manufactures. The conditions in favor of this country have during the latter part of the year been augmented by unfavorable crop conditions in foreign countries, causing a demand for American grain at improved prices.

There is little doubt that the movement of gold in this direction is in the main a natural and regular occurrence, depending on the condition of the foreign trade. But in addition to favorable conditions there is apparently some other influence at work, reflected in the willingness of purchasers to pay a premium for gold. This indicated a belief that there was a bare chance of BRYAN'S election, in which event gold would certainly have commanded a high premium. If the probabilities of the success of the free coinage of silver had been greater, the premium on gold would also have been greater.

It is asserted and with every probability of truth that much of the gold now coming into the country is being hoarded by the people who see a fair speculation in it. It is precisely the same principle that

induces men to patronize lotteries. The possible prospect of winning a great prize will always induce large numbers to invest comparatively small sums in lottery tickets. If the majority of people had been assured that the free coinage of silver would triumph, instead of paying a premium for gold they would have invested in silver, and this would have raised the price of silver. But the price of silver has been falling. Therefore the willingness to pay a premium for gold is nothing more than an outcropping of a willingness, not a rarity at any time, to risk a small amount for the remote chance of a great profit.

It is not difficult to approximate the chances that were taken in purchasing gold at the recent rate paid to brokers for it. If free coinage had triumphed, it is quite certain that gold would have gone to a premium of nearly 200. This means that the payment of one-eighth of a dollar in the purchase of one hundred dollars in gold would in less than two weeks have brought a profit of 100 per cent. That is, the outlay of twelve and-a-half cents, and the interest on one hundred dollars for two weeks, might bring in one hundred dollars. This is rather better than risking money in a policy shop or a lottery. In fact it is really a desperate chance such as people will often take when the amount actually risked is small.

If there had not been almost absolute confidence that the present standard would not be disturbed, gold would have been at a premium of at least twenty-five per cent. during the summer. The commercial world may of course be mistaken, but it is not apt to be, and it was evidently not banking very heavily on the prospect of the materialization of the silver standard and a substantial rise in the gold premium.

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THE GOLD SPECULATORS are now an unhappy lot. They withdrew the metal from the Treasury in considerable quantities and many of them paid a premium for it to brokers, in anticipation of securing a much higher premium in the event of the success of free silver. But the sound money victory has caused all thought of a gold premium to disappear, and those who have bought the coin at an advance over other forms of currency have lost the bonus as well as the interest on the capital employed in the transaction.

Perhaps \$50,000,000 of the gold recently imported has been hoarded, and with the disappearance of the premium it will go into the banks or into circulation. It would seem to be a propitious time for a general relaxation of the firmness with which gold has been held both by banks and individuals, and a modification of the feeling of devout veneration for the \$100,000,000 gold reserve of the United States Treasury.

## THE INFLOW OF GOLD FROM ENGLAND.

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The continued drain of gold from England to the United States, consequent upon the increase of exportation both of manufactures, grain and cotton and other productions, was permitted to go on by the Bank of England much longer than might have been anticipated before taking steps to check it by raising the rate of discount.

The Bank of England holds the gold reserves in that country in a manner analogous to that in which the gold reserves in the United States are held by the Treasury, and to that in which the gold reserves in France are held by the Bank of France. In all three countries the importance of these reserves is recognized, and in each there is a method of preventing their too rapid depletion. In France a premium is placed on gold for export when the demand becomes so great as to excite apprehension. In the United States the plan adopted is to create a sentiment among bankers that it is unpatriotic to encourage the withdrawal of gold. This throws a certain burden of tacit censure on those who find a profit in withdrawing it, and for incurring this censure brokers demand a premium from their customers. The remedy, though not recognized by law or regulation, is virtually the same as that adopted by the Bank of France, viz. : a slight premium.

The Bank of England's plan to prevent the excessive depletion of its stock of gold is the manipulation of the discount rate. The proper maintenance of the reserve is a delicate operation. It must be remembered that a gold reserve, though absolutely necessary, is an expense. The true object, therefore, of the Bank of England or any other holder of a national reserve is to perform this service at as little expense as is consistent with adequate service. Interest is lost on every sovereign or bar of gold that is held for reserve purposes. On the one hand, therefore, the bank does not care to hold one pennyweight of gold more than is necessary to maintain credit intact. On the other side the limit is reached when the withdrawals of gold begin to attract public attention and excite apprehensions that disturb credit. There cannot practically be any fixed minimum limit, because what might be sufficient at one time might be inadequate at another. The whole criterion is the condition of the money market, or what amounts to the same thing, the condition of the commercial mind. As a general rule, however, the directors of the Bank of England, who are in the best of positions to judge of the conditions of the money market, desire to use all the gold that comes to them for the greatest profit of the bank.

For some time past gold has been flowing to the vaults of the bank and the reserve has been increasing. On all this excess the bank was losing interest. Therefore when the demand from this country set in, it was a fortunate circumstance for the Bank of England. As the surplus was drawn down the bank saw no occasion to interfere until there appeared symptoms that the commercial world was beginning to take notice; even then nothing was done until this notice began to acquire the force of apprehension. It will now be



seen that this apprehension might be roused while the supply of gold was still ample. But when it began to be marked the bank had to take measures to allay it. This it has done by raising the rate of discount. How this affects the situation it is not difficult to see.

The business of the bank from which it derives its profits is, as with all other banks, the loaning of money. This is done by the discount of the notes of the public. The Bank of England, however, from its commanding position, its affiliations with the Government, has the choice of all the securities offered in the market to loan upon. It only accepts the very best bills, and therefore its discount rate is as a rule less than the discount rate in the open market where the holders of inferior securities present them for discount. But as the rate of the bank rises or falls the open market rate falls or rises in sympathy.

When obligations to the bank fall due they are paid either in its own notes or gold, and when securities and bills are discounted the bank issues notes or gold. The gold for export is obtained from the bank either by presenting its notes for redemption or by the discount of some form of commercial security. The chief part of it is probably obtained either directly or indirectly by the latter proceeding. When it has an idle surplus of gold the bank therefore welcomes the demand that transforms this idle gold into interest-bearing notes and securities. It could use its whole reserve in this way, but such a proceeding would destroy the whole commercial fabric and jeopardize the power to pay the interest upon which the bank depends for its profits.

The raising of the rate of interest has a two-fold object. As the demand becomes greater the bank sees an opportunity to make a better profit by putting up its price. It does not desire to stop the withdrawal as long as the directors know that the stock of gold is sufficient to perform the duties of a reserve. The second object is to reassure the commercial mind. The rise in the discount rate may or may not check the outflow.

In all this manipulation of their own stock of gold, the directors keep a sharp lookout on the gold reserves of other nations. They study the commercial and financial systems of each nation, and they know the peculiar force exerted by the gold reserve on the public mind in each country.

Thus it is probable that to sustain the financial system of France with its immense amount of silver coinage a larger gold reserve in proportion is required, while at the same time fluctuations of that reserve more readily excite apprehension in the public mind in France than does the fluctuation of the gold reserve in England in the minds of the public there. The Bank of England can let gold go more freely than can the Bank of France. Therefore she can let it go cheaper and thus has the advantage of getting quicker profits. Raising the discount rate may have the effect of sending those who want gold to the Bank of France for it, or to the holders of the stocks in Germany, Russia and Austria. But the financial systems of the three countries last named require even more careful guarding of their gold reserves than in the case of France and England. They must pay a higher price for the benefits conferred by the reserves, therefore they usually charge higher if any gold is required of them.

The United States, being in the fortunate position of a creditor, has all these stocks to draw on, but our financiers of course go to the cheapest market for gold, which is, as has been explained, usually England. The

following quotation from the address of the Editor of the *MAGAZINE* at the World's Congress of Bankers in Chicago, in 1893, explains the operations of the discount rate in controlling the flow of gold, and also gives another reason why the Bank of England can afford to let withdrawals go on to considerable length without interposing any check:

"The Bank of England controls the flow of specie and bullion in and out of the Kingdom by changes in the rate of discount. It discounts the notes of merchants by giving its own notes in exchange, which are redeemable in gold. The raising the rate at once increases the difficulty of obtaining gold for export. No notes are issued by the Bank of England in denominations of less than five pounds. This renders necessary the use of gold sovereigns and silver in transactions of less than that amount. The same reason that keeps always in circulation a certain sum in bank notes to carry on transactions of five pounds or over also keeps in the country outside of the banks a certain stock of gold and silver coin to carry on transactions under five pounds; the gold for transactions under five pounds and not less than one pound, the silver for those under half a sovereign. This stock of gold was, in 1892, estimated by John Biddulph Martin and R. H. Inglis-Palgrave at not more than £55,000,000 in sovereigns and half sovereigns and not below £44,000,000."

The Bank of England, therefore, even if it could get no foreign supplies could in a pinch draw in a very large amount of gold from the stock in the hands of the people.

The foregoing account of the discount rate of the Bank of England, involving as it does a view of the object of maintaining a gold reserve, of its necessity and expense, and of the different degrees of expense in maintaining a gold reserve which are entailed by different financial systems, enables the present situation of the United States to be compared with more certainty. Although just at the present time, through a combination of circumstances, gold is flowing to this country, nevertheless this fortunate fact should not be permitted to gloss over the faults of a financial system that entails an expense far in excess of that entailed on other civilized nations for keeping up the gold reserve necessary to maintain credit, while at the same time nothing is done to compel those who take gold away to pay for it what it costs to get it here.

The placing of checks on the exportation of gold is of course a means that should be used as sparingly as possible. The system of the United States could be made as inexpensive and free as that of England, but as long as the present system exists and costs the country such a prodigious sum as it has since 1893, some temporary checks on exportation might not be inadvisable.

The remedy is to take the keeping of the gold reserve out of the hands of the Government, and placing this duty either with the associated banks of our leading money center, or with some institution to be specially created to perform this duty, and at the same time furnish circulating notes to all the banks of the country on the security of their bills receivable. When the legal-tender and Treasury notes are retired the Government will no longer have occasion for a gold reserve. The gold reserve necessary for the general business of the country can be easily maintained by the banks.

## \* LOANS OF THE UNITED STATES.

### SIX PER CENT. LOANS OF 1815.

A large part of the war debt at the close of the year 1814 was due and unpaid and another large part was soon to become due. These unpaid and accruing demands were in part for temporary loans obtained under the Act of March 14, 1812, and the remainder for Treasury notes issued under various Acts and by the terms of their issue coming due from day to day. When the news of peace was received it was evident that expenses would be reduced, while the revenues of the United States would be much increased by the revival of commerce and the renewal of imports which had been stopped by the war; yet under the system of credits for duties allowed by the Government it would be several months before this increased revenue would reach the Treasury, when it could be used to pay off the millions of dollars of unpaid Government paper afloat. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report of February 24, 1815, estimated the amount then due or soon to become due for temporary loans or Treasury notes at \$18,452,800.

A bill to authorize a loan for — dollars was introduced in the House of Representatives February 25, 1815, and appears to have passed both houses almost without debate. It was considered in committee of the whole, March 2, when Mr. Eppes, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, expressed his regret that the bill had been delayed to so late a period of the session—a delay, however, which had not arisen from any neglect on the part of his committee, but from pressure of other business. The loan for the present year was necessary for the purpose of redeeming Treasury notes charged on the sinking fund. Of these notes there would fall due during the remainder of 1815 and 1816 eight millions of dollars and upwards, and in the month of March, 1815, \$10,000,000, being in truth the whole amount in circulation, viz., \$18,452,800. The loan might be confined to the amount of notes payable during the year, but as the notes due in 1816 might return to the Treasury as part of the receipts of 1815, being receivable in payment of all debts due the United States, it had been thought better to authorize a loan for the whole amount. He therefore moved to fill the blank in the bill with the sum of \$18,452,800. This motion was agreed to. The Act was approved March 3, 1815. It authorized the President to borrow on the credit of the United States a sum not exceeding \$18,452,800 to be applied to defraying any expenses which had been or might be authorized by law during the year. No engagement should be entered into which would preclude the United States from reimbursing any sum borrowed under the Act at any time after the expiration of twelve years from December 31, 1827.

The Secretary of the Treasury was to lay before Congress during the first week in February, 1816, an account of all proceedings under the Act. Author-

\* Continued from the May, 1896, number of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*, page 502.

This series of articles, which began in the *JOURNAL* for October, 1893, page 1074, will be continued from time to time until it includes a complete historical sketch of the loans of the United States from the foundation of the Government up to the present.

ity was given to employ agents for the purpose of obtaining subscriptions or selling the stock of the new loan at a commission not exceeding one-quarter of one per cent., and \$30,000 was appropriated to pay their commissions. The surplus of the sinking fund was pledged for the payment of the interest and the reimbursement of the principal. Banks in the District of Columbia were allowed to lend any portion of the sum authorized to be borrowed, anything in their charters to the contrary notwithstanding. Treasury notes actually issued before the passage of the Act, and charged by law upon the sinking fund, were to be receivable, both principal and interest due, in payment of subscriptions. The last clause of the Act related to interest on Treasury notes, and authorized the payment of interest on such notes, due and unpaid, until such time as funds should be assigned for their payment and notice given thereof. The rate of interest and discount was not limited. It was found impossible to place much of the loan at par, even though the subscriptions might be paid in Treasury notes or in the depreciated paper of the State banks, owing to the following causes:

At the close of the session of Congress on March 4, 1815, the demands on the Treasury were interesting in their nature as well as great in amount. Exclusive of the ordinary expenses of the Government, they consisted of demands for the payment of the army, preparatory to its reduction to a peace establishment, with other heavy arrearages and disbursements in the War and Navy departments; for the payment of the interest on the funded debt, and of the arrearages as well as accruing claims on account of the Treasury note debt; and for the payment of the interest of the bonds issued for the Louisiana purchase, with other important debts contracted in Europe on account of the war.

The efficiency of the means possessed by the Government for the liquidation of these demands depended upon circumstances beyond its control. The balance of the money in the Treasury consisted of bank credits, lying chiefly in banks located in the Southern and Western sections of the Union. The revenue from the provisions made prior to the session of Congress, ending March 14, 1815, had been of comparatively small amount. The revenue from the provision made by that Congress could not be available for a great portion of the fiscal year 1815-1816. In both cases the revenue was payable in Treasury notes, or was in the form of bank credits payable at the places of collection. The only remaining resources for immediate use were an additional issue of Treasury notes and a loan; but the successful employment of these resources was for some time rendered doubtful by the peculiar situation of the credit and currency of the nation.

The suspension of specie payments throughout the greater portion of the United States, and the consequent cessation of the interchange of bank notes and bank credits between the institutions of the country, had deprived the Treasury of all facilities of transferring its funds from place to place; and a proposition which was made at an early period to the principal banks of the commercial cities on the line of the Atlantic with a view to restore these facilities in some degree, could not be effected for the want of concurrence among the requisite number of banks.

In consequence, and there seemed no positive limitation to the duration of the evil, however adequate the public revenue might be in its aggregate amount, to discharge all public engagements, it became inadequate through

the difficulty of application, as the possession of funds in one locality by no means assured the discharge of a debt in another section of the Union. On account of the suspension of specie payments and from various other causes, real or imaginary, differences in exchange arose between the several States and even between districts in the same State; the embarrassments of the Treasury continued to increase, as no allowance had been made by Congress to provide for this difference in exchange. The Treasury notes also, in transactions between individuals, fluctuated according to the rates of exchange, but the Treasury could only receive and pay them out at par. The loan authorized also fluctuated with the inequalities of exchange and subscriptions received in one place were not available for payments in another. For these reasons the ample revenue provided and permanently pledged for the payment of the public creditor, and the auspicious influence of peace upon the business and revenue of the country, did not prevent the depreciation of the Treasury notes and public stock. For a considerable period after the adjournment of Congress these securities were everywhere far below their par value, the discount varying according to the locality and rates of exchange from twenty-five to ten per cent. Payments in bank paper were universally preferred during that period to payments in the paper of the Government, and it followed that wherever the Treasury was unable to procure the currency that passed in any locality, there it was unable to meet its stipulated payments.

The efforts of the Treasury under these trying circumstances were directed to provide promptly and effectually for all urgent demands, at the proper place of payment, and for the requisite amount of funds, to overcome as far as possible the difficulties of the circulating medium so that no creditor should receive more and no debtor pay less, in effective value, on the same account than any other creditor or debtor, and to avoid any unreasonable sacrifice of the public property, particularly with a view to avoiding sacrifice of the public credit.

The banks no doubt found it to their interest to reject the offer of Secretary Dallas to enter into a combination to maintain equality in the currency and in the rates of exchange, but the chief cause of the failure to secure the combination was the lack of confidence and acquaintance among the banks themselves. The proposition of the Secretary was that the State banks should form an association for the support of the Government credit. In consequence of their inability or refusal the Secretary took immediate steps to lay before Congress the necessity of chartering a National bank, this action resulting in the establishment of the second Bank of the United States, in 1816. Under the Act of March 3, 1815, certificates of stock to the amount of \$12,288,147.56 were issued and cash to the amount of \$11,699,326.63 received therefor, an average discount of about four and four-fifths per cent. The length of the loan was fifteen years, payable after December 31, 1827. It was finally paid in 1835, although the larger portion was redeemed in 1830. Under the same Act a temporary loan was also obtained of \$1,150,000 at par, making the total amount of debt contracted \$13,438,147.56, yielding in cash \$12,849,326.63.

#### MISSISSIPPI STOCK.

At the close of the American Revolution, Great Britain, by the treaty of September 3, 1783, surrendered all claims to sovereignty over the Thirteen

Colonies. The treaty declared that the Mississippi should be their western boundary, and Article 1 relinquished to each of the States, naming them and Georgia among them, "all claims to the Government, proprietary and territorial rights of the same."

Under this treaty the State of Georgia, as the successor of the colony bearing that name, claimed to hold a perfect and indefeasible title to all the lands (not before granted to private parties) within her limits as far west as the Mississippi River, including nearly all the present States of Alabama and Mississippi. The only adverse claimants were the Indian tribes, and over all the soil occupied by them the State claimed the right of pre-emption.

In February, 1785, the Legislature of Georgia established the county of Bourbon, beginning at the mouth of the Yazoo River and running southward along the Mississippi River to the thirty-first degree of north latitude. In February, 1788, the legislature authorized the delegates of the State to cede to the United States all her rights of soil, territory and jurisdiction west of the River Apalachicola; but Congress by resolution of July 15, 1788, refused to accept the cession.

The fact of the possession by the State of Georgia of such an immense tract of fertile land appears to have early attracted the attention of speculators, and soon formed the basis of one of the greatest land speculations on record, commenced (as the evidence seems to show) by bribery and carried on by fraud and perjury.

On December 21, 1789, the Legislature of Georgia passed an Act authorizing the grant of the whole country from the Tombigbee to the Mississippi, comprising nearly the whole of the present State of Mississippi and a portion of Alabama, amounting to about thirty millions of acres, to three companies, called the South Carolina Yazoo, the Virginia Yazoo and the Tennessee Companies, for the sum of \$207,580 or less than one cent. per acre; an inconsiderable sum was paid in paper money of the State by the first two companies, and the whole amount was tendered to the Treasurer in the depreciated certificates or evidences of the public debt of Georgia, the acceptance of which was refused. It seems to have been considered that the grant had lapsed by non-payment of the purchase money, for on January 7, 1795, the legislature passed an Act authorizing the sale of nearly the entire country from the Alabama River to the Mississippi (estimated at from thirty-five to fifty millions of acres) to four companies, called the Georgia, the Georgia Mississippi, the Upper Mississippi and the Tennessee, for the sum of \$500,000, which was duly paid into the treasury of the State.

Sweeping charges of bribery were made, affecting with greater or less particularity almost every member of the legislature. The alienation of so vast a body of fertile land under such suspicious circumstances, and for so insignificant a price appears, as it well might, to have produced intense excitement among the people of Georgia.

A new legislature was chosen, whose members proceeded, as far as lay in their power, to undo the work of their predecessors, by passing February 13, 1796, an Act, "declaring null and void a certain usurped Act passed by the last legislature of this State, at Augusta on January 17, 1795, under the pretended title of: An Act supplementary to an Act entitled an Act for appropriating a part of the unlocated territory thereof for the protection of the frontier, and for other purposes." This Act, after declaring the Act by which

the territory was sold to be unconstitutional, passed by usurped authority, fraud and collusion, declared the whole void, and all grants obtained under it "annuled, rendered void, and of no effect, and as the same was made without constitutional authority, and fraudulently obtained, it is hereby declared of no binding force and effect on this State or the people thereof, but is and are to be considered, both law and grants, as they ought to be, *ipso facto*, of themselves void, and the territory therein mentioned is also hereby declared to be the sole property of the State, subject only to the right of treaty of the United States, to enable the State to purchase under its pre-emption right the Indian title." All documents and deeds connected with the purchase were ordered to be expunged from the books of record of the State and the Act itself publicly burnt. The Governor was ordered to return, to those who had in good faith paid it, the money received into the treasury for the land.

"Then," says Mr. Troup, of Georgia, in his speech of March 8, 1814, "such a scene of fraud, iniquity and depravity was exhibited, that the Governor, familiar as he had been with such scenes but a short time before, blushed and shut the doors of the treasury against them. Men concerned in this transaction, but who had not deposited one dollar, by perjury, forgery, or some other crime drew thousands from the treasury.

On April 24, 1802, Georgia ceded to the United States all her territory south of Tennessee and west of the Chattahoochie River. By the terms of cession the United States was to pay Georgia, out of the first net proceeds of the sales of the lands thus ceded, \$1,250,000, and to have the right to reserve five millions of acres, or the proceeds of their sale, for the purpose of satisfying any claims which might he made to any part of the ceded territory.

The question now arose, what were these claims? Besides the claimants under Spanish, French and British grants, and those held from Georgia under actual survey and settlement, whose title was not, as a general thing, disputed, the grantees under the repealed Act of January 7, 1795, and purchasers under them, claimed nearly the whole of the territory. It appeared on investigation that the following companies were claimants and had paid into the Treasury of Georgia as follows:

Georgia Company.....	\$250,000
Georgia Mississippi Company.....	155,000
Tennessee Company.....	60,000
Upper Mississippi Company.....	35,000
Total.....	\$500,000

Besides these companies, the New England Mississippi Land Company claimed a large portion of the original purchase or pretended purchase of the Georgia Mississippi Company by transfer from said company, and there were a large number of claims, called citizens' rights, which were in fact the claims of individuals who had purchased or acquired tracts from the different companies.

Although the four original companies had paid into the Treasury of Georgia the half million dollars required by the terms of the Act of January 7, 1795, yet of this they had withdrawn, under the Act of February 13, 1796, \$310,695.14, leaving the sum of \$189,304.86 actual expenditure. For this insignificant sum they claimed to hold the fee simple title to nearly fifty millions of acres of as fertile land as any to be found on the continent, on the

ground that the State of Georgia, by her constituted authorities, had sold and transferred the territory to them, and that no power existed in any legislature to undo the work of its predecessor when a right had become vested. The New England Mississippi Land Company claimed that even if the original title had been secured by fraud and corruption, yet they were themselves innocent purchasers, buying before the repeal of the Act, under the faith of deeds confirmed by the broad seal of the State and without notice of fraud. But as the State of Georgia, notwithstanding she had formally sold and transferred the lands to them, had subsequently sold and transferred the same territory to the United States for the sum of \$1,250,000, the five companies proposed, January 19, 1803, to also sell their rights in the same to the United States for the sum of ten millions of dollars, of which \$452,000 was to go to the holders of citizens' rights and \$9,548,000 to be paid to the representatives of the companies.

The debates on this subject took a very wide range in Congress and the question was not settled until eleven years afterwards.

It seems to have been concluded by the majority of Congress that the titles of the companies and those claiming under them though vitiated by fraud were of sufficient weight to interfere materially with the settlement of the Mississippi territory, and it was therefore thought best to extinguish them by a compromise. On March 26, 1814, the bill to compromise with the claimants passed the House of Representatives by yeas 84, nays 76, and became a law March 31, 1814. It directed certificates of stock, not bearing interest, payable out of the first money in the Treasury of the United States arising from the sale of public lands in the Mississippi territory after the money due to the State of Georgia and the expenses of surveying the lands had been satisfied, to be issued to an amount not exceeding \$5,000,000, of which not exceeding \$4,750,000 was to go to the representatives of the companies and \$250,000 to the holders of citizens' rights. Under this Act the Mississippi stock, as it was called, was issued to the amount of \$4,282,036.92. This stock was receivable in part payment of lands sold in the territory. Thus the United States paid for the territory now covered by the States of Alabama and Mississippi over \$5,532,000, \$1,250,000 to the State of Georgia and the remainder to the companies and others who had as they claimed previously bought it of the State. The sum paid was rather more than one-third of the price of the Louisiana purchase, and considering the extent of territory involved in each case it was a much higher proportionate price. The whole amount of stock was redeemed by 1830. There was paid in in purchase of public lands \$2,448,789.44.

#### FIVE PER CENT. LOAN OF 1816—SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

The annual message of James Madison, President of the United States, sent to Congress December 5, 1815, contained the following paragraph relative to a national currency:

"It is essential to every modification of the finances that the benefits of a uniform national currency should be restored to the community. The absence of the precious metals will, it is believed, be a temporary evil, but until they can again be rendered the general medium of exchange, it devolves on the wisdom of Congress to provide a substitute which shall equally engage the confidence and accommodate the wants of the citizens throughout the Union. If the operations of the State banks cannot produce this result, the probable



operation of a National bank will merit consideration, and if neither of these expedients be deemed effectual it may become necessary to ascertain the terms upon which the notes of the Government (no longer required as an instrument of credit) shall be issued upon motives of general policy as a common medium of circulation."

The Secretary of the Treasury, in his annual report on the state of the finances, laid before the House December 7, 1815, advised the creation of a United States bank as a remedy for the evils of a depreciated currency.

"The establishment of a National bank," he said, "authorized to issue notes which will be received in all payments to the United States, is regarded as the best and perhaps the only adequate resource to relieve the country and the Government from the present embarrassments. The circulation of its issues will be co-extensive with the Union, and there will exist a constant demand, bearing a just proportion to the annual amount of duties and taxes to be collected, independent of the general circulation. A National bank will, therefore, possess the means and the opportunity of supplying a circulating medium of equal use and value in every State and in every district of every State."

The committee on a national currency having directed their chairman, Jno. C. Calhoun, to request from Mr. Dallas his views on certain points relating to the currency, the Secretary of the Treasury, in reply, December 24, 1815, sent a plan for the establishment of a United States bank, with arguments in its favor. Mr. Calhoun as chairman of the special committee reported to the House January 8, 1816, a bill to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. It was first considered in committee of the whole February 26, and was under discussion for about two weeks. The constitutional questions, which had occupied so much time in discussing the bill for chartering the first Bank of the United States, received little attention. The debate turned principally on the advantages and disadvantages of a National bank, on the details of the bill, and on the question whether it was possible through its aid to correct the evils of the miserably depreciated paper that then formed almost the sole currency. The bill passed the House March 14, 1816, by a vote of 80 yeas to 71 nays. An analysis of the vote shows that it was not so sectional as the vote to charter the first Bank of the United States, and that the locality of the opposition had changed. A considerable majority of the southern members voted for the bill, while from the North and East there was a small majority against it. The debate in the Senate was principally confined to some of the details of the bill and but little was said on the general question, or on its constitutional aspects. It passed the Senate, with some slight amendments, April 3. The amendments were concurred in by the House, and the bill became a law April 10, 1816.

It provided that a Bank of the United States should be established, with a capital of \$35,000,000 divided into 350,000 shares of \$100 each. Seventy thousand of these shares equivalent to \$7,000,000 were to be subscribed by the United States, payable in coin, or in stock of the United States, bearing interest at five per cent. per annum, redeemable at the pleasure of the Government. This stock the bank was to have the right to sell for gold and silver coin, or bullion, but not to sell more than \$2,000,000 thereof in any one year. Subscriptions were to be opened on the first Monday of July, 1816, at one place in each State, and at Washington. Subscriptions by individuals,

corporations or States, were to be payable one-fourth in gold or silver coin, and three-fourths in the funded debt of the United States or in coin, to be paid in three installments, 30 per cent. at the time of subscribing and the balance in six and twelve months.

For the management of the affairs of the corporation there were to be twenty-five directors, five of whom—stockholders—were to be appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate, not more than three of the five to be residents of any one State. No person being a director in the bank or its branches was to be a director in any other bank. Not more than three-fourths of the directors in office at the time of the annual election were to be eligible for re-election, nor was any director to hold his office more than three years out of four, except those who should be directors at the time of the annual election, who might always be reappointed or re-elected. No one but a stockholder, a resident citizen of the United States, could be a director, nor could a director as such receive a salary or emoluments. The total amount of the debts which the corporation should at any time owe, except for deposits, was at no time to exceed \$35,000,000, and in case of excess the directors under whose administration it happened were to be liable.

The corporation was not directly or indirectly to deal in anything except bills of exchange, gold or silver bullion, goods pledged for money lent, or goods which should be the produce of its lands. It was not at liberty to purchase any public debt whatever, nor to take more than six per cent. per annum for its loans and discounts. An office of discount and deposit was to be established in the District of Columbia whenever a law of the United States should require; also one in each State where 2,000 shares of stock were subscribed or held, whenever, at the request of the legislature of the State, Congress might by law require it, and the directors were to have the right to establish such offices of discount and deposit wheresoever they should think fit, in the United States or the territories thereof. The Secretary of the Treasury was to be furnished, whenever he required it, but not oftener than once a week, with statements of the condition of the bank. The notes of the bank, payable on demand, were to be received in all payments to the United States. No note was to be issued of less than five dollars. The bank was not to suspend at any time or refuse payment, in gold or silver, of any of its notes, bills, or obligations, nor of moneys received on deposit. The penalty for refusing to pay such obligations or deposits in coin was to be twelve per cent. per annum until fully paid and satisfied. No other bank was to be established by the authority of the United States during the continuance of the corporation, except banks in the District of Columbia, with an aggregate capital in said District not exceeding \$6,000,000. In consideration of the exclusive privileges conferred on the corporation by the Act, it was to pay the United States a bonus of \$1,500,000 in three equal payments, at the expiration of two, three and four years.

The Government subscription of \$7,000,000 authorized by the Act was made in bonds bearing an interest of five per cent. per annum, redeemable at pleasure, that is, for bank stock the Government paid its own stock. The remainder of the stock in the bank was eagerly taken by private parties, and the bank commenced business January 1, 1817. In 1837 and 1838 the stock of the bank held by the Treasury was nearly all sold at a heavy premium.

The dealings of the Government with the bank proved a financial success. The following table shows the result:

Received as bonus.....	\$1,500,000
Received from dividends .....	7,118,416
Received from sale of \$7,000,000 stock.....	9,424,750
Total.....	\$18,043,167
Deduct for subscriptions.....	\$7,000,000
Deduct for thirteen years interest.....	4,550,000
	11,550,000
Showing a profit to the Government.....	\$6,493,167

The \$7,000,000 Government bonds issued in payment for the stock in the bank were redeemed \$3,000,000 in 1830 and \$4,000,000 in 1831.

#### FIVE AND SIX PER CENT. LOANS OF 1820.

The report of the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, April 14, 1820, showed that there remained in the Treasury, in available funds, on January 1 preceding, only the sum of \$245,665.35. The total amount of expenditures for the year 1820 already authorized by law was \$26,299,164.30, while the estimated revenue was \$22,280,000, leaving a deficit of \$4,019,164.30; or deducting balance in the Treasury of \$245,665.35, the deficit for the year would be \$3,773,498.95, which might be partially met by using, if thought proper, the surplus of the sinking fund, amounting to \$2,288,497.29, when the actual deficit would be \$1,485,001.66. They therefore reported a bill to authorize a loan of \$2,000,000. The committee said that while they hesitated to recommend a loan, they believed that powerful reasons existed against a resort to internal duties and direct taxes in a period of profound tranquillity, the nation having been accustomed to a system of taxation (through duties on imports) which, in its operation, had been paid without being perceptibly felt. They thought that economy and retrenchment in the expenditures of the Government had become imperatively necessary, especially under the state of things that then existed, when the extraordinary depression of commerce, the stagnation of our navigation, the depreciation in the value of exports and of property of every description, and the serious embarrassment under which all branches of industry labored, had compelled economy and retrenchment in the expenditures of every citizen, and had seriously affected the national finances.

The excess of expenditures over revenue had, however, arisen principally from the heavy payments made in the redemption of the public debt continued through a series of years. The original sinking fund of \$7,300,000 per annum established in 1802, had been increased to \$8,000,000 in 1803 and to \$10,000,000 per annum in 1817, with an additional appropriation for that year of \$9,000,000. From this fund \$32,085,750 of the public debt had been redeemed since January 1, 1817, and large outstanding claims, amounting to over \$30,000,000, resulting from the late war with Great Britain, had been paid. The House, on May 4, resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the bill, when a debate arose on a motion to so amend it as to authorize a loan of five millions instead of two.

A motion was finally made to fix the amount to be raised by loan at three millions of dollars, which prevailed by yeas 65, nays 50. The bill passed the House in this form but the Senate attempted to amend it by inserting "five

millions," in place of three. To this the House, after debate and the appointment of a committee of conference, refused to agree. It finally passed both houses and was approved May 15, 1820.

The bill provided that the President of the United States be authorized to borrow \$3,000,000 at a rate of interest not exceeding five per cent. per annum, payable quarter yearly, the principal to be payable at the option of the Government, at any time after January 1, 1832, or to borrow that sum, at a rate not exceeding six per cent. payable quarter yearly, the principal to be payable at any time at the pleasure of the United States. The second section gave the Bank of the United States authority to lend the money or any part thereof, and provided that certificates of stock, signed by the Register of the Treasury or by a commissioner of loans, bearing an interest of five per cent. per annum, might be issued and sold, but not below par. One-eighth of one per cent. was to be allowed as commission to agents for procuring subscriptions or making sales of stock. The surplus of the sinking fund was pledged for the payment of the interest and principal. Under this bill \$999,999.13 was borrowed at five per cent. interest, payable after January 1, 1832, and \$2,000,000 at six per cent. payable at pleasure. On the \$2,000,000 a premium of two per cent. was obtained. The two million loan was paid in 1822 and the remainder in 1831 and 1834. Monroe was President and Crawford Secretary of the Treasury at this time.

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#### COMMENTS ON THE ELECTION.

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J. EDWARD SIMMONS, President Fourth National Bank, New York: The triumphal success of McKinley and Hobart relieves the business community of a tension that has been most severe, and gives assurance to all of the maintenance of our Government on the basis of law and order and the payment of all its obligations in the best money of the world. As a sound-money Democrat, I cannot agree with the high protection principles of the Republican party, but I am most gratified at the election of McKinley and Hobart, who from the beginning have had my earnest support. The result of the election will be the immediate restoration of confidence, the resumption of business, and the beginning of an era of prosperity in this country, the equal of which has never before been seen.

LYMAN J. GAGE, President First National Bank, Chicago: We have been delivered from an awful danger. It means life to all financial and industrial interests. The prosperity that will follow the victory for national honor cannot come in a minute or in a day, though a great bound has been taken in the right direction. It makes all the difference in the world in which direction we are going. Before the election there was a doubt. Now that doubt has been raised and we know in what direction we are going.

HENRY W. CANNON, President of the Chase National Bank, New York: I think the election of Mr. McKinley conclusively demonstrates that our country is full of honest people, who have an abiding faith in its institutions, and who propose to stand by its flag. I look for continued improvement in the financial and business situation from now on, although I do not expect what may be termed a boom.

THOMAS F. BAYARD, Ambassador to the Court of St. James: The keynote that rises above the confusion and excitement and rejoices my ear is that the people of the United States, guided by the instincts of patriotism and self-preservation, regardless of past party affiliations, have unmistakably repudiated repudiation in any form, and have instructed those who seek official power that they must at least assume virtue if they have it not, and that public and private obligations must be placed beyond the reach of the political Jack Cades of this century. It will strongly tend to re-establish international confidence in the stability and security of property intrusted to democratic governments and it will do much to harmonize international interests and assist good relations.

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### APPLICATION OF DEPOSIT TO NOTE—WHERE DUTY ARISES.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July 15, 1898.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOCK HAVEN *vs.* PELTZ.

The duty which a bank owes to an indorser to apply the balance of the principal debtor to the payment of a note held by the bank, arises only when the balance is sufficient for that purpose, and the principal debtor appears on the face of the instrument to be such.

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This was an action against the defendant as the indorser of a note.

MITCHELL, *J.*: The first assignment of error cannot be sustained. While a bank which is the holder of a note, and has on deposit at the time of maturity a sum to the credit of any party liable to it on the note, sufficient to pay it, and not previously appropriated by the depositor, to be held for a different purpose, may apply the deposit to the payment of the note, yet it is not, in general, bound to do so. The cases where the right becomes a duty on the part of a bank rest on the special equity of the party—usually the indorser—to have the payment enforced against the depositor as the one primarily liable. (*Bank vs. Henninger*, 105 Pa. St. 496.) And even in these cases all the circumstances enumerated must exist. Thus the deposit must be sufficient at the time of maturity of the note. Subsequent deposits will not raise the duty. (*Bank vs. Legrand*, 103 Pa. St. 309; *Bank vs. Shreiner*, 110 Pa. St. 188.) And the deposit must not have been previously appropriated to any other use. Cases cited *supra*, and *Bank vs. Foreman* (138 Pa. St. 474), where the principle was conceded, though an exception, of doubtful correctness, was made against a mere notice from the depositor not to pay, unaccompanied by a specific appropriation to a different purpose. And, lastly, the deposit must be to the credit of the party primarily liable. The rule is thus stated by our Brother Williams in the latest case on the subject (*Bank vs. Seitz*, 150 Pa. St.):

"The general rule is well settled that while the bank may appropriate funds in its hands, belonging to any previous party to the note, to the payment of it, yet it is not bound to do so. The note may be treated as in effect an order or check authorizing the bank to apply the deposit to the payment, but the deposit is not payment in law. \* \* \* But, where the bank holds funds of the maker when the note matures, it is bound to consider the interests of the indorsers or sureties; and if it allows the maker to withdraw his funds after protest, and the indorsers are losers thereby, the bank is liable to

them. The reason of this is that the maker is the principal debtor, and liable to all the indorsers whose undertaking is to pay if he does not."

The appellant's offer was defective in two respects: It was not to show the state of Kraemer's account at the maturity of the note, but some days after, and Kraemer was not the maker of the note, but an indorser. It is true that it is claimed by appellant that this was an accommodation note, and known by the bank to be so, and that Kraemer was in fact the principal debtor, even as regards the maker. But, if this was so, it was by the arrangement among the parties. On the face of the note, the maker was primarily liable; and although the bank may have supposed, as the Cashier testified, from the presentation of the note for discount by the first indorser, that the second and third indorsements were for his accommodation, it was under no obligation to draw that inference as to the maker. But, if it had been, the duty of the bank to appropriate has not been carried by any case beyond the deposit of the maker. Nor is it desirable that it should be. On the face of the paper, the maker is the party to pay, and while the bank may, upon dishonor, secure payment from the deposit of any party liable to it, yet there is great force in the reasons for limiting its duty to do so to the party legally answerable in the first instance on the face of the paper.

The rule thus rests on a liability fixed by law, and capable of immediate and conclusive determination by the evidence of the note itself. Otherwise it is thrown open to contest on the private arrangements of parties, to questions of notice and proof, and to all the uncertainties of the final ascertainment of the facts. While money deposited becomes the property of the bank, yet that result flows from the nature of money, which is to be measured by amount, and not by physical identity. Hence a deposit of \$100 is returned by another \$100, without regard to the identity of the notes or the coin, because legally they are the same. Except for this characteristic, a deposit of money to be returned on demand would be, like the deposit of any other article, a mere bailment. But though, for this reason, the title to money deposited passes to the bank, yet the whole business of banking is founded on the faith of the immediate availability of the deposit, as money, for the use of the depositor; and any rule that interfered with the freedom of action of either bank or customer, by compelling a stop of their dealings with each other to examine the relations of other parties to the deposit, would go far towards destroying that instant convertibility which is the essence of the business. We do not think it desirable to go beyond the line already clearly marked by the authorities.

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*ASSESSMENT AGAINST STOCKHOLDER—SET OFF.*

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, June 1, 1896.

WINGATE *vs.* ORCHARD.

A stockholder in an insolvent National bank cannot set off against the assessment upon his stock the amount of an indebtedness due to him from the bank.

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In error to the District Court of the United States of the Western Division of the District of Washington.

This was an action at law by Robert Wingate, as Receiver of an insolvent National bank, against George F. Orchard, a stockholder therein, to recover the amount of an assessment ordered by the Comptroller of the Currency

upon the defendant's stock. By the judgment below, defendant was allowed to set off against this assessment the amount of his deposits in the bank at the time it became insolvent, and the plaintiff brought error.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, *Circuit Judges*, and HAWLEY, *District Judge*.

ROSS, *Circuit Judge*: The sole question presented and argued by counsel in this case is whether or not a holder of stock of an insolvent National bank is entitled to offset against an assessment upon his stock, ordered by the Comptroller of the Currency, the amount of his deposits in the bank at the time it became insolvent. The court below held that the stockholder is entitled to offset against such assessment the amount of such individual claim against the bank, and to review that ruling the present writ of error was brought. We are of opinion that the ruling was erroneous. The statute of the United States providing for the association of persons for carrying on the business of banking provides, among other things, that :

"At least fifty per centum of the capital stock of every association shall be paid in before it shall be authorized to commence business ; and the remainder of the capital stock of such association shall be paid in installments of at least ten per centum each on the whole amount of the capital, as frequently as one installment at the end of each succeeding month from the time it shall be authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to commence business ; and the payment of each installment shall be certified to the Comptroller, under oath, by the President or Cashier of the association." (Rev. St. § 5140.)

When the last of such installments is paid, the stock is fully paid for, and the capital of the bank equals at least the face value of its stock. But the statute providing for such banking institutions proceeds to impose upon those who shall subscribe for their stock an additional liability. It does so in these words:

"The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares" (with certain exceptions not applicable to the present case). (Rev. St. § 5151.)

It was to enforce this additional liability that the Comptroller of the Currency directed the assessment, to enforce which the present suit was brought in the court below. The evident object of the statute is to provide a fund equaling in amount, but in addition to, the face value of the stock, to make good all contracts, debts, and engagements into which such association may enter, and, to that extent, it makes every shareholder individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another. The fund thus provided for is not intended for any particular creditor, but to make good all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, equally and without any preference. But unlike the voluntary obligation of the shareholder to pay for the stock for which he subscribes, and with which funds the business of the bank is to be conducted, the additional or double liability imposed by section 5151 of the Revised Statutes is to be called for only for the purpose of making good the contracts, debts, and engagements of the bank. If necessary for that purpose, that liability is to be enforced pursuant to the provisions of section 5234 of the Revised Statutes ; that is to say, through a Receiver acting

under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency—such Receiver having been appointed by the Comptroller pursuant to the provisions of that section, and of sections 5226 and 5227 of the Revised Statutes. The fund thus provided for, in the event of the liquidation and winding up of the affairs of the bank, equal in amount to the face value of the stock, and imposed for the express purpose of making good the contracts, debts, and engagements of the association, is manifestly a trust fund, to a pro rata share of which all creditors are equally and equitably entitled. Obviously, to permit a holder of stock in such a bank to offset against an assessment for the additional liability thus imposed upon him as such holder the amount of his deposits in the bank, in respect to which he is no more entitled than any other creditor, would be, in effect, to make him a preferred creditor. If the amount of his deposits should equal the par value of his stock, the allowance of such an offset would be, in effect, to pay him in full the amount of his deposits; and, if his deposits are less than the par value of his stock, the effect would be to pay him in full, to that extent, whereas the other depositors may receive little or nothing. Such was not the intention of Congress in imposing, as it did, by section 5151 of the Revised Statutes, upon the shareholders of every national banking association, in addition to the amount invested in such shares, a liability for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof. On the contrary, the purpose was, as has been said, to provide a fund to which all creditors should be entitled to look upon equal terms, and in which, in the event of disaster, all creditors, without preference to any, should be entitled to share pro rata.

There is nothing in the case of *Scott vs. Armstrong* (146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148), relied upon by counsel for the defendant in error, and which they say was the basis of the ruling of the court below, opposed to the views here expressed. In that case no question arose in respect to any holder of stock in a National bank. There the Fidelity National Bank, of Cincinnati, had loaned the Farmers and Merchants' Bank \$10,000, at a discount at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum for ninety days, under an agreement that the money so borrowed, less the discount, should be placed to the credit of the Farmers' Bank on the books of the Fidelity Bank. The promissory note there in suit was executed accordingly, dated and discounted on June 6, 1887, and the proceeds, \$9,819.17, were placed to the credit of the Farmers' Bank, upon the books of the Fidelity Bank, to meet any checks or drafts of the Farmers' Bank, and to pay the note when it became due. Afterwards, and before June 20, the Farmers' Bank drew against the deposit the sum of \$1,009.23; and the balance, \$8,809.94, remained to the credit of the defendant to meet the note, and was so to its credit at the time the Receiver was appointed. Upon the maturity of the note, and before suit was brought, defendant tendered the Receiver the sum of \$1,190.06, the balance due on the note, and kept the tender good. The court held that the credits between the banks were reciprocal, and parts of the same transaction, in which each gave credit to the other on the faith of the simultaneous credit, and that the principle applicable to mutual credits applied.

"It was, therefore," said the Court, "the balance upon an adjustment of the accounts, which was the debt, and the Farmers' Bank had the right, as against the Receiver of the Fidelity Bank, although the note matured after



the suspension of that bank, to set off the balance due upon its deposit account, unless the provisions of the national banking law were to the contrary."

And the court proceeded to show that the provisions of sections 5234, 5236 and 5242 of the Revised Statutes, which were relied upon by counsel as forbidding the set-off, did not do so.

"Undoubtedly," said the Court, "any disposition by a National bank, being insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, of its choses in action, securities, or other assets, made to prevent their application to the payment of its circulating notes, or to prefer one creditor to another, is forbidden; but liens, equities, or rights arising by express agreement, or implied from the nature of the dealings between the parties, or by operation of law, prior to insolvency, and not in contemplation thereof, are not invalidated. The provisions of the Act are not directed against all liens, securities, pledges, or equities, whereby one creditor may obtain a greater payment than another, but against those given or arising after, or in contemplation of, insolvency. Where a set-off is otherwise valid, it is not perceived how its allowance can be considered a preference; and it is clear that it is only the balance, if any, after the set-off is deducted, which can justly be held to form part of the assets of the insolvent. The requirement as to ratable dividends is to make them from what belongs to the bank, and that which at the time of the insolvency belongs of right to the debtor does not belong to the bank."

All of this, while controlling as authority, and perfectly sound in principle, has not, in our opinion, any application to the facts of the present case. But the views we have expressed do find support in a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 118 U. S. 634-653. It is the case of *Delano vs. Butler*, where the court distinguished the assessment imposed upon the stockholders by their own vote, for the purpose of restoring their lost capital, as a consideration for the privilege of continuing business, and to avoid liquidation under section 5205 of the Revised Statutes, and the assessment provided for by section 5151, saying:

"The assessment, as made under section 5205, is voluntary—made by the stockholders themselves, paid into the general funds of the bank as a further investment in the capital stock, and disposed of by its officers in the ordinary course of business. It may or may not be applied by them to the payment of creditors, and, in the ordinary course of business, certainly would not be applied, as in cases of liquidation, to the payment of creditors ratably; whereas, under section 5151, the individual liability does not arise, except in case of liquidation, and for the purpose of winding up the affairs of the bank. The assessment under that section is made by authority of the Comptroller of the Currency, is not voluntary, and can be applied only to the satisfaction of the creditors, equally and ratably. If the claim in the present case were allowed, it would follow that, in every case, payments made by stockholders for the purpose of restoring the impaired capital would be considered as credits on the ultimate individual responsibility of shareholders, and the whole efficiency of the provisions of section 5151 for the protection of the creditors of the company at the time of liquidation would be destroyed. The obligations of the shareholders under the two sections are entirely diverse, and payments made under section 5205 cannot be applied to the satisfaction of the individual responsibility secured by section 5151."

For similar reasons, neither can the individual claim of the stockholder against the bank for moneys deposited by him therein be offset against his responsibility to all of the creditors secured by section 5151. (See, also, *Hobart vs. Gould*, 8 Fed. 57, and cases there cited.) The judgment of the court below, of May 22, 1895, allowing the set-off in question, is accordingly reversed.

*NATIONAL BANK—BORROWING—AUTHORITY OF OFFICERS.*

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, June 8, 1896.

BLANCHARD vs. COMMERCIAL BANK OF TACOMA.

Where a National bank receives and applies to its own use money borrowed on its account by one of its officers, it will be liable for the amount, irrespective of the question whether he had authority to borrow money for the bank.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington.

The case was tried in the circuit court without a jury. The Court made the following, among other, findings of fact:

“That on or about February —, 1892, in the city of Tacoma, Washington, while the said First National Bank of Whatcom was engaged in its banking business, the plaintiff loaned to the said First National Bank of Whatcom, at its special instance and request, the sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000), and the said sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) was paid by the plaintiff to the said First National Bank of Whatcom, for the use and benefit of the said First National Bank of Whatcom, and said bank received the said money for its own use and benefit, and said money was deposited by the plaintiff in its bank, to the credit of the said First National Bank of Whatcom, and the same and other credits of the said First National Bank of Whatcom were thereafter by it, at various times and in various amounts, drawn out upon checks made in the ordinary course of its business, and were used and appropriated by it to its own use and benefit; that at the time of the said loan the said First National Bank of Whatcom then and there agreed and promised to repay to the plaintiff, four (4) months after said date, the sum of ten thousand (\$10,000) dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent., per annum from the date of receiving the same, to wit, from February 4, 1892. (5) That no part of the said sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) so loaned has been paid, except the interest thereon to February 4, 1893; that the negotiations for said loan were conducted upon the part of the said First National Bank of Whatcom by one C. M. Atkins, who, at the time of negotiating the said loan, was the duly and legally qualified and acting President of the said First National Bank of Whatcom, and at the time of making the said loan, to wit, on February 4, 1892, was its duly elected, qualified, and acting Cashier.”

Before GILBERT and ROSS, *Circuit Judges*, and HAWLEY, *District Judge*:

HAWLEY, *District Judge* (omitting part of the opinion): It is conceded by the respective counsel that no authority was ever directly conferred upon Atkins to make the loan for the bank, and the plaintiff in error claims that no inherent power exists in the President or Cashier of a National bank to pledge the credit of the bank for a loan, and that there is no evidence that the Watcom bank received the benefit of the loan. On the other hand, the defendant in error, while conceding that no express authority was given to Atkins by the Watcom bank to make the loan for it, claims that a review of

the evidence will establish the fact that the entire business of the bank was absolutely controlled and managed by Atkins.

This seems to be admitted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, for in their brief it is stated, "Atkins, who was not only Cashier, but general factotum of the bank, dictated its methods of bookkeeping, and ran the whole concern." Again: "Atkins was the chief executive officer of the bank, and dominant in all its affairs, throughout the life of the loan. For all important purposes, he was the bank's sole mouthpiece."

This being true, it is claimed by the defendant in error that where the directors of a National bank permit their managing officer to exercise, during a long period of time, such absolute authority and control over its business and assets as Atkins exercised over the business and affairs of the Whatcom bank, neither the bank nor its Receiver should be permitted to claim, as against one who in good faith dealt with the officer as the bank, that the transaction was not binding upon the bank. There is doubtless much force in this suggestion, and many State authorities have so held. (*Wing vs. Bank* [Mich.] 61 N. W. 1009; *Davenport vs. Stone* [Mich.] 62 N. W. 722, and authorities there cited.) But others have qualified this ruling by confining it to cases where the bank has retained and enjoyed the proceeds of the transaction, as this would amount to a ratification of the President's or Cashier's acts. (*Bank vs. Flanders*, 161 Mass. 335; *Thomas vs. Bank*, 40 Neb. 501; *People's Bank vs. National Bank*, 101 U. S. 181.)

Some of the courts, in support of these views, have proceeded upon the familiar and well-recognized principle that, where one of two innocent parties must suffer by the wrongful act of a third, he who gave the power to do the wrong must bear the burden of the consequences.

In *Bank vs. Armstrong* (152 U. S. 346), the court held that the borrowing of money by a National bank, though not illegal, is so much out of the course of ordinary and legitimate banking business as to require those making the loan to see to it, that the officer or agent acting for the bank had special authority to borrow the money. It follows from that decision that, in order to sustain the fourth finding of the court in this case, there must be some evidence showing that the Whatcom bank had, with knowledge of the facts, received the benefit of the loan.

The *Armstrong* case is, in several respects, different from the case at bar. In that case the appellate court was not assisted by any findings or opinion of the court below, and was left to conjecture upon what grounds the court below had acted, while in this case we have both findings and opinion showing clearly the grounds upon which the court below acted. In its findings it is stated that the sum of \$10,000 was paid by the plaintiff to the First National Bank of Whatcom "for the use and benefit of the said First National Bank of Whatcom, and said bank received the said money for its own use and benefit." In the course of its decision the Court said:

"The books of both banks, and all the evidence in the case, show that the Whatcom bank actually received the money in this manner: The amount of ten thousand dollars was placed to the credit of the Whatcom bank, in an account opened between the two banks, and was mingled with other deposits made in the Commercial Bank to the credit of the Whatcom bank, and the whole amount credited has been paid upon checks drawn from time to time by the Whatcom bank."

There is evidence in the record to support the finding and decision of the court, and herein the case differs essentially from the *Armstrong* case. There the moneys obtained by Harper, Vice-President of the Fidelity National Bank, were appropriated by Harper to his own use, and it did "not appear that the bank ever got a penny of the borrowed money, or any benefit or advantage whatever by reason of the transaction."

The distinction in the facts justifies the conclusion of the court in this case that the Commercial Bank is entitled to recover judgment, not upon the ground that Atkins was authorized by the directors of the Whatcom bank to borrow the money, but upon the ground that it received and appropriated the same to its own use and benefit. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.

#### NATIONAL BANKS—SUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS—JURISDICTION OF COURT.

United States Circuit Court, District of Nebraska, May 7, 1898.

GERNER vs. THOMPSON, *et al.*

Where an action against the directors of an insolvent National bank is based upon the provisions of the National Bank Act, the action must be brought by the Receiver.

*It seems* that such an action can not be brought under the provisions of Rev. Stat. U. S. Sec. 5239 until the Comptroller shall have procured a forfeiture of the franchises of the bank. The Federal court is without jurisdiction of an action against the directors, in the nature of a common law action of deceit.

*SHIRAS, District Judge:* This action was originally brought in the District Court of Lancaster county, in this State, and was thence removed to this court by the defendants on the grounds that the controversy was one arising under the laws of the United States, in that the defendants were proceeded against as directors of the Capital City National Bank, a corporation created under the statutes of the United States, and under the provisions of section 5239 of the Revised Statutes. The jurisdiction of this court can only be sustained upon the theory that the right of action is based upon the provisions of the statutes of the United States, for, if it is based upon a common-law right of action, then the defendants did not have the right of removal to this court, for the reason that the requisite diversity of citizenship does not exist, and the defendants are residents of the State of Nebraska.

In *Bailey vs. Mosher* (11 C. C. A. 304, 63 Fed. 488) the court of appeals for this circuit held that actions of this character, based upon the provisions of the National Banking Act, could be brought only in the name of the Receiver. The facts in that case as averred in the petition were that Bailey had been induced to loan to the Capital City National Bank the sum of \$11,500 in reliance upon the correctness of the official reports made by the directors to the Comptroller of the Currency, and published in the public newspapers, touching the condition of the bank, it being averred that these reports were intentionally falsified, that dividends had been paid when there were no earnings for the payment thereof, and that other violations of the banking Act had been committed, whereby the plaintiff had been damaged in being induced to loan money to an insolvent bank. The court held that the petition counted only on the provisions of the banking Act, and not upon the common law, and therefore the action could not be maintained, because it was not in the name of the Receiver.

The effect of this decision, if I correctly apprehend its meanings, is that rights of action created by the provisions of the banking Act are to be deemed part of the assets of the corporation, and as such are enforceable only by the Receiver in the case the bank has become insolvent; but rights of action arising at the common law, and growing out of transactions not injuriously affecting the capital stock or the interests of the shareholders at large, may be enforced by any one suffering special injury thereby. Under the ruling of the court of appeals in *Bailey vs. Mosher*, to maintain this action in its present form it must be held to be an action at the common law in the nature of an action of deceit, in which event this court is without jurisdiction, because the defendants in that event did not have the right of removal; while, on the other hand, if the action is based upon the National Banking Act, it is not maintainable in the name of the present plaintiff.

[The court here examined the case of *Wells vs. Groves* (41 Fed. Rep. 459) in which it was decided that to maintain suit by the Receiver to enforce the liability of directors arising under the provisions of section 5239 Rev. Stat. U. S. it must appear that a forfeiture had been adjudged by a court of the United States, as under the provision of that section directors could be held personally liable only for such Acts as would work a forfeiture of the charter; and, secondly, that the proceeding should be in equity and not at law; and the court proceeded to show that decision had not been overruled by the decisions of the circuit court of appeals in *Bailey vs. Mosher* (11 C. C. A. 304; 63 Fed. Rep. 488), and *Hayden vs. Thompson*, 17 C. C. A. 592; 71 Fed. Rep. 60.)]

It may be that when the question comes before either the Supreme Court or the court of appeals the ruling may be adverse to the view thus expressed, but, as I understand the facts, the question is an open one, and until finally settled by an appellate tribunal, the safer course is to secure action by the Comptroller, and an adjudication of the question by a competent court. In the particular case now before the court it does not appear that this court has jurisdiction for the reason stated, and the case must therefore be remanded.

#### LOANS TO NATIONAL BANK—CUSTOM—AUTHORITY OF OFFICER TO BORROW.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Ohio, October 13, 1896.

##### CHEMICAL NATIONAL BANK vs. ARMSTRONG.

The question what incidental powers may be necessary to carry on the business of banking, as this phrase is used in the National Bank Act, is a mixed question of law and fact. Where it is shown by the evidence in the case that it is the custom of National banks to borrow money, and for the managing officers of the bank to pledge the credit and securities of the bank to secure such loans without special authority from the board of directors, a call loan so made to a National bank may be recovered, though the money was afterwards misapplied by the officer who procured it.

This was a suit by the Chemical National Bank of New York against David Armstrong, Receiver of the Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati, to recover a loan of \$300,000 made by the complainant March 2, 1887, upon an application in writing over the signature "E. L. Harper, Vice-President" of the Fidelity National Bank.

SAGE, *District Judge* (omitting part of the opinion): The directors of the Fidelity Bank did not authorize or consent to, or until after the failure of the bank, know of this loan. It was not entered upon the books. The book-

keeper and general accountant first knew of it after the failure of the Fidelity Bank. On March 2, 1887, the date when the loan was made, Harper gave to the general bookkeeper a charge ticket, and directed him to place it to his credit, which was done. That ticket read as follows: "Credit check, Transfer of funds, E. L. H., \$300,000. Charge Chemical, New York." At the same time the charge of \$300,000 was made against the Chemical Bank. The entire transaction was fraudulent and criminal on the part of Harper, who was then engaged in wrecking the bank for his own speculative purposes.

By the evidence adduced upon the rehearing it is established that prior to the decision of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* (152 U. S. 346), it was customary and usual for one National bank to borrow money from another, and that it was regarded by bankers as legitimate and in the line of banking business to do so, without any special authority from the board of directors by resolution or otherwise, nor was such authority ever required by the bank making the loan. The President, Vice-President and Cashier severally were treated as having authority to make loans on behalf of the bank; in other words, such transactions were recognized as being within the scope of their general duties. Transactions taking the form of the loan involved in this case, some covering large amounts, but none so large as this, are referred to by officers of banks in their testimony as not infrequent.

The President of the Chemical Bank, having had forty years' experience, testifies that prior to the decision of the *Western National Bank* case it was a usual thing for one bank to borrow money from another bank; that loans were effected by rediscount of bills receivable, or by the bank's note secured by collateral, or by a certificate of deposit; that the President, Vice-President or Cashier acted for the borrowing bank; that no special authority from the directors was ever required, and that the decisions of the courts in that State were specific on that point; also that it made no difference as to the amount of the loan. To the same effect is the testimony of the President of the American Exchange Bank of New York, speaking from thirty-three or thirty-four years' experience; also the testimony of the President of the Third National Bank, an ex-Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, ex-Superintendent of the Bank Department of the State of New York, and an ex-Bank Examiner; the Cashier of the Importers and Traders' Bank, the President of the First National Bank and the President of the Gallatin National Bank, all of the city of New York.

All this testimony is uncontroverted, and it is quite significant that although Receiver Armstrong was himself an old and experienced banker, it was not until after the decision of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* that the point was made that the negotiation of the loan upon which this suit is based was outside the ordinary course of business banking and not within the authority or the line of the duties of the Vice-President of the Fidelity Bank.

In the case of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* the answer denied that the complainant had loaned the sum claimed or any other sum to the Fidelity Bank; averred that the notes mentioned in the bill made by Gahr and endorsed by Harper were discounted by the complainant for Harper, by whom the proceeds of the discount were received; that the discounted notes were at no time the property of the Fidelity National Bank, and that that bank never had any interest in the transaction, and was in no

way responsible therefor. Upon the hearing the bill was dismissed by the court below, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The opinion begins with the statement that "whether the transaction of May, 1887, was a discount by the Western National Bank of New York, in favor of E. L. Harper of the four notes made by A. P. Gahr, and indorsed by Harper, or was a loan by said bank to the Fidelity National Bank, is the question principally discussed in the briefs and oral arguments of the respective parties."

Justice Shiras, speaking for the court, proceeded: "The theory that the case was that of a simple discount by the New York bank of four promissory notes, made by Gahr and indorsed by Harper, and secured by the assignment by Harper of certificates of one thousand six hundred shares of the stock of the Fidelity National Bank, comports with the form of the notes themselves. Such a transaction would have been an ordinary one, and in the course of the usual business of such a bank. The letter of May 16, 1887, in which the proposition was made to the New York bank to make the loan, was signed by E. L. Harper in his own name, without any official designation."

The Court said that "it could not be pretended that Harper, as principal executive officer of the bank, had power without authority from the board to bind the bank by borrowing \$200,000 at four months' time. The Court continued: "It might even be questioned whether such a transaction would be within the power of the board of directors. The powers expressly granted are stated in the eighth section of National Bank Act (Revised Statutes, section 5136, paragraph 7):

A National bank can 'exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal security and by obtaining, issuing and circulating notes.' The power to borrow money or to give notes is not expressly given by the Act. The business of the bank is to lend, not to borrow money; to discount notes of others, not to get its own notes discounted.

There was not only no evidence that Harper had the authority claimed for him, but, also, there was no evidence that the negotiation of a loan, or the borrowing of money, was part of, or incident to, the transaction of banking business between Cincinnati, a commercial centre, and New York, a commercial metropolis of the United States. The decision in *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* is to be recognized as the authoritative statement of the law, and certainly this court has no disposition to otherwise regard it; but it is to be taken with reference to the facts as they there appeared. It is a decision to be carefully limited, and not to be stretched or enlarged by construction or in its application. It is true, upon the facts of that case, that the business of the bank was 'to lend, not to borrow money; to discount the notes of others, not to get its own discounted;' and it is true in a certain general sense. But that the Supreme Court did not intend by the use of that language to lay down a rigid, inflexible rule, applicable to all cases and under all circumstances, is apparent from the reference to, and the quotation from, *First National Bank vs. National Exchange Bank* (92 U. S. 127), which follows in immediate juxtaposition in

the opinion as already cited and copied herein. This view is made more clear by the fact that immediately after this quotation the opinion proceeds: 'Nor do we doubt that a bank, in certain circumstances, may become a temporary borrower of money,' adding that by reason of the extraordinary character of such transactions it would be the duty of the lender to see to it that the officer or agent acting for the borrowing bank had special authority."

The Court then says: "Even therefore if it be conceded that it was within the power of the board of directors of the Fidelity National Bank to borrow \$200,000 on time, it is yet obvious that the Vice-President, however general his powers, could not exercise such a power unless specially authorized so to do, and it is equally obvious that persons dealing with the bank are presumed to know the extent of the general powers of the officials."

All these considerations, together with the circumstance that the entire discussion of the right of a National bank to borrow money is introduced in the opinion after the finding that the transaction involved was upon its face and upon the facts an individual transaction, to which the Fidelity Bank was not a party and for which it was not liable; that finding being decisive and rendering the discussion of the power of a National bank to borrow money unnecessary—which is always to be taken into account in determining the weight of authority—lead this court to the conclusion that the Supreme Court in *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* was dealing with and deciding the case before upon its facts and circumstances without intending to lay down a rule or establish a precedent applicable to all cases or even generally. The question of the authority requisite to enable its officers to conduct such transactions will be considered later. What is the proper business of a bank, and what incidental powers may be necessary to carry on the business of banking, is not purely a question of law, nor altogether a question of fact? It is a mixed question of law and fact, depending as to fact, upon circumstances and location.

It is in testimony in this case that country banks in agricultural districts often borrow, sometimes heavily, at certain seasons of the year from Cincinnati banks to provide for the movement of crops. At other seasons borrowing money might be entirely foreign to the legitimate business of banking, and in other localities it might be so regarded at any season, unless upon some extraordinary emergency. Now, the city banks sustain to the banks of other cities, and especially to those of the city of New York, a relation in many respects similar to that of the country banks to the city banks. The difference is that between cities, and especially between the interior cities and New York, the transactions are heavier, the exchanges are often of large amounts and they may occur at any season of the year. It may be said that it would be an easy thing for the directors to confer upon its officers by express terms the requisite authority. But the question is not now how the authority shall be conferred or by whom exercised, but whether such transactions belong to the business of banking.

By the evidence this case is clearly distinguishable from *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong*, and such transactions are as a matter of fact proved to be included in the business of banking. They are also included as matter of law, because by section 5136 Revised Statutes, power is granted to every National bank to "exercise by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to the law, all such incidental powers as shall be



necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt ; by receiving deposits ; by buying and selling exchange, coin, bullion ; by loaning money on personal security and by obtaining issuing and circulating notes." When the Supreme Court in commenting upon this section said that "the power to borrow money or to give notes is not expressly given by the Act" and added, "The business of the bank is to lend, and not to borrow money; to discount the notes of others not to get its own notes discounted," it was setting forth in crystallized form what it deemed to be the substance of the provisions of the section, rather than stating a conclusion or formulating a rule. Accordingly, in the very next sentence, it cites with approval *First National Bank vs. National Exchange Bank*, quoting the passage which indicates that section 5136 is not to be so strictly construed as to limit the incidental powers to precisely the things specified in the section, for after stating that these powers are such as are required to meet all the legitimate demands of the authorized business, and to enable a bank to conduct its affairs within the general scope of its charter safely and prudently, it adds : "This necessarily implies the right of a bank to incur liabilities in the regular course of its business as well as to become the creditor of others." As is suggested by counsel for complainant the enumeration of powers in section 5136, though clear, is not put in a strictly logical order. It might be paraphrased without changing its meaning.

This case is also distinguishable from that of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* in that there the Court finds that the transaction was in form, as well as in fact, an individual one, and that finding alone was decisive of the case. The court below had entered its decree upon that ground, for it did not touch upon the question of authority or power, which was not even suggested. Here the transaction was in form on behalf of the Fidelity Bank. Neither the power nor the authority of Harper was questioned in the court below, nor was the liability of the bank. The litigation was exclusively concerning the amount due and the interest. So it was in the Court of Appeals until after the opinion in the case of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* was filed in the Supreme Court. Again there the loan was for four months—here it was on call, a very important difference. Upon the evidence the finding of this court is that the power of the Fidelity to borrow money by conducting such a transaction as is involved in this case, is established, and that the same is legitimately within the business of banking, under the National Bank Act.

The remaining question is whether Harper had authority to conduct the transaction. He was Vice-President and acting President—the chief executive officer of the bank. His position made him a vice-principal—a representative of the bank, not merely its servant or employee. From the nature and necessities of the business of banking and the constantly occurring instances or emergencies when success or failure in the conduct of the particular transaction depend upon the executive ability, the judgment and the decision of the officer representing the bank, in reference to points which could not have been anticipated, and which must be promptly and without hesitation settled, it is evident that a large discretion must be vested in such officers. To require special authority for their acts would so embarrass the conduct of the business as to seriously interfere with, if not entirely prevent, the prosperous

conduct of its affairs. Hence such officers stand among the highest in the rank of general agents. Their position warrants the implication of the authority necessary to the performance of their duties, and when proof is made that transactions of the nature of that now under consideration have, for more than twenty years, in and about the city of Cincinnati and the city of New York been conducted by them not only without special authority in each instance, but without any direct authority from their board of directors—in very many instances, indeed generally, without even consulting them—and without any authority whatever except that to be inferred from long established custom and usage—which is as good in the case of a corporation as in the case of an individual—it can hardly be maintained that more must be shown. The conclusion of this Court is that the authority of Harper in this case is sufficiently established.

The point was made in the brief that the amount of the loan, \$300,000, was sufficient to excite suspicion and put the complainant upon inquiry. That might be argued with much force if there was in the then known condition of the Fidelity Bank anything to indicate that its funds were being abstracted by its Vice-President for his own speculative purposes, or that there was any irregularity in the conduct of its business. On the contrary, the unlawful and criminal operations of Harper were not publicly known to the President or board of directors of his own bank until they were brought to light by the failure in June, more than three months after the loan by the Chemical. Why, then, should the Chemical, having no possible motive to enter upon an irregular transaction, and expecting only a low rate of interest, acting upon an application regular upon its face, with bills receivable as collateral, everything being in the usual and customary form, not knowing and not having the means of knowing anything whatever to excite suspicion, there being nothing which the most careful inquiry would have disclosed, have hesitated to make the loan? I see no reason why, under the facts in this case, the extraordinary caution insisted upon by counsel should have been exercised by the Chemical. As long as Harper was accredited to the officers of the Chemical Bank as the chief acting executive officer of the Fidelity Bank, and there was nothing in the known state of its affairs, or of his relations to that bank, to excite suspicion, the officers of the Chemical had the right to trust in his integrity, and to conduct their transactions with him accordingly. I have already stated why, in my opinion, the rule in the case of the *Western National Bank vs. Armstrong* is authoritative so far as it applies, and would control if this case were not distinguishable upon the facts, as has already been pointed out. The decree will be for the complainant for the amount and with interest as directed by the mandate.

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## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

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Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

AUXVASSE, Missouri, Oct. 12, 1896.

SIR:—A forged check is drawn on a bank in A payable to John Smith, or bearer; the check is presented for payment at a bank in B. The bank in B requires the indorsement of

John Smith, which is also forged. The check is then indorsed by bank in B and forwarded to bank in A for payment; the bank in A honors check and remits for same. Subsequently the bank in A discovers the check is a forgery and the forgers both of the check and indorsement are not to be found. Which bank should bear the loss? SUBSCRIBER.

*Answer.*—The general rule that a bank on which a check is drawn is bound to know the signature of the drawer and cannot recover money paid upon a forged signature, has been limited by the later authorities to those cases where there has been no negligence on the part of the bank or person presenting the check for payment. (*People's Bank vs. Franklin Bank*, 88 Tenn. 299; *First Nat. Bank of Danvers vs. First Nat. Bank of Salem*, 151 Mass. 280; *First Nat. Bank of Crawfordsvile vs. Indiana Nat. Bank* [Ind.], 30 N. E. Rep. 808; *Nat. Bank of North America vs. Bangs*, 106 Mass. 441; *Ellis vs. Insurance Company*, 4 Ohio St. 628; *First Nat. Bank vs. Ricker*, 71 Ill. 439; *Rouvant vs. San Antonio Nat. Bank*, 63 Tex. 610.) If then, upon all the facts of the case referred to in the inquiry, negligence was imputable to the bank in B, as, for example, that it took the check under suspicious circumstances, then that bank is liable to the bank at A for the amount. In the absence of a statement as to all the facts we could not give an opinion as to the question which bank would have to bear the loss.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

FLORENCE, Wis., Oct. 9, 1896.

SIR:—A gives his note to B for \$150. B discounts the note at the bank, before it is due. After the note is due, A presents a check to the bank of \$200 and demands payment in cash for the full amount. Would the bank be sustained in law in tendering A \$50 in cash and his past due note of \$150, and would A be obliged to accept same in payment of his \$200 check?

E. E. W., Cashier.

*Answer.*—As the note is past due and unpaid, and held by the bank in its own right, the bank has the right to set off the sum due thereon against the amount of the maker's deposit, which is a debt due from the bank to him. (*Eyrich vs. Capital State Bank*, 67 Miss. 60; *Windisch-Mulhauser Brewing Co. vs. Bank of Marysville* [Ohio], 33 N. E. Rep. 1054.) The actual amount due A is, therefore, the difference between the amount of the note and the amount of the deposit; and he cannot require the bank to pay him anything more. The bank can refuse to pay the \$200 check, unless A is willing to receive the \$50 thereon.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 21, 1896.

SIR:—Can a note or other paper be protested, legally, at any time during the day it is due, of course between the hours for doing business? Are there any decisions of the courts respecting this point? In explanation let us say that while it is the custom of the banks to hold all paper until close of banking hours before protesting, it is claimed that the protest may be legally done at any time during the day between the hours of doing business. If my memory serves me, the express companies, during the panic of 1893, sent a notary with the collector and each item refused by a teller was immediately protested and returned.

CHARLES E. WOLBERT, Treasurer.

*Answer.*—It is well settled that commercial paper may be protested as soon as demand has been made, and the dishonor has occurred, and the holder or notary need not wait until the close of business hours to send notice. (*Bank of Alexandria vs. Swan*, 9 Peters, 33; *Lenox vs. Roberts*, 2 Wheat. 373.) The rule is thus stated in Chitty on Bills (13 Am. Ed. 544.): "It has been doubted whether, in the case of an inland bill or promissory note payable after date or sight, or on a particular event, the holder can legally give notice of the non-payment on the day when it falls due, or whether the drawee or maker is not entitled to the whole of that day to pay in, without any reference to banking hours, and whether it can be considered

as dishonored until the whole of that day has elapsed. But though in general, when a payment is to be made on a day certain, the party is not in default until the expiration of it, the law merchant considers the contract of the acceptor of a bill, or maker of a note, to have been to pay on demand at any part of that day, and therefore it seems clear that notice of non-payment may be given on the last day of grace whenever, after due presentment and demand, the drawee makes an unqualified refusal to pay at all. And in a more recent case it was held that notice of dishonor may be given on the same day that the bill falls due, although there may not have been an absolute refusal, but a mere neglect to pay on presentment."

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

PULASKI CITY, Va., Oct. 10, 1896.

SIR:—Under Rev. Stat. U. S., Section 5193, providing that where a National bank knowingly takes usurious interest for discounting a note, and action in the nature of an action of debt is brought to recover back "double the amount of interest thus paid," is the measure of recovery twice the excess of interest so taken over and above the legal rate, or twice the amount of the entire interest thus taken.

RO. L. GARDINER.

*Answer.*—The amount which may be recovered from the bank as a penalty is twice the amount of interest paid, and not merely twice the amount in excess of the legal rate. (*Crocker vs. First Nat. Bank of Chetopa*, Thompson's Nat. Bank Cases, 317; *Overholt vs. Nat. Bank of Mount Pleasant*, 82 Pa. St. 490; *Barnet vs. Muncie Nat. Bank*, 98 U. S. 555.)

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SHREVE, O., Oct. 15, 1896.

SIR:—A, B, & C compose a partnership (not incorporated) doing a banking business under the name of the Citizens' Bank at O., in the State of Ohio. Can they as private bankers charge 8 per cent interest on loans, retain the interest at the time of making loans and not be liable for usury?

O. T., Cashier.

*Answer.*—It is a well-settled rule that banks and bankers are permitted, by virtue of a long established and universal custom, to receive the amount of interest in advance, by holding it back at the time when they make the loan; (*Fletcher vs. Bank of the United States*, 8 Wheat. 338) and this has been the custom of all bankers, whether incorporated or not. We do not find anything in the laws of Ohio which would appear to limit the privilege to incorporated banks, and we should say, therefore, that the right can be exercised by the Citizens' Bank at O.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LUDINGTON, Mich., Oct. 3, 1896.

SIR:—Will you kindly give me, through your magazine, your opinion in the following case: In 1893, certain parties left with us a mortgage and discharge to be forwarded for collection. The amount was paid and remitted to us by bank to whom we forwarded. Some weeks afterwards, the bank wrote us that the discharge was a forgery and demanded the return of the amount, which we refused to do. They now threaten suit to recover. The papers having been left merely for collection and the money paid over by us when received, can they recover even if the discharge was a forgery? The mortgage was genuine. Would the late decision regarding restrictive indorsements apply to this case?

W. L. HAMMOND, Cashier.

*Answer.*—It is plain that in this case the bank was acting only as an agent, and the rule is well established that where money is paid to an agent by mistake, it cannot be recovered of such agent, after the same has been paid over to the principal before notice of the mistake. (*La Farge vs. Kneeland*, 7 Cow. 460; *Buller vs. Harrison*, 1 Crop. 566; *Mowatt vs. McLelan*, 1 Wend. 174; *Nat. Park Bank vs. Seaboard Nat. Bank*, 114 N. Y. 28.) As there was in this case no indorsement at all, the case is not complicated by any question as to the effect of a restrictive indorsement, but it rests solely upon the ordinary rules which apply in the case of agency.

## \*THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S DISCOUNT RATE.

### *THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION OF A NOTED EXPEDIENT OF BRITISH BANKING.*

There were many reasons why the Bank of England became the great central organization for determining the value of money or capital in the market. We have already seen that it possessed the exclusive right of joint-stock banking until the year 1826. In addition to this monopoly, the large capital at its command gave it a position above other institutions as a lender of money.

Besides its capital, the bank had the privilege of issuing notes, which, of course, meant additional resources. In the year 1718 the note issue was £1,829,980, and has rapidly increased until the present year, when it amounted to £48,000,000. Thus from two sources, viz., subscribed capital and note issue, the Bank of England became a formidable opponent to the other bankers. We can therefore understand how a single bank with large resources became a great power, and assumed the responsibility of fixing the rate, or the price for the loan of capital.

There was, however, another cause tending to give the bank a predominant position, viz., it became the custodian of the money belonging to the State. Again, when the Government required a loan it was called upon to carry out the transaction. At various times, therefore, it had large resources at its command. Our national debt was built up by its aid, and thus from an early period the bank and the Government have been allied.

In return for services rendered to the State, the bank naturally looked to the Government for assistance during commercial crises and panics. The privileges bestowed upon it were therefore: 1. The use of the Government balances, which at times are very large. For example, on January 9, 1895, the amount was £6,200,000. The community naturally thought that if the Government could trust the bank, its savings would be quite secure. 2. It had, as we have seen, the monopoly of joint-stock banking until the year 1826. This gave it a good start before other joint-stock banks came into existence. 3. It was the only joint-stock bank in London which could issue notes. Thus from many singular events the bank became the holder of the cash reserve.

There is rather a curious illustration showing the connection between the bank and the Government. In the year 1797 Mr. Pitt, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was afraid there would not be enough specie in the bank to meet foreign payments, and therefore compelled it not to pay gold for notes issued. Naturally a bank which had the privilege of not paying cash for its notes must obviously assume a commanding position—in fact, it was an institution with a charmed existence. There are, however, two incidents in its history which materially assisted towards making it the principal dealer in capital, and in such capacity to state the price for its loans.

The first was in consequence of the London banks opening accounts at the Bank of England. These banks found it convenient to keep their reserves with that institution, because its premises were better protected, and also for the reason that the bank issued notes, which could be retained far better than gold in their tills. Bank of England notes being a legal-tender for payment of debts, liabilities could be discharged, thus avoiding the use of gold to a large extent.

\* From "Banks and Banking," by H. T. Easton. London: Effingham Wilson.

The balances of the London banks have at times been large. Thus in 1844 the amount was £1,000,000, but in 1872 the amount was £7,500,000.

In 1858 these balances never exceeded the reserve by 20 per cent., but in recent years the proportion has been 50 per cent.

	<i>Proportion of reserve to liabilities.</i>	<i>Proportion per cent. bankers' balances to reserve.</i>
Thus—1846-54.....	51 per cent.	22 per cent.
1855-63.....	43 "	48 "
1864-72.....	42 "	63 "

During the panic years of 1847, 1857 and 1866, the reserve of the Bank of England was insufficient to meet the bankers' balances.

Thus—1857, Bank's reserve.....	£1,462,158
'London bankers' balances.....	4,649,000
1866, Bank's reserve.....	1,202,310
London bankers' balances.....	7,960,000

This additional capital which the bank obtained from the London banks considerably augmented its resources, and any sudden withdrawal of these reserves must react upon the rate of discount, when such rate fluctuates with the amount of reserve.

The second incident in its history was that it assumed the position of a lender of capital to outsiders, that is, to those who did not keep a banking account with it. This is quite different from the practice of the English banks.

In times of panic and commercial crises a great number apply for loans at the Bank of England. The statistics given for the panic years of 1847, 1857 and 1866, show to what extent the community applied for assistance when needed. It has lent largely at various times, and therefore we find that during the present century the bank has gradually assumed a responsibility over the money market by rendering assistance to the commercial community. At such times all those who were possessed of good security were assisted by the bank. The importance of this policy cannot be overrated, because, as we have seen, English trade is conducted by means of borrowed capital, and if the trader could not discount his bills he would soon be obliged to suspend payment.

The merchant purchases goods and pays for the same by means of bills drawn upon him, say three months hence, and he is only able to meet such bills by discounting others received for goods sold. It is therefore of vital importance that he should be able at all times to obtain capital by means of bills discounted. The Bank of England has therefore been of immense service to the commercial community at periods when capital is scarce or a feeling of distrust has pervaded the mercantile world. Its good management is therefore of the highest value. Thus when the deposits of other banks have diminished in consequence of a want of confidence on the part of the depositors, the deposits of the Bank of England have invariably increased.

With regard to the note circulation, the action of the bank is purely mechanical; in fact, as Mr. Bagehot stated, the office could be removed to Somerset House.

The bank is allowed to issue £16,800,000 of notes against securities, but for any amount issued in excess, the bank must hold gold and silver in reserve. This limit was fixed by the Act of 1844, in order to secure the convertibility of the note.

The profit derived by the bank from such issue is made from the securities which bear interest. The profit is, however, divided, the Government receiving £200,000.

The money market is affected when gold is taken from the Bank of England, and we shall see how it affects the rate of interest when we consider the causes of the fluctuations. If, however, as Mr. Bagehot suggested, the department was removed to Somerset House, it is a question whether the loss of a million or two of gold would affect market rates like what takes place under the present conditions.

The weekly reports of the banking department are, however, of greater import-

ance to the outer market, and these reports are keenly scrutinized in order to ascertain what are the forces which might affect the value of money.

We see in the daily papers an analysis in the following form :—

## BANKING DEPARTMENT.

LIABILITIES.	Last year, Jan. 10.	Jan. 2, 1895.	Jan. 9, 1895.	Increase or decrease.
Reserve.....	£3,428,491	£3,192,427	£3,383,624	Inc. £191,197
Public deposits.....	4,899,302	6,598,906	6,213,105	Dec. 385,801
Other deposits.....	31,360,264	38,198,631	38,845,839	Inc. 647,208
Seven day bills.....	155,838	143,967	147,618	Inc. 3,651
<b>ASSETS.</b>				
Government securities.....	11,760,317	14,689,069	16,677,309	Inc. 1,988,210
Other securities.....	25,712,643	24,026,528	21,305,245	Dec. 2,720,283
Notes.....	14,863,580	21,731,120	22,914,375	Inc. 1,183,255
Gold and silver.....	2,018,455	2,241,184	2,246,237	Inc. 5,053
Ratio.....	46¾ p. c.	58¾ p. c.	55¾ p. c.	.....
Bank rate.....	3 p. c.	2 p. c.	2 p. c.	.....

## ISSUE DEPARTMENT.

LIABILITIES.	Last year, Jan. 10.	Jan. 2, 1895.	Jan. 9, 1895.	Increase or decrease.
Gold and bullion.....	£23,795,535	£30,849,895	31,693,857	Inc. £793,960
Notes issued.....	40,245,535	47,649,895	48,413,855	Inc. 763,960
Circulation.....	25,352,155	25,918,775	25,519,480	Dec. 398,295

Those who study the figures very closely are able to guess more or less accurately what has taken place during the preceding week. For example, if we take this particular week as an illustration, we note that the reserve in the banking department has decreased, which would show a greater demand for capital. We shall discuss in the next section the fluctuations of this reserve, and endeavor to understand how far the rate of interest is governed by its amount.

Although the bank issues these weekly balance sheets, the directors do not state their reasons for making alterations. Sometimes an error of judgment occurs, but it is soon rectified, because the bank cannot control the value of money. As the late Mr. Bonamy Price observed, "A banker is the interpreter of the forces at work, and he makes a trial of the rate which those forces prescribe."

In connection with the history of the bank, we have already noticed a gradual growth of deposits, which shows that the public have great confidence in its management. Although there has been a gradual growth of deposits, the bank's position in the money market as a lender of capital has materially altered. Thus if we compare the total amount of capital lent by the banks of the United Kingdom with the amount lent by the Bank of England, we find the proportion is very small, viz.: In 1874 total lent by banks of the United Kingdom = £585,500,000; Bank of England, = £10,800,000, or only 2 per cent. Again, its liabilities are small in comparison with the liabilities of the London joint-stock banks.

Thus—1890, Bank of England.....	= £29,000,000
"    11 London joint-stock banks.....	= 125,539,000
1894, 17 Metropolitan joint-stock banks.....	= 231,800,000
"    Bank of England.....	= 44,600,000

Again, in 1854, the proportion of capital to the liabilities of the Bank of England was 14 per cent., but in 1874 the proportion was reduced to 9 per cent. The bank recognized the fact that its rate of interest was not always the market value, and consequently a few years ago informed the public that, although the minimum rate was published, yet under certain conditions it would discount bills below such rate.

Naturally this privilege would be granted to its own customers rather than to large financial houses which compete against it. The large borrowers of money in

fact avoid the bank if they can possibly do so, because it will only lend money for ten days, and sometimes charges 1 per cent. above the published rate.

In recent years the bank has reduced the limit of loans from ten to seven days, but it reserves the right to state for what period the loan shall be made.

We have seen how the bank gradually assumed a leading position in the money market, through its large paid-up capital, its large deposits, its being the bankers' bank, and finally by its holding the Government balances. There is, however, one important point in connection with its history, and that is, it assumed a great responsibility over the money market. In times of commercial crises and panics it undertook to lend capital to any one who was possessed of good security.

In 1825 the directors stated that the bank had taken a firm and deliberate resolution to make common cause with the country. Mr. Hankey has said that the bank ought never to have encouraged this opinion, but we cannot see how any other system could succeed when we consider its unique position. The only institution in this country which holds a gold reserve must of necessity be the final resource of the mercantile community. During these periods of commercial disaster, the amount of capital advanced by the Bank of England has been very large. The usual proportion of 80 to 50 per cent. of reserve against liabilities has not been kept, in fact the reserve at one time was so low as 6 per cent. We will illustrate this policy on the part of the bank by giving the amounts advanced during the great crises of the present century. With an increased demand for capital, the bank at such periods naturally charged a high rate of interest, viz., from 6 to 10 per cent.

## BILLS DISCOUNTED BY BANK OF ENGLAND.

1809.....	£15,475,700		
1810.....	20,070,800	panic year.	
1825, February 28.....	2,466,000		
" August 31.....	5,486,000		
1836, February 28.....	9,597,000		
" August 31.....	2,950,000	crisis year.	
1836, February 20.....	2,900,000		
" August 30.....	4,400,000		
1837, February 28.....	11,200,000		
" August 29.....	5,100,000	crisis year.	Rate. 4½ to 5 per cent.
1836, February 27.....	3,200,000		
" August 29.....	2,900,000		
1846, February 28.....	13,137,000		8 per cent.
" August 29.....	6,067,000		4   "
1847, February 27.....	8,879,000		5½ "
" August 28.....	9,163,000		5   "
" October 2.....	10,399,000		5   "
" 9.....	10,978,000	crisis year.	5½ "
" 15.....	11,907,000		
" 23.....	12,482,000		8   "
1856, February 23.....	8,883,000		5½ to 4½ "
" August 30.....	4,446,000		6   "
1857, February 28.....	8,859,000		5½ "
" August 29.....	7,863,000		8   "
" October 24.....	9,636,000		
" 31.....	11,105,000		
" November 4.....	11,432,000	crisis year.	10   "
" 11.....	13,233,000		
" 18.....	16,003,000		
" 25.....	17,376,000		
" December 2.....	17,788,000		

In 1857 the bank stated that advances would only be made to bill brokers at certain seasons when the public deposits were particularly large, but at other times an application for an advance would be considered exceptional. The bank, however, in the panic year of 1866, disregarded this rule.



## BILLS DISCOUNTED.

		Rate.
1866, February 28.....	£7,253,000	7 per cent.
" May 2.....	8,884,000	6 "
" " 9.....	9,249,000	7 and 8 "
" " 16.....	13,831,000	9 and 10 "
" " 23.....	14,501,000	10 "
" " 30.....	16,512,000	10 "
" June 6.....	16,003,000	10 "

The policy of the bank during the critical years of 1872-8 and 1878-9 has been ably defended by Mr. Birch, the late Governor. He says :

" In 1872-8 an enormous amount of bills were created with a view of withdrawing gold from England to assist in the payment of the French indemnity to Germany. The bank recognized the danger which might arise from this being carried to too great an extent, and then crippling the ordinary business of the country, and rapidly raised the rate of discount. I find that in 1872 we had seventeen changes in our rates of discount ; in 1873 we had twenty-four changes. The bank rate varied from 8 per cent. to 9 per cent., and from 10 per cent. to 12 per cent., was charged in the latter period on advances, not with a view of making large profits, but with a view of telling people that it was a class of business the bank would do everything in its power to keep within reasonable bounds."

In October, 1878, came the crash of the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank. The Bank of England was in a good position to meet the emergency, and the threatened crisis passed away. The rate was never raised above 6 per cent. : many thought it should have gone higher, following the precedents of 1872-8, but in doing so they did not recognize the fact that the circumstances connected with these periods were entirely different.

" In the year 1878 the stringent action on the part of the bank was with a view to put a stop to the discounting of certain financial bills, and in the year 1878 the main object of the bank was to avoid all unnecessary cause for alarm ; and, the foreign exchanges being in favor of this country, the bank could show a bold front to the difficulties of the situation, and did so, and I venture to think its action met with general approbation."

This is a very important declaration on the part of the Governor of the bank, showing that its present policy is to assist the money market within reasonable limits. In the year 1890 the directors even went a step further in order to prevent a great disaster. When the great house of Baring was in difficulties, the directors called a meeting of the representatives of the principal banks, and agreed with them to guarantee all the outstanding acceptances of the above-mentioned firm. This action on the part of the bank no doubt prevented a great commercial disaster. We think the policy was possibly wise under the circumstances, but whether the Bank of England should guarantee the solvency of houses of repute when in difficulties is a question for serious consideration. A crisis might have been avoided in 1866 when the house of Overend, Gurney & Co. failed, but when a bad system of finance exists it is better that firms who embark in reckless speculation should not be assisted. Of course this is a different policy from that of refusing to assist the market when it may be the means of avoiding a panic.

The bank has recently made concessions to its rivals in the money market, viz., the bill brokers. The bank has agreed to discount bills for them which have not more than fifteen days to run at not less than bank rate, but of course it reserves the right to charge a higher rate. No doubt this will tend to make the Bank of England rate more in harmony with that of the outer market.

The position of the Bank of England is unique, in fact no country has an institution wielding such power over the supply and demand of capital.

It is satisfactory to observe that the great powers entrusted to the bank have not been abused. To promote the prosperity of the country has been its aim rather than to pay high dividends to the stockholders.

(To be continued.)

## ST. LOUIS'S WELCOME TO THE BANKERS.

### *SOCIAL AND ENTERTAINMENT FEATURES OF THE RECENT CONVENTION.*

**B**Y the second Bankers' As-  
tablished in a  
hospitable cit-



*Wm. H. Thomson, Chairman Committee of Arrangements.*

warmth of its greeting to the Twenty-Annual Convention of the American sociation St. Louis has become es-pre-eminent position amongst the ies of the country—a distinction that is amply merited by the series of delightful en-tertainments and brilliant so-cial events arranged for the pleasure of her banker guests.

The MAGAZINE has already presented an ex-haustive account of the business matters of the convention, the report oc-cupying forty two pages of the October number.

The social side of the event was of as much im-portance and interest to the ladies as the more serious affairs were to the men, and as both ladies and gentlemen were enthusiastic participants in all of the entertainments, there is sufficient reason for a brief review of the lighter pleasures of each day's programme.

#### FIRST DAY—RECEPTION OF THE BANKERS.

The first day, upon their arrival at the registry rooms of the Planters' Hotel, the visitors were met by a reception committee composed of men well known in both the business and society circles of St. Louis. The most active and painstaking of these gentlemen were Messrs. Charles Parsons, R. J. Lackland, Richard Hospes, John Nickerson, Thos. A. Stoddart, Charles Hodgman, L. G. Kammerer, Edward Chase, J. C. Richardson, G. W. Garrels, A. W. Straub, F. E. Marshall, J. C. Van Blarcom, L. A. Battaile, Thos. H. West, Breckinridge Jones, Wm. Nichols, C. E. Kircher, D. K. Ferguson, C. W. Bullen, J. B. Case and C. Tompkins.

These gentlemen, after extending a cordial welcome to their guests, provided each member with a badge of the association, which entitled the wearer to full membership privileges at the Jockey. Country, Mercantile, University, Noonday and St. Louis Clubs, and insured them the freedom of visiting at any time during their stay, the St. Louis Exposition, the Anheuser-Busch Brewery, the Cupples Freight Distributing Station, the Missouri Botanical Gardens and the Museum of Fine Arts and free use of the wires of the several telegraph and telephone companies.

## A DRIVE OVER THE CITY.

Following the close of the convention's opening session, the delegates enjoyed a most delightful afternoon's outing under the direction of Chairman Wm. H. Thomson of the local committee of arrangements.

A long line of stylish carriages with liveried drivers awaited the delegates as they left the Olympic Theatre (where the convention was held), and all were taken in charge at that point by the reception and arrangements committees.

## LUNCHEON AT THE UNION STATION.

They were driven to the Union Station, where a bounteous luncheon was served, after which came an inspection (under the guidance of Mr. E. P. Bryan, General Manager of the Terminal Railroad Association) of the terminal facilities, the interlocking plant, etc.

A special train of the Terminal Railroad was in waiting, and being escorted to this train, the visitors were given a trip over the association's properties in St. Louis and East St. Louis.

Arrangements had also been made to visit Granite City, Ills., and the Niedringhaus plant, but this had to be abandoned on account of lack of time.

## CUPPLES FREIGHT DISTRIBUTING STATION.

A stop was made at Cupples Station, the largest freight distributing depot in the United States, where the delegates were met by Mr. Samuel Cupples, of the Cupples Wooden Ware Co., and originator of this great "freight clearing-house," and Mr. E. C. Simmons, of the Simmons Hardware Company, who were introduced by Chairman Thomson. This trip, including rides over the Eads and Merchants' bridges, was thoroughly enjoyed.

## VISIT TO THE ANHEUSER-BUSCH ASSOCIATION.

Following this came a visit to and inspection of the vast plant of the Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association, where the delegates were met and entertained by Secretary Muehlman, of that company, who made a charming speech of welcome, responded to by Chairman Thomson, and the visitors were invited to sample the famous Anheuser-Busch brew, and were presented with souvenir pocket-knives, bearing the monogram of the company.

From the big brewery the party returned to Union Station, whence they were driven in carriages to their respective hotels.

## SECOND DAY—THE EXPOSITION.

The second day, September 23, was spent by many of the ladies of the party in visiting the Exposition (where they were invited through the special courtesy of the Directory), and in enjoying the beauties of the Art Museum.

## RECEPTION BY MR. AND MRS. J. C. VAN BLARCOM.

In the evening, an elegant reception was given in honor of the visiting financiers, by Mr. and Mrs. Jacob C. Van Blarcom, at their palatial home in Westmoreland Place. The entertainment was magnificent in every detail, and was one of the most superb affairs ever celebrated in St. Louis.

The Van Blarcom residence, which is considered to be among the handsomest houses west of New York, was appointed in simply perfect taste on the evening of the reception. The entire building was ablaze with light, and decorated with a wealth of potted plants and cut flowers.

Wild smilax and graceful, trailing vines were festooned over the mantels, wreathed in artistic masses about the chandeliers, and twined around the sweeping



*Residence of Mr. J. C. Van Blarcom.*

balusters. Wherever flowers could be placed, fragrant American Beauty roses were used in greatest profusion. The walls of the lower hall, or reception room, were banked with giant palms, while curtains of vividly green smilax served to divide the corridor into three parts.

The guests began to arrive soon after 8 o'clock, and in a short time the immense house was crowded. The music room, the morning room, the long salon and the three reception rooms were all filled with people who at once proceeded to the drawing rooms where they were received by the hostess, who was assisted by a number of well-known society women. So much care and admirable thoughtfulness had been expended in regard to the comfort of the guests, and the mansion was so commodious that even such a vast throng of guests was entertained with perfect ease.

The extreme beauty of the permanent furnishings of the house, together with the great quantities of flowers, the music of the two orchestras, and the throngs of gorgeously attired ladies, assisted in constituting one of the largest and most elegant receptions in the entire history of St. Louis social events.



*J. C. Van Blarcom.*

#### RECEPTION AT THE ST. LOUIS CLUB—THE PARKS.

Upon adjournment of the convention on the third and last day, Thursday, September 24, carriages were at once taken for the St. Louis Club, where a delicious

luncheon had been prepared and was enjoyed by about four hundred guests. In the afternoon, the visitors enjoyed a drive from the club-house to Forest Park, thence to Lafayette and Tower Grove Parks, and finally to the Missouri Botanical Gardens. The long line of carriages was led by a tally-ho coach, in which were seated Mr. William H. Thomson; Capt. and Mrs. Robert J. Lowry, of Atlanta, Ga.; Mr. and Mrs. Bradford Rhodes, of Mamaroneck, N. Y.; Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Cornwell, of Buffalo, N. Y., and Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Pullen, of New York.

#### BANQUET AT THE PLANTERS' HOTEL.

In the evening at 8 o'clock, the programme of entertainments closed with a grand banquet at the Planters' Hotel. Fifteen tables were made ready, covers being laid for over five hundred guests. The decorations were of delicate maiden-hair fern and stately American Beauties. The glittering cut glass, the highly polished



*Banquet Room at the Planters' Hotel.*

silver and the rich evening costumes of the ladies present, formed a scene of such brilliance as is rarely seen at any public hotel.

It is impossible in this brief review to mention all who were at the banquet, but among the bankers and their wives who were present were the following:


- |  |   |
|--|---|
| Mr. and Mrs. C. Adsit, Hornellsville, N. Y.  | Mr. F. G. Farrell, Jacksonville, Ills.      |
| Mr. D. Annan, Cumberland, Md.                | Mr. and Mrs. D. K. Ferguson, St. Louis.     |
| Mr. and Mrs. G. A. Baker, St. Louis.         | Mr. W. G. Fitzwillson, New York.            |
| Mr. S. A. Battalle, St. Louis.               | Mr. and Mrs. G. W. Garrels, St. Louis.      |
| Mr. E. C. Bowman, Detroit.                   | Mr. F. W. Gookin, Chicago.                  |
| Mr. and Mrs. T. B. Boyd, St. Louis.          | Mr. Carlos I. Greeley, St. Louis.           |
| Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Branch, New York.         | Mr. C. C. Hay, New York.                    |
| Mr. R. S. Brookings, St. Louis.              | Mr. E. W. Hayes, Detroit.                   |
| Mr. and Mrs. E. P. Bryan, St. Louis.         | Mr. F. P. Hays, Louisville, Ky.             |
| Mr. and Mrs. C. W. Bullen, St. Louis.        | Mr. J. C. Hendrix, New York.                |
| Mr. and Mrs. J. F. Campbell, Galveston, Tex. | Mr. E. A. Hewett, Louisville, Ky.           |
| Mr. and Mrs. J. B. Case, St. Louis.          | Mr. and Mrs. Walker Hill, St. Louis.        |
| Mr. R. J. Compton, St. Louis.                | Mr. C. Hodgman and Miss Hodgman, St. Louis. |
| Mr. and Mrs. W. C. Cornwell, Buffalo, N. Y.  | Mr. Riemann Howard, Baltimore.              |
| Mr. and Mrs. G. T. Cram, St. Louis.          | Mr. and Mrs. R. R. Hutchinson, St. Louis.   |
| Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Edmunds, Baltimore, Md.   | Mr. and Mrs. H. C. Ives, St. Louis.         |











Rev. J. J. Kain, St. Louis.  
 Mr. L. B. Kemp, Baltimore.  
 Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Lee, St. Louis.  
 Mr. D. H. Livermore, Atlanta, Ga.  
 Mr. D. McK. Lloyd, Pittsburg, Pa.  
 Mr. and Mrs. R. J. Lowry, Atlanta, Ga.  
 Judge and Mrs. G. A. Madill, St. Louis.  
 Mr. J. H. McDonald, Kansas City.  
 Mr. C. McKnight, Pittsburg, Pa.  
 Mr. S. A. Morrison, Indianapolis.  
 Mr. W. L. Moyer, Chicago.  
 Mr. M. M. Mute, Cincinnati, O.  
 Mr. J. C. Neely, Chicago.  
 Rev. S. J. Niccolls, St. Louis.  
 Mr. C. N. Norment, Washington, D. C.  
 Mr. J. W. Norwood, Wilmington, N. C.  
 Mr. and Mrs. F. G. Niedringhaus, St. Louis.  
 Mr. C. H. Patterson, New York.  
 Mr. G. S. Pierce, Grand Rapids, Mich.  
 Mr. C. W. Pitcairn, Des Moines, Ia.  
 Mr. and Mrs. A. Pizzini, Jr., Richmond, Va.  
 Mr. and Mrs. G. H. Prince, St. Paul, Minn.  
 Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Pullen, New York.  
 Mr. G. F. Putnam, Kansas City.  
 Mr. J. B. Ramsay, Baltimore, Md.  
 Mr. and Mrs. Bradford Rhodes, New York.  
 Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Richardson, St. Louis.

Mr. W. A. Rule, Kansas City.  
 Mr. G. H. Russell, Detroit.  
 Mr. J. N. Simpson, Dallas, Tex.  
 Mr. and Mrs. S. P. Smith, San Francisco, Cal.  
 Mr. G. Stickney, Grand Haven, Mich.  
 Mr. W. H. Thomson, St. Louis.  
 Mr. and Mrs. Wm. H. Thompson, St. Louis.  
 Mr. and Mrs. A. Trowbridge, New York.  
 Mr. and Mrs. J. B. True, St. Louis.  
 Bishop and Mrs. D. S. Tuttle, St. Louis.  
 Mr. C. S. Tyson, Philadelphia.  
 Mr. and Mrs. G. A. Van Allen, Albany, N. Y.  
 Mr. and Mr. J. C. Van Blarcom, St. Louis.  
 Mr. and Mrs. Julius S. Walsh, St. Louis.  
 Mr. W. B. Welling, New York.  
 Mr. W. S. Wells, Platte City, Mo.  
 Mr. P. White, Marquette, Mich.  
 Mr. F. G. Willard, Topeka, Kas.  
 Mr. and Mrs. J. P. Winchester, Wilmington, Del.  
 Mr. A. S. Winston, Lexington, Ky.  
 Mr. W. S. Woods, Kansas City, Mo.  
 Mr. W. E. Worth, Wilmington, N. C.  
 Mr. H. W. Yates, Omaha, Neb.  
 Misses Yates, Omaha, Neb.  
 Mr. J. E. Yeatman, St. Louis.  
 Mr. G. R. Young, Dayton, Ohio.

At 10.35 Toastmaster Wm. H. Thompson rapped for order and introduced Judge George A. Madill, who after speaking on behalf of the local reception committee, made a most able and instructive address on the subject of banking. He eulogized banking as a worthy calling, and urged upon the bankers the necessity of greater activity in promoting the spread of sound ideas on finance.

President-elect Lowry, ex-Presidents Pullen and Parsons and Vice-President Hendrix also made brief and witty talks. Gen John W. Noble, ex-Secretary of the Interior, spoke on the "Resources of Our National Wealth and the Guarantees the Constitution Affords for Their Perpetuation." William S. Witham, of Atlanta, Ga., greatly pleased the bankers with his humorous southern stories.

The banquet was perfect in every respect and has never been surpassed by any similar event in St. Louis. The thorough appreciation and enjoyment manifested by the visiting financiers must have proven an entirely adequate return to the bankers and citizens who so generously provided this very notable series of entertainments.

HELEN CARR.

[NOTE.—The group illustration presented herewith includes the portraits of such of the members of the reception committee and the committee of arrangements as were received in time for publication in this number. The other members of the various committees were also active in promoting the success of the convention and in adding to the enjoyment with which the visitors entered into the social functions provided for their entertainment.]

#### Suspension of Specie Payments by the Bank of England.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

SIR:—Will you please give me the dates on which the Bank of England suspended specie payments.

C. E. HILL.

BELDING, Mich., Oct. 31, 1886.

*Answer.*—The Bank of England suspended specie payments on the following dates: February 25, 1797; April 5, 1819. We also find that there was a suspension of payments on the part of the bank in 1696, and that in 1745 it avoided suspension only by paying in shillings and sixpence. The Bank Act, one provision of which requires payment in specie, was suspended in 1847, 1857 and 1866.—[Editor BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

### AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN EUROPE.

The existing institutions for extending credit to agriculture are being severely tested in several European countries by the prolonged agricultural depression, and appeals to the Government for aid are becoming the order of the day. The mortgage banks and co-operative credit societies, which have heretofore been so successful in promoting agricultural credit, are proving unequal to the demand upon them—not because of any change in their methods, but because of the decline in the price of cereals and of farming lands. New demands for loans have been constantly made by the farmers of Germany and France during the past few years, which have been so great in Germany that the old mutual credit associations have been unable to meet them. A law was passed by the German Reichstag in 1895, creating a central bureau in Berlin for the purpose of making loans out of the public Treasury to the existing societies of agricultural credit. The amount placed at the disposal of the central bureau was only 5,000,000 marks (\$1,200,000), but societies having more capital than they could use were authorized to deposit the surplus with the central bureau to be loaned out to those having too little. The plan was not cordially welcomed by Mr. Schenck, the head of the Schulze-Delitzsch Association of popular banks, who opposed it in the Reichstag. It does not seem to have borne material fruit and complaints of the hard condition of the agriculturalists are still loud and frequent. The Prussian Government recently created agricultural chambers throughout the Kingdom similar to chambers of commerce, and a circular was addressed to these chambers, on July 17, 1896, asking them to lend their aid in the improvement of the conditions of agricultural credit. The Minister of Agriculture, in this circular, attributes existing indebtedness to insufficiency of capital at the time of the purchase of agricultural property and to the division of the land among several heirs. The minister discusses the propriety of limiting the amount of loans, but does not recommend any definite action upon the subject. "The circular is very paternal," says Mr. Maurice Block in *L'Economiste Français*, of September 12, "but it seems to me to dwell in the region of vagueness." The new chambers of agriculture are called upon to interest themselves in the general subject of agricultural credits and to exert their influence in favor of a system of gradual payments at fixed dates and a reduction in rates of interest. The chambers are also asked to make reports to the ministry, which are being awaited by economists with much interest.

In France, the ministry was authorized by the law of November 5, 1894, to create agricultural syndicates, but these have been found insufficient to meet the necessities of the case. It is now proposed to found a national bank of agricultural credit. Senator Calvet proposed at the last session of the French chambers a central institution in each department, to be called "The Society for Insurance at a Fixed Premium against Various Agricultural Risks." This proposition was under debate in the Senate on January 28, 1896, and was postponed until the next session. The similar proposition endorsed by the Minister of Agriculture proposed to guarantee agriculture against risks arising periodically from fire and mortality among stock; periodical annual risks from hail and frost, and occasional risks from floods, cyclones and insects. The data for determining the premiums are believed to be accessible in

the history of agriculture and meteorology. The intervention of the Government will, it is believed, justify the provision of the law that the premiums shall be fixed in each department twenty per cent. below the mean rates of existing private associations.

The Russian Government entered upon a new series of experiments regarding agricultural credit when the Bank of Russia was reorganized in 1894. A recent report by one of the officials of the French Consulate-General at Moscow sets forth some of the precautions which have been adopted by the Russian Government to prevent the abuse of the new law. The borrower is required to designate with precision the object of his loan and public officials take note whether the credit is thus applied and call a halt if it is applied in any other direction. Much of the public money was wasted and never recovered under the system of loans which followed the emancipation of the serfs, and M. Witte, the present Minister of Finance, does not intend to permit a repetition of those experiences. The new laws have provided for special boards connected with each branch of the Bank of Russia for the purpose of reporting upon the maximum credit to be accorded to each borrower. These boards are required to consist, besides the bank officials, of business men familiar with the class of industry of the borrower and of competent cultivators, in the case of agricultural loans. Loans are made for terms sufficiently long to permit the working up of the raw material in the case of manufactures and the gathering of the crops in the case of farming. There exist at present in Russia seven hundred and sixty-four loan and savings associations, which have made advances to the amount of about 18,000,000 rubles (\$9,000,000). They have contributed in only a small measure to the promotion of agricultural credit and many of those founded between 1865 and the present time went to pieces because the peasants did not pay in their subscriptions. A statute of June, 1896, has reorganized these institutions and established them as rural banks with a capital furnished by the Bank of Russia and under its control. Banks which continue under private ownership will be required to disclose their accounts at any time upon demand of the Minister of Finance and will be permitted to borrow of the Bank of Russia for their clients if they disclose the exact use to be made of the loan. The new rural banks are authorized to receive deposits, to buy and sell agricultural tools and produce, and to act as co-operative societies for consumption.

#### THE BANKING LAW OF MEXICO.

The new banking law which took effect in Mexico on July 1 may afford the opportunity for an interesting test of the free banking system in somewhat different surroundings from those under which the system has been tested in Canada. The capital required by the Mexican law for the formation of a new bank is \$500,000, of which half must be exhibited in cash before the bank can begin operations. These provisions are both in accordance with those of the Canadian law. Of a similar character is the Mexican requirement that twenty per cent. of the amount of cash required for beginning operations shall be invested in bonds of the national debt. This provision may be compared with the Canadian requirement that forty per cent. of the cash held shall be in Dominion notes. The limitation of the minimum denomination of the notes to five dollars is also taken from the Canadian law. The limit of note issues under the Mexican law is three times the capital stock. The new banks are required to hold cash to the amount of not less than one-half of their combined circulation, sight deposits and deposits payable upon notice within three days or less. Monthly statements are required, showing the debts due the bank, the cash on hand, the circulation and the various classes of deposits. Branches are not permitted outside the State within which the bank is established without the special permission of the Government. Each bank will be subject to the inspection

of a public official, who is given wide powers in the making up of the accounts. Provision is made for the admission of existing State banks into the new national system and for compensation to the National Bank of Mexico and other banks holding special concessions which are infringed by the new law.

#### CRITICISM OF THE SCOTCH BANKS.

The Scotch banks, which did so much to develop the agriculture and industry of Scotland in the last century, are at last falling under criticism for their conservatism and indisposition to accommodate their customers by low discounts. The "London Economist" points out in its issue of September 26 that while the discounts and advances of the joint-stock banks of England and Wales were increasing £40,000,000 from May, 1895, to May, 1896, the similar items of the Scotch banks increased only £900,000. The whole volume of business is five times larger in the case of the English banks, but this does not account for the discrepancy, nor were business conditions essentially different in the two countries. The ten Scotch banks of issue have an agreement among themselves, in the nature of a "trust," which maintains a uniform discount rate and prevents competition. The "Economist," commenting upon this situation, says:

"These monopoly safeguards may be successful so far as competition with one another is concerned, but past years have shown that they are unavailing in two directions. The policy above mentioned has led to much of the best paper being discounted in London at cheaper rates than can be obtained in Scotland. Not only so, but as the banks are unable to employ the money in Scotland they actually assist their rivals, the discount houses, by sending their surplus cash to London, thus increasing the already excessive supplies there and lowering the rate still more. Can it be wondered at that the merchants of the northern country are annoyed by this arrangement? They are unable to see why they should pay more for money collected in their own country than is asked from their competitors in London. And it is surely paradoxical that it should be possible for a London discount house to pay for the use of money (partly coming from Scotch sources) and yet to discount Scotch paper at lower rates than will be taken by the Scotch banks who obtain a large proportion of their funds for nothing."

The deposits of the Scotch banks have not been increasing of late as they formerly did, when the banks paid a liberal interest on deposits and when other investments were less plentiful. The banks abandoned the time-honored system of paying interest on creditor balances of current accounts on October 1, 1892. The rate on deposit accounts was reduced several years ago to one and a half per cent., and in January, 1895, to one per cent. These low rates removed much of the inducement which for many years attracted capital to the banks and are regarded in Scotland as one of the causes for the large investments in Australian banks and other doubtful securities.

#### NEW INVESTMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The new securities issued in Great Britain during the quarter ending with September reached a value of £41,287,000 (\$200,000,000). This is somewhat less than the quarter ending in June, but is £8,500,000 more than for the corresponding quarter of 1895, more than double the figures for the corresponding quarter of 1894, and more than four times the amount for the corresponding quarter of 1893. The applications of new capital in the entire year 1893 were £49,141,000; in 1894, £91,835,000; and in 1895, £104,690,000. The applications for the first three-quarters of 1896 have already reached £120,781,000 (\$600,000,000), or more than for the entire year 1895. Foreign government loans, including £4,000,000 for Chili, and £8,000,000 for the Chinese indemnity, make up nearly one-fourth of the applications for the last quarter. Other important items are £8,880,000 for breweries and distilleries;

£2,875,000 for manufacturing companies; £2,845,000 for cycles and appliances; £2,608,000 for land and finance companies; and £2,000,000 for Indian and colonial railways. The railway issues were entirely for the Burma Railways Company. The mining companies have required issues of over £4,000,000 and some of the land and finance companies have been organized for dealing in mining shares.

#### SITUATION OF THE BANK OF SPAIN.

The situation of the Bank of Spain does not improve materially, in spite of the earnest efforts of the Government to restore equilibrium in the public accounts. The bank has been compelled to make loans and advances to the Government to the amount of 650,000,000 pesetas (\$130,000,000 at the gold parity) by means of new note issues. The note issues amounted in 1881 to less than 300,000,000 pesetas, and foreign exchange was then at par. The circulation was forced upward by Government demands rather than by business needs to 424,000,000 pesetas in 1885. Gold went to a premium of two and a half per cent., and the premium attained fifteen per cent. in 1892, when the circulation was 854,000,000 pesetas. The circulation is now 1,065,000,000 pesetas and the gold premium is twenty per cent. There was a slight rally in the value of the bills a few months ago but it has been lost. The Government has apparently realized that further loans by means of bank issues are impracticable, and they have now made the extraordinary proposition that the railways shall guarantee a new Government loan by way of payment for the privilege of having their charters extended. This proposal is causing great agitation among the railways, because the limitations upon their corporate powers make it doubtful whether they can properly give any such guarantee. The Government however is bound to have 1,000,000,000 pesetas in some manner and may compel the railways to shoulder the burden.

#### THE BANK OF ENGLAND BY-LAWS.

The supplemental charter of the Bank of England, which was recently accepted by the directors, was laid before the general court of the bank on September 17. The Governor explained three changes in the by-laws which are embodied in the new charter. The general court of the bank is authorized to make changes in these by-laws, if they think proper, but the new charter does not make the changes obligatory. One of them relates to the eligibility of directors for re-election. In the original charter all the retiring directors were eligible. This was changed by an Act of Parliament, so that only two-thirds were eligible, and was afterwards changed to make the proportion seven-eighths. The second power to amend conferred upon the general court is in regard to a vacancy in the office of Governor, Deputy-Governor or director. At present only those can be appointed who have served before in the respective offices, but it is now proposed that any one who has served as a director, or is otherwise qualified as provided by a by-law made by a general court, may be designated. The third change enables a trustee to vote. The by-law adopted on this subject provides that, "Where stock stands in the joint names of two or more members, they may by writing under their hands nominate one of those members to vote in respect of such stock. In the absence of such nomination, the one whose name stands first on the register of members shall alone be qualified and admitted to vote in respect of such stock, in like manner as if the stock stood in his name alone. Every such nomination shall be in a form to be prescribed from time to time by the court of directors."

#### THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN EUROPE.

The third increase of the Bank of England discount rate within the past two months, advancing the rate of three per cent. fixed on September 24 to four per cent. on October 22, is symptomatic of the hardening rates for money all over Europe.

The Imperial Bank of Germany advanced its rate from three to four per cent. early in September, and a further advance has been generally looked for. The advance of September did not prevent the loss of 69,000,000 marks, (\$17,000,000) in gold during the month. The circulation of the Imperial Bank has been expanded to meet the demand for currency and the limit within which circulation may be issued without the special tax has been rapidly narrowed. The Bank of Austria-Hungary has also been approaching the limit of its untaxed circulation, but the directors decided at their meeting on October 22 to continue the rate of four per cent. which has been in force for some time. The Bank of Denmark raised its rate from three and a half to four per cent. at the close of September and the Swiss banks have generally advanced their rate from four to four and a half per cent. The Bank of Bombay and the Bank of Bengal have also made an advance to six per cent.

#### GENERAL BANKING NOTES.

—The half yearly statement for June 30, 1896, of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation—the largest institution in the world except a few of the National banks—shows total liabilities of \$203,378,851. This is an increase of some twenty per cent. over the figures of June 30, 1895. The current accounts stood, by the recent report, at \$100,614,432 and the fixed deposits at \$61,375,402. The note circulation was \$9,092,856. The leading items of the assets were \$52,409,687 in cash, \$7,796,801 in consols and other securities, \$61,108,194 in bills discounted and \$71,727,698 in bills receivable. The earnings of the bank for the half year were \$1,470,795, but as its business is done chiefly in silver-using countries, it is necessary to write off \$461,215 to cover difference in exchange in transmitting the dividends to the shareholders. This permitted a gold dividend of £1, 5s per share, which absorbed \$444,444 and left \$300,184 to be carried to the new profit and loss account.

—The French Bank of Brazil is in process of formation with a capital of 10,000,000 francs (\$2,000,000), for the purpose of establishing more direct financial relations between Brazil and France. French traders are not satisfied with existing arrangements, which compel them to operate through English banks. The new institution is established with the assistance of the Comptoir National d'Escompte, which has subscribed 4,000,000 francs, and the Société Générale, which has subscribed 3,000,000 francs. The remainder of the capital will be subscribed by individuals. It was at first proposed to establish a branch of the Comptoir d'Escompte at Rio, but it was decided that a branch would be at a disadvantage in competition with the English and German banks and that an independent establishment was desirable. M. Denormandie, the head of the Comptoir d'Escompte, will be at the head of the new establishment.

—Strenuous efforts are being made by the Italian Government to rescue the Bank of Naples from complete collapse, even at some pecuniary cost to the Government. Director-General Arlotta has been dismissed and Signor Miraglia, who made a good record in the Ministry of Commerce, has been appointed in his place. The Minister of Finance is said to have granted the bank, by way of concessions, exemption from the tax on circulation for that part of the capital which is locked up; authority to conduct operations of *report*; the increase of the circulation by 20,000,000 lire (\$4,000,000); and the guarantee of the Government for the securities of the land mortgage department, if accompanied by a reduction in the interest on these securities to four per cent.

—It is reported from St. Petersburg that the Ministry of Finance have requested the public disbursing officers to make no more payments in bank bills of one and three rubles (50 cents and \$1.50), but to replace them with gold and silver coin. The bills of these denominations which accumulate in the Treasury are to be withdrawn from circulation and destroyed by the Bank of Russia.

C. A. C.

## BANKING AND COMMERCE IN CANADA.

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### QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN BANK RETURNS.

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In reviewing the second quarterly returns it was alleged that considerable influence had been exerted by the general elections and a different party coming into power. It does not appear as if these predictions and fears, if they were such, had been well grounded. It cannot be denied, however, that the recent campaign in the United States has considerably affected commercial affairs in Canada. It could hardly be otherwise, since the two countries are so closely allied financially, commercially and in geographical position.

In reviewing the third quarter of the year we find that the July returns show an increase of \$406,400 in specie and Dominion notes, which count for nothing as the weight of the increased amount is found in three banks, which shows that it bears but little significance. The balances due from banks and agencies in the United States decreased \$1,771,300, and show a reduction of over six and one-fourth millions during the year. This bringing home of the funds commenced about the end of 1895 and seems to have continued gradually each month, since the total amount on July 31 stood at \$16,713,630, compared with \$18,484,973 on June 30, and which in July, 1895, was \$22,968,798, and for the same month in 1896, was \$15,698,689. At the latter date the total assets were \$226,236,871. The assets July, 1896, amounted to \$319,582,621. Balances due from banks in the United Kingdom increased nearly five millions. This would indicate a large increase in the volume of business transacted there.

The increase of over half a million invested in municipal, colonial and railway securities would show that commercial investments of a more promising character presented themselves. Call loans on bonds and stocks were reduced, as might be expected; but current loans increased \$745,762 during the month and show an increase of \$8,062,780 for the year.

Bank notes in circulation decreased \$761,464 during July. It is believed by many that note circulation is no longer the barometer by which to gauge the extent of trade that it has been in years gone by—that cheques and drafts have largely taken their place and often business deals are made where bank notes are never introduced.

The statement for August follows closely in the wake of statements for that month in former years—note circulation, \$31,509,154, an expansion of \$1,934,774 during the month and \$771,532 above the same month last year. This and other indications compared give the impression that our trade is slightly an improvement upon the two preceding years, viz., 1894 and 1895. As before stated it is believed by many that the improvement in trade need not necessitate an increase in the volume of bank notes in circulation, yet when the increase does occur there is no gainsaying the fact that there is greater activity in commercial circles.

The steady increase in deposits is worthy of note, especially those payable after notice. During August the increase under this heading was \$1,051,776 and for the year \$7,435,330. Deposits payable on demand, although showing an increase during August, decreased during the year \$2,122,181. Such a large increase when business is quiet is not desired by the banks, but when the demand for it is great and current loans expand so rapidly, then is the bankers' harvest in so much that there are ave-



## STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF CANADIAN CHARTERED BANKS—COMPARISON OF THE IMPORTANT ITEMS.

ASSETS.	Sept. 30, 1896.	Aug. 31, 1896.	Sept. 30, 1896.	Increase and decrease for month.	Increase and decrease for year.
Specie and Dominion notes.....	\$23,254,480	\$23,749,094	\$23,535,410	Dec., \$494,604	Dec., \$280,880
Notes of and checks on other banks.....	6,073,648	7,280,463	7,813,012	Dec., 306,845	Dec., 844,384
Due from banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	10,045,600	15,296,453	20,000,316	Inc., 746,147	Dec., 10,644,716
Due from banks and agencies in United Kingdom.....	9,881,792	10,747,400	6,373,183	Dec., 865,608	Inc., 3,308,609
Canadian municipal securities and British provincial or colonial, other than Dominion.....	9,447,721	9,576,270	9,460,491	Dec., 128,549	Dec., 45,770
Railway securities.....	11,716,748	11,663,832	10,009,591	Inc., 77,916	Inc., 1,707,157
Loans on stocks and bonds on call.....	13,677,151	13,218,553	17,068,665	Inc., 358,506	Dec., 3,519,544
Current loans to the public.....	209,899,682	207,410,954	197,729,334	Inc., 2,548,728	Inc., 12,220,348
Overdue debts.....	2,753,236	3,061,084	4,538,140	Inc., 96,172	Dec., 781,904
Total assets.....	\$324,284,175	\$322,735,463	\$321,881,711	Inc., \$1,528,712	Inc., \$2,382,464
CAPITAL.					
Capital stock paid up.....	\$61,725,280	\$62,220,759	\$61,780,328	Dec., \$495,490	Dec., \$55,089
Reserve fund.....	26,373,799	26,343,799	27,153,799	Inc., \$25,000	Dec., 785,000
LIABILITIES.					
Bank notes in circulation.....	\$32,652,176	\$31,509,151	\$32,774,442	Inc., \$1,143,022	Dec., \$122,296
Balance due to Dominion Government.....	3,633,541	4,049,398	5,000,439	Dec., 415,855	Dec., 1,960,898
Balance due to Provincial governments.....	3,870,419	4,417,822	3,911,353	Dec., 546,913	Dec., 40,934
Deposits of the public payable on demand.....	65,827,120	65,294,335	67,774,818	Inc., 562,815	Dec., 1,947,698
Deposits of the public payable after notice.....	123,436,216	123,151,850	116,634,496	Inc., 284,366	Inc., 6,801,730
Deposits payable on demand or after notice between banks.....	2,838,277	3,224,144	2,813,077	Dec., 375,867	Inc., 40,200
Due to banks and agencies in foreign countries.....	257,759	200,157	171,861	Inc., 57,602	Inc., 85,898
Due to banks and agencies in the United Kingdom.....	1,939,597	2,196,101	2,698,080	Dec., 226,504	Dec., 1,928,463
Total liabilities.....	\$224,310,603	\$224,391,104	\$224,074,548	Inc., \$418,499	Inc., \$736,055
MISCELLANEOUS.					
Directors' liabilities.....	\$7,210,154	\$7,106,718	\$7,941,317	Inc., \$103,441	Dec., \$731,163
Greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during month.....	33,396,021	31,900,414	33,153,176	Inc., 1,367,617	Inc., 114,846

Deposit with Dominion Government for security of note circulation, amount required being five per cent. on average maximum circulation for year ending June 30, 1896, \$1,547,061. A discrepancy in capital stock has been caused by the Ontario Bank having reduced capital from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000.

nues through which the deposits of the people can be placed on a remunerative basis. The tendency of the bankers is to place their funds in legitimate Canadian trade in preference to any other investment even though it would seem for the time to bring back larger immediate returns.

Balances due from agents of the banks in Great Britain have greatly increased. The amount held there being \$10,747,400, which is \$4,408,235 more than at the same date a year ago. This indicates that a largely increased export trade has been transacted during the year, and with continued care in quality of products and perseverance in preparing the best facilities for shipping, may be largely developed.

The September statement, an abstract of which is given herewith, is fairly encouraging, although it hardly comes up to the expectations which one is led to think should follow the brightening prospects of August. However, while the movement is not so great as anticipated, it is in the right direction and with the promising increases in values and prices should close a very successful business season for 1896.

A disturbance in the capital columns has been caused by a decision on the part of the directorate of the Ontario Bank to reduce the capital stock of that institution from \$1,500,000 to \$1,000,000. This will not impair in any way the bank's usefulness to the public nor its capability to do its usual quota of business.

The Molsons Bank, which is fast taking a prominent place among the important banking institutions, increased its reserve \$25,000. This bank was formerly very conservative in its transactions but is extending its facilities to meet the needs of the times.

Bank notes in circulation show an increase during the month of nearly one and-a-quarter millions, which will no doubt be largely extended during the current month. The greatest amount of bank notes in circulation at any time during the month was \$33,268,021. Public deposits are still increasing, the gain during September being nearly a million over August. The amount of specie and Dominion notes held by the banks at the end of the month decreased over three-quarters of a million. An increase of about three-quarters of a million is noticeable in balances due from American banks and agencies, while a falling off may be seen of a similar amount in balances due from the same sources in the United Kingdom. Permanent investments in municipal, colonial, foreign or railway stocks remain quiet, although investments in railway stocks increased during the year nearly one and three-quarter millions. Loans on stocks and bonds on calls show an increase of \$358,598, but on the same date last year the amount loaned upon this security was over three and-a-half millions more. Current loans show healthy activity, having increased over August upwards of two and one-half millions, and during the year the increase has been over twelve and one-fourth millions. Trusting to the good judgment of our bankers as loaning only on good security, this would indicate a largely increased volume of trade over either of the last two years. Overdue debts, although having increased slightly during September, are over three-quarters of a million less than a year ago.

So that altogether, if not showing all the improvement desired, yet there seems but little doubt that a prosperous fall trade is before us, and with the certainty of increased values, as the markets at present indicate, a satisfactory showing can be recorded at the end of the business season.

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**British Bank Deposits.**—From July, 1896, to July, 1896, the deposits in the banks of the United Kingdom increased from £570,000,000 to £790,000,000.

On October 17 last, the deposits and current accounts of the English joint-stock banks amounted to £564,500,000, an increase of £79,500,000 over the same date last year.

## BANKERS AT LINCOLN'S TOMB.

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After the close of the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association at St. Louis, the delegates, through the courtesy of the Springfield, Ill., bankers, made a visit to the tomb of Abraham Lincoln, to pay their tribute of admiration and respect to the memory of the great martyr President.

Several notable addresses were made on this occasion by the visiting bankers, a few of which are reproduced below.

EX-PRESIDENT E. H. PULLEN, NEW YORK.

Fellow Citizens: History is a vast gallery of portraits which fascinate attention, excite curiosity, arouse investigation and open broad avenues of knowledge. As we study the character and lives of the originals, our interest deepens and our information regarding the great men of the past is enlarged. Fame does not belong exclusively to those whose lives illustrated the nobler traits of humanity. Vicious lives expressed in deeds of evil live in history as well, and their portraits in this gallery teach salutary lessons. The beloved disciple John will live forever in the Christian heart, crowned with eternal glory—Judas Iscariot will live forever in the Christian mind, an object of detestation and everlasting infamy.

So the portraits we look upon in this historical gallery represent not only the higher qualities of manhood, the virtues that adorn character, truth, courage, self-sacrifice and patriotism, but also vice, cruelty, treachery and cowardice. Every century—every land—has contributed to the enrichment of this gallery. \* \* \*

Among all the portraits in this historical gallery none attracts more admiration and affection than that of Abraham Lincoln. His was the most singularly unique, original, comprehensive and forceful character. Without family prestige, wealth, early education, powerful friends, or any of the advantages that are deemed indispensable to success, he carved out his own career in the face of obstacles almost insurmountable. Born amid the humblest surroundings, reared under the shadow of poverty, necessitated during his early years to perform severe and laborious service, the future held out but little promise to his youthful aspirations, for he cherished, even in his boyhood, laudable ambition and faith, which to the best of his opportunities he materialized in diligent effort.

He had an insatiable appetite for knowledge, and no means within his limited reach to gratify this craving were neglected. His mental digestion was excellent and assimilated all that was worthy of preservation. He was endowed with a wonderful memory—what he learned he retained. Nothing instructive escaped his notice. He was a close student of human nature, and even in the individual characteristics of the associates of his youth he found food for thought—suggestions of the possibilities of the future. Embracing every available, though rare, opportunity to read emanations of the press, he familiarized himself with current events and the utterances of leading men in the statesmanship and politics of the day. As far as he could he kept abreast with the thought of great minds, keenly appreciated and appropriated their educational influence. His was an evolutionary mind, slowly but surely developing germs of truth.

In spite of the rude social elements of his youth he cultivated the instinctive qualities of his nature, honesty, truth, purity and gentleness.

His courage was unquestioned. He never misused his great physical strength in oppressing, but employed it in defending and protecting the weak. Cowardice and fear found no dwelling place in his heart—he never sought conflict, but if it came he bravely met the issue. He feared no man—he feared no one but God. His early struggles to rise above the adverse conditions that encompassed him were complicated by the misfortune of debt. The amount, though not large, was to him enormous, and it was only after years of patient labor, economy and self-denial that he finally emancipated himself from the burden. He was honest in the most comprehensive sense, and his honesty is one of the brighter jewels in his coronet of fame.

His patience was inexhaustible, his perseverance tireless, his application close and constant—quick in mental processes he readily separated the chaff from the grain—gifted with intuitive perception—strong logical powers—firm and uncompromising in principle and

unyielding in adherence to his convictions, yet liberal in respectful toleration of opposite views.

His was a great soul—ininitely great—full of love and sympathy—tender hearted as a woman, no one appealed in vain even mutely, to his generous nature. Helpless himself, he helped others—his voice was ever raised and his arm was ever outstretched in behalf of his suffering fellow creatures. Rejoicing in his liberty as the birthright of an American freeman, he desired, with the intense yearning of his compassionate nature, that all men born free and equal should enjoy the same blessed right and privilege. Plodding his way, at times painfully, in the face of a sea of opposing circumstances, but always hopefully, in the march of his country to a higher and better plane of national character, enlightenment and freedom, his heart bled that any human being in the land of his birth should be left behind, deserted, without hope and without help. Standing himself in the light, its effulgence brightening every footstep and irradiating the future with a bow of promise, his great nature protested that no being bearing the image of his Maker should be left in the darkness.

He occupied and honored his high position with malice toward none, with charity for all—with firm purpose to perform his duty conscientiously—with absolute trust in God as the Leader of Nations, and reliance on Him for strength and light, guidance and help, to meet trials and difficulties as they daily multiplied in his path. There were times of gloom and tribulation, when he could not understand His ways, but there was never a time when he questioned His wisdom and infinite love.

He had a keen sense of humor—native wit without sarcasm. He parried indiscreet questions with humorous illustrations or answered them with quaint parables. But there was plainly manifest an undercurrent of sadness in his nature; indeed, it was indelibly impressed on his rugged features and pathetically visible in his eye and smile. He was just but merciful—with him justice and mercy were inseparable and walked hand in hand.

Such was the man who was called by the voice of the people to fill the highest position in their gift at the most perilous and solemn crisis in their country's history. He was a man of the people, with the people and for the people. The people's voice was but the echo of God's voice. God so loved His chosen people that He rescued Moses from an ark of bulrushes floating on the river to become their lawgiver and leader. God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son, cradled in a manger, to be its Savior and Redeemer. God so loved this nation that in His providence He called Abraham Lincoln from his lowly cabin to lead his people through sacrifice and suffering to peace, brotherhood, universal freedom and perpetual union.

Gentlemen of the American Bankers' Association: We have for a moment laid aside the avocation of our lives—dismissed from thought the routine of our professional labors—divorced ourselves from musty ledgers, moldy balance-sheets, financial statistics and problems, and have gathered around the tomb of the man who, take him all in all, was the greatest man our country has produced. We cannot fail to realize that though dead he speaketh. The words of patriotism, the words of truth and wisdom he uttered in life still live and will be recognized and appreciated by millions yet unborn as masterpieces and classic gems in our language. Let us in this sacred spot imbibe at least something of the great spirit of the man over whose ashes we stand. Let us carry away in our hearts at least something of the symmetry and beauty, purity and strength, patriotism and faith of his character. His memory belongs to no one State, to no one section of our country. It is the undivided and indivisible property of all the people of our glorious Union. American citizens throughout the length and breadth of our land are its loving and grateful custodians and will transmit it, a sacred legacy, to their children and their children's children unto the last generation, so that as long as time endures, the world will revere the name and memory of Abraham Lincoln.

#### VICE-PRESIDENT JOSEPH C. HENDRIX, NEW YORK.

Emerson has said that "He was a child of the forest and cornfields and companion of the squirrel." We have come here to-day simply as an agent of the people for whom he labored. He loved all his fellow men. I see two pictures, one of Napoleon as a schoolboy playing snowball; the other of Abe Lincoln as a boy flat upon the floor, with only the light of the burning logs, poring over the life of George Washington. Later on I see the picture of Napoleon exiled, alone, disheartened. A later picture of Abraham Lincoln is before you to-day. It need not be in bronze or marble; it lies in the hearts of the country.

#### HERMAN JUSTI, NASHVILLE, TENN.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and My Fellow Countrymen: At your bidding I have come as an unofficial and humble representative of the South on this occasion. Gladly and proudly have I joined in the pilgrimage to this sacred shrine, bringing my tribute for him who, like myself, first saw the light of day in Old Kentucky. I bow my head and lift my heart at the tomb of

Lincoln; I bow my head in awe and admiration of his splendid genius, his lofty patriotism, his noble magnanimity! I reverently lift my heart in gratitude to God that unto Abraham Lincoln was entrusted the cause of our country in the time of her greatest peril, and that, through the dispensation of the same kind Providence, that cause, so stoutly and grandly resisted by the flower and chivalry of the South, under his inspired leadership triumphed at last.

How strange the revolution in sentiment, and how wonderful the material changes at the South since that fateful day on which our revered and knightly Lee sheathed his stainless sword and the banner of the Lost Cause was furled forever!

That the War of the Rebellion was a tragic mistake is now clear to my mind, and yet if my arm had been as strong as my heart was willing, I, too, would have naturally followed the cause that was lost, for the sight of an invading army crossing the threshold of our native land rendered irresistible the impulse to follow our kindred and friends, right or wrong, for better or for worse, into that great conflict to strike our best blows—

“For our altars and our fires,  
God and our native land.”

Fortunate Southland, fortunate America, thrice fortunate the cause of human freedom the world over that we of the South failed to rend in twain this American Union—now happily our Union as well as yours; for after all who has a better claim to a full share in its glories than the section of country whence I come?

It is not in a boastful spirit, it is in a spirit of justice and with deepest feelings of national pride that I recall to your minds a few points of history:

Was it not George Washington, of Virginia, who won for us our independence?

Was it not the matchless orator, the noble patriot, the great commoner—Henry Clay, of Kentucky—who drove us into a second war with England that we might forever establish that independence won by Washington?

Was it not the “Hero of New Orleans,” the fiery leader—Andrew Jackson, of Tennessee—who triumphed over the trained forces of Pakenham, and by that one victory insured respect for America on land and sea, at home and abroad?

Finally, was it not a Kentuckian by birth, Abraham Lincoln, who, “with malice toward none, with charity toward all, with confidence in the right as God gave him to know the right,” who rescued our threatened Union and with one fell stroke broke the shackles of four million slaves and set the white man free?

These mighty leaders were of the South—yes, they were Virginia’s, Kentucky’s, Tennessee’s, but by the accident of birth merely. By the choice of their minds, by the achievements of their splendid intellects, by the victories of their genius, and courage, by the sacrifices of their lives, by every hope they felt and every prayer they uttered they were Americans first, last and always. And the lesson we should learn anew as we gather on hallowed ground this day is that, hailing as we do from the North, the South, the East, and the West, we are first of all Americans, and that as such we owe it to the Fathers of the Republic, and to its heroic defenders as well, to transmit to future generations, unsullied, the honor and credit of our nation.

Whenever, therefore, as Americans we are in doubt what course we must pursue—when ever we feel our country is in peril or her honor threatened, let us in imitation of the faithful of old who sought the Holy Sepulchre—seek Mount Vernon, Ashland, the Hermitage, or Springfield, as never-failing fountains of patriotism and wisdom—as pole-stars to guide us in safety to a wise and honorable decision in the path of duty.

Then, my fellow countrymen, having performed our solemn duty we can with minds at peace and with hearts pure close our eyes in sleep or in death, with an unflinching faith that our Union, whose foundations have been laid in the blood of patriots and martyrs, is “one and inseparable, now and forever.”

WM. C. CORNWELL, BUFFALO, N. Y.

Words have small power to bear out the thoughts and memories which crowd around us to-day in the shadow of this sacred tomb.

And foremost as we stand here there comes that vision of the funeral pageant, the solemn procession that wound its way for 1600 miles, while a nation looked upon its beloved, cold and dead, and, to view the venerated one on the way to the tomb, flocked by day and night, in the cool dawn, at full noon, when the solemn twilight was settling, and by the ruddy glare of torches in the night, and at his bier the people mourned uncomfortable and the whole nation throbbed like one heart with aching sorrow.

The mystery of life and death is made doubly wonderful here by the life and character of this mighty one.

Gentle, merciful, full of humor, friend of the homely and the unfortunate, courageous,

just, forgiving, fertile in resources, unerringly wise. Seeing final effects far ahead, with wonderful knowledge of men, the power of his intellect moulded irresistibly the circumstances that presented themselves, and let them come stronger, so he grew stronger to meet them and to mould them his way.

He is called the great intellectual force of our time, one of the world's greatest men, and withal tender in heart and full of yearning pity for the downcast, even the dumb animals. This quality of tenderness and sympathy with the simple so impressed itself upon the people who knew him and the humble ones with whom he came in contact, that there grew around his memory a halo of romance. Why, the farmers of central Illinois around here will tell you to this day that the brown thrush did not sing for a year after he died.

But this tolerant justice extended to those in good circumstances, to the prosperous and wealthy, as well as to the poor. This appeals especially to us at this time when abuse of the fortunate and the thrifty is so common. Full of enthusiasm to accomplish, to right wrongs, he yet worked with utmost caution, diplomacy, statesmanship. His patience, as his biographers truly say, was like that of nature—a vast and fruitful activity but knowing neither haste nor rest.

In days like these in which we live, when the very life of our Republic is threatened by wild theories, revolutionary platforms and appeals to hate, sedition and dishonor, we turn to our great ideals for comfort, to the heroes and the heroic epochs of our native history for encouragement and inspiration—and we do not turn in vain.

If we look to our greatest name and the record of the time of Lincoln, before he had taken up the leadership, we find that a greater emergency confronted us in those days. Rebellion had become rampant in those four months between November of the election and March of the inauguration. Difficult as were his future tasks (through four long years when opposition, calumny, misrepresentation, bore down upon him) none were more so or required more consummate skill and wisdom than the deliverance of those early days of '61; the crystallization of the Union from out the chaos of secession in which it was apparently inextricably involved.

God raised up this leader then, not in a day but through years of trying discipline, to lead the people; through a heritage of hardship and sorrow—out of privation and ignorance—came this great intellect—a light to lead a people out of darkness and bondage, a nation out of the throes of dissolution, into strong unity.

A nation that can produce such a man and that has come through such an ordeal under his guidance; that fully appreciates the character of that struggle and the character of the hero that led them, can never decide wrong on any such question as that which to-day confronts it.

Seeds of sedition and revolution are hourly cast broadcast from the throats of those who, let us in charity say, know not what they do. Appeals for degradation and national dishonor fly on the voice and on the wire from State to State.

In this situation the mind cannot but revert to another time when a demagogue, on Union soil, in a series of public addresses, surpassed all bounds in traitorous denunciation of the Government and in malicious vituperation of the Union. Then as now crowds flocked to hear him; but when the time for ballots came Vallandigham was swept out of sight by the largest majority Ohio ever gave. That great people who through four years of battle days—through ordeal of blood and fire, worked out that wonderful salvation, freedom for the slave and unity and honor for the State, will never give up the heritage so dearly bought, will never allow the national banners to be stained with repudiation and tarnished credit.

History will repeat itself, and the disturbers of public law and order, the breeders of mass and class revolution, the pleaders for dishonesty and national dishonor, will be swept to oblivion by the greatest majority this country has ever known.

His great spirit looks down upon us to-day. Here rests the Moses of the people who after the four years of terrible trial, when victory was won, and the bells were ringing out the sweet hymns of peace, was allowed only to look upon the promised land—not to enter in. But a higher glory and reward were reserved for him. He has entered into the eternal rest and his great spirit looks down complacently upon our struggle with sure knowledge of the outcome.

My friends, let us humbly imitate him in the honest work we are doing for the Nation's honor. In his own words, almost his last, "with malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in."

Able and eloquent addresses were also made by the following gentlemen: President Robert J. Lowry, Atlanta, Ga.; Henry W. Yates, Omaha, Nebr.; John H. Leathers, Louisville, Ky.; Myron T. Herrick, Cleveland, Ohio, and Breckinridge Jones, St. Louis.

## STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATIONS.

### REPORTS OF CONVENTIONS IN VARIOUS STATES.

#### BANKERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

The Sixth Annual Convention of the Bankers' Association of the State of Illinois met at Springfield, October 14.

President W. P. Halliday called the convention to order and Rev. Dr. John Davies delivered the invocation. The visiting bankers were welcomed to Springfield by Mayor Woodruff and Frank W. Tracy, President of the First National Bank. Mr. Tracy was, unfortunately, dangerously ill, and his address was read by Andrew J. Lester.

After cordially welcoming the delegates, Mr. Tracy spoke strongly in favor of sound money, giving some forcible illustrations of the evils of a fluctuating standard of value. Regarding those who were opposed to banks, he said :

Such men know little of the functions of banks. How much wheat, corn, cattle and hogs would be shipped without the assistance of the banks? How many manufactories would be running in this country without the assistance of the banks? Indeed, the United States of America owes its great progress and its present grand position in the world to its banks. Banks have always and everywhere been managed to create prosperity, not to destroy it; therefore, to-day the bankers are rallying a great force in favor of sound money and honesty. For honesty and integrity are the foundations of all credit, and without credit the banks could do no business.

President W. P. Halliday then read his annual address. He favored the revision of our currency system on lines similar to those laid down in the "Baltimore Plan." As to the prevailing commercial depression he said :

Our present hard times are simply the penalty of our sins. The example of the rich in America has not been without its effect upon the times, and has borne its share of bad fruit. Many of them spend their money foolishly in vain display and senseless extravagance, and in this they soon find an army of imitators, first among the fairly well-to-do people, and then on down the line, until at last every man spends more than he can afford.

In a thousand ways we send to distant cities and foreign lands money that would feed hungry mouths and build up commerce and industry at home. There is no denying the fact that great wealth sometimes makes men selfish and sordid, that it makes them forgetful of so many nice little neighborly offices which are due to their home people, who, no doubt, helped to build up these very fortunes by their labor and patronage. The masses of the people seeing this find some way of resenting it, and in their resentment they are apt to make the punishment more than necessary to fit the crime, and the unfortunate thing about it all is that they punish themselves along with the guilty ones.

The offense of a few nabobs can impose burdens upon a whole nation, for their conduct gives schemers and unscrupulous agitators an excuse for arraying all who are designated as the laboring classes against all who are said to be on the side of capital, when in fact labor and capital are now, and ever must be, fellow helpers, if we are to live otherwise than in a state of anarchy. Those who seek to array one class of our citizens against another class are the greatest enemies our country can ever have. Should they ultimately triumph, the death-knell of the republic will soon be sounded.

Times are hard, but agitation will not bring relief. Times can be harder, and it is persistent agitation that will make them so. We want statesmen to lead us out of troubled waters, and not agitators to set brother against brother and employee against employer.

#### FACTS ABOUT BANKS.

What are the facts about banks? The stockholders of banks are, in the main, people of moderate means, embracing merchants, manufacturers, artisans, laborers, clerks, school-

teachers, widows, guardians, and, only occasionally, capitalists. Rich men, as a rule, invest in bonds, mortgages, real estate, etc. The blow, therefore, that is aimed at the rich miscarries and strikes down the helpless. The stockholders of National and State banks in the United States number 463,000. There are 70,697 women shareholders in the National banks of the United States, holding 1,733,772 shares of stock, the value of which is estimated at over \$120,000,000, or nearly 25 per cent. of all the shares, and these shares represent a capital percentage of 18. The total number of State and private banks is 3,200, with an estimated value of over \$307,000,000. The percentage of this capital held by women is nearly 12¼ per cent. divided among 23,146 women. Therefore, what an injury to women results from an unreasonable hostility to banks.

The depositors of banks of course greatly outnumber the stockholders, and therefore the injury is more widespread and severe. There are about 8,150,000 depositors in State and National banks, with deposits of about \$4,620,000,000. One person, therefore, out of every eight persons in the United States, including men, women and children, is a depositor, and as it is estimated that the average number of members in each family is six persons, it requires no skill at figures to determine how large a percentage of our population is affected by the infliction of injury upon the banks of the country. More than this, there are thousands of citizens who are not stockholders or depositors even, but who are in their employ and must necessarily suffer in sympathy.

The cry that banks are a monopoly, that they enjoy special privileges, is absurd. The business of banking is open to all alike who can and will comply with the laws under which existing banks were organized, and I defy any man to show wherein we have any special privileges or enjoy any immunities from taxation, loss by failure or other causes.

The president closed his address with a strong plea for sound currency.

President Halliday appointed the following committee on nominations: Homer W. McCoy, Peoria; John L. Hamilton, Hoopeston; Thomas S. Ridgway, Shawneetown; W. L. Moyer and W. T. Fenton, Chicago.

George A. Sanders of Springfield read a paper on "Municipal Securities."

S. P. Wheeler of Springfield read a paper on "The Necessity for a Universal Law Governing Commercial Paper in the United States."

A committee consisting of John Farson, D. W. Whittenberg, H. H. Harris, C. W. Hinkley and H. W. McCoy, was appointed to wait on Frank W. Tracy, who is seriously ill at his home, and express to him the sympathy of the association.

A resolution was adopted indorsing the proposed bankers' exhibit at the centennial international exhibition to be held at Nashville, Tenn., in 1897.

The Halliday prizes, for competitive essays on "How Can Bank Clerks Become Bankers" were awarded as follows:

First prize, \$100, George A. Sythe, National Bank of Decatur; second prize \$75, W. Hazzard, Commercial National Bank, Peoria; third prize \$50, Albert E. Coen, Bankers National Bank, Chicago.

E. D. Keys of Springfield, on behalf of the executive council, submitted the following resolution, which was adopted by a unanimous vote:

*Resolved*, That in view of the present agitation and discussion of the money system of our country, the Bankers' Association of the State of Illinois again declare it to be their firm and unalterable conviction that the best interests of our country and people demand that the present gold standard shall be maintained; that business and commerce require money of a fixed and stable value, recognized at home and abroad, a dollar which is exchangeable at a certain known value among all nations, which can be converted grain for grain and ounce for ounce into the money of any nation, and a financial policy which will give confidence to all people that our standard will be permanent, enduring and unchanged. As things now exist this can be accomplished only with gold as a standard and not with silver, which would be variable, changeable and unsteady, according to the market price of bullion. We believe:

That with a fixed and settled financial policy and a standard thus recognized as the best, and with confidence as to its permanency, business, manufacture and enterprise would be stimulated; employment would be offered to the people, a season of unbounded prosperity would ensue, and in time our land would be the center of wealth and our people would control and dominate the finances of the world;

That the interests of the banker are identical with the interests of the community in which he lives



That the arraying of class against class, or the poor against the rich, is unjust and dangerous, detrimental to business and subversive of good government;

That the adherence to the present gold standard, using silver with restrictions and regulations in such quantities and to such extent as it can be maintained at par, is the only way in which bimetalism can exist in this country, unless by international agreement;

That value can not be created by law, and the free coinage of silver on the basis of 16 to 1 is not bimetalism, but would result in silver monometallism and would destroy confidence and bring about contraction and unspeakable disaster, and that if we should pass through the ordeal and become established upon a silver basis we would have gained nothing, but would be at great disadvantage in the commerce of the world;

That under such conditions the wage-earner, the laborer, those having fixed salaries and others least able to bear it, would suffer most.

Having the welfare of all classes at heart, we therefore unhesitatingly declare ourselves in favor of a gold standard as that which will be for the best interests of all at home, and will place our nation in the best position and standing among the commercial nations of the civilized world.

Frank Elliott, of Jacksonville, a delegate to the convention of the American Bankers' Association at St. Louis, made his report, after which there was a discussion of the question, "How Can Currency Be Made Elastic, so as to Respond to the Demands of Business?" The discussion was led by E. S. Lacey, President of the Bankers National Bank, Chicago, and Ex-Comptroller of the Currency. He favored the Canadian system. Others taking part were O. F. Parker of Quincy, Frank Elliott of Jacksonville, J. Millikin of Decatur and H. A. Hammond of Wyoming, Ill.

The visiting bankers were given a reception at the residence of B. H. Ferguson, President of the Springfield Marine Bank.

#### SECOND DAY'S SESSION.

At the second day's session of the convention a valuable and interesting paper on "Bank Credits" was read by David B. Dewey, Vice-President of the Bankers National Bank, of Chicago. After carefully defining the nature and importance of credit, he laid down the following principles as being helpful in extending bank credits:

Credit is a necessity in banking. Risk will be in proportion to gain; nothing offers profit that does not present a corresponding risk. In making credit it has been my habit to ask myself:

- (1) Is the customer honest? Is he truthful? Can his statements be relied upon?
- (2) What do his assets consist of? Are they staple and in healthy demand a reasonable part of every year? There are certain classes of goods or products that are short-lived in their use; they may sell quickly to-day and in the near future be unsalable at any price. Any commodity dependent upon current conditions may have a brief period of life and after that become practically worthless. Again, what are the borrower's estimates of value? Are his assets quick or are they slow? What would they be worth in liquidation under pressure? Has he sufficient capital with what the bank will lend him to successfully conduct his business?
- (3) If doing a general business, is it so distributed as not to be dependent upon one locality, where a failure of crops, disaster by fire or any other calamity would cause embarrassment?
- (4) Has the proposed borrower a practical knowledge of his business and does it warrant success? Is he making money? A losing business should always be avoided by the lender of money even if the assets are sufficient when the loan is made. To continue to produce a loss makes ultimate bankruptcy certain. The date of bankruptcy depends only on the size of the bank account or the amount of available assets in the beginning.
- (5) Does the borrower confine himself to his legitimate business and keep out of speculation? If his speculation involves credit to other people is he prudent in his methods of making such credit and wise in his judgment of character? Is he dependent upon sources outside of his regular business for his success or failure or so identified with other interests as to be imperiled? The collapse of a large concern often carries many others with it.
- (6) If a manufacturer, has he sufficient bills and accounts receivable or other quick assets to pay his liabilities? Experience has proved conclusively to every money lender that machinery and plants make poor assets to pay debts with. Methods pursued by manufacturers in charging off or failing to charge off each year an equitable percentage for depreciation in

machinery and plant, is a true index to their prudence or lack of it. Location of plant is also a vital question. What is the power used? If water, is it in regular supply or a fluctuating quantity, demanding a large expenditure of money to keep it in operation? Is there an abundance of raw material used in manufacturing the products, tributary and accessible? Or is the supply limited?

A valuable aid in making credits would be a central bureau of information, accessible to all bankers who desire to make it so. To be able to use paper at will is a practice pregnant with danger. If borrowers knew that all their paper given was reported to the central source referred to, it might make a very material difference in their operations and result in greater safety to lenders. \* \* \*

The bank officer is only a trustee; his trust his sacred; loyalty to his trust should make him forget his prejudices and his friendships when weighing the rights and interests of his bank. To know just how far to go with safety is the wisdom every honest banker seeks.

The same law which governs morals governs business; whether we stand or fall depends upon ourselves. If we stand it must be in the rectitude of our own lives and the prudence of our own management. We may use all the faculties we possess and all the experience we have gained, yet we shall make mistakes. A mistake does not imply a disaster, if the qualities of manhood are so stalwart as to demand another trial, and we are courageous enough to acknowledge past errors and wise enough to profit by experience.

A question raised by Mr. Dewey as to the advisability of loaning money on warehouse receipts brought on an interesting discussion, participated in by J. B. Forgan, of Chicago; H. A. Hammond, of Wyoming, Frank Elliott, of Jacksonville, and E. S. Lacey, of Chicago.

Edward L. Wahl, of Vandalia, read a paper on "Express Money Orders." He was of the opinion that the express money orders had interfered seriously with the business of issuing drafts by the banks. By custom, most banks received express orders over their counters at their face value. He thought this practice ought to be discontinued. The banks had permitted this business to get away from them by appearing to be indifferent about it. E. O. Parker, of Quincy, said that the business taken from the banks by the express companies was inconsequential; it consisted mostly of small orders, on which there would be little profit for banks. Banks were always in danger in issuing small drafts to unknown parties who might fraudulently raise the amount of such drafts. The express companies and the Post Office department had relieved the banks of this danger to a great extent. The express money order business had come to stay, and he thought it useless for the banks to undertake to combat it.

Homer W. McCoy, of Peoria, made the report of the committee on nominations and it was adopted. The officers for the ensuing year thus elected are as follows:

President—Frank L. Elliott, of Hockenhull & Elliott, Jacksonville.

Vice-President—W. T. Fenton, second Vice-President and Cashier National Bank of the Republic, Chicago.

Secretary—Edward Tilden, Assistant Cashier Drivers' National Bank, Chicago.

Treasurer—A. B. Hoblit, Cashier National State Bank, Bloomington.

Delegates to American Bankers' Association—James B. Forgan, Vice-President First National Bank, Chicago; H. H. Harris, Cashier First National Bank, Champaign; Edward D. Keys, Cashier Farmers' National Bank, Springfield; John Farson, Farson, Leach & Co., Chicago; John L. Hamilton, Jr., Hamilton & Cunningham, Hoopeston; Edward Tilden, Assistant Cashier Drivers' National Bank, Chicago; J. L. Burkhalter, President Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, Galesburg; Edward L. Wahl, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' Bank, Vandalia; Joseph C. Ammann, Highland Bank, Highland.

Vice-Presidents—C. H. Talcott, Cashier Will County National Bank, Joliet; T. J. Kinney, Cashier People's Bank, Vermont; F. Bross, President Alexander County National Bank, Cairo; C. H. Turner, Cashier Farmers' National Bank, Pekin; J. Millikin, Decatur; George F. Orde, Assistant Cashier Northern Trust Co., Chicago; J. F. Robinson, Cashier Rock Island National Bank, Rock Island; William Noecker,

President First National Bank, Monticello ; Edward Dickinson, Assistant Cashier Metropolitan National Bank, Chicago ; C. W. Hinkley, President West Side Bank, Chicago ; H. T. Caraway, President First National Bank, Tuscola ; B. H. Ferguson, President Springfield Marine Bank, Springfield ; T. D. Robertson, President Winnebago National Bank, Rockford ; Peter Whitmer, President People's Bank, Bloomington ; Carl Moll, Cashier National Bank of Illinois, Chicago ; D. B. Dewey, Vice-President Bankers National Bank, Chicago ; Frank Hoblit, Cashier First National Bank, Lincoln ; Albert Eads, President Union National Bank, Macomb ; W. L. Grimes, Cashier, Wm. M. and J. S. Van Nortwick, Batavia ; Eli Miller, Cashier First National Bank, Litchfield.

Members of the Executive Council, for three years—W. P. Halliday, President City National Bank, Cairo ; E. J. Parker, Cashier State Savings, Loan and Trust Co., Quincy ; W. L. Moyer, Assistant Cashier American Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago ; Thomas S. Ridgway, President First National Bank, Shawneetown ; William Heineman, Chicago.

Frank Elliott, the newly elected president, was introduced by Mr. Halliday, the retiring president, and made a brief speech, after which the convention adjourned.

The sessions were largely attended by delegates and visitors, and have been most instructive and beneficial. This association, while but in its seventh year, has a membership of 500, and has brought about many beneficial changes in banking systems, credits and general business matters connected with banking institutions.

#### KENTUCKY BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Fifth Annual Session of the Kentucky Bankers' Association convened at Macauley's Theatre, Louisville, October 14. A reception was held during the morning in the parlors of the Galt House. The convention was presided over by President John H. Leathers, Cashier of the Louisville Banking Company. After prayer by Rev. C. R. Hemphill, D D., M. Cary Peter, President of the Bank of Louisville, delivered the address of welcome. The response was by Howard R. French, Cashier of the Exchange Bank of Kentucky, Mount Sterling. President Leathers followed with his annual address, in which he reviewed the financial agitation and the dangers of a debased currency.

Secretary Isham Bridges read his annual report, showing 148 paid-up members.

The report of Treasurer E. W. Hays was then read. It showed receipts during the year, \$1,539 ; disbursements, \$1,327 ; balance on hand, \$212.

The committee appointed to award the prizes of \$100, \$50 and \$25 for the best essay on banking by employees of banks of the State, announced that the first prize was awarded to L. B. McBrayer, Assistant Cashier of the Anderson County Deposit Bank, of Lawrenceburg ; the second to C. B. Lynd, paying teller of the Citizens' National Bank, of Louisville, and the third to C. N. Manning, of the Security Safety Vault and Trust Company, of Lexington.

President Leathers read an invitation from the Pendennis Club, extending the courtesies of the club to the visitors.

M. Carey Peter, President of the Bank of Louisville, read the prize essay prepared by L. B. McBrayer on "Banks, Their Relation to the Community, Their Necessity to the Public, and Their Influence Upon the Prosperity of all the People." Following is an extract :

Banks aid the world by affording the means of transacting business rapidly, very cheaply, and with perfect safety. By means of checks, demand, sight and time bills of exchange and reciprocal accounts with one another, banks effect the exchange of commerce at very much less cost, with absolute safety and more speedily and accurately than could be done by any other system now in use.

For instance, there are \$30,000,000,000 of exchange between the communities of the land every year. To ship the money in actuality would cost \$86,250,000. Statistics show that the banks do this same work for \$10,500,000, a net saving to the public annually of \$75,750,000. Savings deposits aggregate \$1,750,000,000, and it is stated that at least \$80,000,000 is paid annually to these depositors. So then, in all, \$133,750,000 is saved to the public and paid to the savings depositors every year.

E. C. Bohne, Cashier of the Third National Bank, Louisville, followed with a paper on "What the Bank Tells Itself."

S. N. Leonard, President of the Farmers' Bank, of Eddyville, read a paper on "The Duty of the Hour."

President Leathers announced the nominating committee as follows: Oscar Fenley, Louisville; B. F. Curtis, Cashier Clark, County National Bank, Winchester; E. G. Buckner, Cashier Deposit Bank, Owensboro; B. M. Arnett, Cashier Farmers' Exchange Bank, Nicholasville, and J. A. Middleton, President Farmers and Traders' Bank, Shelbyville.

Speaking of the late Thomas L. Barret, President Leathers said the Clearing-House Association of Louisville had appointed a committee, composed of Messrs. J. W. Lindenberger, E. C. Bohne and himself, to get up a tribute in the form of a printed book. Mr. Leathers said that a copy of the book would shortly be sent to each bank in the State.

Before the session adjourned Bernard G. Witt, of Henderson, read a portion of the tribute to Mr. Barret's memory.

The evening from 8 o'clock until midnight was taken up with the reception at the Pendennis Club, tendered to the visiting bankers by the bankers of Louisville.

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#### SECOND DAY'S SESSION.

At the second day's session, on October 15, the report of the executive council was read by L. O. Cox, vice-chairman. It is expected that the association will secure the abolition of the three days of grace, at the next session of the Kentucky Legislature.

A paper on "Banks and the People," by S. K. Sneed, Cashier of the Henderson National Bank, of Henderson, was read in Mr. Sneed's absence by his fellow-townsmen, B. G. Witt, Cashier of the Ohio Valley Banking and Trust Co. He said that the banks and the people are inseparably connected and what affects the banks affects the people. He said that in this crisis which confronted the country the banks should stand together. When President Leathers called for remarks, Mr. Witt said that when he got back to his home he was going to call a spade a spade. He said the bankers sat at their desks and allowed the free silver papers and all the mountebanks and calumniators to call them thieves and thugs. He declared that he, personally, was tired of this sort of abuse and he did not intend to put up with it any longer. He said the bankers had already waited too long. They should have taken a hand in the fight when it first began. Then the sentiment against the bankers would not have gotten the hold on the people that it seems to have now.

President Leathers said that the prejudice against bank officials was uncalled for. With the exception of two or three bank Presidents in Louisville, there was not one who did not depend on his salary for a living. The banks of Louisville are owned, he said, by about 25,000 of the citizens of Louisville.

Logan C. Murray, Vice-President of the American National Bank, Louisville, was invited to a seat on the stage. Mr. Murray in a short speech declared that the officers of a bank were the servants of the people. B. M. Arnett, of Nicholasville, W. S. Wilson, of Eminence, and others made remarks.

S. B. Lynd, paying teller of the Citizens' National Bank, winner of the second Sayre prize read his essay, which was liberally applauded.

B. G. Wilson, chairman of the auditing committee, said that the committee had examined the treasurer's books and found his report absolutely correct.

Lawson Reno, Cashier of the Owensboro National Bank, read a carefully prepared paper on "Are We Responsible?" He said no pains should be spared in examining the financial affairs of the country to find the cause of the financial depression. Several causes might have contributed to the present condition. He declared that it was against all principles of a sound banking system to pay interest on deposits.

C. N. Manning, of Lexington, winner of the third Sayre prize, read his essay, which was a highly creditable production.

Officers for the ensuing year were chosen as follows :

President—John H. Leathers, Cashier Louisville Banking Co., Louisville.

Vice-Presidents : First District—W. F. Paxton, Cashier Citizens' Savings Bank, Paducah.

Second District—Phil T. Watkins, Cashier First National Bank, Owensboro.

Third District—P. J. Potter, Potter's Bank, Bowling Green.

Fourth District—J. S. Grimes, President First National Bank, Elizabethtown.

Fifth District—H. C. Rodes, Vice-President Citizens' National Bank, Louisville.

Sixth District—J. E. Bohannon, Cashier Pendleton Bank, Falmouth.

Seventh District—Charles E. Hoge, Cashier State National Bank, Frankfort.

Eighth District—J. M. Johnson, Cashier Lawrenceburg Bank, Lawrenceburg.

Ninth District—W. W. Ball, Cashier First National Bank, Maysville.

Tenth District—B. F. Curtis, Cashier Clark County National Bank, Winchester.

Eleventh District—R. M. Jackson, Cashier First National Bank, London.

Secretary—Isham Bridges, Manager Louisville Clearing-House Association.

Treasurer—E. W. Hays, Cashier Bank of Kentucky, Louisville.

Executive Committee—S. Bassett, President Fayette National Bank, Lexington; John Stites, Vice-President Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co., Louisville; E. G. Buckner, Cashier Deposit Bank of Owensboro, Owensboro.

The vacancy on the legislative committee caused by the death of Thomas L. Barret was filled by the appointment of Judge Henry Burnett, of Paducah.

After adjournment the convention was suitably entertained by the Louisville bankers. Next year's meeting will probably be held at Frankfort.

## OHIO BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Sixth Annual Convention of the Ohio Bankers' Association assembled at the Hall of the Young Men's Christian Association, Dayton, October 7, President C. E. Niles in the chair.

Rev. E. E. Baker offered prayer and William H. Simms, President of the Dayton National Bank, delivered the address of welcome, which was responded to on behalf of the association by Robert McCurdy, President of the First National Bank, Youngstown.

President C. E. Niles then read his annual address. He spoke in favor of maintaining a single, unvarying standard of value, suggested that in future ladies be invited to attend the conventions, and praised the action of the banks in upholding the Government credit. Referring to prejudices against banks, he said :

Of course, banks are a curse. Let's do away with them and stop oppressing the farmer by furnishing money to buy and move his crops and stock and crippling the mechanic, merchant and manufacturer in helping him on in his business.

Some disappointed man may say, "Crucify them, crucify them," but, gentlemen, the true and honest tradesman and farmer will not say this; the men who have had the heaviest deal-

ings with the banks will not say this; the men who borrow five bushels of wheat, ten bushels of corn, or \$5, or \$500, or \$5,000 in money and pay it when they agree to, will not say this.

Do the people forget the daily accommodations they get at the banks? They do not stop to think that 95 per cent. of all the exchanges and checkings are without a direct profit to the bank. Sometimes, it would seem, we stand too much on the defensive, and take too much abuse, modestly standing back. Why, I know a banker who stood on the curb of the street not long since, as a Populist procession went by, when his eye caught a friend and old neighbor carrying a banner with the words on it: "National banks a national curse. Down with the banks!" and, believe me, within ten days after that procession he loaned the fellow \$200 for ninety days. "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."

After the reading of the reports of the secretary and treasurer and the appointment of the nominating committee, Isaac E. Knisely, President of the Northern National Bank, Toledo, read a paper on "Uniformity of Banking Methods and Customs." He said, in part:

#### UNIFORMITY OF BANKING METHODS AND CUSTOMS.

Let me call attention to a few landmarks which ought always to be kept in view in managing a banking business. We can agree that there are three interests, those of depositors, those of stockholders and those of customers, which must be subserved in the order stated. By depositors I mean, in this case particularly, those who place their money in the banks for safe keeping, with or without interest. By customers, I have reference to those who have accounts with banks as an auxiliary to their business; to borrow money, to discount paper and to have their collections made. A bank which accepts deposits should never approach the danger line. The security of the depositor is paramount to every other interest connected with the bank. Receiving deposits by an officer of a bank, knowing the bank to be insolvent, is made a criminal offense in many places. The rights of stockholders are to be kept in view. They have not invested their money to meet assessments for public convenience, or to be given in concessions to unprofitable customers.

Often the officers, in their zeal to increase business, agree to concessions which, in time, become menaces to the institutions as well as actual loss to the earnings. Let us attempt to analyze the relation of the merchant or manufacturing customer to the bank. He deposits his daily cash and cash items and receives credit. Now, what does he do this for? Because he wishes his funds in a safe place and where he can get them when he calls for them. These deposits are his working capital. They do not abide in any one place; they come and go constantly. What does the bank undertake now and what does it receive? It guarantees the safety of the money, that it shall be forthcoming when called for, and gets the use of the money or as much of it as is not on the wing. What banker can contend or consent that interest shall be paid on such balances or that any favor or concession should be based on this relation?

If a customer has a balance larger than the necessities of his business requires he can separate a part and take out a certificate, and by submitting to the same conditions as other holders of certificates, get interest.

He comes now to borrow money. Does the customer because he keeps a deposit account with a bank have a right to a loan, a right to demand it as implied from this relation? Certainly not. Here is quite another contract, another relation, and it is well understood. The customer should understand the advantage of a bank connection in this particular—to be known at his bank, to have his financial condition understood, his collateral and securities valued so that in an emergency he can get his accommodations quickly. On the other hand the bank, being in possession of this knowledge, is ready to help him. The customer is preferred over others who are not customers because it is to the interest of the bank to prefer him. He prefers to borrow at his bank because it is to his interest to do so. He pays the current rate of interest. Bankers do take into consideration the character of a customer's account in determining his line as well as the rate of interest; yet it is illogical and is the basis of constant complaint by other customers.

Let us take the case of two customers. A has a business which requires \$5,000 working capital and during certain parts of the year he borrows \$5,000 and discounts paper for \$5,000 and his deposits range from \$2,000 to \$3,000. B is another customer, who has a working capital of \$20,000. He borrows at times in the year \$20,000 and discounts paper for another \$20,000. His deposits range from \$10,000 to \$15,000. Why should you treat these customers differently? You get more and larger deposits from B, and you make him larger loans, you say, but you have greater responsibility in protecting his deposits, you have larger risks in his loans, you have larger checks to meet, and must keep on hand a larger percentage of his money. But, you say, here is C, whose deposits are from \$5,000 to \$10,000 dollars, and once in a long time he comes for a short loan. Ought he not to have the lowest rate? Now let me ask you what

would your earnings be if you had all such customers? Perhaps he ought to pay a higher rate for not contributing more to the interest account. I should prefer the customers like A and B. You catch them both ways—going and coming.

Now, we come to another question—skirmishing to get position. The customer comes with his collections; those credited as cash and those sent for collection. This is the field of battle. Here the banker can say: "We have met the enemy and we are theirs." I propose to talk from the standpoint of the depositor who wants security and some interest and the stockholder who wants earnings, and against a class of customers who have monopolized the favors and usefulness of the banks, and on whose accounts the bulk of the losses have been borne. Are your stockholders satisfied with your earnings? Are these commensurate with the risk?

The Comptroller's report shows that the net earnings of all the National banks to capital and surplus for the years 1894 and 1895, are 5 per cent. for each year. The earnings have steadily and gradually decreased for many years.

What was the collection system instituted by banks for? Not for a free labor bureau. It was for profit. The exchange account was once a solace; but, unlike other blessings which are said to brighten as they take their flight, it lingers, only having gone from the credit to the debit side.

Much has been written and spoken about the encroachments of the express companies upon the business of the banks. Have you considered how little we earned from that class of business which they took from us and that we are doing for nothing what they left us? The enterprise of the express companies contrasted with the supineness of the banks is not creditable.

Now, let each banker answer this question: Is there, anywhere in the relation of the bank to its customer, any implied obligation to make his collections for nothing or give him his exchange free? Because it has been done, is no answer. Because another bank does it, therefore we do it, carried to its logical result, in this and other concessions, is about as reasonable as two steamboats racing on the Mississippi, and sometimes has the same ending.

What has this led to? Of course no bank could handle these collections and bear the necessary expense of doing so in a legal and good business method. How are the ordinary checks and drafts handled? I wish each banker before me could give us an instance showing the itinerary of some item, the worst item in his experience, and when grouped together they would show how nearly the business done by the banks is turned into a burlesque. The strife to get customers, to get business, and the fear that the bank will lose a customer or lose some business, has led to it. Is a customer whom we have to buy worth having? Is a customer whom we must hire to stay worth keeping? When your courage fails you to demand what is best for your bank and to refuse what is not best for it, you have lost your birthright as a banker.

You all know something about the par lists and the par systems—the worst reciprocity scheme ever invented. When a man who has large collections to make wants to open an account with a bank he asks to see your par lists, he don't mention his own average balances; collections free, exchange free, and interest bottom rate, rebates on all notes paid before maturity, have our correspondents furnish bonds in all cases when attachment and replevin suits are to be commenced away from home; and when they go from home, give them a letter saying: "To whom it may concern. A. B. is a valued customer and any courtesies shown him, etc." These are about the things they speak of.

Some banks hold out as inducements to get customers large par lists. I have heard that the once famous Fidelity National Bank, of Cincinnati, had the largest par list—its failure was on the same scale. The Columbia National Bank, of Chicago, was a good second in both respects. When a bank hangs out a large par list, take it as a storm signal. What is a par list good for in a panic?

In 1893, on the same morning, notice was received from Cincinnati, Cleveland and Detroit saying, "We will not accept any items not payable in the city at par, and we will not assume any responsibility for collections other than as forwarding agents." We then learned how faulty this method was, but drifted into it again. It is unfair to the customer and unsafe to the bank; it is expensive; it multiplies labor; it requires an army of clerks to run it; it keeps afloat an enormous amount of money three or four times as long as is necessary. If an item can be sent out and returned within five days, who is benefited by keeping it in transit ten days? How are these items handled? The clerk finds from the deposits and the mails a large number of checks and drafts. When the city items have been culled he commences to distribute. All Pennsylvania items go to Cleveland; all Michigan items go to Detroit; all southern Ohio and Kentucky items go to Cincinnati, also West Virginia items; all Indiana items to Indianapolis, and so on. If he don't know where to send an item he pushes it along, hoping someone else will know where it ought to go—and what happens? Of course we don't know the various places these items lay over to get stamps put on them, but we assume that

somebody will look after them. They can almost shift for themselves—they generally go right. If one does go wrong, or is dishonored, it is generally too late to look after the fellow when the item is returned as his estate has probably been settled.

Have you calculated what is the value of the ordinary merchant's or manufacturer's account? The writer is able to give you some figures. Five accounts which were considered good, and fairly represented five different kinds of wholesale business, were selected, and for the purpose of determining what profit if any resulted from them we kept the account as follows:

A. B. & Co.	
Total balance for 30 days.....	\$608,200.00
Checks sent direct .....	262
Checks sent to banks with debit balance.....	120
Total .....	382
Average per check.....	\$72
Total amount represented by said checks.....	27,504
Estimated loss 3 days' time on each check (multiply total amount by 3) .....	82,512.00
	\$50,992.00
Divide by 30 for average balance.....	17,356.00
Value at 3 per cent.....	\$43.39
Cost of 262 checks at 17 cents each.....	44.54
Net loss .....	\$1.15

There were 241 checks sent to reserve banks and 71 to banks with credit balance in addition to the above. On these no loss occurs. Of the five accounts three show net loss and two a small profit. The account I have given is about an average of the five. We can see what is the result of accepting such accounts agreeing to make collections free. It must also be borne in mind that no part of the general expenses of the bank is allowed for in this calculation.

You may want to know why 3 per cent. is allowed on the daily balance in this statement. Are deposits worth any more? I will tell you. In a bank where the writer has access to actual figures for the year from Sept. 1, 1894, to Sept. 1, 1895, the capital, surplus and deposits earned just 2.8 per cent. In Ohio the National banks, not including Cleveland and Cincinnati, earned 2 per cent. on the same for the same time; here, however, the losses and premiums were deducted. If only the expenses and taxes are deducted from the earnings then the rate is 3.8 per cent. In Cleveland the capital, surplus and deposits earned 1.9 per cent.; not deducting losses and premiums, 2.1 per cent. Cincinnati, 1.8 per cent; not deducting losses and premiums, 2.6 per cent. These are all figures from sworn reports and from Comptrollers' reports. If I had made the calculation upon the actual earnings in the bank where the above accounts were kept, they would all have shown a loss.

Country banks perhaps have proportionately less idle money, but when they pay 5 or 6 per cent. on deposits, they had better take their reckoning.

What are we going to do about it? Perhaps nothing. We were taught in our youth that "a rolling stone gathers no moss." Our children will respect the stone for not allowing the moss to grow upon it. Some will say, "How are banks paying dividends and building up a surplus?" They do not do it from this class of customers, nor by free collections and free exchange. They happen to be favored.

What, says one, do you propose as the remedy? The writer has his plan, but there is not time or space here to explain it. Let us charge a fair compensation for all our work, and the plan will develop itself. Charge for every check that comes over the counter except city items, and the country checks will soon go. Charge for all collections and send them more directly, not allowing any item to go out without having its course prescribed before it goes.

The bankers of St. Louis praise this system, and it pertains only to their city. Their system is simple—it is to charge for their labor. The President of one of the large banks in that city told the writer that it was a saving to their bank of \$15,000 per year.

Does any one say, we cannot do it? Let Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Akron, Youngstown and Toledo inaugurate it, and the whole State will fall into line. What did the banks of New York city do with restrictive endorsements? They made a quick, decisive charge, and in less than thirty days, over the whole country, they all lay dead and dying.

The statements from customers showing in detail their financial condition have become so great a help that their general use ought to be adopted. Sometimes customers object to making them, but, if they learn that bankers generally require them, and that they are confidentially treated, their objections will soon disappear.



I trust the plan adopted in the State of New York, so far as applicable, will be adopted here. The blanks are authorized by the State Bankers' Association and also by the different groups of banks. Banks could act independently in that matter, but there is always that threat which lurks about the customer's manner that he can go elsewhere; so that if a bank can feel sure that the same demand will be made of him by other banks, there will be less hesitancy in insisting upon his making the statement.

Bonds for suits are often requested of their banks by customers. Banks are requested to telegraph or write other banks to secure bond for them. I need not discuss the question whether an officer can bind his bank by these arrangements; it is enough to warn bankers to stop this in time. Why shall we not adopt a resolution that we will not ask any bank to furnish a bond, nor furnish one ourselves?

How shall we treat notes payable at the bank? This of course has no reference to notes owned by the bank. A bank has a right to charge to a customer's account any note it owns and is due. The only question then is, what will you do if a note is presented for payment, and the maker has funds on deposit, and the note is in terms payable at the bank? Should you pay it without some further request than that contained in the note? In Ohio the question has not been judicially determined. The case of *Francis vs. the People's National Bank, of Newark*, is pending in the Circuit Court. The judge of the Common Pleas Court charged the jury that the bank having paid the note, the authority contained in the note was sufficient to justify it. The bank is not liable to the holder of the note for not paying it, for all that is claimed by the cases holding that the bank should pay such notes is that the words payable at — bank have the force of a check. But our Supreme Court, as recently as last January, decided that the holder of a check cannot sue a bank that it is drawn upon for refusing to pay it. Then the only question is, can the bank be held liable to the maker of the note, if he has funds there sufficient to pay it? I have not been able to find any case where a bank was sued by the maker for not paying such a note. In States where banks can be sued by the holders of checks for not paying them, they might perhaps be held liable by the holders of these notes; but the holder has no remedy against the banks in this State. How can the maker of the note be damaged by the bank's not paying it? He can pay it at any time. If, however, it goes to protest, and he feels that his credit is hurt, is the bank liable for damages? I say, no. The safe course is not to pay such notes. If the customer wants them paid by the bank, he can so inform the bank by a general verbal or written authority to pay all notes of his made payable at the bank.

The case above referred to, now pending, is a suit against the bank because it did pay such note. If a customer wants his notes paid then he will say, "It was all right for you to pay it." But, if he does not, for any reason, want it paid, then you will have a row with him for paying it; and perhaps, like the People's Bank, of Newark, have a lawsuit.

The law in Ohio is that if a bank accepts an item for collection, and forwards same to another bank, the bank receiving the collection is liable to the customer if any loss occurs through the failure or negligence of such second bank. Do you, any of you, receiving perhaps ten or fifteen cents, in many cases nothing, for the collection of a check or note, and a loss occurs by the failure of the bank you sent it to, think it just that your bank should bear the loss? How can we avoid it?

In Toledo, we have a rule of the clearing-house, requiring all banks to accept collections only upon the condition that the customer will bear the loss. We give each customer a copy of the rule, and we have it printed in large placards, hanging at the teller's window, and it is also printed in all the pass-books. If this were made the general custom in the State, we would soon have it so well understood that there would be no difficulty. However, a difficulty might arise again in this: No court would support such a rule if you sent your items by a route that requires their handling by three or four banks. You cannot by your contract make your customer guarantee all the banks for you, unless he is informed of the itinerary of his items; they must be collected by a more direct method, and I will venture the assertion here that, all our contracts and rules to the contrary, the banks would, if the matter were contested, have to bear the loss in nearly every instance under the present system.

Again I ask, will we undertake any reforms? I remember a definition in mechanical philosophy which says: Inertia is that property of a body which makes it indisposed to move when at rest, and indisposed to stop moving when in motion. I think the banks have inertia badly. They won't move in the right direction, and they won't stop going wrong.

An interesting discussion followed, in which Mr. White and Mr. Griffith, of Cincinnati, Mr. McCurdy, of Youngstown, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Sanborn, of Cleveland, participated.

## SECOND DAY'S SESSION.

At the second day's session, on October 8, papers were read as follows: "Taxation of Banks," S. S. Wheeler, President First National Bank, Lima; "The Country Banker, His Needs and Necessities in View of the Value of His Account, as Seen through Country Spectacles," J. M. Maylone, Assistant Cashier People's National Bank, Newark.

After the transaction of some miscellaneous business the convention proceeded to the election of officers, with the following result:

President—Robert McCurdy, President First National Bank, Youngstown.

Vice-President—G. P. Griffith, Vice-Pres. Citizens' National Bank, Cincinnati.

Treasurer—H. C. Herbig, Cashier Commercial Banking Co., Coshocton.

Secretary—S. B. Rankin, Cashier Bank of South Charleston, South Charleston.

Chairman of Executive Council—W. A. Graham, Cashier Citizens' Bank, Sidney.

Members Executive Council (for three years)—J. C. Reber, Cashier Winters National Bank, Dayton; Jacob Frick, President Wayne County National Bank, Wooster; Jacob Babst, Babst's Banking House, Crestline; (two years), W. P. Orr, President Citizens' National Bank, Piqua.

In the afternoon Gov. Asa S. Bushnell spoke on "Banks and the Manufacturer." He dwelt at length upon the assistance rendered by banks in developing manufacturing enterprises.

At the conclusion of the convention's work an elegant banquet was enjoyed by the delegates at the rooms of the Dayton Club.

Toledo was selected as the place for holding the next convention.

## KANSAS STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

The Ninth Annual Convention of the Kansas State Bankers' Association was held at Topeka, September 29 to October 1.

President T. P. Moore, in his annual address, said that there were 285 State banks, 106 National banks and 124 private banks in Kansas. During the past year thirteen State banks have failed and twenty-eight have gone into voluntary liquidation; during the same period three National banks have failed and four gone into voluntary liquidation—a total of forty-eight, against the organization of twenty-eight new banks, making a net loss of twenty. He recommended that the chattel mortgage, general mortgage and collection laws be amended, and urged that days of grace be abolished.

"The Express Money Order" was one of the principal questions discussed. The trend of the argument favored the passage of a law placing express companies under the supervision of the State bank commissioner, as they are exercising the functions of a bank. The discussion was led by J. R. Mulvane, of Topeka.

G. W. McKnight, of Junction City, presented the following resolution as the report of a special committee, which was adopted:

*Whereas*, The express companies are pushing and extending their money order business in direct competition with the legitimate business of the banks; and

*Whereas*, They have little or no money invested in the business, but depend largely upon the banks to cash their orders at par, which is unreasonable and unjust; then be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of this convention that the bankers, by united action in their respective towns, shall discourage the use of this irregular class of exchange by declining to cash it or receive it on deposit except upon the payment of a reasonable compensation for the trouble of handling it.

John W. Breidenthal, State Bank Commissioner, discussed the causes of bank failures, which he thought originated, chiefly, in mismanagement. In his opinion the negligence of directors was largely responsible for many failures, and he said that stockholders should seek to hold them responsible for losses sustained through their negligence.

After discussing a number of banking and commercial law topics, the convention proceeded to the election of officers, with the following result :

President—A. C. Jobes, President Bank of Commerce, Wichita,

Secretary—F. M. Bonebrake, Assistant Cashier Central National Bank, Topeka.

Assistant Secretary—J. M. Moore, Cashier Fourth National Bank, Wichita.

Treasurer—J. W. Thurston, Cashier Bank of Topeka, Topeka

Vice-Presidents at cities of the first-class : Topeka—T. B. Sweet ; Wichita—C. H. Davidson, Vice-President Kansas National Bank ; Fort Scott—Frank Hornaday ; Leavenworth—E. A. Kelly, Cashier Union Savings Bank ; Atchison—J. H. Hetherington ; Kansas City—E. A. Browne, Assistant Cashier Merchants' Bank.

Vice-Presidents by congressional districts : First District—E. W. Synder, President Manufacturers' National Bank, Leavenworth.

Second District—A. Dobson, Bank of Ottawa, Ottawa.

Third District—G. W. Robinson, Cashier First National Bank, Winfield.

Fourth District—L. T. Herrick.

Fifth District—G. W. McKnight, President First National Bank, Junction City.

Sixth District—J. S. Morse, Jr., Assistant Cashier Phillips County Bank, Phillipsburg.

Seventh District—G. H. Burr, President Commercial Bank, St. John.

The convention will meet at Wichita next year.

**Bank Examiners' Small Pay.**—It has been frequently suggested that the bank examiner ought, if he had called in the pass-books of the bank, to have discovered defalcations resulting from conspiracies between employees of the bank and outside depositors. The obstacle to this practice lies in the fact that it would consume more time in an examination than is practicable, and keep an examiner in a bank for so long a time that suspicion might be aroused as to its condition when no cause for such suspicion really existed. It would thus result that runs would be made upon banks, and perfectly solvent ones be compelled to close. It is not the duty of either the Comptroller or his agent to attend to these details. It rests with the directors of the banks to insist that the executive officers whom they choose shall manage the bank with such care that wrong-doing is impossible. It is also their duty to see that this is done. The directors of banks too often fail to realize the importance of the office which they hold. They ought diligently and honestly to administer the affairs of the association over which they preside. They have no right to leave the management of the bank to the President, or Cashier, or both, but ought to insist on knowing what is being done. They ought to make thorough and frequent examinations of the bank, both as to the honesty of its conduct and the solvency of the paper which it accepts. It is their business to know that the transactions of the banks with which they are connected are properly carried out, and that such methods of bookkeeping and checking of accounts are adopted as would effectually remove opportunities for dishonesty. They owe this much to shareholders who elect them and to depositors and creditors who, relying upon their doing their duty, give credit to the institution they are attached to.

It is not improbable that better results would be obtained in the examination of banks if examiners were paid a fixed yearly salary with an allowance for expenses. The mode of payment now in vogue is in most places, outside of reserve cities, an allowance of a fee of twenty dollars for each bank examination. Out of this sum the examiner is required to pay both his travelling and his living expenses. In order to meet such expenses and leave a suitable compensation for his labor, he must of necessity examine a bank with more rapidity than in many instances he ought. There are cases where several days should be occupied in the examination of a very small bank, but the examiner cannot afford to give the necessary time. If, however, he was employed under a fixed salary paid out of a fund to be contributed by all the banks, together with the payment of his necessary expenses, each bank with which he had to do could receive the attention which it demanded.—*Comptroller Eckels in North American Review.*

# STATE BANKS—REPORTS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS.

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

### REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANK COMMISSIONERS.

OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF BANK COMMISSIONERS,  
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., Sept. 1, 1896.

To His Excellency JAMES H. BUDD, Governor of the State of California:

In compliance with Section 3 of the Act creating the Board of Bank Commissioners, and prescribing their duties and powers, the Eighteenth Annual Report of this commission, containing a tabulated statement and synopsis of the several reports of incorporated State and private banks, which have been filed in the office of the commission since their last report, together with certain recommendations upon the banking laws, is herewith respectfully submitted.

Incorporated State Savings banks.....	57	Private banks.....	20
Incorporated State commercial banks.....	189	National banks.....	31
Foreign banks.....	5	Liquidating banks.....	21
Total.....			308
Total money in banks of California (including National banks).....			\$21,775,362
Total assets.....			303,860,772
Total amount due depositors.....			202,663,602

### COMMERCIAL BANKS.

During the year five new commercial banks have been organized; namely, Exchange Bank, Santa Ana; Fruit-Growers' Bank, Fullerton; Covina Bank, Covina; Bank of Commerce, of San Francisco; The Bank of Long Beach, Long Beach. This will make a total of 174 active banks now conducting a commercial banking business. At the time of the commissioners' report last year, there were 173 active commercial banks.

From an examination of the aggregate resources of the commercial banks, as shown by their reports of June 17, 1895, as compared with the report of July 31, 1896, it will appear that there has been a loss or reduction of \$8,093,008 in resources during the year. The amount of cash on hand, June 17, 1895, was \$19,053,248; and on July 31, 1896, \$14,654,182; showing a loss in cash, within a period of thirteen months, of \$4,399,065. This large reduction is accounted for, in some measure, by the withdrawal from commercial use of \$2,575,807 of county or public money; and also by the distrust and consequent withdrawal of gold caused by the financial agitation incident to the near approach of a presidential election.

### SAVINGS BANKS.

Since our last report, one new Savings bank, namely, Oakland Loan and Investment Company, has been organized, making a total of fifty-seven such institutions now doing a Savings bank business in this State.

The Savings banks have lost no considerable amount by the withdrawal of public money, and it would seem that their depositors have not been so sensitive to the causes that have disturbed commercial banks. They are to be congratulated on their exceptionally sound and healthy condition, as will appear from the following table, showing the deposits at the comparative dates given:

<i>Deposits in Savings Banks.</i>			
1870—January .....	\$36,555,909	1895—January .....	125,518,770
1880—January .....	51,804,903	1895—November .....	130,825,560
1890—January .....	93,882,064	1896—July 31 .....	131,653,654
Number of depositors in San Francisco Savings banks.....			123,484
Number of depositors in interior Savings banks.....			31,372
Total number of depositors.....			159,856
Making an average deposit of .....			\$823

### BANKS IN LIQUIDATION.

Within the year four commercial banks have closed their doors, and are retiring from business; namely, Fallbrook Bank, Fallbrook; Grangers' Bank, San Francisco; Bank of Lincoln, Lincoln; and the Perris Valley Bank, Perris.

The Bank of Lincoln has paid its depositors in full.

The Fallbrook Bank has paid off its deposits, with the exception of about \$125, which amount it has on hand, the same not having been called for.

The Perris Valley Bank, on December 9, 1895, was declared insolvent, having been unable to extend its accommodation loan due, and owing to a correspondent bank, which loan was called by said bank, thereby forcing the bank to close its doors. It is believed by the commissioners that this bank will pay its depositors in full; especially so, if the Supreme Court of the United States should decide that the irrigation bonds issued under the Wright Act are constitutional, as said bank's resources, to the extent of \$14,719, consist of said bonds.

The Grangers' Bank of San Francisco, now in liquidation, closed its doors December 10, 1895. On December 9—one day prior thereto—the commission made an examination into the condition of said bank, and charged off from its resources certain assets found to be doubtful and bad. Afterward, on December 23, 1895, the commissioners made another examination, and again reduced the resources of the bank by charging from its assets other doubtful and bad securities, which resulted in the reduction and impairment of the capital stock of the bank. However, the bank's resources, in the opinion of this commission, are abundant to fully pay off all deposits and claims against it, and its liquidation is being satisfactorily and judiciously managed.

The commission has earnestly endeavored to administer the affairs, in its supervision of all banks in liquidation, in an economical manner, and believes that such banks are being closed as rapidly as the condition of the times will permit.

From June 17, 1895, to July 31, 1896, the total net decrease in the assets and liabilities of all banks in California was \$5,318,808.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is believed by the commission that the laws affecting and governing the banking corporations of this State should be revised. And upon this subject the board is unanimous in its opinions and recommendations upon the following subjects:

Commercial banks should be restricted to the conducting of a commercial banking business. The law, in our opinion, should prohibit the merging of a Savings bank with a commercial bank, and a commercial bank with a Savings bank. In our report of last year, we also recommended that the law be amended to prevent the practice of permitting Savings banks to be conducted in the same room with commercial banks, and governed by the same officers.

The experience of this commission, obtained in the examination of the combined Savings and commercial banks, leads it to the belief and conclusion that depositors in such institutions are frequently, without evident intent or purpose upon the part of the officers conducting the same, misled as to the nature of their deposits or the position they may hold with the bank. And when, if any such institution should become depressed, or be compelled to close its doors, the rights of depositors under the law are in the commercial bank different from those in the Savings bank. The depositor in the commercial bank has the right, under Section 440, Code of Civil Procedure, to offset his deposit against his liability; while in the Savings bank it has been held that such offsets cannot be made.

The commission also recommends that the law be amended, providing that when a bank is declared insolvent a Receiver should be appointed by the court to take charge of the affairs of the bank while the same is in liquidation, with the power placed in the commission to fix the salary to be allowed him by law and the number of additional employees and their salaries.

We further recommend that, at such times as reports of banks shall be called for by the commission, in addition to the requirement of the law now imposed, requiring its President and Secretary to verify under oath said report, at least a majority of the board of directors of said bank shall sign and qualify to the correctness of the same and the value of the assets, as therein set forth.

And it is also recommended that loans made to officers and directors of commercial banks shall be approved by at least three members of the board of directors, who are not directly or indirectly interested in said loans; and that said approval shall be indorsed upon the note or obligation executed to the bank.

It is believed that the enactment of such laws, in addition to those now already on our statute, will, if not perfecting our banking law, greatly add to its value, and throw around banking institutions safeguards against many bank failures.

We again acknowledge the courtesy of officers of National banks in furnishing this commission with reports regarding the condition of their respective institutions.

Respectfully submitted,

PARIS KILBURN,  
J. B. FULLER,  
H. W. MAGEE.  
*Bank Commissioners.*

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of NEW NATIONAL BANKS (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—The style of the firm of Messrs. Work, Strong & Co., has been changed to Strong, Sturgis & Co., Geo. Wood retiring.

—A meeting of the stockholders of the Guaranty Trust Co. will be held on Nov. 20, to decide upon the establishment of a branch office in London.

—The Chemical National Bank recently won a suit in the United States Court, at Cincinnati, for \$800,000, with interest from March 2, 1887, against Receiver Armstrong, of the defunct Fidelity National Bank, of that city. The money had been borrowed by E. L. Harper, Vice-President of the Fidelity National Bank, without consulting the directors, and on this account the Receiver declined to repay it.

—William Waldorf Astor proposes to erect what, it is said, will be the finest office and banking building in the world. The site is the 13,750 square feet at Broadway, Exchange place and New street. The building is to cost between \$3,000,000 and \$4,000,000, and will be fourteen stories high.

—Edmund Clarence Stedman, the poet and broker, received a short time since from Chicago a check which required his endorsement, and after he had drawn on the back a hemisphere which showed Chicago to be the centre of the universe, he wrote these lines under the picture:

Chicago the prairie wind's focus,  
Whose journals so jauntily joke us,  
How proudly she scratches  
Her diamond matches  
And brags of the railways that broke us.

—Mr. Glyn, of the London banking house of Messrs. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co., was a recent visitor at the New York Clearing-House.

—Within the last three or four weeks the price of seats in the New York Stock Exchange has advanced from \$14,000 to \$18,000.

—The clearing-house agent of the branch of the Bank of Montreal will hereafter be the City National Bank instead of the Bank of New York.

—On Oct. 30 rates on call loans went up to 100 per cent., due to the apprehension preceding the election. At the suggestion of the clearing-house committee and the loan committee, a syndicate of banks was formed immediately, which agreed to furnish \$10,000,000, if necessary. This quickly brought the rate down to six per cent.

—Suit has been brought against the Atlantic Trust Co., as trustee for the Lombard Investment Co., to compel the sale of collateral, and the application of the proceeds to the payment of debenture bonds held by English investors.

—The final statement of the State Bank Superintendent in regard to the affairs of the Murray Hill Bank shows a deficit of \$164,345.

—Savings banks report a considerable increase of deposits since the election. Fear of a change to the silver standard led to an excess of withdrawals from many of these banks, but the tide has now turned in a favorable direction. An increase in the amount of gold deposited is also noted.

—Cornelius N. Bliss, who is identified with a number of banks and trust companies of the city, is prominently mentioned for Secretary of the Treasury in the cabinet of President McKinley.

—The officers of the Hanover National Bank entertained the bank's staff at dinner at the Murray Hill Hotel on the evening of November 7.

—The Protective Committee of the American Bankers' Association has recently captured a notorious gang of bank forgers and check-raisers.

## NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—J. C. Holmes succeeds the late C. C. Nichols as Treasurer of the Five Cents Savings Bank.

**Profit-Sharing in Massachusetts.**—During the financial year ending Oct. 15, the Bourne Mills, Fall River, Mass., paid to stockholders 18 per cent. on a capital stock of \$400,000. In the same time operatives who participated in the profit-sharing plan got 10 per cent. of the profits, or 10 per cent of \$72,000. Under the plan in operation all of the employees are eligible to participate, except the Treasurer and head bookkeeper. Each of the participants agrees not to expect or exact any part of the dividends distributed among employees unless he complies with the requirements outlined by the corporation. Among the conditions imposed are: An employee must work six months for the corporation. He must not have quarreled, seriously, with the overseers or other authorities in charge of him because of idleness or bad work. He must make a regular deposit, or saving, in what is termed the profit-sharing bank, established and managed by the mill authorities, as in any other banking institution, public or private, where regular and frequent deposits of savings are exacted. Between 200 and 300 of the employees have always participated in the profit-sharing, and the result is that the Bourne Mills have one of the steadiest communities of operatives in New England. The amounts received by operatives vary greatly. Some receive \$6 for the six months, and some receive as much as \$30. These amounts are paid in addition to the regular wages earned.

**A Treasurer's Suicide.**—Geo. J. Marsh, Treasurer of the Cape Ann Savings Bank, Gloucester, Mass., killed himself on Oct. 8. He was trustee for several estates, and his accounts relating to these trusts are reported short to the extent of about \$200,000. None of the bank's securities were misappropriated, however, and business is being done as usual.

**An Embezzler Pardoned.**—The President has pardoned Emil C. Knappe, convicted of embezzling the funds of the Chicopee National Bank of Springfield, Mass., and sentenced in 1894 to five years' imprisonment.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Philadelphia.**—The Investment Company of Philadelphia has prepared a plan of reorganization which proposes to reduce the capital stock from \$4,000,000 to \$800,000 by exchanging five shares of old for one of new stock. The assets are estimated worth at forced sale \$800,000 in excess of all liabilities, and it is believed that they will in a reasonable time be worth \$1,800,000. Stockholders are to vote December 15 on the adoption of the plan.

—J. Harry Dripps has been promoted to the cashiership of the National Security Bank.

—Plans for the new Mint building have been almost completed.

—B. B. Comegys, President of the Philadelphia National Bank, returned recently from an extensive trip through Europe.

—In addition to the dividends recently declared the following banks have increased their surplus funds: The Penn National Bank, \$25,000, making its surplus fund \$500,000, the same amount as the capital; the Second National Bank, \$10,000 to \$100,000; the Third National Bank, \$10,000, to \$125,000, and the Northwestern National Bank, \$10,000, to \$185,000. All the banks in the list make the same dividend for November as in May last. The following banks in addition to their dividends, report "undivided profits": City National Bank, \$48,000; Independence, \$36,000; Penn, \$50,000; Germantown, \$52,300; Manufacturers' \$40,000; Third National, \$18,200, and Northwestern, \$7,000.

**Pittsburg.**—The Fifth National Bank has removed into its old quarters, but its old customers hardly recognize the place. During the past several months extensive improvements have been made to the building on Sixth street, which has housed the bank for years, and there is no banking institution in this city more comfortably furnished and conveniently located. J. B. Finley, chairman of Group 8 of the Pennsylvania Bankers' association, is President of the Fifth National, and W. P. Knight is Cashier.

**A Woman Bank President.**—Mrs. D. H. Marsh, of Groton, N. Y., is, so far as known, the only woman bank President in this part of the country. Mrs. Marsh was a director and stockholder of the First National Bank of Groton, and on the recent death of her husband she was chosen President in his place.

**Appointed Bank Examiner.**—D. C. Patterson, of Dansville, has been appointed a State Bank Examiner by Superintendent Kilburn of the New York State Banking Department.

**State Bank Commissioner (N. J.).**—Geo. W. Wurts, editor of the "Paterson Press," has been appointed Commissioner of Banking and Insurance for the State of New Jersey, to succeed the late Geo. S. Duryee.

**Bankers' Association Meets.**—A convention of the Second Group, Pennsylvania Bankers' Association was held at Pottsville, October 22. Representatives from Schuylkill, Berks, Chester and Montgomery counties were present. A number of important papers were read.

**Baltimore, Md.**—Harry M. Mason, Cashier of the Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, Easton, Md., has been elected Cashier of the Manufacturers' National Bank of Baltimore.

—Daniel C. Gilman, President of Johns Hopkins University, has been elected a director of the Commonwealth Bank.

### SOUTHERN STATES.

**New Orleans, La.**—On account of the recent bank failures a demand has been created for a bank that will take the class of deposits formerly received by the smaller banks, and in consequence the Provident Savings Bank has decided to do a general commercial banking business hereafter. It has been doing a Savings bank business for two or three years.

—Efforts are being made to reorganize the Union National Bank, with a fair prospect of success.

**Prosperous Southern Bank.**—At the recent annual meeting of the Citizens' Banking and Trust Co., Chattanooga, Tenn., a semi-annual dividend of 3 per cent. was declared and an addition made to the undivided profits. Since its organization, eight years ago, the bank has declared 54 per cent. in dividends. It is now making extensive improvements in its quarters.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—Dr. Samuel Young's three hundred shares of Atlanta Trust and Banking stock have been purchased by local business men. Charles Runnette succeeds Dr. Young as Vice-President.

### WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—The Bankers' Club had its first meeting of the season at Kinsley's, Oct. 15, thus inaugurating the fifteenth year of its usefulness.

Mr. James B. Forgan, Vice-President of the First National Bank, presided. The annual election of officers was held, resulting as follows:

President—John J. Mitchell, President Illinois Trust and Savings Bank.

Vice-President—J. C. Neely, Cashier Merchants' National Bank.

Secretary and Treasurer—W. D. C. Street, Manager Chicago Clearing-House Association.

Members of the Executive Committee—John McLaren, President Hide and Leather National Bank; Holmes Hoge, Assistant Cashier First National Bank.

—Albert E. Coen, Teller of the Bankers National Bank, won the third prize from the State Bankers' Association, in the Halliday contest for the best essay on the subject, "How Can Bank Clerks Become Bankers."

—The Chicago Stock Exchange was reopened Nov. 5, after having been closed since Aug. 3.

—The official statements of the National banks of the city, as made to the Comptroller of the Currency on Oct. 6, showed a considerable decrease in deposits and loans, compared with the previous report. Since the election, however, a big gain in deposits is reported.

**Cincinnati.**—A recognition of the services and standing of Vice-President and Cashier G. P. Griffith, of the Citizens' National Bank, was his election as Vice-President of the Ohio State Bankers' Association at its recent convention. Mr. Griffith has served the association faithfully as Chairman of its Executive Committee, and Cincinnati bankers are gratified at his selection to the office mentioned.

**Detroit, Mich.**—A tasteful souvenir of the campaign just closed has been issued by the State Savings Bank, of Detroit. It is in the form of a neat pamphlet containing statements of all the Detroit banks. The binding is in imitation of gold foil, and the printing is done in the same color, forming a most attractive presentation of the banking resources of the "City of the Straits," and in color appropriately emblematical of the sound-money sentiment of the banks of that city and of the people of Michigan.

—T. C. Sherwood, Commissioner of the State Banking Department, has resigned his office to accept the position of President of the Peninsular Savings Bank, succeeding Alex. Chapoton, Jr., who becomes Vice-President.

—Edward J. Schmidt, an active young business man, has been chosen a director of the Detroit National Bank, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Charles Endicott.

**Bank Consolidation.**—The National Bank of Corning, Iowa, has sold its business to the First National Bank of that city. C. A. Cole, who was Cashier of the National Bank of Corning, is under arrest charged with embezzlement.

**Michigan State Banks.**—Official statements of the condition of the State banks of Michigan on Oct. 6, show total resources of \$85,053,972; deposits, \$67,306,367.

**Michigan Banks Unite.**—The Sault St. Marie (Mich.) National Bank and the Sault Savings Bank, Loan and Trust Co. have consolidated.



**Favors the Group System.**—The Iowa Bankers' Association should adopt the group system as operated so successfully in other States. Divide the State by congressional districts and arrange a local organization for each district with quarterly meetings at various towns in the district. This system will promote interest in the State association, insure a more thorough, closer organization of the banks of the State, and be a means by which more practical benefit may be derived.—*Tri-State Banker (Des Moines)*.

**Topeka, Kan.**—The Topeka Trust Co. has been organized to conduct a business in land and land securities. Capital stock, \$200,000.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—The announcement is made that the Comptroller of the Currency has approved plans for the consolidation of the Flour City National and the Union National Bank. Details of the plan have not yet been made public.

**St. Paul, Minn.**—The Savings Bank of St. Paul is now occupying its new building on Sixth and Cedar streets, where it has one of the most convenient and handsome bank offices in St. Paul. The offices not only include every facility for the convenient transaction of business, but the building is also architecturally attractive. The front elevation is of cut stone and the sides of brick. The vaults, safes and safe-deposit boxes are all of the latest and best types. The Savings Bank of St. Paul was organized and incorporated in 1867. Its present officers are: President, Thomas A. Prendergast; Vice-President, John S. Prince; Cashier, Edward J. Meier; trustees, John Caulfield, John A. Stees, William Hamm, J. C. Prendergast, Edward J. Meier, John S. Prince and Thomas A. Prendergast.

**Stockholders Held Liable.**—A recent decision in the United States court holds the stockholders of the defunct First National Bank of Sedalia, Mo., liable for the whole amount of their stock, notwithstanding the fact that all of it had not been paid for in cash. Final judgment was rendered in the sum of \$52,000.

## PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Wyoming State Banks.**—State Examiner Henderson recently completed an examination of the five State banks located in Wyoming and reports them in good condition. His report shows in the aggregate as follows: Loans and discounts, \$165,670; total deposits, \$177,969; total assets, \$268,547.

**San Francisco.**—The thirty-second annual meeting of the Bank of California was held on October 13. Gross receipts and earnings for the year were \$690,332, and the disbursements—including taxes, items written off and dividends—\$823,063. Total resources are now almost \$17,000,000.

—The annual meeting of the Nevada Bank was held on October 14. The earnings for the year were \$383,306, and payments for expenses, taxes and dividends, \$285,968.

—William Alvord who has just been re-elected President of the Bank of California, was first chosen to fill the position in 1878, and he has been re-elected every year since, so that his recent election makes the nineteenth time the directors have voted to have him act in that relation.

—Isaiah W. Hellman, President of the Nevada Bank, recently returned to the city after having spent the last few months in Europe. His health has been much improved by rest and travel.

**Going Out of Business.**—It is announced that the Bank of San Bernardino, Cal., will retire from business next March. The bank is the oldest in the county, and its discontinuance owing to the fact that the banking business is somewhat overdone in that locality.

**Banks to Discontinue.**—The branches of the Bank of British Columbia at Tacoma and Seattle, Wash., will be discontinued on account of business being unprofitable.

**Creditors Paid in Full.**—The creditors of the Albuquerque (N. M.) National Bank have been paid a dividend of 25 per cent., making 100 per cent. paid on all claims proven.

## CANADA.

**Will Take U. S. Currency.**—During the recent political campaign in the United States many of the Canadian banks refused to take American currency except at a discount. Since the election it will be received at par as heretofore.

**Canadian Bank Returns.**—The usual comparative review of the official returns of the Canadian banks will be found on another page.

**The People's Bank.**—The People's Bank (La Banque du Peuple), of Montreal, on November 2 began paying the second installment of twenty-five cents on the dollar to the depositors. A similar installment will be due May 1 next, and the concluding one a year from this. The prospects of resumption are yet in the region of doubt.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

**California**—**SAN FRANCISCO**.—The Pacific Bank, which failed in 1893, owing depositors \$1,855,000, has paid off all but \$600,000 of the depositors' claims and of these \$145,000 is contested.

**Connecticut**.—Investigation into the affairs of the failed firm of Geo. P. Bissell & Co., Hartford, Ct., show an unsatisfactory condition. The capital was \$45,000, of which \$28,000 is owing by two of the partners. Deposit liabilities are \$290,000. Many of the securities in the bank's assets have greatly depreciated.

—The Willimantic Savings Institute suspended payment under the four months' rule on October 16. The officials of the bank are wealthy and it is believed that payment will soon be restored and the bank be found in a sound condition.

**District of Columbia**—**WASHINGTON**.—Whitford & Co., doing a small banking business in the Central Market, assigned to A. A. Birney, October 12. Assets, \$13,463; liabilities, \$15,637. Deposits were about \$30,000.

**Georgia**—**ATLANTA**.—The Merchants' Bank assigned October 16. President Porter owed the bank \$70,400 at the date of the assignment, and Cashier Farrar owed \$6,588, while his overdrafts personally and as agent, were \$12,300. Liabilities of the bank are \$375,894. A considerable part of the assets has no value.

**Georgia**.—W. C. & L. Lanier, bankers at West Point, assigned October 20.

**Illinois**.—The Second National Bank, Rockford, closed October 15. Its affairs had been entangled for some time and the failure was not unexpected. Deposits were about \$320,000, and it is believed these will be paid.

**Iowa**.—J. B. Bruff, Receiver of the Bank of Atlantic, has filed a statement showing assets, \$194,011; liabilities, \$205,248.

**Kansas**.—The First National Bank, Garnett, closed on November 4 with liabilities of \$96,000 and nominal assets.

**Massachusetts**—**BOSTON**.—The Union Loan and Trust Co., was placed in the hands of Samuel McCall, Temporary Receiver, Oct. 13. Its reserve was below the amount required, and a considerable amount of overdue paper was held. Total deposits are \$235,464.

**Michigan**.—On account of a run the Mecosta County Savings Bank, Big Rapids, closed Oct. 23, and made an assignment to M. Brown.

**Minnesota**.—The Marine National Bank, Duluth, closed Oct. 14, on account of heavy withdrawals and inability to make collections. On Sept. 25, its deposits were \$265,000.

**Missouri**—**ST. LOUIS**.—L. A. Coquard, a well-known broker, assigned on Oct. 23, with assets of \$100,000, and liabilities, \$50,000. The embarrassment is believed to be only temporary.

**Nebraska**.—The Rushville Banking Co. has voluntarily closed, and will dissolve as soon as its business can be closed up.

**New Hampshire**.—The Security Trust Co., Nashua, was enjoined from doing business, Oct. 10, and Lester F. Thurber was appointed assignee. The bank did a successful business until the panic of 1893, when it suspended in July, and was closed to protect depositors. It resumed business in Feb., 1894.

**New Mexico**.—The First National Bank, of Eddy, closed Oct. 12. The bank had a capital of \$50,000, and its last report showed an indebtedness to depositors of \$75,000.

**New York**—**BUFFALO**.—Owing to the heavy withdrawals the Bank of Commerce suspended, Oct. 15. The Bank of Commerce was organized in July, 1873, and is quoted as having a surplus of \$300,000, and a capital of \$200,000. Individual deposits were \$1,304,700 at the date of the last quarterly report. Heavy losses on loans caused the suspension.

**Ohio**.—The Marion Deposit Bank, Marion, closed October 19, and the owner filed a deed of assignment. The bank was established in 1840.

**Oregon**—**PORTLAND**.—The Commercial and Savings Bank closed on October 6. It was organized six years ago with \$50,000 capital. Deposits were about \$8,000.

**Pennsylvania**.—The Bloomsburg Banking Company suspended payment on October 23. The directors claim that the bank is solvent.

**Rhode Island**—**PROVIDENCE**.—Miller & Vaughan, bankers and brokers, made an assignment November 2 to James M. Scott. J. S. Bache, of New York, who backed the firm for \$50,000, withdrew recently, and the firm was unable to secure new capital. The liabilities are estimated at \$150,000. Miller has been a member of the New York Stock Exchange since May 2, 1865.

**South Dakota**.—The Bank of Pukwana has paid off its depositors and gone out of business.

**Texas**.—The City National Bank, of Tyler, suspended October 10, and was placed in the hands of A. G. McIlwaine, Receiver, October 17.

**Washington**—**TACOMA**.—Judgment on a promissory note was rendered against the New England Loan and Trust Company, October 5, and G. A. Leavitt was appointed Receiver.

—The Bank of Kent went into the hands of W. J. Shinn, Receiver, October 8. Deposits were \$11,000. It is claimed that the assets exceed the liabilities.

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

First National Bank, West Liberty, Iowa; by H. H. Ball, *et al.*

Mercantile National Bank, New Orleans, La.; by H. Maspero, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

EUTAW—Merchants and Farmers' Bank.

#### CONNECTICUT.

NEW HAVEN—E. B. Cuthbert & Co.; John C. Clark, Manager.

#### DELAWARE.

WILMINGTON—J. R. Moore & Co.

#### FLORIDA.

CEDAR KEYS—C. B. Rogers & Co.; (collections) capital, \$14,000; Pres., C. B. Rogers; Cashier, J. B. Luttetdoh.

#### GEORGIA.

MILLEDGEVILLE—Samuel Evans; Cashier, M. A. McCram.

#### ILLINOIS.

NEWTON—Newton Bank.

#### IOWA.

LAMOTTE—German-American Sav. Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., N. B. Nammers; Cashier, P. J. Lamb.

#### KANSAS.

CLYDE—Elk State Bank (reorganized); capital, \$25,000.

NESS CITY—First State Bank (successor to First National Bank); capital, \$10,000.

TOPEKA—Topeka Trust Co.; capital stock, \$200,000.

#### MINNESOTA.

AUDUBON—Citizens' Bank (A. O. Netland); capital, \$8,000.

BARNESVILLE—State Bank of Barnesville; organizing.

PINE CITY—McAllen & Hodge.

WALKER—Novers & Gardner.

#### MISSOURI.

PILOT GROVE—Deposit Bank.

TINA—Exchange Bank; capital, \$7,500; Pres., R. B. Allison; Cashier, A. Y. Houston.

WESTBORO—Farmers' Bank (successor to Rankin, White & Lane); Pres., D. A. McColl; Cashier, J. O. Crannell.

#### NEW YORK.

NEW YORK CITY—Hotchkiss & Frank.—Robert Chambers & Co. (successor to Chambers & Frank).

#### OHIO.

CHAGRIN FALLS—Rodgers & Son; capital, \$10,000.

DESHLER—Lee & Brooks; successor to J. C. H. Elder.

#### OKLAHOMA.

OKLAHOMA CITY—Bank of Commerce; capital, \$50,000; Pres., J. H. Wheeler; Cashier, D. W. Hogan.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

PHILADELPHIA—Paul S. Kellar & Co.

#### TEXAS.

FLOYDADA—McMannis & Posey (successors to Floyd Co. Bank).

VICTORIA—Farmers and Mechanics' Bank; Cashier, Frank Lander.

#### VERMONT.

PAWLET—Pawlet Sav. Bank and Trust Co.

#### VIRGINIA.

STUART—People's Bank; Pres., I. H. Adams; Cashier, J. C. Shockley.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

WHEELING—Germania Half-Dollar Savings Bank; capital, \$50,000.

#### CANADA.

#### MANITOBA.

CARMAN—Bank of Hamilton.

WAWANESA—Blanchard & Co.; D. A. McVickar, Manager.

### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

BREWTON—Bank of Brewton; C. L. Sowell, Pres. in place of S. J. Foshee.

#### ARKANSAS.

HARRISON—Bank of Harrison and Boone Co. Bank consolidated under latter title; F. M. Garwin, Cashier.

MELBOURNE—Bank of Melbourne; F. J. Williamson, Pres. in place of B. E. Massey; J. B. Baker, Vice-Pres.

#### CALIFORNIA.

EUREKA—Humboldt Co. Bank; F. W. George-son, Cashier in place of H. A. Libby, deceased.

**SAN BERNARDINO**—Bank of San Bernardino; reported will go out of business.

#### COLORADO.

**LONGMONT**—Emerson & Buckingham; Chas. Emerson, deceased.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**NEW LONDON**—New London City National Bank; Wm. Belcher, Pres. in place of J. N. Harris, deceased.

**STAMFORD**—Stamford National Bank; Jno. B. Reed, Jr., Cashier, deceased.

#### DELAWARE.

**SEAFORD**—First National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of Daniel J. Fooks.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**WASHINGTON**—Central National Bank; James E. Clark, director, deceased.—Ohio National Bank; Thomas Somerville elected director.—Traders' National Bank; no Cashier in place of Brent L. Baldwin, deceased.

#### FLORIDA.

**EUSTIS**—Bank of Eustis (closed Sept. 29; reopened Nov. 1); capital, \$5,000; Henry W. Bishop, Manager.

**MIAMI**—Bank of Bay Biscayne; Chas. H. Garthside, Cashier.

#### GEORGIA.

**CALHOUN**—Bank of Calhoun; H. J. Doughty, Cashier, deceased.

**MACON**—Central Georgia Bank; Jno. Springs Baxter, director, deceased.

**SWAINSBORO**—Bank of Swainsboro; B. L. Humphrey, Cashier, deceased.

#### IDAHO.

**MOUNTAINHOME**—Elmore County Bank; J. F. Shields, Cashier.

#### ILLINOIS.

**CHARLESTON**—Second National Bank; J. K. Decker, Vice-Pres. in place of Eli Wiley.

**LOUISVILLE**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; Geo. B. McCullom, Cashier, deceased.

**LOVINGTON**—Hardware Bank; L. G. Hostetler, Pres.; W. I. McMullen, Asst. Cashier.

**MOUNT CARROLL**—First National Bank; no Cashier in place of O. P. Miles, deceased; J. S. Miles, Asst. Cashier.

**POLO**—Barber Bros. & Co.; Henry D. Barber, deceased.

**WESTFIELD**—Westfield Bank; Bennett & Moffet, Proprietors.

**YATES CITY**—People's Bank; Harriet L. Bailey & Co., Proprietors.

#### INDIANA.

**FLORA**—W. H. Lenon's Bank; title changed to Farmers' Bank.

**GREENSBURG**—Third National Bank; Chas. Zoller, Pres. in place of Jno. E. Robbins; Samuel A. Bonner, Vice-Pres. in place of Chas. Zoller.

**JONESBORO**—State Bank; Robert Corder, Pres. in place of Jno. C. Evans.

**MOUNT VERNON**—First National Bank; Oscar

L. McCallister, Pres. in place of H. C. Williams, deceased.

#### IOWA.

**COUNCIL BLUFFS**—First National Bank; Lucius Wells, Pres. in place of Geo. P. Sanford; no Asst. Cashier in place of Wm. J. Leverett.

**ELDORA**—City State Bank; W. J. Murray, Cashier.

**ONAWA**—Onawa State Bank; S. B. Martin, Pres. in place of B. B. Richards.

**SALEM**—Bank of Salem; Robert Dinsmore, Pres. in place of Geo. W. Tyner, deceased.

**THOMPSON**—Bank of Thompson; W. B. Vaughan, Asst. Cashier in place of N. E. Isaacs.—Farmers' Savings Bank; N. E. Isaacs, Cashier in place of E. W. Virden.

#### KANSAS.

**HOLTON**—National Bank of Holton; Moses Sarbach, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. S. Linscott; Geo. S. Linscott, Cashier in place of W. K. Linscott.

**LAWRENCE**—Merchants' Loan and Savings Bank; W. F. Maroh, Asst. Cashier in place of R. G. Jamison, deceased.

**OSBORNE**—First National Bank; Geo. Bicknell, Pres. in place of T. M. Walker; C. J. Gillette, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. Bicknell.

**SOUTH HAVEN**—South Haven Bank; C. L. Crookham, Cashier in place of T. C. Ellis, deceased.

**TOPEKA**—Topeka Commercial Security Co.; C. Baker, Secretary.

#### KENTUCKY.

**CLAY CITY**—Clay City National Bank; M. H. Courtney, Pres. in place of Floyd Day; Jno. D. Atkinson, Vice-Pres. in place of M. H. Courtney.

**LOUISVILLE**—Louisville Trust Co.; Wm. G. Wetterer, Sec'y and Treas.—Western Bank; Wm. Krippenstapel, director, deceased.

**MAYSVILLE**—Mitchell, Finch & Co.; James M. Mitchell, Pres., deceased.

#### LOUISIANA.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Provident Savings Bank; reports will receive deposits in addition to its Savings Department.

#### MAINE.

**PORTLAND**—Swan & Barrett; Henry St. John Smith, deceased.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Manufacturers' National Bank; Harry M. Mason, Cashier in place of Chas. W. Dorsey.—Commonwealth Bank; Daniel C. Gilman, elected director in place of Theodore Mottu, deceased.—Maryland Trust Co.; Henry J. Bowdoin, 2d Vice-Pres.; F. M. Thierot and F. S. Bangs, elected directors.

**EASTON**—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; F. C. Goldsborough, Cashier in place of Harry M. Mason.

**MASSACHUSETTS.**

**AMESBURY**—Amesbury National Bank, Wm. G. Ellis, Pres., deceased.

**ASHBURNHAM**—First National Bank; O. J. Sawyer, Cashier in place of Mortimer M. Stone, deceased.

**BOSTON**—Boston Five Cent Savings Bank; J. C. Holmes, Treas. in place of C. C. Nichols, deceased. — Atlas National Bank; Joseph L. Foster, Cashier in place of Benjamin P. Lane, deceased; no Asst. Cashier in place of Joseph L. Foster. — Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Oliver White Peabody, deceased.

**CLINTON**—First National Bank; C. C. Stone, Pres. in place of C. G. Stevens.

**LYNN**—First National Bank; Owen Dame, Cashier, deceased.

**ROCKPORT**—Granite Savings Bank; Grafton Butman, Pres. in place of Eben G. Abbott, deceased.

**MICHIGAN.**

**ALPENA**—Alpena National Bank; no Vice-Pres. in place of F. W. Gilchrist.

**CHARLOTTE**—Merchants' National Bank; Jno. T. Wilson, Asst. Cashier, deceased.

**DETROIT**—Peninsular Savings Bank; Theo. C. Sherwood, Pres. in place of Alex. Chapoton, Jr.; Alex. Chapoton, Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. M. Dwyer; Jno. M. Dwyer, 2d Vice-Pres. — Detroit National Bank; Edw. J. Schmidt, elected director.

**SAULT DE STE MARIE**—Saulte Ste Marie National Bank, and Saulte Savings Bank, Loan and Trust Co.; consolidated under latter title.

**MINNESOTA.**

**MINNESOTA LAKE**—Security State Bank; O. H. Schroeder, Cashier in place of Myron Godding.

**MISSISSIPPI.**

**WEST POINT**—Bank of West Point; S. L. Hearn, Pres.; N. B. Crawford, Vice-Pres.; J. W. Keyes, Cashier.

**MISSOURI.**

**AURORA**—Miners and Merchants' Bank; W. O. Buck, Asst. Cashier.

**FILLMORE**—Round Prairie Bank; A. S. Dodge, Cashier in place of C. W. Spicer.

**HAMILTON**—First National Bank; Robert W. Cox, Cashier in place of Jno. T. Stagner; R. J. Murphy, Asst. Cashier in place of Robert W. Cox.

**LEETON**—Bank of Leeton; incorporated and capital increased to \$12,000.

**MEMPHIS**—Scotland Co. National Bank; Geo. H. Lawton, Asst. Cashier.

**ST. LOUIS**—German-American Bank; Claus Vieths, director, deceased.

**TIPTON**—Bank of Tipton; incorporated and capital increased to \$25,000.

**NEBRASKA.**

**DE WITT**—Miles & Fishburn; F. W. Miles, deceased.

**FREMONT**—First National Bank; Sireno R. Colson, Vice-Pres., deceased.

**MAYWOOD**—Bank of Maywood; succeeded by Burson & Edghill.

**NEW JERSEY.**

**JAMESBURG**—First Nat. Bank; I. S. Chamberlain, Cashier in place of Chas. E. Westervelt.

**MORRISTOWN**—National Iron Bank; Edmund D. Halsey, Pres., deceased.

**NEW YORK.**

**AMSTERDAM**—First National Bank; Francis Morris, Pres. in place of James A. Miller.

**BINGHAMTON**—Strong State Bank; Geo. W. Dunn, Vice-Pres.; Edward L. Rose, Cashier.

**BOONVILLE**—First Nat. Bank; E. C. Dodge, Pres. in place of J. R. Tharratt, deceased; James P. Pitcher, Cashier in place of E. C. Dodge; no Asst. Cashier in place of James P. Pitcher.

**BROOKLYN**—North Side Bank and German Savings Bank; Paul Wiedmann, director, deceased. — Brooklyn Bank; Jos. Wechsler, director, deceased.

**CUBA**—Cuba National Bank; C. S. Davis, Pres. in place of Edward D. Loveridge, deceased; C. A. Ackerly, Cashier in place of C. S. Davis; no Asst. Cashier in place of C. A. Ackerly.

**NEW YORK CITY**—Wilcox & Co.; Jno. S. Baird admitted to firm in place of Clement H. Wilcox, retired. — First National Bank; Ebeneser Scofield, Cashier, deceased. — Hanover National Bank; Wm. Logan, Asst. Cashier. — Bowery Bank; Richard Hamilton, Pres., deceased. — Work, Strong & Co.; title changed to Strong, Sturgis & Co.

**SYRACUSE**—State Bank; George A. Wood, Cashier in place of Jonathan C. Chase, deceased.

**WESTCHESTER**—Bank of Westchester; removed to Tremont Avenue, New York city.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**

**MONROE**—People's Bank; W. H. Phifer, Asst. Cashier.

**NORTH DAKOTA.**

**WALHALLA**—Bank of Walhalla; capital, \$4,500; H. L. Holmes, Pres.; C. W. Andrews, Cashier.

**OHIO.**

**CEDARVILLE**—Bank of Cedarville; G. W. Harper, Pres. and Acting Cashier in place of Wm. M. Clemons; Geo. R. Spahr, Asst. Cashier.

**CLEVELAND**—Union National Bank; E. R. Fancher, Asst. Cashier in place of J. D. Watterson, deceased. — German-American Savings Bank Co.; capital stock decreased from \$100,000 to \$50,000.

**FLUSHING**—First National Bank; A. G. Holloway, Pres. in place of David Branson.

**RIPLEY**—Citizens' National Bank; J. Robert Stivers, Vice-Pres. in place of J. C. Leggett.

**ST. MARY'S**—First National Bank; Frank

Koehl, Vice-Pres. in place of R. B. Gordon, deceased.  
**WAPAKONETA**—First National Bank; Jacob Hauss, Cashier.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

**BOYERTOWN**—National Bank of Boyertown; Daniel L. Rhoads, Pres., deceased.  
**CHARLEROI**—First National Bank; W. D. Hartuppee, Pres. in place of J. S. McKean; J. S. McKean, Vice-Pres.  
**DARBY**—First National Bank; surplus increased to \$15,000.  
**ERIE**—Second National Bank; no President in place of Joseph McCarter, deceased.  
**LANSDALE**—Lansdale Trust Co.; no Pres. in place of Henry J. Smith, reported missing.  
**MUNCY**—Muncy Banking Co.; Pres., A. D. Foucart; Vice-Pres., G. G. Wood; Secretary, L. E. Schueyler.  
**PITTSBURG**—Monongahela National Bank; John Hood, director, deceased.  
**WARREN**—First National Bank; Perry D. Clark, Vice-Pres. in place of I. S. Alden, deceased.  
**WILLIAMSPORT**—Lycoming National Bank; J. B. Coryell, Pres. in place of Geo. Bubbs, deceased; O. H. Reighard, Vice-Pres.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

**WICKFORD**—Wickford National Bank; Wm. C. Hunt, Asst. Cashier in place of Chas. B. Reynolds.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

**LAURENS**—Bank of Laurens; E. M. Caine, Pres., deceased.

#### TENNESSEE.

**NASHVILLE**—Fourth National Bank; Henry Hart, director, deceased.

#### TEXAS.

**AUSTIN**—James H. Raymond & Co.; dissolved; business continued under same

name by Jas. H. Raymond, Jas. R. Johnson and Jno. S. Myrick.

**DENISON**—Brooks & Johnston; capital \$10,000; Lysle Kidd, Cashier.

**EAGLE PASS**—S. P. Simpson & Co.; A. J. Bibolet, Cashier, deceased.

#### UTAH.

**MOUNT PLEASANT**—Mount Pleasant Commercial and Savings Bank; Oscar Wall, Cashier in place of Hans S. Neilson.

#### VERMONT.

**BRADFORD**—Bradford Savings Bank and Trust Co.; E. C. Sawyer, Pres. in place of G. W. Chapman, deceased.

**CHELSEA**—National Bank of Orange County; H. N. Mattison, Cashier in place of O. B. Copeland.

**LYNDONVILLE**—Lyndonville National Bank; no Pres. in place of C. D. Bigelow, deceased; no Vice-Pres in place of J. F. Ruggles.

**RANDOLPH**—Randolph National Bank; O. B. Copeland, Cashier in place of Chas. G. Du Bois.

#### WEST VIRGINIA.

**SISTERSVILLE**—Farmers and Producers' National Bank; Jno. R. Wallace, Cashier in place of W. G. Kohl; no 2d Vice-Pres. in place of Jno. R. Wallace.

#### WISCONSIN.

**FENNIMORE**—State Bank; Frank Marsden, Cashier in place of August Stock.

**JUNEAU**—Citizens Bank; W. T. Rambusch, Pres., deceased.

**PORT WASHINGTON**—Bank of Port Washington; Jno. H. Jacque, Proprietor, deceased.

#### CANADA.

#### ONTARIO.

**PAISLEY**—Porteous & Saunders; R. A. Porteous, deceased.

### BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

#### COLORADO.

**OTIS**—Bank of Otis.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**WILLIMANTIC**—Willimantic Savings Institution; suspended demand payments Oct. 18.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

**WASHINGTON**—Whitford & Co.; assigned to A. A. Birney.

#### GEORGIA.

**ATLANTA**—Merchants' Bank; assigned Oct. 16.  
**WEST POINT**—W. C. & L. Lanier; assigned to E. F. Lanier, J. T. Zachary and J. D. Johnson, Oct. 20.

#### ILLINOIS.

**ABINGDON**—Abingdon Safety Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**ROCKFORD**—Second National Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

**VANDALIA**—Bank of Vandalia.

#### IOWA.

**CORNING**—National Bank of Corning; sold out to First National Bank.

#### KANSAS.

**GARNETT**—First National Bank; failed Nov. 4.  
**ARGONIA**—Argonia State Bank; in hands of J. S. Brown, Receiver.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Union Loan and Trust Co.; in hands of Samuel McCall, temporary Receiver, Oct. 18.

**MICHIGAN.**

**BIG RAPIDS**—Meoosta Co. Savings Bank; assigned to M. Brown.

**ITHACA**—First National Bank; in hands of Geo. Reed, Receiver, Oct. 14.

**MOUNT PLEASANT**—First National Bank; in hands of Chas. M. Wilson, Receiver, Oct. 7.

**MINNESOTA.**

**BIWABIK**—Biwabik Banking Co.

**DULUTH**—Marine National Bank.

**HIBBING**—Security Bank.

**MISSOURI.**

**St. Louis**—L. A. Coquard; assigned to Jas. G. Cahill and Alexis C. Dallas.

**MONTANA.**

**MARYVILLE**—E. D. Egerton & Co.

**NEBRASKA.**

**BEATRICE**—Beatrice Sav. Bank; J. E. Smith and W. C. Lehane, Receivers.

**RUSHVILLE**—Rushville Banking Co.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE.**

**NASHUA**—Security Trust Co.; assigned to Lester F. Thurber.

**NEW MEXICO.**

**EDDY**—First National Bank.

**NEW YORK.**

**BUFFALO**—Bank of Commerce.

**OHIO.**

**MARION**—Marion Deposit Bank.

**OREGON.**

**PORTLAND**—Commercial and Savings Bank.

**PENNSYLVANIA.**

**BLOOMSBURG**—Bloomsburg Banking Co.

**RHODE ISLAND.**

**PROVIDENCE**—Miller & Vaughan; assigned, Nov. 2.

**SOUTH DAKOTA.**

**PUKWANA**—Bank of Pukwana.

**TEXAS.**

**TYLER**—City National Bank; in hands of A. G. McIlwaine, Receiver.

**WASHINGTON.**

**KENT**—Bank of Kent; in hands of W. J. Shinn, Receiver, Oct. 8.

**SEATTLE**—Branch of Bank of British Columbia; reported discontinued.

**TACOMA**—New England Loan & Trust Co.; in hands of G. A. Leavitt, Receiver.—Branch Bank of British Columbia; reported discontinued.

**MUNICIPAL BONDS.****DIETZ, DENISON & PRIOR,**

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**Angus R. Macfarlane,**  
**DULUTH, MINNESOTA.**

**Payment of Surety Bonds.**—The Guarantee Company of North America has recently paid \$30,000 in settlement of claims under its bonds on the late officers of the Commercial National Bank of Nashville, Tenn., and the Dover National Bank of Dover, N. H., both of which banks went into the hands of Receivers. The Company had bonded Major Spurr, President, and Frank Porterfield, Cashier, of the Nashville bank for \$5,000 and \$20,000 respectively; and Isaac F. Abbott, Cashier of the Dover bank for \$20,000. Claims for the full amount of each bond were made upon the Company, but as facts developed concerning the management of each bank which created much doubt as to the Company's liability, the respective Receivers consented to an abatement of their claims to \$15,000 in the Nashville cases, and to a like amount in the Dover case, which amount the Guarantee Company has paid in full satisfaction. Both settlements have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency.

**The Clouds Will Be Dispelled.**

*Bradford Rhodes, Esq., Editor Bankers' Magazine.*

SIR:—Our people are to be congratulated on the great victory yesterday. It means good government, honest money and a restoration of confidence, steady employment of labor and protection of American industries. The clouds that have darkened our great country will soon be dispelled by the bright sunlight, which will bring with it a united people, and make us all happy and prosperous once more.

ATLANTA, Ga., Nov. 4, 1896.

ROBERT J. LOWRY,

*President American Bankers' Association.*

## U. S. NATIONAL BANK RETURNS—RESERVE CITIES.

By the courtesy of the Comptroller of the Currency at Washington, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** has been favored with the complete returns of the National banks in all the reserve cities, at the date of the last call on October 6, 1896. These are published below in conjunction with the two preceding statements of July 14, 1896 and May 7, 1896. In this form the figures become much more valuable by reason of the comparison. In this complete shape the returns of National banks in the reserve cities are published in the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** exclusively.

### NEW YORK CITY.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$384,063,826	\$385,103,154	\$314,156,688
Overdrafts.....	171,240	230,437	267,011
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	17,280,850	17,889,007	23,504,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	10,965,000	1,220,000	1,220,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	2,075,200	4,083,360	1,615,650
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	2,731,433	2,021,710	2,218,913
Stocks, securities, etc.....	36,878,781	35,900,088	36,170,794
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	12,833,309	12,873,801	12,303,458
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,574,895	1,584,916	1,580,744
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	28,890,466	23,164,861	26,286,379
Due from State banks and bankers.....	4,398,572	4,490,180	4,183,303
Due from approved reserve agents.....			
Checks and other cash items.....	1,702,232	2,067,097	2,080,641
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	51,078,010	42,279,016	41,646,922
Bills of other National banks.....	1,980,857	1,121,587	986,738
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	57,042	61,758	56,716
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	11,382,978	13,576,699	13,895,591
Gold Treasury certificates.....	10,449,320	9,567,800	8,997,540
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	24,775,000	25,725,000	22,285,000
Silver dollars.....	123,841	93,441	75,699
Silver Treasury certificates.....	6,110,188	5,621,599	8,835,775
Silver fractional coin.....	427,544	462,225	462,252
Legal-tender notes.....	45,096,658	48,046,219	35,362,777
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	19,286,000	18,040,000	23,190,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	780,384	798,209	1,084,069
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	744,328	643,523	515,258
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$626,140,942</b>	<b>\$611,664,677</b>	<b>\$577,882,338</b>
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$50,950,000	\$50,450,000	\$50,450,000
Surplus fund.....	42,635,000	42,340,000	42,340,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	18,068,984	17,112,301	17,634,943
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	14,609,045	14,912,707	20,685,232
State bank notes outstanding.....	16,556	16,556	16,556
Due to other National banks.....	123,290,045	129,674,509	118,761,228
Due to State banks and bankers.....	58,721,485	59,406,814	51,535,895
Dividends unpaid.....	124,299	204,563	149,653
Individual deposits.....	207,085,647	206,099,097	274,373,014
U. S. deposits.....	11,161,467	930,829	832,754
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	192,431	225,810	232,618
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....	200,000	50,000	363,500
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	1,107,980	241,495	507,565
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$626,140,942</b>	<b>\$611,664,677</b>	<b>\$577,882,338</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>28.68 p. c.</b>	<b>29.70 p. c.</b>	<b>29.28 p. c.</b>

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$117,630,529 on May 7, 1896; \$121,132,983 on July 14, 1896; \$108,114,634 on October 6, 1896.

### ALBANY, N. Y.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,705,116	\$7,566,518	\$7,668,478
Overdrafts.....	5,913	2,282	2,332
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	400,000	400,000	500,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....



## ALBANY, N. Y.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	\$27,500	\$27,500	\$27,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,044,483	812,085	942,673
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	295,000	295,000	295,000
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	15,408	22,408	26,516
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,082,875	1,069,699	1,063,200
Due from State banks and bankers.....	612,238	337,941	121,701
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,558,127	4,467,298	1,919,867
Checks and other cash items.....	252,298	133,082	90,111
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	87,727	133,324	124,724
Bills of other National banks.....	70,024	62,304	64,581
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,197	1,974	2,853
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	405,044	422,500	476,587
Gold Treasury certificates.....	284,300	284,300	284,300
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	18,852	20,855	17,410
Silver Treasury certificates.....	47,700	53,268	35,000
Silver fractional coin.....	9,956	19,259	23,581
Legal-tender notes.....	399,707	454,300	424,713
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	18,000	18,000	22,500
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,210		2,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$15,342,636</b>	<b>\$17,288,947</b>	<b>\$14,204,824</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000	\$1,550,000
Surplus fund.....	1,397,000	1,397,000	1,398,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	157,983	166,672	179,654
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	348,590	249,370	431,900
Due to other National banks.....	2,688,594	2,691,905	2,561,307
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,354,290	1,430,305	1,175,781
Dividends unpaid.....	2,841	2,538	391
Individual deposits.....	7,773,668	9,620,361	6,896,051
U. S. deposits.....	47,126	36,213	38,100
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	2,873	13,798	11,899
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	21,738	21,738	21,738
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$15,342,636</b>	<b>\$17,288,947</b>	<b>\$14,204,824</b>
Average reserve held.....	36.98 p. c.	49.50 p. c.	34.60 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,135,560 on May 7, 1896; \$1,254,482 on July 14, 1896; \$1,261,592 on October 6, 1896.

## BALTIMORE, MD.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$31,821,988	\$31,811,440	\$31,463,506
Overdrafts.....	9,156	14,270	24,846
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	2,910,000	3,160,000	3,160,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	202,000	202,000	202,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	100,000		
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	369,294	366,514	365,631
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,430,374	1,390,681	1,861,263
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	2,075,795	2,075,795	2,075,795
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	166,967	166,347	166,198
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,911,553	2,002,181	1,951,080
Due from State banks and bankers.....	358,594	361,509	351,993
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,005,134	4,027,391	3,124,097
Checks and other cash items.....	104,482	101,814	97,111
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,376,838	1,451,199	1,573,313
Bills of other National banks.....	257,050	279,969	181,353
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	13,894	15,544	11,989
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,610,851	1,652,430	1,835,496
Gold Treasury certificates.....	362,810	362,850	367,550
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		15,000	
Silver dollars.....	55,457	51,837	46,206
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,780,698	1,399,479	1,053,645
Silver fractional coin.....	73,369	55,439	59,510
Legal-tender notes.....	758,446	777,397	596,146
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	1,050,000	1,580,000	570,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	130,960	142,200	141,139
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	4,950	2,000	5,170
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$52,040,624</b>	<b>\$53,485,452</b>	<b>\$51,206,575</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$13,243,200	\$13,243,200	\$13,243,200
Surplus fund.....	4,684,200	4,689,750	4,689,750
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,848,994	904,065	1,152,025
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	2,563,480	2,773,880	2,614,800
State bank notes outstanding.....	4,606	4,606	4,606
Due to other National banks.....	4,298,514	4,490,194	4,677,194
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,072,879	928,067	968,518

## BALTIMORE, MD.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Dividends unpaid.....	\$47,800	\$171,173	\$86,308	
Individual deposits.....	24,238,242	25,825,888	23,277,138	
U. S. deposits.....	226,185	220,795	218,071	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....				
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....	315,000	220,000	166,000	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	15,000	4,276		
Total.....	\$52,040,624	\$53,485,452	\$51,306,575	
Average reserve held.....	33.99 p. c.	36.50 p. c.	30.89 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$5,680,632 on May 7, 1896; \$5,884,412 on July 14, 1896; \$4,499,555 on October 6, 1896.

## BOSTON, MASS.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$140,278,309	\$142,984,307	\$140,608,679	
Overdrafts.....	110,657	87,539	90,249	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	11,272,000	11,372,000	11,747,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	265,000	265,000	265,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	289,500	130,000	261,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	1,272,809	1,266,252	1,280,640	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	6,746,328	6,816,319	7,818,804	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	2,374,236	2,380,236	2,378,012	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	434,066	435,974	436,707	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	14,555,449	13,933,207	16,518,258	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	387,674	530,628	408,359	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	21,935,133	23,224,952	19,990,661	
Checks and other cash items.....	296,173	383,230	377,474	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	8,553,281	7,744,689	7,991,637	
Bills of other National banks.....	1,197,451	1,024,613	862,503	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	20,473	20,443	20,310	
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....	5,217,275	5,099,948	5,822,278	
Gold Treasury certificates.....	1,561,240	1,461,060	1,227,860	
Gold clearing-house certificates.....				
Silver dollars.....	89,182	81,479	88,006	
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,750,239	1,958,357	1,830,913	
Silver fractional coin.....	186,119	149,727	162,375	
Legal-tender notes.....	6,857,453	6,899,516	6,224,473	
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	670,000	840,000	680,000	
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	507,240	466,620	520,650	
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	160,900	142,882	50,116	
Total.....	\$228,448,194	\$230,289,294	\$227,101,957	
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....	\$50,750,000	\$50,750,000	\$50,750,000	
Surplus fund.....	14,915,530	14,915,530	14,950,325	
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	4,280,997	5,130,892	4,259,238	
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	10,068,112	10,068,480	10,836,077	
Due to other National banks.....	28,105,457	28,311,206	31,459,320	
Due to State banks and bankers.....	14,255,767	17,241,903	15,832,842	
Dividends unpaid.....	49,838	84,740	177,901	
Individual deposits.....	101,621,740	101,225,755	95,517,923	
U. S. deposits.....	146,416	130,688	105,692	
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	83,224	94,906	93,788	
Notes and bills rediscounted.....				
Bills payable.....	2,082,780	2,227,440	2,213,181	
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	138,850	133,149	408,175	
Total.....	\$228,448,194	\$230,289,294	\$227,101,957	
Average reserve held.....	32.01 p. c.	32.93 p. c.	30.84 p. c.	

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$15,831,508 on May 7, 1896; \$17,080,108 on July 14, 1896; \$16,035,900 on October 6, 1896.

## BROOKLYN, N. Y.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,001,002	\$10,540,839	\$10,394,213	
Overdrafts.....	1,716	5,467	7,628	
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	642,000	642,000	642,000	
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000	
U. S. bonds on hand.....	5,000	5,000	5,000	
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	54,250	52,875	52,500	
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,237,358	2,328,067	2,484,996	
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	442,850	442,850	442,850	
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	213,045	215,580	233,360	
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	83,784	94,375	98,997	
Due from State banks and bankers.....	84,915	89,779	105,148	
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,805,111	2,581,259	2,276,452	
Checks and other cash items.....	61,048	79,648	73,851	
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	708,961	656,556	900,315	
Bills of other National Banks.....	178,887	194,748	230,305	
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	9,319	7,475	6,328	

## BROOKLYN, N. Y.—Continued.

RESOURCES.			
	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	\$369,936	\$440,064	\$552,590
Gold Treasury certificates.....	145,000	184,000	243,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	14,704	24,650	28,800
Silver Treasury certificates.....	492,278	313,700	496,356
Silver fractional coin.....	34,142	42,173	34,343
Legal-tender notes.....	1,467,067	1,396,123	1,198,845
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	29,590	29,590	28,800
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			
Total.....	\$20,881,258	\$20,427,096	\$20,602,706
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000	\$1,352,000
Surplus fund.....	2,219,000	2,240,000	2,240,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	493,467	415,708	498,604
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	566,455	572,450	570,180
State bank notes outstanding.....	1,846	1,846	1,846
Due to other National banks.....	216,635	202,166	270,108
Due to State banks and bankers.....	242,111	240,776	206,310
Dividends unpaid.....	401	10,755	5,655
Individual deposits.....	15,584,912	15,096,515	15,242,132
U. S. deposits.....	152,439	165,279	174,344
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	48,020	49,295	26,217
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	4,968	20,331	25,331
Total.....	\$20,881,258	\$20,427,096	\$20,602,706
Average reserve held.....	35.27 p. c.	32.94 p. c.	32.41 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$2,523,117 on May 7, 1896; \$2,311,681 on July 14, 1896; \$2,424,936 on October 6, 1896.

## CHICAGO, ILL.

RESOURCES.			
	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$92,955,874	\$91,406,164	\$92,355,000
Overdrafts.....	206,650	422,794	242,942
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,650,000	1,650,000	1,450,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	550,000	550,000	530,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	254,800	208,100	87,200
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	107,767	97,500	76,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....	4,978,797	4,544,637	4,782,323
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	821,426	825,848	855,471
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	1,016,587	998,932	719,707
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	13,525,280	14,393,313	14,550,339
Due from State banks and bankers.....	3,533,696	3,604,551	4,210,956
Due from approved reserve agents.....			
Checks and other cash items.....	47,251	32,332	60,239
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	5,033,873	4,245,852	4,116,686
Bills of other National banks.....	1,631,099	833,539	746,258
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	25,102	24,808	24,028
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	14,186,320	14,353,992	12,475,155
Gold Treasury certificates.....	2,503,250	2,492,060	2,547,040
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	251,299	190,725	170,047
Silver Treasury certificates.....	2,535,471	2,068,358	1,612,861
Silver fractional coin.....	216,104	223,032	208,257
Legal-tender notes.....	11,111,798	7,065,611	8,771,349
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	1,160,000	1,240,000	980,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	72,000	72,000	63,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	101,980	103,032	81,210
Total.....	\$158,475,188	\$151,602,136	\$141,726,321
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$21,400,000	\$21,400,000	\$21,400,000
Surplus fund.....	9,522,200	9,543,400	9,548,400
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,284,243	2,154,592	2,255,760
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,091,165	1,062,615	1,067,515
Due to other National banks.....	81,906,292	29,671,705	25,836,245
Due to State banks and bankers.....	20,404,487	20,188,749	17,149,027
Dividends unpaid.....	4,636	24,183	20,301
Individual deposits.....	71,319,175	67,012,322	63,901,947
U. S. deposits.....	494,292	532,632	513,605
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	48,695	31,835	18,498
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		10,100	15,150
Total.....	\$158,475,188	\$151,602,136	\$141,726,321
Average reserve held.....	31.80 p. c.	29.32 p. c.	31.97 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$31,964,212 on May 7, 1896; \$27,608,728 on July 14, 1896; \$26,704,709 on October 6, 1896.

## CINCINNATI, OHIO.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$23,829,375	\$23,802,399	\$22,080,065
Overdrafts.....	89,812	24,942	18,025
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	5,056,000	5,071,000	5,825,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	850,000	850,000	850,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	921,250	685,600	575,650
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	532,411	697,125	695,644
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,514,424	2,594,709	2,801,553
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	406,980	472,700	485,718
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	59,856	59,848	56,823
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,035,520	2,635,109	2,155,675
Due from State banks and bankers.....	668,278	547,128	587,788
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,865,044	3,065,786	2,662,059
Checks and other cash items.....	195,054	195,513	173,699
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	232,925	184,358	271,105
Bills of other National banks.....	241,073	224,941	211,922
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	8,095	2,748	2,879
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	914,247	817,654	857,137
Gold Treasury certificates.....	236,070	278,650	287,640
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	75,359	72,178	58,464
Silver Treasury certificates.....	414,632	418,278	298,706
Silver fractional coin.....	22,035	18,419	18,597
Legal-tender notes.....	2,339,220	2,216,064	2,323,478
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	850,000	360,000	760,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	217,520	228,185	237,732
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	27,300	6,500	10,850
Total.....	\$44,974,509	\$48,156,736	\$48,747,698
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$8,000,000	\$8,000,000	\$8,000,000
Surplus fund.....	2,780,000	2,780,000	2,780,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	826,793	999,070	1,130,194
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	4,405,287	4,503,197	4,730,177
Due to other National banks.....	5,877,776	5,778,681	4,722,999
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,671,945	2,792,039	2,368,892
Dividends unpaid.....	84,442	13,780	6,006
Individual deposits.....	18,151,877	19,315,111	17,934,280
U. S. deposits.....	831,036	899,804	855,492
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....	526,000	360,000	501,095
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	829,349	735,050	720,500
Total.....	\$44,974,509	\$48,156,736	\$48,747,698
Average reserve held.....	28.62 p. c.	32.20 p. c.	33.10 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$4,403,593 on May 7, 1896; \$4,176,238 on July 14, 1896; \$4,569,992 on October 6, 1896.

## CLEVELAND, OHIO.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$27,077,616	\$26,827,143	\$27,411,913
Overdrafts.....	50,009	42,892	29,279
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,400,000	1,400,000	1,450,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	80,000	80,000	80,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	48,790	48,790	53,290
Stocks, securities, etc.....	683,431	675,431	678,431
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	509,971	509,971	509,971
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	212,451	212,451	267,192
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,899,326	1,561,425	1,470,199
Due from State banks and bankers.....	651,373	574,080	533,643
Due from approved reserve agents.....	2,274,891	2,613,460	2,351,267
Checks and other cash items.....	127,777	56,901	84,570
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	257,606	223,801	242,863
Bills of other National banks.....	124,316	125,291	132,126
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	6,050	4,850	6,432
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,352,300	1,342,275	1,350,785
Gold Treasury certificates.....	243,500	244,000	243,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	85,352	94,400	95,246
Silver Treasury certificates.....	142,940	119,000	115,040
Silver fractional coin.....	40,268	36,059	46,361
Legal-tender notes.....	1,063,900	967,000	1,013,270
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	61,270	80,760	64,880
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	12,280	14,500	13,252
Total.....	\$38,393,403	\$37,813,084	\$38,221,046

## CLEVELAND, OHIO.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$9,550,000	\$9,550,000	\$9,550,000
Surplus fund.....		2,054,000	2,064,000	2,064,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		552,909	679,261	806,886
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		1,243,910	1,246,180	1,292,410
Due to other National banks.....		2,314,086	2,540,361	2,154,526
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,651,323	1,732,519	1,739,661
Dividends unpaid.....		84,052	2,385	2,062
Individual deposits.....		17,665,601	17,220,222	17,220,222
U. S. deposits.....		89,548	47,444	43,067
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		21,991	13,064	17,867
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		805,972	90,415	963,795
Bills payable.....		2,205,000	1,175,000	1,575,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		755,000	760,859	755,000
Total.....		\$38,393,408	\$37,813,064	\$38,221,046
Average reserve held.....		28.10 p. c.	27.70 p. c.	28.01 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,948,260 on May 7, 1896; \$2,803,234 on July 14, 1896; \$2,863,732 on October 1, 1896.

## DES MOINES, IOWA.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$2,675,097	\$2,524,161	\$2,153,319
Overdrafts.....		19,511	18,446	16,556
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		292,200	292,200	292,200
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....		.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		13,550	13,000	13,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....		290,400	271,515	295,232
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		144,135	148,635	143,675
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		89,739	89,191	89,003
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		130,041	91,543	113,467
Due from State banks and bankers.....		41,089	38,763	41,224
Due from approved reserve agents.....		509,043	368,733	385,641
Checks and other cash items.....		7,988	4,371	4,459
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		71,795	53,227	75,699
Bills of other National banks.....		38,244	16,841	30,236
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		505	882	839
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....		115,592	89,012	101,667
Gold Treasury certificates.....		760	1,170	2,110
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....		22,550	19,796	20,214
Silver Treasury certificates.....		21,918	4,904	13,293
Silver fractional coin.....		14,888	16,699	11,660
Legal-tender notes.....		819,690	180,353	118,167
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....		.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....		13,117	13,117	13,094
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		.....	.....	23
Total.....		\$4,631,658	\$4,246,670	\$3,996,990

LIABILITIES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$800,000	\$800,000	\$800,000
Surplus fund.....		236,000	236,000	236,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		53,068	59,075	43,655
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		256,840	261,890	261,890
Due to other National bank.....		766,481	633,239	432,536
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,246,118	940,571	828,679
Dividends unpaid.....		2,451	1,519	2,906
Individual deposits.....		1,445,673	1,234,384	1,145,586
U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....		.....	30,000	24,244
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		20,000	50,000	100,500
Total.....		\$4,831,858	\$4,246,670	\$3,996,990
Average reserve held.....		32.00 p. c.	26.54 p. c.	28.75 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$495,403 on May 7, 1896; \$311,937 on July 14, 1896; \$267,112 on October 6, 1895.

## DETROIT, MICH.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$14,746,733	\$14,837,504	\$14,800,890
Overdrafts.....		12,300	13,834	27,938
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		1,351,000	1,350,000	1,423,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		300,000	300,000	300,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		168,000	157,500	155,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....		3,687	6,149	3,118

## DETROIT, MICH.—Continued.

RESOURCES	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	\$36,888	\$39,788	\$39,788
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	76,479	78,975	158,249
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	669,822	761,067	824,961
Due from State banks and bankers.....	233,234	279,078	266,194
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,659,342	2,301,574	2,166,424
Checks and other cash items.....	19,967	16,717	27,469
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	216,714	258,275	232,852
Bills of other National banks.....	152,068	171,173	104,209
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	12,143	18,004	15,041
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,061,945	1,164,442	1,196,940
Gold Treasury certificates.....	30,040	24,110	10,630
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	57,785	49,443	53,247
Silver Treasury certificates.....	131,810	155,424	92,398
Silver fractional coin.....	59,117	45,650	42,919
Legal-tender notes.....	519,798	653,064	464,086
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	60,750	60,750	62,072
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	4,152	5,991	10,909
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,597,705</b>	<b>\$22,743,538</b>	<b>\$22,507,231</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,000,000	\$3,000,000	\$3,000,000
Surplus fund.....	618,000	618,000	618,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	496,890	439,758	432,815
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,306,600	1,192,590	1,242,150
Due to other National banks.....	2,018,323	2,084,107	1,790,394
Due to State banks and bankers.....	3,582,987	3,845,294	3,941,928
Dividends unpaid.....	688	6,091	4,084
Individual deposits.....	9,465,324	10,572,942	10,389,261
U. S. deposits.....	248,738	252,940	235,273
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	65,724	45,862	65,615
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	182,912	54,981	67,737
Bills payable.....	124,500	100,000	120,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$21,597,705</b>	<b>\$22,743,538</b>	<b>\$22,507,231</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>	<b>25.52 p. c.</b>	<b>29.15 p. c.</b>	<b>27.31 p. c.</b>

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,880,490 on May 7, 1896; \$2,092,124 on July 14, 1896  
\$1,859,170 on October 6, 1896.

## HOUSTON, TEXAS.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$2,423,756	\$2,506,749	\$2,268,184
Overdrafts.....	82,780	28,205	117,881
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	26,706	22,233	21,988
Stocks, securities, etc.....	28,890	28,635	34,607
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	132,955	132,796	132,796
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	38,798	38,426	35,239
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	202,570	100,114	73,150
Due from State banks and bankers.....	32,521	21,862	87,879
Due from approved reserve agents.....	400,772	219,657	509,245
Checks and other cash items.....	1,235	3,839	2,194
Exchanges for clearing-house.....			
Bills of other National banks.....	43,175	46,858	52,210
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,510	3,972	1,712
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	120,908	150,126	180,619
Gold Treasury certificates.....	129,670	129,920	130,470
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	32,442	39,732	44,701
Silver Treasury certificates.....	79,331	90,942	48,111
Silver fractional coin.....	23,599	21,654	9,653
Legal-tender notes.....	446,558	446,472	835,759
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	9,000	9,000	9,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$4,508,171</b>	<b>\$4,291,247</b>	<b>\$4,795,299</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000	\$1,150,000
Surplus fund.....	534,800	540,800	541,800
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	87,885	65,905	88,728
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	142,380	153,420	150,050
Due to other National banks.....	184,922	168,175	469,193
Due to State banks and bankers.....	111,400	61,597	221,915
Dividends unpaid.....	3,955	17,750	3,951
Individual deposits.....	2,240,929	2,077,503	2,065,432

## HOUSTON, TEXAS.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
U. S. deposits.....		\$50,000	\$50,000	\$50,000
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		.....	.....	45,000
Bills payable.....		.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		2,889	4,088	5,228
Total.....		\$4,509,171	\$4,291,247	\$4,795,209
Average reserve held.....		58.71 p. c.	50.15 p. c.	67.17 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$832,509 on May 7, 1896; \$878,848 on July 14, 1896; \$1,259,514 on October 6, 1896.

## KANSAS CITY, MO.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$15,155,842	\$14,100,614	\$12,016,458
Overdrafts.....		159,749	113,298	190,278
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		400,000	400,000	400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		36,000	34,000	23,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....		912,739	928,115	957,136
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		92,108	91,608	91,608
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		347,808	373,500	285,500
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		545,936	629,908	678,004
Due from State banks and bankers.....		1,051,178	693,434	979,085
Due from approved reserve agents.....		2,374,262	2,799,438	3,817,064
Checks and other cash items.....		85,280	111,633	75,429
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		457,178	484,559	506,222
Bills of other National banks.....		118,400	215,755	218,111
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		5,265	4,734	4,504
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....		1,044,570	1,038,747	1,183,570
Gold Treasury certificates.....		40,620	17,400	17,940
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....		76,583	121,435	70,028
Silver Treasury certificates.....		336,379	248,572	573,715
Silver fractional coin.....		30,301	29,078	21,237
Legal-tender notes.....		814,971	718,110	1,067,233
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....		.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....		18,000	18,000	18,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		40,674	22,015	18,000
Total.....		\$24,241,829	\$23,282,053	\$23,510,584

LIABILITIES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$3,550,000	\$3,550,000	\$3,550,000
Surplus fund.....		584,500	552,500	554,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		247,610	172,873	179,129
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		380,000	380,000	380,000
Due to other National banks.....		4,188,724	3,806,582	4,110,833
Due to State banks and bankers.....		4,122,317	4,067,336	4,496,501
Dividends unpaid.....		1,311	34,388	1,802
Individual deposits.....		10,423,686	10,190,417	9,749,659
U. S. deposits.....		\$70,700	\$81,618	\$80,924
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		18,408	21,105	12,132
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		19,570	.....	.....
Bills payable.....		650,000	385,000	415,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		.....	.....	.....
Total.....		\$24,241,829	\$23,282,053	\$23,510,584
Average reserve held.....		28.42 p. c.	30.43 p. c.	42.35 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,343,426 on May 7, 1896; \$2,173,342 on July 14, 1896; \$2,933,901 on October 6, 1896.

## LINCOLN, NEB.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$1,737,871	\$1,685,654	\$1,613,515
Overdrafts.....		4,538	9,457	9,743
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		150,000	150,000	150,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....		7,340	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		6,000	6,000	6,000
Stocks, securities, etc.....		58,367	79,669	79,878
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		74,994	74,994	74,994
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		72,744	79,319	82,478
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		40,788	30,498	64,432
Due from State banks and bankers.....		22,552	89,878	25,883
Due from approved reserve agents.....		230,214	132,584	114,065
Checks and other cash items.....		41,221	17,521	30,706
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		16,809	16,697	17,533
Bills of other National banks.....		1,320	3,410	2,825
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		602	619	1,585

## LINCOLN, NEB.—Continued.

RESOURCES	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	\$79,015	\$111,785	\$107,305
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	900	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	9,112	8,650	8,493
Silver Treasury certificates.....	3,481	3,002	4,000
Silver fractional coin.....	3,808	5,647	4,689
Legal-tender notes.....	60,922	48,872	29,708
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	6,750	6,750	6,750
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,629,049</b>	<b>\$2,559,807</b>	<b>\$2,431,746</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	850,000	850,000	850,000
Surplus fund.....	135,000	135,000	85,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	25,141	20,922	27,228
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	135,000	135,000	135,000
Due to other National banks.....	188,721	176,414	97,229
Due to State banks and bankers.....	164,549	147,397	102,998
Dividends unpaid.....	.....	.....	.....
Individual deposits.....	1,054,736	987,080	1,045,302
U. S. deposits.....	.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	65,900	93,793	48,686
Bills payable.....	10,000	14,000	40,295
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,629,049</b>	<b>\$2,559,807</b>	<b>\$2,431,746</b>
Average reserve held.....	29.66 p. c.	26.90 p. c.	23.96 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$156,333 on May 7, 1896; \$176,556 on July 14, 1896; \$151,263 on October 6, 1896.

## LOUISVILLE, KY.

RESOURCES	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$8,455,022	\$7,997,551	\$7,774,296
Overdrafts.....	39,105	36,634	24,406
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,275,000	1,275,000	1,875,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	500,000	500,000	500,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	109,484	96,421	96,421
Stocks, securities, etc.....	375,835	320,500	302,792
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	195,567	195,892	195,892
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	26,376	26,376	20,463
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	589,249	589,426	614,621
Due from State banks and bankers.....	251,313	396,208	197,687
Due from approved reserve agents.....	997,821	1,468,644	968,277
Checks and other cash items.....	12,159	17,581	15,030
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	145,816	135,394	62,959
Bills of other National banks.....	85,466	86,858	101,577
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	4,207	3,538	5,163
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	681,376	608,208	689,877
Gold Treasury certificates.....	5,000	22,800	23,060
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	33,296	34,180	40,343
Silver Treasury certificates.....	.....	34,568	40,000
Silver fractional coin.....	22,344	19,455	18,944
Legal-tender notes.....	460,698	389,711	725,337
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	57,055	57,055	54,635
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	1,009	5,000	4,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$14,318,184</b>	<b>\$14,254,832</b>	<b>\$13,856,799</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,601,500	\$3,601,500	\$3,601,500
Surplus fund.....	726,400	714,000	719,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	211,458	189,741	232,405
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,141,340	1,142,100	1,229,680
Due to other National banks.....	1,825,649	1,954,247	1,387,370
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,467,413	1,568,717	1,434,300
Dividends unpaid.....	7,585	9,614	10,048
Individual deposits.....	4,814,519	4,571,131	4,594,032
U. S. deposits.....	397,580	387,961	183,637
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	99,637	111,329	316,301
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	22,100	2,100	99,341
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	50,200
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	3,000	2,360	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$14,318,184</b>	<b>\$14,254,832</b>	<b>\$13,856,799</b>
Average reserve held.....	29.94 p. c.	35.81 p. c.	36.90 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,202,704 on May 7, 1896; \$1,108,953 on July 14, 1896; \$1,537,581 on October 6, 1896.



## MILWAUKEE, WIS.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$15,971,619	\$14,790,482	\$13,845,771
Overdrafts.....	66,565	74,808	83,054
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	880,000	920,000	920,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	890,000	890,000	300,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	10,250	8,250	7,220
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	187,219	141,959	141,959
Stocks, securities, etc.....	581,300	660,175	448,012
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	182,300	127,268	127,268
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	25,000	25,000	27,822
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	670,512	661,655	528,806
Due from State banks and bankers.....	330,721	399,885	249,608
Due from approved reserve agents.....	8,043,481	2,558,992	2,472,960
Checks and other cash items.....	3,904	8,138	2,996
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	825,684	283,724	366,951
Bills of other National banks.....	56,489	56,608	36,645
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,221	2,432	9,453
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	2,083,730	2,070,680	2,087,107
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	25,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	37,456	46,131	36,085
Silver Treasury certificates.....	86,411	108,004	56,884
Silver fractional coin.....	26,702	23,817	19,993
Legal-tender notes.....	743,608	638,600	422,640
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	36,067	41,400	41,400
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	8,000	143,577	97,718
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$25,455,996</b>	<b>\$24,146,380</b>	<b>\$22,407,115</b>
<b>LIABILITIES.</b>			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000	\$3,250,000
Surplus fund.....	436,000	521,000	521,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	281,011	125,951	219,680
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	730,700	827,000	823,000
Due to other National banks.....	1,067,687	1,544,663	1,896,140
Due to State banks and bankers.....	961,262	815,685	765,694
Dividends unpaid.....	137	1,337	412
Individual deposits.....	17,743,547	16,586,111	14,441,884
U. S. deposits.....	224,102	201,400	201,570
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	171,555	823,300	220,738
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$25,455,996</b>	<b>\$24,146,380</b>	<b>\$22,407,115</b>
Average reserve held.....	31.11 p. c.	30.43 p. c.	31.18 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,982,897 on May 7, 1896; \$2,887,132 on July 14, 1896; \$2,597,690 on October 6, 1896.

## MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$11,107,682	\$11,393,509	\$10,788,168
Overdrafts.....	26,910	21,520	26,337
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	400,000	400,000	400,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	500	500	500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	32,345	31,845	31,532
Stocks, securities, etc.....	841,290	845,315	315,373
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	159,215	159,188	159,188
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	304,786	303,751	303,410
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	486,567	574,330	677,096
Due from State banks and bankers.....	378,440	346,273	455,924
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,429,072	1,118,628	978,225
Checks and other cash items.....	16,224	45,582	31,417
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	605,819	534,399	850,872
Bills of other National banks.....	94,257	51,788	89,950
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	7,667	2,777	5,478
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,017,875	863,647	943,192
Gold Treasury certificates.....	23,500	23,500	13,500
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	43,724	28,066	29,212
Silver Treasury certificates.....	13,798	28,000	130,029
Silver fractional coin.....	17,121	18,689	16,815
Legal-tender notes.....	732,421	307,198	670,124
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	18,000	18,000	18,000
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	.....	5,524	.....
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$17,307,198</b>	<b>\$16,672,063</b>	<b>\$16,966,398</b>

## MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.—Continued.

LIABILITIES		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....		\$5,200,000	\$5,200,000	\$5,200,000
Surplus fund.....		427,500	461,000	461,030
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....		457,159	424,788	418,466
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		306,650	301,150	330,150
Due to other National banks.....		1,508,022	1,305,732	1,588,580
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,046,342	1,062,598	1,251,038
Dividends unpaid.....		1,286	6,202	13,612
Individual deposits.....		8,166,566	7,775,652	7,264,701
U. S. deposits.....		88,695	36,109	40,067
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		4,970	13,824	6,131
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		.....	.....	100,000
Bills payable.....		150,000	.....	310,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		.....	5,000	30,000
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$17,307,193</b>	<b>\$16,672,033</b>	<b>\$16,903,338</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>		<b>35.82 p. c.</b>	<b>27.42 p. c.</b>	<b>34.80 p. c.</b>

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$1,848,434 on May 7, 1896; \$1,269,098 on July 14, 1896; \$1,811,873 on October 6, 1896.

## NEW ORLEANS, LA.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$12,222,595	\$12,172,385	\$10,625,970
Overdrafts.....		861,792	744,134	633,550
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		900,000	1,000,000	850,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
U. S. bonds on hand.....		95,000	3,000	3,100
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		71,674	68,370	50,870
Stocks, securities, etc.....		2,685,173	2,501,522	2,104,163
Banking house, furniture and fixture.....		675,239	674,258	503,698
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....		128,990	1 9,021	73,384
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....		319,996	339,861	363,677
Due from State banks and bankers.....		209,898	220,592	250,721
Due from approved reserve agents.....		1,509,599	1,440,073	1,009,721
Checks and other cash items.....		5,795	12,935	42,926
Exchanges for clearing-house.....		972,590	652,288	1,117,311
Bills of other National banks.....		125,975	99,182	57,765
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....		11,252	7,681	3,376
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:				
Gold coin.....		396,709	435,299	462,481
Gold Treasury certificates.....		118,000	169,610	119,650
Gold clearing-house certificates.....		.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....		63,154	43,296	54,019
Silver Treasury certificates.....		962,123	534,160	1,018,620
Silver fractional coin.....		50,627	52,238	49,306
Legal-tender notes.....		1,895,430	1,282,994	1,027,248
U. S. certificate of deposit for legal-tender notes.....		.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....		40,500	44,620	38,250
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....		11,630	1,880	.....
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$24,313,737</b>	<b>\$22,669,144</b>	<b>\$20,479,813</b>
LIABILITIES.				
Capital stock paid in.....		\$2,900,000	\$2,900,000	\$2,000,000
Surplus fund.....		2,499,500	2,440,000	2,390,000
Undivided profits less expenses and taxes paid.....		490,840	273,194	315,782
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....		806,245	897,195	782,645
Due to other National banks.....		1,189,703	1,061,710	912,095
Due to State banks and bankers.....		1,478,839	1,215,142	870,574
Dividends unpaid.....		18,213	37,458	10,574
Individual deposits.....		14,294,353	13,544,014	12,108,141
U. S. deposits.....		.....	.....	.....
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....		.....	.....	.....
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		243,656	243,178	290,000
Bills payable.....		52,250	52,250	750,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....		345,135	.....	203,000
<b>Total.....</b>		<b>\$24,313,737</b>	<b>\$22,669,144</b>	<b>\$20,479,813</b>
<b>Average reserve held.....</b>		<b>32.74 p. c.</b>	<b>27.79 p. c.</b>	<b>31.42 p. c.</b>

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$3,476,043 on May 7, 1896; \$2,557,487 on July 14, 1896; \$2,761,324 on October 6, 1896.

## OMAHA, NEB.

RESOURCES.		May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....		\$8,696,787	\$8,263,702	\$7,191,954
Overdrafts.....		101,489	104,373	95,626
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....		730,000	730,000	730,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....		450,000	450,000	450,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....		.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....		101,250	101,000	99,635
Stocks, securities, etc.....		677,482	661,473	621,567
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....		832,069	832,068	832,068

## OMAHA, NEB.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	\$413,773	\$424,068	\$453,101
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	454,827	578,903	458,202
Due from State banks and bankers.....	408,705	508,041	379,695
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,897,512	1,828,998	1,944,008
Checks and other cash items.....	91,049	121,470	68,638
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	426,899	497,899	317,402
Bills of other National banks.....	155,897	147,484	238,437
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	7,750	9,109	5,670
*Lawful money reserve, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,463,880	1,328,777	1,479,385
Gold Treasury certificates.....		1,010	1,360
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	91,883	75,980	75,980
Silver Treasury certificates.....	111,874	91,586	162,991
Silver fractional coin.....	64,790	52,496	40,847
Legal-tender notes.....	406,372	461,847	1,176,590
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasury.....	32,800	32,280	32,460
Due from U. S. Treasury.....	710	990	
Total.....	\$17,123,364	\$17,098,025	\$16,953,170
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000	\$3,750,000
Surplus fund.....	321,500	323,500	323,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	74,896	68,169	70,496
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	658,425	658,595	658,905
Due to other National banks.....	1,963,545	2,128,043	2,081,047
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,045,668	1,961,618	1,716,012
Dividends unpaid.....	859	878	543
Individual deposits.....	7,774,963	7,847,223	7,763,848
U. S. deposits.....	233,954	278,144	152,606
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	163,025	98,905	239,144
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....	140,000	85,000	150,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
Total.....	\$17,123,364	\$17,098,025	\$16,953,170
Average reserve held.....	83.26 p. c.	86.01 p. c.	46.73 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,137,279 on May 7, 1896; \$2,011,677 on July 14, 1896; \$2,938,563 on October 6, 1896.

## PHILADELPHIA, PA.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$88,180,157	\$88,230,372	\$86,596,908
Overdrafts.....	21,243	22,974	18,714
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	7,907,500	7,627,500	7,927,500
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	250,000	375,000	25,000
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	896,897	824,899	800,441
Stocks, securities, etc.....	9,715,696	10,203,952	10,174,324
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	4,331,112	4,331,202	4,321,202
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	806,790	635,788	620,506
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	6,964,540	6,809,581	6,570,797
Due from State banks and bankers.....	1,187,884	1,224,424	1,132,086
Due from approved reserve agents.....	11,425,622	10,444,559	10,736,404
Checks and other cash items.....	1,143,375	1,199,818	1,082,350
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	7,871,298	8,690,738	8,271,684
Bills of other National banks.....	345,064	425,442	430,853
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	61,270	58,450	62,896
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,642,246	1,680,891	1,213,440
Gold Treasury certificates.....	202,390	204,230	196,080
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	5,570,000	5,575,000	3,665,000
Silver dollars.....	288,432	282,648	228,844
Silver Treasury certificates.....	4,722,817	3,837,876	3,682,998
Silver fractional coin.....	301,784	299,897	265,285
Legal-tender notes.....	3,182,841	2,510,878	2,644,183
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	3,910,000	3,495,000	3,020,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	355,664	343,237	355,472
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	129,751	117,411	43,910
Total.....	\$161,544,118	\$159,601,697	\$156,512,740
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$21,965,000	\$21,965,000	\$21,965,000
Surplus fund.....	14,638,000	14,673,000	14,673,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	2,409,970	2,593,597	3,049,980
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	7,005,897	6,687,795	7,071,255
Due to other National banks.....	17,426,202	18,626,338	17,209,596
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,830,424	5,622,285	5,081,980
Dividends unpaid.....	834,923	87,743	40,122
Individual deposits.....	91,082,151	88,708,785	86,374,253

PHILADELPHIA, PA.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
U. S. deposits.....	\$153,398	\$208,738	\$198,358
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	1,243	1,095	1,991
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		50,352	98,140
Bills payable.....	297,414	365,000	785,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	889,492		
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$161,544,118</b>	<b>\$159,801,697</b>	<b>\$156,512,740</b>
Average reserve held.....	82.24 p. c.	29.79 p. c.	30.24 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$19,800,361 on May 7, 1896; \$17,836,410 on July 14, 1896; \$16,865,780 on October 6.

PITTSBURG, PA.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$44,009,241	\$45,304,021	\$43,923,195
Overdrafts.....	55,744	68,956	82,950
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	4,215,250	4,810,250	4,980,250
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	3,300		500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	447,413	464,100	469,183
Stocks, securities, etc.....	2,752,216	2,749,815	2,882,447
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	3,177,625	3,193,250	3,290,566
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	528,715	537,164	539,672
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	1,481,628	1,702,288	1,223,882
Due from State banks and bankers.....	834,966	300,355	267,902
Due from approved reserve agents.....	3,501,435	3,899,238	3,613,378
Checks and other cash items.....	252,188	322,657	278,504
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,535,144	1,081,613	1,953,065
Bills of other National banks.....	330,588	283,426	398,006
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	15,722	14,203	18,525
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	2,900,953	2,885,171	3,062,686
Gold Treasury certificates.....	369,990	366,220	387,280
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	287,274	243,310	250,235
Silver Treasury certificates.....	768,066	641,974	625,780
Silver fractional coin.....	187,513	152,185	181,595
Legal-tender notes.....	2,805,205	2,044,351	2,382,774
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with treasurer.....	184,711	215,566	215,226
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	40,500	180,980	42,525
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$70,765,583</b>	<b>\$72,283,112</b>	<b>\$71,068,761</b>

LIABILITIES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$12,100,000	\$12,100,000	\$12,100,000
Surplus fund.....	9,871,618	9,490,543	9,421,218
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	1,371,549	1,845,268	1,609,149
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	3,772,372	4,287,572	4,422,222
Due to other National banks.....	5,100,878	5,808,774	4,690,555
Due to State banks and bankers.....	2,269,018	2,147,587	1,964,080
Dividends unpaid.....	137,814	124,194	56,323
Individual deposits.....	35,582,612	36,758,963	35,489,114
U. S. deposits.....	95,905	149,682	129,461
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	107,262	51,262	65,515
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	694,250	460,653	840,488
Bills payable.....	180,000	80,000	228,198
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	2,500	3,600	52,500
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$70,765,583</b>	<b>\$72,283,112</b>	<b>\$71,068,761</b>
Average reserve held.....	27.23 p. c.	25.61 p. c.	27.71 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$7,098,941 on May 7, 1896; \$6,365,211 on July 14, 1896; \$6,869,330 on October 6, 1896.

ST. JOSEPH, MO.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$3,152,219	\$2,718, 79	\$2,493,742
Overdrafts.....	10,631	21,509	15,154
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	200,000	200,000	200,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	50,000	50,000	50,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	4,000	3,500	3,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	89,503	73,953	76,328
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	108,017	103,350	108,360
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	32,122	35,096	47,643
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	116,344	232,739	173,989
Due from State banks and bankers.....	78,916	71,233	57,351
Due from approved reserve agents.....	374,025	663,064	561,577
Checks and other cash items.....	22,639	24,185	30,347
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	52,800	42,552	49,396
Bills of other National banks.....	11,008	7,145	13,011
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	917	657	602

## ST. JOSEPH, MO.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	\$192,722	\$187,192	\$204,022
Gold Treasury certificates.....	5,630	6,360	11,370
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	33,090	21,502	18,802
Silver Treasury certificates.....	48,773	51,047	51,477
Silver fractional coin.....	8,314	4,716	5,897
Legal-tender notes.....	133,947	145,503	198,297
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	8,955	8,955	8,955
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,900	1,700	1,100
Total.....	\$4,735,413	\$4,675,191	\$4,377,256
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$1,100,000	\$850,000	\$850,000
Surplus fund.....	140,000	140,000	140,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	44,551	42,127	31,898
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	179,100	179,100	179,000
Due to other National banks.....	357,694	346,519	273,638
Due to State banks and bankers.....	583,109	591,778	567,499
Dividends unpaid.....	230	3,918	1,179
Individual deposits.....	2,260,158	2,472,547	2,254,734
U. S. deposits.....	48,782	49,205	49,235
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	557		94
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	21,249		
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
Total.....	\$4,735,413	\$4,675,191	\$4,377,256
Average reserve held.....	26.92 p. c.	35.02 p. c.	37.21 p. c.
*The total lawful money reserve was \$422,416 on May 7, 1896; \$416,369 on July 14, 1896; \$490,896 on October 6.			

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$422,416 on May 7, 1896; \$416,369 on July 14, 1896; \$490,866 on October 6.

## ST. LOUIS, MO.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$27,825,062	\$27,706,748	\$26,197,678
Overdrafts.....	38,898	25,195	44,827
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	1,402,000	1,402,000	1,402,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	525,000	525,000	525,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	191,500	173,500	170,250
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,278,649	1,398,587	1,367,067
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	951,253	950,445	950,454
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	164,537	173,141	173,114
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	2,683,735	3,447,616	3,214,532
Due from State banks and bankers.....	819,148	696,953	671,881
Due from approved reserve agents.....			
Checks and other cash items.....	225,557	114,131	92,036
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	1,266,363	1,258,172	1,137,439
Bills of other National banks.....	262,710	137,967	97,749
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,065	2,041	1,494
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,554,577	1,785,175	2,342,743
Gold Treasury certificates.....	269,770	192,730	190,760
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	27,191	19,861	31,575
Silver Treasury certificates.....	1,374,137	998,758	449,741
Silver fractional coin.....	28,062	26,475	22,490
Legal-tender notes.....	2,289,182	2,257,567	2,856,442
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	1,290,000	1,290,000	180,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	68,042	68,042	61,322
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2,500	16,250	1,000
Total.....	\$44,434,503	\$44,648,758	\$42,368,967
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$9,400,000	\$9,400,000	\$9,400,000
Surplus fund.....	1,866,000	1,861,000	1,861,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	663,986	593,571	623,551
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	1,255,540	1,250,840	1,290,540
Due to other National banks.....	7,646,719	6,946,788	6,705,241
Due to State banks and bankers.....	5,965,474	5,895,474	5,508,688
Dividends unpaid.....	41,787	2,368	1,717
Individual deposits.....	17,148,780	17,592,925	16,222,536
U. S. deposits.....	512,500	512,500	537,262
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....		101,000	58,500
Bills payable.....		475,000	190,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	25,000	25,000	25,000
Total.....	\$44,434,503	\$44,648,758	\$42,368,967
Average reserve held.....	26.35 p. c.	26.01 p. c.	23.95 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$6,832,960 on May 7, 1896; \$6,548,086 on July 14, 1896; \$6,075,741 on October 6, 1896.

## ST. PAUL, MINN.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$10,907,366	\$10,731,212	\$10,450,811
Overdrafts.....	12,852	10,063	16,704
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	252,000	252,000	252,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	475,000	475,000	475,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	.....	.....	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	.....	.....	.....
Stocks, securities, etc.....	714,901	818,262	819,673
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	753,508	752,718	752,718
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	148,150	175,479	175,481
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	874,015	883,280	455,368
Due from State banks and bankers.....	174,521	129,062	203,266
Due from approved reserve agents.....	1,872,604	1,739,486	1,834,232
Checks and other cash items.....	38,633	84,000	88,828
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	346,479	329,510	384,661
Bills of other National banks.....	58,965	88,500	122,192
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	3,668	4,252	3,125
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	2,144,355	2,152,885	1,947,879
Gold Treasury certificates.....	12,200	10,800	8,200
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	54,400	61,663	82,713
Silver Treasury certificates.....	79,864	61,125	228,558
Silver fractional coin.....	32,841	18,156	38,537
Legal-tender notes.....	170,777	145,508	448,469
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	11,298	11,298	11,293
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	18,846	21,346	8,066
Total.....	\$18,657,334	\$18,455,756	\$18,907,861
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000
Surplus fund.....	1,055,000	1,055,000	1,055,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	943,864	806,113	806,373
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	201,950	201,272	224,320
Due to other National banks.....	1,938,938	1,776,242	1,643,406
Due to State banks and bankers.....	1,410,598	1,401,861	1,241,346
Dividends unpaid.....	8,348	6,255	9,646
Individual deposits.....	8,845,357	8,840,080	9,485,436
U. S. deposits.....	212,324	233,176	192,651
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	245,907	171,753	317,629
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	.....	.....	.....
Bills payable.....	.....	.....	.....
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	.....	14,025	.....
Total.....	\$18,657,334	\$18,455,756	\$18,907,861
Average reserve held.....	37.41 p. c.	36.34 p. c.	39.44 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,494,438 on May 7, 1896; \$2,450,137 on July 14, 1896; \$2,754,386 on October 6.

## SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1897.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$7,066,141	\$7,025,026	\$7,134,368
Overdrafts.....	126,944	109,624	140,374
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	100,000	100,000	150,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	103,000	103,000	.....
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	25,113	27,675	10,500
Stocks, securities, etc.....	149,417	149,882	148,681
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	344,587	344,587	344,616
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	20,140	34,038	33,922
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	107,980	147,336	244,985
Due from State banks and bankers.....	232,372	296,061	323,604
Due from approved reserve agents.....	515,675	521,638	543,956
Checks and other cash items.....	.....	.....	.....
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	159,912	206,324	227,139
Bills of other National banks.....	19,080	17,300	6,950
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	653	288	491
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,175,450	1,476,502	2,398,180
Gold Treasury certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold clearing-house certificates.....	.....	.....	.....
Silver dollars.....	18,440	17,180	12,280
Silver Treasury certificates.....	10,624	4,464	35,425
Silver fractional coin.....	27,112	33,670	24,382
Legal-tender notes.....	4,500	12,520	7,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	.....	.....	.....
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	4,500	4,500	6,750
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	300	400	1,200
Total.....	\$10,831,904	\$10,531,971	\$11,999,816

## SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.—Continued.

LIABILITIES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,500,000	\$2,500,000	\$2,500,000
Surplus fund.....	1,425,000	1,450,000	1,450,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	167,850	70,088	149,888
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	45,000	45,000	71,500
Due to other National banks.....	807,219	531,972	602,691
Due to State banks and bankers.....	911,155	819,163	901,736
Dividends unpaid.....	800	13,775	1,239
Individual deposits.....	4,573,196	5,011,291	6,012,816
U. S. deposits.....	101,681	100,669	119,904
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			
Bills payable.....			
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$10,331,904</b>	<b>\$10,531,971</b>	<b>\$11,899,816</b>
Average reserve held.....	30.95 p. c.	32.35 p. c.	43.75 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$1,236,126 on May 7, 1896; \$1,544,317 on July 14, 1896; \$2,477,197 on October 6, 1896.

## SAVANNAH, GA.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$1,319,181	\$1,164,179	\$1,507,413
Overdrafts.....	697	1,198	5,494
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	102,000	102,000	102,000
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	90,000	90,000	90,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....			
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	11,650	11,400	11,150
Stocks, securities, etc.....	76,512	66,715	66,715
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	67,292	67,229	67,229
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	19,845	18,380	18,567
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	56,007	81,772	22,626
Due from State banks and bankers.....	49,781	40,139	28,901
Due from approved reserve agents.....	125,803	54,229	88,351
Checks and other cash items.....			
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	2,142	24,351	
Bills of other National banks.....	19,300	24,597	20,000
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	1,854	1,193	1,989
* Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	1,300	3,200	12,400
Gold Treasury certificates.....			1,000
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	11,000	26,000	6,500
Silver Treasury certificates.....	84,004	150,000	27,000
Silver fractional coin.....	7,095	7,700	4,200
Legal-tender notes.....	70,000	80,000	55,000
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....			
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	4,543	4,543	4,543
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....	2	2	7
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,120,113</b>	<b>\$2,018,950</b>	<b>\$2,152,263</b>

LIABILITIES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Capital stock paid in.....	\$750,000	\$750,000	\$750,000
Surplus fund.....	225,000	225,000	225,000
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	45,425	36,322	47,294
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	87,406	89,475	90,000
Due to other National banks.....	72,849	61,844	47,660
Due to State banks and bankers.....	107,639	106,122	146,579
Dividends unpaid.....	911	1,712	1,032
Individual deposits.....	589,801	656,437	610,728
U. S. deposits.....	7,226	281	3,679
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....	71,904	86,025	80,563
Notes and bills rediscounted.....			25,019
Bills payable.....	150,000		255,000
Liabilities other than those above stated.....	12,441	6,739	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$2,120,113</b>	<b>\$2,018,950</b>	<b>\$2,152,263</b>
Average reserve held.....	42.06 p. c.	43.98 p. c.	28.20 p. c.

\* The total lawful money reserve was \$173,599 on May 7, 1896; \$267,000 on July 14, 1896; \$106,900 on October 6, 1896.

## WASHINGTON, D. C.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Loans and discounts.....	\$6,964,414	\$8,028,622	\$8,147,670
Overdrafts.....	10,510	20,777	16,412
U. S. bonds to secure circulation.....	834,150	874,150	904,150
U. S. bonds to secure U. S. deposits.....	100,000	100,000	100,000
U. S. bonds on hand.....	285,800	396,000	377,500
Premiums on U. S. bonds.....	56,124	68,174	68,617
Stocks, securities, etc.....	1,118,008	1,398,592	1,263,113
Banking house, furniture and fixtures.....	1,069,694	1,069,694	1,069,694

## WASHINGTON, D. C.—Continued.

RESOURCES.	May 7, 1896.	July 14, 1896.	Oct. 6, 1896.
Other real estate and mortgages owned.....	\$55,986	\$56,183	\$54,851
Due from National banks (not reserve agents).....	715,571	583,990	594,686
Due from State banks and bankers.....	86,230	384,901	478,215
Due from approved reserve agents.....	906,986	1,522,605	1,046,333
Checks and other cash items.....	102,481	125,834	259,831
Exchanges for clearing-house.....	177,657	181,838	205,891
Bills of other National banks.....	9,888	19,455	16,455
Fractional paper currency, nickels and cents.....	7,888	6,488	6,622
*Lawful money reserve in bank, viz.:			
Gold coin.....	366,607	616,506	776,466
Gold Treasury certificates.....	655,710	681,550	754,110
Gold clearing-house certificates.....			
Silver dollars.....	10,549	13,755	15,068
Silver Treasury certificates.....	817,989	1,356,175	1,436,996
Silver fractional coin.....	25,971	23,082	18,271
Legal-tender notes.....	588,884	880,561	714,158
U. S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes.....	10,000	10,000	210,000
Five per cent. redemption fund with Treasurer.....	35,270	33,770	34,729
Due from U. S. Treasurer.....			1,310
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$15,082,123</b>	<b>\$18,513,178</b>	<b>\$18,741,235</b>
LIABILITIES.			
Capital stock paid in.....	\$2,575,000	\$3,075,000	\$3,075,000
Surplus fund.....	1,360,500	1,401,000	1,401,500
Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid.....	280,977	263,072	278,747
National bank notes issued, less amount on hand.....	699,535	681,615	706,645
Due to other National banks.....	282,942	316,969	329,157
Due to State banks and bankers.....	140,063	168,120	228,846
Dividends unpaid.....	2,834	7,678	4,911
Individual deposits.....	9,540,544	12,518,397	12,674,961
U. S. deposits.....	84,738	56,417	88,904
Deposits of U. S. disbursing officers.....			
Notes and bills rediscounted.....	44,000	15,000	20,081
Bills payable.....		25,000	32,500
Liabilities other than those above stated.....			
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$15,082,123</b>	<b>\$18,513,178</b>	<b>\$18,741,235</b>
Average reserve held.....	36.21 p. c.	42.12 p. c.	40.22 p. c.

\*The total lawful money reserve was \$2,475,711 on May 7, 1896; \$3,586,609 on July 14, 1896; \$3,925,023 on October 6, 1896.

## Not a Party Victory.

PRESIDENT-ELECT MCKINLEY, in a telegram to Chairman Marcus A. Hanna, of the Republican National Committee, on Nov. 5, said:

"The people in their majesty, ignoring party lines, have declared their detestation of repudiation and dishonor in whatever specious guise they may be presented. They have with the same mighty power affirmed their devotion to law and order and their undeviating respect for justice and the courts. They have maintained their unfaltering determination to support and uphold the constituted authorities of the country and have thereby given new vigor and strength to our free institutions. They have indeed again consecrated themselves to country and baptized the cherished ordinances of free government with a new and holy patriotism.

The victory is not to party or section, but of and for the whole American people. Not the least of the triumphs of the election is the obliteration of sectional lines in the republic. We have demonstrated to the world that we are a reunited people in purpose as in name. We have manifested in the great cause the spirit of fraternity and brotherhood that should always characterize our common and equal citizenship and have proved conclusively that in a country of equal privileges and equal opportunities the insidious doctrine of hate or of class or sectional distinctions cannot prevail.

Let us, as Americans, straightway devote ourselves to the upbuilding of America, to the peace, honor and glory of our common country. Party dissensions should no longer divide or rack the public mind, nor the zeal or temper of either side deter any citizen from patriotic devotion to the good of all."

**Senator Sherman's View.**—In a statement made public on Nov. 5, Senator Sherman, of Ohio, said: "I sincerely hope that the election will settle for ever a question that in my opinion threatens the honor and good faith of the United States more than any other since the close of the civil war. I hope that the present gold standard will be maintained, with the largest use of silver that can be maintained at a parity with gold. This settled, we ought promptly to make such changes in our tariff and revenue laws as will yield a sufficient supply of money to meet current expenses of the Government and create sufficient surplus to pay outstanding bonds within a few years, and to sufficiently and impartially protect American industries."



# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

NEW YORK, November 5, 1890.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION was the controlling factor in business and financial circles during the entire month just ended, as it has been to a considerable extent ever since the adoption of a free-coinage, 16-to-1, platform by the Democratic convention at Chicago on July 9 last. For nearly four months confidence has been disturbed and enterprise has been checked because of the uncertainty and apprehension that existed as to the probable outcome of the issue raised regarding the monetary standard.

On November 8 the question was decided, and Mr. McKinley and the gold standard were declared the popular choice. Since the election there has been a decided revulsion in sentiment, and many happenings point to a more hopeful condition of affairs than has existed for some time past.

At the present writing 24 States, having 277 votes in the electoral college out of a total of 447, are reported to have voted for Mr. McKinley. The importance of these States as regards population, area and wealth, may be judged from the comparisons here made. The following statement shows first, the rank according to population of each State credited to McKinley, the total population, area, true valuation of real and personal property, valuation per capita and railroad mileage. The figures are from the census report of 1890, except for railroad mileage, for which we give the figures published by the Interstate Commerce Commission for June 30, 1894:

Rank.	STATE.	Popula- tion.	Area— Sq. miles.	Property valuation.		Railroad mileage.
				Amount.	Per capita.	
1	New York.....	5,997,853	49,220	\$8,576,701,901	\$1,430	8,052
2	Pennsylvania.....	5,258,014	45,215	6,180,748,560	1,177	9,394
3	Illinois.....	3,826,351	56,850	5,086,751,719	1,324	10,461
4	Ohio.....	3,672,316	41,080	3,951,382,384	1,076	8,547
5	Massachusetts.....	2,338,943	8,315	2,808,045,447	1,252	2,116
6	Indiana.....	2,192,404	36,350	2,095,176,626	956	6,236
7	Michigan.....	2,063,889	58,915	2,065,016,273	1,001	7,698
8	Iowa.....	1,911,896	56,625	2,267,348,333	1,196	8,678
9	Kentucky.....	1,858,635	40,400	1,172,232,313	631	2,021
10	Wisconsin.....	1,636,880	56,040	1,633,306,523	1,067	6,033
11	New Jersey.....	1,444,933	8,175	1,445,285,114	1,006	2,155
12	Minnesota.....	1,301,826	83,365	1,691,851,927	1,300	6,000
13	California.....	1,218,180	158,280	2,532,733,627	2,097	4,861
14	Maryland.....	1,042,390	12,210	1,085,473,048	1,041	1,291
15	West Virginia.....	762,794	24,780	438,954,861	575	1,980
16	Connecticut.....	748,258	4,990	835,120,219	1,119	1,013
17	Maine.....	661,086	33,040	490,134,128	740	1,540
18	New Hampshire.....	376,530	9,305	325,128,740	863	1,101
19	Rhode Island.....	345,506	1,250	504,162,352	1,459	236
20	Vermont.....	332,422	9,565	265,567,323	799	988
21	South Dakota.....	328,806	77,650	425,141,299	1,293	2,790
22	Oregon.....	313,787	96,080	560,306,194	1,822	1,229
23	North Dakota.....	182,719	70,795	337,006,506	1,844	2,514
24	Delaware.....	168,493	2,360	175,678,795	1,043	318
Total 24 States.....		39,952,843	1,040,065	\$47,214,944,311	1,182	98,615
Total 21 other States.....		22,163,968	1,679,436	16,850,158,604	760	74,006
Total United States.....		62,116,811	2,719,500	\$64,065,102,915	\$1,081	172,621

In the totals above presented, the figures for the territories and the District of Columbia are not included. Of the total electoral vote 62 per cent. is cast by the States in the above list. The aggregate population of those States in 1890 was 64 per cent. of the total of all the States, the area is 38 per cent. and the aggregate wealth 74 per cent. The average wealth per capita is 55 per cent. greater than in the other States. The railroad mileage in the McKinley States in 1894 was 57 per cent. of the total.

The comparisons show that the most densely populated portion of the country, and the States possessing nearly three-quarters of the wealth of the country, have voted for a gold standard, not unanimously, but with majorities varying in magnitude. The verdict seems to be a decisive one and its effect promises to be in every way favorable.

No more complete revolution in sentiment or in business conditions has occurred in recent times than that which came about between the last day of October and the few days that have followed the election. During the entire month of October the hoarding of money, particularly of gold, proceeded until the danger of a money panic became imminent. It is estimated that in the four months from July 1 to October 31 \$12,000,000 was drawn from the Savings banks of New York city. During the same time the deposits of the clearing-house banks were drawn down \$53,000,000 and the cash holdings of those institutions were reduced \$16,000,000.

In view of so great a drain upon the resources of the banks it is not surprising that money rates became exceptionally high. Call money, which ruled at  $1\frac{1}{2}$  @ 2 per cent. in July, was quoted at  $127\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on October 30. The stringency in the money market became so pronounced and the situation so critical that the leading banks once again intervened to protect the public from a panic. A syndicate was formed to advance about \$10,000,000 to be used in the loan market should any attempt be made to destroy values by manipulating money. Only about \$2,000,000 was so used, but the syndicate of bankers kept a watchful eye on the situation and through their efforts loaning rates dropped to more normal figures. Since the election the rate for money has fallen even below 6 per cent., notwithstanding the increased demand for money resulting from the improved condition and outlook of general trade.

The fact that gold was hoarded has been demonstrated beyond a doubt by evidence that accumulated both before and since the election. Before that event, there was a disappearance of the precious metal from the usual sources of visible supply which could be explained in no other way. The enormous gold imports could be only partially located in the United States Treasury and in the banks. From September 1 to November 1, 1896, the total stock of gold in the country was estimated by the Treasury Department to have increased from import and the production of our mines \$68,000,000. The Treasury gained only \$16,000,000, and the remaining \$52,000,000 went into the banks or into the hands of the people. The New York banks gained less than \$15,000,000 in specie in those two months, while the Boston banks actually lost nearly \$1,000,000. Statistics of the banks of all the other cities are not available, but there is no doubt that a large amount of the balance of gold unaccounted for failed to go into any bank. It was hoarded by individuals or corporations.

Gold was bought in large quantities in the last week of the month at a premium reaching in some cases as high as one per cent. Yet at the same time the imports of gold were heavy, nearly \$11,000,000 reaching New York in the same week. More than \$40,000,000 of gold imported at New York failed to reach the New York banks or to get into the sub-Treasury so far as the published records prior to the election indicated.

But in the past two days the situation has greatly changed. The premium on

gold has entirely disappeared, and holders of the precious metal have been clamoring at the sub-Treasury for legal tenders in exchange for gold. The Government has not been able to satisfy the demand of these money changers fast enough and a great many were turned away, and were compelled to apply to the banks to relieve them of their undesirable burden.

The prospects, as they now appear, are that there will be an ample supply of gold for the Government, for the banks, and for everybody from this out. Whether the gold imports are to continue will depend to some extent upon the rate of interest which is to rule in our money market. A low rate will tend to discourage imports. Still the increasing activity in various lines of industry will have some influence in making money more stringent and dearer. On the other hand the fact is to be considered that in the past two months the principal European banks have suffered heavy losses of gold. The Bank of England has lost \$40,000,000 or nearly 20 per cent. of the gold it held on September 1; the Bank of France \$20,000,000, or about 5 per cent., and the Bank of Germany \$12,000,000, or 8 per cent.

The heavy export movement of merchandise, which is rapidly reaching record-breaking figures, will have some effect upon the gold movement. In the nine months ended September 30, the exports of merchandise were \$108,000,000 larger than for the corresponding period of 1895, while the imports were \$79,000,000 less. A difference in our trade balance of \$187,000,000, and that difference in favor of the country at least in so far as it affects the international movement of gold, means a possible continuation of the gold imports.

Shipments of breadstuffs have been in large volume and will be an important factor in our foreign trade throughout the year. There is no doubt that we have a market for all our surplus wheat this year and that means better prices than have ruled for a long time past. There has been a very sharp rise in wheat with some reaction but prices are again moving upward. Our wheat crop this year is estimated at about 50,000,000 bushels less than the yield last year and nearly as much less than the yield of 1894. Owing to the uncertainty regarding the amount of wheat actually raised in the United States in recent years, it is not sure that the wheat crop this year will not be nearer 450,000,000 bushels, than 412,000,000 bushels, which last amount is estimated upon the average condition reported by the Department of Agriculture. The crop of oats will be about 150,000,000 bushels less than the big crop of last year, which aggregated nearly 825,000,000 bushels. Our corn crop is estimated at from 2,000,000,000 to 2,500,000,000 bushels, and anywhere between those figures means one of the largest crops ever harvested.

The crop situation abroad is anything but favorable. India, which exported nearly 19,000,000 bushels of wheat in the past year and nearly 57,000,000 bushels in 1892, will not only be unable to export any this coming year but will probably have to import a considerable amount. Australasia, which has been exporting about 11,000,000 bushels a year, will have no wheat to spare this year. The Argentine Republic, which exported 59,000,000 bushels in 1894 and 87,000,000 bushels last year, had another short crop this year, and although the new crop promises to be somewhat better than the late crop, the exports will be small. For the nine months ended September 30 the exports from the Argentine Republic have fallen off nearly 60 per cent. as compared with 1895. Estimates of the Russian crop are clothed with much uncertainty, but in many sections of Russia the harvests have been poor. Russia has been the chief competitor of the United States as a wheat exporter. Last year that country exported nearly 143,000,000 bushels of wheat; in 1894, 123,000,000 bushels; in 1893, 94,000,000 bushels, and in 1892, 49,000,000 bushels. In the last-mentioned year the exports were affected by the crop failure of 1891. While there has been no such failure this year, it is expected that the amount of wheat available for export next year will be very much less than it was in either 1894 or 1895. The

United States therefore has a rare opportunity of gaining by the losses of its rivals in wheat growing.

The general trade of the country has been on the ragged edge of stagnation for a long time past. This year anyway a political campaign has been of no benefit to business. In the first part of the year there was some little improvement over 1895, as indicated by an increase in bank clearings in the United States in the first half of the year of 12 per cent. and in the cities outside of New York of 0.7 per cent. During the following three months, however, there was a decrease of 9.8 per cent. in all cities and of the same percentage outside of New York. In October there was a decrease of 12.3 per cent. in all cities and of 14 per cent. in the cities outside New York. October presents the worst showing of any month of the year, but the end has apparently been reached and November promises to show a very decided recovery.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—There was a stringent money market during the entire month and the ruling rates for money were exceptionally high. The call loan branch of the market was the most active, and during a larger portion of the month call money commanded as high as 10 per cent. In the last week of the month, just preceding the election, the rate was rushed up from 6 to 100 per cent. the latter rate being quoted on October 29. On that day the closing rate was 80 per cent., and on the following day 127 per cent. for loans over election day was paid. The final quotation for the month was 6 per cent. Money was stringent because of hoarding by individuals caused by fears regarding the result of the election, by heavy shipments of money to interior points and the drawing down of balances in New York by outside banks. Rates for commercial paper and time money have been high, but borrowers who were not compelled to get money preferred to wait, anticipating a general reduction in rates after the election, which at this writing appears to have been justified to some extent. At the close of the month call money ruled at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  @ 100 per cent. with the average rate about 18 per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 12 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange collateral was quoted at 12 per cent. for 80 to 90 days, 10 per cent. for four months, 6 @ 8 per cent. for longer dates. For commercial paper the rates are 8 to 10 per cent. for best double and single names. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the following table :

MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	June 1.	July 1.	Aug. 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$ —2	2 —3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	6 —8	3 —6	6 —
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	2 —3	6	6	12 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 80 to 90 days.....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6 —8	6	12 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	9 —11	6	10 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$ —4	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 —11	6	6 —8
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	9	$6\frac{1}{2}$ —7	8 —10
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$ —5	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	6 —7	.....	7 — $7\frac{1}{2}$	8 —10
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	$5\frac{1}{2}$ —6	7 —8	.....	8 —9	8 —10

**EUROPEAN BANKS.**—The gold drain from the leading European banks continued last month, causing a loss of \$21,000,000 to the Bank of England, making more than \$50,000,000 which that bank has lost since September 1. The Bank of France and the Bank of Germany each lost about \$7,500,000 gold last month making \$25,000,000

which has gone out of the former bank since September 1, and about \$14,000,000 out of the latter bank.

#### GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 2, 1896.		October 1, 1896.		November 1, 1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£44,900,056		£40,386,442		£36,182,073	
France.....	78,010,799	£49,385,202	79,080,790	£49,753,206	77,547,262	£49,224,443
Germany.....	81,065,775	13,812,475	29,648,397	14,833,188	28,051,610	14,025,800
Austro-Hungary...	24,402,000	12,775,000	26,064,000	12,795,000	30,453,000	12,692,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,528,000	10,510,000	8,528,000	9,940,000
Netherlands.....	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,685,000	6,842,000	2,696,000	6,743,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,663,333	1,331,667	2,659,333	1,329,667	2,686,000	1,333,000
Totals.....	£192,708,903	£98,901,344	£191,969,932	£98,063,063	£186,063,925	£98,928,243

**MONEY RATES ABROAD.**—Dearer money in Europe has apparently come to stay for a while. The Bank of England advanced its rate of discount to 4 per cent., and the open market rates in nearly all the European cities have advanced sharply. Paris is the only Continental city having a market rate as low as 2 per cent., while the German markets are above 4 per cent.

#### MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	May 15.	June 19.	July 17.	Aug. 14.	Sept. 13.	Oct. 16.
London—Bank rate of discount.....	2	2	2	2	2½	3
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	¾	1½	1—¾	¾—1	1½	2½
6 months bankers' drafts.....	¾	1½	1½—¾	¾—1½	1½—2½	2½
Loans—Day to day.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1	1½
Paris, open market rates.....	1½	1½	1½	1½	1½	2
Berlin, ".....	2½	3	3½	2½	3½	4½
Hamburg, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	3½	4½
Frankfort, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	3½	4½
Amsterdam, ".....	2½	2½	2½	2½	2½	3
Vienna, ".....	3½	3½	3½	3½	4	3½
St. Petersburg, ".....	6½	6½	6	6	5½	5½
Madrid, ".....	4½	5	5	5	5	5
Copenhagen, ".....	3	3½	3½	3½	3½	4½

**FOREIGN EXCHANGE.**—A sharp advance in rates for money and a premium on gold caused a heavy drop in foreign exchange early in the month, and the low rates prevailing in the middle of September were restored, and the importation of gold was resumed. Late in the month there was some advance in sterling rates, but the approaching election caused a dull market, and rates at the close of the month were

#### FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	July 1.	August 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days.....	4.87 — ¼	4.88 —	4.82 — 2½	4.82½ — 3	4.81½ — 2
"  "  Sight.....	4.88 — ¼	4.89 —	4.84 — 4½	4.85½ — ½	4.84½ — ¾
"  "  Cables.....	4.88½ — ½	4.89½ — ¼	4.84½ — 4½	4.85½ — 6	4.85½ — ¾
"  Commercial long.....	4.89½ — ¾	4.87½ — ¾	4.81½ — ¾	4.82½ — ¾	4.81 — ¾
"  Docu'tary for paym't.....	4.86 — ¾	4.87 — ¾	4.81 — 1½	4.81½ — 2½	4.80 — ¾
Paris—Cable transfers.....	5.15½ — 15	5.14½ — 3½	5.20 — 19½	5.18½ — 7½	5.19½ — 8½
"  Bankers' 60 days.....	5.17½ — 6½	5.16½ — 4	5.22½ — 1½	5.20½ — 1½	5.22½ — 1½
"  Bankers' sight.....	5.15½ — 15	5.15 — 4½	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — 1½	5.20 — 9½
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days.....	5.19½ — 8½	5.18½ — 1½	5.26½ — 4½	5.23½ — 1½	5.25 — 4½
Swiss—Bankers' sight.....	5.16½ — 4	5.16½ — 5½	5.21½ — 6	5.18½ — 1½	5.19½ — 8½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days.....	95½ — ¼	95½ —	94½ — ½	94½ — 1½	94½ — 1½
"  Bankers' sight.....	95½ — ¾	95½ — 1½	94½ — 5	96½ — ¾	95½ — 1½
Brussels—Bankers' sight.....	5.15½ — 15	5.15½ — 15	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — 1½	5.20 — 9½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight.....	40½ — ¾	40½ — ¾	40 — 1½	40½ — 1½	40 — 1½
Kroners—Bankers' sight.....	27 — 1½	27 — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½	26½ — 1½
Italian lire—sight.....	5.50 — 45	5.50 — 40	5.50 — 50	5.50 — 50	5.57½ — 47½

considerably lower than they were a month ago. The tables preceding and following show the condition of foreign exchange markets.

## RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Oct. 3.....	4.83½ @ 4.83½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.85½ @ 4.86	4.89½ @ 4.89	4.81½ @ 4.82½
" 10.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80 @ 4.80½
" 17.....	4.80½ @ 4.81	4.83½ @ 4.84	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.80½ @ 4.80½	4.79½ @ 4.80½
" 24.....	4.81½ @ 4.81½	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.85 @ 4.85½	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80 @ 4.80½
" 31.....	4.81½ @ 4.82	4.84½ @ 4.84½	4.85½ @ 4.85½	4.81 @ 4.81½	4.80 @ 4.80½

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	July 15, 1896.	Aug. 12, 1896.	Sept. 16, 1896.	Oct. 14, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills).....	£27,387,770	£27,478,410	£26,835,985	£27,445,550
Public deposits.....	6,951,901	6,215,330	6,514,798	5,420,991
Other deposits.....	58,448,143	55,994,111	50,263,086	47,706,184
Government securities.....	14,980,281	14,568,995	14,944,906	16,185,047
Other securities.....	23,880,421	28,598,618	23,847,085	27,988,077
Reserve of notes and coin.....	37,599,898	36,462,100	32,110,428	28,770,993
Coin and bullion.....	48,187,668	47,188,600	42,148,418	37,506,545
Reserve to liabilities.....	5½%	5½%	5½%	5½%
Bank rate of discount.....	2½	2½	2½	3½
Market rate, 3 months' bills.....	1½ @ 1½	1½	1½ @ 1½	2½ @ 2½
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.).....	113½	112½	109½	108½
Price of silver per ounce.....	31½d.	31½d.	30½d.	29½d.
Average price of wheat.....	24s. 7d.	23s. 6d.	23s. 6d.	25s. 2d.

**SILVER.**—The price of silver in London made a new low record for the year, touching 29½d. per ounce on October 13, the lowest price reached since March, 1895. The highest price of the year was recorded last March, 81 15-16d., from which there was a decline last month of 2 3-16d. The net decline for the month was 5-16d., the closing price being 30d. per ounce, as against 30 5-16d on September 30.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894, 1895, 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low		High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
January..	81½	80½	27½	27½	30½	30½	July.....	28½	28½	30½	30½	81½	81½
February	30½	27½	27½	27½	31½	30½	August..	30½	28½	30½	30½	31½	30½
March....	27½	27	30½	27½	31½	31½	Septemb'r	30½	28½	30½	30½	80½	30
April.....	29½	29½	30½	29½	31½	30½	October..	29½	28½	31½	30½	30½	29½
May.....	29½	28½	30½	30½	31½	30½	Novemb'r	29½	28½	31	30½		
June.....	28½	28½	30½	30½	31½	31½	Decemb'r	28½	27½	30½	30		

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The revenues of the Government were about \$1,700,000 larger in October than in the previous month and about the same amount less than in October last year. The increase over September is almost entirely in internal revenues, and the decrease from last year is exclusively in custom receipts. The Government received nearly \$26,300,000 during the month and paid out nearly \$24,200,000 making a deficit of nearly \$8,000,000 for October and of \$33,000,000 since July 1 last. In 1895 the deficit for the same period was only about \$16,500,000. The expenditures last month were exceptionally large and this month will probably be much smaller. The interest payments in November are about \$3,000,000 less than in October but pension payments are usually somewhat larger this month than last.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	October, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.	Source.	October, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.
Customs.....	\$11,106,498	\$46,966,495	Civil and mis.....	\$10,817,000	\$40,540,585
Internal revenue....	18,363,156	51,306,163	War.....	4,120,000	18,706,043
Miscellaneous.....	1,814,180	7,186,780	Navy.....	3,372,000	12,484,443
			Indians.....	730,000	4,118,814
Total.....	\$26,282,839	\$106,458,380	Pensions.....	10,845,000	47,227,790
Excess of expendi- tures.....	\$7,866,170	\$33,090,290	Interest.....	5,905,000	15,376,008
			Total.....	\$34,179,000	\$188,548,679

## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	July 31.	August 31.	Sept. 30.	Oct. 31.
Net gold.....	\$110,567,322	\$101,706,672	\$124,124,282	\$118,443,021
Net silver.....	38,830,616	25,776,680	16,643,222	14,073,516
U. S. notes.....	67,704,664	75,139,381	62,632,216	56,317,139
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).....	28,780,225	27,539,106	21,216,303	32,542,337
Deposits in National banks.....	16,284,431	16,624,322	16,443,281	16,110,047
Available cash balance.....	\$262,147,249	\$248,786,161	\$241,069,305	\$227,492,094

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expen- ditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$27,804,400	\$34,523,447	\$44,705,967	\$29,237,670	\$32,529,340	\$49,845,367
February.....	22,888,057	25,090,035	87,085,511	26,059,228	26,749,950	129,932,979
March.....	25,470,576	25,716,367	90,463,907	20,041,149	27,274,964	128,646,461
April.....	24,247,836	32,980,676	91,247,144	24,232,863	28,987,381	125,393,904
May.....	25,272,078	28,558,214	99,151,409	24,643,718	28,420,532	108,945,294
June.....	25,615,474	21,683,029	107,512,302	27,794,219	25,444,789	101,689,906
July.....	29,069,698	38,548,064	107,236,487	29,029,269	42,088,468	110,718,746
August.....	28,632,696	32,588,185	100,329,837	25,562,067	35,701,676	100,957,561
September.....	27,549,678	24,320,482	102,911,074	24,584,244	20,579,535	124,094,672
October.....	27,901,748	34,503,425	102,943,180	26,282,829	34,179,000	*118,443,021
November.....	25,986,503	27,169,283	79,353,966			
December.....	26,288,638	25,814,317	63,202,268			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.—There were \$2,800,000 of Government bonds deposited to secure bank circulation last month and an increase in circulation out-

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	July 31, 1896.	Aug. 31, 1896.	Sept. 30, 1896.	Oct. 31, 1896.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$225,942,455	\$229,526,449	\$238,552,080	\$234,497,657
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	208,103,504	210,293,574	214,667,694	216,510,014
Circulation secured by lawful money....	19,838,951	19,233,875	18,884,386	18,387,643
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Four per cents. of 1895.....	32,630,050	34,954,550	35,804,550	36,531,650
Pacific RR. bonds, 6 per cent.....	9,831,000	9,633,000	9,949,000	10,398,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,241,100	22,368,850	22,574,850	22,673,850
" " 1907, 4 per cent.....	151,774,450	152,934,450	154,515,950	155,473,000
Five per cents. of 1894.....	13,067,850	15,192,850	15,929,850	16,068,850
Total.....	\$220,544,450	\$235,078,700	\$238,773,200	\$241,103,850

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1895, \$1,390,000; Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$735,000; 2 per cents. of 1891, \$983,000; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$12,290,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$535,000, a total of \$15,903,000.

The circulation of National gold banks, not included in the above statement, is \$36,737.

standing of \$1,345,000, making an increase in the latter item of \$21,099,000 in the past twelve months. The circulation based on Government bonds has increased \$1,842,000 for the month and \$26,329,000 for the year. The lawful money on deposit to retire circulation decreased \$496,000 last month and \$5,229,000 since November 1, 1895.

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—There was a noticeable movement of money from the banks last month, and as the election approached the feeling became more anxious. There were evidences of private hoarding, and out-of-town banks were calling upon the New York institutions to remit part of their balances. From the middle of July to the close of October about \$60,000,000 of deposits have been withdrawn from the clearing-house banks. Loans have been reduced in the same period about \$35,000,000. During the past month the banks lost \$8,000,000 in deposits, reduced loans \$7,000,000, gained specie \$7,000,000, lost legal tenders \$8,000,000, and gained in surplus reserve nearly \$1,000,000.

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.**

	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Legal tenders.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Surplus Reserve.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>
Oct. 3...	\$453,166,000	\$55,801,100	\$74,408,200	\$454,733,100	\$16,526,025	\$19,960,400	\$575,784,800
" 10...	456,263,300	58,450,400	71,770,000	458,484,800	15,569,200	20,296,800	559,923,100
" 17...	456,139,300	59,138,400	68,198,500	458,695,200	11,911,100	20,521,100	572,569,200
" 24...	450,119,500	60,232,300	66,849,300	448,482,800	14,960,900	20,510,600	565,327,900
" 31...	446,250,400	62,778,100	66,296,600	446,445,900	17,463,225	20,466,800	585,652,100

**DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.**

<b>MONTH.</b>	<b>1894.</b>		<b>1895.</b>		<b>1896.</b>	
	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Surplus Reserve.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Surplus Reserve.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Surplus Reserve.</i>
January .....	\$508,437,800	\$90,815,150	\$549,291,400	\$35,268,850	\$501,089,300	\$15,939,675
February .....	551,808,400	111,623,000	546,986,200	36,751,500	490,447,200	39,623,400
March .....	531,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,054,500	489,612,200	24,442,150
April .....	547,744,200	83,600,150	504,240,200	13,413,450	481,795,700	17,005,975
May .....	573,853,800	83,417,950	526,966,100	27,233,575	495,004,100	22,044,275
June .....	572,188,400	77,965,100	566,229,400	41,221,250	498,874,100	22,230,675
July .....	573,337,800	74,803,350	570,436,300	34,225,925	499,046,900	20,328,275
August .....	581,556,000	69,053,700	574,304,500	40,917,175	485,014,000	17,728,600
September .....	585,973,900	65,820,825	574,929,900	39,149,625	451,934,800	8,836,200
October .....	586,683,500	60,791,825	549,136,500	22,296,175	454,733,100	16,526,025
November .....	585,104,900	63,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400	446,445,900	17,463,225
December .....	579,835,600	52,220,800	520,788,000	18,613,300		

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$585,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 3, 1894.

**BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.**—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table:

**BOSTON BANKS.**

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Legal Tenders.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>
Oct. 3.....	\$180,711,000	\$139,853,000	\$8,566,000	\$6,965,000	\$10,239,000	\$94,763,000
" 10.....	181,179,000	140,463,000	8,867,000	7,184,000	10,301,000	87,468,100
" 17.....	180,739,000	140,782,000	9,232,000	7,620,000	10,411,000	90,789,800
" 24.....	181,489,000	140,412,000	9,788,000	7,424,000	10,302,000	89,334,700
" 31.....	182,542,000	139,623,000	9,627,000	6,037,000	10,285,000	81,243,400



## PHILADELPHIA BANKS.

Dates.	Loans.	Deposits.	Lawful Money Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
October 3.....	\$101,778,000	\$98,828,000	\$27,158,000	\$6,805,000	\$22,200,000
" 10.....	101,774,000	98,869,000	28,717,000	6,822,000	52,455,000
" 17.....	101,767,000	98,942,000	28,944,000	6,852,000	62,258,200
" 24.....	101,540,000	98,485,000	27,278,000	6,885,000	62,572,000
" 31.....	101,502,000	74,127,000	27,117,000	6,904,000	55,214,500

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—More gold was coined at the United States mints last month than in any previous month since January, \$5,727,500. The silver coinage aggregated \$2,844,010 of which \$2,850,000 was in silver dollars. The minor coinage was \$66,900, making a total coinage for the month of \$8,638,409.

## COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES MINTS.

	1895.		1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$3,098,300	\$574,000	\$12,914,800	\$95,000
February.....	6,143,800	491,000	1,240,000	1,500,000
March.....	2,896,102	578,537	1,540,555	1,693,522
April.....	4,639,300	595,000	1,500,000	1,831,000
May.....	4,163,988	440,508	2,857,200	1,828,000
June.....	1,750,000	440,048	3,471,217	1,950,000
July.....	2,910,000	277,000	2,918,300	1,002,000
August.....	3,672,200	748,000	3,815,000	2,698,000
September.....	7,543,573	473,167	3,140,923	2,754,185
October.....	7,215,700	820,000	5,727,500	2,844,010
November.....	6,916,300	190,169		
December.....	8,097,145	75,592		
Year.....	\$59,616,357	\$5,898,011	\$37,624,696	\$18,222,908

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION.**—There was another extraordinary increase in the volume of money in circulation, a total of \$44,753,000, making in two months an increase of more than \$94,000,000. Such an increase in so short a time is without any parallel in recent years. More than \$52,000,000 of the increase is in gold of which \$37,000,000 was gained in October. The other gains were \$1,677,000 in silver dollars, \$948,000 in subsidiary silver, \$3,845,000 in silver certificates, \$7,408,000 in United States notes and \$1,197,000 in National bank notes. There was a decrease of \$589,000 in gold certificates, \$5,004,000 in Treasury notes and \$1,840,000 in currency certificates. The following statement shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on the dates named, the estimated population and the per capita circulation:

## MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$484,723,547	\$463,995,930	\$478,771,490	\$516,340,979
Silver dollars.....	59,205,827	53,445,831	56,513,178	59,190,802
Subsidiary silver.....	64,417,885	59,699,467	60,238,298	61,171,736
Gold certificates.....	49,936,439	38,867,689	38,796,689	38,197,509
Silver certificates.....	338,076,648	345,736,894	354,431,474	357,777,122
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	115,726,709	91,262,524	88,964,047	83,956,764
United States notes.....	230,855,873	231,964,734	249,547,300	256,990,326
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	31,605,000	38,395,000	34,305,000	38,465,000
National bank notes.....	206,653,836	215,798,526	230,804,863	222,002,576
Total.....	\$1,579,208,724	\$1,589,169,634	\$1,582,302,369	\$1,627,055,614
Population of United States.....	70,630,000	71,645,000	71,740,000	71,900,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$22.36	\$22.18	\$22.05	\$22.63

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The Treasury lost \$16,000,000 of cash last month, but retired about \$4,000,000 of certificates and Treasury notes out-

standing, making its net loss \$12,000,000. Of this \$7,000,000 was gold and nearly \$5,000,000 was legal-tender notes, greenbacks. The total gold holdings of the Government are \$155,000,000 against which are \$38,000,000 of gold certificates outstanding, leaving the net gold in the Treasury \$117,000,000.

## MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$83,378,802	\$106,561,114	\$121,772,787	\$107,706,505
Gold bullion.....	29,830,315	33,264,086	40,998,574	47,617,323
Silver Dollars.....	364,063,702	381,056,100	380,688,963	381,361,339
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	116,681,740	114,829,399	118,064,557
Subsidiary silver.....	12,764,321	15,909,801	15,126,483	14,632,846
United States notes.....	115,825,143	114,716,282	97,183,716	89,731,690
National bank notes.....	7,063,137	13,815,370	12,834,494	12,981,668
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$787,547,542</b>	<b>\$782,004,553</b>	<b>\$783,364,366</b>	<b>\$767,065,133</b>
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	538,344,856	514,365,057	516,437,100	512,399,195
<b>Net cash in Treasury.....</b>	<b>\$204,202,686</b>	<b>\$267,739,496</b>	<b>\$266,947,266</b>	<b>\$254,665,938</b>

THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE COUNTRY.—The estimated stock of money in the country on November 1, exclusive of certificates and Treasury notes of 1890, was \$1,881,751,000, an increase in one month of \$32,500,000, of \$75,000,000 since September 1, and of \$98,000,000 since January 1, last. The gold supply increased \$30,000,000 during the month, \$68,000,000 in the past two months, and \$78,000,000 since January 1. The only other important change is in National bank notes—an increase of \$21,000,000 having occurred since the beginning of the year. The following statement shows the amount of each kind of money in the country on the dates mentioned:

## TOTAL SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$568,106,939	\$570,557,063	\$600,544,227	\$624,047,484
Gold bullion.....	29,830,315	33,264,086	40,998,574	47,617,323
Silver dollars.....	423,239,639	434,502,041	437,232,141	439,532,141
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	116,681,740	114,829,399	118,064,557
Subsidiary silver.....	77,182,008	75,892,288	75,354,781	75,894,532
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	218,716,973	229,613,866	233,639,357	234,984,444
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,783,409,410</b>	<b>\$1,806,909,130</b>	<b>\$1,849,240,495</b>	<b>\$1,881,751,552</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion:

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ 80	.....	Twenty marks.....	\$4.75	\$4.80
Mexican dollars.....	50	\$ 51½	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian notes, Chilean pesos.....	48½	48	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.79	4.83
English silver.....	4.86	4.87½	Mexican doubloons.....	15.55	15.75
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.87	4.89	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.50	19.60
Five francs.....	94	97	Ten guilders.....	3.95	3.99
Twenty francs.....	3.86	3.91			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 80d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 65 @ 65½c. Fine silver (Government assay), 65½ @ 66c.

UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.—The net debt of the United States Government was increased last month \$7,000,000, making an increase of \$40,000,000 since January 1. There have been very few changes in the detailed debt statement, a reduc-

tion in the cash assets alone reflects the increase in the net debt. A comparative statement of the debt on the dates named is given below :

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Sept. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.
<b>Interest bearing debt:</b>				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
" " 1907, 4 " .....	559,661,750	559,661,750	559,661,750	559,661,750
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	50,510	46,560	46,560	46,280
Loan of 1904, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
" " 1925, 4 " .....	62,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
<b>Total interest-bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$747,361,960</b>	<b>\$847,364,260</b>	<b>\$847,364,260</b>	<b>\$847,364,480</b>
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,674,510	1,622,960	1,621,790	1,607,010
<b>Debt bearing no interest:</b>				
Legal tender and old demand notes....	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,263
National bank note redemption acct....	22,659,734	19,259,828	18,848,788	18,474,300
Fractional currency.....	6,966,594	6,991,184	6,990,504	6,990,504
<b>Total non-interest bearing debt.....</b>	<b>\$376,368,922</b>	<b>\$372,866,376</b>	<b>\$372,471,635</b>	<b>\$372,100,247</b>
<b>Total interest and non-interest debt.</b>	<b>1,125,636,482</b>	<b>1,221,843,596</b>	<b>1,221,457,695</b>	<b>1,221,071,717</b>
<b>Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:</b>				
Gold certificates.....	50,099,899	40,498,189	40,398,599	39,566,139
Silver " .....	346,702,504	357,204,504	364,476,504	366,463,504
Certificates of deposit.....	34,450,000	39,225,000	34,715,000	35,000,000
Treasury notes of 1890 .....	187,771,230	128,741,230	125,004,230	123,229,230
<b>Total certificates and notes.....</b>	<b>\$568,023,673</b>	<b>\$563,656,973</b>	<b>\$564,594,333</b>	<b>\$564,340,923</b>
<b>Aggregate debt.....</b>	<b>1,693,649,155</b>	<b>1,785,500,569</b>	<b>1,786,052,028</b>	<b>1,785,412,640</b>
<b>Cash in the Treasury:</b>				
Total cash assets.....	787,578,447	849,368,746	849,642,772	866,676,221
Demand liabilities.....	606,551,247	606,042,346	606,468,317	606,106,400
<b>Balance.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$243,346,400</b>	<b>\$241,154,455</b>	<b>\$238,572,761</b>
Gold reserve.....	63,262,268	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	114,764,932	143,346,400	141,154,455	138,572,761
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$178,027,200</b>	<b>\$243,346,400</b>	<b>\$241,154,455</b>	<b>\$238,572,761</b>
<b>Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.</b>	<b>\$47,366,263</b>	<b>\$73,497,196</b>	<b>\$90,908,230</b>	<b>\$97,498,956</b>

**FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.**—The movements of merchandise and specie in September very nearly balanced. The net exports of merchandise were \$34,000,000 and the net imports of gold were about the same amount. The net exports of silver were about \$4,800,000, but we imported \$151,000 of gold ore and \$1,043,000 of silver ore, making the total net exports for the month only about \$3,600,000. The exports were the largest for September in many years, while the imports continued to be at the minimum point. For the nine months of the year the exports of merchandise were nearly \$144,000,000. For the first time in seven years the imports of gold exceed the exports for the nine months. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and nine months ended Sept. 30, for the past six years :

## EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF SEPTEMBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$82,854,095	\$61,504,737	Exp., \$21,349,348	Imp., \$7,106,138	Exp., \$953,168
1892.....	62,906,483	67,466,082	Imp., 4,557,579	Exp., 2,324,127	" 1,190,606
1893.....	72,026,798	46,900,612	Exp., 25,726,186	Imp., 5,242,063	" 2,827,236
1894.....	58,738,678	50,647,668	" 8,150,977	" 418,118	" 3,108,034
1895.....	58,540,063	65,305,620	Imp., 6,765,257	Exp., 16,674,609	" 3,616,301
1896.....	66,068,564	50,825,706	Exp., 34,272,899	Imp., 34,068,080	" 4,792,432
<b>NINE MONTHS.</b>					
1891.....	637,502,970	627,146,154	Exp., 10,446,816	Exp., 64,458,941	Exp., 5,539,846
1892.....	635,310,069	636,106,919	" 29,204,080	" 51,814,596	" 10,172,447
1893.....	603,221,873	625,325,372	Imp., 22,103,499	" 10,317,882	" 18,413,460
1894.....	576,618,279	508,590,042	Exp., 78,028,234	" 73,815,163	" 27,999,672
1895.....	557,827,466	601,043,139	Imp., 43,115,673	" 44,350,343	" 20,663,946
1896.....	666,029,386	522,058,144	Exp., 143,971,242	Imp., 9,318,435	" 37,966,404

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of October, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1896.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				OCTOBER, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.			Lowest.	High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchafson, Topeka & Santa Fe.	28 3/4	34	17 1/4	Feb. 24	8 1/4	Aug. 7	14 1/4	12	14 1/4
preferred	36 1/4	16	26 1/4	Feb. 24	14 1/4	Aug. 7	24 1/4	18 1/4	24 1/4
Atlantic & Pacific.	2	1 1/4	3 1/4	Feb. 6	1 1/4	Jan. 7	....	....	....
Baltimore & Ohio.	66 1/4	32 1/4	44	Jan. 27	10 1/4	Sept. 2	15 1/4	13 1/4	15 1/4
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts.	24	19	25	May 16	15	Feb. 11	....	....	....
Canadian Pacific.	63 1/4	38	62 1/4	May 27	52	Jan. 4	57 1/4	57 1/4	57 1/4
Canada Southern.	57 1/4	42	51 1/4	Feb. 10	40 1/4	Aug. 7	47 1/4	43 1/4	47 1/4
Central of New Jersey.	116 1/4	87 1/4	109 1/4	Apr. 23	87 1/4	Aug. 10	104 1/4	98	104 1/4
Central Pacific.	21 1/4	12	15 1/4	Feb. 15	13 1/4	Aug. 22	18 1/4	13 1/4	18 1/4
Ches. & Ohio vtg. ctf.	23 1/4	12 1/4	18 1/4	Apr. 23	11	Aug. 8	16 1/4	13 1/4	16 1/4
Chicago & Alton.	160	147	160	Jan. 18	146	Aug. 11	160	154	156 1/4
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	22 1/4	69	82 1/4	Apr. 24	53	Aug. 7	77	69 1/4	75 1/4
Chicago & E. Illinois	57	43 1/4	43	Feb. 13	37 1/4	Aug. 10	....	....	....
preferred	106	90	100 1/4	Mar. 5	90	Aug. 11	....	....	....
Chicago Gas.	78 1/4	49 1/4	71 1/4	Oct. 31	44 1/4	Aug. 8	71 1/4	57 1/4	71 1/4
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul.	78 1/4	53 1/4	79 1/4	June 17	56 1/4	Aug. 10	74	67 1/4	73 1/4
preferred	120	114 1/4	120 1/4	Mar. 2	117 1/4	Aug. 7	125	122	125
Chicago & Northwestern.	107 1/4	87 1/4	108 1/4	Apr. 23	85 1/4	Aug. 10	106 1/4	98 1/4	106 1/4
preferred	151	137	150	June 30	140 1/4	Aug. 28	145	145	145
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific.	84 1/4	59	74 1/4	Feb. 24	49 1/4	Aug. 7	67 1/4	57 1/4	66
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	46	28 1/4	45 1/4	Apr. 27	30 1/4	Aug. 8	42	38	41 1/4
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	123 1/4	104	125 1/4	July 8	117	Jan. 7	121 1/4	120	121 1/4
preferred	50	23	39 1/4	Feb. 10	19 1/4	Aug. 8	28 1/4	23 1/4	28
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	97	89 1/4	90 1/4	Feb. 20	73	Aug. 7	80	73	80
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	11 1/4	3	4 1/4	Jan. 16	1 1/4	July 18	1	1	1
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41 1/4	20 1/4	34 1/4	Feb. 24	14 1/4	Aug. 7	20 1/4	16 1/4	19 1/4
Columbus & Hock. Val. Coal	6 1/4	2	4 1/4	Mar. 7	3 1/4	July 9	....	....	....
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	27 1/4	14 1/4	18 1/4	Jan. 27	12 1/4	Aug. 10	17	15 1/4	16 1/4
preferred	69 1/4	55	60	July 22	50	June 22	58	58	58
Consolidated Gas Co.	161 1/4	126	164 1/4	Apr. 29	138	Aug. 10	150	142	148
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	184 1/4	118	120 1/4	Feb. 11	114 1/4	Aug. 10	125	120	124
Delaware, Lack. & Western	174	154	186	June 5	138	Aug. 10	156	153	156
Denver & Rio Grande.	17 1/4	10	14	Feb. 4	10	Aug. 25	11 1/4	11 1/4	11 1/4
preferred	55 1/4	32 1/4	51	Feb. 24	87	Aug. 7	42 1/4	41	42 1/4
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102 1/4	94	100 1/4	May 6	89	Jan. 2	95	94	95
Erie.	....	....	15 1/4	Mar. 12	10 1/4	Aug. 7	15	13 1/4	15
1st pref.	....	....	41 1/4	Mar. 17	27	July 29	34 1/4	31	33
2d pref.	....	....	25	Mar. 16	13	Aug. 6	19 1/4	18	19 1/4
Evansville & Terre Haute	51	28	34 1/4	Feb. 24	24	Aug. 15	81	28 1/4	81
Express Adams.	153	140	150 1/4	Apr. 23	135	Aug. 25	147 1/4	143	147 1/4
American.	119 1/4	109	116	May 25	105	Aug. 18	111 1/4	108 1/4	111 1/4
United States	50	36	48	Apr. 24	35	Aug. 25	43	35 1/4	43
Wells, Fargo.	115	95	101	Feb. 15	80	Aug. 14	90	85	90
Great Northern, preferred.	134	100	121	May 7	108 1/4	Mar. 13	115	115	115
Illinois Central.	106	81 1/4	98	Jan. 31	84 1/4	Aug. 11	94	88	92 1/4
Iowa Central.	11 1/4	5 1/4	10 1/4	Feb. 8	5 1/4	Aug. 13	8 1/4	6 1/4	8 1/4
preferred	38	19	38	Apr. 23	19	Aug. 7	30	24	30
Laclede Gas.	39 1/4	14 1/4	30	Apr. 27	17	July 20	26 1/4	22 1/4	23 1/4
Lake Erie & Western.	28	18 1/4	22 1/4	Feb. 5	12 1/4	Aug. 10	18	14 1/4	17 1/4
preferred	85	61	75	Feb. 7	55 1/4	Aug. 8	68	63 1/4	66
Lake Shore.	153 1/4	134 1/4	154 1/4	June 17	134 1/4	Jan. 7	149	143 1/4	149
Long Island.	84 1/4	83	84	Jan. 7	59 1/4	Oct. 29	65	59 1/4	59 1/4
Long Island Traction.	22	5	22	Feb. 19	16	Jan. 10	....	....	....
Louisville & Nashville.	66 1/4	39	55 1/4	Feb. 24	37 1/4	Aug. 28	49 1/4	41 1/4	47 1/4
Louis., N. A. & Chic., Tr. ctf.	104 1/4	6	10 1/4	Feb. 18	5 1/4	Oct. 21	2	2	1 1/4
preferred	23 1/4	15 1/4	24 1/4	Feb. 13	2	Oct. 23	6	2	8
Manhattan consol.	119 1/4	96	113 1/4	Feb. 11	78 1/4	Aug. 13	94 1/4	88 1/4	98
Michigan Central.	103	91 1/4	97 1/4	Feb. 11	89	Aug. 28	93 1/4	90	93 1/4
Minneapolis & St. Louis.	26 1/4	14	21 1/4	Feb. 21	12	Aug. 21	17	13	17
1st pref.	88	73	83	Feb. 21	54	Aug. 8	72	68	72
2d pref.	62	39 1/4	53 1/4	Apr. 22	30	Aug. 10	44 1/4	42	44 1/4
Mobile & Ohio.	27	13 1/4	25	Jan. 11	14	Aug. 10	18	18	18
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9 1/4	13 1/4	Feb. 21	9 1/4	Aug. 6	12 1/4	10 1/4	10 1/4
preferred.	41	18 1/4	31 1/4	Feb. 25	16	July 20	26 1/4	21 1/4	26 1/4

## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1895.				OCTOBER, 1895.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 24	15	—Aug. 7	22	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$
Nash, Chat. & St. Louis.....	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	64	70	—Oct. 2	70	—Oct. 2	70	70	70
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104 $\frac{1}{2}$	90	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 25	88	—Aug. 6	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	94 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	15	—Jan. 22	9	—Aug. 11	13	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$
1st preferred.....	75	65	80	—Jan. 22	67 $\frac{1}{2}$	—July 28	70	70	70
2d preferred.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 13	20	—Aug. 10	28	23	28
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 20	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	30	16	20	—Feb. 20	25	—Jan. 22	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England.....	65 $\frac{1}{2}$	29	51 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 28	35	—July 21	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., New Haven & Hartford.....	218	174	186	—Feb. 10	160	—July 23	174	167 $\frac{1}{2}$	173 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	194	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 10	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	6	—Aug. 11	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 6	12	—Aug. 8	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$
Norfolk & Western.....	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Oct. 23	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 29	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	17	—Oct. 31	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—May 8	17	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	17
North American Co.....	7	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 24	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 7	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Oct. 27	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	—May 23	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
pref tr. receipts.....	27	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Oct. 23	10	—Apr. 16	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$
Ohio & Mississippi.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 4	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—June 12	14	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	14
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	32	17	22	—Apr. 14	10	—Feb. 18	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Short Line.....	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	16	—Sept. 25	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 14	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pacific Mail.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	31	—Feb. 10	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 7	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 10	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	—June 23	2	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	2
Phila. & Reading.....	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Oct. 31	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 7	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	27 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 7	11	—Aug. 7	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	50	—Feb. 27	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 12	43	43	43
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 31	17	—Jan. 15	.....	.....	.....
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178 $\frac{1}{2}$	146	164	—Feb. 11	138	—Aug. 7	154	145	154
Rio Grande Western.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 10	16	—Feb. 8	.....	.....	.....
preferred.....	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	30	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 10	39	—Jan. 27	.....	.....	.....
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	120	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 27	108	—Sept. 15	112 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	110 $\frac{1}{2}$
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 3	53	—Aug. 14	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	94	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	—Feb. 7	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 10	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	13	—Feb. 26	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 10	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
St. Paul & Duluth.....	35 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 24	15	—Sept. 16	20	19	19
preferred.....	96	88	91	—Feb. 10	84	—Sept. 10	.....	.....	.....
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	115	—Jan. 11	105	—Aug. 11	110 $\frac{1}{2}$	110	110 $\frac{1}{2}$
Southern Pacific Co.....	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 14	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Oct. 22	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$
Southern Railway.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	11	—Feb. 6	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 7	9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	9
preferred.....	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	22	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 25	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 8	27 $\frac{1}{2}$	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	46 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 10	13	—July 20	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$
Texas & Pacific.....	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 25	5	—Aug. 7	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	10	—Apr. 21	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 25	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	9
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 13	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	—July 29	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wabash R. R.....	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	5	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 24	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 7	7	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	7
preferred.....	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 24	11	—Aug. 7	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	16
Western Union.....	95 $\frac{1}{2}$	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	87 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 22	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 10	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	81 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	18 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 14	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 27	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	29	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 13	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 8	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	20	23 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wisconsin Central.....	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 24	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 21	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
<b>"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:</b>									
American Co. Oil Co.....	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	14	19	—Jan. 27	8	—July 20	16	12	16
preferred.....	79 $\frac{1}{2}$	59	63 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 14	37	—Aug. 10	57	47	57
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121 $\frac{1}{2}$	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	120 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 21	95	—Aug. 10	116	105	115 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	107	90 $\frac{1}{2}$	104	—May 27	82 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 8	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	85 $\frac{1}{2}$	100
American Tobacco Co.....	117	63	95	—Apr. 2	51	—Aug. 10	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	76 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	116	90	108	—Feb. 13	95	—Aug. 4	.....	.....	.....
Dts. & Cattle Feed Co.....	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 23	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 7	.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co.....	41	20	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Mar. 13	20	—July 16	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	29 $\frac{1}{2}$
National Lead Co.....	38	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 21	16	—Aug. 10	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	94 $\frac{1}{2}$	78	91 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Apr. 17	75	—Aug. 27	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	88
National Linseed Oil Co.....	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	15	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	—June 23	13	—Aug. 21	16	15	16
National Starch Manfg. Co.....	12	5	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 21	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Jan. 14	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 7	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 31	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	17	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 7	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 31	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. Leather Co.....	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	7	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 8	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	—July 16	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	58	60 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Feb. 14	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 10	69 $\frac{1}{2}$	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	69 $\frac{1}{2}$
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	29	—Jan. 13	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	—Aug. 8	25 $\frac{1}{2}$	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
preferred.....	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	75	80	—Jan. 15	65	—Oct. 12	71 $\frac{1}{2}$	65	69 $\frac{1}{2}$

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 12, '95	....	....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1905	7,000,000	Q J	69½	Oct. 28, '96	69½	67	42,000
Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1905	93,868,000	A & O	76	Oct. 31, '96	76½	72½	130,000
adjustment, g. 4's.....	1905	51,728,000	NOV	40	Oct. 31, '96	40	39½	3,733,000
Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colorado Midland 1st g. 6's.....	1906	429,000	J & D	77½	July 29, '97	.....	.....	.....
eng Tr. Co. certs of dep. ....	.....	5,821,000	.....	60	Oct. 22, '96	60	60	5,000
cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	973,000	F & A	21	June 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certs of dep. ....	.....	3,893,000	.....	19¾	Oct. 27, '96	25½	28½	44,000
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1937	18,790,000	J & J	50	Apr. 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d W. d. g. g. s. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	92	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
Western div. inc. ....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	¾	Oct. 26, '96	¾	¾	10,000
div. small.....	1910	1,811,000	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central div. inc.....	1922	1,811,000	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.).....	1919	3,000,000	A & O	105	July 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
5's. gold.....	1886-1925	10,000,000	{ F&A	92	July 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F&A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1908	11,988,000	{ F&A	108	July 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F&A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., ..	1900	6,000,000	M & N	85	Oct. 26, '96	85	83	5,000
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1900	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s.....	1900	10,667,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1903	10,483,000	J & J	79	May 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,851,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
"B".....	2043	9,855,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. s. 5's.....	1919	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Gen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1930	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. s. g. 5's.....	1930	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's.....	1943	7,650,000	{ J&D	115	Oct. 29, '96	116	114	69,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ J&D	112½	May 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	110½	Sept. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s.....	1924	3,500,000	A & O	75	Oct. 23, '96	75	74	10,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	52	June 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
Union Elevated 1st g. g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	73½	Oct. 29, '96	74½	71	97,000
Seaside & Bkin Bdge 1st g. g. 5's.....	1942	1,865,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	74	Oct. 30, '96	74	72	20,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	96	Sept. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	119	Sept. 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	118½	Oct. 23, '96	118½	117	2,000
Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121½	May 26, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's.....	1913	1,349,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's.....	1906	6,500,000	J & D	104½	Oct. 23, '96	106	104½	11,000
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	A & O	100	Oct. 28, '96	100	100	1,000
registered.....	.....	.....	A & O	97	Feb. 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
Minneap' & St. Louis 1st 7's.....	1927	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's. 1890		825,000	A & O	105½	May 21 '96	....	....	....
1st 5's. 1891		1,905,000	A & O	102	July 23 '96	....	....	....
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's. 1906		18,920,000	J & J	107	Oct. 30 '96	107¾	106	69,000
2d mortg. 5's. 1913		5,100,000	M & S	101	Oct. 29 '96	102¾	101	18,000
registered.			M & S	108¼	Apr. 7 '96	....	....	....
Col. & Cin. Midla'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s. 1899		2,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 31 '92	....	....	....
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's. 1887		4,880,000	M & N	95	July 3 '96	....	....	....
Chat., Rom. & Colu's gtd. g. 5's. 1837		2,090,000	M & S	70	July 25 '96	....	....	....
Central Railroad of New Jersey,								
1st consolidated 7's. 1899		3,886,000	Q J	104½	Oct. 29 '96	105¼	104¼	6,000
convertible 7's. 1902		1,187,000	M & N	116	June 23 '96	....	....	....
deb. 5's. 1908		466,000	M & N	114	Apr. 2 '96	....	....	....
gen. mtg. 5's. 1907		41,604,000	J & J	113	Oct. 30 '96	115	112	100,000
registered.			Q J	112	Oct. 23 '96	112	110¼	33,000
Lehigh & W. B. con. used. 7's. 1900		5,500,000	Q M	102½	Oct. 27 '96	103	102	24,000
mortgage 5's. 1912		2,887,000	M & N	90	May 15 '96	....	....	....
Am. Dock & Improvm't Co. 5's. 1921		4,987,000	J & J	111	Oct. 22 '96	111¼	110	18,000
N. J. Southern 1st. gtd 6's. 1899		411,000	J & J	109½	July 23 '96	....	....	....
Central Pacific g'd bonds. 1897		19,493,000	J & J	100	Sept. 22 '96	....	....	....
San Joaquin br. 6's. 1900		6,080,000	A & O	99	Oct. 16 '96	100¼	99	9,000
Mtge. gold gtd. 5's. 1899		11,000,000	A & O	104	Aug. 21 '96	....	....	....
Central Pacific land grant 5's. 1900		2,526,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16 '96	....	....	....
ext g. 6'series A B C D. 1898		5,598,000	J & J	98	May 8 '96	98	98	1,000
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's. 1918		4,358,000	J & J	107¼	Nov. 27 '96	....	....	....
Western Pacific bonds 6's. 1899		2,735,000	J & J	100	Oct. 28 '96	100	100	5,000
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's. gtd. 1907		8,964,000	J & J	101	Aug. 5 '96	....	....	....
50 year m. g. 5's. 1898		4,800,000	A & O	92¼	Oct. 17 '96	98	92	77,000
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's. 1896		1,500,000	J & J	108¾	Dec. 13 '93	....	....	....
Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd. 1896		2,287,000	J & J	106¼	June 17 '96	....	....	....
6's. g. Series A. 1908		2,000,000	A & O	114½	Oct. 17 '96	114¼	114	6,000
Mortgage gold 6's. 1911		2,000,000	A & O	117	Sept. 18 '96	....	....	....
1st con. g. 5's. 1899		23,558,000	M & N	106	Oct. 29 '96	107¾	104¼	70,000
registered.			M & N	100¼	Sept. 21 '96	....	....	....
Gen. m. g. 4½'s. 1902		21,798,000	M & S	71	Oct. 30 '96	71¼	67	199,000
registered.			M & S	85	Dec. 30 '96	....	....	....
(E. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's. 1899		6,000,000	J & J	95	Oct. 31 '96	95	93	38,000
2d con. g. 4's. 1899		1,000,000	J & J	83	Oct. 29 '96	83	82	26,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's. 1940		650,000	J & J	92½	June 17 '96	....	....	....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's. 1941		400,000	M & S	96	Dec. 21 '96	....	....	....
Elz. Lex. & B. S. g. g. 5's. 1902		3,007,000	M & S	97½	Oct. 22 '96	97¼	95	22,000
Ches. Ohio & S'hwestern m. 6's. 1911		6,176,800	F & A	105½	Feb. 15 '96	....	....	....
2d mtge. 6's. 1911		2,985,000	F & A	48½	Sept. 10 '96	....	....	....
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1898		1,984,000	J & J	110¼	Aug. 22 '96	....	....	....
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's. 1903		1,832,000	J & J	111½	July 8 '96	....	....	....
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's. 1900		1,785,000	F & A	108½	Oct. 21 '96	108¼	108¼	3,000
2d 7's. 1900		300,000	M & N	107½	Oct. 7 '96	107½	107½	2,000
St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's. 1898		188,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 7 '92	....	....	....
Miss. Riv. Bdge 1st s. fd g. 6's. 1912		547,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30 '96	....	....	....
Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's. 1896		8,241,000	A & O	98¼	Oct. 19 '96	98¾	98¼	2,000
deb. 6's. 1896		935,000	J & D	97	Jan. 24 '96	....	....	....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's. 1903		28,324,000	J & J	115	Oct. 31 '96	116	114¼	80,000
5's. sinking fund. 1901		2,315,000	A & O	101	Aug. 5 '96	....	....	....
5's. debentures. 1913		9,000,000	M & N	98	Oct. 29 '96	98¼	94	41,000
convertible 5's. 1903		15,283,900	M & S	97	Oct. 30 '96	97	96	16,000
(Iowa div.) sink. fd 5's. 1919		2,880,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 21 '96	....	....	....
4's. 1919		7,753,000	A & O	96	Oct. 29 '96	96	93¾	18,000
Denver div. 4's. 1822		6,240,000	F & A	89¾	Oct. 2 '96	89¾	89¾	10,000
4's. 1921		3,400,000	M & S	88¼	Nov. 6 '93	....	....	....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's. 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18 '96	....	....	....
Nebraska extensi'n 4's. 1827		26,730,000	M & N	86¼	Oct. 31 '96	93¼	85	139,000
registered.			M & N	90¾	July 10 '95	....	....	....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's. 1911		8,000,000	M & S	112½	Oct. 29 '96	114¼	113¼	57,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. fd c'y. 6's. 1907		2,989,000	J & D	110	Aug. 14 '96	....	....	....
small bonds. 1907			J & D	112	Apr. 2 '96	....	....	....

## BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & E. Ill. 1st con. 6's, gold ..1984		2,658,000	A & O	122½	Oct. 12, '98	122½	122	10,000
"    gen. con. 1st 5's.....1987		7,487,000	M & N	96¾	Oct. 29, '98	97	96¾	27,000
"    registered.....1987			M & N	108	Oct. 8, '98			
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's.....1986		4,626,000	J & J	95	Oct. 26, '98	96	95	4,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st m. 8's P. D. ....1908		3,674,000	F & A	104½	Oct. 8, '98	104½	104½	4,000
"    2d 7-10 P. D. ....1908		1,106,000	F & A	127	July 11, '98			
"    1st 7's 3 gold. R. div. ....1902		3,796,500	J & J	123	Sept. 17, '98			
"    1st 7's 2.....1902			J & J	120	Feb. 8, '94			
"    1st m. Iowa & M. 7's.....1897		1,731,000	J & J	125	Sept. 28, '98			
"    1st m. Iowa & D. 7's.....1899		434,000	J & J	127½	June 5, '98			
"    1st m. C. & M. 7's.....1903		2,363,000	J & J	125	Oct. 22, '98	125	125	2,000
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's, 1905		11,298,000	J & J	126½	Oct. 29, '98	126½	124	16,000
"    1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. 1908		3,605,000	J & J	126½	Oct. 14, '98	126½	107½	8,000
"    1st 6's, Southw'n div. ....1909		4,000,000	J & J	113½	Oct. 2, '98	118½	113½	6,000
"    1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. ....1919		2,500,000	J & J	107	Oct. 21, '98	107	107	5,000
"    1st So. Min. div. 6's.....1910		7,432,000	J & J	114	Oct. 29, '98	115	113½	18,000
"    1st H't & Dk. div. 7's, 1910		5,680,000	J & J	124½	Oct. 29, '98	124½	123	
"    5's.....1910		960,000	J & J	104½	Sept. 30, '98			19,000
"    Chic. & Pac. div. 6's, 1910		3,000,000	J & J	116	Oct. 31, '98	116	116	4,000
"    1st Chic. & P. W. 5's, 1921		25,340,000	J & J	111¾	Oct. 31, '98	112	111	84,000
"    Chic. & M. R. div. 5's, 1926		3,083,000	J & J	108	Oct. 29, '98	108	105	17,000
"    Mineral Point div. 5's, 1920		2,840,000	J & J	104½	Oct. 21, '98	106¾	104½	8,000
"    Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's, 1921		1,860,000	J & J	108½	July 16, '98			
"    Wis. & Min. div. 5's, 1921		4,755,000	J & J	107	Oct. 27, '98	107	107	2,000
"    terminal 5's.....1914		4,748,000	J & J	108½	Sept. 15, '98			
"    Far. & So. 6's assu. ....1924		1,250,000	J & J	118	Sept. 30, '94			
"    mtg. con. s'l'k. f'd 5's, 1916		1,690,000	J & J	98	Jan. 7, '98			
"    Dakota & Gt. S. 5's.....1916		2,856,000	J & J	106½	Oct. 29, '98	106½	106½	20,000
"    g. m. g. 4's, series A.....1909		19,010,000	J & J	98¾	Oct. 29, '98	98¾	92	14,000
"    registered.....			Q	94½	Dec. 11, '98			
"    Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's, 1910		2,155,000	J & D	115¾	Oct. 8, '98	115¾	115¾	10,000
"    1st convt. 6's.....1913		5,082,000	J & D	115	Sept. 28, '98			
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's.....1915		12,771,000	Q F	135	Oct. 30, '98	135	134	10,000
"    coupon gold 7's.....1902		12,336,000	J & D	117	Oct. 26, '98	117	116	17,000
"    registered d. gold 7's.....1902			J & D	117	Oct. 29, '98	117	116	4,000
"    sinking fund 6's.....1879-1929		6,011,000	A & O	115	Apr. 10, '98			
"    registered.....			A & O	114	May 27, '98			
"    5's.....1879-1929		7,301,000	A & O	108½	Oct. 31, '98	108	108½	17,000
"    registered.....			A & O	105¾	Oct. 6, '98	105¾	105¾	2,000
"    debenture 5's.....1903		9,800,000	M & N	107	Oct. 29, '98	108	106½	40,000
"    registered.....			M & N	106	Jan. 16, '98			
"    25 year debent. 5's.....1909		6,000,000	M & N	105	Oct. 29, '98	105½	105	51,000
"    registered.....			M & N	104	May 15, '98			
"    30 year debent. 5's.....1921		9,800,000	A & O	105	Oct. 21, '98	105	105	15,000
"    registered.....			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '98			
"    extension 4's.....1896-1926		18,632,000	F A 15	102	Sept. 4, '98			
"    registered.....			F A 15	99½	May 11, '98			
Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's.....1901		720,000	J & J	107	Sept. 26, '98			
Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		600,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's.....1900		1,350,000	A & O	116	July 9, '98			
Chic. & Milwaukee 1st mtg. 7's.....1898		1,700,000	J & J	104½	Oct. 1, '98	104½	104½	2,000
Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's.....1907		1,582,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '98			
Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's.....1905		1,600,000	M & S	108	Jan. 7, '98			
Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's.....1909		1,900,000	M & S	105	July 21, '98			
Northern Illinois 1st 5's.....1910		1,500,000	M & S	106½	Mar. 31, '98			
Mil., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's, 1921		5,000,000	M & N	128	Oct. 16, '98	128	128	10,000
"    con. deb. 6's.....1907		436,000	F & A	104	May 13, '98			
"    ext. & impt. s'f'd g. 5's.....1929		4,148,000	F & A	110	Oct. 22, '98	110	107	20,000
"    Michigan div. 1st 6's.....1924		1,281,000	J & J	130	July 9, '98			
"    Ashland div. 1st 6's.....1925		1,000,000	M & S	123	Sept. 22, '98			
"    income.....1900		500,000	M & N	105	July 28, '98			
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup.....1917		12,100,000	J & J	124	Oct. 8, '98	124	124	8,000
"    6's registered.....1917			J & J	122	July 18, '98			
"    exten. and collat. 5's.....1934		40,417,000	J & J	99	Oct. 31, '98	100½	99	206,000
"    registered.....			J & J	99½	July 17, '98			
"    debenture 5's.....1921		4,500,000	M & S	91	Oct. 29, '98	91	88½	36,000
"    registered.....			M & S					
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	88½	June 12, '98			
"    1st 2½'s.....1905		1,200,000	J & J	65	Aug. 7, '98			
"    extension 4's.....1905		672,000	J & J	84	Oct. 14, '98			
Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's.....1923		2,750,000	A & O	104	Sept. 18, '98			
"    small bond.....1923			A & O	103	Apr. 26, '98			



BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1930		13,413,000	J & D	124	Oct. 26 '96	125½	123¾	44,000
{ Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	126	Oct. 21 '96	126	126	1,000
{ North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1930		800,000	J & J	125	May 4 '88			
{ St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	127	Oct. 26 '96	127	125	6,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		1,234,000	M & N	106½	May 15 '95			
{ gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1932		9,652,666	Q M	115	Oct. 28 '96	115	112¾	8,000
Ohic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1921		5,753,000	J & D	98¾	Mar. 13 '93			
{ coupons off. ....								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's. 1905		966,000	A & O	120	July 15 '96			
{ 2d g. 4½'s. .... 1937		2,000,000	J & J	108	Oct. 31 '96	106	106	5,000
{ Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,540,000	M & N	108	Oct. 27 '96	106	106	1,000
City Sub. R'y, Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1922		2,430,000	J & D	105½	Apr. 17 '95			
Clev., A. & C. Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1930		730,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. effs. 1st 5's for 1917		2,000,000	A & A	77	Oct. 26 '96	79	77	18,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1938		5,000,000	J & D	86	May 25 '95			
{ do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1939		5,000,000	J & J	98	Oct. 2 '95			
{ St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1930		9,750,000	M & N	98	Oct. 31 '96	98	90½	60,000
{ registered. ....								
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22 '95			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16 '95			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1991		4,000,000	J & J	88½	Oct. 6 '96	88½	89½	1,000
{ Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1936		7,790,000	Q F	95	Oct. 16 '96	95	95	17,000
{ registered. ....								
{ con. 6's. .... 1920		738,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29 '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's 1923		2,571,000	J & J	105	Sept. 28 '96			
Ind. Bloom. & W. 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	109	June 9 '96			
Ohio, Ind. & W. 1st pfd. 5's. 1938		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	74	Oct. 30 '96	74½	73½	32,000
{ income 4's. .... 1990		4,000,000	A	18	Oct. 24 '96	18	18	1,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	107	Oct. 22 '96	107	107	1,000
{ consol mortg. 7's. .... 1914			J & D	132	Sept. 16 '96			
{ sink fund 7's. .... 1914		3,991,000	J & D	119½	Nov. 19 '99			
{ gen. consol 6's. .... 1934			J & J	121	Oct. 6 '96	124	124	12,000
{ registered. ....		3,205,000	J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	105	Aug. 18 '96			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's 1933		4,300,000	A & O	105½	Sept. 29 '96			
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1932		2,481,000	J & J	120½	July 21 '96			
{ registered. ....			Q J					
Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1938		3,000,000	M & S	113	Oct. 31 '96	113½	111	60,000
{ registered. ....								
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. 1931		8,000,000	M & S	83½	Oct. 30 '96	84½	82	45,000
{ gen. mort. g. 6's. .... 1904		2,000,000	J & D	89½	Oct. 31 '96	89½	83	108,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27 '93			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	125	Sept. 2 '96			
{ Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4 '95			
{ Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. .... 1914		5,000,000	M & N	130½	Oct. 5 '96	130½	130	3,000
{ bonds, 7's. .... 1900		281,000	J & J	110	Oct. 2 '96	110	110	1,000
{ 7's. .... 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	134	Sept. 3 '96			
{ 1st c. gtd 7's. .... 1915		12,151,000	J & D	140	Oct. 9 '96	140	140	2,000
{ registered. ....			J & D	136	June 4 '93			
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,030,000	J & J	130	Oct. 30 '96	130	130	5,000
{ const. 5's. .... 1923		5,000,000	F & A	113½	Aug. 29 '96			
Warren 2d 7's. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	113½	Nov. 6 '95			
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
{ 1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. 1917		5,000,000	M & S	138	Oct. 25 '96	138	136	16,000
{ reg. .... 1917			M & S	137	Oct. 7 '96	137	137	5,000
{ Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. 1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Aug. 18 '96			
{ registered. .... 1906			A & O	128½	Feb. 12 '94			
{ 6's. .... 1906		7,000,000	A & O	112½	Oct. 16 '96	112½	110	2,000
{ registered. ....			A & O	115	July 29 '96			
{ Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	May 21 '96			
{ 1st r 7's. .... 1921			M & N	141½	Apr. 20 '96			
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 24 '96			
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1933		730,000	A & O					
Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1936		28,465,000	J & J	85½	Oct. 31 '96	87	85½	18,000
{ 1st mortg. g. 7's. .... 1900		6,382,500	M & N	112½	Sept. 10 '96			
{ imp't. m. g. 5's. .... 1925		8,103,500	J & D	91	Oct. 21 '96	81	81	10,000
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. 1d gt. 3½ S A. 1911		3,040,000	A & O	18	Oct. 27 '96	18½	17	25,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.	
Detroit & Mack. 1st lien g. 4s.....	1905	900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....	
g. 4s.....	1905	1,250,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....	1937	6,332,000	A & O	100	Oct. 2, '96	100	100	2,000	
registered.....	1916	1,000,000	A & O	101½	July 23, '99	.....	.....	.....	
2d 1 m 6s.....	1916	500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.....	1928	4,000,000	J & J	98	Oct. 27, '96	98	96	3,000	
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's.....	1937	2,482,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....	1897	2,149,000	M & S	108½	Oct. 22, '96	104½	103½	11,000	
2d extended 5's.....	1919	4,618,000	M & N	112½	Oct. 13, '96	113	112½	6,000	
3d extended 4½'s.....	1923	2,928,000	M & S	106½	Oct. 7, '96	107	106½	5,000	
4th extended 5's.....	1920	709,500	A & O	112½	Oct. 14, '96	112½	112	12,000	
5th extended 4's.....	1924	16,800,000	J & D	104½	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....	
1st cons. gold 7's.....	1920	3,705,977	M & S	135	Oct. 23, '96	135½	133	58,000	
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....	1920	7,500,000	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....	
Long Dock consol. 6's.....	1933	2,380,000	A & O	131	Oct. 23, '96	131½	101½	25,000	
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....	1916	1,500,000	J & D	132½	July 1, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.....	1908	2,800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
small.....	1908	12,000,000	J & J	102½	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.....	1908	1,100,000	A & O	107	Oct. 29, '96	110	107	159,000	
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....	1942	3,396,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....	1922	30,000,000	J & J	102	Aug. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....	
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....	1913	30,000,000	J & J	87	Oct. 30, '96	89	87	28,000	
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.....	1906	30,927,000	J & J	60	Oct. 29, '96	62	59½	248,000	
registered.....	1906	500,000	J & J	95	Dec. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....	
gen. lien 3-4s.....	1906	3,000,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Bureka Springs R'y 1st 6's, g.....	1933	2,096,000	J & J	108½	Sept. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Evans. & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....	1921	2,096,000	J & J	95	Sept. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....	
1st General g 5's.....	1942	875,500	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....	
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....	1923	450,000	A & O	95	Sept. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....	
Sul. Co. Rch. 1st g 5's.....	1930	1,591,000	A & O	90	Dec. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Evans. & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....	1926	3,999,000	J & J	109	Oct. 7, '96	109	109	1,000	
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....	1923	2,100,000	A & O	91	Apr. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....	
1st con. gold 5's.....	1939	3,063,000	M & N	80	Sept. 25, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....	1939	3,000,000	A & O	103	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....	1918	428,000	J & J	89½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....	
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....	1930	4,370,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
1st con. g 5's.....	1943	1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....	1941	7,699,000	J & J	51	Oct. 30, '96	52½	48	92,000	
Ft. Worth & D. C. cfs. dep. 1st 6's.....	1921	2,888,000	.....	50	Sept. 12, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....	1928	4,756,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's.....	1910	1,000,000	F & A	105	Apr. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....	
2d mortgage 7's.....	1905	13,418,000	J & D	96	Aug. 20, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's.....	1931	5,360,000	M & N	91½	Oct. 31, '96	91½	90½	180,000	
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g 5's.....	1927	3,746,000	J & J	89½	Apr. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Gd. Rapids & Indiana gen. 5's.....	1924	2,838,000	J & J	75	Jan. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....	
registered.....	1924	575,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's.....	1937	1,140,000	M & N	124	Oct. 1, '96	124	124	5,000	
New Haven & Derby con. 5's.....	1918	7,381,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....	
Houston & Texas Central R. R. 1st Waco & N. 7's.....	1903	4,297,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92	.....	.....	.....	
1st g. 5's (Int. gtd.).....	1937	3,455,000	J & J	108½	Oct. 29, '96	108½	108½	1,000	
Con. g. 6's (Int. gtd.).....	1912	705,000	A & O	99	Oct. 10, '96	99	99	12,000	
Gen. g. 4's (Int. gtd.).....	1921	411,000	A & O	68	Oct. 3, '96	68	67	17,000	
Deben. 6's p. & Int. gtd.....	1897	.....	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....	
Deben. 4's p. & Int. gtd.....	1897	.....	A & O	88	Mar. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....	
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's.....	1951	1,500,000	J & J	110	Aug. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....	
registered.....	1951	2,490,000	J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....	
gold 2½'s.....	1951	.....	J & J	104	June 4, '96	.....	.....	.....	
registered.....	1951	.....	J & J	97	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....	

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Illinois Central gold 4's.....	1962	15,000,000	A & O	100	Sept. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's regist'd.....			A & O	101	July 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's.....	1963	24,679,000	M & N	99½	Oct. 26, '98	99½	98	5,000
gold 4's registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
2-10 g. 4's.....	1904	4,808,000	J & J	99	June 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
2-10 g. 4's registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st g 3½ sterl. £500,000.....	1951	2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West'n Line 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,550,000	F & A	102½	Sept. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Calro Bridge 4's g.....	1950	3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Springfield div. coupon 5's.....	1898	1,600,000	J & J	100½	Aug. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Middle div. registered 5's.....	1921	600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic. St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....	1897	539,000	M & N	109½	Nov. 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
1st consol. 7's.....	1897	826,000	M & N	105	Dec. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's.....	1951	16,528,000	J D 15	116	Sept. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
gold 5's registered.....			J D 15	115	Oct. 25, '94	.....	.....	.....
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's.....	1951	3,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bellev. & So. Ill. gtd g. 4½'s.....	1897	998,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....	1907	1,384,000	J & J	120	Apr. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex bonds.....	1906	1,800,000	A & O	28	Apr. 13, '98	.....	.....	.....
stamped.....			A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....	1905	1,824,000	J & J	95	Aug. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....	1909	800,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st ext. g. 5's.....	1943	500,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st 6's gold.....	1919	7,954,000	M & N	117	Oct. 15, '98	117	116	4,000
2d mortgage 4½-5's.....	1909	6,598,000	M & S	87	Oct. 13, '98	67	67	3,000
3d mortgage 9-4's.....	1921	2,701,000	M & S	20	Oct. 20, '98	20	20	1,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....	1938	6,322,000	J & D	94	Oct. 30, '98	95	93	63,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1929	3,040,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....	1925	3,177,000	J & J	41	Oct. 21, '98	41	41	4,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....	1929	1,979,000	M & S	80	Mar. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....	1937	7,250,000	J & J	114	Oct. 26, '98	116	114	18,000
2d mtge. g. 5's.....	1941	2,600,000	J & J	99	Oct. 29, '98	99	99	1,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1945	2,500,000	A & O	101½	Oct. 26, '98	101½	101½	5,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.								
Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....	1898	2,755,000	A & O	106	July 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....	1906	924,000	F & A	123	July 1, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....	1899	1,355,000	A & O	108	May 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
con. co. 1st 7's.....	1900	14,890,000	J & J	110½	Oct. 5, '98	110½	110½	7,000
con. 1st registered.....	1901		Q J	109	Oct. 21, '98	109	109½	26,000
con. co. 2d 7's.....	1903	24,692,000	J & D	117	Oct. 31, '98	117	117	1,000
con. 2d registered.....	1903		J & D	114	Sept. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....	1901	1,000,000	A & O	106	Aug. 12, '98	.....	.....	.....
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1938	840,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & J	114	Feb. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....	1940	15,000,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1941	10,000,000	A & O	108	Oct. 16, '98	108½	108	4,000
registered.....			A & O	108	Sept. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1933	10,280,000	J & J	103	July 27, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....	1945	2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st pfd 6's.....	1914	750,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
g. gtd 5's.....	1914	1,250,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Lex. Av. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....	1903	5,000,000	M & S	113	Oct. 31, '98	113½	111	98,000
registered.....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....	1916	400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
Lit. Rock & M. tr. co. cts. for 1st g. 5's.....	1937	3,145,000	.....	25	Apr. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....	1898	1,121,000	M & N	104	Sept. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....	1931	3,610,000	Q J	105½	Oct. 16, '98	105½	105½	2,000
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....	1934	3,000,000	J & D	90	Oct. 22, '98	90	89	22,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....	1922	1,500,000	M & S	89	Sept. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
g. 4's.....	1932	325,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
deb. g. 5's.....	1934	1,500,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....	1927	984,000	M & S	102½	Aug. 3, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d m. inc.....	1927	1,000,000	S	40	Mar. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....	1897	500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. B'n'n & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....	1935	1,226,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....	1911	250,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 5's.....	1911	750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '98	.....	.....	.....

# BOND SALES.

619

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's. 1932		1,075,000	Q J A N	108½	June 17, '95			
N. Y. B. R. 1st g. g'd 5's. 1943		200,000	J & J					
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. 1945		300,000	J & J					
Louisv'e Rv. & St. Louis								
1st con. TrCo. ct. gold 5's. 1939		3,408,000	J & J	25½	Sept. 11, '96			
Gen. mtg. g. 4's. 1943		2,422,000	M & S	14	May 8, '95			
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's. 1898		7,070,000	A & O	102	Oct. 30, '96	102½	100	46,000
Cecilian branch 7's. 1917		600,000	M & S	102	Sept. 3, '96			
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's. 1930		5,043,000	J & J	112	Oct. 28, '96	112	110½	13,000
2d 6's. 1930		1,000,000	J & J	99½	Oct. 21, '96	99½	99½	1,000
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		2,070,000	J & D	110	Aug. 20, '96			
general mort. 6's. 1930		10,486,000	J & D	113	Oct. 30, '96	113	111	21,000
Pennacola div. 6's. 1930		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '96			
St. Louis div. 1st 6's. 1921		3,500,000	M & S	118	Aug. 28, '96			
2d 3's. 1930		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95			
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. 1900		1,900,000	J & J	110	Aug. 19, '96			
So. N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s. 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '96			
5½ 50 year g. bonds. 1937		1,764,000	M & N	92	Oct. 2, '96	92	92	5,000
Unified gold 4's. 1940		14,994,000	J & J	74	Oct. 20, '96	75	72	136,000
registered. 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93			
Pen. & At. 1st 6's. g. 5's. 1921		2,870,000	F & A	94½	Oct. 26, '96	95	94½	2,000
collateral trust g. 5's. 1931		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '96			
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st g. 4's. 1945		4,000,000	M & S	105½	Dec. 30, '95			
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's. 1937		2,098,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '96			
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's. 1936		3,673,000	F & A	87½	Aug. 20, '96			
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. 1937		6,742,000	J & J	84	Oct. 9, '96	84	84	1,000
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & S					
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	102½	Sept. 18, '96			
cons. g. 6's. 1916		4,700,000	A & O	82	Oct. 28, '96	82½	72½	135,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's. 1940		2,800,000	M & N	40	Oct. 22, '96	40	40	32,000
Louisville Railway Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92			
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. 1900		23,783,000	A & O	93	Oct. 29, '96	93	90	46,000
Manitoba Swn. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D					
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J					
Memphis & Charlestown 6's. g. 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '95			
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. 1908		10,818,000	J & J	117	Oct. 31, '96	117½	116½	69,000
2d 6's. 1909		4,000,000	M & N	105	Oct. 29, '96	105	104	18,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtg. 4's. 1911		58,908,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '96			
1st con. inc. 3's. 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '96			
2d 3's. 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '96			
Mexican International 1st g. 4's. 1942		14,000,000	M & S	71	Oct. 30, '96	72	70¾	144,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95			
2d inc. 6's "A" 1917		12,265,000	M & S	40½	Oct. 20, '96	41	40½	30,000
coup. stamped. 1917								
2d inc. 6's "B" 1917		12,265,000	A	7¼	Oct. 21, '96	7¼	7	20,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. 1910		1,411,000	J & D					
registered. 1910			J & D					
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. 1902		8,000,000	M & N	116½	Sept. 30, '96			
1st con. 5's. 1902		2,000,000	M & N	108	Oct. 22, '96	108	108	1,000
6's. 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 23, '96			
coup. 5's. 1931		3,576,000	M & S	111½	July 24, '96			
reg. 5's. 1931			Q M	115	Apr. 29, '96			
mort. 4's. 1940		2,600,000	J & J	105	July 30, '96			
mtg. 4's reg. 1940			J & J	102	Jan. 20, '96			
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's. 1939		476,000	J & D					
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		5,500,000	F & A					
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 3, '96			
1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	99	Oct. 31, '96	99	98½	27,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	121	Oct. 31, '96	121	121	5,000
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		636,000	J & D	129	May 16, '96			
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,822,000	J & A	115	Aug. 19, '96			
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936		3,208,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '87			
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd. 1936								

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1926		8,280,000	J & J	94	Apr. 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				86½	June 18, '91	.....	.....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
stamped pay. of int. gtd.				.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,060,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,774,000	J & D	81	Oct. 31, '96	81½	79½	408,000
2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	56	Oct. 31, '96	56½	50½	729,000
1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	72	Oct. 28, '96	75½	70	80,000
Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	62	Oct. 30, '96	62	62	5,000
Dal. & Waco 1st g. g. 5's. 1940		1,340,000	M & N	77	July 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		569,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	88½	Oct. 27, '96	88½	85½	18,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	86	Oct. 26, '96	86	83	8,000
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	101	Oct. 20, '96	101	101	10,000
trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	70	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	45	July 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1938		7,000,000	M & S	98	Oct. 8, '96	98	98	1,000
2d extended g. 5's. .... 1938		2,573,000	F & A	105	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1936		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1926		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. L. & I'rn. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1897		4,000,000	F & A	99	Oct. 23, '96	99½	99	19,000
St. Louis & I'rn Mount. 2d 7's. 1897		6,000,000	M & N	101½	Oct. 23, '96	101½	100	13,000
Arkansas b'nch ext 5's. 1896		2,500,000	J & D	100	Oct. 14, '96	100	100	6,000
Carlo. Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1897		1,450,000	J & D	100	Oct. 6, '96	100	100	1,000
g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. 1931		18,345,000	A & O	73	Oct. 26, '96	75	72½	26,000
stamped gtd gold 5's. .... 1931		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mob. & Birm. prior lien. g. 5's. .... 1945		374,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small. ....		226,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small. ....		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. .... 1927		7,000,000	J & J	114½	Oct. 29, '96	115½	113½	25,000
1st extension 6's. .... 1927		914,000	J & D	112	May 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1938		9,489,500	Q J	64½	Oct. 29, '96	65	62½	118,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	111	July 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,300,000	J & J	125	Oct. 22, '96	125	124½	3,000
2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		5,094,000	A & O	96	Oct. 7, '93	96	96	1,000
1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's McM. M.W. & Al. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		371,000	J & J	111½	June 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. .... 1915		1,320,000	A & O	108½	Aug. 13, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. .... 1903		30,000,000	J & J	117	Oct. 30, '96	117	116	25,000
1st registered. .... 1903			J & J	116	Oct. 6, '96	116	116	5,000
debenture 5's. .... 1904		10,000,000	M & S	103	Oct. 26, '96	108½	102½	17,000
debenture 5's reg. .... 1904			M & S	102½	Sept. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		1,000,000	M & S	102½	Oct. 24, '96	102½	102½	2,000
debenture g. 4's. .... 1906		15,000,000	J & D	99½	Sept. 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			J & D	100	Sept. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		6,450,000	M & N	102½	Oct. 31, '96	105½	102½	10,000
registered. ....			M & N	100½	May 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
Harlem 1st mortgage 7's c. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	112	Sept. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
7's registered. .... 1900			M & N	111½	June 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Jersey June. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1966		1,650,000	F & A	102	Oct. 3, '94	.....	.....	.....
reg. certificates. ....			F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	104	Oct. 31, '96	104½	108	201,000
registered. ....			J & J	103	Oct. 31, '96	104	102½	67,400
Beech Creek 1st. g. gtd. 4's. .... 1936		5,000,000	J & J	108	Oct. 31, '96	103	108	2,000
registered. ....			J & J	105½	June 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d gtd. 5's. .... 1936		500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, /		770,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st s. f. Int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940			J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		300,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

# BOND SALES.

631

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
R. W. & Og. con. 1st ext. 5's...1922		9,061,000	A & O	116	Oct. 26, '96	116½	115	32,000
Nor. & Montreal 1st g. gtd 5's. 1916		130,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
R. W. & O. Ter. R. 1st g. gtd 5's. 1918		375,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oswego & Rome 2d gtd gold 5's. 1915		400,000	F & A	110	Oct. 16, '94	.....	.....	.....
Utica & Black River gtd g. 4's. 1922		1,800,000	J & J	108	Dec. 4, '96	.....	.....	.....
Mohawk & Malone 1st gtd g. 4's. 1901		2,500,000	M & S	100	Mar. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
Carthage & Adirond 1st gtd g. 4's. 1901		1,100,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Putnam 1st gtd g. 4's. 1903		4,000,000	A & O	108	May 22, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Chic. & St. Louis 1st g. 4's. 1907		19,425,000	A & O	108½	Sept. 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....			A & O	100½	July 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & New England 1st 7's.....1905		6,000,000	J & J	116	Aug. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's.....1905		4,000,000	J & J	112½	Oct. 23, '96	112½	112½	1,000
N. Y., N. Haven & H. 1st reg. 4's. 1903		2,000,000	J & D	108	Dec. 4, '94	.....	.....	.....
con. deb. receipts.....\$100		15,007,500	A & O	132½	Oct. 31, '96	132½	128½	82,000
small certifs.....\$100		1,430,000	.....	130½	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Northern 1st g. 5's.....1927		1,200,000	A & O	119	Apr. 15, '96	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Ontario & W'n con. 1st g. 5's. 1909		5,600,000	J & D	108	Oct. 30, '96	108	107½	40,000
Refunding 1st g. 4's.....1902		8,125,000	M & S	85	Oct. 31, '96	85	84	80,000
Registered.....\$5,000 only.		.....	M & S	88½	Aug. 25, '92	.....	.....	.....
N. Y., Sus. & W. 1st refunded 5's. 1907		3,750,000	J & J	96	Oct. 31, '96	96	96	2,000
2d mortg. 4½'s.....1907		636,000	F & A	68	Sept. 30, '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. mtg. g. 5's.....1940		2,300,000	F & A	68½	Sept. 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
term. 1st mtg. g. 5's.....1943		2,000,000	M & N	105½	Oct. 31, '96	105½	105½	2,000
registered.....\$5,000		.....	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Wilkesb. & East. 1st gid g. 5's. 1942		8,000,000	J & D	84½	Oct. 30, '96	84½	84½	10,000
Midland R. of N. Jersey 1st 6's. 1910		3,500,000	A & O	111	Oct. 30, '96	111	111	1,000
N. Y., Texas & Mexico g. 1st 4's...1912		1,442,500	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. P. 1st m.R.R. & L.G.S.F.g.c. 6's. 1921		24,067,000	J & J	114½	Oct. 31, '96	114½	111½	65,000
registered.....		17,500,000	J & J	112½	Oct. 30, '96	114½	112½	100,000
J.P.M. & Co. eng ctf dep....		19,000,000	.....	106½	Oct. 21, '96	106½	106½	5,000
g. 2d lgt sfg 6's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		11,408,000	.....	108½	Oct. 27, '96	109	105	100,000
g. 3d lgt sfg 6's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		44,900,000	.....	68	Oct. 28, '96	69	65½	116,000
Indgt con g 5's Tr. Co. c. a. s.		9,450,000	.....	48	Oct. 31, '96	48½	43½	917,000
colts 6's gnts J.P.M. & Co. c.		4,900,000	.....	88½	Oct. 31, '96	90½	86½	142,000
recs. ctf. g. 6's July 1, 1907		832,000	J & J	79	Jan. 25, '96	.....	.....	.....
James Riv. Val. 1st. g 6's T.C. ctf. 1906		1,766,000	M & N	75	Sept. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
Spok. & Pal. eng. ctf. 1st sfg. 6's. 1906		7,965,000	F & A	120	Oct. 28, '96	120	110½	12,000
St. Paul & N. Pacific gen 6's.....1923		400,000	Q F	122½	May 18, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered certificates.....		1,619,000	M & S	100	Dec. 30, '91	.....	.....	.....
Helena & Red M'tain 1st g. 6's. 1907		1,418,000	J & J	78	Oct. 26, '96	78	78	2,000
Dul. & Man. 1st g. 6's. en Tr. Co. ctf. s		4,090,000	J & J	79½	Sept. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
10pc purchase price paid		5,256,000	J & J	103½	Oct. 23, '96	105	102½	170,000
Dak. di. 1st s. fd g. 6's.		380,000	M & S	36	Oct. 26, '96	38	34½	13,000
Tr. Co. ctf. stamped.		878,000	A & O	104	May 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
N. Pacific Term. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1903		1,497,000	M & S	102	Jan. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
N.P. & Mon. J.P.M. & Co. cf. 1g. 6's. 1908		25,523,000	A & O	54	Apr. 21, '96	.....	.....	.....
Cœur d'Alene 1st gold 6's.....1916		4,991,000	A & O	42	May 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. 1st g. 6's.....1938		.....	.....	40½	Oct. 30, '96	42	38	463,000
Central Wash. Tr. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1908		.....	F & A	40	Sept. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
Chic. & N. Pac. 1st g. 5's.....1940		.....	F & A	43½	Apr. 23, '96	.....	.....	.....
U. S. Trust Co. eng. ctf. s		750,000	M & N	108	Aug. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Seat. L.S. & E. Tr. rec. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1931		7,283,000	M & N	115	Oct. 7, '96	115	115	6,000
assessment paid.....1931		2,000,000	A & O	108½	Oct. 30, '96	108½	106½	1,000
Norfolk & Southern 1st g. 5's....1941		5,000,000	F & A	97	Feb. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Norfolk & Western gen. mtg. 6's. 1901		1,498,000	Q M	107½	May 13, '96	.....	.....	.....
New River gen. 6's.....1932		4,086,000	.....	82	Apr. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
imp'ment and ext. 6's.....1934		8,875,000	J & J	66	Apr. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....		3,200,000	J & J	55	Feb. 7, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. adjt mnt mtg		2,475,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
7's.....1924		6,809,500	J & J	69½	May 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. seqmmt g. 5's.....		5,000,000	J & N	82	Oct. 27, '96	82	80	21,000
Tr. Co. ctf. gold 5's.....1900		600,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Nos. above 10,000		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Clinch V. div. g. 5's		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Tr. Co. ctf. Md. & W. div.		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's.....1941		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sci'o Val. & N.E. 1st g. 4's. 1909		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
C. C. & T. 1st g. t. g g 5's. 1922		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdb'g & L. Chapl. 1st con. 6's....1920		.....	A & O	94	Apr. 13, '96	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ogdensburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1920		800,000	O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ogdensburg & L. Chapl. inc. small		200,000	O	82	Feb. 26, '87	.....	.....	.....
Ohio & Miss. con. skg. fund 7's... 1898		3,435,000	J & J	102	Oct. 9, '98	102	102	2,000
" consolidated 7's... 1898		3,086,000	J & J	102	Sept. 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d consolidated 7's... 1911		2,952,000	A & O	104	Oct. 21, '98	104	104	5,000
" 1st Springf'd d. 7's... 1905		1,984,000	M & N	98	Oct. 17, '98	98	98	1,000
" 1st general 5's... 1932		405,000	J & D	98	Apr. 2, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's... 1896		2,000,000	J & D	85	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" gen. mortg. g 6's... 1897		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's... 1921		3,924,000	J & D	87	Oct. 31, '98	89½	85	67,000
" gen. mortg. g 4's... 1921		1,548,000	M & N	16	Oct. 6, '98	18	16	2,000
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certs... 1921		1,255,000	.....	17	Oct. 2, '98	17	17	12,000
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's. 1897		2,717,000	.....	37½	Oct. 21, '98	37½	37½	1,000
Oregon & California 1st g 5's... 1927		18,842,000	J & J	71½	Sept. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's. 1910		4,146,000	J & D	72	Oct. 13, '98	74	72	7,000
" con. mortg. g 5's... 1930		1,258,000	A & O	15	Oct. 27, '98	16½	12	85,000
" Trust Co. certificates... 1930		5,291,000	.....	11¼	Sept. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. 1st 6's... 1909		5,078,000	J & J	109½	Oct. 31, '98	110	108	81,000
" consol. m 5's... 1925		495,000	J & D	82	June 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Trust Co. certs... 1925		12,488,000	.....	61	Sept. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cfs for col. tr g 5's 1919		5,092,000	.....	92	Aug. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's... 1920		1,815,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" Issue of 1890..... 1920		617,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Panama s. f. subsidy g 6's... 1910		1,846,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91	.....	.....	.....
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s, 1st... 1921		19,467,000	J & J	109½	Oct. 22, '98	109½	109½	64,000
" reg. 4½'s... 1921		.....	J & J	109½	Oct. 22, '98	109½	109½	25,000
Pitts., C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s								
Series A... 1940		10,000,000	A & O	105	Oct. 19, '98	105	104½	8,000
Series B... 1942		10,000,000	A & O	108	Sept. 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
Series C... 1942		2,000,000	M & N	110½	July 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Series D gtd. 4's... 1945		2,863,000	M & N	101	Sept. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's... 1900		6,868,000	F & A	111	July 14, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 1st reg. 7's... 1900		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's... 1912		2,917,000	J & J	140¼	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d 7's... 1912		2,546,000	J & J	134¼	July 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 3d 7's... 1912		2,000,000	A & O	128	Aug. 26, '98	.....	.....	.....
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's... 1892		1,506,000	A & O	115¼	July 9, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1892		.....	A & O	110	May 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's... 1900		1,505,000	M & N	114	Aug. 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Series A... 1942		3,000,000	J & J	113¼	Apr. 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 4½ Series B... 1942		1,561,000	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis, V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's... 1897		1,899,000	J & J	101½	Oct. 27, '98	102	101½	9,000
" 2d 7's... 1908		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 2d gtd. 7's... 1898		1,600,000	M & N	105½	Jan. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½'s 1941		3,355,000	J & J	107	May 18, '98	.....	.....	.....
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's... 1942		5,389,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's... 1923		1,675,000	.....	108	June 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds.								
Sterling Gold 6 per cent... 1920		22,782,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Currency 6 per cent... 1905		4,718,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1905		.....	QWch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 5 per cent... 1919		4,998,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" registered... 1919		.....	QWch	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gold 4 per cent... 1943		3,000,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd. g 4½'s... 1935		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
U'd N. J. RR. & Can Co. g 4's... 1944		5,648,000	M & S	113¼	Oct. 28, '98	113¼	113¼	10,000
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's. 1920		1,287,000	J & J	100	Sept. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Evansville div. 1st 6's... 1920		1,470,000	M & S	101	Mar. 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
" Tr. Co. cfs. 2d mort 5's... 1926		1,778,000	M & N	28	May 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's... 1921		1,500,000	Q F	109¼	June 6, '94	.....	.....	.....
" 2d m 4½'s... 1921		1,499,000	M & N	69	July 29, '98	.....	.....	.....





BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's. 1909		857,000	J & J	103	July 8, '98	....	....	....
" small.....1909		8,000,000	J & J	106	July 29, '94	....	....	....
" 2d 6's.....1910		5,878,100	A & O	114½	Oct. 29, '98	116	114½	6,000
" Dakota ext'n 6's.....1910		13,344,000	M & N	115	Oct. 15, '98	117	115	2,000
" 1st con. 6's.....1938		20,323,000	J & J	119½	Sept. 23, '98	....	....	....
" 1st con. 6's, registered.....		7,805,000	J & J	120	Aug. 19, '98	....	....	....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s.....		2,150,000	J & J	102	Oct. 1, '98	102	102	5,000
" 1st cons. 6's register'd.....		6,000,000	J & J	105	Nov. 4, '98	....	....	....
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. 1937		2,700,000	J & D	86	Oct. 28, '98	86	86	16,000
" registered.....		4,700,000	J & D	89	Aug. 19, '98	....	....	....
" Minneapolis Union 1st 6's.....1922		3,625,000	J & J	124	July 31, '98	....	....	....
" Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. 1937		18,886,000	J & J	114	Oct. 21, '98	114	114	28,000
" 1st 6's, registered.....		3,872,000	J & J	102½	Oct. 8, '98	103½	102½	2,000
" 1st g. g. 5's.....1937		2,500,000	J & J	100½	Oct. 9, '98	100½	100½	1,000
" registered.....		500,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
" Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. 1908		5,250,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" registered.....		10,000,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. 1938		30,877,500	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" registered.....		652,000	A & O	....	....	....	....	....
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's. 1943		18,402,000	M & N	86½	Oct. 30, '98	86½	86	120,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. 1919		1,920,000	J & J	81½	Oct. 30, '98	82½	81	181,000
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's...1934		5,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's.....1928		4,180,000	J & J	108	Oct. 31, '98	108½	102½	128,000
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's. gold. 1924		25,839,000	J & J	85½	Oct. 31, '98	86	81½	851,000
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's. 1919		4,500,000	M & S	91	June 27, '98	....	....	....
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		1,000,000	J & J	109	Oct. 27, '98	109	109	5,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's.....1905-12		750,000	A & O	121½	May 25, '92	....	....	....
" g. 5's.....1888-1938		2,000,000	A & O	104	May 24, '98	....	....	....
" 1st con. gtd. g. 5's.....1937		3,123,000	J & J	113	May 5, '98	....	....	....
" Austin & Northw'n 1st g. 5's.....1941		3,106,000	J & J	109½	Oct. 29, '98	107½	106½	28,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's...1937		12,770,000	J & J	111½	Sept. 25, '98	107½	105	83,000
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's....1911		5,660,000	M & N	110	Oct. 22, '98	107½	110	3,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g. 5's. 1904		2,000,000	J & J	114½	Oct. 6, '98	115	114½	12,000
" registered.....		5,597,000	J & J	116½	Oct. 28, '98	117	115	19,000
" East Tenn. reorg. 1st g. 4's...1938		1,328,000	M & S	88½	Apr. 30, '98	88½	88	2,000
" registered.....		3,368,000	A & O	88½	Oct. 28, '98	....	....	....
" Alabama Central, 1st 6's.....1918		600,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's. 1897		1,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" income.....1900		1,000,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's.....1916		1,100,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's...1900		1,100,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" divisional g. 5's.....1930		950,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" con. 1st g. 5's.....1956		1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g. 5-6's.....1922		2,392,000	M & N	98½	Oct. 28, '98	98½	96	23,000
" Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g. 6's.....1925		2,466,000	M & N	100	Oct. 27, '98	100	97	9,000
" Rich. & Danville, con. g. 6's...1915		1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '98	....	....	....
" equip. sink. f'd g. 5's. 1909		2,531,000	J & J	108½	Oct. 30, '98	108½	105½	14,000
" deb. 5's stamped.....1927		500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. 1906		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94	102	102	1,000
" small.....		4,500,000	F & A	102	Oct. 30, '98	....	....	....
" ser. B 6's.....1911		3,500,000	A & O	103½	Oct. 9, '98	....	....	....
" small.....		444,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '98	....	....	....
" ser. C 6's.....1916		1,620,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '98	....	....	....
" small.....		2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '98	94½	93½	190,000
" ser. D 4-5's.....1921		1,620,000	F & A	91	Oct. 31, '98	....	....	....
" small.....		1,775,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. E 5's.....1926		1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small.....		2,392,000	M & N	98½	Oct. 28, '98	98½	96	23,000
" ser. F 5's.....1931		2,466,000	M & N	100	Oct. 27, '98	100	97	9,000
" Virginia Midland gen. 5's.....1936		1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '98	....	....	....
" gen. 5's gtd. stamped. 1928		2,531,000	J & J	108½	Oct. 30, '98	108½	105½	14,000
" W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's.....1924		500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" W. Nor. C. 1st con. g. 6's.....1914		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94	102	102	1,000
" Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g. 4½'s. 1943		4,500,000	F & A	102	Oct. 30, '98	....	....	....
" Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. 1939		3,500,000	A & O	103½	Oct. 9, '98	....	....	....
" 1st con. g. 5's.....1894-1944		444,000	Q JAN	105½	Dec. 18, '98	....	....	....
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd. g. 5's. 1930		1,620,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '98	....	....	....
" Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g. 6's. 1914		2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '98	94½	93½	190,000
" Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's.....1905		1,620,000	F & A	91	Oct. 31, '98	....	....	....
" abine d. 1st 6's.....1912		1,775,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" con. m. g. 5's.....1943		1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....

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NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 5's. { 1905		3,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth {								
1st gold 5's. .... 2000		21,049,000	J & D	84½	Oct. 31, '96	85½	80	173,000
2d gold income, 5's. .... 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	20½	Oct. 31, '96	20½	18½	509,000
Third Avenue 1st g 5's. .... 1957		5,000,000	J & J	119½	Oct. 31, '96	119½	119	18,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's. .... 1935		3,000,000	J & J	105	Oct. 29, '96	106	105	8,000
1st M. g 5's West. div. .... 1935		2,500,000	A & O	107½	July 25, '96	....	....	.....
gen. g. 5's. .... 1935		1,500,000	J & D	97	Oct. 1, '96	....	....	.....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. g. 4's. .... 1990		2,340,000	A & O	76	Oct. 1, '96	76	76	2,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's. .... 1917		4,400,000	J & D	69	Sept. 16, '96	....	....	.....
Tol., St. L. & K.C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's. .... 1916		8,234,000	M & N	66	Oct. 27, '96	66	61	40,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's. .... 1928		1,852,000	J & D	99¼	Oct. 12, '96	99¼	99¼	5,000
Union Pacific 1st 6's. .... 1896			J & J	102	Oct. 29, '96	102	100	18,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1897			J & J	97	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1897			J & J	106	Sept. 23, '96	....	....	.....
1898			J & J	97	Oct. 1, '96	97	97	1,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1898			J & J	100¼	Oct. 22, '96	101	97	30,000
1899			J & J	97	Oct. 1, '96	97	97	6,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1899			J & J	101	Sept. 21, '96	....	....	.....
collat. trust 6's. .... 1908		3,983,000	J & J	97	Oct. 1, '96	97	97	1,000
5's. .... 1907		4,970,000	J & D	85¼	Oct. 1, '96	85¼	85¼	6,000
g 4½'s. .... 1918		2,058,000	M & N	50¼	Apr. 4, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1894		8,568,000	F & A	85	Oct. 24, '96	86	84½	2,000
gold notes, 6's stampd. .... 1894		2,070,000	M & S	80	Oct. 29, '96	82	76	22,000
Ext. sink'g f'd g 8's. .... 1899		1,391,000	F & A	83	Apr. 24, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1895		1,461,000	F & A	108¼	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	.....
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's. .... 1896		779,000	J & D	105	Oct. 28, '96	105	105	5,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1896			J & D	91	Oct. 2, '96	91	91	20,000
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1896			M & N	111	July 27, '96	....	....	.....
Denver div. ased. 6's. .... 1899		2,973,000	M & N	90¼	June 10, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. cfs. ex mat cps {								
1899			M & N	61¼	Oct. 1, '96	61½	61½	2,000
1st con. 6's. .... 1919		1,237,000	M & N	66¼	Oct. 30, '96	67½	64	124,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. .... 1885		10,488,000	M & N	86	June 22, '96	....	....	.....
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. f'd cps 7's. .... 1885		630,000	Q F	30	Oct. 27, '96	30	22	146,000
Atch., Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's. .... 1905		4,070,000	Q F	33	Oct. 27, '96	33	30	11,000
At., Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's. .... 1906		542,000	Q F	25	Oct. 24, '96	25	25	1,000
U. P., Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g 5's. .... 1918		4,480,000	A & O	31¼	Oct. 29, '96	32½	27½	61,000
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g 5's. .... 1939		15,801,000	J & D	62¼	Oct. 31, '96	64¼	58½	332,000
Or. S. L. & U. N. Tr. Co. cts 1st c. g 5's. .... 1919		10,732,000	A & O	109¼	Oct. 30, '96	110¼	107¼	102,000
assented. .... 1922		3,538,000	F & A	110	Oct. 31, '96	110	104½	250,000
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's. .... 1922		11,393,000	J & J	115	May 2, '96	....	....	.....
Trust Co. cts of dep. .... 1908		680,000	J & J	100	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's. .... 1908		1,877,000	J & J	62	Oct. 3, '96	62	62	1,000
gold 5's. .... 1926		1,495,000	J & J	62	Oct. 3, '96	62	62	1,000
Utah So'n Tr. Co. cts gen. mtg 7's. .... 1908		1,824,000	J & J	62	Oct. 3, '96	62	62	1,000
Tr. Co. cts ext. 1st 7's. .... 1909								
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g 6's. .... 1921		1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '92	....	....	.....
Coupon off. .... 1939								
Wabash R.R. Co. 1st gold 5's. .... 1899		31,664,000	M & N	107	Oct. 30, '96	107	102	287,000
2d mortgage gold 5's. .... 1899		14,000,000	F & A	68¼	Oct. 31, '96	69	66	174,000
deben. mtg series A. .... 1899		3,504,000	J & J	21¼	Oct. 22, '96	21½	20½	79,000
series B. .... 1899		25,740,000	J & J	97	July 3, '96	....	....	.....
1st g. 5's Det. & Chl. ex. .... 1940		3,500,000	J & J	102	Oct. 22, '96	102	102	2,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. .... 1908		1,000,000	A & O	104½	Oct. 30, '96	104½	104½	4,000
1st 6's. .... 1937		10,000,000	J & J	40	Oct. 9, '96	41	40	3,000
gen g. 2-3-4's. .... 1943		10,000,000	Nov.	12	Oct. 28, '96	12	9	52,000
inc. 5's. .... 1943		10,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '96	....	....	.....
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's. .... 1911		3,000,000	J & J	97½	Oct. 20, '96	99	97½	5,000
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's. .... 1923		3,000,000	A & O	91	Jan. 27, '96	....	....	.....
Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. .... 1923		1,500,000	F & A	91	May 8, '96	....	....	.....
exten. and imp. g. 5's. .... 1930		1,824,000	J & J	62¼	July 20, '96	....	....	.....
consol mortgage 4's. .... 1922		1,600,000	J & J	33	Oct. 29, '96	35	31¼	58,000
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g 5's. .... 1937		2,304,000	J & J	35½	Oct. 31, '96	35½	33½	114,000
eng. Trust Co. certificates. .... 1937		9,636,000	A & O	6	Jan. 9, '96	....	....	.....
income mortgage 5's. .... 1937		7,775,000						

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,088,000	Q F	108	Oct. 30, '96	108	108	12,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 8's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	65	Oct. 30, '96	65	61	37,000
Am. Water Works Co. 1st 6's. 1907		1,800,000	J & J	105	July 6, '91	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100½	May 13, '89	.....	.....	.....
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bost. Un. Gas & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1989		7,000,000	J & J	81½	Sept. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		13,336,000	M & M	106½	Oct. 29, '96	107	105	184,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	97	Oct. 29, '96	98	97	55,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1987		10,000,000	J & J	91	Oct. 28, '96	91½	89	32,000
Chic. Junc. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	105	July 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	95	Sept. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	99	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Coupon off. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 10, '92	.....	.....	.....
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
Colo. Hock. Val. C'l & I'n g. 6's. 1917		990,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1987		1,250,000	J & J	160	Oct. 31, '96	100	100	4,000
Con'ts Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1908		4,848,000	J & D	82½	Oct. 28, '96	83	80	13,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	F & A	69	Oct. 28, '96	70	69	30,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	107	Oct. 31, '96	107½	106	39,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1905		2,130,000	J & J	100	Oct. 27, '96	100	100	8,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered		.....	A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y. ....		.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. 1982		2,500,000	M & S	111½	May 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1905		2,000,000	J & J	90	Aug. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		8,750,000	J & D	90	Oct. 30, '96	91	88	23,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 6's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 28, '95	.....	.....	.....
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1926		1,080,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92	.....	.....	.....
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,755,000	M & S	110	May 31, '94	.....	.....	.....
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	86	May 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	82	Oct. 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 16, '95	.....	.....	.....
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	91	Oct. 29, '96	93½	91	62,000
small bonds. ....		.....	.....	97½	Nov. 1, '95	.....	.....	.....
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Manh. Beh. H. & L. l'm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
Metrop. Tel & Tel. 1st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92	.....	.....	.....
registered		.....	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	89½	Oct. 23, '96	89½	89½	1,000
Mutual Union Tel. Skg. F. 6's. 1911		1,957,000	M & N	107	Oct. 5, '96	107	107	5,000
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co., 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,837,000	J & J	94½	Sept. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1990		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. conv. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	82½	May 5, '96	.....	.....	.....
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 13, '89	.....	.....	.....
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	106	Oct. 12, '96	106	106	5,000
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	104	Oct. 23, '96	104	103	4,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	97	Oct. 30, '96	97	95½	14,000
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1889-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92	.....	.....	.....
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		590,000	M & N	106½	Oct. 14, '95	.....	.....	.....
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102½	June 3, '96	.....	.....	.....
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g. 6's. 1917		1,299,000	A & O	80	Oct. 24, '96	80	80	1,000
Bir. div. 1st con. 6's. 1917		3,490,000	J & J	82½	Oct. 20, '96	82½	82	16,000
Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g. 6's. 1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g. 6's. 1910		2,434,000	F & A	92	Dec. 3, '95	.....	.....	.....

**BOND QUOTATIONS.**—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

**NOTE.**—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

**MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.**

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
U. S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. rects		6,245,100	.....	21½	Oct. 30, '98	23½	19	71,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb..1915		6,000,000	M & N	111¼	Oct. 12, '98	112	111¼	9,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's..1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's.....1875-1900		3,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 7's registered.....1900		.....	M & N	108	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture, 7's.....1884-1900		1,000,000	M & N	105	Aug. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....1900		.....	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" col. trust cur. 5's.....1908		8,406,000	J & J	104½	Oct. 29, '98	104½	108	20,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		866,000	J & J	68½	Oct. 7, '98	68½	68¼	3,000
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's.1908		570,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.**

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1896.		OCTOBER SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,700	Q M	95	91	.....	.....	.....
" 4's registered.....1907		559,634,000	J A J & O	110½	104¾	107¾	105¾	137,000
" 4's coupon.....1907		.....	J A J & O	111½	106	108¾	106¼	151,500
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	118½	111¾	116¼	115¼	76,000
" 4's coupon.....1925		.....	Q F	119	111¼	118¼	115	450,000
" 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113¾	109	110½	110¾	1,000
" 5's coupon.....1904		.....	Q F	114½	108½	111½	110½	136,000
" 6's currency.....1897		9,712,000	J & J	108¼	103¼	.....	.....	.....
" .....		29,004,952	J & J	105	103	.....	.....	.....
" .....		14,004,560	J & J	107½	105	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee)1896		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**A Colorado Opinion.**—The host of Western students of finance who wish to supplement and check their researches in the bimetallic problem as it is discussed in contemporary literature, will find the venerable **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** an indispensable part of the monthly literature they buy. The great financial question is always sure to be found discussed in its pages in a truly scientific manner, free from that abuse which makes most gold monometallic literature such unpleasant reading. For the best and most lucid arguments on the other side of us, the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** must be consulted. A chief article of the October number is a full report of the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association at St. Louis, an article to be read by all thorough students of finance.—*Denver (Colo.) Evening Post.*

**Great Variety of Topics.**—A special feature of the October number of the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** is an article considering a recent letter by Secretary Carlisle on "Our Gold and Silver Coins—Why They are at a Parity," in which the Secretary says that "silver is redeemable if necessary," and with gold, of course. This number gives, also, the proceedings of the American Bankers' Association at St. Louis, September 22, 23 and 24, 1896. A great variety of financial and banking topics is presented in this magazine, in a clear and forcible manner.—*Salt Lake (Utah) Tribune.*

**The First Banking Journal.**—Messrs. Tootle, Lemon & Co., the well-known St. Joseph, Mo., bankers, write under a recent date:

"We are subscribers to the **MAGAZINE** and value it highly, considering it *facile princeps*, the first banking journal in the country."

## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Baldwin.**—Brent L. Baldwin, Cashier of the Traders' National Bank, Washington D. C., died October 16, in the fortieth year of his age.

**Bubb.**—George Bubb, President of the Lycoming National Bank, Williamsport, Pa., and prominent in the business affairs of that city, died October 17, aged seventy-six years.

**Buckwalter.**—H. B. Buckwalter, President of the Farmers' National Bank, West Chester, Pa., and identified with many other business enterprises of the town, died November 1, aged forty-one years.

**Colson.**—Sireno B. Colson, Vice-President of the First National Bank, Fremont, Nebr., died September 28. Mr. Colson was born at Madison, N. Y., in 1828. He was actively engaged in business and political affairs at Fremont for many years.

**Dame.**—Owen Dame, Cashier of the First National Bank, Lynn, Mass., died suddenly on Oct. 28. Mr. Dame was born at Dover, N. H., in 1833. His banking career included service with banks at Chicago, New York and Boston, and for the past twenty-five years with the First National Bank of Lynn.

**Duryee.**—Geo. S. Duryee, Commissioner of Banking and Insurance for the State of New Jersey, died at his home in Newark, Oct. 28.

**Ellis.**—Wm. G. Ellis, President of the Amesbury (Mass.) National Bank, and largely interested in local business enterprises, died November 3, aged sixty-four years.

**Halsey.**—Edmund D. Halsey, President of the National Iron Bank, Morristown, N. J., died October 17. Mr. Halsey was a lawyer, an ex-member of the New Jersey Legislature and a large holder of real estate and mining property. He was about sixty years of age at the time of his death.

**Hamilton.**—Richard Hamilton, President of the Bowery Bank, New York, died Nov. 3 at his home in Brooklyn. Mr. Hamilton was born in New York about sixty-three years ago. When still a youth he entered the Mechanics and Traders' Bank as a clerk, and later he was made Paying Teller. In 1885 he helped organize the Bowery National Bank and became its Cashier. The bank subsequently surrendered its national charter, and Mr. Hamilton became Vice-President. During the panic of 1893, he was Chairman of the Clearing-House Committee. After the recent death of Henry P. De Graaf, Mr. Hamilton was elected President of the Bowery Bank, as his successor.

**Harris.**—Jonathan N. Harris, President of the New London (Conn.) City National Bank, and well known as a banker and philanthropist, died October 18, aged eighty-one years.

**Hull.**—John F. Hull, an old resident of Poughkeepsie, N. Y., died Oct. 19, aged eighty years. He was of Quaker descent, and was born in Stanfordsville, Dutchess county. In his early life he was Cashier of the Pine Plains Bank. At the organization of the Fallkill Bank, in Poughkeepsie, he was elected its Cashier, which position he filled for forty-four years. He resigned in 1892 on account of ill health. He held the offices of alderman, police commissioner, and commissioner of education. He was county treasurer for two terms during the Civil War.

**Lane.**—B. P. Lane, Cashier of the Atlas National Bank, Boston, died October 18. He was born in that city in 1831 and had been associated with the bank about forty years.

**Latimer.**—John A. Latimer, who was for thirty-five years Cashier of the Brooklyn (N. Y.) Savings Bank, died Oct. 15. Mr. Latimer had not been officially connected with the bank for seven or eight years.

**McCarter.**—Joseph McCarter, President of the Second National Bank, Erie, Pa., died October 6, aged sixty-seven years. From 1880 to 1892 he was Mayor of Erie.

**Mitchell.**—James M. Mitchell, President of Mitchell, Finch & Co's Bank, Maysville, Ky., died October 24, aged seventy-four years.

**Peabody.**—Col. O. W. Peabody, of the well-known banking firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Boston, died Oct. 23. He was born in Springfield, Mass., in 1834. After serving in the war he returned to Boston and engaged in the banking business, founding the firm of Kidder, Peabody & Co.

**Reed.**—John B. Reed, Cashier of the Stamford (Conn.) National Bank, died October 3, aged forty-five years. He entered the bank as a clerk in 1869, and had been Cashier since 1896.

**Richardson.**—William A. Richardson, Chief Justice of U. S. Court of Claims, and Secretary of the Treasury in 1873, died Oct. 19.

**Rhoads.**—Daniel L. Rhoads, President of the National Bank of Boyertown, Pa., died October 10.

**Scofield.**—Ebenezer Scofield, Cashier of the First National Bank, New York city, died Oct. 15, at Elberon, N. J., where he and his family had spent the summer.

# THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

*RHODES' JOURNAL OF BANKING and THE BANKERS' MAGAZINE Consolidated.*

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FIFTIETH YEAR.

DECEMBER, 1896.

VOLUME LIII., No. 6.

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**I**F THE SOUND MONEY TRIUMPH is to be made permanently effectual the efforts that have been made to arouse reflection in the minds of the voters should not now be relaxed. This has been no mere political campaign in the usual sense, but one in which the main issue was a scientific and a moral one. The arguments in favor of the gold standard were grounded in the experience and common sense of mankind, and those against it required the ignoring of all facts and the rejection of every axiom heretofore accepted. The morality of the campaign consisted in the determined effort to sustain the rules and standards upon which civilized and enlightened society can alone exist. It was the cause of a true conservatism that was at stake.

There are of course a very large number of men who are by their training simply politicians who will regard the victory that has been won as merely a triumph of party. These will no doubt seek to reap the usual emoluments of a party success. They will use this success to obtain power and place and be as neglectful as politicians are prone to be of the realization of the ideals which have guided the campaign. But thinking men and those in both parties who merit the title of statesmen will look further and seek to use this manifest awakening of the minds of the people to secure reforms which have been for a long time necessary.

The reform which is of the first and greatest importance is that of our currency system. It is not enough to declare that the gold standard shall be maintained. This of course establishes the foundation upon which the structure of reform must be raised. The gold standard has in reality been the standard of the country since 1834, but errors and blunders in the details of our currency system have rendered the maintenance of this basis difficult and expensive, affording plausible grounds for attacks upon it. The wisest laws and regulations may be discredited by inefficient execution, or by errors

in the arrangement of the details of their execution. A very large share of the arguments of the advocates of free silver which had the most weight in the campaign were derived from the imperfect workings of a clumsy currency system based as it was on the gold standard.

The first error in the system of our currency was in retaining the note-issuing function of the Treasury Department inaugurated during the exigencies of the Civil War. The laws authorizing the issue of the legal-tender notes, necessary as they are generally allowed to have been under the circumstances that called them into existence, should have been repealed when the country recovered from the effects of the war. They were not because the successful termination of the struggle gave them a fictitious importance. Moreover they magnified and sustained the idea of the independent Treasury, which commenced as a system in 1846.

The Government had in the early history of the country experienced trouble in managing its funds. It deposited them with the banks, like any other depositor, so that when not required by the Government they might be used in advancing the general business of the country. While the first Bank of the United States was in operation, and likewise during the greater portion of the existence of the second Bank of the United States, little if any trouble occurred. But both of these institutions were antagonized by the State banks, which sought to secure a share of the money of the Government. After 1836 these efforts were crowned with entire success and the Treasury used the State banks as the medium of its financial operations. Through the reckless management and weakness of a large number of these banks the Treasury experienced great losses, especially during the panic of 1837. Attempts at reform were made in two directions. One was to establish a Government bank on the model of the Bank of the United States, and the other to make the Treasury independent of the banks, by doing its own banking. As has been stated, after a struggle lasting from 1837 to 1846, the independent Treasury system was adopted. It can not be denied that as long as the revenues and expenditures of the Government were small compared with the general mass of money circulating in the country, the system seemed to work well.

The Treasury, during the period from 1846 to 1862, had no power of enlarging the currency, which consisted of gold coin, subsidiary silver and State bank notes. Nor during the war did the independent Treasury work badly. The revenues were enormous and so were the expenditures. The latter were so great however from day to day that, notwithstanding the enormous issues of legal-tender notes, no surplus ever accumulated and was drawn away from the business of the country in a way to disturb it. When however the revenues

began to exceed expenditures, and a surplus was hoarded in the Treasury to be let out at irregular intervals as bonds became payable or were purchased at the discretion of the Secretary, then trouble began to ensue. The legal-tender notes and other Government demand obligations adopted later formed the chief currency of the country, The National bank notes had no power of expansion. When revenues flowed into the Government vaults, the currency violently contracted without any regard to the activity of business. The National banks could not make the void good because the debt on which their power of issuing notes rested was in course of rapid contraction. The Secretary, bound by the traditions of the independent Treasury system, had no means of returning the surplus to the channels of circulation except by payment of debt as it came due or by purchases of bonds not yet matured. He was out of touch with the business of the country, and in his most willing efforts in using the surplus was about as happy in attempting to meet the diverse wants of business as any man would be who had power to attempt to furnish weather suitable to the wants of the whole country.

If he could have used the national banking system as depositories or if there had been an institution like the Bank of England to receive and use safely the Government revenues until required by the Treasury, these untimely contractions and expansions of the currency need not have occurred.

These immense surpluses no doubt sustained the credit of the legal-tender notes and silver certificates, but they had evils of their own. When the revenues began to fall off, this, together with an enormous increase of silver certificates and of Treasury notes of 1890 weighing on the gold reserve, began to make men doubt the credit of the Government. Notes for which gold could be demanded were presented for payment, and an artificial surplus had to be supplied by borrowing.

It seems to be plain therefore that under the independent Treasury system, issuing Government demand notes, the business of the country is liable to be periodically disturbed whether the Government has excessive or deficient revenues. First, the legal-tender notes and silver certificates fill up the currency field and prevent the adoption of a bank currency that will have elasticity to meet the ever-varying wants of the business community and the people. Second, with a revenue in excess of ordinary expenditures, the only way of disposing of the surplus is the reduction of the national debt. This debt can not be called in and paid at any time. It has fixed dates of maturity. Nor can it be purchased at any time with advantage. The Secretary has to await favorable conditions of the market. A surplus accumulated and hoarded in the independent Treasury is sure at unforeseen



times to cause a stringent money market. Its release in payment of debt can not, with due regard to the advantage of the Government, often just meet the demands of business. Artificial conditions of stringency and plethora thus succeed to the detriment of business transactions. Third, if revenue is deficient danger comes with the lack of confidence induced by the decay of the Government credit.

What, then, are the proper directions in which reform must be made? Mere increase of revenue will only renew the dangers of a surplus. There are plainly three things that should be done. First, the legal-tender and Treasury notes should be retired so as to afford a field for a sound and elastic bank-note currency. Second, the National banks should be permitted to issue currency without bonded security to the extent of at least sixty per cent. of their capital, redeemable on demand in gold, and circulation on bonded security to any extent that they see fit to deposit bonds. The free circulation may be issued to them through a central bank organized for the purpose on the security of their loans and discounts, as proposed at Atlanta by the Editor of the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*. Third, the Government should keep its surplus revenue on deposit with the National banks. The silver certificates will have to take care of themselves. Under the system proposed, and the amount being limited to that of the silver dollars now coined, they would probably maintain themselves at par at most seasons of the year. With the growth of the country, and no further coinage of dollars, they would within a few years be easily maintained at par with gold at all times. Such are the directions in which the reform of our currency should be prosecuted.

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THE PRESENT SESSION OF CONGRESS, which met on December 7, has it in its power to formulate the wishes of the people as voiced in the vote of November 3. In the House there is a majority which can easily, if they see fit, obviate the difficulties of the Treasury and so amend present law that prosperity will return to the people and have a permanency never before experienced. The Senate will undoubtedly be in a more pliant mood since the overwhelming popular vote against the free coinage of silver.

Upon the question of the standard there seems to be practical agreement between the Republican and the better part of the Democratic party. The only bone of contention left seems to be a sentimental one, whether the bond sales were necessary for the maintenance of the gold reserve, or whether they were required for the purpose of making good deficiencies in the revenue. There really seems to be no necessity for much discussion of this point. Very

little was said in the campaign on the Republican side animadverting upon bond sales, by any speakers of note. By the leaders of both the hard money parties, it seems to be agreed that the sale of bonds was necessary to sustain the credit of the Government.

It is too small an issue to make now as to whether a deficiency in the gold reserve or a deficiency in revenue rendered them necessary. In fact, as it is plain that the deficiency in revenue caused the deficiency of the gold reserve, and that the credit of the Government declined, as these deficiencies made themselves manifest, the distinction between the causative influence of the one or the other is such a hair-splitting one that it seems like arguing the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. It seems to be kept up to preserve a political distinction between men who would otherwise coalesce upon the main question.

The CLEVELAND Administration has certainly nothing to apologize for. As an introduction to a wrangle on the tariff question this infinitesimal dispute may have its uses. Upon this question of the tariff there are not now such vital differences between the two parties as once existed.

The BRYAN wing of the Democratic party has been fighting for the rankest kind of protection, that of one class of citizens against all the others, of the miners and holders of silver against the rest of the people of the United States.

The manufacturing interests of the country have learned a lesson during this period of depression which they will not soon forget. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 1896, the exportation of manufactured products from this country reached a total of \$228,489,863. Since June 30 the rate of exportation has been increasing, and if it continues it is estimated that the exportation of manufactured products for the fiscal year 1897 will reach \$260,000,000. This is the greatest figure ever reached in the history of the country.

In the last number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE this subject was commented on and reference was made to the fact that the credit of this sale of American manufactures abroad was due to the Wilson tariff, and it was remarked that this reason alone was not apparently adequate, but that this great movement was probably more largely due to the depression of prices which made this the cheapest market in which foreigners could buy. This opinion is confirmed by expert authority. It was according to this authority the fall in prices induced by the disordered currency system which caused our manufactures to go abroad.

"'Tis an ill wind that blows nobody any good." Our manufacturers, in the comparative failure of the home market, with large stocks of goods on hand, were driven to look abroad. They are becom-

ing acquainted with foreign markets and will learn to consult the prices and tastes of such markets. The experience gained will not be abandoned. The effect of this opening of the eyes of our manufacturers to foreign markets to supplement the home market cannot fail to have far-reaching results. They know now at what prices they can compete and whether they can adjust their business to them.

It seems reasonable that American manufacturers will not be so eager as formerly, when they regarded the home market as their only field, for high protection which must inevitably provoke retaliation by foreign nations, and so cut off the foreign markets. On the other hand there must be revenue raised. Whether a party is for high protection or not, in raising actual revenue it soon finds it must abandon the extreme of its theory. A high protective duty may be prohibitive, but it does not bring in revenue. While with absolute free trade no revenue could be raised on imports.

The conditions of the last two years seem therefore to point to a modification of extreme ideas on the question of raising revenue. The currency question settled, it would appear to be the duty of Congress to provide such a revenue as will adequately support an economical expenditure, and at the same time provide for a moderate reduction of the public debt. The necessity for the late bond issues ought to teach a lesson in regard to the evils of a too rapid reduction of a public debt. The sense of honor of the American people was easily aroused in behalf of a rapid payment of the indebtedness caused by the Civil War. The realization of this sentiment required a continuance of a large number of war taxes for an unnecessarily long time. The tax on bank deposits and capital and the bank check tax are cases in point. It was also an excuse for high duties on imports and from this was an easy step to high duties for protection only. The revenues too were continued without proper calculation whether the times of maturity of the debt would permit their use as they came in. The result was accumulation which excited extravagance in expenditure. One cause of the difficulty the country has experienced in recovering from the panic of 1893 is that when the revenues were reduced the taste for extravagant appropriations did not fall off in the same proportion.

It can be confidently hoped that the present Congress at this its last session will not have the same demands for unfair protection made upon it by American manufacturers that have been so rife at previous sessions. It is probable that moderation will prevail in the councils of those to whom Congress looks to guide their action. The revenues can be brought to the right figure by taxes on articles and imports that will not arouse dispute. The claims of interested parties who want protection can wait until they can be carefully examined.

The advantage and efficacy of real protection of a nation's trade interests can not and ought not to be denied, but every interest that seeks aid under the name of protection is not deserving of it. In fact in considering the right of any one business interest to Government interference in its behalf, the effect on all others must be considered. If it is necessary that there should be any adjustment of the laws protecting special interests, such action can be deferred until after more mature consideration. The present Congress during its short term does not want to plunge the country into a state of uncertainty as to any new adjustment. The proper duty is to get the cripple on his mend, and wait for the return of health to perform the operation which may remove his deformity and improve his moral nature.

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RUSSIAN CURRENCY REFORM is progressing satisfactorily in the direction of a specie basis. The great Muscovite Empire is in about the same rank as this country in point of actual and prospective wealth and prosperity, and it affords in respect to the condition of her currency and the plans made to improve it an instance somewhat analogous to our own.

Russia is not yet upon a specie basis, but is attempting to get there. Her standard is gold, but the currency actually in use is paper. The paper rubles now outstanding amount to one billion. This ruble is the representative of the silver ruble and redeemable in it when redeemable at all. Both the paper and the silver rubles are at a discount compared with the gold coins expressed in rubles.

Recently the Finance Minister has decreed that the paper and silver rubles shall each be received at par, and fixes the premium at which the gold coin shall be taken twelve months in advance.

Nothing could show more clearly the autocratic character of the Russian Government than this interference with what in almost all other nations are considered the natural laws of supply and demand. It is in fact a return to mediæval methods.

It is a wonder that the advocates of the free coinage of silver did not get hold of these proceedings of the Russian Finance Minister during their late campaign. It apparently is in the line of proof that all that is necessary to make any money go is the fiat of a good strong government. Of course the success of these arbitrary efforts to make the irredeemable paper ruble the equivalent in ordinary trade of the silver ruble is not yet assured, and yet what might appear rather doubtful to the holder of the most approved economic ideas there are some elements in the Russian situation that may conduce to the success of these apparently arbitrary methods.

The Russian Government has for some time promised the resump-

tion of specie payments and has accumulated a stock of 700,000,000 gold rubles of the present gold coinage as against one billion paper rubles outstanding. The Government is also providing a large stock of silver rubles to circulate alongside of the paper rubles, and at the present low price of silver the premium if any on the silver ruble as compared with the market value of the paper ruble is very slight. In fact in some parts of the Empire the advantage appears to be with the paper ruble, since it is preferred by the people to the silver.

The Russian Minister's show of force may after all be more in appearance than reality. The Government says things strongly in Russia. A man might be anxious to get out of town there, but the permit from the police would probably be in the form of a peremptory command. No allowance is made for fickleness and people must not change their minds. So M. WITTE, the Finance Minister, probably knows that market conditions warrant the circulation of silver and paper rubles side by side and therefore only commands what he knows would occur naturally. The tone of command is however necessary to preserve the dignity of the Government, and enhance its wisdom in the eyes of the populace, while it would also have a good effect in preventing any change of heart on the part of the market.

But this is only one step in the direction of specie payments. It is like Secretary RICHARDSON's homœopathic issue of fractional silver in 1874-75. The public needs to be accustomed gradually to such a surprising change.

After seizing a favorable occasion to get the silver and the paper ruble at a parity the fixing twelve months ahead of the premium on the gold coins is not so arbitrary a proceeding after all. The paper and silver being fixed at the market price of silver, the natural premium on gold would only fluctuate with the fall in price of silver bullion. So to say what the premium would be for the coming twelve months might not be a very difficult task. It would be analogous to the Secretary of the Treasury fixing in advance the price at which he would purchase silver bullion for a given period. Such a proposition as this last was frequently made when the Treasury laws relative to silver purchase were under discussion. In fact it formed the basis of several plans for the rehabilitation of silver broached by experts in the United States.

The next step however in the plan of the Russian Finance Minister after having got the paper and silver rubles at a parity, is to do away with the premium on gold by a recoinage of the gold on hand, either in coin or bullion, into coins of lighter weight, so that the market value of the gold in the ten ruble piece shall exactly correspond to the market value of the silver in ten silver rubles.

During the silver discussion in this country men were frequently

heard to say, why not put enough silver in the silver dollar to make its intrinsic value equal to the gold dollar. Now, M. WITTE's plan is just the reverse of this. It is to take enough gold out of the present ten ruble piece so that what is left shall have the intrinsic value of ten silver rubles. The difference in the two plans is this: that in the one case there would something be lost to the Government by adding to the silver dollar, while in the other case what is taken from the gold ten ruble piece is apparently a profit to the Government. Only apparently however, because it is merely another way of realizing the existing premium on the gold which, as it happens, is mostly held by the Government. Of course if the Government should call in gold coins held by the public and taking them at their present value should return lighter ones, this would be robbery, but the gold held by the public will no doubt be received and coined by weight. The execution of this part of M. WITTE's reform has been postponed for the present by the suggestion of the Emperor.

It may be asked if this action would be perfectly just to the public in Russia, why would not a reduction of the gold dollars of the United States to the equivalent of the silver dollars in intrinsic or market value be equally just. This we believe was one of Mr. BRYAN's propositions. The answer is that although Russia in theory maintains the gold standard, yet in reality for a long time past they have been doing business on a paper basis. They have been in precisely the same condition that the people of the United States were in during the Civil War and for thirteen years after its close.

All transactions have been made in paper rubles, and the bulk of contracts and debts call for paper rubles. The paper and silver rubles have been gradually, through the fall in the price of silver and the strengthening of the credit of the Russian Empire, approaching equivalency until they are now practically at a par with each other. M. WITTE's command to take them at par is like telling a hungry man to eat his breakfast. He would probably do it anyway. The debts and credits of the nation being on the present basis of paper and silver rubles, and gold coins at a premium, there is no shock or injustice in reducing the value of the gold ruble to the same basis. A parallel case might have been made in the United States, if we had remained on a paper basis after the war until some time in the eighties, when probably the price of silver would have fallen so that the silver dollar if free coinage had continued would have been at the same discount as compared with gold as the irredeemable greenback. In such case if the weight of gold in the gold coins had been reduced to correspond, this would be very similar to the Russian proposition. With a probable exception however. The Russian Minister most likely sees as well as any one that if silver continues to fall in price

there will ensue a premium, even on his new gold coins. He also probably knows, however peremptory his decrees and however great his authority, that he can not uphold the price of silver by fiat, and will avert any disaster to his plan by making the silver rubles subsidiary. This could be done by limiting their amount or redeeming them in gold when gold was needed for export. The whole plan when carried out would leave Russia on a gold basis in accordance with the existing relations of debits and credits, with a subsidiary coinage of silver.

It would be an altogether different thing to reduce the value of the gold bullion in the gold coins of the United States to the equivalent of the silver bullion in a corresponding number of silver dollars. All debts and credits are now in gold dollars of present weight. To pursue this course here would be to rob creditors of one-half of their property. Thus it may easily be seen that what is one man's meat may be another man's poison. The Russian plan is a just and ingenious one, and in perfect accord with existing facts and circumstances, even if it does seem a little like an arbitrary fiat.

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THE CRY FOR A COMMISSION to examine and report on the currency question is reviving since the election. In general terms a commission is usually authorized by Congress for purposes of delay and postponement. If our legislators really want to act upon a matter they can through their committees get all the information that can be obtained upon the subject, during the two years in which a Congress continues. If they can not obtain it in that time they had better leave their results to the proper committee of the next Congress, who, if the subject continues to be important, can continue the investigation. Beyond a certain point, action is clogged by excess of counsel.

But admitting for the sake of argument that a commission of inquiry may sometimes be more useful even to Congress than a standing committee, it can with difficulty be conceived how such a commission will be of any use in regard to a subject so much studied and upon which information is so full as upon the currency question. Report after report has been made upon it, and there has been debate after debate. There are before Congress and its committees volume after volume upon every conceivable phase of the subject.

No commission could possibly report any new plan that would be accepted on its merits. If one were authorized a number of eminent gentlemen would doubtless be appointed by the President. They would take the subject in hand and doubtless investigate it thoroughly. They would finally formulate a plan which might be exact and perfect in all its parts. Sooner or later it would be presented in the form of a bill. The House or Senate, as the case might be, would

refer this bill when introduced to the proper committee. The committee would examine it, go over it, call experts upon it, amend it and perhaps supersede it, and after all at length present their own measure to the House or Senate, where it would have to go into the crucible of debate. The final outcome would be precisely the same as if no commission had been appointed, and there would have been much unnecessary delay and expense.

If no commission is authorized there are plenty of members of the House and Senate capable of preparing a bill, or of introducing one prepared by outside experts, or Congress can instruct its committee to investigate and prepare a general measure to cover all the points. To this committee can be referred all recommendations of the executive departments, and recommendations of boards of trade, chambers of commerce, bankers' associations and other commercial bodies as well as the suggestions of individual citizens, expert or otherwise.

The committee has more power than a commission, as it can report at any time directly to Congress, and is thus at the completion of its labors one step nearer than a commission would be. This is of great importance at a short session of Congress. If the present Congress does not take action, there is a great chance that no action will be taken until the next December, for the calling of an extra session after March 4 by Mr. MCKINLEY is a matter of much uncertainty. Many things may intervene to make the calling of an extra session distasteful to him. Whatever the virtues of a commission may be in the minds of some, they must under the circumstances yield to the possibilities of delay that are inherent in it at a time when delay is the one thing to be most greatly dreaded.

There is one advantage in misfortune and disaster and that is the lesson that may be learned from it. Just now the public mind is vividly impressed with the necessity of some reform of the monetary laws of the country. The necessity of such reform would be less realized if during the coming winter or before next summer the business community should find itself on the road to prosperity. This might easily occur without any change in the laws, from the inherent tendency of the United States to thrive even under adverse circumstances. If a revival of business should occur, the defects in the currency laws would be forgotten, and many would believe a great mistake had been made in thinking there were any defects. But prosperity on an unsound basis would not be as permanent as that based on wise and scientific financial conditions and in time the defects which aided in inaugurating the panic in 1893 would operate to bring on another financial revulsion.

It is always easy to find excuses for delay. There are always plenty of good reasons advanced for paltering and mumbling over



a subject. A commission is one of the best of devices for this purpose. As an object lesson proving this there are the commissions appointed to attend the several international monetary conferences. No doubt those participating in these conferences included many eminent experts, and the reports of the several meetings furnish most valuable and exhaustive stores of information on the subjects under review. But the labors of these commissions were wholly barren of practical results. A commission of currency experts could certainly gather many valuable ideas, and any report it might make would doubtless be carefully considered by Congress, and it would also be interesting from an educational standpoint. But the ground has been so thoroughly traversed, both in and out of Congress, that anything further in that direction would seem to be a work of superfluity. No friend of a better currency should advocate the appointment of a commission to investigate and report on currency reform. At the best it is useless, and it may delay and prevent any action whatever. Its principal advantage is the salary and patronage it may bring to the gentlemen who may be called to serve upon it.

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THE LATE ELECTION is not so decisive when judged by the majority of the electoral votes as it is when an analysis is made of the wealth and population of the States which went for sound money. The assessed property valuation in the States carried by the sound money candidate is \$20,770,538,000, while those carried for free silver have property assessed at \$4,500,000,000. In the States that went for the Republican candidate, the workingmen employed numbered 4,069,413 and the number employed in the BRYAN States was 636,562. The annual wages paid in the MCKINLEY States were \$1,991,504,043 and \$273,790,544 in the BRYAN States. In the MCKINLEY States the percentage of illiterate persons was 3.7 and in the BRYAN States 14.8.

These facts show that the successful candidate was really elected by the bulk of the population both capitalists and workingmen, by the wealth and intelligence of the country. The electoral college system is not condemned, it is really vindicated by this showing. The electors which compose it represent the several States, and not the mere popular vote. They have back of them the power and prestige of the States they represent. When once elected they belong to no party, but to the united people, power and influence of the States.

In view of the overwhelming declaration in favor of sound money which has just been recorded by the largest popular plurality ever given a presidential candidate, representing also the major part of the wealth, population, intelligence and industry of the country, it seems preposterous to talk of reviving the agitation in favor of free silver.

## THE FUTURE OF SILVER AS CURRENCY.

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Compromises with silver are responsible for some of the worst evils of the American currency system. It is therefore rather astonishing to see the assertion repeated that the United States ought to maintain in circulation as much silver as can be kept at par in gold, even after the sentiment in favor of silver has met with such an overwhelming defeat.

But this is perhaps natural from the standpoint of the politician who usually takes a lower view of the intelligence of the mass of people as compared with the view taken by the average business man. The agitation in favor of cheap silver money in one form and another has been kept up for so many years, and the leading men of both parties have been in such dread of it as an issue upon which votes might be lost or won, that they cannot yet, it may be, realize the full extent to which the light of reason has penetrated. They fear a recrudescence of the trouble and they resort most naturally to the system of apology and palliation to which they have been accustomed.

The years since the silver agitation began, since 1877-78, have been filled with all sorts of truckling compromises. The Act of 1878 authorizing the purchase of silver bullion and the coinage of silver dollars on Government account was a compromise devised to keep silver mining States in line with the party then in power. The importance of these new and thinly populated States was greatly exaggerated by the close contest between Tilden and Hayes in 1876, when the decision of the election depended on one electoral vote. The politicians of these States were exceedingly skilful in maintaining and magnifying their importance in the councils of the party, which they cajoled or deserted as the exigencies of the occasion seemed to demand. The motive of keeping up their own personal fame and value, in the attitude of the silver Senators, was as important to them as was the rehabilitation of silver. They added to the dignity of their comparatively unimportant constituencies by making much of the silver issue. The Act of 1890 was another compromise. The several international conferences were also compromises. The promise to maintain as much silver in circulation as can be kept at par with gold is another proposition for a compromise. It is even more dangerous than the others, because it is more vague and the door it opens for a subtle and more imperceptible deterioration of the money of the country is wider.

The duty of a Government in regard to the coinage was originally to stamp coins of such metals as were recognized and used as money at their actual bullion value in the markets of trade. This method proved exact enough until comparatively modern times. Not that the difficulty of maintaining coins of two metals in constant and precise parity was not recognized in ancient communities, but they either did not know how to remedy it, or the sense of justice in trade and in the transfers of property had not become so highly cultivated. Any one who has studied the beginnings of commerce will readily see how with the enlightenment of education men began to perceive the opportunities for fraud and evil advantage that lay in a money of

account represented by coins made legally equal, of metals that by the law of supply and demand were constantly fluctuating in relative value. A Government that stamped a piece of gold and then a piece of silver with the same monetary name always became party to possible fraud. When the world was ruled by absolute kings, this worked frequently for the benefit of the treasury of the sovereign, and the bias of those sovereigns was in favor of preserving a manifest abuse. It was one of the mediæval devices by which the governed were legitimately robbed. The necessity of making one metal the standard, that is of stamping the name of the money of account on a given weight of one metal only, was recognized by John Locke and other scientific men. Still the idea was slow in making its way. The people themselves found out the danger that existed in the mint stamp of the money of account on weights of two different metals assumed arbitrarily to be of equal value, and avoided the loss that ensued by putting a premium on the undervalued piece. Governments came slowly to the custom of the markets. Silver coins were made what is called subsidiary; that is recognized as containing less market value than gold coins of the same denomination. Governments kept them in circulation by limiting their coinage to their actual use in business. They became tokens to a certain extent. Their necessity and convenience maintained them at par with the gold coins of equal denomination. This is the position occupied by the fractional silver coins of the United States since 1853, and of other civilized nations for longer periods. The silver dollars coined by the United States since 1878 are practically, though not theoretically, in precisely the same position. They are maintained at par with gold, not because the law says that they are full legal-tender each for a dollar of account, but because they have been limited in quantity. The number of them coined, although large, has not except on one or two occasions been larger than the business of the country would absorb in the shape of convenient paper representatives. That the legal-tender quality alone would not maintain them at par with gold is indicated by the fact that when there was a falling off in the demand for money on account of business depression, there was at once a tendency to hoard gold and put a premium upon it. The declaration of the Government to maintain a silver dollar at a parity with the gold dollar also had an effect, but it was an effect limited by public opinion or the ability of the Government to fulfill its promise.

The silver dollars are therefore a subsidiary coinage dependent for their maintenance at a parity with gold dollars on artificial conditions such as limitation of the coinage and the credit of the Government. These artificial supports are gauged and calculated from the base line of the gold standard on which they rest. Take them away and silver dollars must fall below the gold dollar. These supports have to be sustained at considerable expense, if the issue of silver dollars exceeds the business requirements of the country.

The statement that the Government should pledge itself to coin as much silver as can be kept at a parity with gold is dangerous unless it be more precise. The laws of nature can be to a very large extent overcome by artificial means if "the game is worth the candle." The laws of gravity can be overcome by hoists and pumps, by the operation of steam and electricity. Mountains may be tunnelled or levelled, lakes may be drained. Land may be reclaimed from the sea, isthmuses may be cut through. The only question in regard to great feats of engineering is, will it pay?

The United States is a great and rich nation. It can raise large sums by taxation; it can apply the forces of multitudes of men aided by ingenious machinery. But this great force should not be expended uselessly or simply to show how much strength can be exerted. Will it pay, is the test question.

Now will it pay to use the force of the Government to coin as large an amount of silver as could possibly be maintained at a parity with gold? Common sense at once recognizes that the limit of such coinage should be the limit of usefulness, of profit not to this or that individual or this or that class, but to the whole people. It is monstrous that a vague promise of this kind should be made to serve party ends or the political aggrandizement of any individual. What is the useful limit of silver coinage, which the Government may be rightly called on to sustain at parity with gold for the benefit of the whole people? First, there is the fractional silver coinage which, confessedly containing less market value in bullion than its denomination as money of account calls for, is protected from depreciation by limitation of its legal-tender quality and redemption, when presented in certain sums, in gold. There are no gold coins under five dollars. Business transactions of one dollar and less than five require money in denominations to suit. It might be well to limit the gold coinage to pieces of ten dollars. In that case transactions of one dollar and under ten would require silver dollars or paper representatives of them. As it has been found that between sixty and seventy millions of fractional silver finds ready use in transactions under one dollar, so it can be readily discovered what sum in silver dollars would be required for transactions of less than ten dollars and of one dollar and over. This would be the true scientific limit of coined silver dollars. Their free legal-tender quality should also be limited to amounts of one thousand dollars, and they should be redeemed in gold in certain limited sums.

But there are already nearly five hundred millions of silver dollars in circulation and their parity with gold dollars has been practically maintained. Yes, this is true; but at what an expense this has been done. What has been the cost of keeping the gold reserve, which has been the price of the glory obtained in keeping five hundred million silver dollars at par. Of course it may be said that the gold reserve had to be kept to insure the redemption of the legal-tender notes. But if no silver dollars had been in circulation, very little gold would have been drawn from the reserve on account of legal-tender notes. The silver certificates crowded the legal-tender notes to the redemption counter. The gold reserve has had to be replenished until now the nation is paying interest on over \$200,000,000 of bonded debt issued to procure the gold.

No doubt if the people of the United States are willing to pay for it they can by increasing their debt or increasing taxation maintain a billion silver dollars as easily as five hundred millions. But is this a paying scheme for any one? The energies of the country can be better used in other directions. The silver dollars coined and the silver bullion purchased which may yet be coined are already saddled upon us. They must be endured for a time as the bad legacy of unwise financial laws. But any attempt to increase this burden by experimenting with the strength of the nation should at once be stopped. France to-day would be better off commercially if she could get rid of the larger part of her five franc pieces. The United States would be better off could the amount of silver dollars be reduced to what is actually required of coins of that denomination.

## BANKERS AS PUBLIC EDUCATORS.

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### *IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK TO BE DONE IN SPREADING CORRECT IDEAS OF FINANCE AND BANKING.*

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Banking, in the comprehensive sense of the term, is a science, as well as law, physic, commerce or government. Every banker recognizes this. He also recognizes, as do the followers of other sciences, that the difficulties and perplexities which he meets do not lie so much in mastering its principles as in applying to facts and affairs the rules which these principles prescribe. In other words, it is the practice, not the theories of his profession, which burden him.

If it be a science, what are the character, scope and duties of this profession, beyond the daily obligations of the office hours? This science like all others has its history. Limited and simple like them in its origin, it has followed the path of slow development until its fundamental truths are now recognized and in force throughout the world, and its code of rules, based upon knowledge derived from study, experiment and experience, is conceded to be as definite and certain in its operations as the rules of any science which has to deal with the ebbing and flowing tides in the affairs of men.

To become familiar with the sources and growth of this science, the sources of a knowledge of its principles and their gradual evolution, requires a careful study and analysis, not only of the commercial, political and judicial history of this country for the past two hundred years, but also that of Western Europe for the past six hundred years. A study even of those features of it made peculiar to this country by reason of our dual form of government and the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, is a work in itself of no little magnitude. The organic decree that "Congress shall have power to coin money" and "regulate the value thereof" and that "no State shall coin money or emit bills of credit or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," is a brief utterance of principles of controlling consequence, not only in the limitations placed upon the powers of the respective States, but also in determining the polity of the general Government itself.

To properly understand the causes which led to the adoption of these principles and the results which have followed, recourse must be had to the history of the last two centuries. The life of no living banker extends far enough back to have made him a participant in the events which constitute the major part of this history. Indeed, no living banker, as a matured observer of them, can recall the uncertain career and turbulent experiences and the lessons taught by them, even of the second United States Bank.

All the events of the first one hundred and fifty years of American banking have long since been in charge of the history of that period and are a sealed book except to those who are willing to pay, by investigation and study, the price which the acquisition of knowledge always demands.

And it may also be said that the events bearing especially upon banking which occurred, both in and out of Congress and the courts, from 1850 to 1870 and resulted in the clearing-house of the day, in practically sweeping out of existence the State banks of issue and in inaugurating the existing systems of banking, both State and national, were participated in by comparatively few of the active bankers now in the profession. Among the honored veterans of the calling there are a few

who know because they saw what occurred. But most of the bankers of that period, so brief in the life of the profession, yet so full of history, who by reason of their long experience were admitted leaders, have surrendered to the great law of the universe and passed into the eternities. To the larger number of the men now prosecuting this business, tradition and books are the only sources of knowledge of that eventful period. What has occurred since 1870 has been enacted under the eye of most of the present members of the profession and is familiar to them.

If, turning from our national environment, we seek to compass the entire circle of knowledge upon which the principles and rules of the science of banking have been based and stand to-day, we are confronted by a work of research and study which demands as strong an understanding, as liberal an intellectual equipment, as full a measure of patient and persistent investigation, as are required of the searchers after a knowledge of causes in any of the fields covered by the learned professions. Books, study and thought, thought, study and books, as well as application to business, are as appropriately the tools of the accomplished banker as they are of the accomplished worker in any of the active professions. Although his science has its limitations, it has also its prominent place in the history of all nations; occupies a conspicuous position in all systems of political economy; engages the constant and earnest attention of all governments; is one of the chief foundations upon which all commercial greatness must rest; is the security for stable rewards to all labor, including even the creations of art and of literature.

#### BANKERS THE PROPER SOURCE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION.

Such being the character of the science of banking, such the need for study and such the measure of their acquirements, why are not the bankers of the country the natural and proper source of the opinions which should control the action of both State and national Governments on all fundamental questions of financial policies? I know it is charged that they are swayed by personal interest, are subject to dictation from sources hostile to the masses of the people, even advocates of principles which are not in harmony with but opposed to the independence and best interests of American institutions. But we know, and the great mass of the fair-minded people of the country believe, that these charges are groundless. That they belong to that great family of accusation which is always called into service, in times of excitement and agitation, in an effort to destroy the influence and paralyze the natural leaders of opinion on the questions then uppermost in the public mind. Calumny succeeds for a season, but ultimately truth prevails and gives to fitness and merit the mastery.

We recognize the fact and gladly, too, because it is of the very essence of our personal and political freedom, that within the limits assigned by the organic law the citizen through his ballot is the final umpire in the determination of all policies of administration, including that of finance. And he must be assumed to be, whether he is or not, equal to the duty of deciding correctly. The supreme difficulty of his task is well illustrated by the recent heated controversy which commanded attention in every State of the Union. It will be well for the country if the wise decision made is also final. But there are few of us who are sanguine enough to believe that it will not be tried and retried in Congress, on the hustings and at the ballot box, until it becomes manifest that the conclusion reached has become a clear, unwavering and permanent conviction in the minds of a decisive majority of the voters of the country.

#### OTHER FINANCIAL ISSUES MUST BE SETTLED.

Nor is the question of whether we shall try the experiment of the free coinage of silver on the basis of 16 to 1, or on any other basis; or whether we shall have

bimetallism, with the co-operation of the leading commercial nations of the world; or whether we shall give in our adherence to a gold standard, questions falling confessedly within the lines of the profession of the banker, the only financial question with which the voter must deal in the near future. The bank currency of the country, and with it the character of the bank organizations, and the residence of the power, whether in the nation or in the States, which is to control them, is just before us. Whether we are to have a continuance of the national banking system with its currency, or are to return to State banks of issue, or are to have National banks or State banks, or both, without the power to issue currency; whether a paper currency, without which in convenient volume no people at this stage of the world's history will consent to be, shall be issued directly by the general Government through its Treasury Department or indirectly through a National bank to be created, owned and controlled by it—all these questions are before us, in the immediate future, for decision. And it will be the citizen, either directly by his ballot or indirectly through his representatives in Congress, who will decide them.

#### POPULAR INTELLIGENCE THE COUNTRY'S HOPE.

But can these grave questions, which lie at the very foundations of our progress as a people, be wisely decided by the voter? You and I are bound to answer yes, or else abandon our declaration to the world that government by the people is the best form of government on earth. Yet you and I know that this declaration means, if it means anything at all, that the people who administer such a government must either be themselves educated in the knowledge peculiar to the more abstruse, but nevertheless practical, questions which arise in the political and economic affairs of a great people, or must follow the advice and leadership of those who have made these questions a special study. We all subscribe to the belief that the preservation of this republic depends not only upon the virtue but also upon the education of the voters. And we are all proud of the work of education that is going on about us. Proud of the fact that it has already been carried to such a degree, through the agencies of our universities, our colleges, our academies, our private schools, and last, but chiefly, our public schools, that the great majority of the issues, local, State and national, submitted to the voters of the present day are safely and intelligently disposed of by them. But we also know that these agencies of general education can never, unaided, prepare the great mass of voters of this or of any country to determine questions the correct solution of which depends upon special training and knowledge. They do prepare them, however, to be reflecting readers, thoughtful listeners to and of what may be honestly written and spoken by those who by special training and experience are able to instruct and guide them. The recent political canvass exhibited in a marked degree not only the willingness but the eagerness of the voters of this country to obtain and use information touching questions which lie beyond the reach of ordinary pursuits, in fact, lie peculiarly within the domain of those only whose profession it is to investigate and study them.

The day will come, must come, and I hope soon, when the complex questions involved in the coinage and currency, the circulating medium of the country, as well as the elementary and unerring principles lying at the foundation of every sound financial system, will be taught, not simply in the universities and colleges of the land, but in the common schools of every neighborhood as the physical geography of the country is now taught. What an opportunity for another Peter Parley! This time on the elements of "American Finance," briefly told and truthfully taught and thereby so firmly anchored in the mind of the pupil as to resist for all time the assaults of sophistry. What banker will give to the public schools of the country such a book and thereby make himself immortal? When this is done need

of resort to the specialist will be rare and his work will be brief. But until this is done and to avoid intermediate mistakes, with their long train of distressing consequences, the occasion and the opportunity for a great work exist.

The voters of this country should be given an opportunity, not simply in the turmoil and excitement of a political canvass, but in the intervals, at their homes and in the places where their usual neighborhood meetings are held, to read and hear clear and calm discussion of the history and experience, at least of our own country, touching the coinage of gold and silver, the issue of paper to circulate as money, the function of banks, and the attitude of the general and State governments, under their respective constitutions, towards these matters as well as their respective powers in relation to them. Can this be done? Undoubtedly. Would it pay? Certainly. Would it require an organization? Of course. Would it be expensive? No. Who ought to take charge of it? The bankers of the United States. They are now organized in national, State and district or group associations. These organizations, of course, were not designed for the work to which I refer. They have their own immediate work which is valuable and useful and should not be interrupted. But it is entirely practicable to utilize the membership of these organizations, or such portion of it as may be willing to give assistance. The mere mode or method of getting at it is of secondary importance. But that it should be done under the direction and control of the banking profession of the country, they being the best equipped for the work, would seem to admit of no debate. The activity of the day in every department of thought and instruction and the methods of securing the distribution of their results to the firesides of the people, have multiplied and are multiplying so rapidly, it would seem a comparatively easy task to secure to the same firesides, on paper and in speech, the best thought and wisest counsel of the profession of banking on the great problems which must be met and solved in the near future. If this work is not done by this profession it will not be done at all. It will again fall into the hands of men who make the stump speeches and write the partisan articles of a political campaign and the vote to be reached by those who have the responsibility of the decision of these grave questions will continue to be full of the elements of chance and doubt and danger.

With our seventy odd millions of mixed population, and rapidly increasing; with our vast domain, yet hardly a frontier now left; with our infinite variety of pursuits, yet daily multiplying; with our growing contrariety of opinion, naturally springing out of our varied geographical, agricultural and commercial conditions, can we reasonably expect to escape from this chance and doubt and danger, with the depression of spirit and paralysis of purpose which they entail, unless some such plan of instruction, as that suggested, be adopted? Nor do these utterances warrant the inference that we are pessimists. On the contrary, we are optimists in all that pertains to the perpetuity of American institutions. We believe that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. But we also believe that knowledge in the voter is the price of a correct and wholesome and uniform administration of government by the State and by the nation. We know we can not see the spots on the sun with our unaided eyes. We know we can not turn the current of yonder river back upon its course with the palms of our hands. We know we can not count the stars in the firmament of night. And we know, equally well, that without knowledge we can not vote upon the profound questions of finance with that assurance of wise results which is demanded by the imperishable instincts of patriotic hearts.

GEO. A. MADILL.

ST. LOUIS, MO.



## \*THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S DISCOUNT RATE.

THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION OF A NOTED EXPEDIENT OF BRITISH BANKING.

(Continued from November number, page 540.)

### CAUSES OF FLUCTUATIONS OF RATE.

We will now consider the causes of fluctuations in the bank rate. They are of a varied character, in fact each year brings to light some new force which affects the value of money.

The first great cause would be the state of English commerce. The trade of this country is, as we have seen, transacted by means of borrowed capital obtained from the banks, which are the great storehouses of capital.

When trade is active more capital is required, and therefore we should expect the rate of interest to rise. On the other hand, when trade is depressed less capital is necessary for the requirements of the country.

Our imports and exports are a good index as to the state of trade. Every month we see reference made in the money articles of the daily papers, as to the increase or decrease of our commerce. The reports from our consuls abroad, also inform us whether capital is required in various parts of the world.

When trade is active we should expect prices to rise because of an increased demand. When this occurs we get merchants anxious to take advantage of the improvement in commerce, and therefore increase their business by means of borrowed capital.

Again, when prices are rising, the merchant is able to borrow more capital from the banker, because of the increased value of his goods. We should also expect to notice the imports increasing with a rise of prices, because other nations are anxious to send goods to this country in order to obtain higher values for their commodities.

On the other hand, exports would be diminished because the rise of prices would cause a less number of purchases to be made in this country for export, in consequence of the margin of profit becoming less on each transaction. Whenever there is a *great* difference between the values of imports and exports, the balance finally must be paid in gold, the only commodity which can be utilized for settling international indebtedness. Of course, one notices a great discrepancy between the values of our imports and exports, and therefore one would imagine that large sums of gold have continually to be sent from this country. This, however, is not the case, because England has lent enormous sums to foreign countries, which have to remit money as interest.

Again, this country derives a large income from her carrying trade. When, however, there is no equilibrium the balance must be paid in gold, and that metal can only be obtained in large quantities from the Bank of England. This is one of the reasons why the reserve of gold at the bank is so important. As gold represents capital, its movements to and from this country show to some extent the supply and demand for capital.

\* From "Banks and Banking," by H. T. Easton. London: Effingham Wilson.

Another important cause is that the reserve of gold in the vaults of the bank represents the final resources of this country for meeting cash payments. We have seen that the banks keep their reserves at the Bank of England, and consequently there is no other stock of gold in existence. All sudden demands must be met by that institution.

Our credit system is so vast that one naturally looks to the stability of the banks which hold the surplus capital of the country. If the banks were called upon to repay all their depositors at a given time, they would be unable to do so. The state of credit is therefore an important item in studying changes in the rate of interest.

All sudden demands for capital soon affect the reserve at the Bank of England. As we recognize in this country the importance of keeping a reserve for emergencies, it is important that something should be done to protect such reserve. Fortunately the Bank of England has a good instrument to protect its resources, viz., the rate of discount. Capital soon finds its way to the centre where the highest rate of interest prevails. The reserve at the bank is therefore of great importance, and consequently it is necessary to understand how it influences the value of money. There are in reality three aspects of the reserve.

In the first place, the currency requirements of the country are obtained from the bank. We shall have a good illustration of this, when we consider the autumnal demand for gold.

Secondly, a greater part of the bullion which is required for international purposes is obtained from the amount deposited.

Finally, there is the reserve of gold and notes in the banking department, which is of the greatest importance in influencing the rate of discount.

The daily papers continually make reference to the reserve in commenting upon the value of money. To an outsider not conversant with the familiar terms used daily in Lombard Street, the remarks sometimes made are misleading. We find reference made to the reserve of gold and notes in the banking department, and then, possibly in the same paragraph, reference to the bullion in the issue department. We are then informed that although a fair reserve exists in the banking department yet we must expect to see capital very dear, because a million or two has been drawn from the issue department.

By the Act of 1844 the bank is allowed to issue fifteen millions of notes against securities, and for any sum issued in excess gold must be held in reserve.

It is clear that anyone holding notes can obtain gold from the bank, because that institution is compelled to pay in coin all notes presented for that purpose. How then does the withdrawal of gold from the issue department affect the value of money?

Mr. Clare, in his excellent book entitled "A Money Market Primer," shows the effect of a withdrawal of gold on the reserve at the Bank of England.

Thus, when a depositor withdraws £500,000, notes to that amount are taken from the reserve and returned to the issue department. These notes are cancelled, and sovereigns which are held against them are given in exchange. The effect on the balance sheet is as follows:

#### ISSUE DEPARTMENT.

Notes.....	£38.8 millions.	Securities.....	£16.4 millions.
		Gold.....	22.4     "
			<u>£38.8</u>

#### Withdrawal.

Notes.....	£38.3 millions.	Securities.....	£16.4 millions.
		Gold.....	21.9     "
			<u>£38.3</u>

## BANKING DEPARTMENT.

Capital and rest.....	£18 millions,	Government securities..	£11.7 millions.
Deposits.....	37.2 "	Other	" 28.7 "
		Notes.....	13.8 "
		Coin.....	1 "
	<u>£55.2</u>		<u>£55.2</u>

*Withdrawal.*

Capital.....	£18 millions.	Government securities..	£11.7 millions.
Deposits.....	36.7 "	Other	" 28.7 "
		Reserve.....	14.3 "
	<u>£54.7</u>		<u>£54.7</u>

If, however, the money market restores its balances to the former level, it borrows of the Bank of England or discounts bills at that institution.

We have already seen that gold is the final means for settling international trade, and that it can only be obtained in large quantities from the Bank of England.

When capital is leaving this country in the shape of gold it represents a variety of transactions—such as a scarcity of capital at a foreign centre, or to pay for food imported into this country, or possibly to carry out a large financial operation.

In addition to the currency requirements of this country, it is necessary to keep a certain amount of gold in order to preserve the convertibility of bank notes.

We are informed sometimes that the bank directors have decided to raise the rate, because possibly a small quantity of gold has left the bank; whereas the actual cause might be a depletion of the reserve in the banking department, caused by a scarcity of capital, or possibly other considerations known only to the bank directors. Of the two reserves of which we have spoken, it is certainly the reserve in the banking department which is most important in causing fluctuations in the rate of discount.

Mr. Palgrave says: "Though the total amount of bullion held by the bank is a very important thing, the rate of discount does not appear to be regulated by it."

This is shown by the following returns:

	<i>Bullion held.</i>	<i>Rate of discount.</i>
1844.....	£13,500,000	3½
1845.....	15,200,000	3
1846.....	14,800,000	3½
1854.....	17,500,000	3½
1856.....	10,900,000	5½
1857.....	10,100,000	6½
1858.....	17,800,000	3½
1865.....	14,500,000	4½
1866.....	14,900,000	7
1870.....	20,400,000	3
1871.....	23,500,000	3
1872.....	22,600,000	4½

We know that at times the market suffers from a scarcity of capital rather than of gold. The figures which we have given show that on several occasions the reserve of gold in the issue department has been low, and yet the rate of interest has also been low; but there is a closer connection between the reserve in the banking department and the rate of discount.

It has been already stated that the demand for capital does affect the amount of bullion in the issue department. Capital is required to pay for the balance of trade against us, and must be liquidated by means of gold drawn from this department. It indicates that capital is leaving this country for the payment of food and other



necessaries purchased. The all-important question is, How much gold should be retained in the issue department to meet every contingency ?

There is no doubt that the bank is able to attract bullion from abroad, when its reserves of that commodity are low, by raising the rate.

On the other hand we must remember that the bank has not experienced in the last fifty years a run on its resources for gold. So long as notes can be obtained, the holders do not appear to require gold in exchange. In consequence of the banks keeping their reserves at the bank, they retain in their tills a less amount of gold ; although the liabilities of the banks have increased, yet the amount of cash held is smaller.

		<i>Cash held.</i>
Thus—1880, eleven banks' liabilities.....	£161,325,100	10.3 per cent.
1879, " " " .....	125,530,000	12.8 " "

Of course, improved communication, the use of telegraphic transfers, and the great use of checks have economized gold. Yet, on the other hand, a sudden demand for that metal must be met by the Bank of England. We therefore get changes in the rate of discount, due to the movements of comparatively small amounts of gold.

Mr. Giffen estimates that with a capital of 6,000 millions the quantity of gold and silver held only amounts to twenty millions, or 3 per cent.

Any increase or decrease in the amount must affect the value of money, and these changes are reflected in the reserve of the Bank of England. All transactions are expressed in gold, and therefore if we get prices rising an additional amount must be added to the nominal capital, and particularly to the capital represented by the loans and deposits of banks. If wages rise in this country more gold is required, and consequently the reserve at the bank is diminished.

Our monetary system is a delicate one, and what M. de Laveye stated in 1864 is possibly of more force at the present time. " All countries which carry on gigantic transactions with small reserves of gold and silver, and which have a vast movement of importations and exportations, must be exposed to these economical perturbations. The more a country expels the precious metals from the channels of circulation and replaces them by instruments of credit, bank notes, checks, warrants, deposits, clearing-houses, etc., and the more, at the same time, it develops its relations with foreign countries, the more it will be exposed to the periodical return of financial perturbations, because more easily an unfavorable balance of trade and payments will disturb all the mechanism of exchange, and will require from the managers of credit institutions redoubled circumspection, prudence and ability."

We have in this country a gigantic system of credit built up on a small gold reserve, and in order to protect the same the Bank of England has very frequently to alter the rate of discount.

By raising the rate capital is attracted from abroad, and the reserve at the bank is replenished.

London being the financial centre of the world, all foreign countries naturally ascertain the rates of interest prevailing in London, and if higher rates are ruling here capital finds its way to the most profitable market.

The effect of high rates prevailing in London soon makes itself felt on the trade of this country. Prices of commodities would fall, and this would tend to diminish imports ; but, on the other hand, exports would be increased, and would have to be paid for by means of gold.

If we study the bank reports we shall observe that the rate of interest is dependent upon the reserve, principally that of the banking department. With a low reserve the rates of interest are high, and with a high reserve a low rate of interest. This is shown from the following table :

	Reserve.	Rate of discount.
1845-49.....	8.5 millions.	£3 11 4
1850-54.....	9.8 "	3 5 10
1855-59.....	8.5 "	4 14 3
1860-64.....	8.4 "	4 15 2
1865-69.....	9.6 "	3 18 3
1870-74.....	12.3 "	8 10 3
1875-79.....	13.8 "	2 19 7
1880-84.....	18.4 "	3 7 7
1885-91.....	18.7 "	3 8 4

Fluctuations in the rate of discount are therefore due to the movements of comparatively small amounts of capital. We have, as it were, all the forces which affect the money market concentrated upon the reserve of the Bank of England.

Mr. Giffen says that "the rate of discount in the short loan market of a banking centre like London is not to be identified with the rates for loans generally, and it is only the rate for special loans between special classes of borrowers and lenders. Every change tells on the *sensitive* short loan market."

The position of the Bank of England in the money market is that of a large dealer who fixes the price, and then sees whether customers will transact business. Outside the bank are grouped large dealers in capital, who undersell the bank in order to get business.

These large money dealers are known as bill brokers, who obtain their principal resources from the banks and then discount bills at low rates in the market. It seems rather an anomaly that the banks should lend capital to outsiders to enable them to discount bills at fine rates. The effect of this has been that the banks get a less number of bills for discount than formerly. This change in the system of banking business is to be regretted, because good bills are one of the best investments for surplus capital.

A few years ago the bill brokers only discounted the acceptances of large financial houses and those of the various banks, but at the present time they discount a large amount of trade bills.

Bankers, however, find it convenient to lend their day-to-day balances to the broker, because an investment is at once found for surplus resources, and the money so lent can be called in at a day's notice. It must also be remembered that banks allow interest for deposits, and therefore it is necessary that no portion of the capital entrusted to them should remain unproductive.

The bill brokers either lodge bills which they have discounted as security for money advanced at call or short notice or they deposit marketable securities such as Consol Certificates, India Government Bonds or Indian Railway Debentures. The latter class of securities are known as "floaters." When the loan is called in, the banker returns such hypothecated securities.

As the bills which are lodged as security mature, they are replaced by others having a longer time to run.

The position of the bill brokers is however one of great delicacy, because they are dependent upon the banks for the greater portion of their funds. If the banks have no surplus capital to lend, the brokers apply at the Bank of England for loans, in order to meet their requirements. However, they always endeavor to avoid making applications at the bank because that institution only grants loans for seven days, and it is manifest that within a week great fluctuations might occur in the value of money.

No doubt this system of lending capital to the bill brokers has an important effect upon the value of money. This is shown in the daily quotations for money. We find sometimes the bank rates say 5 per cent., whilst the market rate is only 3 per cent. If the bank finds its discount business getting less, it lowers the rate in

order to bring it more in conformity with the market. The bank certainly does affect the rate for money at a particular moment, but it cannot affect the average rate.

"The reason is that any momentary fall caused by the caprice of such a bank tends to create an immediate rise, so that upon an average the value is not altered."

There is therefore no ground for believing that the price of capital is governed by different laws than that of supply and demand like any other commodity.

We have already stated that both the demands for the internal and foreign trade of this country are reflected in the reserve of the Bank of England. With regard to the foreign trade, we are able to understand the position of the market by the foreign exchanges. These tell us whether a demand for capital exists in any of the great financial centres of the world. All the forces which affect the supply and demand for capital are exhibited in these rates.

The following table shows us the extreme points when gold is likely to reach this country or the reverse :

Paris.....	25.22 $\frac{1}{4}$ = 4 per mille for us.
" .....	25.22 $\frac{1}{4}$ = par of exchange.
" .....	25.12 $\frac{1}{4}$ = 4 per mille against us.
Berlin.....	20.52 = 5 per mille for us.
" .....	20.43 = par.
" .....	20.33 = 5 per mille against us.
New York.....	4.89 = 5 per mille for us.
" .....	4.897 = par.
" .....	4.827 = 8 per mille against us.

The par of exchange is the identical value of the sovereign expressed in its foreign equivalent.

The extreme fluctuations of the exchange are known as bullion points, because when the rates reach these points, gold would be shipped either to or from this country. However, it is possible for the rates to rise or fall beyond such points, because on the shipment of gold to and from this country a saving might be made on freight, insurance, and other charges. One mercantile house might be in a better position than another to secure better terms on the shipment of gold.

Our trade is continually shifting from one place to another. A fresh demand for capital springs up in one corner of the globe, followed possibly by a diminished use of it in another. All these movements of capital react upon the price of commodities and in their turn affect the foreign exchanges.

Many years ago the bank directors looked to the foreign exchanges as their principal guide in fixing the rate of discount, but in recent years they have considered the demands for capital by the Stock Exchange as being of more importance.

Mr. Birch says : "The great thing which governs us is the enormous transactions on the Stock Exchange in France, in Germany, and in the United States. These are the operations we have to follow most carefully."

All such demands would affect the reserve of the Bank of England. The following figures will give us some idea of the demand for capital by the Stock Exchange :

In 1889 there were registered 2,788 companies with a capital of £241,277,000, the largest number ever registered, exceeding the previous year by 238.

Of course all these companies were not floated. Since the Companies Acts were passed 33,901 companies have been registered with a capital of £3,704,520,000. The year 1895 gave the following stupendous figures : 18,862 companies in existence with a capital of £1,035,029,835.

Mr. Giffen has estimated the capital of the country to be £10,000,000,000, and we observe that the figures for 1889 are very large, viz., about one-fortieth of the total amount. Although it does not represent capital paid up, yet the amount is very large.

Some of this capital would be sunk in railways, mines, docks and kindred undertakings, and would not be reproduced for a long term of years.

When there is a great increase in the number of joint-stock companies, it may happen that the savings of the country are not sufficient to meet the great demand, and then the value of money must be high. Shareholders are unable to pay their calls without the assistance of banks, and consequently the rate of interest rises.

Besides the fluctuations due to the increased demand for capital in order to meet the requirements of trade, there are changes which occur annually.

Of these periodical changes, the most important is the autumnal demand, which is principally a currency requirement.

The cause of this demand is, that after the ingathering of the harvest a great number of transactions take place. Corn is sold and other commodities purchased. All this tends to an absorption of capital.

The weekly returns of the Bank of England for the third and fourth quarters of the year show the result of these transactions, in a marked decrease in the bullion and loanable capital.

There is also the autumnal demand for gold from Scotland, due to the fact that rents, salaries, etc., are paid on the Scotch quarter day, viz., November 11.

At this period of the year the Scotch banks exceed their authorized issue of notes and are therefore obliged by the Act of 1845 to hold gold in reserve against any excess. After the demand has subsided, this hypothecated gold soon finds its way back to the Bank of England.

Professor Jevons speaks of the autumnal demand as follows: "To sum up, then, the October drain is due like many others to economic disturbances, to a concurrent of causes. The dispersion of money in wages during the summer and the absorption of money and capital in buying up the produce of the harvest occasion a general autumnal drain upon the resources of the banks, causing the private deposits, the bullion and the reserve of notes to fall. Then the general quarterly payment of rents, bills, and especially the dividends at the beginning of October, cause a sudden extra run upon the resources of the banks quite sufficient in many states of the money market to engender a panic, unless indeed its normal and temporary nature be well understood. The result of this autumnal demand is that we find the value of money higher for the last six months of the year."

This is shown by the following analysis of bank rates:

	<i>Average rates.</i>
1845-61, January to March .....	3.97 per cent.
" April to June.....	3.87 "
" July to September.....	3.00 "
" October to December.....	4.17 "

The Bank of England pays the interest on the national debt by quarterly instalments on January 5, April 5, July 5 and October 5. The effect of these payments is shown in the weekly balance sheets:

- (1) A rapid decrease in Government deposits.
- (2) A decrease in the reserve of notes.
- (3) A decrease in the private securities.
- (4) A slight decrease in the bullion.
- (5) An increase in the private deposits.
- (6) An increase in the note circulation.

When the dividend money, now about £5,250,000 per quarter, is released, it has the effect of increasing the supply of capital, and consequently at these periods we may expect the rate of interest to fall.

The financial requirements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer frequently cause changes in the value of money. This is especially the case when there is a large

sum floating in the market in the form of Treasury or Exchequer bills. The repayment or renewal of such obligations has an effect upon the value of money, especially at times when capital is scarce. The rates at which these obligations are renewed would be an indication to the bank directors as to the position of the outside market.

In the financial papers reference is made to certain payments or calls which fall due. For example, an instalment on an Indian loan of say £1,000,000 has to be paid, and consequently the market is denuded of that amount of capital. Again, a large company makes a call upon its shareholders, who are obliged to find capital to meet the same. Then at the same time we might have the Government borrowing £1,000,000 on Treasury bills. These bills are issued at various dates, and if they are applied for at low rates, it would indicate that the market expects a low average rate for money.

The effect of all these calls upon the market would be to raise the rate of interest.

We often see it stated that the Bank of England has been borrowing on stock. This means that it borrows capital in the market, like the bill brokers. The weekly reports show this by a decrease in Government securities. The bank directors endeavor to make their rate more effective, or, as it is stated, to get control of the market.

It is difficult to understand how capital so obtained by the bank can be utilized at a profit, but when the bank gets control of the market, it is able to get more discount business; which no doubt would more than compensate it for the amount paid as interest on loans.

The rates for money prevailing on the Stock Exchange form a guide to the bank directors in fixing their rate. They study closely the events which are taking place in the great market for securities.

A large portion of the business transacted on the Stock Exchange is of a speculative nature. Stock is purchased, but not paid for, so that when the fortnightly settlement arrives, the buyer has to obtain a loan on his stock, or, as it is termed, "carried over" to the next settlement. This is done by the broker, who charges his client interest for the transaction. The rate of interest charged affords some indication as to the scarcity of capital or otherwise.

We have been considering some forces or economic causes which tend to increase the value of capital in the market. There are, however, causes which have the effect of lowering the rate of interest.

Sometimes a large Government loan is paid off, which has the effect of throwing capital on the market. Again, a railway is purchased by a Government and its capital returned to its shareholders. This recently occurred, when a Dutch railway was purchased by the Government, and produced some effect upon market rates. We have, in fact, rates for money continually changing in consequence of the movement of comparatively small amounts of capital.

However, for more permanent causes of annual average rates, whether high or low, the condition of trade is the most important factor. When trade is depressed, less capital is required, and therefore years of depression would mean low average rates of interest.

Our commercial system is highly organized. The division of labor has made trades dependent upon each other. A depression in one trade soon affects another, and this reacts upon the banks, which find that less capital is required, and consequently rates for money fall.

Again, we find credit an important factor in the money market, not only in connection with the mercantile community, but also with banks. Trade is carried on by means of borrowed capital obtained from the banks, which lend capital belonging to others.



A greater portion of the resources of banks is utilized in the discounting of bills which represent credit transactions, and we have seen that the term discount is used in the money market rather than the term interest, showing that the purchase of these credit documents is the most important business in the money market.

We have already stated that the bank is only in the position of one of the largest dealers in capital. We must, therefore, consider the action of the other lenders, especially the bill brokers and large discount houses, that wield a great power in the market. These institutions compete against the bank, in order to obtain capital and to utilize the same in the discount of bills.

For example, the effect of this competition may be seen by the following quotation of rates prevailing at one time in the market, viz. :

DISCOUNT.		MONEY.	
	Per cent.		Per cent.
Bank rate.....	5	Seven day Bank of England loans.....	6
Three month bank bills.....	4½	Bankers' deposit rate.....	¾
Six month bank bills.....	4½	Brokers' deposit rate.....	¾
Three month fine trade bills.....	5	Seven day market loans.....	¾
Six month fine trade bills.....	5	Day to day money.....	¾

The above rates tell us somewhat as to the position of the money market.

We note that the rate for three month bank bills differs only one-quarter per cent. from the bank rate. This would indicate that the bank is able to effect some discount business, and, therefore, that its rate conforms to the market value for capital.

The rate for six month bank bills is a fraction less, because the market assumes that the average value of money for that period will be less.

It is to be noticed that the rate for fine trade bills is a little more, viz., from one-quarter to one-half per cent. This additional interest is charged because more risk attends the discount of trade bills than bills accepted by banks, which will almost to a certainty be paid.

We observe that the bank charges 1 per cent. above the published rate for seven day loans. This is the usual custom of that institution, and therefore every dealer in money endeavors to meet his engagements without its aid.

The banks generally allow 1½ per cent. below bank rate for deposits, unless the rate is very low, when there is only a difference of 1 per cent. Recently, we have seen the rate for deposits allowed by the banks lowered to one-half per cent. ; whilst the Bank of England remains at the nominal rate of 2 per cent. This would show the great difficulty experienced in utilizing deposits at a profit. The cause of this difference between discount and deposit rates is that the banks have at times to lend money at call, at rates much below bank rate. Then again, they have to find an investment for depositors' money, which of necessity entails risk, and, therefore, some margin is required as an insurance fund. We note that day to day money is only worth 2½ to 3½ per cent., and, therefore, if a banker allowed 3½ per cent. on deposit, there would be a loss by the transaction. However, it is the *average* rate which must be considered.

The brokers' deposit rate is a little higher than the banks', viz., one-quarter per cent., which would indicate that they are anxious to secure the use of capital, and therefore are willing to pay a higher rate.

The brokers prefer a low average rate for money in order to conduct their business rather than a rate continually fluctuating. The profit of the brokers would be the difference between their deposit rates and market rates for discount. They also allow an additional one-half per cent. for money lent them for seven days, in order to avoid applications to the Bank of England.

The last quotation is for day to day money, that is, money which can be called in at any moment by the banks. Naturally money borrowed on such conditions is

not so valuable to the broker, because, if loans are called in, he is obliged to borrow elsewhere, and what the requirements of the market will be on the following day, may not be known.

By studying these rates we get an insight into some of the forces which cause fluctuations in the value of money. The tendency in the money market is towards an equalization of rates. Naturally every borrower endeavors to find the cheapest market. When bills of a certain class are discounted at the banks, it is in consequence of the holders not being able to discount them below bank rate, because, although their credit is good, yet they are not sufficiently known in the market. The forces at work in the market are always tending to make the bank rate equal to the market rate. When there is a great discrepancy between the two, a less number of bills are discounted at the banks. Some of the large banks, however, compete for bills, that is, they discount for their customers at market rates, and such banks would not experience the movements indicated.

Again, the London banks soon ascertain how rates of interest are tending by the daily applications of the brokers. When capital is scarce in the market, the bill brokers visit the banks perhaps two or three times a day in order to obtain the surplus capital of such institutions, and offer at times even higher rates than the bank rate, in order to avoid applying at the Bank of England for loans.

*(To be continued.)*

**COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.**—The aspirants to succeed Hon. James H. Eckels as Comptroller of the Currency may have to wait for some time. In the first place Mr. Eckels seems to be discharging the duties of the position to the general satisfaction of the banks and the people. Further, his term does not expire with the closing of the present Administration. Section 325, Revised Statutes of the U. S., provides:

“The Comptroller of the Currency shall be appointed by the President, on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold his office for the term of five years unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate; and he shall be entitled to a salary of five thousand dollars a year.”

As Mr. Eckels was appointed on April 8, 1898, his term does not expire for some time yet. It has been stated that the present Comptroller may be his own successor if he chooses.

**GOLD CERTIFICATES.**—There is said to be an urgent demand by many bankers for the resumption of the issue of gold certificates by the Treasury, which was first suspended in April, 1898. Secretary Carlisle is said to be opposed to the issue of the certificates, and it is given out that in the opinion of the Treasury the banks should deposit their gold in exchange for legal tenders, which under the present policy of redemption are the same as a gold certificate so far as their redeemability in gold is concerned. The law of 1862 is mandatory in requiring that certificates be issued upon the deposit of gold of twenty dollars or multiples of that sum, but their issue is required to be suspended when the reserve falls below \$100,000,000.

**THE RUSSIAN MINT.**—It is reported that provision will be made next year for the establishment of an imperial Russian mint just beyond the limits of Moscow. Of recent years practically all the Russian coinage has been executed by French firms, although at present there are firms in Birmingham which are under contract with the Russian authorities to strike some 800,000 rubles in bronze. It is felt that the time is now ripe for Russia to mint all its own coinage and if the plans which are now being considered are adopted by M. de Witte, the Minister of Finance, after a year or so no Russian money is likely to be coined outside the Empire.

## \* THE BANK CLERK.

### *KNOWLEDGE AND BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY A BANK CLERKSHIP.*

It sometimes occurs to one during a long service as bank clerk that the knowledge to be gained overtops the benefit; experience accrues rapidly and the good result is not always apparent to the often discouraged observer of his own progress. But in banking as in most other business, experience is knowledge and knowledge is power. From the highest officer to the humblest clerk all should be ready to gather any stray bit of information, for there is always something to be learned even by the most proficient. A clerk is usually eager, as is but natural, to make the most of himself individually, and with the desire for self-improvement or success comes his devotion to his employer's best interests, engendering knowledge of the most useful kind. Of course in any of the shifts of trade there is knowledge to be gained, but the bank clerk's advancement depends almost entirely upon his understanding of the details of his business. His daily experience is the school wherein he learns the thousand and one things, seemingly unimportant, but in reality most necessary to the knowledge of banking.

Between the day a young man assumes the duties of a bank employee and the time when he takes on the dignity of an officer, there is a period of continuous investigation and sober study.

We will suppose the case of a boy entering a bank in the lowest place, that of messenger. To begin, he learns promptness and accuracy, both most essential in any occupation, and that all matters pertaining to his work require careful and serious treatment. He sometimes has important duties to perform and carelessness or negligence in the execution of these duties can place a banking house in a very embarrassing position.

In due course of time other duties are assigned to him, such as balancing pass books, rendering statements of more or less importance, posting records which must show the true condition of affairs and which are preserved from year to year for the purpose of perfecting other records. He learns the various branches of bookkeeping and accounting, where neatness and system must be rigidly maintained.

In the tide of business, notes, deeds of all kinds, coupons and bills of exchange are intrusted to a clerk's care for collection. In order to dispose of these he must acquaint himself with many legal technicalities arising in these transactions. It therefore behooves him to possess at least a moderate knowledge of the law governing banking.

Law is the guardian angel of all business and any note, contract, deed or instrument of any kind not drawn up in accordance with law can not be relied upon. A careful study of various legal authorities "on banking" and "bills and notes," "on agencies," "mortgages and deeds," etc., etc, will benefit him greatly.

He has other opportunities of gaining information. All journals of banking now report supreme court decisions rendered in all parts of the country, and inasmuch as these decisions govern cases of similar complexion, it naturally follows that the bank clerk who is posted on such rulings can use his knowledge to good advantage.

\* Paper prepared by Louis Siemans, of St. Joseph, Mo., and awarded first prize by the Missouri Bankers' Association.

As he climbs the slippery and often extremely uncertain rounds of the banking ladder he reaches the position where he must handle the money belonging to the bank's depositors. In this capacity our rising banker has occasion to display his talents if so be he possesses any. Each individual clerk of any bank is called upon to represent his institution in dealing with depositors and patrons. He learns that courtesy often covers a multitude of sins and that gruffness and arrogance do irreparable damage and that there is nothing more important than courtesy in the business transactions of a bank.

In order that he may not be imposed upon he posts himself on all forms of money issued. He investigates the many acts under which a coin or bill is issued and the circumstances connected with the passage of such an act. A bank clerk's experience is a good school in which to acquire skill in detecting counterfeit money. This skill cannot be reached by a short cut but must be the result of long and patient labor. Careful study and experience will make any bank clerk quick at detecting the spurious among the genuine. This also holds good in his analysis of human nature. From coming in contact with assorted types of character he learns to examine faces as he does his bills and can usually distinguish the rogue from the honest man.

When he has acquired his rules of conduct and the general knowledge he is to apply, he is relieved of the greater part of mental labor, the doing of things becomes a pleasure instead of a tax. Things seem to do themselves.

The knowledge to be gained by a bank clerk could be extended to an indefinite length for, as previously stated, there is always something to be learned—but as discourses have limitations and life is far too brief to specify all one *ought* to know, we will proceed to the benefits to be reaped from the sowing of knowledge.

Of course, knowledge in itself is a benefit, as the clerk who pauses after the mastery of some banking problem and knows himself secure in the understanding of it, readily will feel. The clerk who makes the best use of his time in becoming master of the situation, reaps earlier benefits than the one who with the mistaken idea that he possesses all the time there is, grows careless and relaxes his efforts. Constant application and perseverance will almost always bring success.

It would be hard to overestimate the benefit of a good reputation to a business man and especially to a banker. Much depends on his reputation and integrity. The stewardship of other people's money requires honest, capable and faithful clerks, as well as officers. It is of vital importance that all connected in any way with a banking house should be thoroughly trustworthy. An extended clerkship in a bank is great evidence of the honesty and ability of a man and it naturally follows that his reputation as a business man is unblemished. By the business training he has received he is fitted to cope with difficult financial and commercial problems and in the administration of his own affairs he can act with safety and confidence.

As "the child is father to the man" so the diligent and painstaking clerk is the forerunner of the competent and successful officer, and to such a clerk promotions are sure to come. When they do come the value of his experience is incalculable. Having been through the mill himself he can detect at a glance any irregularities in the work of his subordinates. A great benefit to a bank clerk is the contact with human nature and consequent broadening of his mind. While it is true that many banks have been profitably conducted by narrow minds, it is also a fact that the greatest measures of success is attained by the men who strive constantly for more and better knowledge.

Let us press forward then, fellow bank clerks, in the search for knowledge of the most elevating and useful kind, and following the knowledge will come obvious benefits, but as someone has written, "you must remember it isn't only laying hold of a rope, you must go on pulling."

## FOREIGN BANKING AND FINANCE.

### THE NEW CHARTER OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.

The French Government have at last laid before the Chamber of Deputies (on October 31) their plan for the extension of the charter of the Bank of France, which expires under the existing grant on December 31, 1897. A bill on the subject was presented to the Chambers as early as January, 1891, but was abandoned after discussion because of socialistic and other forms of opposition. The new plan is not very different from that then proposed, but embodies some changes. The charter of the bank is extended for twenty-three years, or until the end of the year 1920. The limit of circulation is raised from 4,000,000,000 francs to 5,000,000,000 francs (\$1,000,000,000). This limit upon the circulation has been repeatedly changed since the grant of the present charter, the last change having been made in 1893. Among the new burdens imposed upon the bank by the proposed charter are the renunciation of further interest upon two loans made to the Government of 60,000,000 francs at three per cent. on June 16, 1857, and 80,000,000 francs at one per cent. on March 29, 1878. The bank is not only required to make over the use of this sum during the continuance of the charter to the Government, but to make a further advance of 40,000,000 francs free of interest. The bank is also required to transfer to the credit of the Government a sum of about 7,000,000 francs for the redemption of old notes, many of which are believed to have been destroyed and of which the Government will hereafter assume the redemption. Several services relating to the payment of interest on the public debt and the transfer of public funds are to be assumed by the bank without charge to the Government. A tax is to be paid to the Government equal to one-eighth of the rate of discount upon that portion of the circulation which is classified as productive circulation. This means, for instance, that when the circulation exceeds the metallic reserve by the amount of 500,000,000 francs, as was the case on November 5, and the prevailing rate of discount is two per cent., one-eighth of two per cent. of 500,000,000 francs, amounting to 1,250,000 francs (\$250,000), would be paid to the Government as a tax. The proper annual payment, however, would be arrived at by calculating the weekly average excess of circulation above the metallic reserve and making allowance for the changes in the rate of discount.

Several important services are to be rendered to the public in addition to those now required from the bank. Traces of the socialistic and agrarian demands upon the bank are found in the requirements relating to the admission of paper presented by agricultural associations and the reduction of the minimum value of the paper admitted to discount. It is provided that bills of exchange and other commercial paper shall be admitted to discount upon the same terms as paper drawn by merchants, when presented by syndical, agricultural and other associations which are notoriously solvent. This system already prevails at the Bank of Germany, the Bank of Russia and the Bank of Italy, and is not open to serious objection within proper limits. The minimum value of paper admitted to discount is reduced to five francs (\$1) when drawn upon the locality where it is discounted and ten francs (\$2) when drawn upon another place. Another concession to the agricultural interests is the provision that the banks shall admit a representative of those interests to the governing boards of the branches. The bank is required within two years to

change eighteen existing auxiliary bureaus into full branches, to establish eleven new branches in leading towns where they are lacking, and to create thirty new auxiliary bureaus. Authority is given the Government to require, between the years 1900 and 1915, fifteen auxiliary bureaus in localities which may be agreed upon and sixty new associated towns.

The wisdom of continuing the monopoly of note issue enjoyed by the bank is conceded by Prof. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, one of the leading representatives of the classical school of political economy, in his review of the proposed charter in "*L'Economiste Français*" of November 7. He does not consider it wise, in view of the possible need of the support of the bank in case of war, to take up the theoretical question of unity and plurality of banks, especially when such a brief time remains for determining the provisions of the new charter. Prof. Leroy-Beaulieu even questions the wisdom of requiring the bank to establish so many new branches and offices, in view of the field for private banking in France and its recent development. He urges that the new charter as proposed should be adopted as early as possible, in view of the small probability of getting a better, and declares that the radicals and socialists have a very exacting temper if they are not satisfied with the character of centralization and uniformity given to the institution by the proposed charter.

#### STOCK COMPANIES IN RUSSIA.

The increase in the number of joint-stock companies formed in Russia and in their capital stock is one of the best proofs of the important part which the country is taking in modern industry and commerce. The number of new corporations thus authorized by the Government in 1888 was thirty-four, with an aggregate capital of 27,060,000 credit rubles (\$18,000,000). The number rose in 1893 to sixty-three, with a capital of 51,600,000 credit rubles and 5,000,000 gold rubles. The year 1895 showed a further advance to ninety-five corporations, with a capital of 77,085,000 credit rubles and 28,000,000 gold rubles. The year 1896, though only half concluded when these statistics were compiled by the *Bulletin Russe de Statistique*, has shown another leap forward by the organization of ninety corporations with a capital of 69,450,000 credit rubles and 52,715,000 gold rubles. These figures represent the creations of each year and their addition to the existing aggregate of corporations represents an increase in eight and a half years of about 500,000,000 rubles (\$250,000,000). There have been also large additions to the capital of existing corporations, which have much exceeded the reductions of capital. The following table shows the new corporations authorized each year, with the increases and reductions in capital of old corporations, expressed in credit rubles (fifty cents). The gold rubles, although representing fifty per cent. higher value, are simply added to the credit rubles because few corporations were organized upon the gold basis before 1895. The new corporations include a considerable number of mining companies for operation in Siberia, but include also manufacturing companies for locomotives, steam engines, sewerage and electric motors :

YEAR.	New corporations.		Additions to capital.	Reductions of capital.
	Number.	Capital.		
		Rubles.	Rubles.	Rubles.
1888 .....	34	27,060,000	4,970,000	460,000
1889 .....	27	37,350,000	8,330,000	500,000
1890 .....	44	57,410,000	9,170,000	1,120,000
1891 .....	30	25,245,000	2,200,000	3,500,000
1892 .....	35	23,620,000	6,850,000	2,842,000
1893 .....	63	56,800,000	3,300,000	3,300,000
1894 .....	68	56,025,000	17,150,000	3,660,000
1895 .....	95	105,085,000	34,294,375	5,140,000
1896 .....	90	122,185,000	25,851,000	1,070,000

The rapid economic development of Russia is doubtless due in a large measure to the stability given to the currency by the accumulation of gold in the Imperial Bank and the Treasury, the issue of gold certificates, and the preparations for the resumption of gold payments. The decree of August 10, 1896, fixes the rate of exchange until December 31, 1897, at ten gold rubles to fifteen paper rubles. The Bank of Russia is directed to maintain this rate by buying and selling gold imperials and half imperials at the prescribed price in paper. This apparently insures fixity of exchange with foreign countries for more than a year to come, and it is generally expected that before that date the Imperial Government will begin a new gold coinage. This coinage will probably be upon the basis of exchange established by the decree of August 10. It is criticized in some quarters as a scaling of the old standard, but Russia was never upon the gold basis. The standard there, up to recent years, was silver, and the proposed basis of resumption is fifty per cent. higher than the present value of the silver coins which were formerly the basis of the currency. It is understood that new gold rubles will be coined upon the new basis of exchange and will be employed in circulation and in the reserves of the Bank of Russia. Russian officials, according to a recent letter from Berlin to the London "Times," are already paid partly in gold and silver and efforts are being made to familiarize the public with the use of coin rather than paper.

#### BANKING DEVELOPMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The latest compilation of the statistics of the commercial banks of Great Britain, made by the London "Economist" of October 17, shows gross deposits estimated at £790,000,000 (\$3,900,000,000). This is nearly twenty-five per cent. greater than the deposits in National, State and private banks in the United States, in spite of our larger population. Savings deposits are excluded in both cases. Their inclusion would bring the two countries more nearly together in amount, with the balance still in favor of Great Britain per head of population. The capital of the joint-stock banks of Great Britain stood in October last at £76,241,000, of which £59,704,000 was held in England and Wales, £9,802,000 in Scotland, £7,109,000 in Ireland, and £125,000 in the Islands. The market value of this capital, however, is on the average three times its face value and amounts to £228,515,000. The average premium now stands at 210 per cent., against 197 per cent. in 1895. The increase in deposits in the British banks, including the Bank of England, is one of the phenomenal developments of the past ten years. The Bank of England deposits stood at about £31,000,000 in July, 1886, and about £65,000,000 in July, 1896. Deposits and current accounts in the other banks of the United Kingdom, including an estimate for those not reporting, were £550,000,000 in 1886 and £730,000,000 in 1896. This represents an increase of about thirty per cent. in ten years, which is a remarkable figure in view of the comparatively slow increase of the British population. The deposits in joint-stock banks alone are calculated at £707,000,000, which includes £94,500,000 in Scotch banks and £45,500,000 in Irish banks. The Scotch deposits have increased £2,500,000 in two years and the Irish deposits £4,000,000 in the same time. The discounts and advances of the English joint-stock banks increased from £302,126,000 on June 30, 1895, to £321,587,000 on June 30, 1896.

Another interesting feature of the recent reports is the large business done by colonial joint-stock banks with London offices and foreign joint-stock banks with London offices. It is through these institutions that London dominates the banking business of the world. They include such banks as the African Banking Corporation, the Australian banks, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, the British Bank of South America, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The paid-up capital of the colonial banks at the date of the latest reports was £31,784,062 and of the foreign banks £21,569,349.

The deposits and current accounts of the colonial banks were £172,726,643 and their advances and loans £162,999,280. The corresponding figures for the foreign banks were £86,625,835 and £104,968,917.

#### THE GERMAN BANKS OF ISSUE.

A report has just been made to the State Department of the United States, embodying the statistics of all the German banks of issue at the beginning of 1896. These statistics are not easily accessible, except for the Reichsbank, and permit some interesting comparisons. The leading items of the accounts at the date of the last two official reports were as follows :\*

NAME OF BANK.	Circulation.	Demand liabilities.	Metallic reserve.	Commercial paper.
Imperial Bank :				
July, 1895.....	1,098,465	506,432	1,017,968	574,078
January, 1896.....	1,078,268	412,219	928,681	543,608
Frankfort Bank :				
July, 1895.....	13,117	7,307	4,656	35,153
January, 1896.....	14,065	7,267	4,884	32,613
Bavarian Bank :				
July, 1895.....	63,711	9,653	31,419	47,130
January, 1896.....	67,793	8,111	31,573	44,385
Saxon Bank :				
July, 1895.....	48,510	20,548	22,142	72,243
January, 1896.....	50,438	9,591	24,971	75,014
Wurtemberg Bank :				
July, 1895.....	23,359	1,662	11,448	19,883
January, 1896.....	20,911	2,514	9,665	20,903
Baden Bank :				
July, 1895.....	14,446	2,770	5,043	19,719
January, 1896.....	16,037	2,473	5,879	20,472
South German Bank :				
July, 1895.....	13,315	102	4,623	17,174
January, 1896.....	13,646	95	4,732	17,907
Brunswick Bank :				
July, 1895.....	2,240	2,865	596	4,761
January, 1896.....	2,970	4,094	772	6,143
Total, July, 1895.....	1,272,293	551,339	1,097,904	790,141
“ January, 1896.....	1,250,148	446,424	1,016,186	761,235

#### CONDITION OF THE BANK OF GERMANY.

It is understood in Berlin that the Imperial Bank does not expect to raise the interest rate above five per cent., which was fixed during October, in spite of the strain which was put for a time upon the resources of the bank. The circulation has been for some time above the legal limit, beyond which it pays a tax of five per cent., and considerable gold has left the bank for Russia and Austria-Hungary. The raising of the rate to five per cent. increased deposits, reduced discounts, brought back several millions of gold and reduced the circulation for the last week of October by about 43,000,000 marks (\$10,500,000). One of the principal reasons for the demand upon the bank is the new German law regarding the stock exchanges. The law does not take effect in its main provisions until 1897, but one paragraph requires that time operations in industrial and similar shares shall be liquidated before January 1, 1897. It is this process of liquidation which is causing heavy demands upon the bank by private bankers and brokers. The effect of the new law is viewed in financial circles with a good deal of anxiety, and it is feared that it will drive German capital to foreign countries. The Agrarians expected a rise in the price of grain to follow the prohibition of what they have considered fictitious sales, but the effect has been the opposite. A part of the downward tendency is doubtless due to the uneasiness caused by the initial enforcement of the

\* In thousands of marks = \$236.



law, but the export trade of the United States seems likely to suffer, because the German importer cannot cover his purchases by term sales, and cannot, therefore, buy largely in advance. Even at home the dealers are restricted in purchasing domestic grain by the absence of any scale of prices except "spot," and are likely to have an advantage over the farmer, owing to the pressure to sell immediately after the harvest. Some of the effects of the law upon general business are set forth in a recent report of Mr. Julius Muth, United States Consul at Magdeburg, to the State Department. The effects upon the Imperial Bank will probably not be permanent or serious except perhaps in diminishing the volume of transactions, but they are being somewhat severely felt at present. The fact that the Austro-Hungarian Bank is able to maintain a rate of four per cent.—one per cent. lower than the Imperial Bank of Germany—would seem to indicate the injurious results upon general business of government interference. A scheme is already under consideration in Berlin for escaping the effects of the stock exchange law by the creation of a Report Bank, which would furnish the cash for spot dealings in shares affected by the new law. The process of *report*, in the language of European bourses, is in the nature of an option, whence the proposed name of the new institution.

#### FINANCIAL MEASURES IN JAPAN.

An interesting plan in regard to Japanese national securities is outlined in a letter from that country published in "*L'Economiste Francais*" of October 24. This plan is none other than the listing of Japanese securities on the London market. Negotiations on the subject have been in progress for some time and were probably one of the motives of the recent European tour of the President of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Details of Japanese loans since the foundation of the present monarchy in 1868 have been forwarded to England and the concurrence of the Bank of Japan is being lent to that of the Specie Bank in putting the matter in a favorable light in England. The credit of Japan has waxed rapidly of late, and Japanese securities have already been purchased in considerable blocks by English capitalists. One of these transactions was recently consummated through the Specie Bank for an amount of 600,000 yen (\$800,000). The news regarding these negotiations corroborates recent reports from London, that the large deposit of the Chinese indemnity funds in the Bank of England will not be seriously disturbed for some time. About £9,000,000 is now on deposit at the bank, of which it was stated in the "London Daily News" of October 18 that £5,000,000 is to be held against the issue of bank notes in Japan. The power to draw on London constitutes as great a security to the bank as the actual possession of the gold and would be an even better security under certain political and economic conditions. It appears probable, therefore, that these funds, whose possible withdrawal has caused some uneasiness in London, will remain there for an indefinite period as a double guarantee of Japanese solvency and of the Japanese currency.

Japan has established a postal savings system which already reckons 1,223,089 depositors with 28,965,427 yen (\$15,000,000) to their credit on July 31, 1896. The depositors on that date included 453,445 agriculturalists, 224,246 merchants, 95,402 mechanics, 79,711 members of the liberal professions, 83,448 public functionaries and 68,604 laborers and domestics of both sexes. The Government continues to open annually a good many miles of new railway construction. The amount thus expended in 1895 was 1,520,000 yen (\$750,000), and the amount spent since 1868 has been 42,217,053 yen (\$21,000,000).

#### LIQUIDATION OF THE COMPTOIR D'ESCOMPTE.

The settlement of the affairs of the *Comptoir d'Escompte*, the great French banking institution which went to pieces as the result of the "copper corner" in 1889, is

nearly complete. The board which has been dealing with the assets has just announced a dividend of 50 francs (\$10) per share, making dividends of 242 f., 50c. which have been declared. There are still several varieties of securities of doubtful value to be disposed of, estimated to be worth 8,400,000 francs. against which are charged a number of doubtful and long-matured debts carried on the books of the *Comptoir d'Escompte*, some of them since its organization in 1848. It is proposed to make a settlement in behalf of the shareholders with some existing society, probably the *Comptoir National d'Escompte*, by which the affairs of the old society shall be closed and its outstanding obligations assumed by the existing body. The *Comptoir d'Escompte* was the outgrowth of the special loans made by the Government at the time of the Revolution of 1848, for the purpose of bridging over the deficiency of loanable capital. The Paris office was converted into a private institution, which carried on a large business in Asia and the Indies, but was wrecked in the attempt to sustain the *Societe des Metaux* in its great speculations. The Bank of France, which came to the rescue of credit when the speculation failed in 1889, was able to announce in the report for 1895 that its relations with the *Comptoir d'Escompte* had been concluded without loss.

#### GENERAL BANKING NOTES.

—The Australian banks have found themselves obliged to reduce the high rates of interest on deposits which attracted so much Scotch capital before 1893 and led to the crash of that year. The three old banks of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania now allow only two and a half per cent. for twelve months and one per cent. for six months. The remainder of the banks continue to pay three per cent. for new deposits and to retain old deposits at three and a half per cent. The position of the Australian banks has improved within the past ten years, notwithstanding the disastrous failure of five banks and the absorption of four others in 1893. The deposits advanced from £85,331,000 in the closing quarter of 1885 to £100,302,000 (\$500,000,000) in the June quarter of 1896. Advances increased from £106,783,000 to £118,951,000, while coin and bullion increased from £13,954,000 to £27,478,000. The note circulation, which was not a serious factor in the banking mania of 1893, has fallen in ten years from £5,623,000 to £4,384,000 (\$21,500,000).

—President Faure, of the French Republic, has just promulgated a decree, embodying the regulations established by the law of July 20, 1895, for the control of Savings banks. The enforcement of the law is entrusted to the Treasurers-General of the Finances, subject to the supervision of the Inspector-General of Finance, and the Paris Savings bank is placed under the direct charge of the Minister of Finance. These officials are directed to exercise their functions by examination of the operations of the bank whenever they judge necessary; by the comparison of deposit books with the current accounts and the books of the bank; and by the verification at least once a year of the cash and securities purporting to be held.

—A plan for mobilizing the locked-up assets of the Bank of Italy and the Bank of Naples has been prepared by Signor Luzzatti, the Minister of the Treasury, and it is reported that it has been signed by the Minister and the representatives of the banks. The project consists in the creation of a new establishment, not engaged in the issue of notes, which takes over the securities held by the banks, and pays for them in shorter term obligations. If the plan is well conceived and carried out, it will lift a great burden from the existing banking system of Italy and perhaps pave the way for legislation which will permit the resumption of specie payments. The full details of the plan have not yet been published.

—The total deposits in the Savings banks of Italy at the end of 1895 have been compiled by the Government and show deposits numbering 1,588,412, to the amount of 1,848,728,104 lire (equal to \$280,000,000, if reckoned upon the value of the gold lire). The increase during the last six months of 1895 was 12,140,189 lire. The postal Savings banks, which do not include all those reporting, showed deposits on August 31, 1896, numbering 2,928,516 and amounting to 461,961,316 lire.

—A plan is under consideration by the British Government for the issue of checks for drafts upon the Post Office Savings banks. These checks will be printed for definite denominations and will apparently be issued only to the amount actually on deposit, like deposit receipts. A limit of £2 is proposed as a maximum for withdrawals at one time, and checks are proposed of denominations of 10 shillings, 15 shillings, £1 and £2. The officials of the Savings bank are not yet satisfied, however, according to the London "Bankers' Magazine" for November, with either the details or the general scope of the plan.

—The upward tendency of interest rates in Europe was marked during October by an increase by the Bank of Norway from four to four and a half per cent., and by the Swiss banks from four and a half to five per cent. This is the second advance made by the Swiss banks within two months.

C. A. C.

**SECRET SERVICE REPORT.**—The report of the Chief of the Secret Service Division of the Treasury, which has just been made to the Secretary, shows the operations of the Division for the past fiscal year. During that time the amount of counterfeit and spurious money captured was \$801,400 of which \$10,678 was counterfeit coin and \$284,686 Canadian bank notes.

In his report the Chief says :

"The counterfeiting of paper money materially decreased during the past year, as evidenced by a comparison of the list of new counterfeits with that of former years. This can, in part, be accounted for by the large increase in 'raised' or 'altered' notes found in circulation, some of which are most skilfully executed. The reasons for this are to me apparent, in that the latter industry is more lucrative to the criminal and more difficult of detection by the public, the constant changing of the designs for the currency making it almost impossible to become thoroughly familiar therewith. It is also made plain that the distinctive paper in use is an aid to the criminal rather than a protection to the public, because of the fact that a note printed upon paper containing silk threads (as a number of the best counterfeits and all of the raised notes are) is accepted in a majority of instances without hesitation, owing to the erroneous impression that the paper used by the Government is manufactured by a secret process and cannot be counterfeited.

I have also become convinced that the introduction of silk into the paper tends to lessen its wearing quality and is therefore responsible, to a degree, for its short life.

The counterfeiting of gold and silver coins has been on the increase in all parts of the country. Some counterfeits of silver coins have appeared on the Pacific Coast that are quite as good as the genuine, both in weight and fineness, and made from dies of excellent workmanship.

The persistent effort of coin counterfeiters, a number of whom are now serving their fifth term of imprisonment, and the extremely light punishment administered by some of our United States judges, calls for some such Act of Congress as that entitled 'A habitual criminal Act,' to be found in nearly all of our State statutes, in order to lessen the great amount of this spurious coin making. The loss from this industry almost always falls on the poor and ignorant classes, and an Act such as above referred to is worthy of earnest consideration."

# BANKING LAW DEPARTMENT.

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## IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST TO BANKERS.

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All the latest decisions affecting bankers rendered by the United States Courts and State Courts of last resort will be found in the MAGAZINE'S Law Department as early as obtainable.

Attention is also directed to the "Replies to Law and Banking Questions," included in this Department.

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### NOTICE TO BANK—KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, June 22, 1896.

LOUISVILLE TRUST COMPANY, *et al.* vs. LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY & CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY.

- A bank whose President acted for it in making a loan on guarantied negotiable bonds, after he had learned that the stockholders of the company making the guaranty had repudiated it as unauthorized, will be charged with notice.
  - A bank whose President has knowledge of a defect in a guaranty on negotiable bonds at the time that it, acting through him, makes a loan thereon, is not charged with notice, he being a part owner in the bonds, and the loan being in part for his benefit.
  - A transferee of negotiable railroad bonds, against whom action is brought to cancel a guaranty thereon, on the ground that the directors had it executed without the petition of stockholders therefor, provided by statute, has the burden of showing want of notice and good faith in the matter.
  - A bank taking a pledge of negotiable bonds as security for a loan, with knowledge of a defense to a guaranty thereof, is itself a *bona fide* purchaser if its pledgor was. Therefore cancellation thereof cannot be decreed in an action to which he is not a party.
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This was an action by the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company to obtain the cancellation of what purported to be the guaranty of the plaintiff company, indorsed upon bonds issued by the Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine and Beattyville Railroad Company, held by the defendants, and to enjoin suits thereon. The bill averred that the pretended guaranty had been fraudulently placed upon the Beattyville Company's bonds by a minority of the complainant's directors, who as individuals had secured the option to buy the bonds at a low price; that the guaranty was void, because authorized by a pretended meeting of the directors, at which there was no quorum; that by the law of Indiana no valid guaranty could be made by the complainant unless a majority of its stockholders filed a written petition for the same with the board of directors; that no such petition had been filed; and that for this reason, also, the pretended guaranty was null and void.

The case was heard before Taft, Circuit Judge, and Severns and Hammond, District Judges.

TAFT, *Circuit Judge* (omitting part of opinion): From the principles established by the authorities quoted, we have no doubt in this case that *bona fide* purchasers of the Beattyville bonds, with the guaranty of the New Albany Company indorsed thereon, without notice of its defects, were entitled to presume from the face of the guaranty, under the name and corporate seal of the company, and the signatures of the president and secretary, that it

was executed by direction of the board of directors, as it in fact was, that they had acted with due authority received from the stockholders by petition as required, and that the company can not now show the fact to have been otherwise.

With respect to two appellants, only, the question of notice arises. These are the Louisville Banking Company and the Kentucky National Bank. The former claims to be the *bona fide* purchaser of fifty-five bonds without notice of any defect in the guaranty. With respect to ten of the bonds, the evidence fully sustains the claim. With respect to the forty-five bonds, the fact appears to be that they were part of two blocks of bonds received by the Banking Company as collateral for two loans made by it to the Improvement Company. The loans were for \$25,000 each, and were secured, one by sixty-two, and the other by sixty-three, Beattyville bonds; but the testimony does not show how the forty-five guarantied bonds were apportioned to the two loans. The loans were made in May, 1890, after the March meeting of the stockholders of the New Albany Company, at which the action of the directors in making the guaranty had been repudiated. Theodore Harris was the President of the Louisville Banking Company and of the Louisville Southern Railway. He was in attendance upon the March meeting of the New Albany stockholders, to learn what the new management intended to do in respect to the Louisville Southern lease, and made a speech to the stockholders, and he, in effect, admits that he then heard of the repudiation by the stockholders of the Beattyville guaranty as unauthorized. It is not distinctly proven, but the evidence of Mr. Harris seems to indicate, that he acted for the bank in making the loans on the one hundred and twenty-five Beattyville bonds in May. It is quite clear that at that time he knew that the stockholders of the New Albany Company had not assented to the guaranty. Under these circumstances, we think that the bank was affected by his knowledge. (*The Distilled Spirits*, 11 Wall. 356; *Hoover vs. Wise*, 91 U. S. 308, 310; *Hotchkiss & Upson Co. vs. Union Nat. Bank*, 15 C. C. A. 264, 68 Fed. 76.)

The fact that the non-assent of the stockholders to the guaranty and their repudiation of the same were then known to the bank, is shown pretty clearly by the circumstance that, in making the loans, no distinction was made between Beattyville bonds indorsed and unindorsed, and no record kept which showed how many of the indorsed bonds were pledged to each loan. The guaranty added very much to the market value of the bonds before its validity was questioned, and, if the bank had been ignorant of its repudiation, we may be reasonably sure that it would have noted the difference in its records between the bonds with the guaranty and those without it. The burden to show want of notice and good faith in this matter is on the bank. (*Stewart vs. Lansing*, 104 U. S. 505; *Smith vs. Sac Co.* 11 Wall. 139; *Lytle vs. Lansing*, 147 U. S. 59.) With respect to forty-five bonds we do not think it has been sustained. Upon these bonds, therefore, the complainant below is entitled to have stamped, under the indorsement of the guaranty, the words: "This guaranty is binding only on the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, a corporation of Kentucky. It is not binding on the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, a corporation of Indiana and Illinois." The complainant is also entitled to an order enjoining suit on these bonds against it, as a corporation of Indiana and Illinois. We are able to make the order of partial cancellation of the guaranty, although

the Louisville Banking Company holds only as pledgee, because the pledgor, the Improvement Company, was a party to the action and to the decree of complete cancellation, and has not appealed therefrom.

The Kentucky National Bank holds eighteen bonds. It acquired five as collateral to a loan of \$4,300, made January 9, 1890, to W. W. Jenkins; eight on a loan of \$7,200, to Osborne & Co., January 11, 1890; and five on a loan to William Cornwall, for \$3,500. These loans were all made by the bank, acting through its President, J. M. Fetter. Fetter was a director in the New Albany Company, and knew that no petition of the stockholders for the guaranty had been filed with the board. Under the rule laid down in the Distilled Spirits case and other cases cited above, the bank must be charged with notice of the defect in the guaranty, so far as the ten bonds received on the Jenkins and Cornwall loans are concerned. It appears, however, that Fetter was a part owner in the Osborne bonds, and that the loan was in part for his benefit. Under these circumstances, we think that the bank cannot be affected with the knowledge of Fetter in that transaction, and it appears that the other directors of the bank had no knowledge of the defect at all. (*Innerarity vs. Bank*, 139 Mass. 332; *Read vs. Doak*, 22 U. S. App. 669, 12 C. C. A. 643, and 65 Fed. 341; *Wilson vs. Pauly*, 18 C. C. A. 475, 72 Fed. 129.) The result is that with respect to the bonds received from William Cornwall, Jr., who was a party to the decree below, and who has not appealed, the same order of partial cancellation and injunction should be made as that already directed to be made in the case of forty-five bonds held as collateral by the Louisville Banking Company. With respect to the bonds received from Jenkins, the difficulty arises that Jenkins is not a party to this action or the decree below, and we cannot, without giving him the opportunity to show that he was a *bona fide* purchaser, make any order which may affect his rights as pledgor of the bonds. With respect to these bonds, therefore, the order will be to deny all relief, and dismiss the bill without prejudice, unless the complainant shall make Jenkins a party, in which case, the question of notice to him and the bank will have to be relitigated. It may turn out that Jenkins had no notice of any defect. If so, then the bank, by taking the bonds as a pledge, is a *bona fide* purchaser, even though it had notice. With the exceptions stated—*i. e.* in regard to forty-five bonds held by the Louisville Banking Company, and ten bonds held by the Kentucky National Bank—the decree of the circuit court is reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill, at the costs of complainant.

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*SUIT AGAINST RECEIVER—REMOVAL INTO FEDERAL COURT.*

United States Circuit Court, District of Washington, July 16, 1896.

HALLAM *vs.* TILLINGHAST.

A suit brought against a Receiver of a National bank cannot be removed by him into the United States Circuit Court, unless the sum involved, exclusive of costs, exceeds \$2,000.

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HANFORD, *District Judge*: This is a suit in equity, originally commenced in the Superior Court of the State of Washington, for Pierce county, against the defendant, as Receiver of an insolvent National bank, appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency. The object of the suit is to reach assets of an insolvent National bank, and to establish a claim of priority against the

funds of the bank in the official custody of the defendant as such Receiver. The amount involved is \$478.75. The case was removed into this court by the defendant on the ground that Federal questions are involved, and the defendant has the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal court in all matters of litigation affecting his trust. The complainant denies the jurisdiction of this court, and has moved to remand the cause to the court in which it was originally commenced.

In the cases of *Price vs. Abbott* (17 Fed. 506); *Armstrong vs. Ettlesohn* (36 Fed. 209), and *Armstrong vs. Trautman* (Id. 275)—and other cases cited as authority by the defendant, the jurisdiction of the circuit court appears to have been sustained on the ground that a Receiver of a National bank is an officer of the United States, and in each of the particular cases mentioned was suing under the authority of an Act of Congress, and jurisdiction to entertain such suits is conferred upon circuit courts of the United States by the third subdivision of Section 629 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. That law, however, by its terms, is applicable only to cases at common law commenced originally in a circuit court, and in which an officer of the United States is plaintiff. It does not apply to a suit in equity, nor to a case in which an officer of the United States is defendant, and no authority is given to remove such a case from a State court into a circuit court.

This case is one arising under the laws of the United States and, if the amount involved were sufficient, it would be removable under the Acts defining the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, approved March 3, 1875, and March 3, 1887. But the Act of March 3, 1875, limits the right of removal to cases where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, amounts to the sum or value of \$500; and by the Act of March 3, 1887, the amount necessary to give jurisdiction, and to entitle a defendant to remove a cause into a circuit court, is raised to \$2,000.

A Receiver appointed by a circuit court, when authorized to defend in a suit affecting his trust, may remove the case into the court which appointed him, on the ground that such a suit is ancillary to the principal case in which the court has acquired jurisdiction, and control of the assets or funds in the custody of its officer. But this rule is not applicable to the case at bar. The defendant does not derive his authority by an appointment from this court, and there is no principal suit pending, to which the case at bar can be related as an ancillary suit.

Motion to remand granted.

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#### COLLECTIONS—LIABILITY FOR DEFAULT OF CORRESPONDENT.

Court of Appeals of Kansas, September 16, 1896.

BEACH vs. MOSER, *et al.*

A bank receiving paper for collection becomes the agent of the depositor, with authority to employ another bank to collect it, and is not liable for the default of such subagent.

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This was an action upon a guardian's bond. The breach alleged was the neglect to collect a draft drawn for a legacy due the ward, which draft had been forwarded through the Farmers and Drovers' Bank of Council Grove, Kansas, of which bank the guardian was Cashier.

GILKESON, *P. J.* (omitting part of the opinion): If we were to concede that the defendant acted as Cashier in this transaction, under the circum-

stances of this case, would his bank be liable to him as guardian? We think not. The Farmers and Drovers' Bank would simply be the agent of the guardian to transmit the note to the Exchange Bank of Belleville, Ohio; and the latter bank would be the agent of the guardian for the collection thereof. *Bank of Lindsborg vs. Ober* (31 Kan. 599). The Farmers and Drovers' Bank was not only authorized to employ another agency, but was directed and instructed as to the particular one to be employed. We think the law is well settled that the bank receiving the paper became an agent of the depositor, with authority to employ another bank to collect it. The second bank becomes the subagent of the customer of the first, for the reason that the customer authorizes the employment of such an agent to make the collection. The paper remains the property of the customer, and is collected for him. The party employed with his assent to make the collection must therefore be regarded as his agent. A subagent is accountable, ordinarily, only to his superior agent, when employed without the assent or direction of the principal. But, if he be employed with the express or implied assent of the principal, the superior agent will not be responsible for his acts. There is in such a case a privity between the subagent and the principal, who must therefore seek a remedy directly against the subagent for his negligence or misconduct. (Story, Ag. §§ 217-313.) These familiar rules of law, applied to the case at bar, relieve it of all doubt, even under the theory of the plaintiff in error.

While it must be admitted that there seems to be a variety of opinion among the very able courts that have had this question before them, yet we doubt, if the cases were all carefully studied, and the facts upon which each case was decided were carefully considered, there would be as much conflict as at first seems; and, undoubtedly, the preponderance of the authorities supports the conclusions we have reached. The following, among others, are to this effect: (*President, etc., of Dorchester and Milton Bank vs. President, etc., of New England Bank*, 1 Cush. 177; *Fabens vs. Bank*, 23 Pick. [Mass.] 330; *Lawrence vs. Bank*, 6 Conn. 521; *Bank vs. Scovil*, 12 Conn. 303; *Hyde vs. Bank*, 17 La. 560; *Aetna Ins. Co. vs. Alton City Bank*, 25 Ill. 243; *Stacy vs. Bank*, 12 Wis. 629; *Tiernan vs. Bank*, 7 How. [Miss.] 648; *President, etc., of Agricultural Bank of Mississippi vs. Commerce Bank of Manchester*, 7 Smedes & M. 592; *Bowling vs. Arthur*, 34 Miss. 41; *Jackson vs. Bank*, 6 Har. & J. 146; *Bank vs. Howell*, 8 Md. 530; *Bank vs. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25; *Bank vs. Earp*, 4 Rawle, 384; *Bellmire vs. Bank*, 4 Whart. 105; *Daly vs. Bank*, 56 Mo. 94; *Smedes vs. Bank*, 20 Johns, 373; *Guelich vs. Bank*, 56 Iowa, 434, 9 N. W. 328.)

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#### LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER—STOCK PURCHASED IN NAME OF MINOR.

United States Circuit Court, District of Vermont, August 22, 1896.

FOSTER vs. CHASE, *et al.*

One who buys stock of a National bank in the name of an infant will be liable for an assessment, since the infant is incapable of binding himself as a stockholder.

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WHEELER, *District Judge*: The defendant bought stock in the names of his minor children in the First National Bank of Silver City, N. M., of which the plaintiff is Receiver, and this suit is brought for an assessment upon it made by the Comptroller of the Currency. The plaintiff claims that the defendant made himself liable for the assessment because of the incapacity



of his children to take the stock and make themselves liable for it. He insists that they only are the shareholders, and liable, if any one is. Assent is necessary to becoming a shareholder, subject to this liability, in a National bank. (*Keyser vs. Hitz*, 133 U. S. 138.) Minors do not seem to have anywhere the necessary legal capacity for that. The principles upon which this disability rests are elementary and universal. (1 Bl. Comm. 492; 2 Kent Comm. 233.)

In buying and paying for this stock, and having it placed on the books of the bank, the defendant acted for himself; in having it placed there in the names of his children, as with their assent, he assumed to act for them. As they could not themselves so assent as to be bound to the liabilities of a shareholder, they could not so authorize him to assent for them as to bind them. To the extent that they could not be bound he acted without legal authority, and bound only himself. (Story, Ag. § 280.) This liability has been sought for defendant to be likened to that of married women becoming shareholders; but that has been incurred where, and because, the law of the place authorized them to become such. (*Keyser vs. Hitz*, *supra*; *Bundy vs. Cocke*, 128 U. S. 185.) No law confers that capacity upon infants, but the banking law seems to refer this liability to their estates in the hands of their guardians. (Rev. St. U. S. § 5152.) Decree for plaintiff.

LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER—PERSONS PURCHASING STOCK IN NAME OF  
INFANT—RATIFICATION BY INFANT.

United States District Court, District of Vermont, August 22, 1896.

FOSTER *vs.* CHASE, *et al.*

One who buys stock in a National bank in the name of an infant will be liable for an assessment made upon such stock, which was made before the infant became of age, and the ratification of such purchase by the infant afterwards will not affect such liability.

WHEELER, *District Judge*: This case, as to defendant Henry Chase, has been heard with, and is like, the one preceding (75 Fed. 797), except that the bank is the First National of Deming, N. M., and the minor here became of age, and assented to holding the stock, after the assessment was made and the suit was brought. The cause of action accrued when the assessment was made, to which the defendant then became, and was, accordingly, liable. The ratification by the minor on becoming of age afterwards would not affect the cause of action that before had fully accrued against the defendant.

LOANS TO A NATIONAL BANK—AUTHORITY OF OFFICER—USE OF  
PROCEEDS.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, June 26, 1896.

DITTY *vs.* DOMINION NATIONAL BANK OF BRISTOL.

The President of a National bank borrowed money on the note of the bank, and deposited such money with the bank's correspondent to replace money which he had embezzled, and the money so deposited was used for the purposes of the bank: *Held*, that the bank was liable on the note.

TAFT, *Circuit Judge*: This was a suit of the Dominion National Bank of Bristol, Va., to require the appellant, Robert M. Ditty, the Receiver of the Citizens' National Bank, an insolvent banking association of the United

States, to allow as valid a claim for \$5,000 on a promissory note executed by C. M. Overman, President of the Citizens' National Bank, in favor of the President of the Dominion National Bank of Bristol, Va.

The Receiver of the bank denied that the note was made and delivered by the Citizens' Bank, or any one authorized to act in that behalf; averred that it was made without the knowledge of the directors, that it had never been ratified by them, and that the money borrowed on it did not go to the use or benefit of that bank, but was obtained by Overman for his individual use and benefit. The facts were agreed on. It appears that Overman, as President of the Citizens' Bank, before the loan in question, had drawn out from the United States National Bank of New York (the reserve agent of the Citizens' Bank) a large part of its reserve fund there deposited, and that some time thereafter, in order to replace the funds which he had embezzled, he did, as President of the Citizens' Bank, procure the loan in question from the Dominion Bank, and gave the note for \$5,000 above described. It further appeared that this \$5,000 was deposited to the credit of the Citizens' Bank in the United States National Bank of New York, and that that particular \$5,000 was drawn out upon drafts of the Citizens' Bank, and applied to pay its lawful debts. It appeared that the directors of the Citizens' Bank had no knowledge or notice of the loan from the Dominion National Bank, or Overman's previous embezzlement of the funds of the Citizens' National Bank on deposit with the United States National Bank, until after the failure of the bank and the appointment of the Receiver.

The chief reliance of the appellant is upon the case of *Bank vs. Armstrong* (152 U. S. 346). In that case the Western National Bank sought to compel the allowance of a claim against Armstrong, as Receiver of the Fidelity National Bank, for a loan of \$200,000 which it had made on a note executed by E. L. Harper, the proceeds of which were deposited to the credit of the account of the Fidelity National Bank, of which Harper was President. It appeared that Harper had drawn out the amount thus deposited on drafts fraudulently issued by him or his confederates for his own use and benefit. It therefore appeared that the money which was loaned did not inure in any way to the benefit of the bank. It was held that the President of the bank had no authority to borrow money in such an amount for the benefit of his bank, and that the bank should not be charged with the indebtedness unless its directors had ratified the loan, and that no such ratification was shown in the record before the court. It is true that the language of Mr. Justice Shiras in delivering the opinion of the court does go to the extent of intimating that, even if the benefit of the loan had been received by the bank in the payment of its debts, this was not a sufficient ratification, unless the directors had knowledge of the receipt of the money and the benefits arising therefrom. This remark, however, was extrajudicial, and not required by the facts of the case; and, until the supreme court shall adjudicate the point, we think we are at liberty to disregard the *obiter dictum*, and reach the conclusion we think warranted by the authorities.

In our opinion, even if the President may not have had authority to effect the loan, yet when he, in order to conceal his previous embezzlement, deposited the sum to the credit of the bank with its reserve agent in New York, and it was checked out for the benefit of the bank, the bank and its board of directors were affected with the knowledge which Overman, as its President,

had of the receipt of the moneys. Having received the benefit through an agent, it is affected with the burden of the notice which that agent had of its reception, and therefore it became liable for money had and received to its use from the Dominion National Bank.

We think the same principle applicable in this case which was applied in the case of *Atlantic Cotton Mills vs. Indian Orchard Mills* (147 Mass. 268, 17 N. E. 496). In that case the treasurer of two corporations was a defaulter in both positions. The defalcations were of long standing, and, to avoid discovery at the annual settlement of the company, he drew checks of the other, and deposited them to the credit of one company in bank. On subsequent investigation, the question was whether the company whose bank account had been swelled by the checks of the other was a debtor to the other for the deposits thus made by the common treasurer. It was held that the company receiving the money, having received it through the sole agency of the man who knew it to be stolen, could only take it with the burden of his knowledge. So, in this case the bank, having received the money through the agency of its President, could not retain it without assuming the burden of the President's knowledge as to how it came to be obtained.

We do not see that the circumstance, in that case, that the treasurer stole the money, and in this, that the President obtained it on the false representation that he was authorized to borrow it for his bank, makes any reasonable distinction between the two cases.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

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*CASHIER OF NATIONAL BANK—TERM OF OFFICE—BY LAWS.*

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, August 31, 1896.

WESTERVELT *vs.* MOHRENSTECHEER, *et al.*

The Cashier of a National bank can not be chosen for any stated term; but he holds his office at the pleasure of the board of directors.

A by-law which provides that the Cashier shall hold his office for a stated term, as for instance, for one year, is void.

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This was an action upon the bond of the Cashier of the Citizens' National Bank of Grand Island, Neb., brought by Edgar M. Westervelt, the Receiver of that bank.

The defendant in error, George A. Mohrenstecher, was the Cashier, and the principal, and Mary Mohrenstecher, Otto A. Mohrenstecher, and William Stull were the sureties, on the bond. Judgment was rendered against the plaintiff below upon the pleadings, on the ground that the office of Cashier of this bank was an annual office, and that the delinquencies charged in the petition occurred after the expiration of the year during which the bondsmen were liable.

SANBORN, *Circuit Judge*: Were the obligors on this bond liable for the defaults of the principal in it after January 14, 1890, under this state of facts? The contention of their counsel is that the office of Cashier of this bank was an annual office, and that their liability was limited to the unexpired term of Vieths, for which Mohrenstecher was appointed in May, 1889. It is familiar law that, in cases where the term of office to which the principal is elected or appointed is fixed by law, the liability of his bondsmen will be limited to the current term, unless they expressly agree to continue liable after its expiration.

The Act of Congress under which this bank was organized provided that its board of directors might appoint a Cashier, require bonds of him, and fix the penalty thereof, and dismiss him at pleasure, and appoint another to fill his place. Its articles of association provided that the board might appoint a Cashier, fix his salary, and continue him in office, or dismiss him, as in the opinion of a majority of the board the interests of the association might require. It is plain that, in the absence of any other regulations, a Cashier once appointed under this Act of Congress and these articles of association would hold his office until he resigned, or until the board of directors of the bank dismissed him. A subsequent appointment of the same man to the same office would have no more effect upon him, or upon the term of his office, than a second deed of the same property by one who had already conveyed it to the same grantee would have. The only act of the board of directors that could affect the tenure of his office, under the Act of Congress, would be his dismissal.

It is, however, contended that the by-laws (which provided that the Cashier should be elected at the annual meeting in January in each year, should give a bond in the sum of \$10,000, and should hold his office for one year, and until his successor was elected and qualified) made this an annual office, and limited the term of the office of this Cashier to the unexpired portion of the year for which his predecessor, Vieths, was elected. But how could the by-laws of this bank repeal or modify the Act of Congress and the articles of association under which they were enacted? The Act of Congress expressly fixed the tenure of office of the Cashier of this bank. It expressly provided that the board of directors might dismiss the Cashier and certain other officers "or any of them at pleasure and appoint others to fill their places." It provided that this Cashier should always hold his office subject to instantaneous removal at the pleasure of the board of directors.

Nor is it at all probable that this provision of the National Bank Act was inserted without purpose or consideration. Observation and experience alike teach that it is essential to the safety and prosperity of banking institutions that the active officers, to whose integrity and discretion the moneys and property of the bank and its customers are entrusted, should be subject to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness or negligence attaches to them. High credit is indispensable to the success and prosperity of a bank. Without it, customers cannot be induced to deposit their moneys. When it has once been secured, and then declines, those who have deposited demand their cash, the income of the bank dwindles, and often bankruptcy follows.

It sometimes happens that, without any justification, a suspicion of dishonesty or carelessness attaches to a Cashier or President of a bank, spreads through the community in which he lives, scares the depositors, and threatens immediate financial ruin to the institution. In such a case it is necessary to the prosperity and success—to the very existence—of a banking institution that the board of directors should have power to remove such an officer, and to put in his place another, in whom the community has confidence.

In our opinion, the provision of the Act of Congress to which we have referred was inserted, *ex industria*, to provide for this very contingency. In any event, it is there, and it clearly provides that the Cashier of a National bank may be dismissed at the pleasure of the board of directors, and that it

may appoint, not the same man again, but another in his place. National banks are creatures of the Act of Congress. Under familiar principles, they have no powers beyond those expressly granted, and those fairly incidental thereto. (*The Omaha Bridge Cases*, 10 U. S. App. 98, 174, 2 C. C. A. 174, and 51 Fed. 309; *Union Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.* 2 C. C. A. 174, 230, 51 Fed. 309, 316.)

It follows from this principle that, since the Act of Congress expressly provides that the Cashiers of National banks should hold their offices subject to the pleasure of the board of directors, neither the bank nor its board can make time contracts or appointments in violation of that provision. (*Harrington vs. Bank*, 1 Thomp. & C. 361; Boone, Banking, § 353; Ball, Banks, 65.)

What, then, is the effect of these established rules upon the by-laws of this bank? It is that that part of these by-laws which provides that the Cashier shall hold his office for one year, and that he shall be elected annually, must fail, and the Cashier of the bank must hold his office under the Act of Congress, subject to immediate removal at the pleasure of the board of directors, until he resigns or is removed.

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#### KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT—NOTICE TO PURCHASER OF NOTE.

Supreme Court of Georgia, July 20, 1896.

KAISER, *et al.* vs. UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK.

1. Where a promissory note executed solely for the accommodation of a bank, and intended by the makers to be used for its benefit only, was made payable to the order of its Cashier, and indorsed in blank, the mere fact that the President of that bank negotiated the note, for his own personal benefit, to a third person, who knew he was such President, would not of itself be notice to that person that this action of the President was unauthorized or improper; nor would this fact be sufficient, without more, to put the third person upon inquiry as to the legality or correctness of the President's conduct in the premises.
  2. A creditor of the President, who in good faith received the note from him before its maturity, and without notice of the equities existing between the makers and the payee, was a *bona fide* holder for value, in the due course of business, although the creditor took the note as collateral security for an existing debt of the President, and for this purpose and upon this consideration only. (*Colebrook*, Collat. Sec. § 18, 1 Morse, Banks, § 600, and authorities cited in both. *Gibson vs. Connor*, 3 Kelly, 47.)
- (Syllabus by the Court.)

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#### USURY—NEW YORK STATUTE—AGREEMENT FOR OPTIONS.

New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Division, June 16, 1896.

HAWLEY vs. KOUNTZE, *et al.*

Under Chapter 237, Laws of New York, 1882, which authorizes parties to contract in certain cases for any rate of interest, the contract must be in writing in order to enable the lender to recover more than six per cent. interest, but an oral contract would not render the transaction usurious and void.\*

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This was an action to enjoin the defendants from selling certain shares of stock deposited with them by plaintiff. From an order containing a preliminary injunction *pendente lite*, defendants appealed.

BARTLETT, J.: The plaintiff borrowed \$15,000 from the defendants, consti-

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\*This decision reverses the decision of the Special Term in the same case, previously reported in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.

tuting the firm of Kountze Bros., and gave them a note therefore, whereby he promised to pay that amount on demand, with interest at six per cent. The payment of this note was secured by the pledge of fourteen shares of the capital stock of the Cataract General Electric Company. At the time the loan was thus made the plaintiff gave to William H. Hollister, one of the defendants, an agreement to sell to him, at his option, to be exercised within a specified period, four shares of such stock, at \$2,000 a share. The plaintiff claims that the stock was then worth more than \$2,000 a share, and that the giving of this option to Mr. Hollister, who was acting in behalf of the defendants' firm, made the transaction usurious. It seems to us, however, that it falls within the purview of Chapter 237 of the Laws of 1882, and is not void, or in any respect illegal, on account of usury. That Act provides as follows:

"In any case hereafter in which advances of money, repayable on demand, to an amount not less than five thousand dollars, are made upon warehouse receipts, bills of lading, certificates of stock, certificates of deposit, bills of exchange, bonds or other negotiable instruments pledged as collateral security for such repayment, it shall be lawful to receive or to contract to receive and collect, as compensation for making such advances, any sum to be agreed upon, in writing, by the parties to such transaction."

The learned Judge at the special term held that the Act of 1882 had no application to the present case, because the exaction in excess of interest was not a sum of money, nor was it provided for by a written agreement.

We think that the statute should receive a more liberal construction. The payment in excess of six per cent. was whatever amount, over \$2,000 a share, should be realized by the defendants upon the exercise of the option to purchase the four shares of Cataract General Electric stock. The giving of a written instrument—the option agreement—by acting under which a sum of money could ultimately be obtained in addition to the statutory rate of interest, was equivalent to an express agreement in writing to pay such sum of money.

But, in the view which we take of the Act of 1882, the only importance of an agreement in writing as to the sum to be received by the lender is to enable the lender to collect more than six per cent. as his compensation. The effect of that enactment was to remove from the operation of the usury laws of the State all loans of money, payable on demand, where the amount lent or advanced is not less than \$5,000, and where warehouse receipts, bills of lading, certificates of stock, certificates of deposit, bills of exchange, bonds, or other negotiable instruments are pledged as collateral security for such repayment of the money borrowed.

If the agreement is merely oral, as to the compensation to be received by the lender in such a transaction, we think that the statute nevertheless makes the loan non-usurious, though it would seem that a contract in writing is necessary in order to enable the lender to collect more than six per cent. In 1850 a statute was enacted in this State (Laws 1850, c. 172) which provided that no corporation should thereafter interpose the defense of usury, and it was held that its effect was to repeal the statute of usury so far as it applied to corporations (*Curtis vs. Leavitt*, 15 N. Y. 85-155). "The condition of this class of beings becomes the same," said Brown, J., "as if the usury law never existed." (See, also, *Bank vs. Hoge*, 35 N. Y. 65.)

A similar effect, we think, was produced by the enactment of Chapter 237 of the Laws of 1882 upon all demand loans, of \$5,000 and upward, secured by the pledge of negotiable instruments. Such loans were thereby withdrawn from the operation of the general usury law of the State. As to them the general usury law then ceased to exist. If these views be correct, there was nothing usurious in the transaction which forms the subject-matter of the present suit, and the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction.

The order continuing the preliminary injunction should be reversed, and the injunction vacated, with \$10 costs and disbursements. All concur.

**RIGHT OF BANK TO CHARGE NOTE DUE TO ACCOUNT OF INSOLVENT  
DEPOSITOR—CHECK AS ASSIGNMENT OF DEPOSIT.**

Supreme Court of Iowa, Oct. 15, 1896.

THOMAS, *et al.* vs. EXCHANGE BANK OF ANGUS.

Where a depositor is insolvent, and the bank holds a note made by him, it may charge such note to his account, though the same is not due.

While the drawing and delivery of a check is an equitable assignment *pro tanto* of the deposit, it can not confer upon the holder any greater right to the fund than the drawer himself possesses.

This case involved the question as to the right of various claimants to a general balance of \$1,044.50, which a depositor doing business with the Exchange Bank had on deposit with the Citizens' National Bank of Des Moines, and against which deposit such bank had charged a note of \$1,000.

DEEMER, *J.* (omitting part of the opinion): Appellants further contend that, as the note was not due, the bank had no right or authority to offset the deposit as against it. That this is or has been the rule at law may be conceded; but such is not the rule in equity, and it may well be doubted whether under our statutes it is now the rule at law. But this question we need not determine, for it is almost universally held that, if the debtor be insolvent, a bank may offset as against a debt not due any sum which it may be owing to the debtor, unless, of course, the account which it owes has been pledged to some specific purpose, or is impressed with some trust. (See *Morse, Banks*, § 329; *Scott vs. Armstrong*, 146 U. S. 499; *Schuler vs. Israd*, 120 U. S. 506; *North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. vs. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co.* 152 U. S. 596; *Davis vs. Milburn*, 3 Iowa 163; *Kentucky Flour Co. vs. Merchants' Nat. Bank* [Ky.] 13 S. W. 910; *Nashville Trust Co. vs. Fourth Nat. Bank* [Tenn.] 18 S. W. 822; *Bank vs. Green* [N. J. Ch.], 17 Atl. 689; *Morse, Banks* [3d Ed.], § 337; *Trust Co. vs. Leck* [Minn.] 58 N. W. 826.)

It is contended, however, that the issuance of the checks in suit was an equitable assignment to appellants, *pro tanto*, of the funds in the National bank, which gave to the payees thereof an immediate right of action against the bank, and that in such an action the payees have a superior right to the fund; and *Roberts vs. Corbin*, 26 Iowa, 315, is cited. All that is held in that case is that the holder of checks secures thereby an equitable assignment to the funds of the drawer in the hands of the bank against which it is drawn, and that the holder may bring an action against the bank in his own name.

It is also said that the rights of the drawee of the check are superior to those of an assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the drawer. It was not held that the holder of the check had any greater rights than the drawer

would have had as against the bank holding the funds had no assignment been made; nor do we think such a rule ought to be established. All that the holder receives is an assignment or *pro tanto* assignment of the funds of the drawer in the bank against which the check or draft is drawn. In this case the Citizens' Bank had no notice of the issuance of the checks until after it discovered the insolvency of Pearson. It then had the right, as we have seen, to use the deposit account as an offset to the amount due it on the note; and the holders of the drafts had no greater rights than Pearson would have had had he been attempting to collect the deposit.

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**PRESIDENT—AUTHORITY TO ASSIGN JUDGMENT.**

Supreme Court of Iowa, Oct. 22, 1896.

**GUERNSEY vs. BLACK DIAMOND COAL AND MINING COMPANY.**

The President of a bank, in virtue of his office, has authority to assign a judgment owned by the bank.

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The plaintiff, as assignee in trust of two judgments against the defendant coal and mining company, brought this action in equity to set aside certain conveyances of real estate, and to declare such judgments senior and superior liens thereon.

GIVEN, J. (omitting part of the opinion): On the trial plaintiff introduced in evidence an assignment in writing in due form to him, as trustee, of each of these judgments, the assignment of the Marquardt Savings Bank judgment being signed "G. W. Marquardt, Pres.," and the one in favor of the Iowa National Bank being signed "Ed. H. Hunter, Pres't Iowa Nat'l Bank." To these offers the defendants objected "as incompetent, and for the further reason that it nowhere appears that the officer who made the assignment had any authority to make it."

It will be observed that by this objection the defendants do not question the genuineness of the signature of Mr. Marquardt or of Mr. Hunter, nor that they were Presidents of their respective banks, but ground the objection upon the claim that it nowhere appears that, as such officers, they had authority to make these assignments. *Klemme vs. McLay* (68 Iowa, 158) is cited.

In that case it was questioned whether the persons executing the assignment were officers of the bank authorized to make the assignment, while in this the objection is not that they were not Presidents of the banks for which they acted, but it is not shown that as such they had authority to make these assignments. There is no showing of authority beyond what may be inferred from the fact that each executed the assignment from his bank, as President thereof.

The powers of the President of a bank are such as are inherent in the office, or conferred by usage or resolution of the board of directors. We have no evidence as to usage, nor of resolution conferring this power, and therefore must inquire whether such a power is inherent in the office.

Presidents of banks are usually, if not universally, members of the board of directors, and, in the absence of usage or resolution, their powers are not greatly in excess of that which can be exercised by any other single director. In *Morse, Banks*, § 143, it is said:

"But, ordinarily, the position is one of dignity, and of an indefinite gen-



eral responsibility, rather than of any accurately known power. The President is usually expected to exercise a more constant, immediate, and personal supervision over the daily affairs of the bank than is required from any other director; indeed, it is a singular fact that the entire collection of judicial authorities justifies the annunciation of only one act as falling within the properly inherent power of the President. This solitary function is to take charge of the litigation of the bank. There is no question that this matter belongs to him by virtue of his office. He may institute and carry on legal proceedings to collect demands or claims of the bank."

It will be observed that these assignments are to the plaintiff in trust, and evidently were so made for the purpose of collection, and to the end that the relief herein asked might be sought in one action.

Our conclusion is that the objections are not well taken, and that the plaintiff has sufficiently established his ownership of the judgments to entitle him to maintain this action. Plaintiff, in his opening argument, anticipates a claim that his judgments are not valid, but, as defendants do not so claim in argument, the matter requires no further notice.

#### LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS—HOW ENFORCED.

Supreme Court of Nebraska, Oct. 7, 1896.

FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. *vs.* FUNK.

1. The provisions of section 7 of article 11 of the Constitution of Nebraska, designated "Corporations," that "every stockholder in a banking corporation or institution shall be individually responsible and liable to its creditors, over and above the amount of stock by him held, to an amount equal to his respective stock or shares so held, for all its liabilities accruing while he remains such stockholder," are enforceable without special supplementary statutory enactments.
2. The special individual liability of a stockholder in a banking corporation or institution, superadded to his ordinary liability by the above-quoted section of the constitution, is for the creation of a trust fund for the benefit of all creditors of the banking corporation or institution in which stock is held; and an action to render available such liability must be prosecuted by one creditor of such corporation or institution for the benefit of all other creditors, or by the Receiver of such corporation or institution when there is a Receiver.
3. The requirements of section 4, art. 11 (designated "Miscellaneous Corporations"), of the constitution, that before enforcement of individual liability of stockholders there must be judicially ascertained the indebtedness proposed to be enforced, and that the assets of the corporation be first exhausted, *held* applicable to the stockholders' liability in banking corporations or institutions described by section 7 of the same article. (Syllabus by the Court.)

Action by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company against Z. T. Funk to enforce defendant's liability as stockholder in an insolvent bank. The points decided are stated in the syllabus.

#### INDORSEMENT FOR COLLECTION—AUTHORITY OF BANK TO SUE.

Supreme Court of California, Sept. 16, 1896.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF FORT COLLINS *vs.* HUGHES.

A bank to which a note is transferred for collection may maintain an action thereon.

This was an action upon a promissory note. The answer denied, among other things, the ownership of the note.

The Court said: "The answer of defendant avers, in substance, that the

note was transferred to plaintiff for collection. This gave such an ownership in the note to the plaintiff as entitled it to maintain the action. True, if indorsed without consideration or subsequent to maturity, as is averred, it would be subject to any valid defense of the plaintiff, but a recovery could not be defeated for want of ownership in plaintiff alone."

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*ACTION ON BOND—EMBEZZLEMENT—BURDEN OF PROOF—INCORRECT ENTRY.*

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

COMMONWEALTH TO USE OF FARMERS' BANK OF HUMMELSTOWN *vs.* STRICKLER.

The trial in an action on a teller's bond having been on the theory that he converted to his own use \$1,000 of the bank's money, there was no error in instructing that the bank had the burden of showing that he took the money, and converted it to his own use, and that a mere incorrect entry would not of itself impose an obligation on him, but that it would be necessary to show that a money loss accrued to the bank.

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MCCOLLUM, J: It is not denied that this case was tried in the court below on the theory that the defendant on April 1, 1887, converted to his own use a thousand dollars of the bank's money. The statement of claim was prepared in accordance with this theory, and the declaration of the plaintiff's counsel, when interrogated by the court in regard to the nature of their client's contention, harmonized with it. A claim of this nature, although made in a civil suit, necessarily involved a reflection upon the defendant's character. It was tantamount to, if not in plain terms, a charge of embezzlement. That both parties to the suit so regarded it is further shown by the fact that the defendant was allowed without objection to introduce evidence of his character for honesty. If the issue had related to an alleged loss caused by an error of the defendant in adding the items in the depositors' columns, there would have been no occasion or room for evidence of this nature. We have specifically referred to the matters above mentioned because they are proper for consideration in determining whether there is substantial cause for the complaint made by the plaintiff in respect to the charge. In view of the issue presented by them, we cannot regard the instruction concerning the burden of proof as prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or in any sense misleading. There was no warrant in the evidence for a conclusion that the bank sustained a loss by reason of an error in adding the items in the depositors' column. It was not claimed that there was any error in any item of the column, or that the bank, in consequence of the error in adding the items, paid to any depositor more than he was entitled to receive. It required something more than the error complained of to sustain the claim that the defendant had appropriated the bank's money. The learned Judge therefore made no mistake in saying:

"A mere incorrect entry would not of itself impose an obligation on the defendant; it would be necessary to show that a money loss accrued to the bank."

If the bank received and had the benefit of all the deposits made on April 1, 1887, it was not injured by the error in footing them. The only ground on which a recovery was possible, with due regard to the claim of the plaintiff and the evidence in the case, was that the defendant withheld or abstracted from the bank for his own purposes a thousand dollars belonging to it. Whether he did so was a question for the jury upon all the evidence in the

case. It was submitted to them in an adequate and impartial charge, and their decision of it was in accord with a fair preponderance of the testimony. Judgment affirmed.

## REPLIES TO LAW AND BANKING QUESTIONS.

Questions in Banking Law—submitted by subscribers—which may be of sufficient general interest to warrant publication will be answered in this department.

A reasonable charge is made for Special Replies asked for by correspondents—to be sent promptly by mail. See advertisement in back part of this number.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

DERRY, Conn., Nov. 25, 1896.

SIR:—I am surprised at your answers to J. D. F. and "Cashier" on page 324 of your September issue; that is, if you intend to give the impression that such indorsements are accepted by bankers; our own experience shows that checks so indorsed are sent back for guarantee of indorsement.

BOOKKEEPER.

*Answer.*—In the answers referred to we said that as the word Senior or Sr. was no part of a person's legal name, the indorsement of a check drawn to the order of "John Smith, Sr.," if made by the person who was intended as payee, would be legally sufficient, though the payee omitted to add the letters "Sr."; and also that a draft drawn to "John Jones, Secy.," could be indorsed simply "John Jones," the word "Secy.," being merely *descriptio personæ*, and the draft being payable to him in his individual capacity. We were speaking then merely of the legal sufficiency of such indorsement. Banks, no doubt, do insist that such additions shall be made to the signature; and this is often necessary for the protection of the bank, since it cannot know all the facts; and as between them and their depositors (to whom alone they are liable) they would probably not be held responsible for refusing to pay a check where the validity of the indorsement might, perhaps, be questioned.

A bank might, also, very properly ask the bank which presented the instrument so indorsed to guarantee the indorsement.

*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

LANSING, Mich., Nov. 20, 1896.

SIR:—B. & Co. of this place received a check from a concern in Kansas, drawn on a bank in that place. This check was deposited with us in usual deposit account, and forwarded by us to our correspondent at Detroit, and they sent it to their correspondent in the place where it was payable. The check was paid, but two days after the bank which received the money failed before remitting. Our Detroit correspondent has charged the check back to our account. Have they the right to do so?

CASHIER.

*Answer.*—The courts of Michigan have adopted the English and New York rule, that in the absence of an express or implied contract varying such liability, a bank receiving paper for collection is responsible for the neglect or default of the agent or correspondent to which it transmits the paper. (*Simpson vs. Walby*, 65 Mich. 479.) And under this rule the liability of the collecting bank extends to any failure of its agents to account for or pay over the proceeds after the collection. (*Mackersy vs. Ramsays*, 9 Cl. & F. 818; *Simpson vs. Walby*, 63 Mich. 479.) In *Mackersy vs. Ramsays*, the collection had been fully made by the house in Calcutta, which was acting as the agent of Coutts & Co., the London correspondent of Ramsay & Co., but the money was lost by the subsequent failure of the Calcutta firm. It was held by the House of Lords that Ramsay & Co. were liable to their customer for this amount. In the course of his opinion in this case, Lord Cottenham said: "I cannot distinguish this case from the ordinary transactions between parties

having accounts between them. If I send to my bankers a bill or draft upon another banker in London, I do not expect that they will themselves go and receive the amount and pay me the proceeds, but that they will send a clerk in the course of the day to the clearing-house and settle the balances in which my bill or draft will form one item. If such clerk, instead of returning to the bankers with the balance should abscond with it, can my bankers refuse to credit me with the amount? Certainly not. If the bill had been drawn upon a person at York, the case would have been the same, although, instead of the bankers employing a clerk to receive the amount, they would probably employ their correspondent at York to do so; and if such correspondent received the amount, am I to be refused credit because he afterward became bankrupt while in debt to my bankers? If the balance were not in favor of my bankers, the question would not arise, so that my title to the credit would depend upon the state of the account between my bankers and their correspondent. The amount in money was received by the correspondent of my bankers at York; as between me and them, it was received by them, and nothing which might subsequently take place could deprive me of the right to have credit with them for the amount."

Each bank is liable to its immediate principal. The Lansing Bank is liable to its depositor, and the Detroit bank is liable to its immediate principal, the Lansing bank. (*Montgomery County Bank vs. Albany City Bank*, 7 N. Y. 459; *Reeves vs. State Bank*, 8 Ohio St. 465.)

The Detroit bank cannot, therefore, charge back the amount to the Lansing bank, but must look to its own agent for indemnity.

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

— OHIO, NOV. 25, 1896.

SIR:—We receive from a correspondent a draft dated the 20th of the month, payable ten days after date. Is it necessary that we should present this draft for acceptance to the drawers?

ASST. CASHIER.

*Answer.*—A bank as an agent for collecting is required to do all that the owner of the paper himself would do if he were an ordinarily prudent and careful man; and the diligence required of the holder of paper in order to charge prior parties is not always the measure of the diligence due from the collecting bank. While, then, the presentment of the draft mentioned in the inquiry for acceptance is not required in order to charge the drawer, yet, as it would be in the interest of the customer to have it accepted, the bank must present it for that purpose. (*First National Bank vs. Fourth National Bank*, 77 N. Y. 320.)

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*Editor Bankers' Magazine:*

NEW YORK, DEC. 2, 1896.

SIR:—I noticed a report in one of the newspapers the other day that a woman had had a man arrested for giving her a worthless check in payment of a board bill. How could this be done? Is it not simply the payment of a debt? And is it not necessary to the criminal character of the act that the person taking it should have paid something or given something upon the faith of the check?

BANK CLERK.

*Answer.*—The delivery of a worthless check simply in payment of a debt is not a criminal offence. To give the transaction a criminal character it is necessary that some money or property should have been obtained. (Penal Code, § 529.) But if there were a lien upon a man's goods, and they were being held for the satisfaction of a claim, then if he were to obtain possession of these goods by means of a worthless check, the case would doubtless be within the statute.

## PRACTICAL BANKING DEPARTMENT.

### HELPFUL HINTS DERIVED FROM EXPERIENCE.

#### RECONCILING ACCOUNTS BETWEEN BANKS.

There are no accounts more easily manipulated by bookkeepers who desire to cover deficiencies and defalcations than accounts of corresponding banks, hence the necessity of these "reconciliation sheets," whereby if a bookkeeper makes a false "proof," the irregularities leading to it can be easily traced. The following form for reconciling balances in statements of accounts rendered by one bank to another has been prepared by a National bank examiner of ten years' experience and it has been in use by many National banks for the past five years and has given universal satisfaction. The form is so simple as to be easily understood. A statement in this form should be submitted to the directors or examining committee at least once a month. The form given herewith [see opposite page] is considerably reduced in size, the original being  $9\frac{1}{4} \times 11\frac{3}{4}$  inches. Each bank can determine the size of blank best suited to its requirements.

#### CONCISE FORM OF DAILY STATEMENT.

One of the most important points which a daily statement of resources and liabilities should show is the exact amount of available cash assets. Many of the statements now in use are of such a character as to make it difficult to ascertain this without tedious computation. By the form submitted below the available cash is seen almost at a glance; *i. e.*, by dividing \$68,000, by \$170,000, the result being, say, 40 per cent. The difference, 60 per cent., showing amount of the deposits (including rediscounts), which have been loaned. The proof being shown by deducting \$98,000 from the entire amount of investments (\$200,000), leaving \$102,000, which divided by \$170,000 gives 60 per cent.

#### DAILY STATEMENT FORM.

RESOURCES.			
Loans and discounts.....		\$85,437.50	
Overdrafts.....		500.00	
\$12,500..... United States bonds, 5 per cent. fund and premiums...		14,562.50	
\$50,000..... United States bonds (for deposits) and premiums.....		60,000.00	
Stocks, securities and claims.....		20,000.00	
Banking house fixtures and furniture.....		10,000.00	
Other real estate and mortgages.....		5,000.00	
Current expenses.....		4,500.00	\$200,000
<hr/>			
\$10,000..... United States bonds on hand and premiums.....		\$12,000.00	
Due from approved reserve agents.....		20,000.00	
"    "    other banks.....		16,000.00	
Cash and cash items.....		20,000.00	
Cash short.....			68,000
<hr/>			
Total.....			\$268,000



## LIABILITIES.

Capital stock, surplus and undivided profits.....	\$36,750.00	
Circulation.....	11,250.00	\$48,000
Due to....Banks.....	\$5,000.00	
Deposits subject to check .....	80,000.00	
Certificates of deposit—demand.....	10,000.00	
Certificates of deposit—time.....	9,000.00	
Certified checks.....	2,900.00	
Cashier's checks.....	595.00	
United States deposits.....	50,000.00	
Dividends unpaid.....	2,500.00	
Cash over.....	5.00	
	<u>\$180,000.00</u>	
Bills payable and rediscounts.....	10,000.00	170,000
Total.....		<u>\$358,000</u>

Percentages—available cash = 40 (a).

“ loans to deposits = 60 (b).

Method of computation (a) :  $\$68,000 \div 170 = 40$  per cent.

“ “ “ (b) :  $\$200,000 - 98,000 = 102,000 \div 170 = 60$  per cent.

**Treasurer's Annual Report.**—The annual report of Hon. D. N. Morgan, Treasurer of the United States, made public on November 28, gives the following statistical and other information :

“The total receipts from all sources during the last fiscal year were \$336,976,300, as against \$313,390,075 for the fiscal year 1895, an increase of \$13,586,125. The receipts from customs aggregated \$160,021,751, a gain of \$7,863,134; from internal revenue, \$146,763,864, a gain of \$3,341,122; from sales of public lands \$1,005,523, a loss of \$97,823; from miscellaneous sources \$19,185,060, a gain of \$2,479,622.

The total expenditures for the year were \$352,179,446, as against \$356,195,396 for 1895, a decrease of \$4,015,952. The deficiency for the year is \$25,203,245, or \$17,601,977 less than for last year. The net receipts from the \$302,315,400 of bonds sold in 1894, 1895, and 1896 were \$294,164,365.” Continuing, the report says:

“In ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances there is a natural flow of gold toward the Treasury, which often is limited only by the capacity of the Treasury to carry the specie. The product of our mines finds its way to the mint, where it is paid for by checks, and these are presented at the counters of the Sub-Treasuries, or through the Clearing-House in New York, as currency obligations. The result is an increase of the gold reserve and a diminution of the available balance of notes and silver certificates. Gold imported in the form of bullion or foreign coin takes usually the same course. Besides these two sources of ordinary gain to the gold reserve, there is another in the direct exchange of paper currency for the coin where the paper is preferred for its greater convenience. Fortunate, indeed, has it been for the Treasury that even during the most critical periods through which the country has recently passed, these currents of inflow have not been altogether checked, and that where their volume has been materially diminished, the loss has been partly made good by the assistance of financial institutions. In the fifteen months ending with September last the withdrawals of gold from the Treasury in redemption of United States notes and Treasury notes amounted to the immense sum of \$192,972,205, while the net gains of gold from all sources attained a total of \$96,138,902.

The net proceeds of the National bank notes redeemed during the year were \$107,591,026, the largest amount for any like period in ten years, and, with the exception of three years, the largest since 1879. The cost for the redemption of National bank notes has been assessed against the banks at the rate of \$1.12½ per \$1,000.”

## THE COMPTROLLERS OF THE CURRENCY.

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### *OPINIONS OF THE MAGAZINE'S SUBSCRIBERS ON THE STEEL-PLATE ENGRAVING.*

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In accordance with the announcement previously made, a finely executed steel-plate engraving, showing the several Comptrollers of the Currency from the establishment of the Bureau to the present time, has been sent to all paid-up subscribers to the **BANKERS' MAGAZINE** for the year 1896.

From the several thousand letters of acknowledgment received, testifying to the high artistic and historic value of the engraving, the following have been selected as being fairly representative of the general tenor of opinion:

**J. B. PERRY**, Cashier First National Bank, Fond du Lac, Wis.: I beg to acknowledge receipt of a very handsome steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, for which please accept thanks.

**E. H. VREDENBURGH**, Vice-President The Powers Bank, Rochester, N. Y.: Your fine steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency is received, and we shall have it framed for the bank as you suggest, as it is well worthy of preservation. Accept our thanks for same.

**WILLIAM J. ASHLEY**, Vice-President Merchants' Bank, Rochester, N. Y.: Accept our thanks for the beautiful engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which we shall take great pleasure in framing and hanging in our office. As a work of art it is certainly a gem, and possesses such historical value that we shall regard it as a great addition to our "gallery of worthies." With best wishes, etc.

**JNO. C. ATHEY**, Assistant Cashier Traders' National Bank, Washington, D. C.: We beg to express our thanks for the beautiful steel engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency received this day.

**JOHN G. WHITEMAN**, Cashier Girard National Bank, Philadelphia: I have received the very handsome engraving of the various Comptrollers of the Currency, which is very acceptable, and for which please accept our thanks.

**W. S. BOYNTON**, Treasurer Passumpsic Savings Bank, St. Johnsbury, Vt.: Please accept thanks for engraving of Comptrollers of the Currency. It is very neat, and we will have it framed and hung in our trustees' room.

**HON. JAMES H. ECKELS**, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D. C.: I am in receipt of two copies of the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, for which you will please accept my thanks. I shall have one copy nicely framed and hung up in the room of the Comptroller.

**FRED L. OAKS**, Cashier Framingham National Bank, South Framingham, Mass.: We have received from you the fine portraits of the Comptrollers of the Currency, and thank you very much for them.

**J. THOS. SMITH**, Cashier National Bank of Baltimore, Baltimore, Md.: I thank you for the steel engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which is admirably executed.

**HENRY C. KNOX**, Cashier Paterson National Bank, Paterson, N. J.: Permit us to thank you for the handsome engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which is interesting both from an artistic and historical standpoint. You will see it handsomely framed upon the occasion of your next visit to our bank.

**HON. A. B. HEPBURN**, ex-Comptroller of the Currency, and President Third National Bank, New York: I am in receipt of copy of plate giving photographs of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which is very good indeed. Please accept my thanks for the same.

**W. H. CARPENTER**, Cashier Union National Bank, Philadelphia: We are in receipt of a very handsome steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, for which the officers and directors of this bank extend their thanks and desire to say to you that it shall be



handsomely framed and hung in a conspicuous place in our board room. We prize it very much and must congratulate you upon the issue of so handsome a testimonial to your subscribers.

C. A. HUBBARD, Cashier Lake City Bank, Lake City, Minn.: We are in receipt of the handsome portrait of the Comptrollers of the Currency and shall hasten to frame and hang in a suitable place in our office. Please accept our thanks for the gift, which is certainly a fine work of art. We admire enterprise and ability, which leads us to add that we have space for a portrait of your Mr. Bradford Rhodes.

EDWARD T. BELL, President First National Bank, Paterson, N. J.: We acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your compliments in the form of a finely-executed steel-plate engraving of the various Comptrollers of the Currency, from the date of the organization of this Bureau in 1863 to 1896. We congratulate you upon your enterprise, and appropriate action as the leading bankers' magazine in the country.

A. S. FRISSELL, President Fifth Avenue Bank, New York: We are very much obliged for the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which is really valuable, and quite different from other things of the sort which we sometimes get.

ALBERT J. WILLSON, Jason Willson & Co.'s Exchange Bank, Marion, Ind.: Your fine steel-engraved group of all the Comptrollers of the Currency is now being framed and will be hung in our private office. It is a beauty all the way through, from the old gentleman at the top to the boy at the bottom.

WM. A. CARR, Secretary Union Trust Company, Pittsburg, Pa.: We beg to acknowledge receipt of copy of steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, for which we thank you. It is a very artistic production and we appreciate it very much.

W. L. MOYER, Assistant Cashier American Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago: We beg to acknowledge receipt of the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency. It is very neat and we will take pleasure in framing it and hanging it in our office. With thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending us a copy and wishing you continued success, we are, etc.

JOHN R. WALSH, President Chicago National Bank, Chicago: Your engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency has been received for which please accept thanks. It is a very good piece of work.

A. W. BUCK, Johnston, Buck & Co., Bankers, Ebensburg, Pa.: We beg to thank you for the fine engraving you sent us. It is indeed a work of art. We will have it suitably framed and give it a conspicuous place in our office.

R. LEE KERR, Cashier Savings Bank of Rock Hill, Rock Hill, S. C.: We beg to acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of the engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, and thank you for same. We always look for the monthly visits of your magazine with the pleasure of an old friend.

S. DOW ELWOOD, President Wayne County Savings Bank, Detroit, Mich.: Many thanks for the very fine reproductions of the several Comptrollers of the Currency, just received. I shall have the same properly framed. It so happens that I knew personally Freeman Clark, formerly of Rochester N. Y. From 1845 to 1849 I daily waited on him as a clerk in the Rochester City post office. Jno. Jay Knox and the writer were residents of Oneida County, N. Y. Mr. Knox of Augusta township, the writer of Vernon township; we knew each other as boys. I had the pleasure of renewing the memories of boyhood days when he was Comptroller, and after as President of the National Bank of the Republic, New York. His death was a great loss. Mr. E. S. Lacey, a Michigan man, I was well acquainted with as Cashier of a National Bank of Charlotte, Mich., and a member of Congress from this State, and now President of the Bankers National Bank of Chicago—another good man. Mr. Eckels, the present Comptroller, I have had the pleasure of often meeting, another good man, and the right man in the right place. It would be well to keep him there. All of the other gentlemen now alive are good men and have commendable records as successful practical bankers and financiers. This country to-day is indebted to all of them for their able discharge of the duties and responsibility placed on them.

WM. H. CLARK, Cashier Quaker City National Bank, Philadelphia: The engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency received. It is an excellent picture, and as soon as framed will adorn our office. Thanking you for your generous gift, etc.

W. G. BROCKWAY, Cashier First National Bank, Gadsden, Ala.: We are pleased to acknowledge receipt of the handsome present sent us, and have had the same nicely framed and hung up in our office. It is certainly quite pleasant to receive this recognition at your hands, which favor we highly appreciate. We regard your magazine the very best of its kind, and whose coming we always look forward to with pleasure as well as profit. We

would make special mention of your legal reports, which are very full and complete. Again thanking you for this courteous remembrance, we are, etc.

**EDMUND D. RANDOLPH**, President Continental National Bank, New York: We have to thank you for the beautiful steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency received from you to-day, which we intend to have framed and will preserve it for its artistic merit and excellent portraiture of valued friends, as well as a memento of the donors.

**HON. W. L. TRENHOLM**, Ex-Comptroller of the Currency, and President American Surety Company, New York: I thank you very much for the beautiful engraving that you have been kind enough to send me, containing steel-engraved portraits of the first nine Comptrollers of the Currency. I have known all these gentlemen, except Messrs. Clark and Hulburt; and I can testify to the accuracy of the likeness in each case. I am having the group framed, and will place it in my library.

**JOHN H. DAVIS**, of Messrs. John H. Davis & Co., New York: We beg to acknowledge receipt from you of the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, and to thank you for so timely and finely executed grouping of men who have occupied that responsible position. We shall take pleasure in its preservation and shall read with interest the sketches which, according to your circular, are to appear in the January number of your magazine.

**HON. H. W. CANNON**, Ex-Comptroller of the Currency and President of the Chase National Bank, New York: Your favor of this date is received with copy of artist's proof of your new steel plate, Comptrollers of the Currency, for which please accept my best thanks.

**JAMES H. WILLOCK**, President Second National Bank, Pittsburg: We thank you for the gift of a steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which has been duly framed and now ornaments our directors' room. We congratulate you upon the happy thought which suggested this kind remembrance to your customers, and hope for the continued success of yourselves and the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE*.

**JAMES W. MANIER**, President Susquehanna Valley Bank, Binghamton, N. Y.: We write to thank you for the engravings of the several Comptrollers. The portraits are very good, and we are having the engraving framed as a desirable office ornament. Many thanks for the remembrance.

**F. M. ARNOLD**, Cashier First National Bank, Clarion, Pa.: I am in receipt of steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which I appreciate and think quite handsome. I will have same framed. Please accept my thanks.

**MORRIS L. WILLIAMS**, Vice-President and Cashier Commercial National Bank, Detroit, Mich.: We beg to acknowledge receipt of your sketch of the Comptrollers of the Currency and must congratulate you on the excellence of the work and the artistic reproduction.

**EDWIN BROWER**, Cashier Mercantile National Bank, Hartford, Conn.: We have received in good order the engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency which you so kindly sent us, and for which you have our thanks. We are having same framed and will hang it on the walls of our office.

**E. HAMMETT**, Cashier Lincoln National Bank, Chicago.: We are in receipt of your portraits of the Comptrollers of the Currency, for which accept thanks.

**E. A. BURBANK**, Cashier North National Bank, Boston: Please accept thanks for steel-plate portraits of the different Comptrollers of the Currency since 1863, received to-day with your compliments.

**THOS. J. BUDD**, Cashier Third National Bank, Philadelphia: Many thanks for the copy of the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency from the creation of the bureau in 1863 to the present time, which you have kindly sent us.

**H. BERNARD COOMBE**, Cashier People's Bank of Brooklyn, Brooklyn, N. Y.: I beg to acknowledge receipt of the handsome engraving of portraits of the Comptrollers of the Currency, and which I shall take pleasure in having framed and hung in my office in the bank.

**GEO. PEASE**, Cashier Citizens' National Bank, Faribault, Minn.: It is with much pleasure that I acknowledge receipt of the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency sent to us through your courtesy. Same is now being framed and will occupy a place on the walls of our banking office.

**J. W. HERING**, Cashier Union National Bank, Westminster, Md.: I thank you for the steel-plate engraving of the Comptrollers of the Currency, which through your kindness I received a few days ago. The likenesses are admirable and the whole work highly artistic. I have had it handsomely framed and placed in our President and directors' room.

## VERMONT—REPORT OF INSPECTOR OF FINANCE.

The report of the Inspector of Finance for the State of Vermont for the past year has just been received. A summary of the report follows :

Twenty-two Savings banks and eighteen trust companies are now doing business in the State. The average amount of deposits to each depositor is \$311.48, a decrease in average amount of \$0.40 (forty cents) for the year.

There are 2,411 of the \$1,500 class of depositors, who have to their credit \$4,886,890, an average to each of \$2,031.

The aggregate deposits of the Savings institutions is \$32,170,742, which is an increase for the year of \$1,767,478, and for the two years, \$4,303,887. This amount is deposited by 103,281 depositors, an increase in number for the year of 5,795, and for two years, 10,042.

The amount loaned on mortgages of real estate in this State is \$6,613,133, an increase during the year of \$542,952. Amount loaned on real estate elsewhere, \$11,085,427, an increase of \$523,188. Loans on personal security, \$2,800,002, showing a decrease of \$12,898. Loans with bank stock as collateral security, \$244,759, an increase of \$32,390.

United States bonds owned, \$787,081, an increase of \$391,715. State, city, county, town, village and other bonds owned, \$8,946,373, a decrease of \$126,403.

Real estate owned for banking purposes, \$204,987, an increase of \$31,765. Real estate acquired by foreclosure, \$424,512, an increase of \$60,770 during the year, and an increase of \$137,828 for the past two years. Bank stock owned, \$410,485, an increase of \$2,080.

The surplus reserve fund required by law to be set aside and held to meet losses and depreciation of securities by all the Savings banks amount to \$906,221, an increase of \$4,001.

The total accumulations in all the Savings banks and trust companies, including the lawful reserve and interest, is \$1,766,889, an increase during the year of \$111,661.

The Savings banks and Savings banks and trust companies have paid taxes to the State during the year to the amount of \$207,575, an increase over 1895 of \$16,239.

The expenses of all these institutions for the past year, including taxes, have been \$361,455, an increase for the year of \$24,468.

The depositors in Savings banks have been credited with interest on their deposits for the year to the amount of \$919,760, an increase over last year of \$45,946.

### INVESTMENTS IN WESTERN MORTGAGES.

The amount invested outside of this State in mortgages, largely in the West, from 1887 to 1896, inclusive, and the increase or decrease each year, is shown by the following table:

1887.....	\$6,225,903	1892.....	\$9,007,792
1888.....	6,563,797	1893.....	9,943,110
1889.....	7,218,661	1894.....	9,730,610
1890.....	7,519,470	1895.....	10,559,239
1891.....	8,086,590	1896.....	11,085,427

Our Savings banks are growing more and more conservative in purchasing western loans, and look much more carefully at the location of the property, not only its present, but its prospective value, the parties through whom and to whom they loan, than they did a few years since; and make the rate per cent. of interest which they are to receive secondary to the security of the principal. It would be useless, and would not be true, to say that none of our Savings institutions have met with losses from western investments. Some have no such investments, and there are several which have but a small amount. It is probably a fact that no class of investors in our State, when the amount invested is taken into consideration, are meeting with so few losses as our Savings institutions. Very few new loans are taken in localities where there have been losses from loans heretofore made. Experience is a thorough teacher—her lessons sometimes are expensive, but in the long run they are valuable. A good understanding of geography is essential in making loans in the West. Had some of those who have suffered from losses of money loaned in certain sections remembered that in the geographies of some years ago the farms on which they have taken mortgages were not only on the border of the Great American desert, but in some cases near its centre, they would have placed their money elsewhere.

### GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

I am convinced that the time has come when our Savings banks should be limited to four per cent. dividends. There are a few banks which can possibly pay four and one-half per

cent. for some time yet, but some are paying it that can hardly afford to. The tendency almost everywhere is toward lower rates of interest, and unless there is an improvement, this change must surely come. Some of our strongest banks are considering the matter of reducing dividends to four per cent., and I am inclined to the opinion that most, if not all, will do so. Still, I think it the better policy for the State to make the reduction for this reason, that in case a part should reduce their rate of dividends, and others should not, it would naturally create a feeling that these banks which had made the reduction had either made new losses, or were not being managed well, and the result would probably be the withdrawal more or less of deposits and putting the money into banks which had not reduced their rate of dividends, thus not only injuring the banks from which the money was withdrawn, but working detrimentally to certain sections of our State by taking money which legitimately belongs in one place, and putting it where perhaps it is not needed. In case dividends are reduced to four per cent., the balance of earnings, if any, after setting aside a proper amount for surplus, could and should be used in purchasing a higher grade of securities.

In regard to the investment of the capital stock of trust companies, there is some difference in opinion as to how the law should be construed. I think the State should say that the capital stock of such companies should be invested in the same kind of securities as the deposits. If the capital stock of such companies is for the security of the depositors, and no surplus is required to be maintained, then it seems but just and proper for the State to have something to say as to how it should be invested. In fact, I think quite a share of the trust companies concede this, and invest only in the same classes of securities as they invest their deposits. If, however, it is not thought expedient for the State to say this, I would suggest that the trust companies be required to furnish the Inspector of Finance with a list of the securities in which their capital stock is invested.

The matter of bonds of treasurers of Savings institutions is being more or less discussed at present. It may be regarded as somewhat ultra, but I have about come to the conclusion that the bonds of treasurers should be furnished by the banks. Very likely the State and the banks are not ready for the change, but in the way of bonds of this kind and of a similar nature, surety companies are largely taking the place of individuals. The banks, no doubt, would regard, and perhaps justly, the expense as a great objection. This feature could be partially taken into account in the compensation paid the treasurer. One or two of our banks have already adopted this plan.

Some of the objections to individual bonds are these. First: as a rule, a poor man, no matter how competent or worthy, unless he has wealthy relatives or friends, hardly has the courage to ask for a position as treasurer, because he knows it will be almost impossible for him to furnish a satisfactory bond.

In the second place the bond of a good surety company is deemed better security than an ordinary individual bond, for in case of defalcation, a surety company expects to pay what it has promised to pay, while experience has proved that individuals as a rule intend to get rid of paying.

The chances are that out of a half dozen individuals on an ordinary bond, in case of a loss, one-half of the number would be found to have little or no attachable property, and those of the others who had property would have so little of it that much of a defalcation would mean ruin to them, and then sympathy for the unfortunate bondsmen might result in the banks sharing the loss with them, rather than incur the criticism of the community by enforcing collection. Besides these reasons, most of the bondsmen are unknown to the Inspector of Finance, and consequently he is obliged to rely largely upon general information as to the pecuniary ability of the parties, and this very frequently is misleading.

I recommend that the law be so changed that the salary and expenses of the Inspector of Finance be paid by the State, instead of by the banks. This may be regarded as an act of justice to the banks, and would also, I understand, be in line with the policy of other States. This change would not affect this officer, but would relieve other officials of considerable labor, as the salary and expenses of this officer now are collected from forty institutions, in proportion to their deposits.

I do not think there is any present necessity for enlarging the limits for investment.

The managers of our Savings institutions seem to realize the responsibility of their positions and apparently were never doing more faithful and conscientious work than now.

In all cases where the Savings banks and trust companies are doing business in offices with National banks and over the same counter, the examinations have been made at the same time as the examinations of the National banks, and I would acknowledge the courtesy of Hon. Elisha May, National Bank Examiner, for so arranging the dates of his examinations as to have made this possible.

My appointment as Inspector of Finance was made to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Hon. Fred E. Smith, which took effect November 30, 1896.

FRED G. FIELD, *Inspector of Finance.*

## REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.

The report of the Director of the Mint shows the operations of the mints and assay offices during the fiscal year 1896, together with statistics of foreign countries, relative to the production, coinage, and monetary condition of each.

### DEPOSITS AND PURCHASES.

The gold bullion deposited at the mints and assay offices during the year was valued at \$108,311,125. Of this amount \$68,769,383 were original deposits and \$34,541,741 were redeposits. The classification of the original deposits was as follows:

Domestic bullion.....	\$53,910,957
Uncurrent domestic coins.....	1,670,005
Foreign material (bullion and coin).....	9,799,799
Old plate and jewelry.....	3,382,622

The face value of the uncurrent domestic gold coins transferred from the Treasury to the mints at Philadelphia and San Francisco for recoinage was \$825,583, and the amount deposited at the mints and assay offices was \$858,297, a total face value of \$1,683,880; the coinage value of which was \$1,670,005, showing a loss upon recoinage of \$13,874.

The silver bullion deposited represented a coinage value of \$11,848,694. Of this amount \$11,672,077 were original deposits, and \$176,617 were redeposits. The classification of the original deposits was as follows:

Domestic bullion.....	\$5,715,742
Uncurrent domestic coin.....	4,009,579
Foreign material.....	1,075,323
Old plate and jewelry.....	781,427

The purchases of silver bullion for subsidiary coinage under the provisions of Section 30,526, Revised Statutes of the United States, was 184,578.14 fine ounces, costing \$122,429.

### COINAGE.

The coinage executed at the mints during the fiscal year was as follows:

<i>Description.</i>	<i>Pieces.</i>	<i>Value.</i>
Gold.....	3,584,780	\$58,578,400
Silver dollars.....	7,500,882	7,500,882
Subsidiary silver.....	12,923,707	3,939,819
Minor coins.....	54,321,484	869,357
Total.....	78,330,773	\$71,188,468

In addition to the above coinage there were coined at the mint at Philadelphia, for the Government of Ecuador, 500,000 twenty-cent pieces (*sucre* pieces), of the value of \$100,000.

The silver dollar coinage included in the above table was made from bullion purchased under the Act of July 14, 1890, and the seigniorage on this coinage was \$3,327,736.

The total coinage of silver dollars from bullion purchased under the Act of July 14, 1890, from August 13, 1890, (the date the law went into effect) to July 1, 1896, has been \$47,544,776. The number of fine ounces of silver employed in this coinage was 36,772,912, costing \$36,964,557 with a seigniorage of \$10,580,218.

From July 1, to November 1, 1896, there were consumed 6,776,996 fine ounces, costing \$6,038,283, with a coinage of \$8,762,100, giving a seigniorage of \$2,723,816. A total coinage under this Act, to November 1, 1896, of \$56,306,876, with a total seigniorage of \$13,304,084, leaving on hand at the mints a balance of 125,061,262.74 fine ounces, costing \$112,865,625.

Of the subsidiary silver coinage \$332,698 was coined from new bullion purchased under the provisions of Section 3,526, United States Revised Statutes, for subsidiary silver coinage (the seigniorage on this coinage was \$175,319), and \$3,607,120 from uncurrent subsidiary silver coin transferred from the Treasury to the mints for recoinage.

The balance on hand July 1, 1896, available for subsidiary silver coinage, was 1,161,708.46 fine ounces, costing \$1,514,520.

The value of the minor coinage made from new material, was \$699,985, while the remainder of the coinage—\$179,352—was made from old and uncurrent minor coins transferred from the Treasury for recoining. There were also \$353,006 in minor coins transferred from the Treasury to the Philadelphia mint for cleaning and reissue.

The total amount of minor coins issued by the mint at Philadelphia since 1798 to June 30, 1896, was \$27,818,107; of this amount \$2,382,461 has been remelted, leaving \$25,435,646 as the total amount outstanding on June 30, 1896.

Deducting the balance on hand at the mints July 1, 1873, the net seigniorage, or profit on the coinage of silver from that date to June 30, 1896, was \$78,145,603.

#### GOLD AND SILVER BARS.

Gold and silver bars were manufactured at the mints and assay offices during the fiscal year, as follows:

Gold.....	\$53,248,523
Silver.....	7,370,454
Total.....	\$60,618,978

#### COURSE OF SILVER.

The average London price of silver bullion during the fiscal year was 30.832 pence, equivalent to \$0.69005; the New York price was \$0.68491 and the average price at the par of exchange was \$0.67568.

The highest quotation during the year was 31½ pence, equivalent to \$0.70204; the lowest quotation was 30 pence, equivalent to \$0.66081.

The commercial ratio of gold to silver was 1 to 30.58 and the bullion value of a United States silver dollar, at the yearly average price, was \$0.52232. The number of grains of pure silver, at the average price, purchasable with a United States silver dollar, was 710.06, equivalent to 1.479 fine ounces.

#### EARNINGS AND EXPENDITURES.

The maintenance of the institutions connected with the mint service necessitated an expenditure of \$1,163,566 during the fiscal year, which, with the earnings from all sources, aggregated \$3,384,009; a net gain over expenditures of \$2,220,502.

#### IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

The net gold exports for the fiscal year were \$78,904,612, as against \$30,117,376 for the previous year.

The net silver exports were \$33,262,258, as against \$27,631,789 for the previous year.

#### INDUSTRIAL ARTS.

The employment of precious metals in the industrial arts in the United States during the calendar year 1895 was:

Gold.....	\$13,429,085
Silver.....	12,277,024
Total.....	\$25,706,109

The new material consumed in the manufacture of these bars was, gold, \$8,481,789; silver, \$9,625,387.

#### METALLIC STOCK IN THE UNITED STATES.

The metallic stock in the United States on July 1, 1896, was, gold, \$599,597,964; silver, \$628,728,071; a total of \$1,228,326,035.

#### PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER.

The estimated production of the precious metals in the United States during the calendar year 1896, was:

<i>Metals.</i>	<i>Fine ounces.</i>	<i>Commercial value.</i>	<i>Coining value.</i>
Gold.....	2,254,780	\$46,610,000	\$46,610,000
Silver.....	55,727,000	86,445,000	72,051,000

The estimated production of gold and silver in the world, for the calendar year 1896, was as follows:

<i>Metals.</i>	<i>Fine ounces.</i>	<i>Commercial value.</i>	<i>Coining value.</i>
Gold.....	9,694,640	\$300,406,000	\$300,406,000
Silver.....	168,808,368	110,073,700	217,610,800

#### WORLD'S COINAGE.

The total coinage of gold and silver by the various countries of the world, was as follows:

Gold.....	\$231,087,438
Silver.....	121,610,219
Total.....	\$352,697,657

#### TOTAL METALLIC STOCK AND UNCOVERED PAPER IN THE WORLD.

The total metallic stock and uncovered paper in the world was estimated on January 1, 1896, to be as follows:

Gold.....	\$4,143,700,000
Full legal-tender silver.....	3,616,700,000
Limited tender silver.....	630,200,000
Total metallic stock.....	\$8,390,600,000
Uncovered paper.....	2,558,000,000
Grand total.....	\$10,948,600,000

#### COUNTERFEIT SILVER COINS.

The Director in his report states there is no doubt that the silver coins of the United States are now being counterfeited, pieces being manufactured exactly similar to the genuine in size, weight and devices. The fineness of the counterfeits so far discovered varies from the genuine, but in some cases they contain a higher percentage of silver than the genuine.

A very dangerous counterfeit silver half dollar has made its appearance in the East and West, the weight of which is 182 grains, with a fineness of 867½, while the weight of the genuine is 182.9, of the fineness of .900. To what extent this counterfeiting has been done, it is impossible to say. These coins could not have been made from genuine dies, as a record of all dies manufactured is kept. These dies are numbered and at the end of each year are cancelled, and returned to the mint at Philadelphia, where they are compared with the record, and when found correct are destroyed in the presence of the Superintendent, coiner, engraver, and assayer of the mint at Philadelphia.

The Director states that it would be impossible for these coins to have been issued from the mints, as every precaution is taken to see that every coin stamped comes within the tolerance allowed by law, both as to the weight and fineness. From every delivery of coin by the coiner, at any of the mints, two pieces are taken indiscriminately and sent to the bureau of the mint, where they are weighed and assayed. In addition to this, there are taken to be tested by the Annual Assay Commission one piece, from each two thousand pieces or fractional part of two thousand, and none of the coins so far tested by the bureau or Annual Assay Commission have been found outside of the limit of tolerance, either as to the weight or fineness.

So far the best known protection against the counterfeiting of coins has been found to be the lettering placed on the edges, similar to that on the first coinage of the United States, or of the five franc pieces of France.

The Director recommends that authority be given the Secretary of the Treasury to have experiments made to determine the best means of preventing the counterfeiting or at least minimizing the danger.

At the prevailing price of silver, the difference between the bullion and nominal value of our silver coins is about 100 per cent. This constitutes a great temptation for the stamping of such coin by unscrupulous persons, affording them an opportunity to place in circulation counterfeit silver coins, at about 100 per cent. profit, as good as those stamped by the mints and which cannot be distinguished from them, even by experts.

[The usual tabular information from the Director's Annual Report will be published in a later number of the BANKERS' MAGAZINE.]

# ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY.

TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH CONGRESS.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,  
WASHINGTON, December 7, 1886.

SIR :—In compliance with law, I herewith submit for the consideration of Congress the annual report of the Comptroller of the Currency. It constitutes the thirty-fourth report made, and is for the year ended October 31, 1886.

The total number of National banks organized from the date of the granting of the first certificate of authority, on June 20, 1863, to the close of the year embraced in this report, has been 5,051, making an average for each year of 153. On October 31 last there were in active operation, of this number, 3,679, having an authorized capital stock of \$650,014,896, represented by 288,902 shareholders. The average capital stock of each bank in the system was \$176,682; the number of shares to each, 2,296, and of shareholders, 78. The total outstanding circulating notes of the banks in active operation was \$211,412,820, of which \$208,988,172 was secured by bonds of the United States and the balance by lawful money deposited with the Treasurer. The total of all National bank circulation outstanding on October 31 was \$234,553,807, of which amount \$7,091,205 was secured by bonds still held for account of insolvent and liquidating banks and \$18,747,480 by lawful money deposited for their account, and by active banks reducing circulation.

The net increase in the amount of circulation secured by bonds during the year was \$26,329,053, and the gross increase in the total circulation, \$21,099,429.

On October 3, 1893, the date of the last report of condition, the total resources of the 3,678 banks then reporting was \$3,263,885,313, of which \$1,808,283,839 represented their loans and discounts and \$362,165,738 money of all kinds in bank.

Of their liabilities, \$1,597,891,058 represented individual deposits, \$336,342,834 surplus and net undivided profits, and \$309,944,019 outstanding circulating notes secured by bonds.

In geographical divisions the 3,679 banks in operation are divided as follows: 1,539 banks with a capital stock of \$401,145,135 in the Eastern States, including Delaware and Maryland; 1,563, with a capital stock of \$110,241,860, in the Western, and 557, with a capital stock of \$138,423,100, in the Southern States.

In point of number of active banks Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois and Texas lead with 430, 328, 268, 243, 221 and 206 banks, respectively. Arranged according to capital stock, Massachusetts is first with \$97,017,500; New York second, with \$86,086,000; Pennsylvania third, with \$74,753,129; followed by Ohio, with \$45,770,338; Illinois, \$38,746,000, and Texas, \$21,863,000.

There were organized during the report year 28 banks, located in 15 States and the District of Columbia, with an aggregate capital stock of \$3,245,000. Of this number 8 were in Pennsylvania, 2 each in New York, Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio and West Virginia, and 1 each in Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and District of Columbia. The number located in the Eastern States was 12, the capital stock aggregating \$1,180,000; in the Western States 6, with a combined capital stock of \$875,000, and in the Southern States 10, having a total capital stock of \$1,190,000. The State of Georgia is first in amount of capital stock represented by new banks, having \$600,000; Pennsylvania has \$550,000, and the District of Columbia, \$500,000.

The number of banks organized was 18 per cent. of the yearly average.

The corporate existence of 26 National banks in 16 States, with capital stock of \$3,158,800, and a total circulation of \$1,175,400, has been extended during the year. Pennsylvania has 5; New Jersey and Illinois, 3 each; Delaware and North Carolina, 2 each, and in the following States 1 each: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York and Ohio. Of the total capital, Pennsylvania aggregates \$390,000; New Jersey, \$272,000; Illinois, \$150,000; Delaware, \$140,800; North Carolina, \$151,000; Alabama, \$100,000; Colorado, \$100,000; Connecticut, \$100,000; Georgia, \$100,000; Iowa, \$400,000;



Maine, \$50,000; Maryland, \$75,000; Massachusetts, \$100,000; Minnesota, \$50,000; New York, \$75,000, and Ohio, \$600,000.

Under the Act of July 12, 1882, providing for the extension of National banks, the corporate existence of 1,693 banks, representing an aggregate capital stock of \$403,247,115, has been extended. Of these New York has 238, with capital stock of \$73,572,480; Massachusetts, 228, with capital stock of \$28,592,200; Pennsylvania, 204, with capital stock of \$53,776,000, followed by Ohio with 112 and an aggregate capital of \$18,479,000.

The number of banks leaving the system by reason of the expiration of their corporate existence was 1, having capital stock of \$100,000 and circulation of \$90,000. This bank was located in North Carolina, and was succeeded by a new association with capital stock of \$100,000 and circulation of \$22,500.

During the year ending October 31, 1897, the corporate existence of 19 banks, with a capital stock aggregating \$2,298,000 and circulation of \$783,900, will expire. They are located in 13 States, 4 of them being in New York, 2 each in Colorado, Michigan and Ohio, and 1 each in Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Texas. In the succeeding ten years, from 1897 to 1906, inclusive, the corporate existence of 903 banks, having capital stock of \$146,461,150 and circulation of \$39,003,872, will expire.

The number of banks leaving the system during the year through voluntary liquidation was 37, having capital stock of \$3,745,000 and circulation of \$1,262,815.

It has been found necessary to appoint Receivers for 27 banks during the year. Their aggregate capital stock was \$3,805,000 and circulation \$761,500. Of this number 4, with capital stock of \$995,000, were among those which closed their doors in 1893 and subsequently resumed business, but through continued business depression and the slow character of their assets were unable to meet their obligations, and were thus compelled to go into insolvency.

A comparison of the data of this year with that set forth in the report of this bureau for the year 1895 shows the number of active banks to have decreased 36, with a decrease in capital stock of \$4,305,000. The number of banks organized is 15 less and the number going into voluntary liquidation 14 less. There has been a decrease of 9 in the number of Receivers appointed and 45 in the number of extensions of corporate existence. The loss through expiration of charters decreased 3, and the number of banks organized to succeed expiring associations remains unchanged.

#### REVIEW OF REPORTS, 1892 TO 1896.

On September 30, 1892, the aggregate resources, as also the aggregate liabilities, of the National banks rose to the highest mark in the history of the system, viz., \$3,510,094,897. On the side of liabilities, individual deposits stood at \$1,765,422,933, and on the side of resources, loans and discounts were \$2,171,041,068, being respectively the maximum amount ever registered, either before or since September 30, 1892. Along the lines of these two items of receiving deposits and lending money, representing, as they do, the principal functions of banking in this country, the greatest fluctuations have occurred during the years under consideration. The item of deposits showed very little variation in amount from September 30, 1892, to May 4, 1893, when it was \$1,749,980,817. After the latter date, however, it shrunk suddenly and rapidly to \$1,556,761,230 on July 12, 1893, and on October 3, 1893, touched \$1,451,124,330, the lowest point since December 11, 1890. From this shrinkage of deposits, amounting to nearly \$300,000,000, from May 4 to October 3, there was a rapid and steady recovery, until on October 2, 1894, just a year after the date of lowest depression, they were \$1,728,418,819, or but \$21,000,000 less than on May 4, 1893. There was thereafter for a brief period a slight decrease in the volume, but it rose again on July 11, 1895, to \$1,738,022,006, falling again to \$1,648,082,888 on February 28, 1896, and standing at \$1,668,413,507 on July 14, 1896. Between this date and October 6, 1896, decrease was marked, being nearly \$71,000,000, leaving the deposits at the latter date at \$1,597,801,068.

The resources of the banks showed loans and discounts to the amount of \$2,161,401,858 on May 4, 1893. They had fallen on July 12 to \$2,020,483,671, and on October 3 to \$1,843,684,167. It is noticeable that after this date there was a steady expansion of loans and discounts until October 2, 1894, when the amount was \$2,007,122,191.

As the deposits held by National banks are the chief source of supply for the funds from which loans and discounts are made to their customers, and as the law requires the banks, in the interest of depositors, to keep on hand in money a stated proportion of the funds deposited with them for safe-keeping, known as lawful money reserve, this reserve is necessarily affected by the movements of deposits and loans, and an examination of its ebbs and flows during the four years under review is of equal interest.

On September 30, 1892, the lawful money reserve of all the banks, consisting of specie, legal money notes, and certificates for legal-tenders deposited, amounted to \$327,000,000; on December 9, 1892, it was \$318,000,000; on March 6, 1893, \$313,000,000, and on May 4, 1893, \$322,000,000. The variations during this period, it thus appears, were slight; but through the extraordinary

demands of depositors occurring suddenly and unexpectedly after May 4 the reserve on July 12, 1893, fell to \$289,000,000, the banks being compelled to pay \$193,000,000 of deposits during that period, \$141,000,000 of which were provided by the calling in of loans and discounts, which the banks, under the force of such withdrawals, were compelled to demand.

The drain of deposits continued after July 12, and by October 3, 1893, \$105,000,000 more had been withdrawn, these and prospective withdrawals being provided for by the collection of \$177,000,000 of loans and discounts, with the result that the reserve on hand reached on October 3, \$346,000,000. After October 3, 1893, with returning confidence, deposits were rapidly returned to the banks and there was gradual expansion of loans and discounts, though in smaller proportion. There was again an increase in reserve. From \$346,000,000 on October 3 it went to \$414,000,000 on December 19, 1893; to \$433,000,000 on February 23, 1894, touching on May 4, 1894, \$452,000,000, the highest point it has ever reached. It decreased to \$430,000,000 on July 13, to \$402,000,000 on October 2, and \$374,000,000 on December 19, 1894. On July 11, 1895, the amount stood at \$382,000,000, after which it fell to \$340,000,000 on September 23, 1895, since which time, and up to October 6, 1896, the reserve on hand has been steady. The variations are measured by a limit of \$12,000,000 between the highest and lowest amounts held.

The amount of circulating notes of the National banks outstanding on September 30, 1892, was but \$143,423,236. The increase thereof was very slight and gradual, due mainly to the compulsory obligation of new banks to deposit bonds, up to July 12, 1893, when it stood at \$155,070,821. Under the stress of a currency famine the issues expanded by October 3, 1893, to \$182,950,726, but thereafter steadily decreased, falling to \$160,337,071, on December 19, 1894. With the new issue of bonds, the lessened price of bonds, and an apparent increased margin of profit in issuing notes the volume began to increase, until on October 6, 1896, it amounted to \$209,944,019, or about \$66,000,000 greater than on September 30, 1892.

In the matter of capital stock the maximum in the history of the system was reached on December 9, 1892, being \$689,693,017 for 3,784 banks. This amount had decreased to \$688,701,300 on May 4, 1893, while the number of banks had increased to 3,830, the largest number doing business at any time previous or since. After May 4, 1893, there was an almost steady decrease in capital stock as well as in the number of banks, and on October 6, 1896, there were but 3,676 banks doing business with capital of \$648,540,325, a falling off of 154 in the number of banks and of over \$40,000,000 in capital stock. It is, however, noteworthy that in the face of this substantial decrease in the number of banks and their capital stock they had, on October 6, 1896, a surplus fund of \$247,090,074, and net undivided profits of \$83,652,759, making a total of \$330,742,833 as compared with an aggregate of \$340,524,178 on September 30, 1892, of which \$233,571,424 was surplus fund and \$101,652,754 net undivided profits.

In view of the heavy losses sustained by the banks during four years of severe liquidation and shrinkage of values, reflected in the figures showing largely reduced net earnings (only 5 per cent. for the year ended March 1, 1895, and 5.4 per cent. for 1896), these figures bear tribute not only to the efficiency of the law compelling banks to lay aside a certain percentage of earnings as a surplus fund, but also to the prudence and courage of bank managers in strengthening the security of depositors by doing more than the law requires in this respect in the face of a largely reduced earning capacity.

The complaint has been not infrequently heard during the past years that those engaged in banking have been unfair toward the business public in the matter of withholding credit. A careful study of the returns given shows that such restriction has resulted from necessity and not from choice. The unsettled currency conditions which have so marked the course of the country of late have made depositors more easily frightened into demanding their deposits, and to meet such calls on demand large amounts of idle money had to be always kept in bank. In such case it could not be otherwise than that loans on the one hand should be called in and new credit denied on the other. The profits of banking have thus been curtailed, for such profit only arises where the largest portion of a bank's deposits are in the hands of borrowers. The course pursued resulted in diminished profits to those interested as shareholders, but it afforded the depositor the opportunity of obtaining his deposit whenever desired.

#### EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS.

The Act of March 3, 1890 (section 5212, Rev. Stat.), provides that each national banking association shall report to the Comptroller within ten days after declaring a dividend the amount of such dividend and the amount of net earnings in excess of such dividend. Abstracts of these reports by semi-annual periods from associations in each State, reserve city, and geographical division for the current and prior years, will be found in the Appendix, as will also a table showing, from March 1, 1870, to March 1, 1896, the number of banks, capital, surplus, dividends, net earnings, and ratios of dividends, etc., to capital, etc., for each year, and the average for twenty-seven years. The average number of banks for the current year was 3,698; capital, \$655,990,855; surplus, \$243,203,540; net earnings, \$48,596,794; dividends paid, \$45,551,673. The average rate per cent. of dividends paid was 6.9; the per cent. of dividends

based on capital and surplus, 5, and the per cent. of net earnings on capital and surplus, 5.4. A comparison with the reports of the previous year indicates a decrease of 37 in number of banks; \$6,761,510 in capital, and \$700,872 in dividends paid; while the surplus fund increased \$2,597,285 and net earnings \$3,006,485. The surplus fund at its maximum, prior to the current year, was \$247,732,601 in 1894, when the number of banks was 3,764. This fund now exceeds that amount by \$470,939, while the number of banks is 66 less. The maximum rate of dividends paid was 10.5 per cent. in the year ended March 1, 1870, and the minimum 6.8 per cent. in 1894. The aggregate amount of net earnings and dividends paid during the twenty-seven years was \$1,475,063,464 and \$1,300,609,576, respectively. The average rate of dividends based on capital for that period was 8.3 per cent.; net earnings on capital and surplus, 7.9 per cent.; and dividends on capital and surplus, 6.4 per cent.

#### CONDITION OF STATE BANKS AND BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.

On or about the close of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1896, the number of banks incorporated under State authority and in operation was 5,708 and the number from which reports have been received 4,936. Reports have also been received from 824 private banks, making a total of 5,780 reporting banks, or 323 less than reported in 1895.

The following statement shows the principal items of resources and liabilities of these banks in 1893, 1894, 1895, and 1896:

ITEMS.	1893.	1894.	1895.	1896.
Loans.....	\$2,348,196,077	\$2,133,628,978	\$2,417,468,494	\$2,279,515,283
Bonds.....	1,009,604,350	1,010,248,230	1,375,026,025	1,210,827,399
Cash.....	205,645,208	229,373,004	227,743,308	169,196,601
Capital.....	408,007,240	398,735,980	422,062,618	400,831,399
Surplus and undivided profits.....	348,206,287	352,424,784	370,397,003	362,602,702
Deposits.....	8,070,462,680	2,973,414,101	2,185,245,810	3,276,710,916
Resources.....	3,979,008,533	3,868,474,997	4,138,990,529	4,200,124,955

The number of State banks which reported is 3,708, a decrease of 66 from the number reporting in 1895. The principal items of resources and liabilities of these banks are: Loans, \$702,505,798; stocks and bonds, \$97,234,561; capital, \$240,133,835; deposits, \$695,659,914. The aggregate resources amount to \$1,107,187,508. These figures compared with those of 1895 show the decrease as follows: Capital, \$10,270,480; deposits, \$16,750,509; aggregate resources, \$40,358,310. Loans and discounts and investments in stocks and bonds have increased \$4,617,730 and \$5,245,865, respectively.

The reports of dividends paid by State banks and loan and trust companies have been received from 1,310 institutions located in 32 of the States and Territories. State banks to the number of 1,195, with capital of \$87,985,913, reported the payment of dividends to the amount of \$5,985,222, the average rate being 6.8 per cent; loan and trust companies to the number of 115, with capital of \$52,715,402, paid dividends amounting to \$5,254,300, an average rate of 9.9 per cent. The aggregate capital of the State banks and loan and trust companies reporting this information is \$140,701,315, dividends paid \$11,239,422, and the average rate 7.9 per cent.

#### CONDITION OF SAVINGS BANKS.

Saving banks reports to the number of 988 have been received, of which 677 are from mutual institutions and 311 from stock Savings banks, the latter being operated for the benefit of both shareholders and depositors. The aggregate resources of the latter class of banks are only about 14 per cent of the resources of all reporting savings institutions. With the exception of 4 banks located in Ohio, 5 in Indiana, 1 in Wisconsin, and 1 in West Virginia, the mutual Savings banks are confined to the New England and Eastern States. The aggregate resources of this class of banks amount to \$1,849,906,621; loans and discounts, \$645,788,348; United States bonds, \$147,761,264; other bonds and stocks, \$717,416,244; surplus and undivided profits, \$158,595,855; and deposits, \$1,696,190,603. The aggregate resources of both mutual and stock Savings banks are \$2,143,307,163: loans, \$1,055,187,769; United States bonds, \$149,525,375; other bonds and stocks, \$756,676,312; surplus and undivided profits, \$174,714,993; deposits, \$1,985,466,468, of which \$1,907,156,277 are savings deposit accounts. An increase over 1895 is noted in each of these items, as follows: Loans, \$19,580,027; stocks and bonds, \$63,303,998; surplus and undivided profits, \$905,094; deposits, \$91,108,670; total resources, \$80,542,835.

The number of depositors in Savings banks has increased since 1895 from 4,875,519 to 5,065,494, and the average deposit from \$371.36 to \$376.53. In view of the fact that nearly 80 per cent. of both number of depositors and amount of deposits in Savings banks is represented by banks in the New England States and New York, the following statement is of in-

terest as showing the percentage of population in the States named who are depositors in Savings banks :

<i>States.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Maine.....	160,216	23.9
New Hampshire.....	162,444	41.3
Vermont.....	108,281	30.9
Massachusetts.....	1,302,479	50.1
Rhode Island.....	130,232	34.6
Connecticut.....	846,758	41.5
New York.....	1,685,787	25.4
		9

On July 1 last reports were received from National banks, and also partial returns from State banks and loan and trust companies, relative to the number of depositors and amount of deposits held by them on that date. The actual deposits being known, the number of depositors in the two latter classes have been estimated. Adding the number of shareholders in the building and loan associations (taken from information appearing in the last report of the Commissioner of Labor on building and loan associations) to the number of depositors in the banks and banking institutions, the aggregate is obtained of the number of individuals in the States named who are creditors of these institutions. It is probable that some persons have accounts in more than one bank, but the number presumably is not large enough to materially affect the result.

From a comparison of the figures in the table immediately preceding with those in the one following it will be noticed that the States maintain the same relative positions; that is, the proportion in Maine, 23.7 is the least; New York follows with 35.8; Vermont, 30.9; Rhode Island, 43.9; New Hampshire, 47.1; Connecticut, 47.8, and Massachusetts, 50.2. The average for the seven States is 42.04. The number of depositors and the percentage of the population who are depositors in the various classes of institutions mentioned appear in the following statement:

<i>States.</i>	<i>Number of depositors.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Maine.....	198,737	29.7
New Hampshire.....	185,057	47.1
Vermont.....	121,176	36.3
Massachusetts.....	1,539,500	59.2
Rhode Island.....	171,739	43.9
Connecticut.....	898,857	47.8
New York.....	2,393,625	35.8
Total.....	5,008,691	42.04

Information with respect to the rate of interest paid by Savings banks is but partial, but it is noted that from the returns it is exceedingly difficult to maintain the rate of interest which has been paid during the past few years, and indications are that a reduction in the rate is inevitable in the near future. The latest returns indicate that the average rate paid is a fraction less than 4 per cent.

#### LOAN AND TRUST COMPANIES AND PRIVATE BANKS.

Loan and trust companies to the number of 280 have submitted reports. The principal items of resources and liabilities are as follows: Loans, \$462,153,337; United States bonds, \$37,400,637; other bonds and stocks, \$163,763,914; capital, \$111,146,973; surplus and other undivided profits, \$84,313,612, and deposits, \$586,468,156.

Private banks to the number of 824 have reported, showing an aggregate capital of \$22,310,086; undivided profits, \$7,799,625; deposits, \$59,116,378; loans, \$59,693,379; United States bonds, \$2,368,416; other stocks and bonds, \$4,840,174, and aggregate resources, \$94,348,131.

#### PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF RESOURCES AND LIABILITIES OF ALL BANKS.

A condensed statement is herewith given for the purpose of comparison, exhibiting the principal items of resources and liabilities of each class of banks referred to:

<i>ITEMS.</i>	<i>State banks.</i>	<i>Loan and trust companies.</i>	<i>Savings banks.</i>	<i>Private banks.</i>
Loans.....	\$702,505,798	\$462,153,337	\$1,055,187,769	\$59,693,379
United States bonds.....	728,888	37,400,637	148,525,375	2,368,416
Other bonds.....	96,507,673	163,763,914	756,676,312	4,840,174
Cash.....	101,088,641	26,900,871	35,201,528	6,157,561
Capital.....	240,133,835	111,146,973	27,240,505	22,310,086
Surplus and profits.....	95,774,472	84,313,612	174,714,993	7,799,625
Deposits.....	695,659,914	596,468,156	1,935,496,498	59,116,378
Total resources.....	1,137,187,508	855,282,153	2,143,307,163	94,348,131

Similar information relative to National banks, banks other than National, and the total of all banks appears in the following table:

ITEMS.	5,676 national banks.	5,780 other banks.	9,456 all banks.
Loans.....	\$1,893,268,630	\$2,279,515,233	\$4,172,784,122
United States bonds.....	230,057,145	189,089,316	419,096,461
Other bonds, etc.....	188,985,358	1,021,788,073	1,210,788,436
Cash.....	343,143,323	169,198,601	512,341,923
Capital.....	648,540,825	400,881,399	1,049,421,724
Surplus and profits.....	3 6,332,534	362,602,702	366,945,536
Deposits.....	1,618,082,537	3,276,710,910	4,894,773,447
Total resources.....	3,263,685,814	4,200,124,955	7,463,810,399

The capital stock of National banks on July 14 and of all other banks at date of latest returns to this bureau aggregates \$1,051,976,254, an average of \$14.71 per capita of population. The averages in 1893, 1894, and 1895 were \$16.20, \$15.61, and \$15.44, respectively.

The aggregate banking funds, which include capital, surplus, undivided profits, and individual deposits of National and all other banks, are shown to be \$6,695,496,521, an average of \$90.60 per capita. The per capita averages in 1893, 1894, and 1895 were \$95.63, \$93.57, and \$95.83, respectively.

The specie and other currency held by National banks on July 14 and by other banks about the same date amounted to \$531,856,513. The classification of this amount was but partially made by the returning officers, except as to the National banks, and therefore appeared as follows: Gold, including certificates, \$200,980,831; silver and silver certificates, \$48,832,667; National-bank notes, legal-tenders, and currency certificates, \$306,522,953; fractional currency, \$690,427; specie, not classified, \$2,413,485; cash, not classified, \$72,107,150.

#### INVESTIGATION AS TO KINDS OF MONEY AND CURRENCY IN ALL BANKS.

The importance of obtaining a proper classification of the money and currency held by the banks throughout the country led to the sending out of a circular addressed to the individual banks—national and other—together with trust companies, requesting them to furnish this office with a correct classification of the amount and kinds of money held upon the 1st day of July last. The number of banking houses and trust companies inquired of was 12,962, and replies were received from 5,723. The information, while in a measure incomplete, is of such a character as to enable a thoroughly fair and correct result from all to be approximated.

The total amount of cash in the 5,723 institutions reporting was \$413,124,849, divided as follows: Gold coin, \$134,077,008; gold certificates, \$55,481,838; silver dollars, \$8,254,612; fractional silver, \$7,399,073; silver certificates, \$39,663,596; Treasury notes, 1890, \$13,126,018; United States notes, \$110,490,375; currency certificates, \$20,858,000; National bank notes, \$23,795,534. Of this total cash the 3,458 National banks reporting held \$335,174,616, and the 2,265 State, etc., banks \$77,950,233. The amount of gold coin and gold certificates held by these National banks was \$155,073,604, and by these State, etc., banks, \$34,484,737. In this connection it may be stated that the total number of National banks, viz., 3,689, held on July 14, the date of the report nearest July 1, \$361,658,485 cash, of which amount there was in gold coin and gold certificates \$161,853,560.

The total cash and the part thereof of gold and gold certificates held by reporting banks in each geographical division is as follows:

Geographical division.	Total cash.	Amount of gold and gold certificates.
New England States.....	\$35,689,272	\$15,408,786
Eastern States.....	213,129,559	88,580,133
Southern States.....	29,086,601	9,558,183
Western States.....	109,584,645	56,410,427
Pacific States and Territories.....	26,634,762	19,605,530
Total.....	\$413,124,849	\$189,558,341

It is a fair estimate to be drawn from reports received, and in view of their general distribution and character, and the proportion of cash of those reporting to total cash held in all such banks, that as 2,265, or 24.4 per cent. of all banks and companies other than National banks held \$34,484,737 in gold coin and gold certificates, the whole number of banking institutions and companies in operation in the United States on July 1, other than National, viz., 9,280, held on that day in gold coin and gold certificates \$140,989,507. Adding to this amount \$161,853,560, the total gold coin and gold certificate holdings of the National banks on July 14

as being the same as held by all of them on July 1, the total gold and gold certificate holdings of the banks of the country on that day was \$302,798,367.

The report of the Treasurer of the United States shows that upon July 2 there was free gold in the Treasury to the amount of \$101,648,103. It is evident from all these facts that the available gold and gold certificates in the banks and the free gold in the Treasury on or about July 1 was \$404,441,470. On October 31 it was larger, as the free gold in the Treasury amounted to \$118,443,021, making the total in the Treasury and in banks, \$421,236,388.

#### VALUE TO THE PUBLIC OF BANKS AND GROWTH IN NUMBER AND DEPOSITS.

The use of substitutes for money by the public in making payments has resulted from the improved facilities of exchange, brought about by the employment of better methods of banking and the increased deposits gained through the growth in the number of banks. In previous reports from the Comptroller's office, attention has been called to the advantage gained to the general public because of these facts, but in more than one instance and from more than one section general and sweeping denunciation is made of the whole system. The great body of the people, however, can not but know that since the inauguration of the national banking system there has been a direct and immense money saving to all classes.

It is unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the question, but in a general way it may be stated that this bettered condition has been seen in the saving in heavy discounts on the bank currency prevalent before 1863; the saving in the rates of interest on loans and discounts; the saving in making of exchange, and the saving to customers in charges for making collections. If the subject could be freed from all connection with politics and never enter as an issue into a political campaign all would readily admit these things and insist upon the benefits being enlarged instead of restricted. It is worthy of notice that despite political opposition all sections of the country show a greater public demand for their establishment and a larger use of the agencies which they afford in transacting the daily affairs of life. This statement is best illustrated by the following table, compiled from as accurate statistics as can be obtained, and while the total number of banks set forth together with the total amount of deposits fall short of the actual number and amount, owing to the failure to receive reports from all banks, the figures as given indicate that the increase has been proportionate to the increase in the country's population.

*Number of National and Other Banks and Their Deposits in the Years  
1863, 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1896.*

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>
1863.....	1,825	\$686,412,948
1870.....	2,494	1,159,323,324
1880.....	6,546	2,192,632,218
1890.....	8,390	4,116,015,951
1896.....	9,456	4,874,001,975

\* The figures for 1870 include State bank reports for 1873, no figures for 1870 being obtainable. The number of banks other than national is not shown in the reports from which the statement of number of banks and deposits was taken.

#### CHANGES IN CLEARING-HOUSE RETURNS.

Upon the same lines have been the changes in the transactions of the clearing-houses during the same periods. The early reports of the Comptrollers do not contain information with respect to the operations of any except the Clearing-House of the city of New York. The clearings and balances of that association, which represents from 55 to 60 per cent. of the aggregate clearings of all associations for the respective years of 1863, 1870, 1880, 1890 and 1896 are as follows:

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>	<i>Balances.</i>
1863.....	\$14,867,697,849	\$677,628,493
1870.....	27,804,539,406	1,098,484,822
1880.....	37,182,128,621	1,518,538,631
1890.....	37,690,698,572	1,753,040,145
1896.....	29,350,894,884	1,843,239,239

#### INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS, 1896.

The number of banks placed in the hands of Receivers during the year was 27, located in 15 States, having an aggregate capital stock of \$3,805,000 and circulation of \$761,500, of which amount \$132,908 has been destroyed and \$628,992 is yet outstanding. Of these banks 4 were temporarily closed during the financial stringency of 1893 and subsequently resumed business.

The banks which failed during the year are nine less in number than those which were placed in the hands of Receivers in 1895, and \$1,430,020 less in amount of capital stock, but the nominal assets and the ascertained liabilities are more, the former by \$1,638,077, and the latter by \$1,965,324.

The number, capital, assets and liabilities of National banks, in each State, which failed during the past year are as follows: Total number of banks, 27; capital, \$3,305,000; assets estimated good, \$4,506,100; estimated doubtful, \$5,481,181; estimated worthless, \$1,800,180; total assets, \$13,745,420; total liabilities, \$9,001,326.

#### EXISTING BANKS AND BANK FAILURES.

The number of National banks in existence on October 31, and of all other banks at date of latest returns prior thereto, with the number and per cent. of failures of each class and of all, is shown in the following table:

CLASS.	Number of banks in existence Oct. 31, 1896.	Failures.	
		Num-ber.	Per cent.
National banks.....	3,679	27	.73
State banks and trust companies.....	4,944	59	1.01
Savings banks.....	764	9	1.18
Private banks.....	3,552	42	1.18
Total.....	12,939	137	1.05

#### INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS FROM 1863 TO 1896.

From the date of the organization of the first National bank, in 1863, up to and including October 31, 1896, 330 banks, or about 6½ per cent. of all created, have failed, being an average of 10 failures a year.

Thirteen of the 330 associations placed in the hands of Receivers as insolvent have been restored to solvency and resumed business, and one permitted to go into voluntary liquidation. The affairs of 154 have been finally closed. Of the remaining, 162 are still open, 22 of which are on the inactive list.

The total capital stock of all these failed National banks amounted to \$55,775,920, circulation to \$19,641,909, and the total claims proved against them to \$96,322,170.

The Receivers appointed to administer upon the assets of such associations reported \$65,220,676 as good, \$81,329,555 as doubtful, and \$43,072,192 as worthless. The total assets aggregated \$187,622,774. To this amount must be added the assessment upon shareholders, amounting to \$29,087,070, making an aggregate total of assets and assessments of \$216,709,844.

To the creditors of these insolvent associations has been paid in the form of dividends up to the present time the sum of \$62,766,144; loans paid and other disbursements, \$12,809,437; legal expenses, \$2,623,365, and all other expenses, \$4,631,801. The amount of offsets allowed and settled amounted to \$13,569,732, and the losses on assets compounded or sold under order of court aggregate \$39,512,525. The nominal value of assets returned to shareholders was \$4,902,023. There has been returned to shareholders in cash \$1,117,384. The amount in the hands of the Comptroller undistributed is \$1,854,798. The nominal value of unliquidated assets is \$55,488,826, and the uncollected assessments on shareholders, \$17,114,799.

The number of banks which failed during the last four years was 149, having a total capital of \$22,745,020, nominal assets amounting to \$65,534,381, and claims proved \$25,594,603.

#### PERCENTAGE OF DIVIDENDS PAID BY FAILED NATIONAL BANKS.

The average percentage of dividends paid to creditors of insolvent National banks whose affairs are entirely closed is about 75 per cent. Of the total dividends paid to creditors of all the insolvent National banks from the beginning of the national banking system in 1863, amounting, as above stated, to \$62,766,144, the sum of \$2,451,959 was paid during the past year. The average percentage of all costs of conducting insolvent trusts to assets other than those collected has been 5.51.

The difficulties attendant upon the liquidation of the assets of failed banks during the past four years have arisen through many of such assets being of a character not to be reduced to money in a season of financial depression. Many indeed would be worthless under any financial condition. It is contemplated that real estate beyond an amount needed for banking purposes shall constitute no part of a bank's assets, and yet under the plea of having acquired it for a debt previously contracted, many failed banks are found to have a great amount of it, either wholly unsalable or salable only at a very great sacrifice. The weakness of banks holding assets of this character has been developed during these years, and in consequence a large number of them have passed into the hands of Receivers to be dealt with according to law.

## CAUSES OF FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS AND DUTY OF DIRECTORS.

A careful examination has been made into the causes of failures of National banks and the number failing from each cause, from 1863 to 1896, with the following result:

Three have resulted from defalcations of officers; 22 from defalcations of officers and fraudulent management; 1 from defalcation of officers and excessive loans to others; 2 from defalcations of officers and depreciation of securities; 13 from depreciation of securities; 19 from excessive loans to others, injudicious banking and depreciation of securities; 18 from excessive loans to officers and directors and depreciation of securities; 6 from excessive loans to officers and directors and investments in real estate and mortgages; 8 from excessive loans to others and depreciation of securities; 4 from excessive loans to others, and investments in real estate and mortgages; 1 from excessive loans, and failure of large debtors; 4 from excessive loans to officers and directors; 4 from failure of large debtors; 8 from fraudulent management; 15 from fraudulent management, excessive loans to officers and directors, and depreciation of securities; 12 from fraudulent management and depreciation of securities; 24 from fraudulent management, and injudicious banking; 8 from fraudulent management, defalcation of officers, and depreciation of securities; 5 from fraudulent management, injudicious banking, investments in real estate and mortgages, and depreciation of securities; 9 from fraudulent management, excessive loans to officers and directors, and excessive loans to others; 19 from injudicious banking; 54 from injudicious banking, and depreciation of securities; 12 from injudicious banking, and failure of large debtors; 13 from investments in real estate and mortgages, and depreciation of securities; 43 from general stringency of the money market, shrinkage in values, and imprudent methods of banking; and 8 were wrecked by the Cashiers.

The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from a study of the causes resulting in these failures is that in the great majority of instances those directly responsible for the management of the banks involved, both directors and executive officers, have been negligent of their duties and wanting in insisting upon the employment of methods of ordinary safety and prudence. It follows that every bank failure has caused more or less loss to creditors and shareholders and subjected those connected with these institutions to criticism. The relation which the Comptroller's office bears to the banks and its method of examinations have been so much a matter of public discussion that it seems wise at this time to call the attention of both Congress and the public to these relations and the duties which it is believed rest directly upon and should be discharged by those whose oaths make it obligatory on them to conserve the interest of the bank.

The duties resting upon directors are not in contemplation of law merely formal ones, to be met in a formal manner only. It is expected that they shall be thoroughly conversant, both in general and in detail, with the manner of the conduct of institutions with which connected and the methods employed. Bank directors should know whether the best bookkeeping methods are used in their banks, whether precautionary measures in the verifying of entries upon ledgers and pass-books are taken, and whether employees from President to bookkeeper are engaged in speculative enterprises and employing the bank's funds, thus endangering the safety of those trusting the bank. The character of the internal management necessarily makes the institution a safe or an unsafe one. In so far as the Comptroller is concerned, nothing more can be done in this regard than to suggest changes for the better, and by examinations made under his direction ascertain whether or not the capital stock of the bank is impaired either through the taking of worthless paper, overextending credit, or through defalcations. These examinations are made but twice a year, and are in no wise designed to relieve the directors from their responsibility in the premises. It is often assumed that they do, but the assumption is erroneous. They but emphasize the necessity of examinations and the duty of directors to make them. The Comptroller, through his examiners, inspects the paper of a bank only after it has been taken. The executive officers and directors should know of its character before it is taken.

The Comptroller can not detail who in the bank shall verify the entries made upon ledgers and pass-books of depositors. He can only suggest the wisdom of having another than the one who makes such entries verify them. The frequent changing of bookkeepers from desk to desk and the calling in of pass-books at frequent intervals are suggestions sent from this office, but the carrying of them into effect falls upon those who at all times have to do with the active management of the bank. If directors delegate the powers they alone should discharge to the executive officers, the executive officers are apt to delegate them to others, and a condition is reached which, if it does not bring about scandal, results in loss. The security of the bank depositor is certain to be maintained if bank officers and directors co-operate with the supervising officers and insist that both the spirit and the letter of the bank Act be carried out. It can never be made absolutely sure, however, if the examining is all done by the governmental officers and none by the directors. Examinations by both,



thorough and complete, are essential, and the depositor has a right to demand of the latter as much attention to official duty and official oath as of the former. He is entitled to the very best service of both.

#### RESULT OF INVESTIGATION ON EXTENT OF THE USE OF CREDIT INSTRUMENTS IN DAILY PAYMENTS.

[The efforts of the Comptroller to secure data as to the use of credit instruments in daily payments has brought out many interesting facts. A condensation of the kinds of money, checks, etc., on deposit in the 5,530 banks of all classes reporting on July 1, shows:]

Number of replies.....	5,530
Gold coin.....	\$1,863,569
Silver coin.....	1,642,844
Total specie.....	3,512,418
Currency.....	19,064,598
Checks.....	280,339,201
Total.....	302,956,232
Per cent of gold.....	0.6
Per cent of silver.....	0.5
Per cent of currency.....	6.3
Per cent of checks.....	92.5

From the face of the returns the conclusion to be drawn is that 67.4 per cent of the retail trade of the country is transacted by means of credit paper; that 95.3 per cent of the wholesale trade is so carried on; 95.1 per cent of business other than mercantile, and 92.5 per cent of all business.

In retail trade the National banks have 86 per cent of the deposits. The percentage of credit instruments in these deposits varies from 52 in Rhode Island to 87.3 in Nevada (imperfect returns only being received from the latter State).

#### CREDIT INSTRUMENTS USED—ULTIMATE CONCLUSION.

What conclusion is finally to be reached as to the true proportion of the demand for an exchange medium which is met by the use of credit instruments? First, the returns for mercantile business must be considered. The average per cent. of retail trade transacted by means of credit instruments, it is seen, is 67, according to the face of the returns; that 40 per cent. is as low as could in reason be claimed to be correct, and that 55 per cent. is, all things considered, probably about accurate.

There seems no reason to think that the per cent. of checks shown by the returns for wholesale payments needs to be diminished by any allowances. That per cent. is 95. If the returns for retail and wholesale business are combined, 87 is had as the average per cent. of the deposits of the merchants of both classes in the form of credit instruments. If the retail business is taken at 40, and weights the per cents. of the two classes of trade according to their total returns, we get 79 as the average per cent. If the retail average is taken at 55, the similarly weighted average for both kinds of business is 83. If each kind of business is regarded as of equal importance, the averages are: With retail trade at 40 per cent., 83; with retail trade at 55 per cent., 78.

It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that 75 is a net figure at which to rest, as the per cent. of both retail and wholesale business which is done by credit-paper exchange.

What influence should the third class of check users have in determining the final proportion of credit instruments in the exchange medium? Some writers argue that the checks due to speculative transactions should be ruled out of the count. "If all of these receipts represented legitimate business," wrote the Comptroller in 1881, "the means for merchandising and manufacturing would be most abundant." Speculative transactions occur in the business of wholesale dealers; but the speculation which it is claimed should be thrown out of the calculation is, perhaps, transactions in stocks. The payments, however, for stock transactions can not be regarded otherwise than as constituting a real part of the demand for an exchange medium, and so influence the amount needed; speculative transactions of other kinds exert an influence on prices, and also influence that demand.

The real question of importance is as to the per cent. of the total *currency demand* which is satisfied by means of credit instruments. It would seem, therefore, that in seeking to determine what amount or per cent. of money of account is dispensed with because of the use of credit instruments, the means of payment in speculative transactions may not be ignored, even when they are purely stock speculations. If, however, they are thrown out, what is left? The Comptroller, in 1881, estimated that of the \$165,000,000 checks and drafts received by the banks of New York city on September 17 of that year, three-sevenths represented stock transactions. If even one-half of the total transactions of "all other" depositors, as representing speculations in stocks, is deducted and assume that they are all paid for by checks, \$200,000,000 is left for the total business deposits, of which \$180,000,000 was in checks. *This is 90 per cent.*

Heretofore in this report it has been assumed that the figures obtained from retail trade are within \$9,000,000 of the total retail business for the day, and that the checks used in performing this business formed about 53 per cent. of the whole medium of payment. It has been estimated that the total amount of checks passing through the New York Clearing-House is about 70 per cent. of the whole number drawn. Of course, the percentage will be much lower for the country as a whole. If it is assumed that it is 30 per cent. for the country as a whole, and there are added to the figures returned by the banks for the various kinds of deposits amounts representing 80 per cent. of the returns in checks, after rejecting \$100,000,000 for stock transactions, 85 per cent. is left as a result. This is probably not far out of the way as representing the per cent. of the business of the country which is paid for by means of checks, drafts, and other credit instruments. This method, of course, is arbitrary, but is probably as reliable as any other that could be assumed.

It may safely be concluded, therefore, that at least 80 per cent. is a reasonable estimate from all the data presented.

The subject may be looked at in still another way. If it is assumed that the volume of business is constant for a brief period, and if it is supposed that this volume may be taken to represent the total money demand, then the amount of the medium of exchange necessary for the country would be approximately the sum of these quantities: The amount of money actually used to make exchanges in a given period, as a week, divided by the velocity of circulation; the amount of credit instruments used in payments in the same period, divided by their velocity of circulation; the amount of money needed as a reserve for the credit operations. Each one of these is very difficult to determine. The question of the velocity of circulation, especially, is a problem on which there is very little definite information. If, however, satisfactory information were available, it would now be less difficult to deal with the "quantity of money" question than ever before.

The general result of this discussion is very strongly to emphasize the importance of the part played by credit instruments of exchange in the economy of the country.

The two diagrams which follow [pp. 706-7] present readily to the eye the relative standing of the States in the use of checks in retail and in all business transactions as shown by the bank deposits.

#### SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE BANK ACT.

I submit for consideration the following suggestions which it is believed if embodied into law would be of material public benefit:

First. That the loans and discounts of any bank to its executive officers and employees be restricted in amount, secured by proper collateral or by additional signature or signatures of financially responsible persons to the notes taken, and made only upon the approval of the board of directors—a separate written record thereof being kept.

Second. That no loan shall be made to a director not an executive officer of the bank except either upon a deposit of collateral security or upon a note given therefor bearing in addition to such director's own signature the signature or signatures of one or more financially responsible person or persons.

Third. That upon a day in each year, to be designated by the Comptroller, the directors of National banks shall be required to make an examination of the affairs of the bank with which connected and submit to the Comptroller of the Currency a report thereon upon blanks to be furnished for such purpose.


Fourth. That the Assistant Cashier, in the absence or because of the disability of the Cashier, be authorized to sign the circulating notes and to sign and make oath or affirmation to reports of condition of a National bank.

Fifth. That some class of public officers be empowered to administer the general oaths required to be taken by the National Bank Act.


Sixth. That in places having a population of less than 2,000 inhabitants National banks shall be permitted, under regulations to be made by the Comptroller of the Currency and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, to be organized with a capital stock of not less than \$25,000, and with a corresponding reduction in the amount of bonds required to be deposited with the Treasurer of the United States.

Seventh. That National banks be permitted under such regulations and restrictions as shall be made by the Comptroller of the Currency and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury to establish branch banks in towns and villages where no National bank is established and where the population does not exceed 1,000 inhabitants; such branch banks to have the right to receive deposits, make loans and discounts, and buy and sell exchange, but in no case to be permitted to issue circulating notes other than of the parent bank. It shall in all respects be considered as a part of the parent bank, and in each case where such branches are maintained the Comptroller shall receive in the reports of the central bank a statement properly sworn to and attested of the condition of its branches. He shall also

*Deposits, retail trade, per cent checks, by States, lowest to highest.*



*All deposits, per cent checks, by States, lowest to highest.*



have the right of separate and independent examinations, and he may whenever he deems it necessary require, before granting the right to any bank to maintain branches, that the paid-up capital stock of such bank be increased to an amount to be fixed by him with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Eighth. That the semi-annual tax levied on account of the circulating notes of a National bank be reduced so as to equal but one-fourth of 1 per cent.

Ninth. That the Comptroller of the Currency be authorized to issue to national banking associations circulating notes to the par value of the bonds, when the market value thereof is equal to the par value, deposited by them with the Treasurer of the United States to secure such notes.

#### AMENDMENTS TO RESTRICT BORROWING BY OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS AND TO ENFORCE KNOWLEDGE OF BANK'S CONDITION.

It is known by those familiar with the conduct of banks that danger, loss, and at times scandal and dishonesty arise in the conduct of a bank from the too large use of its funds by its executive officers, employees and directors. And not less often does it occur that directors, charged with the duty and under the law of administering its affairs, at such times plead ignorance of the condition developed by its failure or the serious impairment of its capital. The first and second amendments recommended design to remedy the one and take away all excuse for the other of these sources of weakness to banks and of delinquencies of those who are concerned in the management.

The deposit feature of banking in this country has been developed to its present great proportions by the National bank, the source of whose strength has arisen from its national character. If there is no legal responsibility because of its national origin and supervision resting upon the general Government to protect depositors and shareholders against needless loss, there is a moral one, which can only be discharged by the enactment and enforcement of the best protective measures. The powers now vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, despite the exercise of them to the utmost, are but limited. He can suggest, but not enforce—as he might in the light of amendments asked for—rules and regulations which would guarantee a better condition of affairs in the banking world and relieve the public anxiety in times of financial uncertainty.

#### ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL BANKS WITH A LESS CAPITAL STOCK THAN FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS.

The National banking system was for many years protested against, by those who looked upon its creation by national statute, as an innovation of the rights reserved to the States under the provision of the Federal Constitution. Whether or not the prejudice against the system upon that ground has yielded through the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of the law, or for other reasons, the fact is that throughout the whole country whatever complaint is now urged against it is placed upon a different basis. It has drawn to itself support and inspired general confidence because of its central and uniform governmental supervision and examination, the frequent publication of sworn reports of condition, the double liability of shareholders, the percentage of reserve to be held against deposits required, and the necessity of having the bank's funds invested in quick assets rather than tied up in real estate investments. These features have been the means of giving it a strength beyond any State system, and guarantee its future continuance. Its usefulness, however, can still be enlarged and its benefits to the people made more widespread.

The complaint to-day is mainly directed against it because the minimum capital stock required is so large that small towns and villages can not have the banking advantage which, if less capital were required, they might and would. The allegation laid is not without force, argument, and reason. In many sections of the country under existing requirements National banks, though needed, can not be supported from a want of surplus investable capital necessary to establish them. These places suffer more for want of banks of deposit and discount than from any need of banks of issue, but under amendments six and seven, to which attention is called, either banks of issue, deposit and discount, or banks of deposit and discount alone could be had.

The minimum capital stock required at present for the organization of a National bank is \$50,000, with a deposit with the Treasurer of the United States of United States bonds of \$12,500. The proposed reduction of capital stock to \$25,000, with a proportionate reduction in the amount of bonds to be deposited with the Treasurer, in places of less than 2,000 inhabitants would give independent banks of issue to communities in the South and West which, owing to the conditions surrounding them, can not take from their daily business needs a greater sum and invest in banking. The result is that they are deprived both of the use of foreign and local capital and the utilizing of their own credits. The safety of banking upon a reduced capital stock in such localities would be not less than that which attaches at present

in larger cities and towns upon a greater capital stock. State banks are, under proper regulations and safeguards, conducted upon the basis of a small capital and, with the methods of examinations employed and the requirements exacted, there is no reason to believe that banks in the national system would be less safe. It would be far better for depositors in all towns and villages of limited population if officers and directors of National banks had dividends to pay upon but half of fifty thousand of capital instead of upon the whole amount. It would lessen the hazarding of loans upon uncertainties in order to make a profit which can not be legitimately earned and therefore diminish the number of resultant failures.

The enabling of these communities to have National banks would bring them in touch with those portions of the country where there is a surplus of investable capital. For many years this capital has been invested in other States largely in National bank stocks and it has thus come about that facilities for commercial exchange have been afforded many places where local capital could not be furnished for the purpose, and the loanable capital needed increased, with the effect of lowering rates of interest beyond those previously prevailing. In evidence of the extent of this investment it was shown by an investigation made in 1890 that nearly one-third of the capital stock of 520 National banks in Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas and Nebraska had been contributed by Northern and Eastern shareholders, while in Dakota, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and Arizona more than one-half of that of 144 National banks was held by non-resident shareholders. In the States of Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Kentucky and Tennessee, of the shares of 410 National banks a little more than one-sixth of the total was held by non-residents.

#### THE ESTABLISHING OF BRANCH BANKS.

The construction placed upon the National Bank Act as now in force by the Supreme Court precludes the establishing and maintaining of branch banks under it. In the agitation for the increased volume of circulating medium, either in the form of silver or irredeemable greenbacks, it has been many times suggested by those who have argued against both, that with the majority of the communities where the honest demand for more money was made it was a lack for them of credit and not a lack of volume in the country's circulating medium from which they suffered. The statement is undoubtedly true; but it arises in the largest measure only because they have not the means of availing themselves of that which elsewhere entitles and obtains credits which is equivalent to and does answer the purposes of money. This state of affairs is due in the most appreciable degree from not having at hand such facilities of banking as will enable them to show to those in control of loanable capital why credit should be extended and to whom.

The very smallest of agricultural communities, even though deprived of transportation facilities, under a branch-bank system could still be given the advantages of available capital, lower interest, and lessened cost of exchange, privileges they can not enjoy when dependent upon the banking methods employed by the village or entirely isolated storekeeper. The branches grafted upon a parent institution of strength would introduce a capital into places unable to support independent banks, which could successfully compete with that of the local lender of money at exorbitant rates of interest, and make it possible to obtain credit without endangering all property interests in so doing. They would as well afford a place of local deposit, and within a very brief period the local capital, theretofore idle and useless, would become available loanable capital. The use of a bank as a place of deposit of funds means the use of the check, the draft, the bill of exchange and other credit devices which reduce to a minimum the passing from hand to hand of actual money or the currency representatives of money in the payment of obligations. Under such an order of things every dollar would become an efficient dollar, and instead of supporting but a single transaction it would support many.

It is not an extravagant assertion to state that with these enlarged opportunities of gaining credit at hand, all entitled thereto could readily obtain it. It would soon follow that all of such would come to appreciate the fact that money is always to be had by those seeking it if they can offer sufficient inducements in the way of current profit and hope of return to its owner to cause him to part with it. That which is termed "the money question" is, in its proper analysis, more one of facilities of exchange, methods of transportation, and means of obtaining credit than of the volume thereof in existence in a particular country or locality. The whole surplus loanable capital of the world is always available to the people of every country where credit is maintained and who offer investments which promise a margin of profit. Modern methods of banking and modern methods of transportation make it immaterial whether the volume of money in the world is greater in London or New York, in Chicago or New Orleans, in Boston or San Francisco. It is as equally available for one place as the other if proper knowledge is had by the owner of it of the financial character and ability of those desiring its use.

Upon the same lines it is available between these centers of commerce and smaller and more remote places. The important thing is the possession of this knowledge, by those who control the money or credit to be loaned. It is knowledge of a character only to be obtained through the corporations and men whose business is dealing in debts and credits, viz., banks and bankers. If a community is deprived of banks and bankers, it is deprived of the channel through which it can make known that it has to offer to investable capital that which entitles to credit. It is false reasoning which overlooks this, the true source of the difficulty, and alleges that there is a scarcity of money and that the volume should be increased. The scarcity-of-money argument, however, always stops short of an explanation of how it is to be obtained after the increase is had, unless the defects in distribution existing before the increase was made are remedied.

The permitting of branch banks would be the forming of agencies through which a better trade distribution of currency could and would be made. The money of a country congregates at the great financial centres, to remain idle and profitless or to be used at a very small profit, only because there seem to be no new arteries through which it can flow. It is not a matter controlled by any feeling of sentimentalism or wish to create a scarcity in one section of the country and a plethora in another, for such rule of conduct could have but one result, loss to all concerned.

It may be objected to the establishing of branch banks that they would tend to create a monopoly. The objection is hardly tenable; for there could not, under the proposed amendment, be a branch established in any city, town, or village where a National bank was in existence, and moreover the privilege of establishing a branch at a designated place would be open to the competition of all banks already established outside of such place. Upon the other hand, they would stand as an aid introduced from the outside, which, while of profit to the nonresident shareholder, would in the end be of equal if not greater benefit to resident citizens. They could not weaken the parent bank; for with the taking on of new responsibilities additional capital could be required. They would place the national banking system in this respect in line with the systems maintained in other great commercial nations and in accord with the provisions of some of the banking systems of the States. Under the restrictions adverted to, it is immaterial that the number of central banks in the United States would be so largely in excess of those in England, Scotland, Ireland, Germany, France, and Canada. If the principle is a correct one, the administrative detail involved will not be difficult to deal with.

The monetary problems which confront Congress, embarrass the administrative officers of the Government, harass the business world, and bring a plague upon American politics must ultimately find solution in required banking improvements. The time must come when the banks shall be such agencies of distribution of loanable capital as will make credit everywhere equally available to the extent to which those seeking it are justly entitled. So, too, must a point be finally reached when banks shall issue all the credit currency of the country and stand wholly responsible, instead of the Government, for its redemption in gold coin whenever and in whatever quantities presented.

#### THE ISSUING OF BANK NOTES BY THE GOVERNMENT AND BY THE BANKS.

Upon the specific subject of granting an increased issuance of circulating notes upon bonds deposited, and a reduction in the rate of tax now collected beyond any possible need of the Government, discussion has not been wanting in recent years in any reports made to Congress by Comptrollers of the Currency. It has been given a place in messages of the President and the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. The urgency evidenced by these repeated efforts has arisen from a belief that no valid reason can be urged against the propriety of such amendments, nor can any be assigned for further continuing the provisions of the bank Act in this regard as they are.

No one can urge that the payment of notes issued to the amount of 100 cents on the dollar of each bond deposited to secure the notes is not completely assured, nor can it be gained that the rate of tax upon circulation of one-quarter of one per cent per annum is not amply sufficient to reimburse the Government for all expenditures made by it on behalf of the banks. The reasons for the provisions of the law when first enacted do not now, nor is it at all probable that they will ever again, exist. It is a frequent complaint that though the National banks alone are enabled to issue bank notes without incurring heavy penalties, they fail to use the privilege to the extent that the public has a right to expect and demand. This complaint fails to take account of the fact that banks, whether National, State or private, do not deliberately undertake an investment of capital in any enterprise unless the promised profit from it is greater than that of some other in which this capital might be engaged.

Banks other than national do not issue bank notes, simply because by so doing they must incur loss through the enforcing of the 10 per cent tax against the notes so issued. Upon the

same grounds National banks do not issue notes when there is either a direct loss to them in so doing or a profit too small to warrant the investment in bonds and the payment of the rate of tax levied. While it is true that National banks are in a sense public institutions, in that they are under direct governmental supervision, they are none the less associations of private individuals, formed wholly for purposes of private gain. There is invested in them the individual property interests of individual citizens and it is as unreasonable to find fault with them for not conducting a losing business as it is to so treat the individual in the other dealings which he carries on. The public has a right to expect from that part of it engaged in national banking just as much and no more business generosity than from those engaged in agriculture, manufacture, or mining. On the other hand, this class is entitled to as much consideration from the general public as the classes referred to, and no more.

There is no monopoly under the present banking laws given to any class of citizens beyond that which comes to any person having investable capital. It is on the same footing exactly with the business of the merchant with no more favoring laws in the matter of taxation. It is to be doubted whether the returns upon the capital invested in banking, proportionate to the amount, indicate as large a percentage of profit as that invested in merchandise. The net earnings on the capital stock and surplus fund of National banks for the past year was 5.4 per cent, including all profit made on the issue of circulation. As compared with the profits accruing to those interested in many mining and manufacturing enterprises the rate is exceedingly small.

The Actuary of the Treasury has for recent years estimated the profit upon bank circulation, secured by all classes of accepted Government bonds, to be as follows:

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Profit.</i>
October 31, 1894.....	0.967
October 31, 1895.....	1.107
October 31, 1896.....	1.659

Upon this basis the amount of National bank circulation outstanding secured by a deposit of bonds was—

November 1, 1894.....	\$179,401,384
November 1, 1895.....	190,180,961
November 1, 1896.....	216,510,014

It thus appears that the law controlling bond-secured circulation is that which governs all other business undertakings. Increase follows conditions of promised profit and decrease those where no apparent profit is discernible. Unnecessary restrictions and unnecessary taxation only serve to hamper at needed times an enlarged circulation of an instrument of credit which has the merit of always being safe and redeemable. It is not to be claimed that these amendments would make the bank-note circulation of the country perfect, but they would at least improve it and again attract to its attention banks which have now become indifferent. If the right of note issue should properly vest in National banks they ought to have every privilege which can be consistently and properly granted, and thus enabled to make the exercise of this function a means of facilitating the interests of trade and commerce. It is unnecessary to discuss the right. That has been passed upon by the courts and the National bank note is the willingly accepted bank currency of the people. It is therefore certain to continue, and for this reason, if for no other, legislation which will make of greater scope and wider utility the note-issuing powers of the National banks is legislation which should find enactment.

The monetary difficulties of the Treasury which affect every class of people and embarrass the administration of the affairs of the Treasury Department can not longer continue without entailing still greater loss and more widespread financial disaster. They do not find their origin in any mere surface and temporary weakness, nor are they due to recent and passing conditions. They are inherent in the financial policy which has been built up in the United States and constitute an integral part of it. Instead of lessening in ill effects with time, they will accumulate more strength for harm at each recurring season of financial and business disturbance.

The policy of having the Treasury a bank of issue, as it is in the issuing of the Treasury notes, without attaching to it needed bank-of-issue powers, and of making it a bank of deposit in the maintenance of the sub-treasury system without corresponding bank-of-deposit essentials, violates the laws of all successful government financiering. If the Treasury is to be a bank of issue, it should be clothed with complete powers in this regard. If it is to be a bank of deposit, it should be governed by principles invoked by such an institution and make of benefit to trade and commerce the moneys which come into its vaults. It ought not to embarrass the business world by locking up vast sums, resulting at times in artificially creating a money stringency, and at others, by suddenly expending equally large amounts, creating a plethora. If the harm worked by this latter feature of our financial policy is less than that flowing from the former, it is nevertheless a source of very great weakness.



Though it may be a debatable question as to the wisdom of taking the moneys gathered for public revenues out of the channels of daily business and locking them up in the sub-treasuries of the country, the experience of this and other countries certainly demonstrates that there is little, if any, room to doubt the folly of the direct issue and redemption of Treasury bank notes by the Government. It is a practice abandoned as a controlling policy by every great government save the United States, on the ground of unsoundness. Other countries which tolerate it at all, issue these notes only in very limited quantities and not on lines followed here. It had no advocates in this country until the advent of the civil war, and was then accepted only because of an urged necessity, under the promise of being but a temporary expedient and was admittedly wrong as a matter of principle by those who fathered it. The staunchest friends it had in either House of Congress protested against the continuance of Treasury issues beyond the war period, and with equal emphasis promised at an early date their payment and cancellation.

A policy in finance wrong in principle never becomes right in practice. The truth of the statement is fully illustrated by the course of the legal-tender Treasury issues of the United States. They have been always a disturbing element in business, and their current redemption a continuing weakness and anxiety to the Treasury. They compel the Treasury of the United States to carry a reserve of gold which their use makes the basis of supply for all places and all people. They have not even the merit of being without expense to the Government. At one time it was argued in behalf of continuing their issue and compulsory re-issue that to cancel them meant to dangerously contract the currency. That argument has given way to one which assumes that they are what is termed "a non-interest bearing debt," and are consequently carried without additional tax upon the public. Those who advance this as an argument either disregard or are ignorant of the facts.

#### EFFECTS OF MAINTAINING TREASURY AND NATIONAL BANK NOTES COMPARED.

The argument as stated in favor of the continuance of Treasury notes is their assumed lack of cost to the public. That advanced against issues of National banks is that they burden the people and take from the people for private benefit. If the first argument is opposed by the facts, not less so is the second. The comparison could not be more striking or the results upon the income of the Treasury more diametrically opposite. The course of the former has increased the rate of taxation necessary to meet the expenses of the general Government, while that of the latter has lessened it. This rate has been further lessened by other items of revenue gained to the Government directly from the National banks.

#### *Revenues Received by the Government from National Banks from 1863 to October 31, 1896.*

Tax on capital stock prior to March 3, 1883.....	\$7,855,887.74
Tax on deposits prior to March 3, 1883.....	60,940,067.16
Tax on circulation to June 30, 1886.....	79,390,680.89
Tax on circulation, July 1 to October 31, 1896, estimated.....	617,225.34
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>\$148,803,861.13</b>
From unredeemed circulation, two-fifths of 1 per cent. of actual circulation outstanding on October 31, 1896 (\$706,616,831).....	2,826,466.00
<b>From taxation.....</b>	<b>\$148,803,861.13</b>
From unredeemed circulation.....	2,826,466.00
Saving by National banks handling Government deposits to the amount of \$5,855,099,160.91 at rate of three-eighths of 1 per cent. per \$1,000.....	21,956,621.85
<b>.....</b>	<b>\$173,586,948.98</b>
Deduct expenses of Comptroller's Office, appropriated for by Congress to October 31, 1886.....	16,147,700.00
<b>Total profit to Government.....</b>	<b>\$157,439,248.98</b>

It thus appears that instead of loss resulting to the Government from the creation of the National banks, the direct money benefit to it therefrom has been \$157,439,248.98, which could be further augmented by adding the saving made to the Treasury by having had annually the use of the five per cent. redemption and lawful money fund kept by the banks for the current and ultimate redemption of their notes with it, amounting, on October 31 of the present year, to \$26,951,641.

The efforts in other countries have been directed toward divorcing the treasury department of governments from the bank-note function. That function has been given to corporations created for the purpose. It has followed that the duties of their treasury departments have been limited to the collection and expenditure of revenues and their regulation, while the banks have issued promissory bank notes and both currently and ultimately redeemed

them. The problem of maintaining a gold reserve to a certain amount has not vexed and harassed them, nor interfered with the conduct of the citizen's private business. The volume of the currency so issued has depended upon the needs of business as seen in many portions of such countries by institutions invested with the right to meet the local demand. It is not affected by change of political parties nor discussed as a matter to be decided by political affiliations. There is no state of affairs peculiar to the United States which makes it wise to employ different methods or to invoke different rules in the same line of conduct. It is equally certain that there is no exemption vouchsafed to this country from loss in violating the proven rules requisite to sound and prudent monetary and fiscal operations.

The current credit instruments entering into the movements of finance, trade and commerce, ought all to be issued by the banks as needed, under Government supervision, in order to insure uniformity and guard against loss. The responsibility for their redemption in gold coin should be wholly borne by the banks, and upon the banks should rest the duty of furnishing whatever gold is needed for domestic or foreign business purposes. In order to attain this end the credit currency of the Government now outstanding should be redeemed in gold and retired, through funding or otherwise, as speedily as safety will permit, and the banks made to assume the rights and burdens which properly belong to them. The sound State and private banks prior to 1863 redeemed their own notes in gold and furnished all gold needed for domestic trade and to settle international balances. The National and other banks from the resumption of specie payments until 1890, when the Government's credit currency was again enlarged and legislated upon, followed the same practice. The question is not one of ability on their part to meet such demand, but one of opportunity, freed from Government competition and unrestricted by unrequired Government control.

It is respectfully submitted that legislation by Congress, based upon safe and prudent lines, having in view the gradual payment and cancellation of the credit currency now maintained by the Government and the issuance hereafter of all of such currency through the banks, with full responsibility therefor placed upon them, should be had at the very earliest practicable moment. The results which would follow such enactments would be beneficial, and neither would monopoly be created nor favor shown thereby.

#### CONCLUSION.

The added work entailed by the investigations made and tabulated, together with an increase in correspondence, has largely fallen upon the force of employees in the Comptroller's office. It has been done without increasing the number thereof, and in a manner which warrants the renewing of the testimony heretofore given to each one's character and efficiency. The work done by the National bank examiners and the Receivers of failed National banks has been equally satisfactory, conscientious, and intelligent.

JAMES H. ECKELS,

*Comptroller of the Currency.*

#### THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

**Appropriations for 1897-8.**—On December 7 Secretary Carlisle sent to Congress the estimates of appropriations required for the public service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, as furnished by the several executive departments.

The estimates for 1897-8, by title, are:

Legislative establishment.....	\$4,379,820.80	Pensions.....	\$141,323,880.00
Executive establishment.....	19,865,952.00	Public works.....	31,437,061.92
Judicial establishment.....	907,120.00	Postal service.....	1,298,394.47
Foreign intercourse.....	2,062,728.76	Miscellaneous.....	38,844,216.68
Military establishment.....	24,202,636.48	Permanent annual appropriations.....	120,078,220.00
Naval establishment.....	82,434,773.62		
Indian affairs.....	7,297,525.87		

The estimates foot up \$421,718,970.60, against \$418,001,073.17, estimated for 1896-7, and \$432,431,005.98, appropriated for that year.

**Extension of Banking Facilities.**—In our financial relations with other countries we are dependent largely upon the services rendered by foreign interests. Particularly in our dealings with the nations to the south of us we are in urgent need of direct international banking facilities. We do \$150,000,000 worth of business with South America in a year, and yet all our balances have to be settled through English or European banking houses. In the great trade centres of South America the English, the Germans, the French and the Italians have their banks, but I think that I am right in saying that there is not an American bank in all South America. Manifestly, this is a serious hindrance to our trade.—*Theodore C. Search in North American Review.*

## THE CURRENCY REFORM MOVEMENT.

A preliminary conference to consider the best way to inaugurate the movement for currency reform was held at Indianapolis, Ind., on December 1, representatives being present from the boards of trade and commercial clubs of the following cities: Cincinnati, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Des Moines, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Omaha and Peoria.

J. C. Adams, President of the Indianapolis Board of Trade, delivered an address explaining the object of the conference. In the course of his remarks he said:

"The Indianapolis Board of Trade, in common with the business interests of this country, believe that the result of the recent election was an earnest protest against the debasement of our monetary system as well as a positive declaration in favor of a sound, stable, and unfluctuating currency.

Different views are entertained as to methods of procedure and details of plans in the matter of currency revision, but after our grievous and costly experience, we are forced to the conclusion that the time has now arrived when the Government must either discontinue the banking business, with its expensive and complicated system, or go into it on a broader, better defined, and more comprehensive scale. The game is not worth the candle. The burden is too heavy to be safely borne.

The cause of our trouble is not difficult to locate; to determine the best course to pursue, and apply remedial legislation that will provide the great nation with a sound, uniform, and elastic currency, whether it be gold, silver, or paper, is the intelligent purpose and paramount question which will claim the best thought and business judgment of the conference which you are about to consider the propriety of calling."

Ex-Governor E. O. Stanard, of Missouri, was made permanent chairman and Jacob W. Smith, of Indianapolis, secretary.

Hon. W. H. H. Miller, ex-Attorney-General of the United States, thought that the deficiency in the revenues was largely responsible for the apparent defects in the currency system.

John R. Wilson, of Indianapolis, one of the originators of the national Democratic movement, was present by invitation and delivered a speech of some length, reviewing carefully the history of the present currency system, and demonstrating the fact that it was a patch-work that had been built up to meet emergencies from time to time. He favored the appointment of a properly constituted commission.

M. E. Ingalls, the well-known railway president, said:

"We can never put the greenbacks out of harm's way until we get some change that will give us a more elastic banking system. The Southern States cast their votes almost solidly upon the side of free silver at the last election, not so much because they believed in silver as because they are distressed by our banking system and want a change."

An executive committee was appointed and on December 4 the committee issued a call for a formal conference to be composed of representative men chosen from the boards of trade, chambers of commerce, commercial clubs or other similar commercial bodies in cities of 8,000 or more inhabitants, according to the census of 1890. The conference will meet at Indianapolis on January 12.

### THE MOVEMENT IN CONGRESS.

At a meeting of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House, on December 8, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

The first was introduced by Mr. Brosius (Rep., Pa.) and reads thus:

*Resolved*, That with a view to obtaining the latest and best thought on the subject of our financial and banking system, this committee invite suggestions and communications from financial, commercial, and industrial organizations which may have any definite plan to present on the subject.

The second was offered by Mr. Johnson (Rep., Ind.):

*Resolved*, That all general bills now before this committee contemplating a revision of the banking and currency system be submitted to the Comptroller of the Currency with the request that he analyze the same in writing and come before this committee and state the effect of each bill, if enacted into law, and also that he formulate and submit to this committee his views of a proper measure for the revision of the financial and banking system of the country.

## GROUP VII., NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION.

### ANNUAL MEETING IN NEW YORK.

Group VII. of the New York State Bankers' Association, comprising the counties of Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Sullivan, Ulster and Westchester, held its annual meeting at the Murray Hill Hotel, New York city, Saturday, December 5, Bradford Rhodes, chairman of the group, presiding.

The attendance of members was good, and a number of ladies were present. Among the invited guests in attendance were: Hon. F. D. Kilburn, Superintendent State Banking Department; Hon. W. L. Strong, Mayor of the City of New York; Hon. Charles S. Fairchild, ex-Secretary of the Treasury; Hon. W. L. Trenholm, ex-Comptroller of the Currency; Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Chairman House Committee on Banking and Currency; Hon. Wm. B. Hornblower, and Edward E. Poor, President of the National Park Bank, New York.

Edward Elsworth, President of the Falkkill National Bank, Poughkeepsie, was elected chairman of the group for next year, and Secretary Van Inwegen was unanimously re-elected. The election of a new executive committee was deferred until the next meeting. An address by John J. Crawford, of the New York bar, on "The Liability of Officers and Stockholders of Domestic Corporations for Loans made to the Corporation," was listened to with interest. C. A. Pugsley, the delegate from Group VII. to the recent convention of the American Bankers' Association in St. Louis, submitted an interesting report.

Hon. F. D. Kilburn, Superintendent of the State Banking Department, said:

"I know of at least three banks in this State which, although perfectly solvent, would have gone into voluntary liquidation had Bryan been elected. It was a great danger that threatened, and the battle was won by hard fighting. We now know that confidence is restored. We all know that about 90 per cent. of everything that is sold is sold on confidence. It does not make any difference how much money you have got, if you do not have confidence you cannot do business. But you bankers must not have too much confidence. It is a good thing to lend money, if you are pretty certain that you are going to get it back. If you cannot feel certain on that point, do not lend your money. More banks fail and go to the wall from bad loans than from any other cause."

After the business meeting luncheon was served, and this was followed by short speeches.

Mayor Wm. L. Strong said, in part:

"The banks of this city and vicinity have done more to preserve the Union than any other one class in the community. When Chase needed money for the war he failed to raise it elsewhere, but he got all he wanted from the New York banks."

Ex-Secretary of the Treasury Charles S. Fairchild said:

"One of our great difficulties during the past eight or ten years has been the currency question, and it seems to me that in this eastern part of the country there were a great many people who failed to inform themselves regarding the silver question. I do not think this will do for the future. We must give these great questions our best thought. We ought to use our influence to get the Government out of the business of banking. I think this matter of paper money can safely be left to the banks. I think that in some of the plans which have been proposed you will have a perfectly safe system of note issue—a system based upon the assets of the banks in some proportion. You men who are bankers know what constitute the assets of a bank. The objection on the part of some people that note issue by the banks based on their assets would be unsafe, is ridiculous. You say Government bonds are safe. If the great bulk of the assets of any country doing a banking business is not good, then your country is bankrupt and your Government bonds are good for nothing. The banks are in a position to regulate the issue of currency, for the reason that they are so closely in touch with the business of the country, and a note issue by the banks would therefore be much more elastic, as the notes could be shipped to different points as the occasion demanded."

Hon. Wm. B. Hornblower made an interesting and practical talk, partly as follows:

"I feel somewhat embarrassed at being called upon to address you, the more so, perhaps, because of the very flattering introduction given me by your chairman. I feel very much out of place among the bankers. I am a laboring man, earning my living daily by the sweat of my tongue! I know very little about the principles of banking. I have the honor to number among my clients, either regularly or occasionally, some of the most distinguished bankers of this city, and they have tried to inculcate into me now and then some of the prin-

ciples of banking, but without any very great success. We lawyers do not readily grasp the principle of grasping money—at any rate we have not learned how to hold on to it permanently when we have grasped it."

Speaking of the free-silver Democratic convention held in Chicago, Mr. Hornblower said:

"We hear how that convention charged the bankers of the United States with being in a great conspiracy to ruin the country. Yet nobody knew why the banks should want to make their customers bankrupt—that was something that nobody stopped to explain. One of the largest factors in the last campaign was the influence of the banker among his customers. In every little town in this country there was a banker, the President of a National bank or of a State bank, the Cashier of a bank, or even a private banker—this man had the money of his depositors to care for. He held a responsible position and he had to meet the question face to face. He knew that the election of Bryan meant ruin to the bank of which he was the head. He was not to be misled by sophistry, by sentiment, by passion or by eloquence. He knew that eloquence could not take the place of logic. He knew that eloquence could not take the place of sound finance. Quietly, sometimes, perhaps, without saying a word, but vigorously and successfully in most cases, he managed to make his customers feel and realize that any sudden abasement of the currency meant disaster, and the word "disaster" was the word that came home to the minds of these shrewd merchants and manufacturers in those country towns. And the laboring man also finally came to understand it."

In conclusion Mr. Hornblower protested against the admission of any more "half-baked" States into the Union, and thought it would be unwise to annex Cuba or Hawaii to the United States.

Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, said in part:

"You bankers don't begin to realize the importance of your position in this country. You hold the very highest place in the pyramid which constitutes the social structure. There is not a business that doesn't have as its most necessary partner the banker. No other business could prosper if it held the relations to the Government that you hold. You want the Government to have nothing to do with you, beyond exercising supervision and attending to the mechanical production of your notes. You want to manage your own business."

One of the pleasant features of the meeting was the presentation of a handsome silver loving cup to Mr. Samuel D. Coykendall, President of the First National Bank of Rondout, Kingston, N. Y., as a token of remembrance for his generous entertainment of the members of the group and their friends at the mid-summer meeting, held at the New Grand Hotel in the Catskills, June 26, 27.

Chairman Bradford Rhodes made the presentation speech on behalf of the group, as follows:

"Having a very pleasant duty to perform, my speech must be brief, not because 'she is waiting for me,' as Chauncey Depew said the other night, but because you are doubtless curious to know my subject and will wish for a speedy climax.

Bulwer-Lytton says, 'If a good face is a letter of recommendation, a good heart is a letter of credit.' The sentiment is especially appropriate to this occasion. Last June the members of Group VII. and their friends were the guests of a gentleman—one of our own number—whose generous hospitality and warm-hearted welcome made us all very happy. As a host he needs no letter of recommendation, and with us his letter of credit is inexhaustible, as back of it is the good will and love of every member of our association. Disinterested love rules the world, its power is supreme in statecraft, in business and in the social affairs of life.

Agnes ago the great preacher said, 'We are saved by grace.' The ladies who honor us by their presence here to-day appreciate the supplemental statement that—

'Man while he loves is never quite depraved  
And woman's triumph is a lover saved.'

Words are fleeting; they pass away; therefore the expression of our highest regard should take some tangible form. I am commanded by the association to present our friend with a loving cup, bearing this inscription:

PRESENTED BY GROUP VII.  
NEW YORK STATE BANKERS' ASSOCIATION,  
to

SAMUEL D. COYKENDALL,

In recognition of his generous hospitality extended to the members of Group VII.  
and their friends during the mid-summer meeting of the Association.

GRAND HOTEL—CATSKILL MOUNTAINS.

June 26, 27, 1896.

Then fill the golden chalice to the brim; aye, it is already filled with our best affection. Embellished with a vine typifying enduring friendship, and fruit indicating his bounty.

Mr. Coykendall, in presenting this cup as a token of affectionate remembrance, be well assured that our united good wishes for your health and continued prosperity go with it. May life's pathway always be beside the still waters, and may you always say truly, my cup runneth over with earth's choicest blessings."

Mr. Coykendall made a few appropriate remarks, accepting the testimonial, and cordially thanking the members of the group for this evidence of their esteem.

## PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S CURRENCY VIEWS.

In his annual message, transmitted to Congress on December 7, President Cleveland made the following suggestions in regard to currency reform:

"I can not refrain from again earnestly presenting the necessity of the prompt reform of a system opposed to every rule of sound finance and shown by experience to be fraught with the gravest peril and perplexity. The terrible Civil War which shook the foundations of our Government more than thirty years ago brought in its train the destruction of property, the wasting of our country's substance, and the estrangement of brethren. These are now past and forgotten. Even the distressing loss of life the conflict entailed is but a sacred memory, which fosters patriotic sentiment and keeps alive a tender regard for those who nobly died. And yet there remains with us to-day, in full strength and activity, as an incident of that tremendous struggle, a feature of its financial necessities, not only unsuited to our present circumstances, but manifestly a disturbing menace to business security and an ever-present agent of monetary distress.

Because we may be enjoying a temporary relief from its depressing influence this should not lull us into a false security nor lead us to forget the suddenness of past visitations."

### GOVERNMENT DEMAND NOTES SHOULD BE RETIRED.

"I am more convinced than ever that we can have no assured financial peace and safety until the Government currency obligations upon which gold may be demanded from the Treasury are withdrawn from circulation and canceled. This might be done, as has been heretofore recommended, by their exchange for long-term bonds bearing a low rate of interest or by their redemption with the proceeds of such bonds. Even if only the United States notes known as greenbacks were thus retired, it is probable that the Treasury notes issued in payment of silver purchases under the Act of July 14, 1890, now paid in gold when demanded, would not create much disturbance, as they might, from time to time, when received in the Treasury by redemption in gold or otherwise, be gradually and prudently replaced by silver coin.

This plan of issuing bonds for the purpose of redemption certainly appears to be the most effective and direct path to the needed reform. In default of this, however, it would be a step in the right direction if the currency obligations redeemable in gold, whenever so redeemed, should be canceled instead of being reissued. This operation would be a slow remedy, but it would improve present conditions."

### AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL BANK ACT.

"National banks should redeem their own notes. They should be allowed to issue circulation to the par value of bonds deposited as security for its redemption, and the tax on their circulation should be reduced to one-fourth of one per cent.

In considering projects for the retirement of United States notes and Treasury notes issued under the law of 1890, I am of the opinion that we have placed too much stress upon the danger of contracting the currency, and have calculated too little upon the gold that would be added to our circulation if invited to us by better and safer financial methods. It is not so much a contraction of our currency that should be avoided as its unequal distribution.

This might be obviated, and any fear of harmful contraction at the same time removed, by allowing the organization of smaller banks and in less populous communities than are now permitted, and also authorizing existing banks to establish branches in small communities under proper restrictions."

### GOVERNMENT MUST GO OUT OF THE BANKING BUSINESS.

"The entire case may be presented by the statement that the day of sensible and sound financial methods will not dawn upon us until our Government abandons the banking business and the accumulation of funds, and confines its monetary operations to the receipt of the money contributed by the people for its support, and to the expenditure of such money for the people's benefit.

Our business interests and all good citizens long for rest from feverish agitation, and the usurpation by the Government of a reformed financial policy which will encourage enterprise and make certain the rewards of labor and industry."

## BANKING AND FINANCIAL NEWS.

This Department includes a complete list of **NEW NATIONAL BANKS** (furnished by the Comptroller of the Currency), **STATE AND PRIVATE BANKS**, **CHANGES IN OFFICERS**, **DISSOLUTIONS AND FAILURES**, etc., under their proper State heads for easy reference.

### NEW YORK CITY.

—The one hundred and twenty-eighth annual dinner of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York was held at Delmonico's, November 17. Addresses were made by President Alexander E. Orr, Postmaster-General Wilson, Governor Griggs, of New Jersey, and W. Bourke Cockran.

—Chas. J. Fisk, of Messrs. Harvey Fisk & Sons, was recently elected Mayor of Plainfield, N.J.

—Lionello Perera & Co. succeed Cantoni & Co., bankers, at 49 Wall street.

—Clarence H. Wildes & Co is a new banking and brokerage firm at 36 Wall street.

—O. W. Clapp & Co., incorporated, succeed Clapp & Co.

—William S. Opdyke, for twenty-five years counsel for the Fourth National Bank and son of George S. Opdyke, the first President of that institution, has been unanimously elected a director of the bank to fill the vacancy caused by the death of John H. Inman.

—For the first time since 1885 London is now borrowing money in this market on the security of sterling exchange. This is due to the fact that interest rates have actually been lower in New York than in London. As the loans will have to be repaid later, it is thought that the operations referred to may prevent the exportation of gold in the spring.

—On November 10, Alexander Gilbert, formerly Cashier of the Market and Fulton National Bank, was elected President, to succeed Robert Bayles, who having filled the office for thirty-three years, asked to be relieved. In order that the bank might not be entirely deprived of his services, he was unanimously chosen Vice-President. Thomas J. Stevens was elected Cashier, and John H. Carr, Assistant Cashier.

—The Mining Exchange of New York city was incorporated on November 10. Stephen V. White, of Brooklyn, is one of the directors.

—A brief history of the banks doing business in the city in 1852 has recently been published by the "New York Times." In 1852 there were forty-one banks in active business; thirty-two of these are still existing. Resources and liabilities of these institutions have increased from \$103,781,470 in 1852 to \$381,139,446 in 1896.

—Members of Group IX. of the New York State Bankers' Association met November 24, in the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce. A. B. Hepburn, President of the Third National Bank, and Chairman of Group IX., presided. The principal business transacted was the electing of the following officers: Chairman—Frederick B. Schenck, President of the Mercantile National Bank; Secretary and Treasurer—Joseph W. Harriman, Cashier of the Merchants' National Bank; Executive Committee—Stuart G. Nelson, Vice-President of the Seaboard National Bank; William Milne, Cashier People's Bank; C. H. Stout, Cashier National Bank of the Republic, and Henry P. Davison, Cashier Liberty National Bank.

—The Central National Bank, having sold its real estate at the corner of Broadway and Pearl street, its stockholders will be asked at the annual meeting in January to vote on a proposition to reduce the capital stock from \$2,000,000 to \$1,000,000. It has a large surplus, and the plan is to return to shareholders the price of the real estate. This, it is reported, was about \$900,000. A new building is being erected on the site, part of which will be occupied by the bank. The Central National Bank is one of the very strong institutions of the city, doing an especially large business among the best class of wholesale dry goods merchants. Its surplus exceeds half a million.

—The Fifth Avenue Bank has declared a regular dividend of twenty per cent., and an extra dividend of five per cent., payable January 2.

## NEW ENGLAND STATES.

**Boston.**—Messrs. Kidder, Peabody & Co., J. P. Morgan & Co., and Blake Bros. & Co. were recently awarded \$3,250,000 of State bonds at 105.829.

—An important meeting of Massachusetts Savings bank people was held recently to take active steps to secure a reduction in Boston National bank capital. The Savings banks of Massachusetts hold stock to the amount of over \$10,000,000 in Boston National banks, and they are at the head of a movement to secure better returns on their investment by means of reducing the bank capital of Boston in the hope of getting larger dividend returns and increasing the price of Boston bank stocks. This movement has been growing for some time, and definite action is now taken, as it is felt that the banks will not be able to continue paying such dividends as the Savings bank people feel they should earn. Any plan proposed will probably be in the nature of a consolidation of three or four small banks into one large bank.

—E. H. Rollins & Sons announce their removal to 19 Milk Street.

—It is understood that Mr. Phineas Pierce, Vice-President of the Continental National Bank, will succeed the late Hon. W. T. Hart as President of that institution.

**Debentures Promptly Paid.**—On December 1 the Middlesex Banking Company, of Middletown, Conn., paid the debentures of Series 41, due on that day, and also announced that it would pay in advance the debentures of Series 46, due March 1, 1897.

**Candidate for Treasurer.**—It is reported that a prominent Bridgeport (Conn.) Republican, William E. Seeley, President of the First National Bank, will be a candidate for the position of Treasurer of the United States, now held by the Hon. D. N. Morgan of Bridgeport.

**Hartford, Conn.**—There is a considerable gain reported in the deposits in the Savings banks. The old Society for Savings now has deposits in excess of \$17,000,000.

**A Venerable Bank President.**—Hon. William W. Thomas, President of the Canal National Bank, Portland, Me., recently celebrated the ninety-third anniversary of his birth. Mr. Thomas is undoubtedly the oldest man in active business in the city or State. He manages his own private business, and is still President of the bank over whose affairs he has presided for nearly half a century. Despite his great age, Mr. Thomas's mind is as clear, his greeting as hearty, and his smile as genial as ever.

## MIDDLE STATES.

**Baltimore.**—At a meeting of the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, November 19, these resolutions were passed:

"That it is the sense of this board that the banking business of the nation should not be a function of the Government—notably that the issue of paper money, whether it be based on the credit of the Government redeemable in coin or whether it be issued on the strength of bullion deposits in its custody or held as its own, is a pernicious system. The volume of money in circulation should adapt itself to the ever-fluctuating needs of commerce and daily life and the private means of independent agents, such as banks, should be devoted to the special business of providing adequate resources for the varying wants of the community by a fair and unrestricted resort to the markets of the world, drawing capital from the cheapest market and dispersing an oversupply when necessary.

To use the credit of the Government by selling bonds in order to relieve the money market when private enterprises could easily procure the necessary remedy, is not only a very expensive but also a very dangerous method, as it cannot be done without dragging a simple business transaction into the arena of politics. It opens the door for the introduction of a multitude of plans likely to originate from motives of selfish interest and apt to be devised by untrained minds. Private responsibility should take the place of public irresponsibility in handling money matters.

That the President appoint a committee for the purpose of pressing this matter before the respective committees of Congress and to use the influence of this corporation to bring about proper legislation."

—The city will receive a premium of \$26,150 on \$500,000 of 3½ per cent. bonds, recently awarded to the Maryland Trust Co. The bonds belong to the loan of 1940, and the successful bid was 108.77, with accrued interest, making the offer worth 105.23 for the entire block, all or none. There were twenty-three bidders.

—The old banking firm of Robert Garrett & Sons, which was dissolved by the death of Robert Garrett, will be continued by his nephews under the same style of firm.

**Newark, N. J.**—There are in Newark nine National banks, one State bank, and five Savings banks. The managers of these institutions are careful and conservative financiers, many having risen to Cashier or President from a clerkship in a bank, and, therefore, they know



how to deal with the depositors. The people have confidence in the banks, and the sound financial condition of each bank speaks well for the managers. The business done annually by the banks of the city is very large. The aggregate capital of the nine National banks and one State bank is \$3,100,100, and the total surplus on a recent date was \$2,540,000. There were 50,540 depositors in the five Savings banks on January 1 last. In round numbers, the total assets exceeded \$13,000,000; the amount due depositors, \$11,700,000, and the aggregate surplus exceeded \$1,300,000. This is an excellent showing; one that will firmly establish the confidence of the people in the banks.

**New Jersey Bank Swindled.**—On November 24 the First National Bank of Trenton, N. J., was swindled to the extent of \$1,000 by a clever forger. Recently the bank received a letter inclosing a note for \$1,000, purporting to be drawn by William Balderson, a customer of the bank, with the request that it be discounted and the amount credited to his account. The paper was submitted to the board of directors, and after some discussion was ordered discounted. Shortly after, a stranger entered the banking house of Drexel & Co. in Philadelphia, with a check for \$600 on the First National Bank of Trenton, signed by William Balderson, with a request that it be cashed. The officials of the Philadelphia bank telephoned to Trenton, and learning that the account was good for that amount, gave him the money. The same person went through a similar procedure with a check for \$400. When the checks came from Philadelphia, the Cashier of the First National Bank of Trenton suspected nothing wrong. Mr. Balderson was informed that his note had been discounted and that he could draw against it. "What note?" asked Mr. Balderson. "Why, the note you mailed us last week," was the reply. Mr. Balderson denied all knowledge of the note, and upon examination pronounced it a forgery.

**New State Bank.**—About \$15,000 has been subscribed for a new State bank at Cornwall, N. Y.

**New Bank at Rome, N. Y.**—A new National bank is to be organized at Rome, N. Y., with \$100,000 capital. The Central National Bank building has been purchased for the new institution. Among the incorporators will be E. S. Parker and O. G. Staples, of the Columbia National, Washington, D. C.

**Action against a Bank.**—The county of Rensselaer, New York, has commenced an action against the failed National Bank of Troy, for the recovery of \$210,000. The attorneys for the county claim that this sum was transferred to the account of the institution, while Morrison was treasurer of the county and Cashier of the bank, without legal right or procedure.

**Albany, N. Y.**—Expert architects are preparing plans for a new building for the Albany Savings Bank.

**Pittsburg.**—At the annual meeting of the Pittsburg Trust Co., on Nov. 17, the undivided profits account was increased to \$170,000. A fair year's business was reported.

—The new State Bank of Pittsburg, capital, \$50,000, opened for business in its own building on December 1.

—The Pennsylvania Bankers' Association will hold its annual convention in Pittsburg, December 16 and 17.

—At a meeting of the Bankers and Bank Clerks' Mutual Benefit Association, held November 16, the following officers were elected: President, J. Denniston Lyon, of W. R. Thompson & Co.; vice-president, Robert D. Book, of the Exchange National Bank; treasurer, Edward E. Duff, of the People's Savings Bank; corresponding secretary, Charles E. Schuetz, Odd Fellows Savings Bank; recording secretary, M. N. Ballard, Union National Bank.

**Buffalo, N. Y.**—Group I. of the State Bankers' Association met at the Iroquois Hotel, November 19. Judge Charles Daniels read a paper on the "Personal Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Corporations." W. H. Ticknor spoke on "Salient Points of Difference between National and State Banks and Trust Companies." Officers for the ensuing year were chosen as follows: Chairman, A. J. Barnes, Cashier City Bank, Buffalo; secretary and treasurer, James Kerr, Cashier Union Bank, Buffalo; executive committee, P. P. Pratt, President Manufacturers and Traders' Bank, Buffalo; E. F. Dickinson, Cashier Jamestown National Bank, Jamestown; Henry Weil, President Metropolitan Bank, Buffalo; D. W. Tomlinson, President Bank of Batavia, Batavia; F. L. Bartlett, President Exchange National Bank, Olean.

—On November 18 the transmission of electric power from Niagara Falls to Buffalo was successfully accomplished. The current will be kept on continuously. The problem of the loss in transmitting the current twenty-two miles is one which has puzzled electricians, but it is thought the appliances, insulation, etc., in the present transmission will make the loss small and the commercial use of the power possible.

**Syracuse, N. Y.**—Group IV. of the State Bankers' Association met in this city, November 20. William Sherer, Manager of the New York Clearing-House, gave a very interesting

description of the operations of that institution. The new officers of the group are: Chairman, F. C. Eddy, Cashier Bank of Syracuse; secretary, Geo. L. Bonta, Cashier N. Y. State Banking Co., Syracuse; executive committee, Geo. W. Hannahs, Cashier Farmers' National Bank, Adams, N. Y.; Amos Youmans, Cashier First National Bank, Fulton; F. J. Peck, Cashier First National Bank of Cortland, Cortland; E. E. Coe, Cashier Farmers and Merchants' State Bank, Oneida; W. J. H. Parker, Cashier First National Bank, Moravia.

**Pennsylvania Building and Loan.**—The Commissioner of Banking has made his annual report on the condition of building and loan associations in Pennsylvania. It shows the total resources of these association to be \$90,519,917. The commissioner states that as a rule the associations are well managed.

**Brooklyn, N. Y.**—On November 18 a reception was given in the new Manufacturers' National Bank building, at the corner of Broadway and Berry street, by the directors, by way of celebrating the completion of the banking office and vaults. An invitation had been extended to the officers of leading financial institutions, and the reception was largely attended by them as well as by the stockholders and depositors of the institution. The various modern equipments for the safe keeping of money and valuables with which the bank is fitted interested the visitors much. The entire building of the bank has taken nearly two years to complete. The four upper floors are occupied by offices.

—A meeting of Group VIII. of the New York State Bankers' Association was held at the parlors of the Montauk Club, Nov. 18. At the business meeting early in the evening Walter E. Frew, of the Queens County Bank, was elected President for the ensuing year, James M. Brush, of the Huntington Bank, as Treasurer and J. A. Nexson, of the Fulton Bank, Brooklyn, as new member of the executive committee, the other members re-elected to the committee being John G. Jenkins of the First National Bank, Henry E. Hutchinson, of the Brooklyn Bank, C. T. Young of the City Bank and John A. Potter of the Patchogue National Bank. Brief addresses were made by ex-President Griswold, Hon. A. B. Hepburn, Murat Halstead and ex-Mayor David A. Boody.

**Rochester, N. Y.**—Group IV. of the State Bankers' Association met here November 21. After discussing a number of practical banking subjects the following officers were elected: Chairman, F. H. Hamlin, President Canandaigua National Bank, Canandaigua; secretary, T. J. Swanton, Cashier Commercial National Bank, Rochester.

## SOUTHERN STATES.

**Atlanta, Ga.**—E. S. McCandless succeeds J. C. Kirkpatrick as Cashier of the Atlanta Trust and Banking Co.

**Bank to Resume.**—The German-American Savings Bank, Charleston, S. C., in the hands of the United States courts since July last, will be allowed to resume business.

**Southern Bank Profits.**—W. S. Witham, of Atlanta, Ga., who is largely interested in country banks in that State, reports the net earnings of his banks as ranging from 14¼ to 28 per cent.

**Good for West Virginia.**—An endorsement on a blank recently sent out by the publishers of the *MAGAZINE* to a bank in West Virginia, says: "No West Virginia bank has failed for a long, long time—probably not since the war."

**Days of Grace, Ga.**—An Act has been introduced in the Georgia Legislature abolishing days of grace.

**New Orleans, La.**—The Southern National Bank, which suspended business in September, owing to large embezzlements by two of its bookkeepers, resumed on December 7 with \$435,000 in deposits. The capital is now \$300,000.

—At a meeting held on November 17 it was decided to liquidate the affairs of the Mutual National Bank. Efforts are being made to organize the Mercantile National Bank, capital, \$300,000, as its successor.

**Bank Wanted.**—A bank is said to be needed at Arlington, Ga. D. A. Carter may be addressed for information.

**Mississippi Bank Tax.**—On November 23 the Supreme Court of Mississippi decided what is known as "the bank tax case," being a suit by State Revenue Agent Adams for taxes amounting to \$40,000 against all banks that paid only five mills municipal tax. A test was made on the Capital State Bank of Jackson, the court holding that the additional tax, not having been levied by the municipal authorities, was not collectible. The court declined to go into the constitutionality of the law exempting banks.

**Concerning Gold Contracts.**—The Legislatures of Georgia and Alabama have recently voted down propositions prohibiting the making of contracts payable in gold coin.

## WESTERN STATES.

**Chicago.**—Lyman J. Gage, President of the First National Bank, has been mentioned for Secretary of the Treasury.

—In a decision handed down by the supreme court the latter holds that banking institutions in the State cannot buy and sell real estate. They can take real estate for indebtedness, but must sell it within five years.

—The supreme court has declared the Torrens Land Title Act unconstitutional. The Torrens law provided for the Australian system of registering land and titles.

—Local bucket-shops are being prosecuted under the postal laws for using the mails to defraud.

—A rather large exchange in bank stocks has been effected between President Shaw of the American Trust and Savings Bank and S. A. Kent. The former exchanged 500 shares of the Metropolitan National Bank for 500 shares of the American Trust and Savings Bank, held by Mr. Kent, the latter paying the difference in market value of the shares.

**Minneapolis, Minn.**—Mention was made in the November number of the *MAGAZINE* of the consolidation of the Union National and Flour City National Bank. The latter title will be that of the new institution, which will be larger and stronger than either of the old banks. Geo. E. Maxwell, Vice-President of the Union, and H. J. Neller, Cashier, will be with the Flour City.

**St. Louis, Mo.**—The Federal Court of Appeals has decided that National banks have no right to do a brokerage business by selling mortgages for independent corporations.

—Charles W. Isaacs recently resigned as Cashier of the St. Louis National Bank.

**Kansas Bank Consolidation.**—The Farmers and Merchants' National Bank, El Dorado, Kans., has bought out the Exchange National Bank, which will go out of business.

**Lombard Investment Co.**—The Anglo-American Mortgage and Agency Co., an English corporation owning a large amount of the Lombard Investment Co. securities, has filed suit at Wichita, Kansas, against the Lombard Investment Co., of Kansas, to recover about \$200,000. This action is a preliminary step towards instituting proceedings against the eastern stockholders of the Lombard Co., the courts of the Eastern States having held that the double liability imposed by the laws of Kansas upon stockholders and corporations can be enforced outside the State.

**Indianapolis, Ind.**—At the session of the Farmers' National Congress, held here on November 11, the following resolution was adopted, being a substitute for one favoring free silver:

*"Resolved, That the Farmers' National Congress urgently requests the incoming administration of the national Government to speedily adopt all practicable methods to obtain the concurrence of a sufficient number of nations to secure bimetallism, with the unlimited coinage of gold and silver as equal money of ultimate redemption, and thereby restore bimetallic prices for the world's commerce.*

—The Capital National Bank lately bought \$150,000 worth of Government bonds, with a view to taking out additional circulation.

**New Branch Bank.**—The Lake Shore Banking and Savings Co., Cleveland, Ohio, will shortly open a branch in that city.

**A Well Equipped Bank.**—The Batavian Bank, La Crosse, Wis., is now equipped with the best type of safety-vaults and safe-deposit boxes, including the most modern appliances for protecting money and valuables from the destructive forces of the elements and the prying hands of the bank burglar.

**They Have Disappeared.**—State Bank Commissioner Breidenthal (Kansas) after making an investigation, has discovered that only six out of the 381 original mortgage companies which did business in the State during boom days are now doing business. The others have either gone out of business or are in the hands of Receivers.

**Louisville, Ky.**—Logan C. Murray, Vice-President of the American National Bank, has recently been very ill, his life being despaired of at one time. Mr. Murray has been prominent in banking circles in Louisville and New York for many years, and has many friends who will be glad to learn of his recovery.

**Milwaukee, Wis.**—The transfer of lands and securities by F. T. Day, of this city, to secure his indebtedness to the Plankinton Bank, has been held to be a valid transfer by the circuit court, notwithstanding that the action was taken within sixty days of Day's assignment. If the supreme court upholds the decision, it will settle all doubts as to the creditors

of the bank being paid in full. The decision involves property valued at from \$300,000 to \$400,000.

**They Won't Do It.**—Reports to the effect that the Populist statesmen of Kansas, will make Mexican dollars a legal tender need not alarm anybody. Such a scheme would be in conflict with the Federal laws.

**Duluth, Minn.**—A movement is under way for the reorganization of the Marine National Bank, now in the bank examiner's hands. The indications are that it will succeed. The work of reorganizing the Security Bank is still in progress, with 80 per cent. of the depositors agreed.

**Stockholders Pay Up.**—The New York stockholders of the Chadron (Neb.) Banking Company have paid into court the full amount of their liability under the law, amounting to \$16,500 and the criminal prosecution against A. C. Putnam, President of the bank, for receiving money when the bank was insolvent, has been dropped.

**Kansas Loan Companies.**—The erratic course of Kansas—politically—has brought some pretty sharp criticism upon the State, but the Populist leaders are not far wrong in announcing the following decision: "Loan and investment companies will be put under the control of the State Bank Commissioner, who will have the same supervision over them that he has over the State banks. These concerns will have to submit to a thorough examination of their business by the proper official, and if they can not comply with a rigid investigation and show that they are solvent corporations, they will be prohibited from doing business in Kansas." It would not be overstepping the truth to say that some of these companies have in the past put a direct premium on dishonest loan transactions, and have helped to give Kansas mortgages a bad reputation among investors.

**Investment of Home Capital.**—The First National Bank of Fort Dodge, Iowa, has purchased \$25,000 of five per cent. bonds of the independent school district of Fort Dodge, for which the bank pays one per cent. premium. This makes \$40,000 of five per cent. bonds sold by the school district to the First National since November 3, \$15,000 to take up old bonds and \$25,000 for the new high school building. This town declares itself to be able to take care of itself in a financial way, without the advice or consent of any outsiders on earth!

**Circulation Doubled.**—The National German-American Bank, Wausau, Wis., has purchased \$25,000 in Government bonds, and will double its circulation.

**Attempted Bank Swindle.**—An attempt was made recently to swindle a Columbus, Ohio, bank, by means of a forged check. The bank check had been printed especially for the forgers, but was imperfectly done.

**Bank May Resume.**—It is reported that the Jackson County Bank, Black River Falls, Wis., which went into the hands of a Receiver in September, will reorganize and resume business.

**Kentucky Bank Organized.**—A number of prominent business men have organized the People's Bank and Trust Co., at Bardstown, Ky. It will commence business some time next summer, a building being erected in the meantime.

**New Bank Organizing.**—Kenosha, Wis., is to have another bank, \$80,000 of the capital of \$100,000 having been subscribed. It is intended to occupy the building formerly occupied by the Dan Head Bank.

**Banker Turned Lecturer.**—Rev. John D. Knox, once a well-known banker at Topeka, Kans., is now lecturing in that State, his subjects being Europe and the Holy Land.

**New Banking Commissioner.**—Gen. Daniel B. Ainger, of Charlotte, has been appointed State Banking Commissioner of the State of Michigan, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Theodore C. Sherwood, who has been elected President of the Peninsular Savings Bank of Detroit.

**Bank Directors Sued.**—A suit of interest to bankers has been submitted in the United States court at Grand Rapids, Mich. It is that of Robert T. Gibbons, Receiver of the City National Bank of Greenville against Henry N. Anderson and John J. Foster, directors. Leroy Moore was President of the bank. When it failed in June, 1893, he was found to be a debtor to the amount of \$175,000. In October, 1892, his indebtedness, direct and as indorser, was \$121,000, and the Comptroller of the Currency ordered a curtailment. The bank was managed entirely by Moore, and the directors continued to let him have his own way and he increased his liability by \$54,000 before the failure. The suit is to determine whether the directors can be held financially responsible for their neglect of duty in permitting Moore to continue his operations.

**For Comptroller of the Currency.**—George M. Reynolds, President of the Des Moines (Iowa) National Bank, is mentioned for Comptroller of the Currency, in case the present incumbent, Hon. James H. Eckels, decides to retire from the office. Mr. Reynolds has been

in the banking business since he was seventeen years of age. He has been identified with several Iowa banks, and in 1893 he was elected Cashier of the Des Moines National Bank, becoming President in 1895. His management of the bank has been extraordinarily successful. Mr. Reynolds was elected a member of the executive council of the American Bankers' Association at the late convention in St. Louis. He has many friends in Iowa and elsewhere who would be pleased to see him appointed Comptroller.

### PACIFIC SLOPE.

**Eddy, New Mexico.**—Isaac N. Rogers has been appointed Receiver of the First National Bank here. Efforts will be made if possible to have the bank resume at an early date. If the attempt is unsuccessful a new bank will doubtless be organized, as there is no other bank in the town. The growing industries require a solid bank in this town, which is located in a prosperous valley, with irrigation canals for 200,000 acres of land, of which only 10,000 are now under cultivation. The sugar beet factory which is located here, and largely owned by Milwaukee, Wis., capitalists, is about to commence operations on the first crop of beets, and from the indications the result obtained will prove highly satisfactory to the farmers who have been at work raising the crop, planted in July last.

**San Francisco.**—M. Silberstein is now reported as the Manager of the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris.

**Wyoming's Private Banks.**—Harry B. Henderson, the State Examiner, has completed an official report of the private banks in Wyoming for the year ending September 30, 1896. There are eight private banks in the State, with an aggregate capital stock of \$164,948. The total assets amount to \$783,948, and the total loans and discounts amount to \$593,232.

**New Washington Banks.**—A new bank is to be organized at Cheney, Wash., and will probably be known as the State Bank of Cheney; capital, \$50,000.

—Spokane is to have a new bank—the Holland National; capital, \$500,000.

—John S. Miller, of Helena, Mont., announced the opening of a private bank at Ellensburg on Dec. 1.

**Spokane Clearing-House.**—The Spokane (Wash.) Clearing-House Association, which has been dormant since the 1893 panic, was reorganized on Nov. 23 with the following officers: President, M. M. Cowley; Vice-President, J. P. M. Richards; Secretary, W. D. Vincent; Treasurer, Geo. S. Brooke.

### Robberies, Defalcations, Embezzlements, Etc.

—Bank robbers, who are said to have stolen \$50,000 in the last few months from banks in Kansas and Nebraska, were captured recently in the former State.

—President Leland, of the failed First National Bank, Springville, N. Y., is under arrest charged with unlawful conversion of the proceeds of a note.

—Gov. Turney has pardoned R. F. Truslow, sentenced to three years' imprisonment for misappropriating funds of the Bank of Carroll, of Huntingdon, Tenn., of which he was Cashier. He had served eighteen months of the sentence.

—J. C. Watts, Cashier of the State Bank of Neola, Iowa, is a defaulter in the sum of \$10,000. He is supposed to be somewhere in Colorado.

—J. H. Stickle, who was President of the Blue Valley Bank, Hebron, Neb., has been sentenced to two years' imprisonment for embezzlement.

—The Bank of Burchard (Neb.) was robbed of \$400 on November 10. The vault was blown open.

—Harry Klem, teller of the Farmers' National Bank, Lebanon, Pa., was arrested on November 20 charged with embezzlement and making false entries.

—Several officers of the American National Bank, New Orleans, La., are under indictment for receiving deposits, knowing the bank to be insolvent.

—Anthony Kozel, ex-President of the West Side Bank, Chicago, has pleaded guilty to larceny. The small tradesmen and workmen, who were the chief patrons of the bank lost everything, as the assets were barely \$2,000, with liabilities of over \$100,000.

—The Metropolitan National Bank, New York, now in liquidation, has been robbed of \$60,000 in securities, and Richard V. D. Wood, the Assistant Cashier, who is charged with the theft, is a fugitive from justice.

## FAILURES, SUSPENSIONS AND LIQUIDATIONS.

**Georgia—ATLANTA.**—Arrangements have been made to pay the depositors of the Merchants' Bank in installments of ten and twenty per cent., payments to begin December 15 and extend to May 1, 1898. Receiver's certificates bearing four per cent. will be issued.

**Idaho.**—The Elmore County Bank, Mountainhome, closed November 14, and W. T. Montgomery was appointed Receiver. A demand on the bank for \$13,000 of county funds, which could not be met, caused the failure. An attempt is being made to reorganize.

**Illinois.**—The Bank of La Harpe was reported closed November 14.

**Indian Territory.**—G. A. Gill, owner of the South McAlester Bank, assigned to W. B. Rutherford November 27; liabilities, \$38,000; assets, estimated \$10,000 or \$15,000.

**Iowa—SIOUX CITY.**—The First National Bank suspended on November 19. It was one of the oldest banks here, and was generally reputed to be sound. Deposits were \$573,000 and loans \$492,000. Complications and rumors growing out of the recent Savings bank failure were the immediate causes of the suspension.

A short time after the failure of the National bank a run commenced on the Sioux City Savings Bank, which was forced to suspend. F. B. Goss was appointed Receiver. Deposits of the bank were about \$100,000.

Inability to realize on its securities and heavy withdrawals caused the Iowa Savings Bank to close on November 10. The last statement showed: Assets, \$470,000; deposits, \$150,000. W. P. Manley was appointed Receiver.

—The First National Bank, Decora, closed November 10, owing to a run; capital, \$75,000; assets, \$445,000.

**Kansas.**—The Citizens' State Bank, of Soldier, capital, \$10,000, has gone into voluntary liquidation, paying depositors.

—The Logan County Bank, Russell Springs, has paid depositors, and is closing up its business.

—The Bank of Hays City, private, closed November 7. Estimated assets, \$30,000; liabilities, \$40,000, of which about \$30,000 is due depositors. Elwin Little is Receiver.

—The Baxter Bank, Baxter Springs closed Dec. 5, and is in the hands of the Deputy Bank Commissioner.

**Massachusetts—BOSTON.**—Gage & Felton, bankers and brokers, suspended December 1; liabilities about \$100,000.

**Michigan.**—The First National Bank of East Saginaw went into the hands of a bank examiner on November 21. One of the officers owed the bank \$75,000, and the money which the bank had borrowed exceeded its capital by \$10,000. Efforts are being made in the direction of a reorganization and resumption of business.

—The Arenac County Bank, of Standish, was reported closed, Nov. 23. Deposit liabilities from \$45,000 to \$60,000. C. L. Judd, Cashier of the failed First National Bank, East Saginaw, was the owner.

**Missouri—KANSAS CITY.**—The Missouri National Bank suspended November 30. Slow collections and disagreement among the directors are given as the causes of the failure. The bank had a capital of \$250,000, and at the date of its last report had surplus and profits amounting to \$23,000; deposits, \$1,131,000; due to other banks, \$294,000. It was established in 1891, with 38 depositors, and now has 2,685. In July, 1893, it was compelled to suspend for about ten days. Though there is evidently some depreciation in the assets, it is probable that the depositors will be paid and that a fair return will be made to the stockholders.

—The Bank of Westport was reported closed December 1. Its capital is \$10,000; assets, \$32,000; liabilities, \$20,000. The failure of the Missouri National Bank of Kansas City was the cause.

—D. A. Mayer, of Sturgeon, Receiver of the Exchange Bank of that town, reported to the court recently that the depositors had been paid in full, and the stockholders had received 25 per cent. on account, and that the available assets were not yet entirely exhausted.

—The Davies County Savings Association, Gallatin, closed November 25. The liabilities are \$109,000; assets about \$169,000. The depositors will be paid. T. B. Yates and Milton Ewing

are the assignees. The bank was founded by J. B. McFerrin, and was raided and robbed by the James brothers in December, 1869, when they killed the Cashier, John Sheets.

—The Henry County Bank, Clinton, assigned Dec. 4 to Calverd and Lewis. The deposits are about \$125,000, and bills payable about \$20,000. The bank was organized in 1882 and had a capital stock of \$75,000.

**Nebraska.**—The State Banking Board has taken charge of the Bank of Paxton. Deposits were only about \$10,000.

**New Hampshire.**—The Squamscott Savings Bank, Exeter, will pay depositors and go out of business.

—Great hardship has been caused at Claremont by the disastrous failure of the Sullivan Savings Institution, which was enjoined from doing business in February last. It is claimed that John L. Farwell, who was President, put \$1,700,000 belonging to the bank, and trust funds, into Western investments most of which are of little value. In the past eighteen months twenty-two Savings banks are said to have failed in the State with deposits of \$17,800,000, of which about 25 per cent. has been lost.

**New York—NEW YORK CITY.**—Clapp & Co., brokers, assigned November 11. A new firm, O. W. Clapp & Co., has been organized as successor.

—John R. Hazel and Henry Persons were appointed Receivers of the Bank of Commerce, Buffalo, Dec. 2. Assets, \$1,508,254; liabilities, \$1,700,115, of which \$341,623 is due depositors.

**Oregon.**—Creditors of the failed Job Bank, Corvallis, were recently paid a final dividend of 8 per cent., making 38 per cent. in all.

**Pennsylvania—PITTSBURG.**—A. J. Lawrence, a broker, made an assignment to James Carothers, November 28. Mr. Lawrence was at one time President of the Pittsburg Stock Exchange and was formerly President of the Bankers' and Bank Clerks' Association.

—The report of the auditor of the assigned estate of the late banking firm of Schall & Danner, of York, shows that the dividend due the creditors is less than 1 cent on the dollar.

**South Dakota.**—The Dakota National Bank, Sioux Falls, suspended November 23 because of heavy withdrawals. The last official statement made by the bank showed \$176,000 in deposits and \$198,000 in loans and discounts. The bank is said to be heavily loaded with real estate. Its officers hope to reorganize.

**Texas.**—The First National Bank, Tyler, was reported suspended on November 30. It was organized in 1887, and had a capital of \$200,000; surplus and profits, \$62,000; due to other banks, \$9,000; deposits, \$231,000; borrowed money, \$224,000.

—The Citizens' Bank, Midlothian, suspended November 30.

**Modern Banks of Issue.**—Some indication of the growing interest in banking discussions is afforded by the appearance of a second edition of the "History of Modern Banks of Issue," written by Mr. Charles A. Conant and published by the Putnams. It is only six months since the first edition was printed, and the changes in the new edition are not numerous. They bring the changes in the interest rate of the Bank of England down to date and embody some new matter regarding the Swiss banking system. Mr. Conant's book was carefully reviewed in the BANKERS' MAGAZINE at the time of its publication in June and it is only necessary to say that it embodies a careful account of each of the banking systems of the world and the economic crises by which they have been affected.

#### Gold Movement for Four Years.

	1893-1894.	1894-1895.	1895-1896.	1896-1897.
July.....	Imp., \$5,776,401	Exp., \$12,822,572	Exp., \$3,296,067	Exp., \$9,097,798
August.....	" 40,822,529	" 1,985,308	" 15,123,175	Imp., 2,098,997
September.....	" 5,242,063	Imp., 418,118	" 16,674,809	" 34,098,080
October.....	" 1,072,919	" 519,851	" 76,887	" 27,618,770
November.....	" 4,136,832	" 1,507,288	" 13,468,188	
December.....	Exp., 1,908,800	Exp., 9,424,439	" 14,170,899	
January.....	" 573,790	" 24,698,489	" 198,596	
February.....	" 1,068,335	Imp., 4,067,008	Imp., 9,375,399	
March.....	" 2,929,241	" 4,120,290	" 293,653	
April.....	" 9,402,110	" 2,029,781	Exp., 2,662,498	
May.....	" 23,124,058	" 3,271,193	" 18,499,415	
June.....	" 22,376,872	" 1,963,750	" 6,077,397	
Year.....	Exp., \$4,528,942	Exp., \$30,964,449	Exp., \$30,588,649	

## NEW BANKS, CHANGES IN OFFICERS, ETC.

### NEW NATIONAL BANKS.

The following notices of intention to organize National banks have been approved by the Comptroller of the Currency since last advice.

First National Bank, South McAlester, I. T.; by C. C. Hemming, *et al.*

National Bank of Walden, Walden, N. Y.; by Geo. W. Stoddard, *et al.*

### NEW BANKS, BANKERS, ETC.

#### ALASKA.

JUNEAU—B. M. Behrends; capital, \$40,000.

#### COLORADO.

DENVER—National Loan and Trust Co.; capital, \$100,000.

#### ILLINOIS.

NEWTON—Bank of Newton (Jno. L. Oakey); Cashier, R. G. Hall.

#### INDIANA.

CAYUGA—Collett & Co.; Pres., S. S. Collett; Vice-Pres., J. S. Groudyke; Cashier, Jno. D. Collett.

#### IOWA.

HORNICK—Johnson Bros.; Cashier, Frank H. Johnson.

MUSCATINE—State Bank and Trust Co. (successor to Cook, Musser & Co.) capital, \$75,000; Pres. P. M. Musser; Vice-Pres., Edw. C. Cook; Cashier, S. B. Cook.

THOMPSON—State Bank; capital, \$30,000; Pres., J. F. Thompson; Vice-Pres., J. N. Vaughan; Cashier, W. B. Vaughan; Asst. Cashier, J. O. Osmundson.

#### KANSAS.

KANSAS CITY—Stumpf Loan and Trust Co.; organizing.

#### KENTUCKY.

BARDSTOWN—People's Bank and Trust Co.; capital, \$50,000; Pres., W. I. Samuels; Vice-Pres., Thomas Smith; Cashier, Ben Johnson.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

LEOMINSTER—Leominster Loan & Trust Co.

SPRINGFIELD—T. M. Shepherd.

WORCESTER—Winslow & Allen; James W. Allen, Mgr.

#### MICHIGAN.

HOMER—Webster & Andrus (successors to Farmers' State Bank.)

#### MINNESOTA.

WEST DULUTH—H. E. Smith & Co. Bank; capital, \$10,000; Pres., Hanson E. Smith; Cashier, James P. Smith.

#### MISSISSIPPI.

OKOLONA—Merchants and Farmers' Bank,

#### MISSOURI.

ST. LOUIS—Cleveland Investment Co.; capital, \$23,000.

#### NEW YORK.

NEW YORK CITY—O. W. Clapp (successor to Clapp & Co.)

#### OHIO.

LORAMIE—Michael Moorman (collections).

TOLEDO—Ohio Sav. Bank Co. (organizing).

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

PITTSBURG—State Bank; capital, \$50,000; Pres. W. E. McCarthy; Cashier, Jacob B. Negley.

#### TEXAS.

WELLINGTON—J. F. Hamilton; capital, \$5,000.

#### VIRGINIA.

HAMPTON—Whiting Banking Co.

#### WASHINGTON.

CHENEY—State Bank; Capital, \$50,000; W. D. Vincent, Cashier.

SPOKANE—Holland National Bank; reported organizing; capital, \$500,000.

#### CANADA.

##### BRITISH COLUMBIA.

SANDON—Bank of British Columbia; Mgr., H. G. Marquis.

##### MANITOBA.

OAK LAKE—Andrew & Co.

### CHANGES IN OFFICERS, CAPITAL, ETC.

#### ALABAMA.

EVERGREEN—Bank of Evergreen; reported resumed.

#### ARIZONA.

PHOENIX—Phoenix National Bank; F. S. Belcher, Pres., deceased.

#### CALIFORNIA.

DOWNER—Los Nietos Valley Bank; J. W. Buster, Vice-Pres. in place of D. D. De Nure.

LOS ANGELES—Broadway Bank; capital increased to \$30,000.



**ORLAND**—Bank of Orland; S. W. Murdock, Cashier in place of W. L. Mecum.

**SAN DIEGO**—California Mortgage Loan and Trust Co.; E. W. Newkirk, Secretary.

**SAN FRANCISCO**—Comptoir Nationale de Escompte de Paris; M. Silberstein, Manager in place of L. Housset.—German Savings and Loan Co.; Edward Kruse, Vice-Pres., deceased.

#### COLORADO.

**DURANGO**—Smelter National Bank; Lloyd C. Sheets, Cashier.

**DENVER**—Union National Bank; Zeph T. Hill, Receiver *pro tem.* in place of W. S. Nelson, deceased.—Denver National Bank; Edward Eddy, director, deceased.

#### CONNECTICUT.

**NEW HAVEN**—Union Trust Co.; Eugene S. Bristol, Treas. in place of Wm. T. Bartlett, deceased.

**PUTNAM**—Putnam Savings Bank; Geo. W. Holt, Pres. in place of J. H. Gardner, deceased.

**STAMFORD**—Stamford National Bank; W. L. Baldwin, Cashier in place of Jno. B. Reed, Jr., deceased.

#### DELAWARE.

**MIDDLETOWN**—Citizens' National Bank; Joseph Biggs, Pres., not "Briggs" as previously advised by Comptroller's office.

#### GEORGIA.

**AMERICUS**—People's National Bank; G. P. McCorkle, Cashier in place of Lester Windsor; Lester Windsor, Asst. Cashier.

**ATLANTA**—Atlanta Trust and Banking Co.; W. A. Hemphill, Pres.; Chas. Runette, Vice-Pres.; E. S. McCandless, Cashier.

#### ILLINOIS.

**CHICAGO**—Chandler & Co.; Peyton R. Chandler, deceased.—Globe National Bank; Amos Grannia, director, deceased.—First National Bank; Jno. R. Hoxie, director, deceased.

**LEXINGTON**—People's Bank; business transferred to State Bank.

**MOUNT PULASKI**—First National Bank; David Vanhise, Pres. in place of John Lincoln; A. H. Lucas, Vice-Pres. in place of David Vanhise; Wm. Rupp, Jr., Cashier in place of C. W. Lincoln; Geo. Rupp, Asst. Cashier.

#### INDIANA.

**INDIANAPOLIS**—Indiana National Bank; E. L. McKee, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. B. Yandes.

**VALPARAISO**—Farmers' National Bank; W. G. Windle, Vice-Pres. in place of W. H. Gardner; W. H. Gardner, Cashier in place of G. F. Bartholomew; E. J. Gardner, Asst. Cashier.

#### IOWA.

**NEOLA**—State Bank; H. Mendel, Cashier in place of J. C. Watts.

#### KANSAS.

**CLYDE**—Elk State Bank; E. S. Marsh, Pres.; W. H. Howard, Cashier; A. J. Patterson, Asst. Cashier.

**COTTONWOOD FALLS**—Chase County National Bank; no Pres. in place of A. S. Howard, deceased.

**ELDORADO**—Exchange National Bank; absorbed by Farmers' and Merchants' National Bank.

#### KENTUCKY.

**FRANKLIN**—McElwain-Megular Banking Co.; J. H. Covington, Cashier in place of James N. Larue, resigned.

**MAYSVILLE**—Mitchell, Finch & Co.; Jno. A. Reed, Pres. in place of James M. Mitchell, deceased.

#### LOUISIANA.

**NEW ORLEANS**—Whitney National Bank; J. E. Bouden, Jr., Asst. Cashier.—Union National Bank; resumed business Dec. 7.

#### MAINE.

**DEXTER**—Dexter Savings Bank; Albert G. Bradbury, Treasurer, deceased.

**LEWISTON**—First National Bank; J. Y. Scruton, Pres., deceased.

**ROCKLAND**—North National Bank; E. F. Berry, Cashier in place of Fred R. Spear.

#### MARYLAND.

**BALTIMORE**—Robert Garrett & Sons; dissolved by death of Robert Garrett; business continued under same name by Jno. W. and Robert Garrett.

#### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—E. H. Rollins & Sons; removed to 19 Milk St.—Continental National Bank; Wm. Tennant Hart, Pres., deceased.

**LYNN**—First National Bank; C. E. Mailey, Cashier in place of Owen Dame, deceased.

**NORTHAMPTON**—Northampton Institution for Savings; Oliver Walker, Pres.

**SALEM**—Salem National Bank; J. T. Mahoney, Pres. *pro tem.*

**WEST STOCKBRIDGE**—Miners' Savings Bank; Wm. M. Kniffin, Pres., deceased.

#### MICHIGAN.

**THREE RIVERS**—First National Bank; S. A. Walton, Pres. in place of C. L. Blood; R. R. Pealer, Vice-Pres. in place of S. A. Walton.

#### MINNESOTA.

**ADRIAN**—Adrian Exchange Bank; Ottis S. Melick, Cashier, deceased.

**FISHER**—Bank of Fisher; M. Sanaker, Cashier, deceased.

**MINNEAPOLIS**—Union National Bank and Flour City National Bank; consolidated under latter title.

#### MISSOURI.

**KANSAS CITY**—Missouri National Bank; Harry P. Clark, Asst. Cashier.

**ST. LOUIS**—St. Louis National Bank; Eugene Karst, Acting Cashier in place of Chas. W. Isaacs.

**WESTBORO**—Farmers' Bank (successors to

Rankin, White & Laur); capital, \$10,000; J. W. Peck, Asst. Cashier.

#### NEBRASKA.

BLOOMINGTON—Franklin County Bank; C. W. Black, Pres. in place of Geo. W. Shepard, resigned.

OMAHA—United States National Bank; C. W. Hamilton, Pres., deceased.

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

CLAREMONT—Claremont National Bank; Frank P. Vogl, Pres. in place of Jno. L. Farwell; J. Duncan Upham, Vice-Pres. in place of Geo. N. Farwell.

NEWPORT—Citizens' National Bank; F. C. Grant, Acting Cashier.

#### NEW JERSEY.

BRIDGETON—Cumberland National Bank; J. Boyd Nixon, Vice-Pres., deceased.

#### NEW MEXICO.

MAGDALENA—Bartlett & Taylor; succeeded by Frank G. Bartlett.

#### NEW YORK.

BELFAST—State Bank; N. C. Saunders, Vice-Pres. in place of I. S. Hunt, resigned.

FREDONIA—Fredonia National Bank; H. L. Cumming, Asst. Cas. in place of H. G. Allen.

LONG ISLAND CITY—Queens County Bank; Wm. Steinway, Vice-Pres., deceased.

NEW YORK CITY—National City Bank; Geo. D. Meeker, Cashier, deceased.—Market and Fulton National Bank; A. Gilbert, Pres. in place of R. Bayles; R. Bayles, Vice-Pres. in place of A. Gilbert; T. J. Stevens, Cashier in place of A. Gilbert; Jno. H. Carr, Asst. Cashier.—Fourth National Bank; Wm. S. Opdyke, elected director in place of Jno. H. Inman, deceased.—German Savings Bank; Wm. Steinway, Vice-Pres., deceased.—Bank of the Metropolis; Wm. Steinway, director, deceased.—Cantoni & Co.; succeeded by Lionello Perera & Co.

#### OHIO.

ASHTABULA—Farmers' National Bank; no Cashier in place of C. C. Booth.

MOUNT VERNON—First National Bank; Fred D. Sturges, Pres. in place C. Delano, deceased; H. A. Sturges, Cash. in place of Fred D. Sturges; no Asst. Cash. in place of H. A. Sturges.

WESTON—Exchange Banking Co.; title changed to Exchange Bank; A. J. Munn, sole owner.

XENIA—Citizens' National Bank; J. D. Edwards, Pres., deceased.

#### OREGON.

MCMINNVILLE—McMinnville Nat. Bank; John W. Cowls, Pres., deceased.

#### PENNSYLVANIA.

ERIE—Second National Bank; D. D. Tracy, Pres. in place of Jos. McCarter, deceased.

JOHNSTOWN—First National Bank; C. T. Frazer, Pres. in place of James McMillen, deceased; Herman Baumer, Vice-Pres. in place of C. T. Frazer.

LANSDALE—Lansdale Trust Co.; Jacob C. Swartley, Pres. in place of Henry J. Smith.

LEBANON—First National Bank; Jno. H. Hoffer, Cashier reported an embezzler.

NEW BETHLEHEM—Citizens' National Bank; I. B. Kauffman, Cashier.

PHILADELPHIA—National Bank of Germantown; Jabez Gates, director, deceased.—Corn Exchange National Bank; J. R. McAllister, elected director in place of Jno. H. deceased.

PITTSBURG—Iron and Glass Dollar Savings Bank; F. William Rudel, Cashier in place of Henry Stamm, deceased.—Monongahela Nat. Bank; Thos. Jamison, Pros., deceased.

UNIONTOWN—Second National Bank; G. S. Harah, Asst. Cashier.

WEST CHESTER—Farmers' National Bank; A. P. Hall, Pres. in place of H. P. Buckwalter, deceased.

#### RHODE ISLAND.

PROVIDENCE—Mechanics' National Bank; H. E. Thurston, Asst. Cashier.—Rhode Island National Bank; Samuel S. Sprague, Pres., deceased; Frederick I. Marcy, director, deceased.

#### SOUTH CAROLINA.

CHARLESTON—German American Savings Bank; reported will resume business.

LAURENS—Bank of Laurens; O. B. Simmons, Pres. in place of E. M. Caine, deceased.

#### SOUTH DAKOTA.

MITCHELL—First National Bank; O. P. Graham, Asst. Cashier, resigned.

#### TENNESSEE.

COLUMBIA—Farmers and Merchants' National Bank; capital increased from \$20,000 to \$50,000.

KNOXVILLE—Union Bank; W. L. Welcker, Pres.; C. R. Love, Vice-Pres.; W. H. Geer, Cashier.

#### TEXAS.

AUSTIN—James H. Raymond & Co.; Frank Hamilton, deceased.

TAYLOR—First National Bank; Jno. R. Hoxie Pres., deceased.

VERNON—R. C. Neal; succeeded by Merchants and Cattlemen's Bank.

#### VERMONT.

BRATTLEBORO—Vermont National Bank; Geo. S. Dowley, Pres., deceased.

#### WASHINGTON.

NEW WHATCOM—Bank of New Whatcom; style changed to Graves & Backus, bankers; J. B. Baldy, Manager.

#### WISCONSIN.

BLACK RIVER FALLS—Jackson County Bank; reported reopened.

OSHKOSH—German National Bank; C. H. Krippene, Cashier in place of R. B. Evans.

WAUPACA—Exchange Bank; transferred to Waupaca County National Bank.

SAUK CITY—Charles Naffz; discontinued banking; collection business continued.

**SHEBOYGAN**—Citizens' State Bank; Jacob T. Jagodnigg, Cash, in place of C. A. Crawford.

### CANADA.

#### ONTARIO.

**KINGSTON**—Bank of Montreal; J. H. Pipon, Manager in place of R. J. B. Crombie.

**BELLEVILLE**—Bank of Montreal; R. J. B. Crombie Manager in place of R. Richardson.

#### NEWFOUNDLAND.

**ST. JOHN'S**—Bank of Montreal; F. J. Hunter Manager in place of J. M. Greaat.

## BANKS REPORTED CLOSED OR IN LIQUIDATION.

### CALIFORNIA.

**SAN FRANCISCO**—E. H. Rollins & Sons; discontinued.

### GEORGIA.

**CEDARTOWN**—First State Bank.

### IDAHO.

**MOUNTAINHOME**—Elmore County Bank; in hands of Receiver.

**NEZPERCE**—Bank of Nezperce.

### ILLINOIS.

**LA HARPE**—Bank of La Harpe.

**ROCKFORD**—Second National Bank; in hands of H. H. Waldo, Receiver, Nov. 10.

### INDIAN TERRITORY.

**SOUTH McALESTER**—South McAlester Bank (G. A. Gill); assigned Nov. 27.

### IOWA.

**DECORAH**—First National Bank; in hands of Wm. H. Dent, Receiver, Nov. 24.

**SIoux CITY**—Iowa Savings Bank; in hands of W. T. Manley, Receiver.—First National Bank.—Sioux City Savings Bank; in hands of F. B. Ross, Receiver.

### KANSAS.

**BAXTER SPRINGS**—Baxter Springs Bank.

**GARNETT**—First National Bank; in hands of R. E. Spangler, Receiver, Nov. 9.

**HAYS CITY**—Bank of Hays City.

**MILAN**—Farmers and Merchants' Bank; reported out of business.

**SOLDIER**—Citizens' State Bank; in voluntary liquidation.

### MASSACHUSETTS.

**BOSTON**—Gage & Felton.

### MICHIGAN.

**AUGUSTA**—Augusta Bank.

**SAGINAW (EAST)**—First National Bank of East Saginaw.

**STANDISH**—Arenac County Bank.

### MINNESOTA.

**DULUTH**—Marine National Bank; in hands of Wm. E. Lucas Receiver, Nov. 11.

### MISSOURI.

**CLINTON**—Henry County Bank; assigned to Calverd & Lewis, Dec. 4.

**GALLATIN**—Davies Co. Savings Ass'n.

**KANSAS CITY**—Missouri National Bank; in hands of Theo. B. Wallace, Receiver, Dec. 4.

**WESTPORT**—Bank of Westport.

### NEBRASKA.

**PAXTON**—Bank of Paxton.

**WALLACE**—State Bank; in hands of Receivers.

### NEW HAMPSHIRE.

**EXETER**—Squamscott Savings Bank; winding up affairs.

### NEW MEXICO.

**EDDY**—First National Bank; in hands of Isaac W. Rogers, Receiver, Nov. 10.

### NEW YORK.

**BUFFALO**—Bank of Commerce; Henry H. Persons and John R. Hazel, Receivers.

### PENNSYLVANIA.

**PHILADELPHIA**—N. W. Harris & Co.; discontinued.

**PITTSBURG**—A. J. Lawrence & Co., assigned.

### SOUTH DAKOTA.

**SIoux FALLS**—Dakota National Bank.

### TEXAS.

**DALLAS**—Lindsley & Lindsley; reported discontinued banking.—J. M. Beattie; closed.

**MIDLOTHIAN**—Citizens' Bank.

**TYLER**—First National Bank.

### WASHINGTON.

**NEW WHATCOM**—Bennett National Bank; P. W. Strader, appointed Receiver.

## MUNICIPAL BONDS.

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Bonds of Cities, Counties, Villages, School Districts bought and sold.

### Banks and Investors

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Angus R. Macfarlane,

DULUTH,

MINNESOTA.

## WORLD OF FINANCE.

### CURRENT VIEWS ON MONETARY AFFAIRS.

#### A MENACE TO BUSINESS INTERESTS.

The greenbacks and the Sherman notes—about \$475,000,000 of which, in the aggregate, are in existence, three-fourths of which are usually outside of the Treasury, and all of which are gold obligations—are a serious and constant menace to the Treasury reserve, and thus to the entire financial system and to the country's business interests. This currency can be used again and again to raid the Treasury reserve, and the fact that it has been so used was one of the reasons for the sale of \$262,000,000 bonds in the past two years to protect the Treasury gold fund. If the reissue law of 1878 had never been passed the greenback debt—for it was originally recognized on all hands as a debt, and one to be paid as soon as practicable after the passing of the emergency which created it—would have been cancelled long ago. It ought to be extinguished at the earliest possible opportunity, and this dangerous element of the currency wiped out.—*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*.

#### SUCH A SYSTEM WORSE THAN FOLLY.

The fact that the Government has been compelled to sell four issues of bonds during the last three years to protect the reserve, and that, while receiving \$293,000,000 in gold for these bonds, the Government's net gain was only \$58,000,000, proves conclusively the worse than folly of such a system (the legal tenders) and the absolute necessity for an immediate readjustment of this system to the existing exigencies of the currency and the country.—*New York Mail and Express*.

[The paper quoted favors the reissue of the greenbacks only in exchange for gold.]

#### COMMENDS THE FOWLER BILL.

The "Hartford Courant" concludes a favorable review of Congressman Fowler's currency bill as follows:

"The plan receives high praise from those who study it and should have the thoughtful attention of the bankers of this city, whose opinion upon it might have an important influence upon the question of its solution."

This bill was printed in full in the *BANKERS' MAGAZINE* for March, 1896, page 371.

#### THE ANT AND THE GRASSHOPPER.

Those who complain that banks will not favor them have precisely the same cause of complaint against their neighbors that the grasshopper had against the ant. The ant had provided for the winter and the grasshopper had not. The grasshopper no doubt thought it all wrong that winter should follow summer, and he would have voted, if he could, to change the regulations governing the weather. But if he could have changed them or if he could have waited till they changed themselves, he would probably have been just as improvident as he was before and as he had always been.—*Tacoma (Wash.) Ledger*.

# MONEY, TRADE AND INVESTMENTS.

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## A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

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NEW YORK, December 3, 1896.

RESTORED CONFIDENCE AND BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT are the optimistic sentiments of the world of business at the present time. There may be some disappointment that the improvement is not more rapid, but the dying portion of the year is not usually the season of revival in industrial or trade enterprise.

That there has been substantial improvement, however, is not to be denied. This is true as to prices of many things, commodities as well as securities. A glance at our tables of stock and bond quotations will show a long list of securities which sold higher in November than during any previous time this year. In the last half of the month there was some reaction in the stock market, but closing prices generally show very satisfactory gains over the prices quoted a short time ago.

Then there is wheat, which has made a further advance in price. New high records were made early in the month, then came a drop but the lost ground was all recovered subsequently, and just at the end of the month cash wheat touched the dollar mark at the New York Produce Exchange. It is a long time since "dollar wheat" has been anything but a reminiscence, but with the foreign demand for this cereal keeping up, the price may come to be standard for this year's crop or for what is left of it.

The successful marketing of a number of issues of city and State bonds at good prices illustrates the change that has taken place. Only a short time ago New York city bonds could not be disposed of at a price satisfactory to the Comptroller. Last month the city sold \$16,000,000  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. bonds running from fifteen to thirty years, obtaining 104.71 per cent. for them. Subscriptions were received to the amount of nearly \$181,000,000. The City of Philadelphia also sold an issue of \$1,500,000 4 per cent. bonds at 101.299 per cent. An issue of \$8,250,000 Massachusetts State  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. bonds was sold to New York and Boston bankers at 105.829. The sale of low interest-bearing bonds at such rates of premium indicates that the investing of capital, for a time suspended, has been resumed.

Nothing more remarkable has occurred recently than the flood of gold which came into sight immediately after the election. The yellow metal was carried and carted to the sub-Treasury faster than it could be weighed and counted. The banks were also made depositaries of large sums of gold, and for the first time in years the New York Clearing-House Association increased its issue of gold certificates representing gold deposited in its vaults. About \$7,000,000 of gold is reported to have been deposited in the clearing-house since October 15.

For the first time—except a slight increase in April last—since November, 1895, the production of iron shows an increase for October. There were only 180 furnaces in blast with a weekly capacity of 112,782 tons on October 1. A month later there were 133 furnaces in operation with a capacity of 124,077 tons. The general sentiment regarding this industry is very hopeful both as to the future of prices and an increase in consumption.

The last half of 1896 will long be memorable for the object lesson furnished of the effect of distrust upon capital, and of the tendency of money to disappear whenever any question as to its standard quality is raised.

Early in July last the banks of the principal Eastern cities were carrying large lines of deposits. When it became evident that the political campaign was to involve the question of a change in the money standard of the country, there began a drain upon the deposits which lasted for several weeks until well into September. Then came a more hopeful view regarding the outcome of the political contest; wheat began to rise rapidly in price, exports greatly increased and gold flowed freely into the country from abroad, and for a few weeks deposits increased. As we approached the day of the election, fear as to the result again became a dominant factor and once more deposits were withdrawn and money hoarded. This continued until the day of election and then the last stage was witnessed, a piling up of deposits in the banks such as never seen before, at least in recent years, was witnessed. The situation is accurately portrayed in the following statement of the weekly changes in deposits in New York, Boston and Philadelphia since July 18:

WEEK ENDED	New York.	Boston.	Philadelphia.
July 25.....	Dec., \$12,632,900	Dec., \$3,962,000	Dec., \$2,261,000
Aug. 1.....	" 8,344,200	" 2,962,000	" 62,000
" 8.....	" 7,849,500	Inc., 430,000	" 2,490,000
" 15.....	" 9,770,800	Dec., 2,539,000	" 1,058,000
" 22.....	" 9,085,100	" 1,236,000	Inc., 198,000
" 29.....	" 6,383,800	" 3,482,000	" 208,000
Sept. 5.....	" 4,863,000	Inc., 1,209,000	Dec., 761,000
" 12.....	" 1,417,500	Dec., 594,000	" 408,000
" 19.....	Inc., 321,800	Inc., 2,084,000	Inc., 691,000
" 26.....	" 2,392,600	" 1,285,000	Dec., 351,000
Oct. 3.....	" 6,384,400	" 4,479,000	Inc., 2,470,000
" 10.....	" 3,751,700	" 610,000	Dec., 257,000
" 17.....	Dec., 4,799,600	" 316,000	Inc., 273,000
" 24.....	" 5,212,400	Dec., 370,000	Inc., 457,000
" 31.....	" 2,036,900	" 786,000	" 407,000
Nov. 7.....	" 8,008,300	Inc., 1,741,000	" 1,788,000
" 14.....	Inc., 15,919,900	" 2,202,000	Inc., 2,206,000
" 21.....	" 21,937,800	" 1,153,000	" 2,068,000
" 28.....	" 14,336,000	" 2,159,000	" 1,651,000

In the three weeks ended November 28 the deposits in New York banks increased \$52,000,000; in Boston, \$6,600,000, and in Philadelphia, about \$6,000,000. The deposits in the three cities on dates named below were as follows:

	July 18.	November 7.	November 28.
New York.....	\$506,991,000	\$438,437,000	\$490,634,000
Boston.....	145,155,000	141,367,000	146,881,000
Philadelphia.....	100,745,000	94,295,000	100,240,000

That there was most extensive hoarding practiced during the period prior to November 3 there is very convincing evidence. From September 1 to November 1 the net imports of gold aggregated \$62,000,000. Only about \$16,000,000 of this gold went into the Treasury, while a very much larger amount of other kinds of money was disbursed. In the two months there was a net loss of \$13,000,000 cash in the Treasury. The Government estimates of the amount of money in circulation show an increase of nearly \$88,000,000 between September 1 and November 1. When we come to examine the statements of the banks where, ordinarily the increased money supply should make some showing, we find that but little of the added circulation is accounted for. From August 29 to October 31 the New York banks gained \$15,432,000 in specie, but lost \$3,177,000 in legal tenders. Those institutions therefore secured only about \$7,000,000 of the \$88,000,000 increased money supply. The Boston banks gained less than \$1,700,000 and the Philadelphia banks about \$1,200,000.

Since November 1 the gold movement has been quite insignificant and there has been very little increase in the other sources of money supply, but the New York banks have gained nearly \$14,000,000 in specie and \$11,000,000 in legal-tender notes

in the past four weeks, a total increase of \$25,000,000. The Boston banks gained very little in cash reserves but the Philadelphia banks gained nearly \$2,700,000.

It would be interesting to compare the statements of the banks of the entire country for a similar period, but the data are not available. The National banks have made reports to the Comptroller of the Currency for October 6 last, the last previous statement having been made on July 14. During that time about \$30,000,000 of gold came from abroad but the total gold holdings of the National banks fell from \$161,858,000 in July to \$160,728,000 in October. It is estimated that the money in circulation increased in the same time about \$70,000,000, not a dollar of which apparently went into the National banks.

#### NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The abstract of reports made to the Comptroller of the Currency, showing the condition of the National banks in the United States on October 6, 1896, makes an unfavorable comparison with the preceding one of July 14 last and as well with the statement of a year ago. The capital, surplus, deposits and reserves of the National banks during the past two years were as follows:

#### CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES.

	Capital.	Surplus.	Individual Deposits.	Gold.	Silver.	Legal tenders.
Oct. 2, 1894.....	\$688,861,847	\$245,197,517	\$1,728,418,819	\$198,027,231	\$40,323,423	\$165,644,028
Dec. 19, 1894.....	686,271,045	244,907,179	1,665,496,346	176,794,767	42,243,455	156,053,472
Mar. 5, 1895.....	682,100,100	246,180,065	1,667,843,286	178,100,435	42,771,206	144,956,622
May 7, 1895.....	659,146,756	246,740,227	1,660,961,269	177,264,388	41,362,212	145,459,159
July 11, 1895.....	658,224,179	247,782,176	1,736,022,008	171,217,457	43,209,757	164,515,172
Sept. 28, 1895.....	657,135,498	246,448,426	1,701,652,521	162,626,280	39,312,021	148,966,695
Dec. 13, 1895.....	656,956,245	246,177,563	1,720,550,241	168,244,430	38,467,979	130,649,428
Feb. 28, 1896.....	653,964,915	247,178,188	1,648,002,868	156,894,080	39,123,428	141,242,513
May 7, 1896.....	652,069,780	247,546,067	1,687,629,515	157,761,800	44,611,646	147,006,632
July 14, 1896.....	651,144,865	248,398,423	1,668,413,507	161,858,560	41,981,869	140,378,280
Oct. 6, 1896.....	648,540,325	247,680,075	1,567,891,058	160,723,860	40,064,742	142,534,730

The number of banks has fallen from 8,689 to 8,676, a loss of 13 since July, the aggregate capital has been reduced \$2,600,000 and the surplus \$678,000. The net circulation increased \$10,700,000. The amount due other banks decreased \$39,000,000 and individual deposits, \$70,500,000. This loss of nearly \$110,000,000 in deposits of banks and individuals is evidence of the conditions that prevailed in the past few months. Part of it is due to the closing up of some banks, but the decrease in deposits was mainly the result of impaired confidence, curtailed credit and restricted business operations. But little change is shown in the cash reserves of the banks, the reduction in loans aggregating \$72,000,000, having offset the loss in deposits to a considerable extent. The next statement of the banks will probably be for a date about the middle of December and then improved conditions will probably be reflected.

**FOREIGN TRADE.**—But once in the history of the United States have the exports of merchandise been as large as in the month of October, the latest month for which official statistics have yet been published. The great volume of exports is one of the most interesting developments of the present situation. It is nearly five years since the export movement was as large as it is now. In October, 1891, the total value of exports was \$102,877,000 the largest for any month up to that time; in November following the total was \$110,103,000; in December, \$119,935,000, and in January, 1892, \$100,188,000. These are the only months which recorded a total of \$100,000,000 until now. For October this year the exports reached an aggregate of \$113,885,000, the largest on record except for December, 1891. In July, 1894, the exports had fallen to less than \$53,000,000.

As the imports of merchandise are very small the net balance of exports has become very large, \$63,011,000 in October, the largest balance of which we have any record. The following table shows the largest total exports and net exports for any month in each of the past thirteen years.

<i>Gross.</i>		<i>Net.</i>	<i>Gross.</i>		<i>Net.</i>
1894.....Dec.	\$91,344,155	Dec. \$49,173,182	1891.....Dec.	\$119,936,896	Dec. \$50,487,873
1895.....Jan.	80,582,584	Jan. 38,361,501	1892.....Jan.	100,138,336	Jan. 37,418,786
1896.....Dec.	85,417,824	Dec. 29,136,222	1893.....Dec.	93,551,729	Dec. 43,628,862
1897.....Oct.	76,033,439	Dec. 21,118,323	1894.....Jan.	85,940,226	Jan. 33,440,279
1898.....Dec.	85,757,590	Dec. 25,170,696	1895.....Dec.	92,529,117	Dec. 30,328,070
1899.....Oct.	97,828,446	Dec. 37,002,926	1896.....Oct.	113,385,497	Oct. 63,011,822
1890.....Dec.	98,451,752	Dec. 37,640,421			

The net exports in October this year were \$12,500,000 more than for any previous month. In December, 1891, the exports exceeded the imports by nearly \$50,500,000, and in December, 1894, by \$49,000,000, but the October, 1896, balance is far beyond even those totals.

In 1878 and 1879 when the Government was engaged in maintaining the public credit and in restoring its currency to a gold basis, the country was greatly helped by its large exports, but then the largest total of exports for any one month was less than \$88,000,000 in October, 1879, and the largest balance of net exports was only about \$40,000,000 in the same month. The situation as regards our foreign trade never was more favorable than at the present time, and with an export balance of nearly \$207,000,000 for the ten months, a total of \$300,000,000 for the full calendar year 1896 is quite possible not to say probable.

**THE MONEY MARKET.**—The month has witnessed a complete revolution in the money market. From extreme stringency and abnormally high rates of interest there has been a change to an over-abundance of money and extremely low rates. Last month borrowers paid as high as 127 per cent. per annum for money on call; this month they obtained money for as low as 1 per cent. Immediately after the election money which had been going into hiding began to return to the banks and a flood of money poured into those institutions at a rate which has not been paralleled in any recent period. Money is plentiful again and will remain cheap until business has resumed greater activity. The gold imports have ceased, due to the decline in interest rates here and in part to the investments now being made in sterling exchange. A good deal of money is being loaned upon sterling and at satisfactory rates. Some loans are being made on warehouse collateral also. Commercial paper of the very best class is scarce although paper bearing acceptable names is in good supply and readily taken. At the close of the month call money ruled at 1 @ 8 per cent. with the average rate about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., while banks and trust companies quote 3 per cent. as the minimum rate. Time money on Stock Exchange

## MONEY RATES IN NEW YORK CITY.

	<i>July 1.</i>	<i>Aug. 1.</i>	<i>Sept. 1.</i>	<i>Oct. 1.</i>	<i>Nov. 1.</i>	<i>Dec. 1.</i>
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Call loans, bankers' balances.....	2 — 3	2 — $2\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 8	3 — 6	6 —	1 — 3
Call loans, banks and trust companies.....	3 — $3\frac{1}{2}$	2 — 3	6	6	12 —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 to 60 days.....	3	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 8	6	12 —	3 —
Brokers' loans on collateral, 90 days to 4 months.....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	9 — 11	6	10 —	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — 4
Brokers' loans on collateral, 5 to 7 months.....	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$	6	10 — 11	6	6 — 8	4 —
Commercial paper, endorsed bills receivable, 60 to 90 days.....	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	9	$6\frac{1}{2}$ — 7	8 — 10	4 — $4\frac{1}{2}$
Commercial paper prime single names, 4 to 6 months.....	5 — $5\frac{1}{2}$	6 — 7	.....	7 — $7\frac{1}{2}$	8 — 10	$4\frac{1}{2}$ — 5
Commercial paper, good single names, 4 to 6 months.....	$5\frac{1}{2}$ — 6	7 — 8	.....	8 — 9	8 — 10	5 — 6



collateral was quoted at 8 per cent. for 80 to 60 days,  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  @ 4 per cent. for 90 days to four months, and 4 per cent. for five to six months. For commercial paper the rates are 4 @  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  per cent. for 60 to 90 days endorsed bills receivable,  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  @ 5 per cent. for four months commission house and first-class four to six months' single names and 5 @ 6 per cent. for good paper having the same length of time to run. The rates for money in this city on or about the first of the month for the past six months are shown in the preceding table.

EUROPEAN BANKS.—The flow of gold from the principal European banks has been checked and in fact the tide has turned, the Bank of England as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary having made gains late in the month. There is a net loss for the month in the holdings of the Bank of England and the Bank of France, but Germany gained about \$4,500,000. Compared with a year ago the first-named bank has lost \$32,000,000 of gold.

#### GOLD AND SILVER IN THE EUROPEAN BANKS.

	January 1, 1896.		November 1, 1895.		December 1, 1895.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
England.....	£44,980,066		£36,182,073		£36,051,848	
France.....	78,010,739	£49,395,202	77,547,252	£49,224,443	77,284,863	£49,274,611
Germany.....	81,085,775	13,812,475	23,051,600	14,035,800	23,964,000	14,482,000
Austro-Hungary...	24,402,000	12,775,000	30,453,000	12,662,000	30,625,000	12,539,000
Spain.....	8,004,000	10,250,000	8,528,000	9,940,000	8,528,000	9,968,000
Netherlands.....	3,583,000	6,847,000	2,636,000	6,743,000	2,635,000	6,759,000
Nat. Belgium.....	2,663,333	1,331,667	2,666,000	1,333,000	2,701,333	1,350,667
Totals.....	£192,708,903	£93,901,344	£186,063,925	£93,928,243	£186,739,044	£94,423,273

MONEY RATES ABROAD.—Rates in the foreign money markets have been higher but latterly have been growing easier. At the close of the month the discount rate in London for 60 to 90 day bank bills was  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  per cent. and the open market rate at Paris 2 per cent. and at Berlin and Frankfurt  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  per cent.

#### MONEY RATES IN FOREIGN MARKETS.

	June 19.	July 17.	Aug. 14.	Sept. 13.	Oct. 16.	Nov. 15.
London—Bank rate of discount....	2	2	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	4
Market rates of discount:						
60 days bankers' drafts.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{4}$ —1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
6 months bankers' drafts.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$ — $1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{4}$ —1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$ — $3\frac{3}{4}$
Loans—Day to day.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	3
Paris, open market rates.....	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$
Berlin, ".....	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Hamburg, ".....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Frankfort, ".....	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$
Amsterdam, ".....	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Vienna, ".....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
St. Petersburg, ".....	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6	5	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6
Madrid, ".....	5	5	5	5	5	5
Copenhagen, ".....	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$

FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—Rates for sterling exchange advanced sharply and at the close of November were about where they were at the beginning of October. The

#### RATES FOR STERLING AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

Week ended	BANKERS' STERLING.		Cable transfers.	Prime commercial. Long.	Documentary Sterling. 60 days.
	60 days.	Sight.			
Oct. 31.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.82	4.84 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.84 $\frac{3}{4}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81 @ 4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 @ 4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$
Nov. 7.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.82 $\frac{1}{4}$	4.85 @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86	4.81 @ 4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.81
" 14.....	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.82	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.80 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 21.....	4.82 $\frac{1}{4}$ @ 4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.85 $\frac{3}{4}$ @ 4.86	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.82	4.81 @ 4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$
" 28.....	4.83 $\frac{1}{4}$ @ 4.83 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.86 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.87 @ 4.87 $\frac{1}{2}$	4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.83	4.81 $\frac{1}{2}$ @ 4.82 $\frac{1}{2}$

decline in rates in the local money market and higher rates abroad have had their natural influence upon sterling. Besides these causes the purchase of long sterling for investment has aided the advance in quotations. The preceding and following tables show the condition of foreign exchange markets.

## FOREIGN EXCHANGE—ACTUAL RATES ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

	August 1.	Sept. 1.	Oct. 1.	Nov. 1.	Dec. 1.
Sterling Bankers—60 days .....	4.88 —	4.82 — 2¼	4.82½ — 3	4.81¼ — 2	4.83½ — 4
“ “ Sight .....	4.89 —	4.84 — 4¼	4.85¼ — ½	4.84¼ — ¾	4.86¼ — 7
“ “ Cables .....	4.89¼ —	4.84¼ — 4¾	4.85¼ — 6	4.85¼ — 1½	4.87 — ¼
“ Commercial long .....	4.87¼ — ¾	4.81¼ — ¾	4.82¼ — ¾	4.81 — 1½	4.83½ — 8
“ Docu'tary for paym't. ....	4.87 — ½	4.81 — 1½	4.81½ — 2½	4.80 — 8	4.82½ — ¾
Paris—Cable transfers .....	5.14½ — 3¼	5.20 — 19½	5.18½ — 7½	5.19½ — 8½	5.17½ —
“ Bankers' 60 days .....	5.16¼ —	5.22¼ — 1½	5.20½ —	5.22¼ — 1½	5.20½ — 20
“ Bankers' sight .....	5.15 — 4½	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — ½	5.20 — 9½	5.18½ —
Antwerp—Commercial 60 days ..	5.18½ — ½	5.25½ — 4½	5.23½ — ½	5.25 — 4½	5.23½ — 2½
Swiss—Bankers' sight .....	5.16¼ — 5½	5.21¼ — 6½	5.18½ — ½	5.19½ — 8½	5.19½ — 8½
Berlin—Bankers' 60 days .....	95½ —	94½ — ½	94½ — ½	94½ — ½	94½ — ½
“ Bankers' sight .....	95½ — 1½	94½ — 5	94½ — ½	95½ — ½	95½ — ½
Brussels—Bankers' sight .....	5.15¼ — 15	5.20½ — 20	5.18½ — ½	5.20 —	5.18½ — ½
Amsterdam—Bankers' sight .....	40½ — ½	40 — ½	40 — ½	40 — ½	40½ — ½
Kroners—Bankers' sight .....	27 — ½	28½ — 1½	28½ — 7	28½ — 1½	27 — ½
Italian lire—sight .....	5.50 — 40	5.60 — 50	5.60 — 50	5.57½ — 47½	5.55 — 45

## BANK OF ENGLAND STATEMENT AND LONDON MARKETS.

	Aug. 12, 1896.	Sept. 16, 1896.	Oct. 14, 1896.	Nov. 11, 1896.
Circulation (exc. b'k post bills) .....	£27,476,410	£26,835,965	£27,445,550	£26,546,525
Public deposits .....	6,215,380	6,514,796	5,420,991	5,393,937
Other deposits .....	55,664,111	50,263,086	47,706,184	43,509,134
Government securities .....	14,956,966	14,944,906	16,185,047	13,758,066
Other securities .....	28,568,618	23,347,085	27,968,077	27,329,644
Reserve of notes and coin .....	36,462,190	32,110,428	26,770,963	25,718,470
Coin and bullion .....	47,138,600	42,146,413	37,566,545	35,464,995
Reserve to liabilities .....	56½%	56½%	50½%	52½%
Bank rate of discount .....	2½	2½	3½	4½
Market rate, 3 months' bills .....	1½	1½ @ 1½%	2½ @ 2½%	3½ @ 2½%
Price of Consols (2½ per cents.) .....	112½	109½	108½	110½
Price of silver per ounce .....	81½d.	80½d.	80½d.	80½d.
Average price of wheat .....	23s. 6d.	23s. 6d.	25s. 2d.	30s. 9d.

**SILVER.**—The price of silver in London made a slight advance early in the month but the highest point was touched on November 3, our election day. Then silver touched 80 3-16; two days after it fell to 29¾, which is the low record for 2½ years and was made on October 13 as well. The final price for the month was 29¾ a net decline for the month of ¼.

## MONTHLY RANGE OF SILVER IN LONDON—1894, 1895, 1896.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.		MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.		High	Low.	High	Low.	High	Low.
January..	31¾	30¼	27½	27¼	30½	30½	July.....	28½	28¾	30½	30¼	31½	31½
February	30½	27½	27½	27¼	31½	30½	August..	30½	28½	30½	30¼	31½	30¾
March....	27½	27	30½	27½	31½	31½	Septemb'r	30½	29½	30½	30½	30½	30
April.....	29½	29½	30½	29½	31½	31½	October..	29½	28½	31½	30½	30½	29¾
May.....	29½	28½	30½	30½	31½	30½	November	29½	28½	31	30½	30½	29¾
June.....	28½	28½	30½	30½	31½	31½	Decemb'r	28½	27½	30½	30		

**GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND DISBURSEMENTS.**—The financial exhibits of the Government are still depressing, and instead of any improvement the deficit continues to grow. The revenues are not increasing; last month they were \$25,210,696, more than \$1,000,000 less than in October and \$700,000 less than in November, 1895. Custom receipts were the smallest for any month since July, 1894, and were \$1,500,000 less than in November last year. Expenditures have increased, the total

being \$32,882,000, or \$5,600,000 more than a year ago. For the month there is a deficit of \$7,621,000, making \$40,510,000 since July 1 last. During the corresponding five months last year the deficit was only about \$17,600,000, and in the year preceding only about \$24,000,000. There was a slight surplus in December last year, but even with smaller interest and pension payments this month it is doubtful if a surplus will be shown for December this year.

## UNITED STATES TREASURY RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES.

RECEIPTS.			EXPENDITURES.		
Source.	November, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.	Source.	November, 1896.	Since July 1, 1896.
Customs.....	\$9,960,886	\$56,896,821	Civil and mis.....	\$8,098,000	\$48,674,200
Internal revenue....	13,104,828	64,410,932	War.....	4,967,000	23,701,513
Miscellaneous.....	2,175,483	9,861,268	Navy.....	3,463,000	14,952,534
			Indians.....	1,103,000	5,217,840
			Pensions.....	13,177,000	60,505,843
			Interest.....	3,024,000	18,127,326
Total.....	\$25,240,996	\$130,669,076	Total.....	\$32,882,000	\$171,179,957
Excess of expenditures.....	\$7,621,303	\$40,510,880			

## UNITED STATES TREASURY CASH RESOURCES.

	August 31.	Sept. 30.	Oct. 31.	Nov. 30.
Net gold.....	\$101,708,672	\$124,124,282	\$118,443,021	\$130,407,287
Net silver.....	25,776,690	16,643,222	14,079,506	17,112,908
U. S. notes.....	75,139,381	62,632,216	56,317,138	85,809,737
Miscellaneous assets (less current liabilities).....	27,539,106	21,216,303	32,542,887	28,797,566
Deposits in National banks.....	16,624,322	16,443,281	16,110,047	15,528,924
Available cash balance.....	\$246,786,161	\$241,056,305	\$237,492,094	\$228,006,484

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES AND NET GOLD IN THE TREASURY.

MONTH.	1895.			1896.		
	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.	Receipts.	Expenditures.	Net Gold in Treasury.
January.....	\$27,804,400	\$34,523,447	\$44,705,987	\$29,237,670	\$32,529,840	\$49,845,507
February.....	22,888,057	25,096,036	37,065,511	26,056,228	26,749,956	123,902,979
March.....	25,470,576	25,716,367	90,463,907	30,041,149	27,274,994	123,646,461
April.....	24,247,636	32,990,076	91,247,144	24,282,596	26,967,881	125,398,900
May.....	25,272,078	26,558,214	99,151,409	24,643,718	26,483,532	108,345,234
June.....	25,615,474	21,665,029	107,512,932	27,794,219	25,444,789	101,659,905
July.....	29,069,086	38,548,064	107,236,487	29,029,200	42,063,466	110,719,746
August.....	28,952,090	32,588,185	100,329,637	25,562,097	35,701,676	100,957,561
September.....	27,549,678	24,620,482	92,911,974	24,584,244	26,579,535	124,064,672
October.....	27,901,748	34,503,425	92,943,180	30,282,329	33,978,277	119,721,523
November.....	25,980,503	27,190,236	79,833,936	25,210,096	32,832,000	*130,407,287
December.....	26,288,938	25,814,317	63,262,268			

\* This balance as reported in the Treasury sheet on the last day of the month.

COIN AND BULLION QUOTATIONS.—Following are the ruling quotations in New York for foreign and domestic coin and bullion:

## FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COIN AND BULLION—QUOTATIONS IN NEW YORK.

	Bid.	Asked.		Bid.	Asked.
Trade dollars.....	\$ 60	.....	Twenty marks.....	\$4.75	\$4.80
Mexican dollars.....	50½	\$ 51½	Spanish doubloons.....	15.50	15.70
Peruvian soles, Chilian pesos..	48½	48	Spanish 25 pesos.....	4.79	4.82
English silver.....	4.86	4.87½	Mexican doubloons.....	15.55	15.75
Victoria sovereigns.....	4.87	4.89	Mexican 20 pesos.....	19.10	19.60
Five francs.....	94	97	Ten guilders.....	3.95	3.99
Twenty francs.....	3.86	3.91			

Fine gold bars on the first of this month were at par to ¼ per cent. premium on the Mint value. Bar silver in London, 297½d. per ounce. New York market for large commercial silver bars, 65 @ 65¼c. Fine silver (Government assay), 65½ @ 65¾c.

**NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.**—The growth of National bank circulation, which under the inspiration of Government bond issues was very rapid for some time, appears to have been checked. The net increase in circulation for the month was only \$414,446 and in Government bonds on deposit to secure circulation only \$169,000. Still there are nearly \$21,500,000 of notes outstanding in excess of the amount a year ago, while the money on deposit with the Treasurer to retire circulation has been reduced nearly \$4,700,000.

## NATIONAL BANK CIRCULATION.

	Aug. 31, 1896.	Sept. 30, 1896.	Oct. 31, 1896.	Nov. 30, 1896.
Total amount outstanding.....	\$229,526,449	\$233,552,030	\$234,897,857	\$235,312,103
Circulation based on U. S. bonds.....	210,293,574	214,897,694	216,510,014	216,600,664
Circulation secured by lawful money....	19,232,875	18,654,336	18,387,843	18,702,419
U. S. bonds to secure circulation:				
Four per cents. of 1895.....	24,354,550	35,804,550	36,531,650	36,910,050
Pacific R.R. bonds, 6 per cent.....	9,633,000	9,949,000	10,396,000	10,391,000
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	22,363,850	22,574,850	22,673,850	22,623,850
1907, 4 per cent.....	152,334,450	154,515,950	155,473,000	155,530,900
Five per cents. of 1894.....	15,192,850	15,928,850	16,038,850	15,816,350
Total.....	\$235,078,700	\$238,773,200	\$241,103,350	\$241,272,150

The National banks have also on deposit the following bonds to secure public deposits: 4 per cents. of 1895, \$1,550,000; Pacific Railroad 6 per cents., \$675,000; 2 per cents. of 1891, \$1,063,000; 4 per cents. of 1907, \$12,110,000; 5 per cents. of 1894, \$535,000, a total of \$15,903,000.

The circulation of National gold bonds, not included in the above statement, is \$96,787.

**UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.**—About the only important change in the items contained in the public debt statement is the decrease in the cash balance in the Treasury. The gross debt is undergoing very little change, but the loss in cash is causing the net debt to increase. On November 30 the net debt was \$995,769,000; on October 31 it was \$987,498,000 and on January 1, \$947,298,000. In eleven

## UNITED STATES PUBLIC DEBT.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.	Dec. 1, 1896.
Interest bearing debt:				
Funded loan of 1891, 2 per cent.....	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500	\$25,364,500
" " 1907, 4 ".....	559,631,750	559,637,800	559,638,800	559,638,450
Refunding certificates, 4 per cent.....	50,510	46,530	46,280	46,170
Loan of 1894, 5 per cent.....	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
" " 1895, 4 ".....	62,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400	162,315,400
Total interest-bearing debt.....	\$747,361,960	\$847,364,230	\$847,364,480	\$847,364,520
Debt on which interest has ceased.....	1,674,510	1,621,790	1,607,010	1,591,620
Debt bearing no interest:				
Legal tender and old demand notes.....	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863	346,735,863
National bank note redemption acct....	22,659,734	18,845,788	18,474,380	18,544,249
Fractional currency.....	6,893,364	6,890,504	6,890,504	6,890,504
Total non-interest bearing debt.....	\$376,288,962	\$372,471,635	\$372,100,247	\$372,170,117
Total interest and non-interest debt.	1,125,325,462	1,221,457,685	1,221,071,717	1,221,126,257
Certificates and notes offset by cash in the treasury:				
Gold certificates.....	50,099,889	40,328,639	39,588,139	39,433,139
Silver ".....	345,702,504	364,476,504	366,463,504	367,903,504
Certificates of deposit.....	34,450,000	34,715,000	35,060,000	35,510,000
Treasury notes of 1890.....	137,771,280	125,004,280	123,229,280	121,677,280
Total certificates and notes.....	\$568,023,673	\$564,524,323	\$564,340,923	\$567,523,923
Aggregate debt.....	1,693,349,135	1,785,982,008	1,785,412,640	1,788,650,180
Cash in the Treasury:				
Total cash assets.....	787,578,447	849,642,772	836,676,221	835,961,579
Demand liabilities.....	609,551,247	608,483,317	603,103,460	610,604,431
Balance.....	\$178,027,200	\$241,154,455	\$233,572,761	\$225,357,098
Gold reserve.....	63,262,268	100,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
Net cash balance.....	114,764,932	141,154,455	133,572,761	125,357,098
Total.....	\$178,027,200	\$241,154,455	\$233,572,761	\$225,357,098
Total debt, less cash in the Treasury.	947,298,262	980,303,230	997,498,956	996,769,159

months the debt has increased \$48,000,000. A comparative statement of the debt on the dates named is given in the preceding table.

**GOLD AND SILVER COINAGE.**—The Government is still running its mints at something near their full capacity. The gold coinage in November reached \$5,064,700 and the silver coinage \$2,805,022. There were \$1,914,000 silver dollars coined. The minor coins minted were valued at \$89,000, making the total coinage for the month \$7,458,722.

#### COINAGE OF THE UNITED STATES MINTS.

	1895.		1896.	
	Gold.	Silver.	Gold.	Silver.
January.....	\$3,698,300	\$574,000	\$12,914,600	\$65,000
February.....	6,143,800	491,000	1,240,000	1,500,000
March.....	2,866,102	573,537	1,540,555	1,683,531
April.....	4,630,300	595,000	1,500,000	1,831,000
May.....	4,163,938	440,503	2,857,200	1,826,490
June.....	1,750,000	440,043	2,471,217	1,550,663
July.....	2,910,000	277,000	2,918,200	1,062,000
August.....	3,672,200	748,000	3,315,000	2,686,000
September.....	7,543,573	473,167	3,140,923	2,754,185
October.....	7,215,700	820,000	5,727,540	2,844,010
November.....	6,916,300	190,169	5,064,700	2,305,022
December.....	8,067,145	75,502		
Year.....	\$50,616,357	\$3,698,011	\$42,689,306	\$20,537,931

**NEW YORK CITY BANKS.**—The statements of the clearing-house banks of this city during the past two months are a striking commentary on the effect of confidence upon money institutions. From October 10 to November 7, \$20,000,000 of deposits were withdrawn from the banks, and from November 7 to 28, three weeks, deposits increased \$52,000,000. During the latter period there was very little increase in the supply of money in the country, while during the time that the deposits were being reduced gold was coming into the country at the rate of \$5,000,000 to \$10,000,000 per week. The bank situation has very much improved in the past few weeks and one very favorable sign is the increase of nearly \$22,000,000 in loans since November 7.

#### NEW YORK CITY BANKS—CONDITION AT CLOSE OF EACH WEEK.

	Loans.	Specie.	Legal tenders.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Circulation.	Clearings.
Oct. 31...	\$446,250,400	\$62,778,100	\$66,296,600	\$446,445,900	\$17,463,225	\$20,406,800	\$585,652,100
Nov. 7...	442,179,700	63,702,600	60,717,200	438,437,600	14,810,400	20,516,800	601,922,600
" 14...	445,408,600	71,968,900	65,124,400	454,357,500	23,508,925	20,499,100	718,890,400
" 21...	454,982,000	76,175,400	72,204,000	476,295,300	29,905,675	20,331,900	721,445,000
" 28...	463,618,200	76,618,000	77,457,200	490,634,800	31,411,625	20,318,000	568,662,900

#### DEPOSITS AND SURPLUS RESERVE ON OR ABOUT THE FIRST OF EACH MONTH.

MONTH.	1894.		1895.		1896.	
	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.	Deposits.	Surplus Reserve.
January.....	\$506,437,800	\$80,615,150	\$549,291,400	\$35,268,860	\$501,069,300	\$15,999,675
February.....	551,808,400	111,623,000	546,965,200	36,751,500	490,447,200	39,623,400
March.....	531,741,200	75,778,900	528,440,800	28,054,500	496,612,200	24,442,150
April.....	547,744,200	88,600,150	504,240,200	18,413,450	481,795,700	17,006,975
May.....	573,853,800	83,417,950	526,968,100	27,223,575	495,004,100	22,944,375
June.....	572,138,400	77,985,100	566,229,400	41,221,250	498,874,100	20,220,675
July.....	573,337,800	74,808,350	570,436,800	34,225,925	496,046,900	20,328,375
August.....	581,556,000	69,053,700	574,814,500	40,917,175	485,014,000	17,728,000
September.....	585,973,900	65,620,825	574,929,900	39,149,925	451,934,800	8,832,200
October.....	586,633,500	60,791,825	549,136,500	22,296,175	454,733,100	16,598,025
November.....	595,104,900	68,204,275	529,862,400	17,594,400	446,445,900	17,463,325
December.....	579,835,600	52,220,800	520,788,000	18,613,300	490,634,300	31,411,625

Deposits reached the highest amount, \$595,104,900 on November 3, 1894, and the surplus reserve \$111,623,000 on February 8, 1894.

**BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA BANKS.**—The changes in the condition of the clearing-house banks of Boston and Philadelphia are shown in the following table :

**BOSTON BANKS.**

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Specie.</i>	<i>Legal Tenders.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>
October 31..	\$162,542,000	\$139,623,000	\$9,637,000	\$3,087,000	\$10,285,000	\$81,243,400
November 7..	161,955,000	141,887,000	9,619,000	5,700,000	10,288,000	112,349,709
" 14..	160,964,000	143,539,000	9,472,000	5,968,000	10,112,000	105,406,000
" 21..	160,817,000	144,722,000	9,495,000	6,798,000	10,058,000	162,383,500
" 28..	161,823,000	146,891,000	9,660,000	6,808,000	10,143,100	91,177,300

**PHILADELPHIA BANKS.**

<i>Dates.</i>	<i>Loans.</i>	<i>Deposits.</i>	<i>Lawful Money Reserve.</i>	<i>Circulation.</i>	<i>Clearings.</i>
October 31.....	\$101,502,000	\$96,078,000	\$27,117,000	\$6,984,000	\$55,916,500
November 7.....	101,696,000	94,295,000	25,474,000	6,880,000	59,586,600
" 14.....	101,445,000	96,501,000	26,880,000	6,888,000	61,862,600
" 21.....	101,262,000	98,569,000	29,232,000	6,918,000	66,619,300
" 24.....	101,476,000	100,240,000	29,777,000	6,853,000	60,647,000

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**—The Government cash in the Treasury was reduced about \$3,000,000 in November. The Treasury gained more than \$14,000,000 gold, \$1,610,000 silver dollars and \$2,259,000 Treasury notes of 1890, while parting with \$17,755,000 greenbacks. There was a small increase in certificates issued, about \$550,000.

**MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES TREASURY.**

	<i>Jan. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Nov. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Dec. 1, 1896.</i>
Gold coin.....	\$83,378,392	\$121,772,787	\$107,708,505	\$117,557,275
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	40,998,574	47,617,328	51,999,327
Silver Dollars.....	364,063,702	380,688,963	381,361,399	382,972,296
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	114,829,399	113,064,557	112,187,964
Subsidiary silver.....	12,764,321	15,123,488	14,632,846	14,570,200
United States notes.....	115,825,143	97,133,716	89,730,890	71,975,533
National bank notes.....	7,063,137	12,834,494	12,981,868	13,063,471
Total.....	\$737,547,542	\$783,384,366	\$767,095,133	\$764,246,556
Certificates and Treasury notes, 1890, outstanding.....	533,344,856	516,437,160	512,399,196	512,946,771
Net cash in Treasury.....	\$204,202,686	\$266,947,206	\$254,695,938	\$251,299,785

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION.**—The estimated amount of money in circulation increased last month nearly \$19,400,000, making since September 1 an increase of \$107,000,000. The circulation per capita increased 23 cents in November and \$1.88

**MONEY IN CIRCULATION IN THE UNITED STATES.**

	<i>Jan. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Oct. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Nov. 1, 1896.</i>	<i>Dec. 1, 1896.</i>
Gold coin.....	\$484,728,547	\$478,771,490	\$516,340,979	\$516,729,882
Silver dollars.....	59,205,927	56,513,178	58,190,802	58,493,845
Subsidiary silver.....	64,417,685	60,228,298	61,171,736	61,233,946
Gold certificates.....	49,996,439	38,736,639	38,197,309	38,016,749
Silver certificates.....	336,076,648	354,431,474	357,777,122	356,312,121
Treasury notes, Act July 14, 1890.....	115,728,769	88,934,047	83,959,764	80,147,901
United States notes.....	230,855,873	249,547,300	256,950,326	274,705,483
Currency certificates, Act June 8, 1872..	31,605,000	34,305,000	32,485,000	38,470,000
National bank notes.....	206,653,836	220,804,863	222,002,576	222,335,419
Total.....	\$1,579,206,724	\$1,582,302,299	\$1,627,055,614	\$1,646,444,746
Population of United States.....	70,630,000	71,774,000	71,902,000	72,030,000
Circulation per capita.....	\$22.36	\$22.06	\$22.63	\$22.86

In the last three months. The net gold in circulation increased only about \$200,000. Silver dollars and certificates were reduced \$1,100,000 and Treasury notes of 1890 \$3,811,000. Nearly \$23,800,000 of greenbacks and currency certificates were released from the Treasury and put into circulation. The preceding statement shows the amounts of the various kinds of money in circulation on the dates named, the estimated population and the per capita circulation.

**THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE COUNTRY.**—The total money supply of the United States, exclusive of certificates and Treasury notes, represented by coin or bullion on December 1 was \$1,897,744,531, an increase of about \$16,000,000. The stock of gold coin increased \$10,000,000 and of silver bullion \$4,000,000. Silver dollars increased about \$2,000,000, but silver bullion decreased nearly \$1,000,000. National bank notes increased about \$400,000. The following statement shows the amount of each kind of money in the country on the dates mentioned:

#### TOTAL SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES.

	Jan. 1, 1896.	Oct. 1, 1896.	Nov. 1, 1896.	Dec. 1, 1896.
Gold coin.....	\$568,106,980	\$600,544,227	\$624,047,494	\$634,287,157
Gold bullion.....	29,820,315	40,508,574	47,617,328	51,989,827
Silver dollars.....	423,299,629	437,232,141	439,552,141	441,408,141
Silver bullion.....	124,612,532	114,829,209	118,064,557	112,187,954
Subsidiary silver.....	77,182,006	75,354,781	75,804,582	75,808,546
United States notes.....	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016	346,681,016
National bank notes.....	218,716,973	233,639,357	234,984,444	235,308,910
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>\$1,783,409,410</b>	<b>\$1,849,249,495</b>	<b>\$1,881,751,552</b>	<b>\$1,897,744,531</b>

Certificates and Treasury notes represented by coin, bullion, or currency in Treasury are not included in the above statement.

**FOREIGN TRADE MOVEMENTS.**—The present export movement of merchandise is of extraordinary magnitude. The exports in October amounted to more than \$118,000,000, exceeding the very large shipments of October, 1891, by \$10,500,000. In 1894 the exports were less than \$84,000,000. On the other hand the import movement is abnormally low, but a little more than \$50,000,000 in the month as compared with \$75,000,000 last year. In the ten months ended October 31 the exports exceeded the imports by nearly \$207,000,000, while in the same time last year the imports exceeded the exports by \$31,000,000. The gold imports in October aggregated \$27,618,770, making a gain in the ten months of \$36,937,205. In the two months, September and October, the net imports of gold were \$61,000,000. The following table shows the movements of merchandise, gold and silver, for the month and ten months ended October 31 for the past six years:

#### EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF UNITED STATES.

MONTH OF OCTOBER.	MERCHANDISE.			Gold Balance.	Silver Balance.
	Exports.	Imports.	Balance.		
1891.....	\$102,877,243	\$66,836,259	Exp., \$36,040,984	Imp., \$16,088,352	Exp., \$87,718
1892.....	87,800,919	71,999,550	" 15,801,369	" 2,634,060	" 12,464
1893.....	87,675,451	51,735,632	" 35,940,159	" 1,072,919	" 2,089,804
1894.....	83,653,121	60,019,986	" 23,633,135	" 519,851	" 3,445,119
1895.....	87,080,972	75,080,844	" 12,010,128	Exp., 78,857	" 3,302,616
1896.....	113,385,497	50,373,975	" 63,011,522	Imp., 27,618,770	" 3,905,917
<b>TEN MONTHS.</b>					
1891.....	740,470,213	668,982,413	Exp., 48,487,800	Exp., 48,370,589	Exp., 6,234,564
1892.....	753,171,018	708,105,559	" 45,065,459	" 49,180,466	" 10,184,911
1893.....	690,897,354	677,090,604	" 13,806,690	" 9,244,993	" 30,454,046
1894.....	600,271,397	563,610,028	" 36,661,369	" 73,285,312	" 31,434,791
1895.....	645,018,439	676,123,483	Imp., 31,105,045	" 44,427,200	" 33,883,522
1896.....	779,447,387	572,461,905	Exp., 206,985,482	Imp., 36,937,235	" 41,892,321

# ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.

The following table shows the highest, lowest and closing prices of the most active stocks at the New York Stock Exchange in the month of November, and the highest and lowest during the year 1896, by dates, and also, for comparison, the range of prices in 1895:

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				NOVEMBER, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.		Lowest.		High.	Low.	Closing.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe.	22½	3½	18	—Nov. 4	8½	—Aug. 7	18	13½	18½
preferred	36½	16	28½	—Feb. 24	14½	—Aug. 7	27½	22½	22½
Atlantic & Pacific	2	½	1	—Nov. 4	½	—Jan. 7	1	½	½
Baltimore & Ohio	66½	32½	44	—Jan. 27	10½	—Sept. 2	18	15½	16½
Buffalo, Rochester & Pitts.	24	19	26	—May 16	15	—Feb. 11	20½	20½	20½
Canadian Pacific	62½	38	62½	—May 27	52	—Jan. 4	58½	57	57
Canada Southern	57½	42	51½	—Feb. 10	40½	—Aug. 7	51	47½	48½
Central of New Jersey	118½	81½	110	—Nov. 4	87½	—Aug. 10	110	101	101
Central Pacific	21½	12	16½	—Nov. 27	13½	—Aug. 22	10½	16½	16½
Ches. & Ohio vtg. cfs.	22½	12½	18½	—Nov. 10	11	—Aug. 8	18½	16½	16½
Chicago & Alton	180	147	184	—Nov. 9	146	—Aug. 11	180	147	147
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy	92½	60	83½	—Nov. 10	53	—Aug. 7	82½	76	77½
Chicago & E. Illinois	57	43½	43	—Feb. 13	37½	—Aug. 10	41	40	41
preferred	108	90	100½	—Mar. 5	90	—Aug. 11	108	90	90
Chicago Gas	78½	49½	78½	—Nov. 7	44½	—Aug. 8	78½	71½	71½
Chic., Milwaukee & St. Paul	78½	53½	80	—Nov. 4	50½	—Aug. 10	80	73½	73½
preferred	180	114½	130½	—Mar. 2	117½	—Aug. 7	180	125	125½
Chicago & Northwestern	107½	87½	106½	—Apr. 23	85½	—Aug. 10	108½	102½	104½
preferred	151	137	150	—June 30	140½	—Aug. 28	150	150	150
Chicago, Rock I. & Pacific	84½	59	74½	—Feb. 24	49½	—Aug. 7	74½	67	68½
Chic., St. Paul, Minn. & Om.	46	28½	46½	—Nov. 27	30½	—Aug. 8	46½	40½	44½
preferred	123½	104	126	—Nov. 27	117	—Jan. 7	128	123½	128
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. Louis	50	28	36½	—Feb. 10	19½	—Aug. 8	33½	28½	30
preferred	97	83½	90½	—Feb. 20	73	—Aug. 7	86½	82	85
Col. Coal & Iron Devel. Co.	11½	3	4½	—Jan. 16	½	—July 18	2½	1	1½
Col. Fuel & Iron Co.	41½	20½	34½	—Feb. 24	14½	—Aug. 7	22½	19½	25½
Columbus & Hock. Val. Coal	9½	2	5½	—Nov. 24	½	—July 9	5½	4½	5
Col. Hocking Val. & Tol.	27½	14½	20½	—Nov. 10	12½	—Aug. 10	20½	16½	17½
preferred	86½	55	60	—July 22	50	—June 22	60	54	54
Consolidated Gas Co.	161½	126	168	—Nov. 24	133	—Aug. 10	168	149½	160
Delaware & Hud. Canal Co.	134½	118	129½	—Feb. 11	114½	—Aug. 10	129½	124	128½
Delaware, Lack. & Western	174	154	166	—June 5	138	—Aug. 10	160½	157	157½
Denver & Rio Grande	17½	10	14	—Feb. 4	10	—Aug. 25	14	12½	13½
preferred	55½	32½	51	—Feb. 24	37	—Aug. 7	47	43½	43½
Edison Elec. Illum. Co., N. Y.	102½	94	100½	—May 6	89	—Jan. 2	100½	99½	100½
Erie	17½	13	17½	—Nov. 9	10½	—Aug. 7	17½	15½	15½
1st pref.	41½	34	41½	—Mar. 17	27	—July 29	38½	33½	35½
2d pref.	25	16	25	—Mar. 16	13	—Aug. 6	23½	20	22½
Evansville & Terre Haute	51	28	34½	—Feb. 24	24	—Aug. 15	37½	30	30
Express Adams	153	140	154	—Nov. 9	135	—Aug. 25	154	148	148
American	119½	109	116	—May 25	105	—Aug. 18	113½	111	111
United States	50	36	48	—Apr. 24	35	—Aug. 25	47	43	43
Wells, Fargo	115	95	101	—Feb. 15	80	—Aug. 14	97	94	97
Great Northern, preferred	134	100	122	—Nov. 24	108½	—Mar. 13	122	117	120½
Illinois Central	108	81½	98	—Jan. 31	84½	—Aug. 11	97½	92	95
Iowa Central	11½	5½	10½	—Feb. 8	5½	—Aug. 13	9½	7½	7½
preferred	38	19	38	—Apr. 23	19	—Aug. 7	33	29½	29½
Laclede Gas	33½	14½	30	—Apr. 27	17	—July 20	29½	21	23½
Lake Erie & Western	28	15½	22½	—Feb. 5	12½	—Aug. 10	23½	18½	18½
preferred	85	61	75	—Feb. 7	55½	—Aug. 8	73½	72	72
Lake Shore	153½	134½	154½	—June 17	134½	—Jan. 7	153½	149	152½
Long Island	84½	83	84	—Jan. 7	54	—Nov. 30	86	84	84
Long Island Traction	22	5	22	—Feb. 19	16	—Jan. 10	22	19	19
Louisville & Nashville	66½	39	55½	—Feb. 24	37½	—Aug. 26	53½	47½	49
Louis., N. A. & Chic., Tr. cfs.	10½	6	10½	—Feb. 18	½	—Nov. 25	10½	9½	9½
preferred	29½	15½	24½	—Feb. 13	1	—Nov. 25	24½	14	16
Manhattan consol.	119½	95	113½	—Feb. 11	73½	—Aug. 13	104	93	94½
Michigan Central	108	91½	97½	—Feb. 11	89	—Aug. 28	108	98	98
Minneapolis & St. Louis	29½	14	21½	—Feb. 21	12	—Aug. 21	20½	18½	20
1st pref.	88	78	83	—Feb. 21	54	—Aug. 8	78	75	78
2d pref.	62	30½	53½	—Apr. 22	30	—Aug. 10	49	48	48
Mobile & Ohio	27	13½	25	—Jan. 11	14	—Aug. 10	24½	21	22½
Missouri, Kan. & Tex.	19	9½	14½	—Nov. 10	9½	—Aug. 6	14½	12	13½
preferred	41	18½	31½	—Feb. 25	16	—July 20	31	26	28



## ACTIVE STOCKS, COMPARATIVE PRICES AND QUOTATIONS.—Continued.

	YEAR 1895.		HIGHEST AND LOWEST IN 1896.				NOVEMBER, 1896.		
	High.	Low.	Highest.	Lowest.			High.	Low.	Closing.
Missouri Pacific.....	42½	18½	29½—Apr. 24	15—Aug. 7			26½	21½	21½
Nash., Chat. & St. Louis.....	81½	64	70—Oct. 2	70—Oct. 2			...	...	...
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River.....	104½	90	98½—Feb. 25	68—Aug. 6			98	94	94½
N. Y. Chicago & St. Louis.....	18½	10	15—Jan. 22	9—Aug. 11			13½	12½	12½
" 2d preferred.....	75	63	80—Jan. 22	67½—July 23			...	...	...
" preferred.....	34½	20	33½—Apr. 13	20—Aug. 10			31½	28½	28½
N. Y., Lake Erie & Western.....	15½	7½	17½—Feb. 20	13½—Jan. 7			...	...	...
" preferred.....	30	16	29—Feb. 20	25—Jan. 22			...	...	...
N. Y. & New England.....	63½	29	51½—Jan. 28	35—July 21			...	...	...
N. Y., New Haven & Hartf'd.....	218	174	188—Feb. 10	160—July 23			183	177	180½
N. Y., Ontario & Western.....	194	114	164—Nov. 10	11½—Aug. 10			169	144	154
N. Y., Sus. & Western.....	144	6½	12—Nov. 9	6—Aug. 11			12	9	10
" preferred.....	43½	19½	31½—Feb. 6	12—Apr. 8			30	24½	26
Norfolk & Western.....	61½	1½	12½—Nov. 10	1½—Apr. 29			12½	12	12
" preferred.....	19½	8	19½—Nov. 10	4½—May 8			19½	17	18
North American Co.....	7	2½	6½—Feb. 24	3½—Aug. 7			5½	4½	5
Northern Pacific tr. receipts.....	8½	2½	16½—Nov. 9	1½—May 23			16½	14½	14½
" pref tr. receipts.....	27	10½	28½—Nov. 11	10—Apr. 16			28½	22½	29½
Ohio & Mississippi.....	...	...	...	...			...	...	...
Ohio Southern.....	19½	4	...	...			...	...	...
Oregon Improvement.....	14½	3	4½—Jan. 4	¼—June 12			2½	1½	1½
Oregon Railway & Nav.....	23	17	24—Nov. 2	10—Feb. 18			24	20	22
Oregon Short Line.....	11½	8½	18½—Nov. 10	8½—Apr. 14			18½	15½	17
Pacific Mail.....	34½	20	31—Feb. 10	15½—Aug. 7			28½	21½	25½
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville.....	7½	2	3½—Feb. 10	1½—June 23			3½	2½	3
Phila. & Reading.....	23½	4½	31½—Nov. 10	2½—Jan. 7			31½	27½	28
Pitts., Cin. Chic. & St. Louis.....	22½	12	18½—Feb. 7	11—Aug. 7			17½	13½	14½
" preferred.....	60½	48½	59—Feb. 27	40½—Aug. 12			52	52	52
Pitts. & Western, preferred.....	34½	18	30½—Jan. 31	17—Jan. 15			...	...	...
Pullman Palace Car Co.....	178½	146	164—Feb. 11	138—Aug. 7			160	156½	158½
Rio Grande Western.....	19½	15	18½—Feb. 10	16—Feb. 8			...	...	...
" preferred.....	46½	30	46½—Feb. 10	30—Jan. 27			...	...	...
Rome, Wat. Ogdens' g.....	120	112½	116½—Apr. 27	108—Sept. 15			...	...	...
St. Louis, Alton & T. H.....	68	35½	60½—Jan. 3	53—Aug. 14			...	...	...
St. Louis & Southwestern.....	94	4½	5½—Feb. 7	2½—Aug. 10			5½	4½	5
" preferred.....	10½	8	13—Feb. 26	6½—Aug. 7			12½	9½	10½
St. Paul & Duluth.....	85½	18	27½—Feb. 24	15—Sept. 16			23	23	23
" preferred.....	95	86	91—Feb. 10	84—Sept. 10			...	...	...
St. Paul, Minn. & Manitoba.....	116½	104	115—Jan. 11	105—Aug. 11			112½	111	112½
Southern Pacific Co.....	26½	16½	22½—Jan. 14	14—Nov. 6			17½	14	15½
Southern Railway.....	14½	7	11½—Nov. 10	6½—Aug. 7			11½	9	9½
" preferred.....	44½	22	33½—Feb. 25	15½—Aug. 8			38½	27½	27½
Tennessee Coal & Iron Co.....	46½	13½	34½—Feb. 10	13—July 20			32½	25	28
Texas & Pacific.....	14½	6½	12—Nov. 10	5—Aug. 7			12	8½	9½
Toledo, A., A. & N. M.....	4½	1½	...	...			...	...	...
Union Pacific trust receipts.....	17½	4	12½—Nov. 4	3½—Jan. 26			12½	9	9
Union Pac., Denver & Gulf.....	6½	2½	5½—Feb. 13	1½—July 29			4½	2½	2½
Wabash R. R.....	10½	5	8—Nov. 9	4½—Aug. 7			8	6½	7
" preferred.....	26½	12½	19½—Feb. 24	11—Aug. 7			19	15½	16
Western Union.....	96½	82½	90½—Nov. 11	73½—Aug. 10			90½	85	88
Wheeling & Lake Erie.....	18½	6½	13½—Feb. 14	5½—Aug. 27			9½	6½	8
" preferred.....	54½	29	40½—Feb. 13	20½—Aug. 8			35½	29½	31½
Wisconsin Central.....	7½	2½	4½—Feb. 24	1½—Aug. 21			3½	3	3
<b>"INDUSTRIAL" STOCKS:</b>									
American Oil Co.....	30½	14	19—Jan. 27	8—July 20			17½	14½	15
" preferred.....	79½	59	68½—Feb. 14	37—Aug. 10			63½	55	55½
American Sugar Ref. Co.....	121½	86½	126½—Apr. 21	95—Aug. 10			125	115½	115½
" preferred.....	107	90½	104—May 27	82½—Aug. 8			104	100½	106
American Tobacco Co.....	117	63	95—Apr. 2	51—Aug. 10			84	74½	75
" preferred.....	118	90	108—Nov. 6	95—Aug. 4			106	100	101
Dis. & Cattle Feed Co.....	25½	7½	20½—Apr. 23	9½—Aug. 7			...	...	...
General Electric Co.....	41	20	39½—Mar. 13	20—July 16			35½	29½	29½
National Lead Co.....	38	17½	28½—Apr. 21	18—Aug. 10			28	24½	25½
" preferred.....	94½	73	92½—Nov. 19	75—Aug. 27			82½	88	88
National Linseed Oil Co.....	31½	15	21½—June 23	18—Aug. 21			19	16	16
National Starch Manfg. Co.....	12	5	7½—Nov. 13	4½—Jan. 14			7½	7	7½
U. S. Cordage Co.....	9	2½	7½—Nov. 13	3½—Aug. 31			7½	4½	6½
" preferred.....	17	1½	14½—Nov. 13	6½—Aug. 31			14½	9½	12½
U. S. Leather Co.....	24½	7	11½—Feb. 8	5½—July 16			11½	8½	9
" preferred.....	97½	58	69½—Feb. 14	41½—Aug. 10			68½	56½	60
U. S. Rubber Co.....	48	21	29—Jan. 13	14½—Aug. 8			27	20	25½
" preferred.....	99½	75	89—Jan. 15	65—Oct. 12			83½	70½	81

# RAILWAY, INDUSTRIAL AND GOVERNMENT BONDS.

LAST SALE, PRICE AND DATE AND HIGHEST AND LOWEST PRICES AND TOTAL  
SALES FOR THE MONTH.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ala. Midland 1st gold 6s.....	1928	2,800,000	M & N	92	Apr. 13, '95	.....	.....	.....
Ann Arbor 1st g 4's.....	1985	7,000,000	Q J	72½	Nov. 30, '96	74½	70	246,000
{ Atch Top & Santa Fe gen g 4's.....	1995	96,113,000	A & O	78	Nov. 30, '96	80½	75½	2,253,000
adjustment, g. 4's.....	1995	51,723,000	NOV	41	Nov. 30, '96	44½	40½	3,899,000
Equip. tr. ser. A. g. 5's.....	1902	1,500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chicago & St. Louis 1st 6's.....	1915	1,500,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Colorado Midland 1st g. 6's.....	1966	429,000	J & D	77½	July 29, '97	.....	.....	.....
eng Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	5,821,000	.....	72	Nov. 21, '96	73½	68	129,000
cons. g. 4's st'd gtd.....	1940	973,000	F & A	21	June 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certfs of dep.	.....	3,893,000	.....	20	Nov. 25, '96	22½	20	259,000
Atlan. av. of Brook'n imp. g. 5's, 1934	.....	1,500,000	J & J	82½	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
Atlanta & Danville 1st g. 5's.....	1950	1,238,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Atlan. & Pac. gtd. 1st g. 4's.....	1937	18,790,000	J & J	49	Nov. 14, '96	49	49	1,000
2d W. d. g. s. f. 6's.....	1907	5,500,000	M & S	92	July 23, '90	.....	.....	.....
Western div. inc.....	1910	10,500,000	A & O	1½	Nov. 25, '96	1½	¾	539,000
div. small.....	1910	1,811,000	A & O	10	Mar. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
Central div. inc.....	1922	.....	J & D	4½	Aug. 5, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. 1st 6's (Parkersburg br.) 1919	.....	3,000,000	A & O	108	Nov. 20, '96	108	103½	21,000
5's, gold.....	1985-1925	4,956,000	{ F & A	90	Nov. 30, '96	90	87	2,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	87	May 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. con. mtge. gold 5's.....	1968	11,988,000	{ F & A	103	July 2, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ F & A	107½	Mar. 7, '94	.....	.....	.....
Balti. Belt, 1st g. 5's int. gtd., 1960	.....	6,000,000	M & N	92	Nov. 24, '96	92	83½	11,000
W. Virginia & Pitts. 1st g. 5's.....	1960	4,000,000	A & O	111	Dec. 12, '95	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Southwest'n 1st g. 4½'s, 1960	.....	10,667,000	J & J	102	May 29, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st c. g. 4½'s.....	1963	10,483,000	J & J	99½	Nov. 12, '96	99½	99½	10,000
1st inc. g. 5's "A".....	2043	8,651,000	NOV	25	Aug. 18, '94	.....	.....	.....
"B".....	2043	9,655,000	DEC	11	Feb. 8, '96	.....	.....	.....
B. & O. Sw. Term Co. gtd g 5's.....	1942	1,200,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Monongahela River 1st g. 5's 1919	.....	700,000	F & A	104½	July 1, '92	.....	.....	.....
Cen. Ohio. Reorg. 1st c. g. 4½'s, 1960	.....	2,500,000	M & S	104	June 4, '95	.....	.....	.....
Ak. & Chic. Junc. 1st g. s. g. 5's, 1930	.....	1,500,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 21, '95	.....	.....	.....
coupons off.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Broadway & 7th av. 1st con. g. 5's, 1943	.....	7,650,000	{ J & D	118½	Nov. 24, '96	118½	116½	68,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ J & D	112½	May 29, '95	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn City 1st con. 5's.....	1941	4,373,000	J & J	110½	Sept. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Elevated 1st gold 6s's, 1924	.....	3,500,000	A & O	79½	Nov. 24, '96	82	75	36,000
2d mtg. g. 5's.....	1915	1,250,000	J & J	45	Nov. 19, '96	45	45	1,000
{ Union Elevated 1st g. 6's.....	1937	6,148,000	M & N	79	Nov. 19, '96	80	71½	51,000
{ Seaside & Bkin Bdge 1st g. 5's 1942	.....	1,365,000	J & J	80	Mar. 31, '96	.....	.....	.....
Brooklyn Rapid Transit g. 5's.....	1945	4,875,000	A & O	75	Nov. 30, '96	78½	74½	89,000
Brunswick & Western 1st g. 4's.....	1938	3,000,000	J & J	74	Sept. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo, Roch. & Pitts. g. g. 5's.....	1937	4,407,000	M & S	97	Nov. 20, '96	97	96	4,000
{ Rochester & Pittsburg. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,300,000	F & A	120	Nov. 12, '96	120	119	3,000
cons. 1st 6's.....	1922	3,920,000	J & D	120½	Nov. 30, '96	120½	120	9,000
{ Clearfield & Mah. 1st g. g. 5's.....	1943	650,000	J & J	121½	May 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Susquehanna 1st g. 5's, 1913	.....	1,349,000	{ A & O	100	Feb. 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Burlington, Cedar R. & N. 1st 5's, 1906	.....	6,500,000	J & D	107	Nov. 27, '96	107	105½	29,000
con. 1st & col. 1st 5's.....	1934	6,425,000	{ A & O	103	Nov. 19, '96	103	102½	3,000
registered.....	.....	.....	{ A & O	97	Feb. 9, '96	.....	.....	.....
{ Minneap's & St. Louis 1st 7's, g. 1927	.....	150,000	J & D	140	Aug. 24, '96	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ced. Rap Ia. Falls & Nor. 1st 6's, 1890		825,000	A & O	105½	May 21, '96	....	....	....
1st 5's, 1890		1,905,000	A & O	102	July 28, '96	....	....	....
Canada Southern 1st int. gtd 5's, 1908		18,820,000	J & J	110	Nov. 30, '96	110	107½	48,000
2d mortg. 5's, 1913		5,100,000	M & S	104½	Nov. 27, '96	104½	103	85,000
registered.			M & S	103½	Apr. 7, '96	....	....	....
Col. & Cin. Mid'd. 1st. Ext. 4½'s, 1899		2,000,000	J & J	92½	Aug. 31, '92	....	....	....
Cent. R. & Bkg. Co. of Ga. c. g. 5's, 1897		4,880,000	M & N	95	July 3, '96	....	....	....
{ Chat., Rom. & Colu's g'tg. g. 5's, 1897		2,080,000	M & S	70	July 25, '96	....	....	....
Central Railroad of New Jersey.								
1st consolidated 7's, 1899		3,838,000	Q & J	105½	Nov. 11, '96	105½	105½	2,000
convertible 7's, 1902		1,167,000	M & N	116	June 23, '96	....	....	....
deb. 6's, 1906		468,000	M & N	114	Apr. 2, '96	....	....	....
gen. mtg. 5's, 1897		41,604,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 30, '96	118½	115	231,000
registered.			Q & J	115	Nov. 30, '96	116	114½	72,000
Lehigh & W.-B. con. ased. 7's, 1890		5,500,000	Q & M	104½	Nov. 30, '96	104½	102½	26,000
mortgage 5's, 1912		2,887,000	M & N	90	May 15, '96	....	....	....
Am. Dock & Improv'm't Co. 5's, 1921		4,987,000	J & J	115	Nov. 30, '96	115	111	18,000
N. J. Southern Int. gtd 6's, 1899		411,000	J & J	104	Nov. 13, '96	104	103½	4,000
Central Pacific g'd bonds, 1897		19,493,000	J & J	102½	Nov. 30, '96	102½	100½	31,000
San Joaquin br. 6's, 1900		6,080,000	A & O	108	Nov. 24, '96	103	99	37,000
Mtge. gold gtd 5's, 1899		11,000,000	A & O	101	Nov. 25, '96	101	101	1,000
Central Pacific land grant 5's, 1900		2,528,000	A & O	84½	Sept. 16, '96	....	....	....
ext g 5's series A B C D, 1898		5,598,000	J & J	99	Nov. 12, '96	99	99	4,000
Cal. & O. div. ex. g. 7's, 1918		4,358,000	J & J	98	Oct. 16, '96	....	....	....
Western Pacific bonds 6's, 1899		2,735,000	J & J	107½	Nov. 27, '96	....	....	....
North. Ry. (Cal.) 1st g. 6's, gtd, 1907		3,964,000	J & J	100	Oct. 28, '96	....	....	....
50 year m. gg. 5's, 1898		4,800,000	A & O	101	Aug. 5, '95	....	....	....
Charleston & Sav. 1st g. 7's, 1898		1,500,000	J & J	92½	Oct. 17, '96	....	....	....
Ches. & Ohio pur. money fd., 1898		2,287,000	J & J	108½	June 17, '96	....	....	....
6's, g. Series A, 1908		2,000,000	A & O	114½	Oct. 17, '96	....	....	....
Mortgage gold 6's, 1911		2,000,000	A & O	119	Nov. 13, '96	119	118	6,000
1st con. g. 5's, 1899		23,553,000	M & N	107½	Nov. 30, '96	108	106	231,000
registered.			M & N	105½	Nov. 30, '96	105½	104½	72,000
Gen. m. g. 4½'s, 1902		21,792,000	M & S	73	Nov. 30, '96	75	70	764,000
registered.			M & S	85	Dec. 30, '96	....	....	....
(H. & A. d.) 1st c. g. 4's, 1899		6,000,000	J & J	98½	Nov. 23, '96	98	95	43,000
2d con. g. 4's, 1899		1,000,000	J & J	88	Nov. 30, '96	88	87½	34,000
Craig Val. 1st g. 5's, 1940		650,000	J & J	92½	June 17, '96	....	....	....
Warm S. Val. 1st g. 5's, 1941		400,000	M & S	96	Dec. 21, '96	....	....	....
Eliz. Lex. & B. S. g. 5's, 1902		3,007,000	M & S	99	Nov. 25, '96	99	98	6,000
Ches. Ohio & S'hwestern m. 6's, 1911		6,178,800	F & A	105½	Feb. 15, '96	....	....	....
2d mtge. 6's, 1911		2,865,000	F & A	48½	Sept. 10, '96	....	....	....
Ohio Val. g. con. 1st gtd. g. 5's, 1898		1,984,000	J & J	110½	Aug. 22, '96	....	....	....
Chicago & Alton s'king fund 6's, 1903		1,832,000	J & J	118	Nov. 23, '96	113	113	1,000
Louisiana & Mo. Riv. 1st 7's, 1900		1,785,000	F & A	109	Nov. 23, '96	109	109	1,000
2d 7's, 1900		300,000	M & N	107½	Oct. 7, '96	....	....	....
St. Louis, J. & C. 2d gtd 7's, 1898		188,000	J & J	104½	Dec. 7, '92	....	....	....
Miss. Riv. B'dge 1st s. f'd g. 6's, 1912		547,000	A & O	105½	Oct. 30, '96	....	....	....
Chicago, Burl. & North. 1st 5's, 1898		8,241,000	A & O	98½	Oct. 19, '96	....	....	....
deb. 6's, 1896		935,000	J & D	97	Jan. 24, '96	....	....	....
Chicago, Burl. & Quincy con. 7's, 1903		28,924,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 30, '96	118½	115½	205,000
5's, sinking fund, 1901		2,315,000	A & O	101	Aug. 5, '96	....	....	....
5's, debentures, 1913		9,000,000	M & N	98	Nov. 30, '96	99½	95	71,000
convertible 5's, 1903		15,253,900	M & S	100½	Nov. 28, '96	101½	97	50,000
(Iowa div.) sink. f'd 5's, 1919		2,811,000	A & O	101½	Sept. 21, '96	....	....	....
4's, 1919		7,571,000	A & O	96	Oct. 29, '96	....	....	....
Denver div. 4's, 1922		6,141,000	F & A	92½	Nov. 23, '96	92½	92	10,000
4's, 1921		3,300,000	M & S	88½	Nov. 6, '96	....	....	....
Chic. & Iowa div. 5's, 1905		2,320,000	F & A	107½	Jan. 18, '96	....	....	....
Nebraska extensi'n 4's, 1927		26,780,000	M & N	89	Nov. 27, '96	89½	89½	43,000
registered.			M & N	90½	July 10, '96	....	....	....
Han. & St. Jos. con. 6's, 1911		8,000,000	M & S	117	Nov. 27, '96	117½	114½	12,000
Chicago & E. Ill. 1st s. f'd c'y. 6's, 1907		2,969,000	J & D	114½	Nov. 17, '96	114½	114½	5,000
small bonds, 1907			J & D	112	Apr. 2, '96	....	....	....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int's paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic. & E. Ill. 1st con. 6's. gold .. 1884		2,653,000	A & O	122	Nov. 30, '98	122	122	1,000
"  gen. con. 1st 5's. .... 1887		7,487,000	M & N	101½	Nov. 30, '98	101½	94	301,000
"  registered .. 1887			M & N	104½	Nov. 25, '98	104½	104½	1,000
Chicago & Ind. Coal 1st 5's. .... 1936		4,626,000	J & J	100	Nov. 25, '98	100	98	9,000
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.								
Mil. & St. Paul 1st m. 8's P. D. .... 1888		3,674,000	F & A	105	Nov. 23, '98	105	105	7,000
"  2d 7 3-10 P. D. .... 1888		1,106,000	F & A	127	Nov. 20, '98	127	127	1,000
"  1st 7's \$ gold, R. div. .... 1902		3,798,500	J & J	125½	Nov. 4, '98	125½	125½	2,000
"  1st 7's £. .... 1902			(J & J)	120	Feb. 8, '94			
"  1st m. Iowa & M. 7's. .... 1897		1,736,000	J & J	126	Nov. 27, '98	126	126	3,000
"  1st m. Iowa & D. 7's. .... 1899		484,000	J & J	127½	June 5, '98			
"  1st m. C. & M. 7's. .... 1903		2,398,000	J & J	125	Oct. 22, '98			
Chicago Mil. & St. Paul con. 7's. .... 1905		11,298,000	J & J	129	Nov. 18, '98	129	128	13,000
"  1st 7's, Iowa & D. ex. .... 1908		3,505,000	J & J	128	Nov. 6, '98	128	128	13,000
"  1st 6's, Southw'n div. .... 1909		4,000,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 23, '98	117½	115	88,000
"  1st 5's, La. C. & Dav. .... 1919		2,500,000	J & J	109	Nov. 18, '98	109	107½	10,000
"  1st So. Min. div. 6's. .... 1910		7,432,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 28, '98	117½	114½	40,000
"  1st H't & Dk. div. 7's. .... 1910		5,680,000	J & J	127	Nov. 28, '98	127½	126	21,000
"  5's. .... 1910		990,000	J & J	104½	Sept. 30, '98			
"  Chic. & Pac. div. 6's. .... 1910		3,000,000	J & J	116	Oct. 31, '98			
"  1st Chic. & P. W. 5's. .... 1921		25,340,000	J & J	114½	Nov. 30, '98	114½	112	143,000
"  Chic. & M. R. div. 5's. .... 1926		3,083,000	J & J	108	Nov. 28, '98	110	107½	22,000
"  Mineral Point div. 5's. .... 1910		2,840,000	J & J	104½	Oct. 21, '98			
"  Chic. & Lake Sup. 5's. .... 1921		1,360,000	J & J	106½	July 16, '98			
"  Wis. & Min. div. 5's. .... 1921		4,755,000	J & J	111	Nov. 28, '98	111	110	44,000
"  terminal 5's. .... 1914		4,748,000	J & J	112½	Nov. 28, '98	112½	112	6,000
"  Far. & So. 6's assu. .... 1924		1,250,000	J & J	118	Sept. 20, '94			
"  mtg. con. si'k. f'd 5's. .... 1916		1,680,000	J & J	96	Jan. 7, '98			
"  Dakota & Gt. S. 5's. .... 1916		2,856,000	J & J	108½	Nov. 18, '98	108½	108	6,000
"  g. m. g. 4's, series A. .... 1889		19,010,000	J & J	96½	Nov. 30, '98	96½	96	56,000
"  registered .. 1889			Q & J	94½	Dec. 11, '98			
"  Mil. & N. 1st M. L. 6's. .... 1910		2,155,000	J & D	115½	Oct. 8, '98			
"  1st convt. 6's. .... 1913		5,082,000	J & D	115	Sept. 28, '98			
Chic. & Northwestern cons. 7's. .... 1915								
"  coupon gold 7's. .... 1902		12,771,000	Q & F	140	Nov. 30, '98	140	133½	30,000
"  registered d. gold 7's. .... 1902		12,336,000	J & D	118½	Nov. 27, '98	118½	118½	7,000
"  sinking fund 6's. 1879-1929			A & O	110	Nov. 19, '98	118½	116½	30,000
"  registered .. 1879-1929		6,011,000	A & O	110	Nov. 17, '98	110	110	1,000
"  5's. .... 1879-1929			A & O	110	Nov. 23, '98	110	110	10,000
"  registered .. 1879-1929		7,301,000	A & O	108	Nov. 30, '98	108	107½	7,000
"  debenture 5's. .... 1933			A & O	106½	Oct. 6, '98			
"  registered .. 1933		9,800,000	M & N	109	Nov. 25, '98	109	107½	34,000
"  25 year debent. 5's. .... 1909			M & N	107	Nov. 24, '98	107	107	5,000
"  registered .. 1909		6,000,000	M & N	105	Oct. 26, '98			
"  30 year debent. 5's. .... 1921			M & N	104	May 15, '98			
"  registered .. 1921		9,800,000	A & O	104½	Nov. 24, '98	105	103	36,000
"  extension 4's. .... 1898-1926			A & O	107	Nov. 20, '98			
"  registered .. 1898-1926		18,632,000	F & A	98	Nov. 4, '98	99½	98	2,000
"  Escanaba & L. Superior 1st 6's. .... 1901		720,000	F & A	100	Nov. 10, '98	100	100	20,000
"  Des Moines & Minn. 1st 7's. .... 1907		600,000	J & J	107½	Nov. 28, '98	107½	107½	2,000
"  Iowa Midland 1st mortg. 8's. .... 1900		1,360,000	F & A	127	Apr. 8, '84			
"  Chic. & Milwaukee 1st mtg. 7's. .... 1898		1,700,000	A & O	118	July 9, '98			
"  Winona & St. Peters 2d 7's. .... 1907		1,582,000	J & J	104½	Oct. 1, '98			
"  Milwaukee & Madison 1st 6's. .... 1906		1,800,000	M & N	127	Apr. 17, '98			
"  Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. 1st 5's. .... 1909		1,800,000	M & N	108	Jan. 7, '98			
"  Northern Illinois 1st 5's. .... 1910		1,500,000	M & N	108	Nov. 20, '98	108	108	1,000
"  Mil., Lake Shore & We'n 1st 6's. .... 1921		5,030,000	M & N	107	Nov. 28, '98	107	107	1,000
"  con. deb. 5's. .... 1907		436,000	M & N	129	Nov. 27, '98	129	129	1,000
"  ext. & impt. s. f'd g. 5's. .... 1929		4,148,000	F & A	104	May 13, '98			
"  Michigan div. 1st 6's. .... 1924		1,281,000	F & A	112	Nov. 27, '98	112	111	32,000
"  Ashland div. 1st 6's. .... 1925		1,000,000	J & J	120½	Nov. 30, '98	120½	125	3,000
"  income. .... 1925		500,000	M & N	126	Nov. 18, '98	126	126	10,000
Chic., Rock Is. & Pac. 6's coup. .... 1917								
"  6's registered .. 1917		12,100,000	J & J	129½	Nov. 27, '98	129½	128	5,000
"  exten. and collat. 5's. .... 1934			J & J	129	Nov. 23, '98	129	129	3,000
"  registered .. 1934		40,417,000	J & J	103½	Nov. 30, '98	104½	99½	369,000
"  debenture 5's. .... 1921			J & J	101½	Nov. 28, '98	108½	101½	80,000
"  registered .. 1921		4,500,000	M & S	92	Nov. 16, '98	92	92	5,000
Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 1st 4's. .... 1906								
"  1st 2½'s. .... 1906		1,200,000	J & J	88½	June 12, '98			
"  extension 4's. .... 1906		1,200,000	J & J	65	Nov. 18, '98	65	65	3,000
"  Keokuk & Des M. 1st mor. 5's. .... 1923		672,000	J & J	84	Oct. 14, '93			
"  small bond. .... 1923		2,750,000	A & O	100	Nov. 25, '98	100	100	1,000
			A & O	103	Apr. 28, '98			

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Chic., St. P., Minn. & Oma. con. 6's. 1890		13,413,000	J & D	128	Nov. 25 '96	128	125½	34,000
Chic., St. Paul & Minn. 1st 6's. 1918		3,000,000	M & N	127	Nov. 13 '96	127		4,000
North Wisconsin 1st mort. 6's. 1890		800,000	J & J	125	May 4 '88			
St. Paul & Sioux City 1st 6's. 1919		6,070,000	A & O	127	Nov. 11 '96	127	127	2,000
Chic. & Wn. Ind. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1919		1,234,000	M & N	108½	May 15 '95			
gen'l mortg. g. 6's. 1892		9,652,686	Q M	115	Oct. 28 '96			
Chic. & West Michigan R'y 5's. 1891		5,753,000	J & D	98½	Mar. 13 '93			
coupons off.								
Cin., Ham. & Day. con. s'k. f'd 7's. 1905		996,000	A & O	120	July 15 '96			
2d g. 4½'s. 1897		2,000,000	J & J	104	Nov. 10 '96	104	103½	15,000
Cin., Day. & Ir'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1941		3,500,000	M & N	108	Nov. 21 '96	108	108	2,000
City Sub. R'y. Balto. 1st g. 5's. 1892		2,430,000	J & D	106½	Apr. 17 '95			
Clev., Ak'n & Col. eq. and 2d g. 6's. 1890		730,000	F & A					
Clev. & Can. Tr. Co. c'tfs. 1st 5's for 1917		2,000,000		80	Nov. 4 '96	80	80	3,000
Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. gen. m. 4's. 1903		5,000,000	J & D	86	May 25 '95			
do Cairo div. 1st g. 4's. 1899		5,000,000	J & J	98	Oct. 2 '95			
St. Louis div. 1st col. trust g. 4's. 1890		9,750,000	M & N	92	Nov. 30 '96	93	92	35,000
registered.				90	June 10 '96			
Sp'gfield & Col. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		1,035,000	M & S	87	Oct. 22 '95			
White W. Val. div. 1st g. 4's. 1940		650,000	J & J	83	Dec. 16 '95			
Cin., Wab. & Mich. div. 1st g. 4's. 1991		4,000,000	J & J	91	Nov. 6 '96	91	91	1,000
Cin., Ind., St. L. & Chic. 1st g. 4's. 1893		7,790,000	Q F	97	Nov. 30 '96	97	97	4,000
registered.				95	Nov. 15 '94			
con. 6's. 1890		738,000	M & N	104	Mar. 29 '93			
Cin., S'dusky & Clev. con. 1st g. 5's. 1898		2,571,000	J & J	105	Sept. 28 '96			
Ind. Bloom. & W. 1st pfd. 7's. 1900		1,000,000	J & J	100	June 9 '96			
Ohio, Ind. & W. 1st pfd. 5's. 1898		500,000	Q J					
Peoria & Eastern 1st con. 4's. 1940		8,103,000	A & O	78	Nov. 30 '96	78	75	90,000
income 4's. 1890		4,000,000	A	18	Nov. 23 '96	19	17	28,000
Clev., C., C. & Ind. 1st 7's s'k. f'd. 1899		3,000,000	M & N	105½	Nov. 21 '96	105½	105½	9,000
consol mortg. 7's. 1914		3,991,000	J & D	122	Sept. 16 '96			
sink. fund 7's. 1914			J & D	119½	Nov. 19 '96			
gen. consol 6's. 1894		3,205,000	J & J	124	Nov. 11 '96	126	124	6,000
registered.			J & J					
Cin., Sp. 1st m. C., C. & Ind. 7's. 1901		1,000,000	A & O	105	Aug. 18 '96			
Clev., Lorain & Wheel'g con. 1st 5's. 1893		4,300,000	A & O	104½	Nov. 10 '96	104½	108	6,000
Clev., & Mahoning Val. gold 5's. 1898		2,481,000	J & J	120½	July 21 '96			
registered.			Q J					
Col'bus & Ninth Av. 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1893		3,000,000	M & S	116½	Nov. 24 '96	116½	116½	20,000
registered.			M & S					
Col., Hock. Val. & Tol. con. g. 5's. 1891		8,000,000	M & S	88½	Nov. 30 '96	89½	84	184,000
gen. mort. g. 6's. 1904		2,000,000	J & D	90	Nov. 30 '96	91	89½	152,000
Conn., Passumpsic Riv's 1st g. 4's. 1943		1,900,000	A & O	102	Dec. 27 '93			
Delaware, Lack. & W. mtge 7's. 1907		3,067,000	M & S	125	Sept. 2 '96			
Syracuse, Bing. & N. Y. 1st 7's. 1906		1,966,000	A & O	130	Jan. 4 '95			
Morris & Essex 1st m 7's. 1914		5,000,000	M & N	139	Nov. 30 '96	140½	137½	14,000
bonds, 7's. 1900		281,000	J & J	110	Oct. 2 '96			
7's. 1871-1901		4,991,000	A & O	134	Sept. 3 '96			
1st c. gtd 7's. 1915		12,151,000	J & D	140½	Nov. 30 '96	140½	139	29,000
registered.			J & D	136	June 4 '93			
N. Y., Lack. & West'n. 1st 6's. 1921		12,000,000	J & J	130	Oct. 30 '96			
const. 5's. 1923		5,000,000	F & A	114	Nov. 30 '96	114	114	1,000
Warren 2d 7's. 1900		750,000	A & O	113½	Sept. 6 '95			
Delaware & Hudson Canal.								
1st Penn. Div. c. 7's. 1917		5,000,000	M & S	140	Nov. 13 '96	140	140	2,000
reg. 1917			M & S	137	Oct. 7 '96			
Albany & Susq. 1st c. g. 7's. 1906		3,000,000	A & O	117	Aug. 18 '96			
registered.			A & O	128½	Feb. 12 '94			
6's. 1906		7,000,000	A & O	112½	Oct. 16 '96			
registered.			A & O	115	July 29 '96			
Rens. & Saratoga 1st c. 7's. 1921		2,000,000	M & N	145	Nov. 16 '96	145	145	2,000
1st r 7's. 1921			M & N	141½	Apr. 20 '96			
Denver City Cable Ry. 1st g. 6's. 1908		3,397,000	J & J	97½	Feb. 24 '93			
Denver Con. T'way Co. 1st g. 5's. 1893		730,000	A & O					
Denver Tramway Co. con. g. 6's. 1910		1,219,000	J & J					
Denver Met. Ry. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1911		913,000	J & J					
Denver & Rio G. 1st con. g. 4's. 1906		28,465,000	J & J	89	Nov. 30 '96	91½	85	62,000
1st mortg. g. 7's. 1900		6,382,500	M & N	112	Nov. 27 '96	112	111	28,000
impt. m. g. 5's. 1898		8,103,500	J & D	91	Oct. 21 '96			
Detroit, Mac. & Ma. Id gt. 3½ S. A. 1911		3,080,000	A & O	18	Nov. 30 '96	20½	18	47,000

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Detroit & Mack. 1st Hen g. 4s.....	1905	900,000	J & D	67	Mar. 24, '95	.....	.....	.....
g. 4s.....	1905	1,260,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth & Iron Range 1st 5's.....	1937	6,332,000	A & O	100½	Nov. 25, '96	103½	100	32,000
registered.....	1937	1,000,000	A & O	101½	July 23, '99	.....	.....	.....
2d 1 m 6s.....	1916	500,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duluth, Red Wing & S'n 1st g. 5's.....	1928	4,000,000	J & J	100	Nov. 27, '96	100	100	2,000
Duluth So. Shore & At. gold 5's.....	1937	2,482,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Erie, 1st mortgage ex. 7's.....	1907	2,149,000	M & S	102½	Nov. 20, '96	102½	102½	3,000
2d extended 5's.....	1919	4,618,000	M & N	114	Nov. 23, '96	114	114	15,000
2d extended 4½'s.....	1923	2,928,000	M & S	108½	Nov. 23, '96	109½	108	2,000
4th extended 5's.....	1929	709,500	A & O	112½	Oct. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
5th extended 4's.....	1928	16,860,000	J & D	104½	May 27, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. gold 7's.....	1920	3,705,977	M & S	137½	Nov. 27, '96	138½	137½	19,000
1st cons. fund c. 7's.....	1920	7,500,000	M & S	142	Nov. 8, '94	.....	.....	.....
Long Dock consol. 6's.....	1953	2,380,000	A & O	132½	Nov. 26, '96	132½	132	10,000
Buffalo, N. Y. & Erie 1st 7's.....	1916	1,500,000	J & D	132½	July 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
Buffalo & Southwestern m 6's.....	1908	2,800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small.....	1909	12,000,000	A & O	103	Nov. 23, '96	103	103	7,000
Jefferson R. R. 1st gtd g 5's.....	1909	1,109,000	M & N	114½	Nov. 30, '96	111½	107½	250,000
Chicago & Erie 1st gold 5's.....	1942	8,396,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. L. E. & W. Coal & R. R. Co. 1st g currency 6's.....	1922	30,000,000	J & J	91½	Nov. 25, '96	93	89	222,000
N. Y. L. E. & W. Dock & Imp. Co. 1st currency 6's.....	1913	30,927,000	J & J	64	Nov. 27, '96	66	60½	730,000
Erie R.R. 1st con. g-4s prior bds.....	1906	500,000	J & A	98	Nov. 12, '96	98	98	8,000
registered.....	1906	8,000,000	J & J	106	Nov. 18, '96	107	106	10,000
gen. Hen 3-4s.....	1906	2,086,000	A & O	95	Sept. 14, '94	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1906	375,000	A & O	110	May 10, '93	.....	.....	.....
Bureka Springs R'y 1st 6's.....	1933	450,000	A & O	95	Sep. 15, '91	.....	.....	.....
Evans & Terre Haute 1st con. 6's.....	1921	1,591,000	J & J	90	Dec. 11, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st General g 5's.....	1942	8,999,000	A & O	113	Nov. 25, '96	113	110	15,000
Mount Vernon 1st 6's.....	1923	2,100,000	M & N	80	Nov. 30, '96	80	80	1,000
Sul. Co. Beh. 1st g 5's.....	1930	3,083,000	A & O	75	Nov. 30, '96	75	75	4,000
Evans & Ind'p. 1st con. g g 6's.....	1926	8,000,000	J & J	103	Aug. 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
Flint & Pere Marquette m 6's.....	1920	423,000	J & J	80½	May 14, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. gold 5's.....	1939	4,370,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Port Huron d 1st g 5's.....	1939	1,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Florida Cen. & Penins. 1st g 5's.....	1918	7,699,000	.....	64½	Nov. 30, '96	65½	51	308,000
1st land grant ex. g 5's.....	1930	2,888,000	J & J	50	Sept. 12, '96	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g 5's.....	1943	4,756,000	F & A	105	Apr. 6, '96	.....	.....	.....
Ft. Smith U'n Dep. Co. 1st g 4½'s.....	1941	1,000,000	J & J	100	Nov. 20, '96	100	100	2,000
Ft. Worth & D. C. cts. dep. 1st 6's.....	1921	1,000,000	M & N	91	Nov. 30, '96	91½	89½	122,000
Ft. Worth & Rio Grande 1st g 5's.....	1928	5,290,000	J & J	76½	Nov. 20, '96	77½	77½	1,000
Gal., Harrisburgh & S. A. 1st 6's.....	1910	2,888,000	M & N	124	Oct. 1, '96	.....	.....	.....
2d mortgage 7's.....	1905	575,000	M & N	115½	Oct. 15, '94	.....	.....	.....
Mex. & Pac. div. 1st 5's.....	1931	1,140,000	J & J	125	June 29, '92	.....	.....	.....
Ga. Car. & N. Ry. 1st gtd. g. 5's.....	1927	7,881,000	J & J	108	Nov. 25, '96	110	108	6,000
Housatonic R. con. m. g. 5's.....	1937	3,455,000	A & O	99	Oct. 10, '96	.....	.....	.....
New Haven & Derby con. 5's.....	1918	4,297,000	A & O	66½	Nov. 28, '96	67½	66	47,000
Houston & Texas Central R. R. 1st Waco & N. 7's.....	1903	706,000	A & O	94	Dec. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 5's (int. gtd.).....	1937	411,000	A & O	88	Mar. 28, '96	.....	.....	.....
Con. g. 6's (int. gtd.).....	1912	1,500,000	J & J	110	Aug. 17, '96	.....	.....	.....
Gen. g. 4's (int. gtd.).....	1921	2,490,000	J & J	102½	Dec. 30, '95	.....	.....	.....
Deben. 6's p. & int. gtd. 1907	1907	15,000,000	J & J	104	June 4, '98	.....	.....	.....
Deben. 4's p. & int. gtd. 1907	1907	.....	A & O	97	Dec. 17, '95	.....	.....	.....
Illinois Central 1st g. 4's.....	1951	.....	A & O	103	Nov. 17, '96	108	101	2,000
registered.....	1951	.....	A & O	101	July 27, '95	.....	.....	.....
gold 3½'s.....	1951	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered.....	1952	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's.....	1952	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
gold 4's regist'd.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
gold 4's.....1953		24,679,000	M & N	100	Nov. 30, '96	100½	100	9,000
gold 4's registered.....1904			M & N					
2-10 g. 4's.....1904		4,808,000	J & J	99	June 10, '96			
2-10 g. 4's registered.....1904			J & J					
1st g. 3 sterl. £500,000.....1951		2,500,000	M & S	92½	July 13, '96			
registered.....			M & S					
West'n Line 1st g. 4's, 1951		3,550,000	F & A	102½	Sept. 3, '96			
registered.....			F & A					
Cairo Bridge 4's g.....1950		3,000,000	J & D	101½	Sept. 10, '96			
registered.....								
Springfield div. coupon 6's.....1896		1,000,000	J & J	100½	Aug. 17, '96			
Middle div. registered 5's.....1921		600,000	F & A	116½	Aug. 16, '96			
Chic., St. L. & N. O. T. lien 7's.....1897		539,000	M & N	102½	Nov. 27, '96	102½	102½	3,000
1st consol. 7's.....1897		826,000	M & N	101½	Nov. 18, '96	101½	101½	1,000
gold 5's.....1951		16,526,000	J & D	118½	Nov. 30, '96	118½	118½	1,000
gold 5's registered.....			J & D	115	Oct. 25, '94			
Memph. div. 1st g. 4's, 1951		3,500,000	J & D	98½	June 16, '95			
registered.....			J & D					
Bellev. & So. Ill. gtd g. 4½'s.....1897		998,000	A & O	100	Nov. 30, '96	100½	100	8,000
Cedar Falls & Minn. 1st 7's.....1907		1,334,000	J & J	120	Apr. 28, '96			
Ind., Dec. & Spg. 1st 7's tr. rec. ex								
bonds.....1906		1,800,000	A & O	28½	Nov. 20, '96	28½	28½	3,000
stamped.....								
Ind., Dec. & West. 1st g. 5's.....1905		1,824,000	J & J	101	Nov. 20, '96	101	100	82,000
Indiana, Ill. & Iowa 1st g. 4's.....1909		900,000	J & D	84½	Jan. 20, '96			
1st ext. g. 5's.....1943		500,000	M & S	94½	Nov. 21, '96			
Internat. & Gt. N'n 1st. 6's, gold. 1919		7,954,000	M & N	116½	Nov. 20, '96	116½	115	82,000
2d mortgage 4½-5's.....1909		6,598,000	N & S	68	Nov. 27, '96	72	66	6,000
3d mortgage 4-4's.....1921		2,701,000	N & S	24	Nov. 27, '96	27	23	38,000
Iowa Central 1st gold 5's.....1938		6,322,000	J & D	100	Nov. 30, '96	100	94½	86,000
Kansas C. & M. R. & B. Co. 1st								
gtd g. 5's.....1929		3,000,000	A & O					
Kings Co. El. series A. 1st g. 5's.....1925		3,177,000	J & J	45	Nov. 30, '96	50	45	6,000
Fulton El. 1st m. g. 5's series A.....1929		1,979,000	M & S	60	Mar. 30, '96			
Lake Erie & Western 1st g. 5's.....1937		7,250,000	J & J	116½	Nov. 21, '96	116½	114	6,000
2d mtge. g. 5's.....1941		2,600,000	J & J	102	Nov. 10, '96	102	101½	14,000
Northern Ohio 1st gtd g. 5's.....1945		2,500,000	A & O	102	Nov. 19, '96	102	102	10,000
Lake Shore & Mich. Southern.								
Buffalo & Erie new b. 7's.....1896		2,755,000	A & O	108½	Nov. 18, '96	108½	103	6,000
Detroit, Mon. & Toledo 1st 7's.....1906		924,000	F & A	123	Nov. 14, '96	123	123	5,000
Lake Shore division b. 7's.....1899		1,355,000	A & O	104½	Nov. 10, '96	104½	104½	2,000
con. co. 1st 7's.....1900			J & J	113½	Nov. 27, '96	114	113	43,000
con. 1st registered.....1900		14,890,000	Q J	109	Oct. 21, '96			
con. co. 2d 7's.....1903			J & D	121½	Nov. 30, '96	121½	118½	8,000
con. 2d registered.....1908		24,692,000	J & D	114	Sept. 19, '96			
Cin. Sp. 1st gtd L. S. & M. S. 7's.....1901		1,000,000	A & O	106	Aug. 12, '96			
Kal., A. & G. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1938		840,000	J & J					
Mahoning Coal R. R. 1st 5's.....1964		1,500,000	J & J	116	Nov. 30, '96	118½	116	21,000
Lehigh Val. N. Y. 1st m. g. 4½'s.....1940		15,000,000	J & J	99½	Sept. 28, '96			
Lehigh Val. Ter. R. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1941		10,000,000	A & O	110½	Nov. 17, '96	110½	110½	1,000
registered.....			A & O	108	Sept. 20, '96			
Lehigh V. Coal Co. 1st gtd g. 5's.....1933		10,280,000	J & J	103	July 27, '96			
registered.....			J & J					
Lehigh & N. Y. 1st gtd g. 4's.....1945		2,000,000	M & S	92	Mar. 24, '96			
registered.....			M & S					
Elm., Cort. & N. 1st g. 1st ptd 6's.....1914		750,000	A & O					
g. 5's.....1914		1,250,000	A & O					
Lex. Av. & Pav. Ferry 1st gtd g. 5's.....1908		5,000,000	M & S	115½	Nov. 28, '96	116½	115½	81,000
registered.....			M & S					
Litchfield Car'n & W. 1st g. 5's.....1916		400,000	J & J	95	Feb. 25, '96			
Lit. Rock & M., tr. co. cts. for 1st								
g. 5's.....1937		3,145,000		25	Apr. 29, '96			
Long Island R. 1st mtg. 7's.....1896		1,121,000	M & N	104	Sept. 15, '96			
Long Island 1st cons. 5's.....1931		3,610,000	Q J	120	Nov. 23, '96	120	120	11,000
Long Island gen. m. 4's.....1938		3,000,000	J & D	92	Nov. 27, '96	92	90	15,000
Ferry 1st g. 4½'s.....1922		1,500,000	M & S	89	Nov. 30, '96	89	89	2,000
g. 4's.....1932		325,000	J & D					
deb. g. 5's.....1934		1,500,000	J & D					
N. Y. & Rock'y Beach 1st g. 5's.....1927		984,000	M & S	102½	Aug. 3, '96			
2d m. inc.....1927		1,000,000	S	40	Mar. 23, '96			
N. Y. & Man. Beach 1st 7's.....1897		500,000	J & J	102½	Apr. 15, '96			
N. Y. B'kin & M. B. 1st c. g. 5's.....1935		1,226,000	A & O	105	Jan. 16, '96			
Brooklyn & Montauk 1st 6's.....1911		250,000	M & S					
1st 5's.....1911		750,000	M & S	107½	July 16, '96			

## BOND SALES.

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Long Isl. R. R. Nor. Shore Branch								
1st Con. gold garn't'd 5's. 1932		1,075,000	Q J A N	103½	June 17, '95	....	....	.....
N. Y. B. Ex. R. 1st g. 5's. 1943		200,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Montauk Extens. gtd. g. 5's. 1945		300,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e Ev. & St. Louis								
1st con. TrCo. ct. gold 5's. 1939		3,406,000	J & J	25½	Sept. 11, '98	.....	.....	.....
Gen. mtg. g. 4's. 1943		2,432,000	M & S	10½	Nov. 12, '98	10½	10	2,000
Louisville & Nashville cons. 7's. 1938		7,070,000	A & O	104	Nov. 30, '98	104½	103	42,000
Cecilian branch 7's. 1917		600,000	M & S	102	Sept. 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
N. O. & Mobile 1st 6's. 1930		5,014,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 27, '98	117½	116	7,000
2d 6's. 1930		1,000,000	J & J	99½	Oct. 21, '98	.....	.....	.....
E. Hend. & N. 1st 6's. 1919		2,070,000	J & D	110	Aug. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
general mort. 6's. 1930		10,488,000	J & D	118	Nov. 23, '98	118	113½	9,000
Pensacola div. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & S	100	Apr. 17, '98	.....	.....	.....
St. Louis div. 1st 6's. 1921		3,500,000	M & S	118	Aug. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's. 1930		3,000,000	M & S	67	May 25, '95	.....	.....	.....
Nash. & Dec. 1st 7's. 1900		1,900,000	J & J	110	Aug. 19, '98	.....	.....	.....
So. N. Ala. si'g fd. 6s. 1910		1,942,000	A & O	92½	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
5½ 50 year g. bonds. 1937		1,764,000	M & N	92	Oct. 2, '98	.....	.....	.....
Unified gold 4's. 1940		14,994,000	J & J	79½	Nov. 21, '98	80½	74	262,000
registered. 1940			J & J	83	Feb. 27, '93	.....	.....	.....
Pen. & At. 1st 6's. g. 1921		2,870,000	F & A	94½	Oct. 28, '98	.....	.....	.....
collateral trust g. 5's. 1931		5,129,000	M & N	101	June 1, '98	.....	.....	.....
L. & N. & Mob. & Montg								
1st g. 4's. 1945		4,000,000	M & S	104	Nov. 10, '98	104	104	1,000
N. Fla. & S. 1st g. 5's. 1937		2,086,000	F & A	85	Apr. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
South & N. Ala. con. gtd. g. 5's. 1938		3,673,000	F & A	92	Nov. 27, '98	92	92	1,000
Kentucky Cent. g. 4's. 1937		6,742,000	J & J	89	Nov. 27, '98	89	89	1,000
Lo. & Jefferson Bdg. Co. gtd. g. 4's. 1945		3,000,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisv'e, New Alb. & Chic. 1st 6's. 1910		3,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 18, '98	108	108½	4,000
cons. g. 6's. 1916		4,700,000	A & O	90	Nov. 28, '98	93	83	193,000
gen. mtg. g. 5's. 1940		2,800,000	M & N	44	Nov. 25, '98	44	39	51,000
Louisville Railw'y Co. 1st c. g. 5's. 1930		4,600,000	J & J	100½	Sept. 9, '92	.....	.....	.....
Manhattan Railway Con. 4's. 1930		23,783,000	A & O	95½	Nov. 30, '98	95½	93	185,000
Manitoba Sw'n. Coloniza'n g. 5's. 1934		2,544,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Market St. Cable Railway 1st 6's. 1913		3,000,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Memphis & Charlestown 6's. g. 1924		1,000,000	J & J	58	Jan. 7, '95	.....	.....	.....
Metropolitan Elevated 1st 6's. 1908		10,818,000	J & J	117½	Nov. 25, '98	119	117½	66,000
2d 6's. 1939		4,000,000	M & N	104	Nov. 23, '98	104½	103	18,000
Mexican Central.								
con. mtge. 4's. 1911		58,908,000	J & J	67½	Jan. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. inc. 3's. 1939		17,072,000	JULY	19	Jan. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
2d 3's. 1939		11,724,000	JULY	9	Jan. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
Mexican International 1st g. 4's. 1942		14,000,000	M & S	72	Nov. 30, '98	73	71½	187,000
Mexican Nat. 1st gold 6's. 1927		11,532,000	J & D	90	Mar. 6, '95	.....	.....	.....
2d inc. 6's "A". 1917		12,285,000	M & S	42½	Nov. 12, '98	42½	42½	18,000
coup. stamped. 1917								
2d inc. 6's "B". 1917		12,285,000	A	8	Nov. 17, '98	8	8	15,000
Mexican Northern 1st g. 6's. 1910			J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
registered. 1910		1,411,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Michigan Cent. 1st con. 7's. 1902		8,000,000	M & N	114½	Nov. 25, '98	114½	112½	31,000
1st con. 5's. 1902		2,000,000	M & N	108	Oct. 22, '98	.....	.....	.....
6's. 1909		1,500,000	M & S	118	May 23, '98	.....	.....	.....
coup. 5's. 1931		3,576,000	M & S	111½	July 24, '98	.....	.....	.....
reg. 5's. 1931			Q M	115	Apr. 29, '98	.....	.....	.....
mort. 4's. 1940		2,600,000	J & J	105	July 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
mtge. 4's reg. 1940			J & J	102	Jan. 20, '98	.....	.....	.....
Battle C. Sturgis 1st g. g. 6's. 1939		476,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mil. Elec. R. & Light con. 30yr. g. 5's. 1926		5,500,000	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Minneapolis & St. Louis 1st g. 7's. 1927		950,000	J & D	140½	June 8, '98	.....	.....	.....
1st con. g. 5's. 1934		5,000,000	M & N	99½	Nov. 23, '98	101	98	32,000
Iowa ext. 1st g. 7's. 1909		1,015,000	J & D	121	Oct. 31, '98	.....	.....	.....
Southw. ext. 1st g. 7's. 1910		638,000	J & D	129	May 16, '98	.....	.....	.....
Pacific ext. 1st g. 6's. 1921		1,382,000	J & A	120	Nov. 25, '98	120	120	1,000
Minneapolis & Pacific 1st m. 5's. 1936								
stamped 4's pay. of int. gtd. 1936		3,206,000	J & J	102	Mar. 26, '97	.....	.....	.....



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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Minn., S. S. M. & Atlan. 1st g. 4's. 1923 stamp'd pay. of int. gtd.		8,280,000	J & J	94 89½	Apl. 2 '96 June 18 '91	....	....	.....
Minn., S. P. & S. S. M., 1st c. g. 4's. 1888 stamp'd pay. of int. gtd.		6,710,000	J & J	.....	.....	....	....	.....
Minn. St. R'y 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1919		4,060,000	J & J	97	Dec. 18 '96	....	....	.....
Missouri, K. & T. 1st mtge g. 4's. 1900		39,774,000	J & D	84½	Nov. 30 '96	85½	81¼	380,000
2d mtge. g. 4's. .... 1900		20,000,000	F & A	58	Nov. 30 '96	61	56	919,000
1st ext gold 5's. .... 1944		998,000	M & N	80	Jan. 30 '96	.....	.....	.....
of Texas 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		2,685,000	M & S	76	Nov. 27 '96	79	75	22,000
Kan. C. & P. 1st g. 4's. 1900		2,500,000	F & A	62	Oct. 30 '96	.....	.....	.....
Dal. & Waco 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,840,000	M & N	77	July 15 '96	.....	.....	.....
Booneville Bdg. Co. gtd. 7's. .... 1906		599,000	M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mo. Kan. & East'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1942		4,000,000	A & O	80	Nov. 25 '96	92	90	20,000
Missouri, Pacific 1st con. g. 6's. .... 1920		14,904,000	M & N	89	Nov. 18 '96	89½	83	24,000
3d mortgage 7's. .... 1906		3,828,000	M & N	108	Nov. 21 '96	103	100	4,000
trusts gold 5's. .... 1917		14,376,000	M & S	70	Aug. 14 '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st collateral gold 5's. 1920		7,000,000	F & A	45	July 28 '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pacific R. of Mo. 1st m. ex. 4's. 1908		7,000,000	M & S	98	Oct. 8 '96	.....	.....	.....
2d extended g. 5's. .... 1908		2,578,000	F & A	102	Nov. 6 '96	102	102	3,000
Verdigris V'y Ind. & W. 1st 5's. 1906		750,000	M & S	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Leroy & Caney Val. A. L. 1st 5's. 1928		520,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
St. L. & I'n. Mount. 1st ex. 5's. 1907		4,000,000	F & A	100½	Nov. 11 '96	100½	100	7,000
St. Louis & I'n. Mount. 2d 7's. 1907		6,000,000	M & N	100½	Nov. 27 '96	100½	97½	60,000
Ark'nas b'nch ext 5's. 1896		2,500,000	J & D	100	Oct. 14 '96	.....	.....	.....
Carlo, Ark. & T. 1st 7's. 1907		1,450,000	J & D	100	Oct. 6 '96	.....	.....	.....
g. con. R.R. & I. gr. 5's. 1901		18,845,000	A & O	74	Nov. 28 '96	77½	73½	114,000
stamp'd gtd gold 5's. 1901		6,945,000	A & O	80	May 5 '96	.....	.....	.....
Mob. & Birm. prior lien. g. 5's. .... 1945		874,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small. ....		228,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
inc. g. 4's. .... 1945		700,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small. ....		500,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mobile & Ohio new mort. g. 6's. 1927		7,000,000	J & J	118	Nov. 21 '96	118	117	17,000
1st extension 6's. .... 1927		974,000	J & D	112	May 1 '96	.....	.....	.....
gen. mortgage 4's. .... 1908		9,489,500	Q J	68	Nov. 30 '96	69	63½	165,000
St. Louis & Cairo gtd g. 4's. .... 1931		4,000,000	M & S	86	Dec. 17 '96	.....	.....	.....
Morgan's La. & Texas 1st g. 6's. .... 1920		1,494,000	J & J	111	July 21 '96	.....	.....	.....
1st 7's. .... 1918		5,000,000	A & O	128	July 23 '95	.....	.....	.....
Nashville, Chat. & St. L. 1st 7's. .... 1913		6,200,000	J & J	128	Nov. 30 '96	130	127	26,000
2d 6's. .... 1901		1,000,000	J & J	107½	Apr. 27 '95	.....	.....	.....
1st cons. g. 5's. .... 1928		5,094,000	A & O	100	Nov. 11 '96	100	98	2,000
1st 6's T. & Pb. .... 1917		800,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1st 6's McM. M.W. & A. 1917		750,000	J & J	108	Mar. 24 '96	.....	.....	.....
1st g. 6's Jasper Branch. 1923		871,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
O. & N. East. prior lien g. 6's. 1915		1,320,000	A & O	106½	Aug. 13 '94	.....	.....	.....
N. Y. Cent. & Hud. R. 1st c. 7's. 1903		30,000,000	J & J	120	Nov. 28 '96	120	118	100,000
1st registered. .... 1903		.....	J & J	119	Nov. 25 '96	119	116	180,000
debenture 5's. .... 1904		.....	M & S	106	Nov. 20 '96	106	106½	23,000
debenture 5's reg. ....		10,000,000	M & S	105	Nov. 11 '96	105	105	2,000
reg. debent. 5's. .... 1889-1904		1,000,000	M & S	104	Nov. 6 '96	104	102	4,000
debenture g. 4's. .... 1906		15,000,000	J & D	99½	Sept. 8 '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & D	103	Nov. 16 '96	103	103	5,000
deb. cert. ext. g. 4's. .... 1905		6,450,000	M & N	101	Nov. 20 '96	101	101	2,000
registered. ....		.....	M & N	100½	May 12 '96	.....	.....	.....
7's registered. .... 1900		12,000,000	M & N	110½	Nov. 23 '96	111	110	24,000
N. Jersey Junc. R. R. g. 1st 4's. 1866		1,660,000	M & N	110	Nov. 27 '96	110	106½	82,000
reg. certificates. ....		.....	F & A	100	Nov. 25 '96	100	100	1,000
registered. ....		.....	F & A	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
West Shore 1st guaranteed 4's. ....		50,000,000	J & J	108½	Nov. 30 '96	108½	104	394,000
registered. ....		.....	J & J	105½	Nov. 25 '96	105½	104	86,000
Beech Creek 1st g. gtd. 4's. .... 1886		5,000,000	J & J	108½	Nov. 20 '96	108½	108½	3,000
2d gtd. 5's. .... 1886		500,000	J & J	105½	June 12 '96	.....	.....	.....
registered. ....		.....	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Clearfield Bit. Coal Corporation, 1st s. f. int. gtd g. 4's ser. A. 1940		770,000	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
small bonds series B. ....		33,100	J & J	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Gouv. & Oswega. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1942		200,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

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BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

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NAME.	Principal Duc.	Amount.	Int'd Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High	Low.	Total.
Ogdenburg & Lake Chapl. inc. 1920		800,000	o					
Ogdenburg & L. Chapl. inc. small		200,000	o	82	Feb. 26, '87			
Ohio & Miss. con. skg. fund 7's. 1898		8,425,000	J & J	105	Nov. 30, '96	105	105	1,000
" consolidated 7's. 1898		3,098,000	J & J	105	Nov. 27, '96	105	105	6,000
" 2d consolidated 7's. 1911		2,962,000	A & O	105	Nov. 9, '96	105	105	1,000
" 1st Springf'd d. 7's. 1905		1,984,000	M & N	96	Oct. 17, '96			
" 1st general 5's. 1902		405,000	J & D	96	Apr. 2, '92			
Ohio River Railroad 1st 5's. 1896		2,000,000	J & D	103	Nov. 30, '96	103	103	3,000
" gen. mortg. g 6's. 1907		2,428,000	A & O	80	Jan. 31, '96			
Ohio Southern 1st mortg. 6's. 1921		3,924,000	J & D	95	Nov. 30, '96	97½	94½	172,000
" gen. mortg. g 4's. 1921		1,548,000	M & N	19½	Nov. 30, '96	19½	19½	1,000
" gen. eng. Trust Co. certs. 1909		1,265,000		19½	Nov. 30, '96	20	16	63,000
Omaha & St. Lo. Tr Co. cts. 1st 4's. 1907		2,717,000		87½	Oct. 21, '96			
Oregon & California 1st g 5's. 1927		18,842,000	J & J	71½	Sept. 17, '96			
Oregon Improvement Co. 1st 6's. 1910		4,146,000	J & D	86	Nov. 24, '96	86	78½	5,000
" con. mortg. g 5's. 1909		1,258,000	A & O	20½	Nov. 13, '96	20½	17	579,000
" Trust Co. certificates. 1909		5,291,000		19½	Nov. 25, '96	20	17	247,000
Oregon Ry. & Nav. 1st s. f. g. 6's. 1909		4,900,000	J & J	112½	Nov. 24, '96	112½	111½	38,000
Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. con. g 4's. 1946		15,174,000	J & D	82½	Nov. 30, '96	82½	82	8,000
Paducah, Tenn. & Ala. 1st 5's. 1920								
" issue of 1920		1,815,000	J & J					
" issue of 1922		617,000	J & J					
Panama s. f. subsidy g 6's. 1910		1,846,000	M & N	101½	Dec. 21, '91			
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.								
Penn. Co.'s gtd. 4½'s. 1st. 1921		19,467,000	J & J	112	Nov. 30, '96	112	110	32,000
" reg. 1921			J & J	110	Nov. 17, '96	110	109½	6,000
Pitts., C. C. & St. Louis con. g 4½'s 1940		10,000,000	A & O	108½	Nov. 23, '96	108½	108	12,000
" Series A. 1942		10,000,000	A & O	107	Nov. 20, '96	107	107	10,000
" Series B. 1942		2,000,000	M & N	110½	July 7, '96			
" Series D gtd. 4's. 1945		2,863,000	M & N	101	Sept. 19, '96			
Pitts., C. & St. Louis 1st c. 7's. 1940		6,868,000	F & A	111	July 14, '96			
" 1st reg. 7's. 1900			F & A					
Pitts., Ft. Wayne & C. 1st 7's. 1912		2,917,000	J & J	140½	Apr. 23, '96			
" 2d 7's. 1912		2,546,000	J & J	135	Nov. 20, '96	135	135	1,000
" 3d 7's. 1912		2,000,000	A & O	128	Aug. 26, '96			
Chic., St. Louis, & P. 1st c. 5's. 1932		1,506,000	A & O	115½	July 9, '96			
" registered. 1900			A & O	110	May 3, '92			
Cleve. & Pitts. con. s. fund 7's. 1900		1,505,000	M & N	114	Aug. 4, '96			
" Series A. 1942		8,000,000	J & J	113½	Apr. 18, '96			
" 4½ Series B. 1942		1,561,000	A & O					
St. Louis, V. & T. H. 1st gtd. 7's. 1897		1,868,000	J & J	102½	Nov. 30, '96	102½	102	22,000
" 2d 7's. 1908		1,000,000	M & N	102	Apr. 23, '96			
" 2d gtd. 7's. 1896		1,600,000	M & N	100	Nov. 25, '96	100	100	5,000
G. R. & Ind. Ex. 1st gtd. g 4½ g 1941		8,255,000	J & J	107	May 18, '96			
Allegh. Valley gen. gtd. g 4's. 1942		5,389,000	M & S					
Penn. RR. Co. 1st Rl Est. g 4's. 1923		1,675,000		108	June 25, '96			
Penn. RR. co. Consol. Mtg. Bds. 1920		22,762,000	J & D					
Sterling Gold 6 per cent. 1906		4,718,000	J & D					
" registered. 1919		4,998,000	Q mch					
Gold 5 per cent. 1943		3,000,000	M & N					
" registered. 1935		1,250,000	M & N					
Clev. & Mar. 1st gtd g 4½'s. 1944		5,646,000	M & S	113½	Nov. 27, '96	113½	118	80,000
Peoria, Dec. & Evansville 1st 6's. 1920		1,287,000	J & J	100½	Nov. 30, '96	100½	100½	6,000
" Evansville div. 1st 6's. 1920		1,470,000	M & S	102	Nov. 19, '96	102	101	8,000
" Tr. Co. cts. 2d mort 5's. 1923		1,778,000	M & N	24	Nov. 30, '96	24	22	8,000
Peoria & Pekin Union 1st 6's. 1921		1,500,000	Q F	102½	June 6, '94			
" 2d m 4½'s. 1921		1,499,000	M & N	80	Nov. 11, '96	80	80	1,000

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				Price	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Phil. & Read. gen. g 4's Tr. Co. ctf's.		46,121,000	.....	80½	Nov. 30, '98	81½	77	3,632,000
"    assented			.....					
"    registered			.....	79½	Nov. 18, '98	79½	79½	5,000
"    1st pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs.		23,663,000	.....	47	Nov. 30, '98	49½	45	2,658,000
"    all instal. pd.			.....					
"    2d pref. inc. Tr. Co. certfs.		15,810,000	.....	36¼	Nov. 23, '98	34	28	2,192,000
"    all instal. pd.			.....					
"    3d pref. inc. .... 1908			.....	12¼	Feb. 7, '98			
"    3d pr. in. con. .... 1908		21,654,482	F	4¼	Oct. 24, '98			
"    Tr. Co. ctf's all instal. pd. ....				34¼	Nov. 30, '98	36½	32	1,286,000
Pine Creek Railway 6's. .... 1902		3,500,000	J & D	123¼	Oct. 26, '98			
Pittsburg, Clev. & Toledo 1st 6's. 1922		2,400,000	A & O	108¼	Apr. 5, '98			
Pittsburg, Junction 1st 6's. .... 1922		1,440,000	J & J	124	Mar. 12, '98			
Pittsburg & L. E. 2d g. 5's ser. A. 1923		2,000,000	A & O	112	Mar. 23, '98			
Pittsburg, McK'port & Y. 1st 6's. 1922		2,250,000	J & J	117	May 31, '98			
"    2d g. 6's. .... 1924		900,000	J & J					
"    McKspt & Bell. V. 1st g. 6's. .... 1918		600,000	J & J					
Pittsburg, Pains. & Fpt. 1st g. 5's. 1916		1,000,000	J & J	95¼	Apr. 2, '98			
Pitte., Shena'go & L. E. 1st g. 5's. 1940		3,000,000	A & O	91¼	Nov. 31, '98	93	89¼	98,000
"    1st cons. 5's. .... 1943		786,000	J & J	83¼	June 5, '98			
Pittsburg & West'n 1st gold 4's. 1917		9,700,000	J & J	74¼	Nov. 23, '98	74¼	72½	30,000
"    Mort. g. 5's. .... 1891-1941		3,500,000	M & N	79½	Sept. 9, '98			
Pittsburg, Y & Ash. 1st cons. 5's. 1927		1,562,000	M & N					
Rio Grande West'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1909		15,200,000	J & J	74¼	Nov. 30, '98	76½	73	143,000
Rio Grande Junc'n 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1909		1,850,000	J & D	98	Jan. 13, '98			
Rio Grande Southern 1st g. 3-4, 1940		4,510,000	J & J	64	Nov. 6, '98	64	63	14,000
Salt Lake City 1st g. sink fu'd 6's. 1913		297,000	J & J					
St. Joseph & Grand Island 1st 6's. 1925		553,000	M & N	44	May 11, '98			
"    Cent. Tst Co. ctf's of deposit		6,447,000		50	Nov. 27, '98	51¼	45	72,000
"    St. Joseph & Grand Is'd 2d inc. .... 1925		1,680,000	J & J	10	Aug. 2, '98			
"    Coupons off				8	June 25, '98			
"    Kansas C'y & Omaha 1st g. 5's. 1927		2,940,000	J & J	37¼	Oct. 16, '98			
St. Louis, A. & T. H. 1st 2T. g. 5's. 1914			J & D	105	Nov. 12, '98	105	105	4,000
"    registered		2,200,000	J & D					
"    Belleville & Carott 1st 6's. .... 1923		485,000	J & D	115	June 22, '98			
"    Chic., St. L. & Pad 1st gtd. g. 5's. 1917		1,000,000	M & S	102¼	Oct. 26, '98			
"    St. Louis South. 1st gtd. g. 4's. 1931		560,000	M & S	70¼	May 28, '98			
"    2d inc. 5's. .... 1931		126,300	M & S	72¼	Nov. 25, '91			
"    1st con. 5's. .... 1930		369,000	M & S					
"    Carbond'e & Shawt'n 1st g. 4's. 1932		250,000	M & S					
St. Louis & San F. 2d 6's. Class A. 1908		500,000	M & N	112	Nov. 23, '98	112	112	1,000
"    2d g. 6's. Class B. .... 1908		2,768,500	M & N	112	Nov. 23, '98	112	110¼	6,000
"    2d g. 6's. Class C. .... 1908		2,400,000	M & N	111¼	Nov. 23, '98	111¼	110¼	9,000
"    1st g. 6's P. C. & O. .... 1919		1,041,000	F & A	111	May 23, '98			
"    gen. g. 6's. .... 1931		7,807,000	J & J	109	Nov. 24, '98	109¼	104	34,000
"    gen. g. 5's. .... 1931		12,208,000	J & J	97½	Nov. 20, '98	97½	95	40,000
"    1st Trust g. 5's. .... 1907		1,099,000	A & O	90	Nov. 11, '98	90	90	11,000
"    Trust Co. cefs for Cons.								
"    4's all installments paid.		14,184,000	A & O	64	Nov. 30, '98	23¼	21	94,000
"    Ft. Smith & Van B. Bdg. 1st 6's. 1910		335,000	A & O	104	Oct. 15, '98			
"    St. Louis, Kan. & So. W. 1st 6's. 1918		732,000	M & S	100	Jan. 19, '98			
"    Kansas, Midland 1st g. 4's. .... 1937		1,608,000	J & D					
St. Louis S. W. 1st g. 4's Bd. ctf's. .... 1909		20,000,000	M & N	67¼	Nov. 30, '98	70	65½	224,000
"    2d g. 4's inc. Bd. ctf's. .... 1909		8,000,000	J & J	26	Nov. 30, '98	29¼	26½	143,000
St. Paul City Ry. Cable con. g. 5's. 1907		2,480,000	J & J	15	Aug. 8, '98			
"    gtd. gold 5's. .... 1937		1,138,000	J & J	90	Mar. 20, '98			
St. Paul & Duluth 1st 5's. .... 1913		1,000,000	F & A	114	Aug. 24, '94			
"    2d 5's. .... 1917		2,000,000	A & O	100	Oct. 15, '98			

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				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
St. Paul, Minn. & Manito'a 1st 7's. 1909		867,000	J & J	103	July 3, '98	....	....	....
" small			J & J	106	July 29, '94	....	....	....
" 2d 6's. .... 1909		8,000,000	A & O	116½	Nov. 24, '98	116½	116½	13,000
" Dakota ext'n 6's. .... 1910		5,676,000	M & N	116	Nov. 23, '98	116	112½	19,000
" 1st con. 6's. .... 1938		13,944,000	J & J	122	Nov. 17, '98	122	122	8,000
" 1st con. 6's, registered			J & J	120	Aug. 19, '98	....	....	....
" 1st c. 6's, red'd to 4½'s. ....			J & J	108½	Nov. 30, '98	108½	108½	8,000
" 1st con. 6's register'd		20,323,000	J & J	105	Nov. 4, '98	....	....	....
" Mont. ext'n 1st g. 4's. .... 1967		7,806,000	J & D	88	Nov. 25, '98	88	87	9,000
" registered			J & D	89	Aug. 19, '98	....	....	....
Minneapolis Union 1st 6's. .... 1922		2,150,000	J & J	124	July 31, '98	....	....	....
Montana Cent. 1st 6's int. gtd. .... 1967		6,000,000	J & J	114	Nov. 6, '98	114	114	1,000
" 1st 6's, registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
" 1st g. g. 5's. .... 1967		2,700,000	J & J	100½	Nov. 25, '98	100½	100½	1,000
" registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
Eastern Minn. 1st d. 1st g. 5's. .... 1908		4,700,000	A & O	104½	Nov. 23, '98	104½	100½	6,000
" registered			A & O	....	....	....	....	....
Willmar & Sioux Falls 1st g. 5's. .... 1968		3,625,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
" registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
San Ant. & Ara. Pass 1st g. g. 4's. .... 1943		18,993,000	J & J	56½	Nov. 30, '98	56½	54	487,000
San Fran. & N. Pac. 1st s. f. g. 5's. .... 1919		3,872,000	J & J	100	Mar. 17, '98	....	....	....
Sav. Florida & Wn. 1st c. g. 6's. .... 1984		4,056,000	A & O	114	July 24, '98	....	....	....
Seaboard & Roanoke 1st 5's. .... 1923		2,500,000	J & J	98	Apr. 18, '98	....	....	....
Sodus Bay & Sout'n 1st 5's, gold. .... 1924		500,000	J & J	105	Sept. 4, '98	....	....	....
South Caro'a & Georgia 1st g. 5's. .... 1919		5,250,000	M & N	89	Oct. 20, '98	....	....	....
South'n Pac. of Ariz. 1st 6's 1909-1910		10,000,000	J & J	94	Nov. 23, '98	94	93½	15,000
South. Pac. of Cal. 1st 6's. .... 1905-12		30,677,500	A & O	104½	Oct. 9, '98	....	....	....
" g 5's. .... 1888-1938		652,000	A & O	85½	May 19, '94	....	....	....
" 1st con. gtd. g 5's. .... 1967		18,402,000	M & N	86½	Nov. 30, '98	87½	85	107,000
Austin & Northw'n 1st g 5's. .... 1941		1,920,000	J & J	82½	Nov. 23, '98	82½	81½	87,000
So. Pacific Coast 1st gtd. g. 4's. .... 1967		5,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	....
So. Pacific of N. Mex. c. 1st 6's. .... 1911		4,180,000	J & J	105	Nov. 30, '98	106	103	130,000
Southern Railway 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1944		25,898,000	J & J	86½	Nov. 30, '98	82½	85½	1,007,000
" registered			J & J	....	....	....	....	....
East Tenn. reorg. lien g 4's. .... 1938		4,500,000	M & S	88½	Nov. 21, '98	91½	88½	26,000
" registered			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Alabama Central 1st 6's. .... 1918		1,000,000	J & J	109	Oct. 27, '98	....	....	....
Atl. & Char. Air Line, 1st 7's. .... 1907		500,000	A & O	121½	May 25, '92	....	....	....
" income. .... 1900		750,000	A & O	104	May 24, '95	....	....	....
Col. & Greenville, 1st 5-6's. .... 1916		2,000,000	J & J	113	Nov. 9, '98	113	110	30,000
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. 1st 7's. .... 1900		3,123,000	J & J	110	Nov. 30, '98	110	109½	2,000
" divisional g 5's. .... 1930		3,108,000	J & J	111	Nov. 25, '98	111	110	4,000
" con. 1st g 5's. .... 1956		12,770,000	M & N	106½	Nov. 23, '98	107½	106½	57,000
Ga. Pacific Ry. 1st g 5-6's. .... 1922		5,660,000	J & J	110	Nov. 5, '98	110	110	13,000
Knoxville & Ohio, 1st g 6's. .... 1925		2,000,000	J & J	115	Nov. 23, '98	115	114½	3,000
Rich. & Danville, con. g 6's. .... 1915		5,597,000	J & J	119	Nov. 27, '98	119	117	24,000
" equip. sink. f'd g 5's. .... 1909		1,328,000	M & S	98½	Apr. 30, '98	....	....	....
" deb. 5's stamped. .... 1927		3,868,000	A & O	98	Nov. 16, '98	98	98	5,000
Vir. Midland serial ser. A 6's. .... 1906		600,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. B 6's. .... 1911		1,900,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. C 6's. .... 1916		1,100,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. D 4-5's. .... 1921		960,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. E 5's. .... 1926		1,775,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" small			M & S	....	....	....	....	....
" ser. F 5's. .... 1931		1,310,000	M & S	....	....	....	....	....
Virginia Midland gen. 5's. .... 1936		2,362,000	M & N	99	Nov. 23, '98	99½	98	6,000
" gen. 5's, gtd. stamped. .... 1926		2,466,000	M & N	100	Oct. 27, '98	....	....	....
W. O. & W. 1st cy. gtd. 4's. .... 1924		1,275,000	F & A	79½	Apr. 3, '95	....	....	....
W. Nor. C. 1st con. g 6's. .... 1914		2,531,000	J & J	112	Nov. 18, '98	112½	110	53,000
Staten Island Ry 1st gtd. g 4½'s. .... 1943		500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	....
Ter. R. R. Assn. St. Louis 1g 4½'s. .... 1938		7,000,000	A & O	100½	Sept. 12, '94	....	....	....
" 1st con. g. 5's. .... 1894-1944		4,500,000	F & A	102	Oct. 30, '98	....	....	....
" St. L. Mers. bdg. Ter. gtd. g 5's. .... 1930		3,500,000	A & O	108½	Oct. 9, '98	....	....	....
Terre Haute Elec. Ry. gen. g 6's. .... 1914		444,000	Q J A N	105½	Dec. 18, '95	....	....	....
Texas & New Orleans 1st 7's. .... 1905		1,620,000	F & A	108	Feb. 19, '98	....	....	....
" abine d. 1st 6's. .... 1912		2,575,000	M & S	107½	Apr. 16, '98	....	....	....
" con. m. g 5's. .... 1943		1,620,000	F & A	94	Nov. 23, '98	94½	94	101,000

# BOND SALES.

757

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Tex. & Pacific, East div. 1st 6's. 1906		3,784,000	M & S	107	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
fm. Texarkana to Ft. Worth								
1st gold 5's. 2000		21,049,000	J & D	88	Nov. 30, '96	89	84½	172,000
2d gold income, 5's. 2000		23,227,000	MAR.	21½	Nov. 30, '96	25	20½	1,701,000
Third Avenue 1st g 6's. 1907		5,000,000	J & J	121¼	Nov. 30, '96	121¼	121	58,000
Toledo & Ohio Cent. 1st g 5's. 1935		3,000,000	J & J	108	Nov. 28, '96	108	106	15,000
1st M. g 5's West. div. 1935		2,500,000	A & O	107½	July 25, '96	....	....	.....
gen. g. 5's. 1935		1,500,000	J & D	....	....	....	....	.....
Kanaw & M. 1st g. 4's. 1930		2,340,000	A & O	78	Nov. 14, '96	78	76	4,000
Toledo, Peoria & W. 1st g 4's. 1917		4,400,000	J & D	73	Nov. 19, '96	75	73	7,000
Tol., St. L. & K.C. Tr. Rec. 1st g 6's. 1916		8,234,000	M & N	68	Nov. 30, '96	75	65	125,000
Ulster & Delaware 1st c. g 5's. 1928		1,852,000	J & D	99¼	Oct. 12, '96	....	....	.....
Union Pacific 1st 6's. 1896			J & J	103	Nov. 27, '96	103	102	25,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps				101	Nov. 25, '96	101	98	41,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	102¼	Nov. 30, '96	104¼	101	46,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps		27,229,000	J & J	101¾	Nov. 25, '96	101¾	100	35,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	103	Nov. 30, '96	105	102	99,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	101½	Nov. 25, '96	101½	98	87,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps			J & J	102¾	Nov. 25, '96	105¼	102¾	22,000
collat. trust 6's. 1906		3,983,000	J & J	101	Nov. 25, '96	102	100	21,000
5's. 1907		4,970,000	J & D	95	June 22, '96	96½	96	4,000
g 4½'s. 1916		2,068,000	M & N	50	May 22, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. 1894				51½	Nov. 12, '96	57	50	44,000
gold notes, 6's stamp, 1894		8,586,000	F & A	97	Nov. 13, '96	97	96	4,000
Ext. sink'g f'd g 6's. 1899		2,070,000	M & S	90	Nov. 13, '96	90	85	36,000
eng. Tr. Co. certifs. 1899		1,391,000		93	Apr. 24, '96	....	....	.....
Kansas Pacific 1st 6's. 1895		1,461,000	F & A	103½	Sept. 30, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps		779,000		....	....	....	....	.....
1st 6's. 1896		2,169,000	J & D	105	Oct. 28, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps		1,494,000		91	Oct. 2, '96	....	....	.....
Denver div. ased. 6's. 1899		2,973,000	M & N	115	Nov. 30, '96	115	115	11,000
eng. Tr.Co. cfs. ex mat cps		2,914,000		95	Nov. 18, '96	95	95	5,000
Tr.Co. cfs. 1st con. 6's. 1919		10,664,000		66	Nov. 30, '96	72	65	205,000
Cent. Br. Un. Pac. f'd cps 7's. 1905		630,000	M & N	96	June 22, '96	....	....	.....
Atch. Colo. & Pac. 1st 6's. 1905		4,070,000	Q F	36	Nov. 9, '96	36	35	82,000
At. Jewell Co. & West. 1st 6's. 1905		542,000	Q F	35	Nov. 9, '96	35	35	5,000
U. P., Lin. & Colo. 1st gtd g. 5's. 1918		4,480,000	A & O	25	Oct. 24, '96	....	....	.....
Den. & Gulf 1st c. g. 5's. 1939		15,801,000	J & D	36	Nov. 21, '96	40	34	315,000
Or.S.L.&U.N.Tr.Co. 1st c. g. 1919		10,792,000	A & O	65½	Nov. 25, '96	68¼	64	460,000
assented.								
Oregon Short Line 1st 6's. 1922		3,538,000	F & A	111¼	Nov. 30, '96	115	110	114,000
Trust Co. cfs. of dep. 1922		11,363,000		109½	Nov. 30, '96	114½	109½	205,000
Utah & Nor'n R'y 1st mtg 7's. 1908		689,000	J & J	115	May 2, '96	....	....	.....
gold 5's. 1926		1,877,000	J & J	100	May 14, '96	....	....	.....
Utah So'n Tr.Co. cfs. gen. mtg 7's. 1909		1,495,000	J & J	67¾	Nov. 14, '96	67¾	66¼	11,000
Tr.Co. cfs. ext. 1st 7's. 1909		1,924,000	J & J	68	Nov. 14, '96	68	64	9,000
Valley R'y Co. of Ohio con. g. 6's. 1921		1,499,000	M & S	105	Feb. 29, '92	....	....	.....
Coupon off.								
Wabash R.R. Co., 1st gold 5's. 1939		31,664,000	M & N	105½	Nov. 30, '96	106	103½	369,000
2d mortgage gold 5's. 1939		14,000,000	F & A	70½	Nov. 30, '96	75	68½	166,000
deben. mtg series A. 1939		3,500,000	J & J	....	....	....	....	.....
series B. 1939		25,740,000	J & J	25¾	Nov. 14, '96	26½	22	173,000
1st g. 5's Det. & Ch. ex. 1940		3,500,000	J & J	99¾	Nov. 30, '96	98¾	95	64,000
St. L., Kan. C. & N. St. Chas. B. 1st 6's. 1908		1,000,000	A & O	102	Oct. 22, '96	....	....	.....
Western N. Y. & Penn. 1st g 5's. 1937		10,000,000	J & J	105	Nov. 21, '96	107¼	105	12,000
gen. g. 2-3-4's. 1943		10,000,000	A & O	45	Nov. 30, '96	46¼	44¼	13,000
inc. 5's. 1943		10,000,000		13¼	Nov. 30, '96	14½	12¾	47,000
West Va. Cent'l & Pac. 1st g. 6's. 1911		3,000,000	J & J	108	Feb. 18, '96	....	....	.....
Wheeling & Lake Erie 1st 5's. 1926		3,000,000	A & O	97	Nov. 21, '96	97	96	11,000
Wheeling div. 1st g. 5's. 1928		1,500,000	J & J	91	Jan. 27, '96	....	....	.....
exten. and imp. g. 5's. 1930		1,824,000	F & A	91	May 8, '96	....	....	.....
consol mortgage 4's. 1932		1,600,000	J & J	62¼	July 20, '96	....	....	.....
Wisconsin Cent. Co. 1st trust g. 5's. 1937		2,364,000	J & J	33	Oct. 29, '96	....	....	.....
eng. Trust Co. certificates		9,636,000		40	Nov. 24, '96	43½	35	557,000
income mortgage 5's. 1937		7,775,000	A & O	7½	Nov. 13, '96	8	7	14,000

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int'l Paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
American Cotton Oil deb. g. 8's. 1900		3,088,000	Q F	103½	Nov. 28, '96	109	103½	7,000
Am. Spirit Mfg. Co. 1st g. 8's. 1915		2,000,000	M & S	75	Nov. 30, '96	78	69	660,000
Am. Water Works Co. 1st 6's. 1907		1,600,000	J & J	106	July 6, '91			
1st con. g. 5's. 1907		1,000,000	J & J	100½	May 13, '99			
Barney & Smith Car Co. 1st g. 6's. 1942		1,000,000	J & J					
Boet. Un. Gas 1st cts s'k f'd g. 5's. 1899		7,000,000	J & J	87½	Nov. 10, '96	87½	87½	4,000
B'klyn Union Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1945		12,326,000	M & M	106½	Nov. 30, '96	106½	105½	129,000
B'klyn Wharf & Wh. Co. 1st g. 5's. 1945		17,500,000	F & A	100½	Nov. 30, '96	101½	98	153,000
Chic. Gas Lt & Coke 1st gtd g. 5's. 1897		10,000,000	J & J	95	Nov. 24, '96	95	92½	189,000
Chic. June. & St'k Y'ds col. g. 5's. 1915		10,000,000	J & J	107	Nov. 23, '96	107	107	25,000
Colo. Coal & Iron 1st con. g. 6's. 1900		2,954,000	F & A	99	Nov. 20, '96	100	99	19,000
Colo. C'l & I'n Devel. Co. gtd g. 5's. 1909		701,000	J & J	99	Feb. 8, '96			
Coupon off.								
Colo. Fuel Co. gen. g. 6's. 1919		1,043,000	M & N	108½	Nov. 10, '92			
Col. Fuel & Iron Co. gen. sf g. 5's. 1943		2,021,000	F & A	80	May 27, '96			
Colo. Hock. Val. C'l & I'n g. 6's. 1917		960,000	J & J	94	Sept. 21, '94			
Consolidated Coal conv. 6's. 1897		1,250,000	J & J	100	Oct. 31, '96			
Con'n's Gas Co. Chic. 1st g. 5's. 1906		4,348,000	J & D	85	Nov. 27, '96	86½	85	58,000
Detroit Gas Co. 1st con. g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	F & A	75½	Nov. 14, '96	75½	71½	152,000
Edison Elec. Illu. 1st conv. g. 5's. 1910		4,312,000	M & S	110½	Nov. 27, '96	110½	107½	36,000
1st con. g. 5's. 1905		2,180,000	J & J	105½	Nov. 25, '96	105½	100½	112,000
Brooklyn 1st g. 5's. 1940		1,000,000	A & O	109	Feb. 24, '96			
registered.			A & O					
Equitable Gas Light Co. of N. Y.								
1st con. g. 5's. 1892		2,500,000	M & S	111½	May 7, '95			
Equit. Gas & Fuel, Chic. 1st g. 6's. 1905		2,000,000	J & J	90	Aug. 24, '96			
General Electric Co. deb. g. 5's. 1922		8,750,000	J & D	98½	Nov. 30, '96	94	90	30,000
Grand Riv. Coal & Coke 1st g. 5's. 1919		780,000	A & O	90	Nov. 28, '96			
Hackensack Wtr Reorg. 1st g. 5's. 1906		1,090,000	J & J	107½	June 3, '92			
Hend'n Bdg Co. 1st s'k. f'd g. 6's. 1931		1,755,000	M & S	110	May 31, '94			
Hoboken Land & Imp. g. 5's. 1910		1,440,000	M & N	102	Jan. 19, '94			
Illinois Steel Co. debenture 5's. 1910		6,200,000	J & J	86	May 8, '96			
non. conv. deb. 5's. 1910		7,000,000	A & O	92	Oct. 2, '95			
Iron Steamboat Co. 6's. 1901		500,000	J & J	75½	Dec. 4, '95			
Int'r Cond & Insul Co. deb. g. 6's. 1925		500,000	A & O	81	Oct. 16, '96			
Lac. Gas L't Co. of St. L. 1st g. 5's. 1919		10,000,000	Q F	98	Nov. 30, '96	94½	92½	67,000
small bonds.				97½	Nov. 1, '96			
Madison Sq. Garden 1st g. 5's. 1919		1,250,000	M & N					
Manh. Beh H. & L. l'm. gen. g. 4's. 1940		1,300,000	M & N	55	Aug. 27, '96			
Metrop. Tel & Tel. l'st s'k f'd g. 5's. 1918		2,000,000	M & N	108½	Jan. 5, '92			
registered.			M & N					
Mich. Penins. Car Co. 1st g. 5's. 1942		2,000,000	M & S	60½	Oct. 23, '96			
Mutual Union Tel. B'kg. F. 6's. 1911		1,957,000	M & N	108	Nov. 27, '96	108	108	2,000
Nat. Starch Mfg. Co. 1st g. 6's. 1920		3,897,000	J & J	96	Nov. 20, '96	96	96	1,000
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 5's. 1890-1900		2,000,000	J & J	94	May 21, '94			
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. gen. g. 5's. env. 1920		1,261,000	M & N	100	June 4, '95			
N. Y. & Ontario Land 1st g. 6's. 1910		443,000	F & A	92½	May 5, '96			
North Western Telegraph 7's. 1904		1,250,000	J & J	107	May 13, '99			
Peop's Gas & C. Co. C. 1st g. g. 6's. 1904		2,100,000	M & N	106	Oct. 12, '96			
2d 6's. 1904		2,500,000	J & D	107	Nov. 25, '96	107	105	25,000
1st con. g. 6's. 1943		4,900,000	A & O	100	Nov. 20, '96	100	96½	43,000
Peoria Water Co. g. 6's. 1899-1919		1,254,000	M & N	100	June 23, '92			
Pleasant Valley Coal 1st g. 6's. 1920		580,000	M & N	105½	Oct. 14, '95			
Procter & Gamble, 1st g. 6's. 1940		2,000,000	J & J	117	Dec. 12, '95			
So. Y. Water Co. N. Y. con. g. 6's. 1923		478,000	J & J	102½	June 3, '96			
Spring Valley W. Wks. 1st 6's. 1906		4,975,000	M & S					
Standard Rope & Twine 1st g. 6's. 1946		3,000,000	F & A	79	Nov. 30, '96	80	76½	76,000
inc. g. 5's. 1946		7,500,000						
Sun. Creek Coal 1st sk. fund 6's. 1912		400,000	J & D					

BOND QUOTATIONS.—Last sale, price and date; highest and lowest prices and total sales for the month.

NOTE.—The railroads enclosed in a brace are leased to Company first named.

## MISCELLANEOUS BONDS—Continued.

NAME.	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't paid.	LAST SALE.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				Price.	Date.	High.	Low.	Total.
Ten. Coal, I. & R. T. d. 1st g 6's...1917		1,298,000	A & O	82½	Nov. 30, '98	82½	80	9,000
{ Bir. div. 1st con. 6's...1917		3,490,000	J & J	87½	Nov. 27, '98	87½	83	73,000
{ Cah. Coal M. Co. 1st gtd. g 6's...1922		1,000,000	J & D	84	May 2, '95	.....	.....	.....
{ De Bard. C & I Co. gtd. g 6's...1910		2,434,000	F & A	92	Dec. 3, '95	.....	.....	.....
U.S. Cordage Co. 1st col. g 6's tr. recta		6,245,100	.....	28	Nov. 21, '98	31½	25	284,000
U. S. Leather Co. 6½ g s. fd deb..1915		6,000,000	M & N	110½	Nov. 23, '98	110½	109½	14,000
Vermont Marble, 1st s. fund 5's...1910		640,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Western Union deb. 7's....1875-1900		3,720,000	M & N	110	Apr. 10, '98	.....	.....	.....
" 7s registered.....1900			M & N	108	Sept. 30, '98	.....	.....	.....
" debenture, 7's....1884-1900			M & N	105	Aug. 25, '98	.....	.....	.....
" registered.....			M & N	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" col. trust cur. 5's.....1933		8,405,000	J & J	108	Nov. 27, '98	108	105	24,000
Wheel L. E. & P. Cl Co. 1st g 5's.1919		868,000	J & J	65½	Oct. 7, '98	.....	.....	.....
Whitebrst Fuel gen. s. fund 6's..1908		570,000	J & D	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.

NAME	Principal Due.	Amount.	Int't Paid.	YEAR 1896.		NOVEMBER SALES.		
				High.	Low.	High.	Low.	Total.
United States 2's registered.....Opt'l		25,364,500	Q M	96	91	96	96	5,000
" 4's registered.....1907		559,634,000	J A J & O	110½	104¾	110½	108½	107,000
" 4's coupon.....1907			J A J & O	111½	106	110½	109½	128,000
" 4's registered.....1925		162,315,400	Q F	120	111¾	120	119¾	131,000
" 4's coupon.....1925			Q F	120¾	111¼	120¾	118	626,000
" 5's registered.....1904		100,000,000	Q F	113¾	109	112¾	111¼	71,000
" 5's coupon.....1904			Q F	114¾	108¾	113¾	111	278,000
" 6's currency.....1897		9,712,000	J & J	103¾	103¼	.....	.....	.....
" .....1898		29,904,952	J & J	105	103	.....	.....	.....
" .....1899		14,004,500	J & J	107½	105	.....	.....	.....
" 4's reg. cer. ind. (Cherokee) 1896		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....1897		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....1898		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
" .....1899		1,660,000	MAR	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

**Postal Savings Banks.**—In the United Kingdom deposits are now received at 11,000 Post Offices from 9 A. M. to 6 P. M. The depositor receives from the postmaster a pass-book, in which are recorded the deposits and withdrawals. Any sum from 25 cents to \$250 may be deposited in one year, and interest is paid on any sum that is a multiple of \$5 and is compounded. Withdrawals may be speedily effected, by telegraph or otherwise. A depositor may, if he chooses, have his accumulated deposits invested in Government bonds. Small savings may be made by the purchase of postage stamps, which, when they reach a certain amount, are recorded as deposits. There are 6,000 schools in which the children are encouraged to save through the machinery of the Post Office, a clerk coming round to the school at intervals to receive the stamps and furnish pass-books. The aggregate deposits in the Postal Savings banks at the end of 1896 was \$402,500,000, the year's increase being \$23,500,000. Besides this, 69,131 depositors held \$31,500,000 of Government bonds. One out of every seven persons in England is now a depositor in the postal banks. In 1893 there were 9,833,198 deposits made, aggregating \$123,000,000, and withdrawals aggregated \$108,500,000. Operations are conducted on a similarly large scale in the postal savings features of other countries.

**New Counterfeit \$5 National Bank Note.**—On the National Bank of Commerce, New York, Series of 1882, Check Letter G, Charter No. 733, Bank No. 78763, portrait of Garfield photographic production.



## BANKERS' OBITUARY RECORD.

**Bartlett.**—William T. Bartlett, Treasurer of the Union Trust Co., New Haven, Conn., died in that city Nov. 17. He was a prominent figure in business circles there for about fifty years. At one time he was Secretary of the New Haven and New London Railroad.

**Belcher.**—F. S. Belcher, President of the Phoenix (Ariz.) National Bank and the First National Bank, Charlotte, Mich., died at Rockport, Texas, Nov. 28. Mr. Belcher was born in Kentucky, but had been engaged in business in Michigan for many years. He had been President of the Phoenix National Bank for two years past.

**Bradbury.**—Albert G. Bradbury, Treasurer of the Dexter (Me.) Savings Bank died Nov. 25.

**Cowls.**—John W. Cowls, President of the McMinnville (Ore.) National Bank, died Nov. 24. Mr. Cowls was born in Onondaga county, N. Y., in 1823. He had held many local offices and was a member of the Oregon Senate in 1872.

**Davis.**—T. A. Davis died at Telluride, Colo., Nov. 15. He organized and was President of the San Miguel Valley Bank, the first bank established in the country, until it was merged into the First National Bank.

**Dowley.**—Col. Geo. S. Dowley, President of the Vermont National Bank, Brattleboro, died Nov. 21. His business interests were large and his devotion to them constant. He had been President of the bank since 1880, and Cashier for some time before his election to the presidency.

**Edwards.**—Dr. J. D. Edwards, President of the Citizens' National Bank, Xenia, Ohio, and a practicing physician in that city since 1860, died on Nov. 20, aged seventy-six years.

**Gardner.**—J. H. Gardner, President of the Putnam (Ct.) Savings Bank, a sound and conservative banker and prominent in business and political affairs, died Nov. 10, aged about sixty years.

**Grenfell.**—Pascoe Du Pre Grenfell, senior partner in the firm of Morton, Rose & Co., London, died Dec. 1.

The firm of Morton, Rose & Co. is the London house of Morton, Bliss & Co., of New York city. Mr. Morton is the Governor of New York, and the Rose in the firm is Sir John Rose, at one time Finance Minister of Canada. The London house is the fiscal agent of the Dominion of Canada. Sir John Rose was knighted for his services in the days preceding confederation and subsequently in aiding the young colony through financial difficulties.

**Hamilton.**—C. W. Hamilton, President of the United States National Bank, Omaha, Neb., and prominent in financial affairs, died Nov. 19.

**Hart.**—Wm. T. Hart, President of the Continental National Bank, Boston, and ex-President of the New York and New England Railroad, died Nov. 17.

**Hoxie.**—John R. Hoxie, President of the First National Bank, Taylor, Texas, and a leading Chicago business man, died Dec. 21. He was born in New York State in 1831.

**Inman.**—John H. Inman, senior member of the well-known firm of Inman, Swann & Co., New York cotton brokers, a director of the Fourth National Bank and the American Surety Co., New York, and formerly in the banking business in Georgia, died Nov. 5.

**Jamison.**—Thomas Jamison, President of the Monongahela National Bank, Pittsburg, Pa., died Dec. 4.

**Kniffin.**—Wm. M. Kniffin, President of the Miners' Savings Bank, West Stockbridge Mass., died Nov. 2.

**Kruse.**—Edward Kruse, an active merchant of San Francisco and Vice-President of the German Savings and Loan Society, died Nov. 1. He was born in Germany in 1829, and located in San Francisco in 1849.

**Meeker.**—Geo. D. Meeker, Cashier of the National City Bank, died Nov. 22, in his forty-eighth year. He went into the bank in 1863 to succeed David Palmer as Cashier. He had formerly held the place of Cashier in the National Union Bank of Dover, N. J. Mr. Meeker was popular with the President and directors of the National City Bank, and enjoyed their highest confidence and esteem. He was a thorough business man.

**Melick.**—Ottis S. Melick, a banker at Adrian, Minn., died Nov. 2.

**Sayre.**—The Rev. William N. Sayre, for fifty years pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Pine Plains, N. Y., died at his home in that village Nov. 20, aged eighty-eight years. He retired from the ministry in 1883. Dr. Sayre was for a number of years President of the Stissing National Bank.

**Scruton.**—John Y. Scruton, President of the First National Bank, Lewiston, Me., died Nov. 15 at the age of seventy-five years.

**Sprague.**—Samuel S. Sprague, one of the oldest and best known business men of Providence, R. I., President of the Rhode Island National Bank, director of the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., and connected with numerous other enterprises, died Nov. 11. Mr. Sprague was born at Killingly, Conn., July 3, 1819.

**Stamm.**—Henry Stamm, Cashier of the Iron and Glass Dollar Savings Bank, Pittsburg, Pa., for over twenty years, died Nov. 21.

**Steinway.**—Wm. Steinway, the well-known piano manufacturer and one of the public-spirited citizens of New York, died on Nov. 30. He was interested in several banks in New York and vicinity.
















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